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European Union Politics

Seventh Edition

Michelle Cini

Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom

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Preface

This seventh edition of European Union Politics builds on the

success of the previous six editions by retaining and updating the
chapters published in the previous version of the book. Innovations
in this edition include new chapters on the Migration and Refugee
Crisis and on the COVID-19 pandemic.

The book remains true to its earlier ambition, which was to offer
students of EU politics an introductory text that would be both
accessible and challenging, written by authors who are experts in
their field. It was designed with undergraduates in mind, particularly
those coming to the topic of the EU for the first time; but we know
that it has also proven a useful basic text for more advanced
students. As in previous editions, we aim to make the study of the
European Union an appealing prospect for students. All students
should, however, be reading beyond this book, and we provide some
guidance on reading at the end of each chapter with that
recommendation in mind.

The large number of chapters in this volume should not be taken to

imply that the book is comprehensive; rather, it aims to provide a
solid overview of a range of topics falling loosely under the rubric of
EU politics. Other textbooks focus more specifically on history,
theories, institutions, or policies. This book aims to give a taste of all
these areas of EU study. We thank our contributors, without whom
this book really would not have been possible. We also owe a debt of
gratitude to the editorial and production team at Oxford University
Press, and in particular to Anna Galasinska for her flexibility and
sensitivity in supporting us through the challenges we faced in
putting together this edition, and for her extremely efficient handling
of this project.

Michelle Cini

Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán

June 2021
New to this edition

• Extensive empirical updating of content taking account of

recent developments in the European Union.

• New chapter on COVID-19 and the European Union.

• New chapter on the Migration and Refugee Crisis.
Detailed contents

List of figures

List of boxes

List of tables

List of contributors

List of abbreviations

1 Introduction

Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán

1.1 Introduction

1.2 Why a European Union?

1.3 What is the European Union?

1.4 What does the European Union do?

1.5 The organization of the book

Part 1 The Historical Context

2 The European Union: Establishment and Development

David Phinnemore
2.1 Introduction

2.2 Integration and cooperation in Europe: ambitions, tensions, and divisions

 2.3 The Communities and a Europe of ‘the Six’

2.4 Establishing the European Union

2.5 Reviewing the Union: the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and the Treaty
of Amsterdam

2.6 Preparing for enlargement and the twenty-first century: the 2000
Intergovernmental Conference, the Treaty of Nice, and the ‘Future of Europe’
debate

2.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

3 Carrying the EU Forward: The Era of Lisbon

Clive Church and David Phinnemore

3.1 Introduction

3.2 From the ‘Future of Europe’ debate to the Constitutional Treaty

3.3 The 2003–04 Intergovernmental Conference and the Constitutional Treaty

3.4 From Constitutional Crisis to ‘Negotiating’ the Treaty of Lisbon

3.5 The main elements of the Treaty of Lisbon

3.6 The Treaty of Lisbon: an appraisal

3.7 Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon

3.8 The significance of the Treaty of Lisbon

3.9 Implementing the Treaty of Lisbon

3.10 Beyond the Treaty of Lisbon: crises, Brexit, and the future of the EU

3.11 Conclusion
 Questions

Guide to further reading

Part 2 Theories and Conceptual Approaches

4 Neo-functionalism

Carsten Strøby Jensen

4.1 Introduction

4.2 What is neo-functionalism?

4.3 A brief history of neo-functionalism

4.4 Supranationalism and spillover

4.5 The formation of supranational interest groups

4.6 Critiques of neo-functionalism

4.7 The revival of neo-functionalism

4.8 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

5 Intergovernmentalism

Michelle Cini
5.1 Introduction

5.2 What is intergovernmentalism?

5.3 Classical intergovernmentalism and its critics

 5.4 Variants of intergovernmentalism

5.5 Liberal intergovernmentalism and its critics

5.6 New intergovernmentalism

5.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

6 Theorizing the European Union after Integration Theory

Ben Rosamond
6.1 Introduction

6.2 The limits of the classical debate and five ways forward

6.3 Political science, the ‘new institutionalism’, and the European Union

6.4 Social constructivist approaches to the European Union

6.5 International relations and international political economy revisited

6.6 Critical theories and the European Union

6.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

7 Governance in the European Union

Thomas Christiansen
7.1 Introduction

7.2 Conceptualizing governance in the European Union

 7.3 Multilevel governance

7.4 ‘New governance’ and the European regulatory state

7.5 Normative debates about governance

7.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

8 Europeanization

Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Why does Europeanization matter?

8.3 Explaining top-down Europeanization

8.4 Explaining bottom-up Europeanization

8.5 Towards a sequential perspective on Europeanization?

8.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

9 Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union

Stijn Smismans
9.1 Introduction

9.2 From ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘democratic deficit’

9.3 Maastricht and the debate during the 1990s

 9.4 EU democracy and the governance debate

9.5 The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon

9.6 The output gap, populism, and EU legitimacy

9.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

Part 3 Institutions and Actors

10 The European Commission

Morten Egeberg
10.1 Introduction

10.2 The functions of the Commission

10.3 Commission influence

10.4 The President and the Commissioners

10.5 Commissioners’ cabinets

10.6 The Commission administration

10.7 Committees, networks, and EU agencies

10.8 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

11 The European Council and the Council of the European

Union
Jeffrey Lewis
11.1 Introduction

11.2 The Council system’s evolving hierarchy and enigmatic traits

11.3 The layers of the Council system

11.4 The ministers’ Council(s)

11.5 The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy

11.6 How does the Council system work?

11.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

12 The European Parliament

Charlotte Burns
12.1 Introduction

12.2 The evolving European Parliament

12.3 The powers and influence of the European Parliament

12.4 The internal politics of the European Parliament

12.5 Elections, the people, and the European Parliament

12.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

13 The Court of Justice of the European Union

Paul James Cardwell
13.1 Introduction

13.2 The history and development of the Court of Justice

13.3 Composition and status

13.4 Roles of the Court of Justice

13.5 The work of the Court of Justice

13.6 ‘Activism’ of the Court?

13.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

14 Interest Groups and the European Union

Rainer Eising and Julia Sollik

14.1 Introduction

14.2 The EU institutions and interest groups

14.3 Regulating EU lobbying: the long road towards a mandatory register of

interest groups

14.4 The variety of European interest groups

14.5 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

15 Citizens and Public Opinion in the European Union

Simona Guerra and Hans-Jörg Trenz

 15.1 Introduction

15.2 General perceptions of the European Union

15.3 Explaining public attitudes towards European integration

15.4 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

Part 4 Policies and Policy-making

16 Policy-making in the European Union

Edward Best
16.1 Introduction

16.2 EU competences and modes of governance

16.3 The policy cycle and EU law

16.4 Legislative procedures

16.5 Policy coordination and economic governance

16.6 Policy-making in external relations

16.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

17 Trade and Development Policies

Michael Smith
 17.1 Introduction

17.2 Institutions and policy-making: the Common Commercial Policy

17.3 Institutions and policy-making: development assistance policy

17.4 The European Union’s policy objectives in trade and development

17.5 The European Union as a power through trade and development

17.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

18 Enlargement

Ana E. Juncos and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán

18.1 Introduction

18.2 The history of enlargement

18.3 Enlargement: the process and actors

18.4 Explaining enlargement

18.5 The future of enlargement: key challenges

18.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

19 The European Union’s Foreign, Security, and Defence

Policies

Ana E. Juncos and Anna Maria Friis

19.1 Introduction
 19.2 The emergence of the EU as a foreign and security actor

19.3 CFSP institutions and actors

19.4 Explaining the EU as an international actor

19.5 CSDP operations and missions: policy in action

19.6 The future of EU foreign and security policy: challenges and opportunities

19.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

20 The Single Market

Michelle Egan
20.1 Introduction

20.2 Market integration in historical perspective

20.3 What is a Single Market?

20.4 The politics of neo-liberalism and ‘1992’

20.5 Compensatory measures and regulatory adjustments in the Single Market

20.6 Swings and roundabouts: the revival of the Single Market

20.7 Globalization, external governance, and the Single Market

20.8 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

21 The Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

Emek M. Uçarer
21.1 Introduction

21.2 Preludes to cooperation

21.3 The Schengen experiment

21.4 Maastricht and the ‘third pillar’

21.5 Absorbing the third pillar: from Amsterdam to Lisbon

21.6 Policy output: baby steps to bold agendas

21.7 EU migration and asylum policy before and after the migration crisis

21.8 Towards a Security Union?

21.9 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

22 Economic and Monetary Union

Amy Verdun
22.1 Introduction

22.2 What is economic and monetary policy?

22.3 From The Hague to Maastricht (1969–91)

22.4 From treaty to reality (1992–2002)

22.5 Explaining economic and monetary union

22.6 Criticisms of economic and monetary union

22.7 The global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis

22.8 A new European Commission, Parliament, and the COVID-19 crisis

 22.9 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

23 The Common Agricultural Policy

Ève Fouilleux and Viviane Gravey

23.1 Introduction

23.2 The early days of the Common Agricultural Policy and the issue of CAP reform

23.3 After 1992: the long reform process

23.4 Past and present debates on the CAP and EU agriculture

23.5 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

24 Environmental Policy

Viviane Gravey, Andrew Jordan, and David Benson

24.1 Introduction

24.2 The development of environmental policy: different perspectives

24.3 Linking different perspectives: the underlying dynamics of environmental

policy

24.4 Policy challenges: new and continuing

24.5 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

Part 5 Issues and Debates

25 The Euro Crisis and European Integration

Dermot Hodson and Uwe Puetter

25.1 Introduction

25.2 From global financial crisis to euro crisis

25.3 EU institutions and the euro crisis

25.4 The euro crisis and the future of the EU

25.5 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

26 The Migration and Refugee Crisis

Andrew Geddes
26.1 Introduction

26.2 Setting the scene

26.3 Problematizing the policy approaches

26.4 The impact of crisis

26.5 A new agenda after 2015?

26.6 Four key themes

26.7 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

27 Brexit

Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán and Michelle Cini

27.1 Introduction

27.2 The UK in Europe between 1945 and 2016

27.3 The 2016 Brexit Referendum

27.4 The Withdrawal Agreement

27.5 The Trade and Cooperation Agreement

27.6 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

28 COVID-19 and EU Health Policy

Eleanor Brooks, Sarah Rozenblum, Scott L. Greer, and Anniek

de Ruijter
28.1 Introduction: from egotism to integration

28.2 What is EU health policy?

28.3 The EU’s response to COVID-19

28.4 Conclusion: investing in EU health policy?

Questions

Guide to further reading

29 The Future of the EU

Brigid Laffan
 29.1 Introduction

29.2 Four scenarios on the future of the EU

29.3 Intervening factors shaping the future of the EU

29.4 Conclusion

Questions

Guide to further reading

Glossary

References
Index
List of figures
Chapter 1

1.1 Map of Europe

Chapter 2

2.1 The pillar structure from Maastricht to Amsterdam

2.2 The pillar structure from Amsterdam to Lisbon

Chapter 10

10.1 European Commission: organization structure (simplified)

Chapter 12

12.1 Turnout in European Parliament elections 1979–2019

Chapter 14

14.1 Number of registrations in the Transparency Register, 2011–

20
Chapter 16

16.1 The policy cycle

Chapter 18

18.1 Key stages in the negotiation process

Chapter 23

23.1 CAP annual expenditure (1980–2019)

Chapter 24

24.1 Environmental infringements per member state in 2019

Chapter 27

27.1 Regional distribution of the Brexit vote

Chapter 29

29.1 Four scenarios on the future of Europe

List of boxes
Chapter 2

2.1 Background: Key dates in European integration: early efforts

2.2 Case Study: The Schuman Declaration

2.3 Background: Key dates in European integration: the

establishment and growth of the Communities

2.4 Case Study: The Luxembourg Compromise

2.5 Case Study: From intergovernmental conference (IGC) to
treaty

2.6 Background: Key dates in European integration: from Single

European Act to Eastern enlargement, 1983–2003
2.7 Case Study: The Treaty on European Union

2.8 Background: The European Communities: from three to two

to one
Chapter 3

3.1 Background: Key dates in European integration: from the

Treaty of Nice to the Constitutional Treaty

3.2 Background: Key dates in European integration: from

rejection of the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of Lisbon

3.3 Case Study: Structure of the Consolidated Treaty on

European Union (TEU)

3.4 Case-Study: Structure of the Treaty on the Functioning of the

European Union (TFEU)

3.5 Background: Key dates in European integration: the EU and

treaty reform beyond the Treaty of Lisbon
Chapter 4

4.1 Key Debates: Loyalty shift in the European Parliament

4.2 Case Study: Functional spillover: from the Single Market to

the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance

4.3 Case Study: Political spillover in the Brexit process

4.4 Case Study: Cultivated spillover in the area of health policy—

the use of antibiotics in the veterinarian sector

4.5 Key Debates: ‘Elite socialization’ and ‘loyalty transfer’

4.6 Key Debates: Neo-functionalist expectations about European

institutions
Chapter 5

5.1 Key Debates: Intergovernmentalism as description, theory,

and method

5.2 Key Debates: The European rescue of the nation state

5.3 Case Study: LI and De Gaulle

5.4 Case Study: LI and Brexit

5.5 Key Debates: LI and representation

Chapter 6

6.1 Key Debates: Institutions and the new institutionalism

6.2 Key Debates: Rational choice and the science of EU studies

6.3 Key Debates: The EU and statehood

Chapter 7

7.1 Background: Definitions of ‘governance’

7.2 Case Study: The reform of EU regional policy and the

development of the multilevel governance approach

7.3 Case Study: The authorization of GMOs: A case study of

European regulatory governance
7.4 Key Debates: Managing the eurozone crisis: Technocratic
governance, representative democracy, and normative debate
Chapter 8

8.1 Key Debates: Europeanization

8.2 Case Study: Top-down and bottom-up Europeanization: the

case of the economic crisis
8.3 Key Debates: Explaining ‘downloading’ and ‘taking’

8.4 Key Debates: Explaining ‘uploading’ and ‘shaping’

8.5 Case Study: Bottom-up Europeanization: the Common
Fisheries Policy
Chapter 9

9.1 Background: Good Governance according to the European

Commission

9.2 Case Study: Delegated legislation

9.3 Case Study: The European Citizens’ Initiative in practice

9.4 Background: The rule of law and democratic backsliding

Chapter 10

10.1 Background: The Commission as a multi-sectoral and multi-

functional organization
10.2 Case Study: Has the Commission been weakened by the
financial crisis?
10.3 Key Debates: The growing party-politicization of the College
of Commissioners?

10.4 Background: Selected Commission

departments/Directorates-General (DGs)
10.5 Case Study: The politics of administrative reorganization
Chapter 11

11.1 Background: EU Council configurations

11.2 Background: Renovating the General Affairs Council

11.3 Case Study: Making History: the July 2020 MFF rule of law
summit
11.4 Case Study: The Council’s Brexit (Art. 50) format

11.5 Background: The President of the European Council

11.6 Key Debates: Poland’s isolation over President Tusk’s 2017
Reappointment

11.7 Background: The European Council President’s ‘Leaders’

Agenda’

11.8 Background: The division of labour between Coreper I and II

11.9 Background: Organization of the General Secretariat of the
Council

11.10Background: The new qualified majority voting system

11.11 Background: EU Council presidency rotations, by ‘trio’,
2019–30
11.12 Key Debates: Article 7—What would it take?
Chapter 12

12.1 Background: The evolving European Parliament

12.2 Case Study: Agreeing budgets during crises

12.3 Background: Appointing the Commission

12.4 Case Study: The seats of the European Parliament

12.5 Key Debates: Accommodating Eurosceptic MEPs
Chapter 13

13.1 Background: The distinctiveness of the Court of Justice

13.2 Case Study: The Brexit effect on the Court of Justice

13.3 Case Study: Infringement actions decided by the Court of
Justice in 2019

13.4 Case Study: The Wightman decision

13.5 Case Study: The Cassis de Dijon decision

13.6 Key Debates: The Hartley and Arnull debate

Chapter 14

14.1 Key Debates: Lobbies and interest groups

14.2 Case Study: UK financial sector lobbying during Brexit
negotiations
14.3 Case Study: Interest representation during the COVID-19
crisis
Chapter 15

15.1 Background: Euroscepticism

15.2 Key Debates: Public opinion: Beyond political parties, across
civil society
15.3 Case Study: Emotions and the 2016 Brexit Referendum

15.4 Key Debates: The constraining dissensus through

referendums on Europe
Chapter 16

16.1 Case Study: The Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Directive

16.2 Key Debates: The troubled introduction of delegated acts

16.3 Background: Qualified majority voting

16.4 Key Debates: Trilogues and transparency
16.5 Case Study: The EU and Cuba
Chapter 17

17.1 Background: The Common Commercial Policy

17.2 Background: Key stages in the evolution of the EU’s relations
with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries

17.3 Background: EU–China trade disputes: textiles, solar panels,

steel, and cyber-security
17.4 Key Debates: Brexit and the EU’s trade and development
policies
Chapter 18

18.1 Case Study: The accession of Turkey to the EU

18.2 Background: Accession process for a new member state

18.3 Background: The Copenhagen criteria
18.4 Debate: Enlargement, state-building, and peace-building in
the Balkans
Chapter 19

19.1 Background: A chronology of the CFSP

19.2 Background: The politics of the High Representative

19.3 Key Debates: The EU’s integrated approach
19.4 Background: CSDP missions and operations
19.5 Case Study: Operation Atalanta: Fighting piracy off the Horn
of Africa

19.6 Key Debates: The EU Global Strategy

Chapter 20

20.1 Background: Stages in economic integration

20.2 Background: Characteristics of capitalism
20.3 Background: The Single Market programme
20.4 Case Study: Updating the Single Market: the digital economy
20.5 Case Study: Brexit and the importance of the UK Single
Market

20.6 Key Debates: Theorizing the Single Market

Chapter 21

21.1 Background: Catalysts for early cooperation in Justice and

Home Affairs (JHA) matters
21.2 Background: What is Schengen?
21.3 Case Study: Strains on Schengen and the freedom of
movement: populism, the refugee ‘crisis’, and thepandemic
21.4 Key Debates: The Dublin Convention
21.5 Key Debates: Brexit and AFSJ
Chapter 22

22.1 Background: Three stages to economic and monetary union

22.2 Background: The Maastricht convergence criteria
22.3 Background: The Stability and Growth Pact
22.4 Background: The European Semester
Chapter 23

23.1 Background: The formal CAP decision-making process

23.2 Case Study: Eastern enlargement and the CAP
23.3 Key Debate: The CAP and developing countries

23.4 Key Debate: The CAP and Brexit

Chapter 24

24.1 Background: The evolution of EU environmental policy

24.2 Background: Key principles of EU environmental policy
24.3 Key Debates: The eighth Environmental Action Programme

24.4 Case Study: Plastic pollution policy

24.5 Case Study: The Seveso accident
24.6 Case Study: Emissions trading
Chapter 25

25.1 Background: The global financial and euro crises

25.2 Case Study: The ECB and the crisis

25.3 Background: ‘Six-pack’, ‘two-pack’, Fiscal Compact, and

Banking Union
25.4 Key Debate: The euro crisis and the EU’s problems of
legitimacy
Chapter 26

26.1 Key Debates: Migration flows to the EU

26.2 Background: Timeline of key developments
26.3 Key Debates: Asylum seekers and refugees

26.4 Case Study: The COVID-19 crisis and migration

26.5 Key Debates: Migration and Brexit

Chapter 27

27.1 Key Debates: Why did the UK vote to leave the EU?
27.2 Background: Article 50 TEU

27.3 Case Study: The Irish border

27.4 Key Debates: The sticking points during the TCA negotiations
Chapter 28

28.1 Background: COVID-19 as a public health emergency of

international concern

28.2 Case Study: The Union civil protection mechanism

28.3 Case Study: The EU4HEALTH programme

28.4 Key Debates: Equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines

28.5 Case Study: Medical Devices Regulation in the EU

Chapter 29

29.1 Background: Article 2 TEU

29.2 Case Study: Article 7 proceedings against Poland and
Hungary

29.3 Key Debate: Solutions to the economic effects of the COVID-

19 pandemic
List of tables
Chapter 6

6.1 Five pathways beyond integration theory

6.2 The ‘new institutionalisms’

Chapter 11

11.1 European Council and EU Council meetings, 2009–19

Chapter 12

12.1 Special legislative procedures

12.2 Composition of the European Parliament post-Brexit (2020)

Chapter 15

15.1 Image of the EU

Chapter 16

16.1 EU competences category

16.2 Trilogues: how compromises are reached

Chapter 17

17.1 The European Union and its major rivals in the global
political economy

17.2 EU27 net bilateral and multilateral overseas development

assistance (ODA), 2019
Chapter 18

18.1 Enlargement rounds

18.2 Applications for EU membership (since 1987)

Chapter 21

21.1 JHA/AFSJ cooperation: from Trevi to Lisbon

Chapter 26

26.1 Mediterranean sea crossings

Chapter 28

28.1 The three faces of health policy

List of contributors

David Benson is a Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Department of

Politics, University of Exeter, UK.

Edward Best is Senior Expert at the European Institute of Public

Administration (EIPA) and Senior Fellow of Maastricht University,
Netherlands.

Tanja A. Börzel is Professor of Political Science, holds the chair for

European integration and is Director of the Center for European
Integration, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany.

Eleanor Brooks is a lecturer in health policy at the Global Health

Policy Unit (GHPU), School of Social and Political Science,
University of Edinburgh, UK.

Charlotte Burns is Professor of Politics in the Department of

Politics and International Relations, University of Sheffield, UK.

Paul James Cardwell is Professor of Law and Vice Dean

(Education) at the Dickson Poon School of Law, King’s College
London, UK.

Thomas Christiansen is Professor of Political Science and

European Integration in the Political Science department at Luiss
University Guido Carli, Rome, Italy.
Clive H. Church is Emeritus Professor in the Department of
Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK.

Michelle Cini is Professor of European Politics and Head of the

School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies at the
University of Bristol.

Michelle Egan is Professor and Jean Monnet Chair ad personam in

the School of International Service at the American University,
Washington DC, USA.

Morten Egeberg is Emeritus Professor of Public Policy and

Administration in the Department of Political Science and at
ARENA, University of Oslo, Norway.

Rainer Eising is Professor of Political Science in the Faculty of

Social Science, Ruhr University, Bochum, Germany.

Ève Fouilleux is a Director of Research in Public Policy Analysis at

the National Centre for Scientific Research (CNRS) and Gustave
Eiffel University, and associated researcher at the French
agricultural research and cooperation organization (CIRAD), in
Montpellier, France.

Anna Maria Friis is an independent researcher.

Andrew Geddes is Professor of Migration Studies and Director of

the Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute,
Florence, Italy.
Viviane Gravey is a Lecturer in European Politics in the School of
History, Anthropology, Philosophy and Politics at Queen’s University
Belfast, Northern Ireland, UK.

Scott L. Greer is Professor of Health Management and Policy,

Global Public Health and Political Science at the University of
Michigan, USA.

Simona Guerra is Senior Lecturer in Comparative Politics in the

Department of Politics at the University of Surrey, Guildford, UK.

Dermot Hodson is Professor of Political Economy in the

Department of Politics, Birkbeck College, University of London, UK.

Andrew Jordan is Professor of Environmental Sciences in the

School of Environmental Sciences, University of East Anglia,
Norwich, UK.

Ana E. Juncos is a Professor of European Politics in the School of

Sociology, Politics, and International Studies (SPAIS) at the
University of Bristol, UK.

Brigid Laffan is a Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman

Centre for Advanced Studies and Director of the Global Governance
Programme at the European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy.

Jeffrey Lewis is Professor in the Department of Political Science at

Cleveland State University, USA.

Diana Panke is Professor of Political Science at the Albert-Ludwigs

University, Freiburg, Germany.
Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán is a Senior Lecturer in
European Politics at the School of Sociology, Politics, and
International Studies (SPAIS) at the University of Bristol, UK.

David Phinnemore is Professor of European Politics and Jean

Monnet Chair in the School of Politics, International Studies, and
Philosophy, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, and
Visiting Professor at the College of Europe, Bruges, Belgium.

Uwe Puetter is Professor of Empirical European Research at the

Institute of Social Sciences and Theology at Europa-Universität
Flensburg, Germany.

Ben Rosamond is EURECO Professor and Deputy Director of the

Centre for European Politics, Department of Political Science,
University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

Sarah Rozenblum is a PhD candidate in Health Management and

Policy at the University of Michigan, USA.

Anniek de Ruijter is Associate Professor of European Law and

Director of Amsterdam Law Practice at the University of Amsterdam,
Netherlands.

Stijn Smismans is Professor in Law, Jean Monnet Chair in

European Law and Governance, and Director of the Jean Monnet
Centre of Excellence at the Cardiff Law School, Cardiff University,
UK.

Michael Smith is Emeritus Professor of European Politics at the

Department of Politics, History, and International Relations,
Loughborough University, UK, and Professor in European Politics at
the University of Warwick, UK.

Julia Sollik is Research Assistant in Sustainability Science at

Bochum University of Applied Sciences, Germany.

Carsten Strøby Jensen is Associate Professor of Sociology at the

University of Copenhagen, Denmark.

Hans-Jörg Trenz is Professor of Sociology of Culture and

Communication at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa/Florence,
Italy.

Emek M. Uçarer is Professor of International Relations in the

Department of International Relations at Bucknell University,
Pennsylvania, USA.

Amy Verdun is Professor of Political Science at the University of

Victoria, Canada, and visiting professor at the Institute of Political
Science, Leiden University.
List of abbreviations

ACP African, Caribbean, and Pacific

ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting and Trade Agreement

AER Assembly of European Regions

AFCO Constitutional Affairs Committee, European

Parliament
AfD Alternative für Deutschland

AFET Committee on Foreign Affairs

AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice

AG Advocate-General
AGFISH Council for Agriculture and Fisheries

AGS Annual Growth Survey

ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe

AmCham American Chamber of Commerce

AMM Aceh Monitoring Mission

AoA Agreement on Agriculture

APA advance purchase agreement

APEC Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation

ARNE Antiracist Network for Equality in Europe

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations

BDI Federation of German Industries

BEPGs Broad Economic Policy Guidelines

BEUC Bureau Européen des Unions des Consommateurs

[European Consumer Union Bureau]

BLEU Belgium Luxembourg Economic Union

BNP Banque Nationale de Paris

BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China

BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy (‘mad cow

disease’)

BTO Brussels Treaty Organization

BUAV British Union for the Abolition of Vivisection

BUSINESSEUROPE Confederation of European Business

CALRE Conference of European Regional Legislative

Parliaments

CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CAR Central African Republic

CARDS Community Assistance for Reconstruction,

Development and Stabilization

CCP Common Commercial Policy

CdT Translation Centre for the Bodies of the European

Union

CDU Christian Democratic Union (Germany)

CEAS Common European Asylum System

CEB Council of Europe Development Bank

CEC European Confederation of Executives and Managers

Staff

CEDEC European Federation of Local Public Energy

Distribution Companies
CEDEFOP European Centre for the Development of
Vocational Training

CEE Central and Eastern Europe

CEEP Centre Européen des Entreprises Publics [European

Association for Public Sector Firms]

CEFIC European Chemical Industry Council

CEMR Council for European Municipalities and Regions

CEN European Committee for Standardization

CENELEC European Committee for Electro-technical

Standardization

CEO Corporate European Observatory

CEPOL European Police College

CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement

CFC chlorofluorocarbon

CFCA Common Fisheries Control Agency

CFI Court of First Instance

CFP Common Fisheries Policy

CFR Charter of Fundamental Rights

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CGS Council General Secretariat

CIREA Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange

on Asylum
CIREFI Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange
on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration

CIVAM Network of French Alternative Farmers

CivCom Committee for Civilian Crisis Management

CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union

CLA Country Landowners Association

CLRA Congress of Local and Regional Authorities

CMO common market organization

CNG Compressed Natural Gas

CNJA Centre National des Jeunes Agriculteurs [French

Young Farmers’ Association]

CO2 carbon dioxide

CoA Court of Auditors

CoE Council of Europe

CoFE Conference on the Future of Europe

COGECA General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation

in the European Union

COMPET Competitiveness (including Internal Market,

Industry, and Research) (EU Council)
CONECCS Consultation, the European Commission and
Civil Society database

COPA Committee of Professional Agricultural

Organizations

COPS See PSC

CoR Committee of the Regions

Coreper Committee of Permanent Representatives

CPMR Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions

CPVO Community Plant Variety Office

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

CSG Council Secretariat General

CSO civil society organization

CSR country-specific recommendation

CSU Christian Social Union (Germany)

CT Constitutional Treaty

CWP Commission Work Programme

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DCFTA deep and comprehensive free trade area

DExEU Department for Exiting the European Union

DG Directorate-General

DG DEVCO Directorate-General for Development and

Cooperation
DG ECHO Directorate-General for Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Operations
DG MOVE Directorate-General for Transport and Mobility

DG NEAR European Neighbourhood Policy and

Enlargement Negotiations Directorate-General

DG SANTE Directorate-General for Health and Food

Safety

DI differentiated integration

DIT Department for International Trade (UK)

DQL Directorate for Quality of Legislation

DRC Democratic Republic of Congo

DUP Democratic Unionist Party

E&T education and training

EACEA Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive

Agency

EACI Executive Agency for Competitiveness and

Innovation

EAEC European Atomic Energy Community

EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee

Fund

EAHC Executive Agency for Health and Consumers

EAM European Agenda on Migration

EAP Environmental Action Programme

EASA European Aviation Safety Agency

EAW European Arrest Warrant

EBA European Banking Authority

EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and

Development

EC European Community; European Communities

ECA European Court of Auditors

ECB European Central Bank

ECDC European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

ECHA European Chemicals Agency

ECHO European Community Humanitarian Office

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECJ European Court of Justice

ECOFIN Council of Economics and Finance Ministers

Ecosoc See EESC

ECR European Conservative Reform Group

ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

ECTC European Counter Terrorism Center

ecu European currency unit

EDA European Defence Agency

EDC European Defence Community
EdF Électricité de France
EDFs European Development Funds

EDIS European Deposit Insurance Scheme

EDP excessive deficit procedure

EDU European Drug Unit

EEA European Economic Area; European Environment
Agency

EEAS European External Action Service

EEB European Environmental Bureau

EEC European Economic Community

EES European Employment Strategy
EESC European Economic and Social Committee

EFA European Free Alliance

EFC Economic and Financial Committee (of ECOFIN)

EFD Europe of Freedom and Democracy

EFDD Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy

EFSA European Food Safety Authority

EFSF European Financial Stability Facility

EFSM European Financial Stabilization Mechanism

EFTA European Free Trade Association

EGC European General Court

EGD European Green Deal

EGF European Globalization Adjustment Fund

EIA environmental impact assessment
EIB European Investment Bank

EIoP European Integration Online Papers

EJA European Judicial Area
ELO European Landowners Organization

EMA European Medicines Agency

EMCDDA European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and
Drug Addiction

EMEA European Medicines Agency

EMS European Monetary System

EMSA European Maritime Safety Authority

EMU economic and monetary union

ENDS Environmental Data Services Ltd

ENF Europe of Nations and Freedom

ENISA European Network and Information Security

Agency

ENP European Neighbourhood Policy

ENPI European Neighbourhood Partnership Instruments

ENV Environment (EU Council)

EONIA European Overnight Index Average

EP European Parliament
EPA economic partnership agreement
EPC European Political Community; European political
cooperation
EPERN European Parties Elections and Referendums
Network
EPFSF European Parliamentary Financial Services Forum

EPI environmental policy integration; European policy

integration
EPP European People’s Party

EPPO European Public Prosecutor’s Office

EPSCO Council for Employment, Social Policy, Health and
Consumer Affairs

ERA European Railway Agency

ERC European Research Council Executive Agency

ERDF European Regional Development Fund

ERICs European Research Infrastructure Consortiums
ERM Exchange Rate Mechanism

ERPA European Research Papers Archive

ERRF European Rapid Reaction Force

ERT European Round Table of Industrialists

ESC Economic and Social Committee

ESCB European System of Central Banks

ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ESF European Social Fund

ESM European Stability Mechanism

ESMA European Securities Markets Authority
ESS European Security Strategy

ETCG Education and Training 2010 Coordination Group

ETF European Training Foundation

ETI European Transparency Initiative

ETS Emissions Trading Scheme

ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute

ETSO European Association of Transmission Systems
Operators

ETUC European Trade Union Congress/Confederation

EU European Union

EUAM European Union Advisory Mission

EUBAM European Union Border Assistance Mission

EUBG EU battlegroups
EUCAP European Union Capacity Building Mission
EUDO European Union Democracy Observatory, European
University Institute

EUFOR European Union Force

EUGS EU Global Strategy

EUJUST European Union integrated rule of law mission

EUL European United Left

EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission

EU MAM European Union Military Advisory Mission

EU MAM-RCA/RAC European Union Military Advisory

Mission—Central African Republic
EUMC European Union Military Committee

EUMM European Union Monitoring Mission

EUMS European Union Military Staff
EUNAVFOR European Naval Force (Somalia)

EU-OSHA European Agency for Safety and Health at Work

EUPAT EU Political Advisory Team

EUPM European Union Police Mission

EUPOL European Union Police Office

EUPOL COPPS European Union Coordinating Office for

Palestinian Police Support
Euratom See EAEC

EURELECTRIC Union of the Electricity Industry

EUROCADRES Council of European Professional and
Managerial Staff
EUROCHAMBRES Federation of the Chambers of
Commerce in the European Union

EURO-COOP European Consumer Co-operatives

Association
EURODAC European dactyloscopy (fingerprint database)
EUROFOUND European Foundation for the
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions
Eurojust European Union’s Judicial Cooperation Unit

Europol European Police Office

Eurostat European Statistical Office

EUSA European Union Studies Association

EUSC European Union Satellite Centre

EUSEC European Union Security Sector Reform Mission

EUTM European Union Training Mission

EWG Eurogroup Working Group

EWL European Women’s Lobby

EYCS Education, Youth, Culture, and Sport (EU Council)

FAC Foreign Affairs Council (EU Council)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

FDI foreign direct investment

FDP Free Democratic Party (Germany)
FEU full economic union
FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance
FN Front National

FNSEA Fédération Nationale des Syndicats d’Exploitants

Agricoles [French National Federation of Farmers’ Unions]
FoodSovCAP European Movement for Food Sovereignty
and another Common Agricultural Policy

FPU full political union

FTE full-time equivalent
FRA European Fundamental Rights Agency
Frontex European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union
FTA Free Trade Agreement; free trade area

FYR former Yugoslav Republic

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAC General Affairs Council
GAERC General Affairs and External Relations Council

GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDP gross domestic product
GDR German Democratic Republic
GEMU Genuine Economic and Monetary Union

GEODE Groupement Européen de Sociétés et Organismes

de Distribution d’Énergie [European Group of Societies for
the Distribution of Energy]
GMO genetically modified organism
GNI gross national income
GNP gross national product

GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System

GSA European GNSS Supervisory Authority
GSC General Secretariat of the Council
HERA Health Emergency preparedness and Response
Authority

HLWG High-Level Working Group on Asylum and

Immigration
HoA Horn of Africa
HOSG heads of state and government
HR High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy
HSC Health Security Committee

HSG harder soft governance

IIA inter-institutional agreement
IIABL Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making
ICJ International Court of Justice

ICT Information and Communications Technology

ICTY International Criminal Tribunal of former Yugoslavia
ID Identity and Democracy
IEEP Institute for European Environmental Policy
IFIEC International Federation of Industrial Energy
Consumers
IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agricultural
Movements
IGC intergovernmental conference
IHRs International Health Regulations
ILO International Labour Organization

IMF International Monetary Fund

IMP Integrated Mediterranean Programmes
IMPEL Network for Implementation and Enforcement of
Environmental Law
IPA Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance

IPE international political economy

IR international relations
ISAF International Security Assistance Force
ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

ISS European Union Institute for Security Studies

IT Information Technology
ITER International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
ITRE Committee on Industry, Research and Energy
JAC Jeunesse Agricole Chrétienne [Young Christian
Farmers]
JASPERS Joint Assistance in Supporting Projects in
European Regions
JEREMIE Joint European Resources for Micro and
Medium Enterprises
JESSICA Joint European Support for Sustainable
Investment in City Areas
JHA Justice and Home Affairs

JNA Joint National Army (of Serbia)

JPCCM judicial and police cooperation in criminal matters
JTR Joint Transparency Register
LI liberal intergovernmentalism

LMU Latin monetary union

LPF Level playing field
LT Lisbon Treaty
MBS mortgage-backed security

MC Monetary Committee
MDG Millennium Development Goals (UN)
MDR Medical Devices Regulation
MENA Middle-East and North African
MEP member of the European Parliament
MEQR measures having equivalent effect
Mercosur Mercado Común del Sur [Southern Common
Market]
MFA Minister of Foreign Affairs; Multi-Fibre Arrangement
MFF Multi-Annual Financial Framework

MGQ maximum guaranteed quantity

MINEX System for the Promotion of Mineral Production
and Exports
MIP Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
MLG multilevel governance

MP member of Parliament
MTR mid-term review (CAP)
NAFTA North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
NAP national action plan

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NBs notified bodies
NECP National Energy and Climate Plan
NEPI new environmental policy instrument
NFU National Farmers’ Union (UK)

NGEU Next Generation EU

NGL Nordic Green Left
NGO non-governmental organization
NHS National Health Service
NI Northern Ireland
NI non-inscrit

NLG Nordic Green Left

NMGs new modes of governance
NPE Normative Power Europe
NPF national policy framework

NUTS Nomenclature of Units for Territorial Statistics

OCA optimum currency area
ODA overseas development assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development
OEEC Organization for European Economic Cooperation

OHIM Office for the Harmonization of the Single Market

(Trade Marks and Designs)
OJ Official Journal (of the European Union)
OLP ordinary legislative procedure
OMC open method of coordination

OMT Outright Monetary Transactions

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCTF European Police Chiefs Task Force
PD Political Declaration
PDB preliminary draft Budget
PDCA Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement

PEPP pandemic emergency purchase programme

PES Party of European Socialists
PESCO Permanent structured cooperation
PHARE Poland and Hungary Aid for Economic
Reconstruction
PHEIC Public Health Emergency of International Concern

PIIGS Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain

PIREDEU Providing an Infrastructure for Research on
Electoral Democracy in the European Union
PiS Law and Justice Party (Poland)
PJCCM Policy and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal
Matters
plc public limited company

PLO Palestine Liberation Organization

PM Prime Minister
PNR passenger name record
PNV El Partido Nacionalist Vasco [Basque Nationalist
Party]

PP Permanent President of the European Council

PPE personal protective equipment
PPP purchasing power parity
PR proportional representation; public relations

PSC Political and Security Committee (also COPS)

PTCF (European) Police Chiefs Task Force
QMV qualified majority voting
R&D research and development

R&T research and technology

RABIT rapid border intervention teams (Frontex)
RAC Central African Republic
REA Research Executive Agency

REGLEG Conference of European Regions with Legislative

Powers

RIA regulatory impact assessment

RQMV Reverse Qualified Majority Voting
RRF Recovery and Resilience Facility
RRP Recovery and Resilience Plan

RSPB Royal Society for the Protection of Birds

S&D Social and Democratic Alliance
SAA stabilization and association agreement
SAP Stabilization and Association Process

SAPARD Special Accession Programme for Agriculture

and Rural Development
SARS severe acute respiratory syndrome

SCA Special Committee on Agriculture (of AGFISH)

SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDR special drawing right
SEA Single European Act
SEM Single European Market

SFP Single Farm Payment

SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SIS Schengen Information System
SitCen Situation Centre (GSC)

SLIM Simpler Legislation for the Internal Market

SMEs small and medium-sized enterprises
SMET Single Market Enforcement Task Force
SMP Securities Markets Programme

SRM Single Resolution Mechanism

SSC Scientific Steering Committee
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
SSR security sector reform

STABEX System for the Stabilisation of ACP and OCT

Export Earnings

STF Sustainable Transport Forum

TA Treaty of Amsterdam
TACIS Programme for Technical Assistance to the
Independent States of the Former Soviet Union and Mongolia

TCA Trade and Cooperation Agreement

TCN third-country national
TEC Treaty on the European Community
TEN-TEA Trans-European Transport Network Executive
Agency
TESM Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism

TEU Treaty on European Union

TFE Task Force Europe
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
TRAN Committee on Transport and Tourism

TSCG Treaty of Stability, Coordination and Governance in

the Economic and Monetary Union

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UEAPME European Association of Craft, Small and
Medium Sized Enterprises
UK United Kingdom

UKIP United Kingdom Independence Party

UKTF Task Force for Relations with the United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNFCCC UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees
UNICE See BUSINESSEUROPE
UNIPEDE International Union of Producers and
Distributors of Electrical Energy
UNMIK UN Mission in Kosovo

UNSC UN Security Council

US United States
VAT value added tax
VCI Verband Chemischer Industrie [(German) Chemical
Industry Association]
VIS Visa Information System

VOC volatile organic compound

WA Withdrawal Agreement
WEU Western European Union
WFP World Food Programme

WPEG White Paper on European Governance

WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
YES Young Workers’ Exchange Scheme
1
Introduction
Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
1.1 Introduction
1.2 Why a European Union?

1.3 What is the European Union?

1.4 What does the European Union do?

1.5 The organization of the book

Reader’s Guide

This chapter comprises a very brief introduction to

European Union (EU) politics. It aims to help those
students who are completely new to the EU by drawing
attention to some general background information and
context, which should help to make sense of the chapters
that follow. To that end, this introductory chapter begins by
explaining what the EU is, why it was originally set up, and
what the EU does. The chapter ends by explaining how the
book is organized.
1.1 Introduction

The European integration process has moved in fits and starts.

Periods of heightened activity and enthusiastic reform have been
followed by years of stagnation, pessimism, and crisis. Indeed, some
scholars claim that a crucial explanatory factor driving the evolution
of first the European Community (EC), and later—after 1993—the
European Union (EU), has been the crises that the EC/EU and its
member states have had to address over the past six decades or so.
That may be so; but even if crises have (re-)invigorated European
integration in the past, this does not mean that they will continue to
do so in the future. Relying on crises as a driver of European
integration is a risky strategy.

Especially since the onset of the financial crisis in 2007–08, the

European Union has been experiencing multiple and overlapping
crises, including an economic crisis, which also provoked a social
crisis for the citizens it affected; a refugee, migration, or borders
crisis, which has contributed to thousands of deaths and which has
exacerbated tensions between member states; a ‘rule of law’ crisis,
which threatens the independence of judicial systems in some
member states; ‘Brexit’, the first time a member state—and a large
one at that—has left the Union; and finally a public health crisis in
the form of the COVID-19 pandemic. The cumulative effect of these
crises and talk of an ‘existential crisis’ has led some commentators to
argue that the very existence of the EU is in jeopardy; rather than
focusing on European integration, these scholars have directed their
attention to the theme of Europe’s (potential) ‘disintegration’.
However, amid the gloom, the EU has proven itself to be remarkably
resilient amid calls for reform and the circulation of new or
rediscovered ideas about what the future of European integration
might look like. To paraphrase the American author, Mark Twain,
reports of the death of the EU have—so far—been exaggerated, but
that is not to say that its survival is inevitable (on this point see
Gillingham, 2016).
1.2 Why a European Union?

Understanding the EU from an historical perspective means stepping

back to the post-1945 era. The European integration process was
initiated in the 1950s largely because of the negative experiences of
the six founding member states during and in the immediate
aftermath of the Second World War. This period was also marked by
the ‘end of Empire’, with the European integration project
constructed as a way of offering Europe new purpose in a new world
order, whether to rescue the European nation state from decline or
to address geopolitical challenges resulting from the onset of the
Cold War.

Maintaining peace was a primary objective at the time. So too was

economic recovery. And even though the idea of a formalized system
of European cooperation was not entirely new, the shape that the
post-1945 Communities (and later Union) would take was—while
drawing on familiar models of government—innovative (see Chapter
2).

From the standpoint of the twenty-first century, it is perhaps easy to

forget how important the anti-war rationale for European integration
was in the 1940s and 1950s. But this ambition to prevent a repeat of
the two world wars also went hand-in-hand with a general awareness
that (Western) Europe had to get back on its feet economically after
the devastation of the war years. Inter-state cooperation was
considered a step towards a new post-war order. Fundamental to this
objective was the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Germany as
the engine of the West European economy. One can only imagine
how controversial such an idea was at the time. Surely, encouraging
the re-emergence of a strong Germany would pose a serious threat to
the security of Western Europe? Was this not a case of short-term
economic objectives trumping long-term geopolitical ones?
Ultimately, however, these two ostensibly contradictory objectives of
‘peace’ and ‘economic reconstruction’ began to be viewed as mutually
reinforcing. European integration—or rather the prospect of it—was
the instrument that allowed this change of perspective to become
credible.

The EU has altered dramatically since the early days of the

Community (see Figure 1.1), and some argue that the original
objectives of the 1950s are no longer relevant. Certainly, despite an
absence of solidarity among EU member states, and different
preferences on the nature and direction of European integration, the
prospect of war between them seems extremely slim now,
demonstrating, one might argue, the success of the integration
project. However, European integration has been criticized and
challenged on several fronts, and not least for substituting
technocratic governance for democracy, for failing to deliver on
promised economic growth and global competitiveness, at times for
its insularity and conservatism, and for failing to be responsive to its
citizens. Moreover, the EU has only very recently begun to address
seriously the challenges posed by the new digital economy and
society, and by climate change.
F I G U R E 1 . 1 Map of Europe

For the time being, however, it seems that the European Union will
continue to exist in one form or another, even if its future shape and
trajectory is unpredictable. Any explanation of why this is the case
must rest on an understanding of the importance of the external or
‘security’ dimension of the EU’s role. It is almost a truism now to
state that since the early 1990s the discourse around ‘old’ definitions
of security which implies military security—closely related to the
notion of defence—has been subsumed within a more wide-ranging
(comprehensive) notion of security. Even if the actions of
governments do not always live up to the ambitions of this discourse,
security issues can now be said to encompass environmental hazards
and energy supply issues, migration flows, financial crisis, public
health, and demographic change—as well as military threats. Two
contextual ‘events’ have been crucial in accounting for the
broadening out of the concept: the end of the Cold War in 1989; and
the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington DC on 11 September 2001 (often referred to
as ‘9/11’). While the former ended the bipolarity of the post-1945
period, the latter redefined security threats as internal as well as
external, as more multi-dimensional and fluid, and as less
predictable. Add to this a growing awareness of the threats posed to
future generations from climate change, and to current populations
from environmental pollution, extreme instability in financial
markets, the rise of non-Western economies, such as Brazil, India,
and China, and the economic crisis and more recent COVID-19
crises, challenges to the dominant neo-liberal, capitalist paradigm,
and it seems that the period after 1989 marked a transition to a
newly emerging world order. However, this new world order is not
static as the changing and challenging relations with Russia, the
problematic aftermath of the Arab Spring, the instability derived
from Western intervention in Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the
lengthy and continuing fallout from the Syrian war have
demonstrated.
The EU is as much a product of this new world order as it is an actor
seeking to manage change, or an arena in which other actors attempt
to perform a similar function. Thus, there is no claim here that the
EU alone can address these issues. It is but one response, one that is
highly institutionalized, that facilitates agreement through
procedural mechanisms such as qualified majority voting and norms
of consensus, all overseen by a goal-orientated, politically involved
bureaucracy, a directly elected co-legislature, and (arguably) an
activist judicial system. Even though recent events often present the
European Union as a ‘problem’ to be solved, this book demonstrates
in many different ways that it also has the potential to provide
solutions to the challenges facing Europe in the third decade of the
twenty-first century, while acknowledging the EU’s flaws, and the
tensions and paradoxes that plague the Union, both at the level of
integration, broadly cast, and within specific policy domains.

The EU is not just an agent of security, however, no matter how

broadly we define the concept. It also concerns itself with welfare-
related issues, albeit within certain constraints. From a normative
perspective, which accepts that the state ought to take responsibility
for the well-being and social condition of its citizens (rather than
leaving them to fend for themselves), the notion of the EU as a neo-
liberal entity with a strong focus on economic governance and
financial stability accounts for only part of what the EU is or does. In
its original form, the welfare state was a European construct, so it
should come as no surprise to find that the EU has had ambitions in
this direction. But it is important not to overstate the EU’s capacity
in this respect. Although redistribution and EU-level intervention
finds expression in many European policies, when this is compared
to the functions performed by its member states, the EU performs a
very limited welfare role. While some argue that this is right and
proper, others would like to see the EU developing its activities
further in this direction, perhaps in the form of a revival of the idea
of a ‘Social Europe’. These ideas have gained more purchase as a
consequence of the political fall-out from the COVID-19 public
health crisis.
1.3 What is the European Union?

But what is the European Union? One way of answering this

question is to view the EU as a family of 27 liberal-democratic
states, acting collectively through an institutionalized system of
decision-making. When joining the EU, members sign up not only to
the body of EU treaties, legislation, and norms (the so-called acquis
communautaire), but also to a set of shared common values, based
on democracy, human rights, and principles of social justice. This
does not prevent member states challenging these ‘agreed’ norms
and values. Members, and indeed agents of the European
institutions, are keen to stress the diversity of the Union—most
obviously in cultural and linguistic terms.

Since its establishment in the 1950s, commentators have argued over

the kind of body the European Community (now Union) is. Whilst
there is a growing consensus that the EU sits somewhere between a
traditional international organization and a state, the question of
whether it resembles one of these ‘models’ more than the other is
contested. Although it might seem fair to claim that the European
Union is unique, or a hybrid body, even this point can be contentious
because it could prevent researchers from comparing the EU to
national systems of government and international organizations.
Such issues are addressed in the theories of European integration
and theories of EU politics covered in this book.
The common institutions of the EU, the Commission, Parliament,
EU Council, Court, the European Council, and the European Central
Bank (ECB) along with many other bodies, are perhaps the most
visible manifestations of the European Union. These institutions,
discussed at length in the chapters that follow, are highly
interdependent; and together they form a nexus for joint decision-
making in a now extremely wide range of policy areas. While many
argue that the EU Council (comprising the EU’s governments and
support staff) still predominates as the primary legislator, the
importance of the European Parliament has grown substantially
since the 1980s, so that it is now generally considered as a co-
legislature. Ultimately, however, the member states remain in a
privileged position within the EU, as it is they (or rather their
governments) who can change the general institutional framework of
the Union through treaty reform; or even withdraw from the Union.
1.4 What does the European
Union do?

One answer to the question ‘what is the European Union?’ might be

to say that the EU is what it does. This leads us to focus on the wide
range of activities in which the EU is involved, the highest profile and
important of which are the making and management of European-
level policies, and the representation of the EU and its member states
externally, beyond Europe’s borders. European policies, once agreed,
must (or should) be implemented across all EU member states. But
as implementation is usually the responsibility of national or sub-
national governments, the EU-level actors tend to devote most of
their attention to developing policy ideas and turning those ideas
into legislation or actions which have concrete effects. Many of those
policy initiatives respond to problems that have arisen in Europe
because of increasing transnational (or cross-border) movements.
There are exceptions to this; but the EU is most competent to act
where the Single Market is concerned. Examples of this have
included the EU’s involvement in the reduction of Europe-wide
‘roaming’ charges for mobile phone calls, a more transparent pricing
of airline tickets on the Internet, the legal obligation to clearly label
the presence of any genetically modified organism (GMO) in food, or
protecting the four freedoms (free movement of goods, capital,
services, and people) in the aftermath of Brexit.
How, then, is European policy made? It is not easy to summarize the
European policy process in just a few paragraphs. One reason for this
is that there is no one way of making European policy. Some policies,
such as foreign policy and policy on certain aspects of justice and
home affairs, are very intergovernmental, and use a decision-making
process that is based largely on government-to-government
cooperation. By contrast, there is much more of a supranational (EU-
level) quality to policies, such as agricultural policy and policy on,
say, European-wide mergers. Focusing on policy types, Wallace and
Reh have grouped similar types of policies together, identifying five
‘modes’ of European decision-making: the classical Community
method; the EU regulatory mode; the EU distributional mode; the
policy coordination mode; and intensive transgovernmentalism
(Wallace and Reh, 2015; see also Chapter 16). These five modes give
some indication of the extent of variation across the EU’s policy
process.

In some of the earliest textbooks on the EC, the adage that ‘the
Commission proposes, the Council disposes’ was often repeated. As a
general statement of how EU policy-making operates today, this is
now far from an accurate depiction. It is certainly true that in the
more supranational policy areas, the Commission proposes
legislation; however, this does not provide a good summary of the
Commission’s role across the board.

It is fair to say that policy now emerges from the interaction of

several actors and institutions. First among these is what is
sometimes referred to as the ‘institutional triangle’ of the European
Commission, European Parliament, and the Council of the European
Union (the EU Council). However, many other European, national,
and sub-national bodies, including interest groups, also play an
important role (see Chapter 14). The functions, responsibilities, and
obligations of these actors and institutions depend on the rules that
apply to the policy under consideration. While there are rather
different rules that apply to budgetary decisions and to the
agreement of international agreements, and indeed for economic and
monetary union, much of the work of the European Union involves
regulatory activities.

Although different procedures still govern the way that policy is

made, this variation is arguably not as extreme as it once was. Most
legislation is now made using the ordinary legislative procedure
(OLP). This procedure used to be called ‘co-decision’; older books
and articles will refer to it as such, and sometimes the concept of ‘co-
decision’ is still used to reflect the sharing of legislative power across
the EU Council and Parliament. This is because the OLP allows both
the Parliament and the Council, as co-legislators, two successive
readings of legislative proposals drafted by the Commission. In
broad terms it means that the EU Council, comprising national
ministers or their representatives, and the European Parliament,
made up of elected representatives, together ‘co-decide’ EU laws.
Together, then, they make up the EU’s legislature. The Commission,
by contrast, is often labelled the EU’s executive body (note however
that the Council also performs some executive functions). The
Commission is not a government as such but has some government-
type functions in that it proposes new laws; and has responsibility for
managing policies once they have been agreed (see Chapter 10).
For the EU’s member states who sit in the EU Council, policy is
determined through either unanimity, where all countries have a
potential veto, or a weighted voting system called ‘qualified majority
voting’ (or QMV). Most EU policies are now decided upon using a
qualified majority (see Chapter 11). However, increasingly, other
‘modes’ of policy-making are being used beyond the formal kinds of
decisions that require a vote from the Council and the Parliament.
This includes a process called the ‘open method of coordination’
(OMC), which provides a framework for member states to work
towards policy convergence in areas of national competence such as
employment, social protection, social inclusion, education, and youth
and training, through sharing common objectives, policy
instruments, best practice, and peer pressure to achieve policy
convergence. The Commission, the Parliament, and the Court of
Justice of the EU have a limited or no role in the process, which
makes this form of policy largely intergovernmental in character.

Focusing solely on the legislative process, then, tells only part of the
story of what the EU does. It does not tell us anything about the role
the EU plays in distributing money, through its Structural Funds, or
by providing research grants to university researchers, or for creating
temporary recovery plans to address the effects of the economic and
COVID-19 crises; nor does it say anything about the substance of EU
activities, such as the foreign policy actions which take place under
the European flag, EU efforts to forge consensus on economic
governance, or the environmental initiatives that shape the EU’s
position in international negotiations on climate change. Neither
does it tell us about what the EU means for democracy in Europe, the
extent to which the EU is a union for European citizens, or how the
EU has been affected by or contributed to various crises, such as the
financial crisis, the migration and refugee crisis, Brexit, or the
COVID-19 pandemic. All of these issues are addressed in the
chapters that follow.
1.5 The organization of the book

The book is organized into five parts. Part One covers the historical
evolution of the European Community from 1945. Chapter 2 focuses
on the origins and early years of the European integration process,
taking the story of the European integration up to the Nice Treaty
and Chapter 3 then covers the period from the Constitutional Treaty
to the Lisbon Treaty, the financial crisis, Brexit, and the COVID-19
pandemic.

Part Two deals with theoretical and conceptual approaches that have
tried to explain European integration and EU politics. Chapter 4
reviews the fortunes of neo-functionalism; while Chapter 5
summarizes the key elements of the intergovernmental approaches
to European integration. Chapter 6 has a wide remit, focusing on
how European integration and EU politics have been theorized since
the 1990s. Chapter 7 focuses on governance approaches; Chapter 8
on Europeanization; and Chapter 9 on democracy and legitimacy in
the EU.

Part Three introduces the European institutions: the European

Commission (Chapter 10); the European Council and the EU Council
(Chapter 11); the European Parliament (Chapter 12); and the Court
of Justice of the EU (Chapter 13). It also includes chapters on
interest intermediation (Chapter 14) and the EU’s citizens and public
opinion (Chapter 15).
Part Four covers a sample of European policies, which, though not
aiming to be in any way comprehensive, demonstrates the various
ways in which such policies have evolved, and—though to a lesser
extent—how they operate. It starts in Chapter 16 with an overview of
the EU policy process. Thereafter, Chapter 17 tackles trade and
development policies; Chapter 18 focuses on enlargement; Chapter
19, foreign, security, and defence policies; and Chapter 20, the Single
Market. Chapter 21 discusses the policies on freedom, security, and
justice. Chapters 22 and 23 deal, respectively, with economic and
monetary union (EMU) and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
Finally, Chapter 24 examines the EU’s environmental policy.

The final part of the book, Part Five, comprises four chapters, each of
which deals with specific issues related to the politics of the
European Union and the future of European integration and a
chapter focusing on the future of the EU. The first, Chapter 25,
covers the post-2007 financial and economic crisis, Chapter 26
performs a similar function for the migration and refugee crisis;
Chapter 27 addresses Brexit; and Chapter 28 reviews the EU’s
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic from early 2020 to mid-2021.
Chapter 29 concludes the book by considering the prospects for the
European Union, focusing on four possible scenarios for the EU’s
future development.

This book is accompanied by online resources designed to take your

learning and understanding further. Visit the website to access
materials including extra multiple-choice questions with instant
feedback, web links, answer guidance to end-of-chapter questions,
and updates on new developments in EU politics.
PA RT 1
T H E H I S TOR I C A L
C ON T E X T

2 The European Union: Establishment and Development

David Phinnemore
3 Carrying the EU Forward: the Era of Lisbon
Clive Church and David Phinnemore
2
The European Union:
Establishment and Development
David Phinnemore
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Integration and cooperation in Europe: ambitions, tensions,
and divisions

2.3 The Communities and a Europe of ‘the Six’

2.4 Establishing the European Union

2.5 Reviewing the Union: the 1996 Intergovernmental

Conference and the Treaty of Amsterdam

2.6 Preparing for enlargement and the twenty-first century: the

2000 Intergovernmental Conference, the Treaty of Nice, and
the ‘Future of Europe’ debate

2.7 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

The focus of this chapter is the emergence of the European

Communities in the 1950s, their evolution in the three
decades thereafter, and the establishment and early
development of the European Union (EU) in the 1990s. The
chapter explores key developments in the first five decades
of European integration and some of the tensions that have
shaped them. It considers the ambitions of the architects
and supporters of the European Communities and how
their hopes and aspirations played out as integration
became a reality in the 1950s and 1960s. It looks at how
their ambitions grew and how the process then lost
momentum in the 1970s before the idea of ‘European
union’ was rekindled in the 1980s with the Single European
Act (1986) and the Single Market project. These acted as
catalysts for a new era of dynamic European integration
with the now expanded Communities at its core. The
chapter then explores how, through the adoption and
implementation of the Treaty on European Union (1992), the
European Union was established. The chapter assesses the
unique and incomplete form of the new ‘union’ and
examines the impact on it of reforms introduced by the
Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000) as
the EU sought to prepare itself for further enlargement and
the challenges of the initial years of the twenty-first
century.
2.1 Introduction

The European Union (EU) today is firmly established as the pre-

eminent organization in the multi-faceted and dynamic process of
European integration. It was not ever thus. The EU was formally
established only on 1 November 1993, more than four decades after
early efforts at promoting institutionalized cooperation between
European states bore initial fruit with the establishment of the
Council of Europe in 1949. The EU’s emergence in the early 1990s
should not therefore be seen as a radical and wholly new initiative of
post-Cold War European politics even if its creation certainly gained
some inspiration from the momentous events of 1989 in Central and
Eastern Europe and the desire, according to the authors of its
founding treaty, to establish ‘firm bases for the construction of the
future Europe’. The establishment of the EU in 1993 also needs to be
viewed as a further stage in a process of ever closer integration
between an increasing number of states. The roots of the process can
be clearly traced back to the early years of European cooperation in
the 1940s and in particular to the efforts of ‘the Six’—Belgium,
France, (West) Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—
in the 1950s to establish new forms of supranational integration
in a concerted effort to promote peaceful reconciliation and
coexistence, economic growth and security, and social development.
This chapter explores two important and related developments. The
first is the emergence of the European Communities created by ‘the
Six’ in the 1950s and their evolution during subsequent decades.
Here, the chapter notes the progress ‘the Six’ made in establishing
supranational institutions, moving towards common policies and
raising their ambitions for further economic and political
integration. The chapter draws attention, however, to the fact that
there was far from universal support for the activities of ‘the Six’.
States were divided over what forms and in what areas cooperation
and integration should take place. Tensions existed over how far
integration should go and who should be involved. And new divisions
and tensions were created with the establishment of the
Communities; rather than uniting ‘Europe’, integration was—initially
at least—focused on a limited number of continental Western
European states, with Western Europe split between an ‘inner six’
and an ‘outer seven’. Over time, the core would expand as other
states, the United Kingdom among them, joined ‘the Six’; a process
that would actually increase tensions within the Communities and
contributed, against a backdrop of industrial decline and economic
recession in the 1970s, to a slowdown in integration. By the early
1980s, albeit with the Communities established, enlarged to ten
members with two more soon to follow, and its institutions
functioning, European integration had seemingly lost its dynamism.
It appeared unlikely that the more ambitious hopes and aspirations
of the architects and supporters of the Communities would be
realized; any prospect of moving to a European ‘union’ appeared to
have faded. In fact, the complete opposite occurred.
This leads to the second important development covered by the
chapter: the establishment and early development of the EU in the
1990s. The chapter explores how the idea of ‘European union’ was
rekindled in the 1980s with the Single European Act (1986) and
the Single Market project acting as catalysts for a new era of dynamic
Communities-based integration. It considers how, through
‘Maastricht’ and the adoption and implementation of the Treaty on
European Union (1992), the European Union was established and
assesses the unique and incomplete form of the new ‘union’. The
chapter outlines the original structure of the EU and how this was
affected by certain key developments during its first decade and
later. The chapter therefore examines not only the origins of the EU,
but also the background to and content of the Treaty of Amsterdam
(1997) and the Treaty of Nice (2000) as well as the launch of the
economic and monetary union (EMU) in 1999. The chapter
concludes with an assessment of what sort of union the EU had
become by the turn of the twenty-first century, what hopes and
aspirations its supporters had for it as EU leaders in 2000 launched
a ‘Future of Europe’ debate, and as ideas of adopting a European
constitution came to the fore.
2.2 Integration and cooperation in
Europe: ambitions, tensions, and
divisions

The EU owes its existence to the process of European integration

that has been a defining feature of post-Second World War Europe.
Ideas for European ‘unity’ did not simply emerge in the post-1945
period, however. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s and also during
the war years, various proposals had been drafted for federal or pan-
European union. Among these was Altiero Spinelli’s 1941
Ventotene Manifesto ‘For A Free and United Europe’, a blueprint
for a federation of European states. A number of political leaders and
governments-in-exile were also considering ideas and plans for post-
war integration. Consequently, when hostilities in Europe did end in
May 1945 the new governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands moved quickly to establish a ‘Benelux’ customs union,
and opportunities opened up for advocates of new forms of
supranational political organization to advance their case. Fears of
German military revival also led France and the United Kingdom in
1947 to sign the Treaty of Dunkirk on establishing a defensive
alliance and mutual assistance pact; a year later they were joined
through the Treaty of Brussels by the Benelux countries, and the
following year, on 4 April 1949, military and defence cooperation was
extended even further with the establishment of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) and the incorporation, in a new
‘Atlantic Alliance’, of the Treaty of Brussels signatories, the United
States, Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland (see
Box 2.1).
BO X 2 . 1
Background: Key dates in European integration: early
efforts

1947 March United States announces Truman Doctrine

March Treaty of Dunkirk signed

June United States announces Marshall Plan

1948 January Benelux Customs Union established

March Treaty of Brussels signed

April Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC)

established

May Congress of Europe in The Hague

1949 April Washington Treaty establishing the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) signed

May Statute of the Council of Europe signed

1950 May Schuman Plan circulated

October Pleven Plan for a European Defence Community (EDC)

circulated

1951 April Treaty of Paris—establishing the European Coal and Steel

Community (ECSC)—signed

1952 May Treaty constituting a European Defence Community signed

July ECSC established

1953 March Draft Treaty embodying the Statute of the European Political
Community adopted

1954 August Assemblée Nationale rejects EDC

October West European Union (WEU) established

 1955 June Messina Declaration on further European integration

1957 March Treaties of Rome—establishing the European Economic

Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy
Community (EAEC)—signed

1958 January EEC and EAEC (Euratom) established

1959 November OEEC negotiations on a European free trade area collapse

1960 May European Free Trade Association (EFTA) established

Not all governments warmed to the idea of integration even if past,

present, and future political leaders (e.g., Winston Churchill, Paul-
Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Francois Mitterrand) who
attended The Hague Congress of 1948 did resolve to pursue the
creation of a European ‘Union’ or ‘Federation’. They may have agreed
to establish a ‘European Assembly’, draft a ‘Charter of Human
Rights’, and include Germany in their endeavours, but the appetite to
pursue the ambitious goal of a ‘United Europe’ was far from
universal. Governments in the Benelux countries and in France and
Italy were broadly enthusiastic and willing to consider supranational
integration, but those in the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the
Scandinavian countries were at best lukewarm, maintaining a
preference for much looser forms of intergovernmental cooperation.
Germany under Adenauer’s leadership was interested, seeing
engagement as a means for rehabilitation. For the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe, however, the emerging realities of
Europe’s division between a capitalist and democratic West and the
Soviet Union-dominated East, and the onset of the Cold War, ruled
out involvement. Moreover, post-war economic recovery was a far
more pressing concern than the pursuit of political integration.

Nevertheless, on 5 May 1949, Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland,

Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom did establish the Council of Europe. Soon Greece
and Turkey joined, and in 1950 the accession of Iceland and (West)
Germany brought the membership to 14. The essentially
intergovernmental nature of the Council of Europe’s activities and
ambitions disappointed federalists and other supporters of
integration such as Spaak, but an important first step had been taken
in establishing institutionalized political cooperation in Europe.
Initial steps in promoting economic integration had also been taken
in April 1948 with the establishment of the Organisation for
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Created at the
insistence of the US government to administer US financial
assistance from the Marshall Plan, the OEEC was also committed to
promoting trade liberalization among the 17 participating ‘West’
European states. For integrationists, the OEEC, like the Council of
Europe, lacked ambition. Incorporating as many states as possible
promoted inclusivity, but it tended to mean that the goals to be
achieved were limited to the pragmatically possible. The two
organizations were also unwieldy, relying on unanimity for taking
decisions, their intergovernmental nature conferring on each
member state a veto.

Advocates of more supranational integration involving the creation

of new institutions and the pooling of sovereignty did not abandon
all hope of realizing some form of ‘United Europe’. In May 1950, the
French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, proposed the pooling
under a supranational authority of French and German coal and steel
resources. The brainchild of the French diplomat and
internationalist, Jean Monnet, this would not only facilitate the
modernization of production and increase the supply of coal and
steel and so contribute to further economic development, it would
also make war between France and Germany ‘materially impossible’.
Other states, notably the United Kingdom, were encouraged to join.
Yet Schuman was clear that this new initiative of narrowly focused
sectoral integration was but a first step in a process of
establishing closer supranational economic and political integration;
it was intended to be ‘the first concrete foundation of a European
federation indispensable to the preservation of peace’ (see Box 2.2).
BO X 2 . 2
Case Study: The Schuman Declaration

The contribution which an organized and living Europe can

bring to civilization is indispensable to the maintenance of
peaceful relations. In taking upon herself for more than 20
years the role of champion of a united Europe, France has
always had as her essential aim the service of peace. A united
Europe was not achieved, and we had war.
Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single
plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first
create a de facto solidarity. The coming together of the nations
of Europe requires the elimination of the age-old opposition of
France and Germany. Any action taken must in the first place
concern these two countries …
The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately
provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic
development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will
change the destinies of those regions which have long been
devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they
have been the most constant victims.
The solidarity in production thus established will make it
plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not
merely unthinkable, but materially impossible. The setting up of
this powerful productive unit, open to all countries willing to take
part and bound ultimately to provide all the member countries
with the basic elements of industrial production on the same
terms, will lay a true foundation for their economic unification …
 By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High
Authority, whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other
member countries, this proposal will lead to the realization of
the first concrete foundation of a European federation
indispensable to the preservation of peace …
Source: Schuman Declaration, 9 May 1950 ( [Link]
eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman-declaration/index_en.htm,
accessed 6 April 2021).

The governments of the Benelux countries, Germany, and Italy

responded positively, and negotiations commenced in Paris in June
1950. Other European states watched on, leaving ‘the Six’ to draft the
treaty that would lead to the establishment of the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and the creation of
Europe’s first supranational institutions: the High Authority, the
Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and the Court
of Justice. The successful negotiation of the Treaty of Paris
encouraged ideas of pursuing sectoral integration in other areas. A
pressing priority with the onset of war on the Korean Peninsula in
1950 was the defence of Western Europe. With the USA committing
resources to contain Soviet expansionism in the Far East, Western
Europe appeared vulnerable. German rearmament was deemed
necessary. But how could German rearmament take place so soon
after the end of the Second World War? The solution, proposed by
Monnet and the French Prime Minister, René Pleven, lay in
incorporating German military forces in a supranational European
Defence Community (EDC) modelled on the ECSC. In 1954, a
treaty establishing the EDC was drawn up.
Once again, this new, elite-driven, supranational initiative would be
limited to ‘the Six’, the United Kingdom having refused to participate
in the creation of a de facto European army. So too would the
European Political Community (EPC) that was being planned
by Spaak and others to complement the EDC. Neither the EDC nor
the EPC, though, came into being. In August 1954, the French
parliament, the Assemblée Nationale failed to ratify the treaty
establishing the EDC; with it fell plans for the EPC. Integrationists’
immediate hopes for a new community to complement the ECSC
were dashed. One new organization did, however, emerge, and this
time involved more than just ‘the Six’. On 23 October 1954, the
Brussels Treaty (1948) was modified to include West Germany, and
the Western European Union (WEU) involving ‘the Six’ and the
United Kingdom was established. It would be through the WEU that
Germany would rearm and on 9 May 1955 join NATO.

The failure of the EDC was a blow for advocates of integration. Yet
almost immediately, new proposals were being made for extending
economic integration. In June 1955, Foreign Ministers of ‘the Six’
gathered in Messina and agreed on ‘une rélance européenne’, a re-
launch of the integration process, through a customs union as well
as integration in specific economic sectors. Discussions chaired by
Spaak, which initially involved the United Kingdom, ensued before
negotiations to establish two new supranationalcommunities—the
European Economic Community (EEC), and the European
Atomic Energy Community (EAEC)—were launched in 1956
and concluded in 1957 with the signing on 25 March of the Treaties
of Rome. Drawing on the model of the ECSC, ‘the Six’ committed
themselves not only to the establishment of a customs union but
also to the adoption of common commercial, agricultural, and
transport polices and the establishment of a common market with
common rules governing competition. The EEC would also involve
the free movement of workers and capital, certain social policy
activities and an investment bank. The purpose of the EAEC was,
through supranational integration, ‘the speedy establishment and
growth of nuclear industries’.

These were ambitious goals, and, as the ratification process revealed,

not ones universally shared by domestic political elites and political
parties. Each of ‘the Six’ completed ratification, however, and on 1
January 1958, the EEC and EAEC were established. With new
institutions—a Commission, an Assembly (which immediately
referred to itself as the European Parliament), a Court of Justice, and
a Council—a new era of integration was launched, albeit one that in
addition to promising deeper integration also heralded an era of
deeper divisions with Western Europe. With efforts within the OEEC
to complement the establishment of the EEC’s customs union with
the establishment of a European free trade area covering 18
countries collapsing in November 1958, Western Europe was
effectively split in trading terms between an ‘inner Six’ and the rest.
With the establishment by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal,
Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of the looser,
intergovernmental European Free Trade Association (EFTA)
in 1960, an ‘outer seven’ was created and the division of Western
Europe into two trade blocs was formalized.
Key Points

• Early efforts at integration after the Second World War

revealed major differences between states over the
extent to which they were willing to pursue supranational
integration rather than intergovernmental cooperation.
• The early years of integration saw a variety of
organizations with different memberships and purposes
established.

• In the 1950s ‘the Six’—Belgium, France, (West)

Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—
emerged as the core of European integration.

• The Treaties of Rome established the basis of the

European Union’s institutional architecture.
2.3 The Communities and a
Europe of ‘the Six’

The establishment of the EEC and EAEC in 1958 heralded a new era
of supranational integration among ‘the Six’. Yet considerable
energies had to be invested in realizing the goals set out in the
Treaties of Rome. For the EEC, a challenging timetable of tariff cuts
and quota removals had to be implemented if the customs union was
to be achieved by the target date of 31 December 1969. Common
policies for agriculture, external trade, and for transport had to be
drawn up and agreed. New institutions, notably the Commission,
had to be created and their operations coordinated with those of the
ECSC. Common rules governing the common market had to be
adopted, and relations, particularly regarding trade, regulated with
non-members and overseas territories. The tasks ahead were
challenging, and only if aims and objectives were met would the new
Communities be contributing to the broader political ambition of
many of the treaties’ drafters: ‘to lay the foundations of an ever closer
union among the peoples of Europe’. The predominantly economic
focus of activities could not hide the fact that the Communities were
part of a political process and far from being the limit of
integrationists’ ambitions (see Box 2.3).
BO X 2 . 3
Background: Key dates in European integration: the
establishment and growth of the Communities

1958 January EEC and EAEC established

1959 January First tariff cuts made by the EEC

1961 July The Fouchet Plan for a ‘union of states’ proposed

1962 January The EEC develops basic regulations for a Common

Agricultural Policy

1963 January de Gaulle vetoes UK membership

January Elysée Treaty on Franco-German Friendship and

Reconciliation signed

1965 April Merger Treaty establishing a single institutional structure for

the ECSC, EEC, and EAEC signed

June ‘Empty-Chair’ Crisis begins

1966 January Luxembourg Compromise ends ‘Empty-Chair’ Crisis

1967 July Merger Treaty enters into force

November de Gaulle vetoes UK membership

1968 July EEC customs union established

1969 December Hague Summit supports enlargement, greater policy

cooperation, and economic and monetary union (EMU)

1970 October Werner Report on EMU published

Davignon Report on foreign policy cooperation leads to the

establishment of European political cooperation

1972 March Currency ‘snake’ established

 1973 January Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom join the
Communities

1974 December Paris Summit agrees to establish a European Council and

accepts the principle of direct elections to the European
Parliament (EP)

1976 January Tindemans Report on ‘European Union’ published

1979 March European Monetary System (EMS) established

June First direct elections to the EP

1981 January Greece joins the Communities

It was this reality that in many respects accounted for the fact that
‘the Six’ were not joined by others. Greece and Turkey were
interested, but had yet to reach a level of economic development
such that they could compete in the common market; they were soon
granted ‘associate’ status with the prospect of possible membership
at some future point. Other, often fiercely independent, states were
very wary about the perceived and actual ‘loss’ of sovereignty that
membership of a supranational entity entailed. This was true of most
of the EFTA states. The Scandinavian members were in any case
already pursuing their own regional forms of ‘Nordic cooperation’.
Neutrality precluded Austria from participating, just as it would have
Switzerland and Sweden had they shown any interest in
membership, which they did not. As for the United Kingdom,
although committed to trade liberalization in Europe, successive
governments had long been wary of political integration. Moreover,
why should a post-imperial power with a history of playing a role on
the global stage become embroiled in a regional project between
continental European states which, given historical tensions and
war, had little prospect, so London thought, of success? Portugal and
Spain, meanwhile, effectively ruled themselves out, as dictatorships,
from participating.

The early years of the EEC and EAEC demonstrated that integration
was possible, at least between ‘the Six’. The new institutions were
established, thus adding to the ‘neo-functionalist’ pressures for
closer integration (see Chapter 4); tariff reductions were introduced;
and some envisaged common policies were drafted. Soon the United
Kingdom was reassessing its decision to stand aside and in August
1961, a few days after Ireland, applied for membership. Denmark
soon followed, with Norway eventually applying too. The UK
application, broadly welcomed by most of ‘the Six’, did lead to
accession negotiations. In January 1963, however, the French
President, Charles de Gaulle, announced his opposition to the
United Kingdom joining and vetoed the application, seeing in the
United Kingdom a Trojan horse for US influence. Others suspected
de Gaulle of fearing a rival for leadership of the Communities. Not
that de Gaulle was an enthusiast for supranational integration. His
clear preference was for intergovernmentalism (see Chapter 5), as
reflected in his 1961 proposal, in the Fouchet Plan, for a ‘Union of
the European peoples’. His preference was most in evidence four
years later when he sparked a major crisis in the EEC by opposing a
scheduled move to qualified majority voting and French
ministers refused to participate in Council meetings. The seven-
month ‘empty chair’ crisis threatened to paralyse decision-making
and was only resolved with the adoption of the ‘Luxembourg
Compromise’ (see Box 2.4).

BO X 2 . 4
Case Study: The Luxembourg Compromise

The Luxembourg Compromise is the political declaration

agreed in January 1966 by the European Communities’ then six
member states to resolve the ‘empty chair’ crisis of 1965–66.
The declaration states that ‘Where, in the case of decisions
which may be taken by majority vote on a proposal of the
Commission, very important interests of one or more partners
are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavour, within
a reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by
all the Members of the Council while respecting their mutual
interests and those of the Community’. Although not legally
binding, the Luxembourg Compromise has in effect provided
member states with a de facto veto over Council decisions that
formally only require a qualified—now double—majority to be
adopted. Although only very rarely invoked, the Luxembourg
Compromise is still available to be used.

De Gaulle’s hostility towards anything that might undermine French

sovereignty did not, however, prevent integration among ‘the Six’.
During the 1960s, a Common Agricultural Policy was drawn up, tariff
reductions accelerated so that the customs union was established
ahead of schedule in 1968, and the institutions of the ECSC, EEC,
and EAEC merged. The European Court of Justice also issued
important rulings on the primacy and direct effect of EEC law (see
Chapter 13). However, the launch of any new initiatives to take the
EEC beyond its original objectives had to wait until after de Gaulle
had left office in April 1969. Advocates of integration were eager to
proceed. No sooner had de Gaulle resigned the French Presidency
and been replaced by Georges Pompidou than the heads of state and
government of ‘the Six’ gathered in The Hague to discuss not just
enlargement to include the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, and
Norway—all of which had applied again in 1967—but also further
integration. Accession negotiations were soon opened; a plan for
EMU agreed; talks on establishing ‘own resources’ financing of the
Communities launched; and a proposal for European political
cooperation (EPC), the forerunner of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, drawn up.

The early years of the 1970s appeared to bode well for integration. In
1970 the Werner Report on EMU was published, initial attempts
were launched to limit currency fluctuations, and agreement was
reached on an ‘own resources’ funding mechanism (see Chapter 22).
Three years later, on 1 January 1973, the Communities enlarged to
include Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The ‘Six’ had
become ‘Nine’. In addition, there were now industrial free trade
agreements in place with the remaining EFTA states—including
Iceland. First tentative steps at foreign policy coordination were
taken, and later in the decade two Structural Funds—the European
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European
Social Fund (ESF)—were established. In December 1975
agreement was reached on holding direct elections for the European
Parliament (EP) (see Chapter 12). Six months earlier, Greece had
applied for membership; two years later Spain and Portugal would
submit their applications. Further enlargement was on the agenda.

Such developments could not mask the fact that the 1970s was a
challenging decade for the Communities and for integration.
International currency instability, the 1973 oil crises, and inflation
brought an end to the sustained economic growth of the post-war
period. Governments in Europe generally reacted to the economic
crisis by pursuing national as opposed to coordinated European
responses. The appetite for new projects appeared to be drying up.
Moreover, the Communities were adjusting to new members.
Neither the United Kingdom—which soon set about renegotiating the
terms of its membership and held a referendum in 1975 on staying in
the ‘common market’—nor Denmark was particularly minded to
support further integration. With governments’ attention firmly on
trying to mitigate the effects of economic recession and high
unemployment, Europe entered a period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ with
integration apparently stagnating.

Efforts nevertheless continued to be made to sustain and deepen

integration. A boost of sorts came with the regularization of meetings
of heads of state and government as the ‘European Council’ from
1975 onwards and so the beginnings of greater institutionalized
intergovernmentalism. This undermined the supranational nature of
the Communities and the executive role of the Commission. It did,
however, provide opportunities for more high-profile political
leadership with successive leaders of France (e.g., Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, Mitterrand, Jacques Chirac) and Germany (e.g., Helmut
Schmidt, Helmut Kohl) in particular pushing for further integration
(see Chapters 10 and 11). In 1975, at the request of his fellow
members of the European Council, Leo Tindemans, the Belgian
Prime Minister, produced a report on ‘European Union’, setting out
proposals for, inter alia, institutional reform, EMU, and a common
foreign policy. The European Council responded to the second of
these and a European Monetary System (EMS) was established
in 1979. The same year, the first direct elections to the EP were held;
turnout was 63 per cent. Agreement was also reached on admitting
Greece in 1981. By now negotiations on the accession of Portugal and
Spain had also begun.

With its expanding membership, the Communities reinforced their

status as the main vehicle for increasingly pan-West European
integration. Enlargement had its costs, however. The membership
had become more diverse with more interests having to be
accommodated; countries that were economically less developed
than the original Six stretched the Communities’ finances, and so, for
integrationists, widening threatened to undermine the prospects for
deepening integration and furthering the avowed goal of ‘ever closer
union’. Indeed, supporters of widening were suspected of
championing enlargement precisely in order to prevent deeper
integration (see Chapter 18). With the Communities in the early
1980s getting bogged down in battles over budgetary contributions
and reform of the CAP, and with the United Kingdom under
Margaret Thatcher proving particularly combative and insisting on a
rebate from the budget, integrationists’ fears appeared borne out. As
the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome
approached, the mood was far from upbeat. The front cover of The
Economist of 20 March 1982 depicted a headstone declaring the EEC
‘moribund’ with the epitaph Capax imperii nisi imperasset—‘it
seemed capable of power until it tried to wield it’.

Key Points

• Supranational integration was initially limited to ‘the Six’

and was established through three ‘Communities’: the
ECSC, the EEC, and the EAEC.

• The 1960s witnessed both progress in developing the

EEC but also a failure to enlarge and the ‘empty chair’
crisis.

• Plans for economic and monetary union and further

integration foundered in the 1970s as the now enlarged
Communities entered recession.

• The enlarged Communities were faced with the

challenges of a more diverse membership.
2.4 Establishing the European
Union

Ultimately, developments in the 1980s proved to be a turning point

in the history of the Communities, much to the delight of champions
of integration, such as the new French President, Mitterrand, the
new German Chancellor, Kohl, and Jacques Delors, Commission
President from 1985 to 1995. Whereas in the 1970s the intention,
expressed by heads of state and government of ‘the Six’ in 1972, to
convert ‘their entire relationship into a European Union before the
end of the decade’ came to nothing, by the end of the 1980s the
prospects appeared increasingly real. The commitment to ‘European
Union’ had not fallen victim to the Eurosclerosis and Europessimism
of the 1970s. This was evident in June 1983 when the Stuttgart
European Council proclaimed a ‘Solemn Declaration on European
Union’ and agreed to a ‘general review’ within five years of the
Communities’ activities with the possibility of a new ‘Treaty on
European Union’. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs)—
now directly elected and predominantly enthusiastic supporters of
integration—were soon proffering ambitious ideas in a Draft Treaty
establishing the European Union (1984). These tended to be ignored
in those member states, notably the United Kingdom, where
governments were both generally opposed to ideas for closer
integration and somewhat dismissive of the prospects for realizing
the flowery rhetoric of ‘solemn’ declarations. The preference was for
more pragmatic action. And here the Thatcher government’s
advocacy of deregulation and more liberal markets soon found
common cause with the Commission and its proposals—encouraged
by European multinationals—to remove remaining non-tariff
barriers to trade within the EEC and establish a genuine ‘single’—
or ‘internal’—market. The logics of intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism both appeared to be driving closer integration (see
Chapters 4 and 5).
The Single Market project, conceived in 1984–85, was a major
stage in the process of European integration. It not only provided the
Communities with a new sense of purpose, it would also ultimately
act as a significant catalyst for integration in other areas. Thus, and
following the logic of neo-functionalism, pressures for integration
spilled over from the efforts to establish the free movement of goods,
services, capital, and people. If the project were to be implemented,
however, decision-making needed to be relieved of member state
vetoes. A timeframe was also needed. With Germany effectively
agreeing to finance an expansion of the Structural Funds to assist
economically less-developed existing and soon-to-be member states
to compete in the brave new world of the Single Market, Greece,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain signed up. The United Kingdom was
also on board. Necessary treaty changes were soon negotiated in an
intergovernmental conference (IGC) (see Box 2.5) with more
integrationist-minded member states pushing, with MEPs and the
Commission, for other policy and supranational political ambitions
to be incorporated in the revisions, including more powers for the
EP. The result was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 (see
Box 2.6).

BO X 2 . 5
Case Study: From intergovernmental conference (IGC)
to treaty

The European Union and the European Communities were all

established by constitutive treaties concluded between their
founding member states. If the member states wish to reform
the EU, they need to amend the constitutive treaties. This has
historically been done via an intergovernmental conference
(IGC), in which the member states negotiate amendments.
Agreed amendments are then brought together in an
amending treaty that all member states must sign and ratify.
Ratification normally involves each member state’s parliament
approving the treaty by vote. In some member states, for either
procedural or political reasons, treaties are also put to a
referendum.
BO X 2 . 6
Background: Key dates in European integration: from
single European Act to Eastern enlargement, 1983–
2003

1983 June Solemn Declaration on European Union is proclaimed by

heads of state and government

1984 February EP adopts a Draft Treaty establishing the European Union

June Fontainebleau European Council agrees to take action on a

number of outstanding issues hindering progress on
integration

1985 March The European Council agrees to the establishment of a

Single Market by the end of 1992

1986 January Portugal and Spain join the Communities

February Single European Act (SEA) signed

1987 July SEA enters into force

1991 December Maastricht European Council agrees Treaty on European

Union (TEU)

1992 February TEU signed

1993 November European Union established

1995 January Austria, Finland, and Sweden join the EU

1996 March 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) launched

1997 June Amsterdam European Council agrees Treaty of Amsterdam

July Agenda 2000 published

October Treaty of Amsterdam signed

1999 January Stage III of economic and monetary union (EMU)

 launched

May Treaty of Amsterdam enters into force

2000 February 2000 IGC launched

December Nice European Council agrees Treaty of Nice

2001 February Treaty of Nice signed

2002 January Introduction of the euro

2003 February Treaty of Nice enters into force

2.4.1 The Single European Act

In adopting the SEA, the member states agreed some significant
amendments to the Treaty of Rome. They also signalled that the SEA
was not simply about Single Market-orientated reforms, but an
attempt, genuine as far as most member states were concerned, to
realize their desire to ‘transform’ their relations into ‘a European
Union’, to ‘implement’ this new entity, and to invest it ‘with the
necessary means of action’. So, the unanimously agreed SEA
introduced a range of new competences (environment, research
and development, and economic and social cohesion); established
31 December 1992 as the deadline for the completion of the internal
market; facilitated the adoption of harmonized legislation to
achieve this; committed the member states to cooperate on the
convergence of economic and monetary policy (see Chapter 22); and
expanded social policy competences to include health and safety in
the workplace and dialogue between management and labour. As
regards the institutions, it expanded the decision-making role of the
EP through the introduction of a cooperation procedure to cover
mainly internal market issues, and the assent procedure
governing association agreements and accession. The SEA also
extended the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the
Council, allowed the Council to confer implementation powers on
the Commission, and established a Court of First Instance (CFI) to
assist the European Court of Justice in its work. In addition, it gave
formal recognition to the European Council and EPC. The fact that
neither was technically part of the Communities reflected member
states’ differences on how much supranational integration they
were willing to pursue. For some, there was a clear preference for
intergovernmental cooperation, and any commitment to ‘European
union’ was at best rhetorical.

Agreement on establishing a European Union was not, however, far

off. As indicated, the SEA, and the goal of completing the internal
market by the end of 1992, ushered in a period of renewed dynamism
for the Communities. This was accompanied by calls for further steps
towards European Union being made by senior European leaders
such as Mitterrand and Kohl, as well as by Delors. Others—most
notably, Thatcher—resisted, often vehemently. Momentum towards
new plans for EMU became particularly strong, inspired in part by a
spillover logic from the Single Market project, in part by a French
desire to gain some influence over the Deutschmark and German
monetary policy. Agreement was soon reached on launching a new
IGC in 1991. Before long a second IGC—on political union—was
being proposed. The motivation was less the spillover from the
renewed internal dynamism of the Communities, but more the
momentous geopolitical changes that were taking place in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). Communist regimes had been
collapsing since 1989, the Cold War had ended, and there was now
the prospect of German unification. Out of these emerged the Treaty
on European Union (TEU).

2.4.2 The Treaty on European Union

Agreed by the member states at Maastricht in December 1991, the
TEU—often referred to as the ‘Maastricht Treaty’—was designed
to expand the scope of European integration, to reform the EC’s
institutions and decision-making procedures, and to bring about
EMU (see Box 2.7). It also furthered the goal of ‘ever closer union’ by
bringing together the EEC—now renamed the European Community
—the ECSC, and the EAEC as part of an entirely new entity, the
‘European Union’. This was to be more than simply the existing
supranational Communities. Established on 1 November 1993, it
comprised not only their supranational activities, but also
intergovernmental cooperation on common foreign and security
policy matters (CFSP) and justice and home affairs (JHA) (see
Chapters 19 and 21).
BO X 2 . 7
Case Study: The Treaty on European Union

The impact of the TEU on the process of achieving ‘ever-closer

union’ was considerable. Most significantly, through it the
member states formally established the EU. In turn, the TEU
promoted European integration in a whole variety of ways,
whether through the promotion of cooperation in the two new
intergovernmental CFSP and JHA pillars or through the
expansion of EEC—now EC—activities. Indeed, thanks to the
TEU, the EC was given new competences in the fields of
education, culture, public health, consumer protection, trans-
European networks, industry, and development cooperation.
Citizenship of the EU was also established and, of course, the
TEU set out the timetable for EMU by 1999. As for existing
competences, some were expanded—notably in the areas of
social policy, the environment, and economic and social
cohesion—although, in an attempt to assuage concerns about
the over-centralization of power, the principle of subsidiarity
was introduced. Moreover, the TEU saw the establishment of
new institutions and bodies, including the European Central
Bank, the Committee of the Regions, and the Ombudsman.
As for existing institutions, the powers of the EP were increased
(not least through the introduction of the new co-decision
procedure), greater use of QMV in the Council was agreed, the
Court of Auditors was upgraded to an institution, and the
European Court of Justice gained the power to fine member
states.
 This mix of supranational integration and intergovernmental
cooperation meant that the new EU fell short of what might
normally be considered a union: a political and legal entity with
a coherent and uniform structure. Indeed, an early assessment
of the EU, referred to its constitutional structure as a ‘Europe of
bits and pieces’ (Curtin, 1993). Depending, for example, on the
policy area, the decision-making roles of the relevant
institutions differed. Prior to the EU, there was essentially one
approach, the so-called ‘Community method’—that is, the use
of supranational institutions and decision-making procedures
to develop, adopt, and police policy (see Chapter 16). This
would no longer be the case.
That the EU lacked uniformity in terms of its structures and
policy-making procedures was evident from the terminology
widely used to describe the new construct. For many, whether
practitioners, academics, or others, the EU was structurally akin
to a Greek temple consisting of three pillars. It would remain
thus until the Treaty of Lisbon. The first pillar comprised the
three Communities (losing the ECSC in mid-2002—see Box
2.8) whereas the second and third consisted of essentially
intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of CFSP and,
originally, JHA (see Figure 2.1). Changes in the relationship
between the pillars after 1993 meant that the boundaries
between them became blurred. Indeed, with the entry into force
of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the pillars
disappeared (see Chapter 3).
F I G U R E 2 . 1 The pillar structure from Maastricht to Amsterdam
 BO X 2 . 8
Background: The European Communities: from three to
two to one

The TEU introduced reforms to the three Communities. It also

renamed the EEC the ‘European Community’, although that
name had often been used informally as shorthand for the EEC
before that date. The ECSC was later disbanded in July 2002,
its founding treaty having expired, as envisaged, after 50 years.
Since then, through the Treaty of Lisbon, the EC has been
merged into the EU, leaving only the EAEC as a discrete
‘Community’.

To supporters of supranational integration, the establishment of the

pillar-based EU in 1993 represented a clear setback. This was
because the intergovernmental pillars threatened to undermine the
supremacy of the Community method. For others, adopting a mix of
supranational and intergovernmental pillars merely formalized
existing practices and preferences. Even prior to the TEU, the
member states were pursuing intergovernmental cooperation outside
the framework of the EC. The most obvious examples were EPC and
Schengen activities relating to the removal of border controls (see
Chapter 21). These had been taking place since the early 1970s and
mid-1980s respectively. All the same, the mix of supranationalism
and intergovernmentalism—particularly given that the
Community institutions, with the exception of the Council, were at
best marginal players in Pillars II and III—meant that the EU, when
established, was less of a union than many had either hoped or
feared. The idea of the new EU as a union was also undermined by
other features of the TEU. First, plans for EMU—the most important
new area of EC activity—were set to create a three-tier EU, with
member states divided between those that would become full
participants, those that would fail, initially at least, to meet the
convergence criteria and so be excluded from the single currency,
and those—the UK and Denmark—that either had availed or could
avail themselves of opt-outs (see Chapter 22). Semi-permanent
differentiation between member states in a major policy area
would characterize the new EU. Second, it was agreed that closer
integration in the area of social policy would be pursued only by 11 of
the then 12 member states. Resolute opposition to increased EU
competences meant that new legislation resulting from the so-called
‘Social Chapter’ would not apply to the UK. Third, Denmark was
later granted a de facto opt-out from involvement in the elaboration
and implementation of foreign policy decisions and actions having
defence implications. All of this created the image of a new but
partially fragmented EU.

That the TEU’s provisions did not all apply to the same extent to all
member states was significant, because such differentiated
integration had never before been enshrined in the EU’s treaties.
Differentiation between member states had existed, but it had always
been temporary, notably when new member states had been given
strict time limits for fulfilling their membership obligations. Hence
there were fears that the Maastricht opt-outs would set a precedent
leading, at worst, to an à la carte EU, with member states picking
and choosing the areas in which they were willing to pursue closer
integration. Such fears were initially assuaged when, at the time of
the 1995 enlargement, the EU refused to consider any permanent
exemptions or opt-outs from the existing acquis communautaire
for the new member states. Austria, Finland, and Sweden had to
accept all of the obligations of membership, including those
concerning social policy, EMU, and the CFSP, the latter being
significant because each of the three countries was still notionally
neutral.

Key Points

• Despite ‘ever closer union’ being a long-established goal

of the EC member states, the EU was not created until
1993.

• The TEU created a new entity, the European Union.

• The new EU lacked a uniform structure, consisting of
one supranational and two intergovernmental pillars.

• The TEU introduced treaty-based opt-outs from certain

policy areas for some member states.
2.5 Reviewing the Union: the 1996
Intergovernmental Conference and
the Treaty of Amsterdam

That the European Union, when it was created, was less than its title
implied was recognized not only by those studying the EU, but also
those working in its institutions and representing its member states.
Those who drafted the TEU acknowledged that what they were
creating was not the final product, but part of an ongoing process. In
the TEU’s very first Article, the member states proclaimed that the
establishment of the EU ‘marks a new stage in the process of
creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe’
(emphasis added). They then proceeded to facilitate the process by
scheduling an IGC for 1996 at which the TEU would be revised in
line with its objectives.
Views on the purpose of the 1996 IGC differed. For the less
integrationist member states, notably the UK, it would provide an
opportunity to review and fine-tune the functioning of the EU and its
structures. It was too soon to consider anything radical. Other
member states did not want to rule out a more substantial overhaul.
The IGC would provide an opportunity to push ahead with the goal
of creating ‘ever closer union’, something that the European
Parliament was particularly keen to see, as its draft Constitution of
February 1994 demonstrated. Ever closer union, it was argued, was
necessary if the EU wished to rectify the shortcomings of the
structures created at Maastricht and prepare itself, having enlarged
in 1995 to 15 member states, to admit the large number of mainly
Central and Eastern European (CEE) applicants (see Chapter 18).
Enlargement was now on the agenda: at Copenhagen in June 1993,
the European Council had committed the EU to admit CEE countries
once they met the accession criteria. Moreover, several member
states were growing increasingly impatient with the reluctance of less
integrationist member states, particularly the UK and Denmark, to
countenance closer integration and there was also a need to bring the
EU closer to its citizens. Popular reaction to the TEU had shown that
elites—the drivers and designers of the Communities and now the
EU—needed to do more to convince people of the value of union. Not
only had the Danish people initially rejected the TEU in June 1992,
but also the French people had only narrowly approved it three
months later. Securing parliamentary ratification in the UK had also
proven to be a tortuous affair.
The shortcomings of the EU’s structures were highlighted in
reports produced by the Council, Commission, and EP in 1995. They
all agreed that the pillar structure was not functioning well and that
the intergovernmental nature of decision-making in Pillar III was a
significant constraint on the development of JHA cooperation. As for
Pillar II, also intergovernmental, its inherent weaknesses had been
highlighted by the EU’s ineffective foreign policy response to the
disintegration of Yugoslavia. Such shortcomings, it was argued,
needed to be addressed, particularly given the commitment to
enlargement. Preparations would have to be made, notably where
the size and composition of the institutions were concerned. In
addition, QMV would have to be extended to avoid decision-making
paralysis. Also needed within an enlarged EU, at least in the eyes of
supporters of closer and more dynamic integration, were
mechanisms that would allow those member states keen on closer
integration to proceed without the need for the unanimous
agreement of the others. There was consequently much discussion of
ideas concerning a ‘core Europe’, variable geometry, and a
multi-speed EU.
Preparations for reforming the EU began in earnest in 1995 with
the formation of a ‘Reflection Group’. Its report suggested three
key aims for the 1996 IGC: bringing the EU closer to its citizens;
improving its functioning in preparation for enlargement; and
providing it with greater external capacity. The report also promoted
the idea of ‘flexibility’ mechanisms that would facilitate ‘closer
cooperation’ among groups of willing member states. The IGC was
then launched in March 1996 and eventually concluded in June 1997,
after the more integration-friendly Labour Party under Tony Blair
had come to power in the United Kingdom.

2.5.1 The Treaty of Amsterdam

Signed on 2 October 1997, the Treaty of Amsterdam attracted far less
popular attention than the TEU had. This does not mean that it was
an insignificant treaty. In terms of substantive changes, it added the
establishment of an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’ (AFSJ) to
the EU’s objectives and shifted much of JHA activity from Pillar III
into Pillar I—in what is referred to as communitarization. In
doing so, the thrust of cooperation in Pillar III was refocused on
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (PJCCM), and the
pillar renamed accordingly (see Figure 2.2). At the same time,
provision was made for Schengen cooperation to be incorporated
into the EU. These reforms gave greater coherence to EU activity. Yet
the changes were also accompanied by increased differentiation. The
UK, Ireland, and Denmark gained various opt-outs from both the
new AFSJ and Schengen cooperation (see Chapter 21).

F I G U R E 2 . 2 The pillar structure from Amsterdam to Lisbon

There was also the potential for further differentiation, with the
introduction of mechanisms for ‘closer cooperation’. Under these,
member states that wished to do so could use the EC framework to
pursue enhanced cooperation among themselves. This was
possible provided that the mechanisms were only used as a last
resort, that a majority of member states would be participating, and
that the cooperation would be open to all other member states.
Moreover, closer cooperation could not detract from either the
principles of the EU and the acquis or from the rights of member
states, nor could it be pursued for CFSP matters. Such restrictions, as
well as the de facto veto that each member state had over closer
cooperation, meant that the provisions would be difficult to use. In
fact, the first formal request to use them was not made until 2008,
when nine member states proposed closer cooperation to pursue
common rules on cross-border divorce. All the same, the possibility
of increasing differentiation within the EU was being established.

Where the Treaty of Amsterdam lessened differentiation within the

EU was in its repeal, at the behest of the Blair government, of the UK
opt-out from social policy. There was a bolstering of the EC’s social
policy competences too. Moreover, an employment policy chapter
was introduced, in part as an attempt to assuage popular concerns
that the EU did not have its citizens’ interests at heart. Similar
concerns were behind other new emphases, notably the enhanced EC
competences concerning consumer and environmental protection,
greater efforts to promote transparency and subsidiarity, and a
reassertion that EU citizenship does not undermine national
citizenship (see Chapter 9).

In terms of addressing the shortcomings of Pillar II, member states

in the IGC resisted calls for a communitarization of the CFSP,
preferring to maintain existing intergovernmental arrangements.
Reforms were, however, introduced in an attempt to improve the
consistency of EU action by involving the European Council more, by
creating the post of High Representative, by establishing a policy
planning and early warning unit, by seeking to develop long-term
strategies, by clarifying the nature of the different instruments
available, by defining more precisely the EU’s concept of security
(the so-called ‘Petersberg tasks’ of humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping, and crisis management, including peacemaking), and
by allowing for ‘constructive abstention’ so that member states
abstaining would not block CFSP initiatives (see Chapter 19). The
commitment to deeper integration was evident in renewed
references to a common defence policy and a common defence.

Finally, the Treaty of Amsterdam was supposed to prepare the EU

institutionally for enlargement. In this regard, it failed, deferring to a
later date the resolution of key questions, such as the size of the
Commission, the redistribution of votes in the Council, and the
nature of majority voting. Unanimity was replaced by QMV in some
19 instances, but even here, thanks to German insistence, progress
was far less than anticipated or desired by many member states. This
was underlined in a declaration issued by Belgium, France, and Italy
to the effect that further treaty reform should be a precondition for
the signing of the first accession treaties with applicant countries
(see Chapter 18). The Treaty of Amsterdam did not fail totally,
however, regarding institutional reform. The size of the European
Parliament was capped at 700 members, and use of the assent and
co-decision procedures was extended, thus enhancing the EP’s
legislative role. The EP’s hand in the appointment of the Commission
was also increased, as was its right to set its own rules for its elected
members (see Chapter 12).

Key Points

• Early experiences of the EU raised concerns about the

functioning of the pillar structure.

• The desire not to be held back by less integration-

minded member states led to mechanisms for closer
cooperation between interested and willing member
states.
• The Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated Schengen
cooperation into the EU.

• Despite the acknowledged need to introduce institutional

reforms in preparation for enlargement, the Treaty of
Amsterdam failed to prepare the EU sufficiently to admit
more than a handful of new members.
2.6 Preparing for enlargement and
the twenty-first century: the 2000
Intergovernmental Conference, the
Treaty of Nice, and the ‘Future of
Europe’ debate

With momentum in the late 1990s building towards enlargement to

include the ten Central and Eastern European countries as well as
Cyprus and potentially Malta, the need to introduce institutional
reform remained on the EU’s agenda. Without such reform it was
feared that policy-making could grind to a halt. Moreover, there were
concerns that enlargement could challenge the whole idea of union.
Admitting ten CEE countries, most of which had been undergoing
processes of wholesale transformation from command economies to
fully functioning market economies, and some of which had only
recently (re-)established themselves as independent states, was
something that the EU had never done before. How to accommodate
and integrate the new members became a major question. At the
same time, integrationists, particularly within the EU institutions,
were determined to ensure that the EU’s acquis and the notion of
union would be neither impaired nor undermined by enlargement,
and that its institutions could continue to function as decision-
making and decision-shaping bodies. Moreover, confronted with the
prospect of what amounted to almost a doubling of the EU’s
membership, integrationists were faced with the challenge of
ensuring that the commitment towards ‘ever closer union’ would be
maintained. Opponents of ‘ever closer union’, notably the United
Kingdom, often welcomed enlargement precisely because it
complicated integration efforts.

2.6.1 Enlargement moves centre-

stage
Preparing the EU institutionally for enlargement had been a key
objective of the 1996 IGC. Yet the Treaty of Amsterdam, as noted,
failed to deliver. Instead, reform was postponed. However, a Protocol
did envisage that, at the time of the next enlargement, the
Commission would consist of one national representative per
member state provided, by then, the weighting of votes within the
Council had been modified either via a re-weighting or through the
adoption of a dual majority system of voting (see Chapter 11). The
idea behind the re-weighting was to compensate the larger member
states for giving up ‘their’ second Commissioner. The Protocol also
provided for an IGC to carry out a ‘comprehensive review of … the
composition and functioning of the institutions’ at least one year
before the membership of the EU exceeds 20 member states.

In reality, the provisions of the Protocol were mainly ignored. Even

before the Treaty of Amsterdam entered into force on 1 May 1999,
the European Council in 1998 had identified institutional reform as
an issue of primary concern. Then, in June 1999, it agreed to hold an
IGC the following year to address the key institutional questions. The
issues—the size and composition of the Commission, the weighting
of votes in the Council, and the possible extension of qualified
majority voting (QMV) in the Council—became known as the
‘Amsterdam leftovers’.

What pushed the European Council into calling an IGC for 2000
were changes in the EU’s handling of the enlargement process. In
July 1997, a matter of weeks after the Amsterdam European Council,
the Commission had published Agenda 2000, its blueprint for
enlargement. Following its recommendations, the Luxembourg
European Council, in December 1997, agreed to launch an inclusive
accession process with all applicant states (except Turkey), but to
open actual accession negotiations with only six of the applicants
(Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and
Slovenia). It was felt at the time that six new members could be
squeezed into the EU without necessarily holding an IGC. Within 18
months, however, attitudes towards enlargement had changed and,
in the aftermath of the 1998–99 Kosovo conflict, a new Commission
under the leadership of integrationist Italian former Prime Minister,
Romano Prodi, was proposing to open accession negotiations with
six more applicants—Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania,
and Slovakia—and to recognize all applicants, including Turkey, as
‘candidate countries’ (see Chapter 18). Opening up the possibility
of large-scale enlargement made the need to address the Amsterdam
leftovers more urgent. Hence an IGC was called.
2.6.2 The 2000 IGC
The 2000 IGC opened in February 2000 with a limited agenda. Most
member states preferred to focus on the Amsterdam leftovers.
Others, as well as the Prodi Commission and most MEPs, favoured a
broader agenda. Strong support was voiced for a reorganization of
the treaties and the integration of the WEU into the EU as a step
towards a common defence policy. A Commission report also
reminded the member states that it was incumbent on them to
ensure that the IGC reformed the EU in such a way that it would
remain flexible enough ‘to allow continued progress towards our goal
of European integration. What the Conference decides will set the
framework for the political Europe of tomorrow’. The EU, it warned,
‘will be profoundly changed by enlargement, but must not be
weakened by it’. The EP came out strongly in favour of a wider
agenda, dismissing the ‘excessively narrow agenda’ adopted by the
Helsinki European Council in December 1999 as one that ‘might well
jeopardize the process of integration’.

Such calls were initially overlooked by the IGC, although ‘closer

cooperation’ was added to its agenda by the Feira European Council
in June 2000. By this time, however, certain member states were
beginning to think more openly about the future of the EU. Hence
negotiations were soon taking place against a backdrop of speeches
from German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, advocating in a
personal capacity ‘a European federation’, and French President
Chirac, championing proposals for a European constitution. Other
proposals on the future shape of the EU from, among others, Blair
and his Spanish counterpart, José María Aznar, soon followed.

Many of the proposals were too ambitious for the IGC, in which
progress was already proving to be slow, not least due to major
differences on how best to deal with the Amsterdam leftovers. The
situation was not helped by the heavy-handed manner in which
France, holding the Council presidency, was managing the IGC,
purportedly abusing its position to promote essentially a French
agenda rather than seeking to broker compromises between the
member states. At no point were the accusations louder than at the
Nice European Council, which, after more than four days, eventually
agreed a treaty. Once tidied up, the Treaty of Nice was signed on 26
February 2001.

2.6.3 The Treaty of Nice

What the member states agreed at Nice attracted much criticism.
Although it was rightly heralded as paving the way for enlargement,
for many it produced suboptimal solutions to the institutional
challenges increased membership raised. On the former, QMV was
extended to nearly 40 more treaty provisions, albeit in many
instances ones concerned with the nomination of officials rather than
policy-making, although some ten policy areas did see increased use
of QMV. Reaching a decision using QMV did not, though, become
any easier. Despite a reweighting of votes—each member state saw
its number of votes increase, with the larger member states enjoying
roughly a trebling and the smaller member states roughly a doubling
—the proportion of votes required to obtain a qualified majority
remained at almost the same level as before and was actually set to
increase. Moreover, a new criterion was introduced: any decision
could, at the behest of any member state, be required to have the
support of member states representing 62 per cent of the EU’s total
population.

Provision was also made for a staged reduction in the size of the
Commission. From 2005, each member state would have one
Commissioner. Then, once the EU admitted its 27th member, the
next Commission would comprise a number of members less than
the total number of member states, provided an equitable rotation
system had been agreed. Staying with the institutions, the cap on the
size of the EP was revised upward to 732 and maximum sizes were
agreed for the Committee of the Regions and the European
Economic and Social Committee. Reforms were also introduced
to the competences and organization of the European Court of
Justice and the Court of First Instance (renamed the General Court
in 2009).

The imminence of enlargement to relatively young democracies in

CEE, coupled with an awareness of existing institutional difficulties,
also accounted for an enhanced stress on democracy and rights.
Hence a ‘yellow card’ procedure was introduced for member states
deemed to be at risk of breaching the principles on which the EU is
founded, the Treaty of Amsterdam having already provided for the
suspension of voting and other rights. The Treaty of Nice also made
closer cooperation—now referred to as ‘enhanced cooperation’—
easier to pursue, reducing the number of member states needed to
start a project as well as the opportunities to block such a project.
Enhanced cooperation could also now be used for non-military
aspects of the CFSP.

All of this opened up the possibility of the EU becoming a less

uniform entity. However, the Treaty of Nice also gave the EU a
greater sense of coherence. In the area of CFSP and following the
development of the European Rapid Reaction Force, it made the
EU rather than the WEU responsible for implementing the defence-
related aspects of policy (see Chapter 19). It also increased the focus
on Brussels as the de facto capital of the EU. With enlargement, all
European Council meetings would be held in the Belgian capital.

Yet although the Treaty of Nice paved the way for a more ‘European’
EU by introducing the institutional reforms necessary for
enlargement, it did little in terms of furthering the avowed goal of
‘ever closer union’. Integration-minded MEPs were quick to express
their concerns, voicing particular criticism of a perceived drift
towards intergovernmentalism and the consequent weakening of the
Community method. The member states did, with the new Treaty,
however, set in motion a process that drew on the speeches made by
Fischer et al. to promote a debate on the future of the EU (see
Chapter 3). To some, the Commission especially, this would provide
an opportunity to create a stronger, more integrated EU with a less
fragmented structure. Others, however, envisaged greater flexibility,
a clear delimitation of competences, and a weakening of
commitments to ‘ever closer union’. As with all previous rounds of
treaty reform the Treaty of Nice was not being seen as determining
the finalité politique of the EU. It was but the latest stage in a
larger process.

Key Points

• Changes in the approach that the EU was adopting

towards enlargement in 1999 gave greater urgency to
the need to address the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’ and to
agree institutional reform.
• Agenda 2000 provided the European Commission’s
blueprint for enlargement.

• The Treaty of Nice may have paved the way for

enlargement, but to many it provided suboptimal
solutions to the institutional challenges posed by a
significantly larger EU.

• While criticized for potentially weakening the EU, the

Treaty of Nice initiated a process designed to respond to
calls for a European Federation and a European
Constitution.
2.7 Conclusion

The history of European integration is a history of competing

preferences and ambitions, primarily of states and their leaders but
also of institutions and other elite actors. The early years of
integration, with its multiplicity of organizations and efforts to
establish more reflected the tensions that existed between supporters
of bold new supranational forms of political organization and those
limiting their perspectives to looser, less ambitious forms of
intergovernmental cooperation. Out of these tensions emerged the
European Communities, initially based around ‘the Six’, but soon
attracting interest from others and eventually enlarging its
membership. From the outset, the Communities were conceived not
as an end in themselves, but as staging posts to a more integrated
Europe, with some form of ‘European union’ ultimately being
established. During the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, few
ambitions beyond the establishment of the Communities and their
supranational institutions, and progress towards some original
policy goals, were realized. Initially, there was as much division
within Western Europe as there was unity, not least because of
differing attitudes towards supranational integration as a model for
political cooperation between states. Divisions were gradually
overcome as the Communities enlarged, but differences on what
forms integration should take, what areas it should cover, and in
which directions it should go persisted, and still do today.
From the mid-1980s, however, treaty reform and intergovernmental
conferences (IGCs) became almost permanent items on the agenda
of the EU. As a result, the EU was established and evolved in a
variety of ways: the member states agreed to expand the range of
policies in which the EU has a competence to act; they adjusted the
decision-making powers of the institutions; and they embarked on
some major integration projects—notably EMU and the adoption of
the euro in 2002, and enlargement that subsequently brought the
membership to 28 before returning to 27 with the UK’s withdrawal
in 2020. Driving these was a complex mix of state interests and
institutional preferences generally advanced by political elites, albeit
often with the support of business interests.

Consequently the EU assumed, during its first decade, many of the

characteristics of a union. For some, especially eurosceptics, it soon
resembled, or was deemed to be becoming, a superstate. Yet for
many, particularly supporters of integration and political union, it
has always been a much looser and more fluid organization than its
name suggests. Its initial pillar structure—which would eventually
disappear with the Treaty of Lisbon—embodied a complex mix of
intergovernmental cooperation and supranational integration that
brought together, in various combinations, a range of supranational
institutions and the member states to further a variety of policy
agendas. Adding to the complexity, and reflective of the tensions
which persisted between member states over integration, were the
various opt-outs that Denmark, Ireland, and the UK introduced,
notably regarding certain JHA matters and in particular Schengen,
as well as the differentiated integration created by EMU and the
emergence of the eurozone. Moreover, successive rounds of treaty
reform sought to facilitate a more multi-speed EU through the
introduction and refinement of mechanisms for enhanced
cooperation. All of this raised questions about how uniform the EU
was and would be in the future.

What the various rounds of treaty reform also reveal, however, is that
the EU and its member states were aware of the challenges raised by
its complex structure and procedures, particularly in the light of
enlargement. This is not to say that its member states ever really
warmed to the challenges, introduced appropriate reforms,
streamlined the EU, or decided what its finalité politique should be.
There was, and there remains, considerable difference of opinion.
This was evident in the subsequent ‘future of Europe’ debate and the
negotiation of the Constitutional Treaty (2004), its rejection, the
adoption of the replacement Treaty of Lisbon (2007), and more
recently, Brexit. As Chapter 3 shows, several reforms in the 2000s
and the 2010s have made the EU more like the union that its name
implies. However, since its establishment in 1993, it has been, and
remains, a complex—indeed messy—evolving mix of
supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and differentiated forms of
integration.
Q UEST I O NS

1. Why was supranational integration limited to ‘the Six’ in

the 1950s and 1960s?

2. What is meant by ‘ever closer union’?

3. Have opt-outs and mechanisms for enhanced
cooperation undermined the EU as a union?
4. What impact did the Treaty of Amsterdam have on the
pillar structure of the EU?
5. Why did the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference fail to
adopt the institutional reforms necessary to prepare the
EU for enlargement?
6. Did the Treaty of Nice prepare the EU adequately for
enlargement?

7. To what extent has the EU been characterized

structurally by a complex mix of supranationalism,
intergovernmentalism, and differentiated forms of
integration?
8. To what extent has European integration been an entirely
elite-led process?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Dedman, M. (2009) The Origins and Development of the

European Union: A History of European Integration (London:
Routledge). A useful and concise introduction to the history of
European integration.
Dinan, D. (2014) Origins and Evolution of the European Union,
2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press). An authoritative
account of the history of the European Communities and the
European Union.
Gilbert, M. (2020) European Integration: A Political History, 2nd
Edition (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield). An introduction to the
political development of European integration since 1945
Laursen, F. (ed.) (2006) The Treaty of Nice: Actor Preferences,
Bargaining and Institutional Choice (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff).
An analysis of the making of the Treaty of Nice, paying particular
attention to member states and key issues on the agenda of the
IGC.
Lynch, P., Neuwahl, N., and Rees, W. (eds) (2000) Reforming
the European Union from Maastricht to Amsterdam (London:
Longman). A volume assessing developments in the EU during
the 1990s, paying particular attention to the reforms introduced
by the Treaty of Amsterdam.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
3
Carrying the EU Forward: The Era
of Lisbon
Clive Church and David Phinnemore
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
3.1 Introduction
3.2 From the ‘Future of Europe’ debate to the Constitutional
Treaty

3.3 The 2003–04 Intergovernmental Conference and the

Constitutional Treaty

3.4 From Constitutional Crisis to ‘Negotiating’ the Treaty of

Lisbon

3.5 The main elements of the Lisbon Treaty

3.6 The Treaty of Lisbon: an appraisal

3.7 Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon

3.8 The significance of the Treaty of Lisbon

3.9 Implementing the Treaty of Lisbon

3.10 Beyond the Treaty of Lisbon: crises, Brexit, and the future of
the EU

3.11 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

This chapter explores how the EU ended a long period of

constitutional change by agreeing the Treaty of Lisbon and
then used it to face new challenges of a financial crisis,
Brexit, and COVID-19. All of these contributed to thinking
that further treaty change might be needed. The process
started in the Convention on the Future of Europe in 2002–
03, which led to the Constitutional Treaty of 2004. Despite
its rejection, the EU persisted with treaty change, and
produced not a constitution, but, in October 2007, an
orthodox amending treaty—the Treaty of Lisbon—carrying
forward much of the Constitutional Treaty into two
consolidated treaties. Although ratification was held up by
an initial referendum rejection in Ireland in June 2008,
reflecting both doubts about some elements of the Treaty
and a deeper unease about the EU, this was overcome, and
the Treaty entered into force on 1 December 2009. Its
implementation proceeded relatively smoothly but was
complicated by the eurozone crisis, which in turn pushed
the EU to pursue further treaty reform, this time resulting,
because of UK objections, in an extra EU compact as well
as a treaty amendment. Thereafter, increasing
Euroscepticism, populism, and persistent question marks
over the popular legitimacy of the EU caused the official
appetite for treaty reform to all but evaporate for much of
the 2010s, even if integrationists believed further reform
was needed. Then, after the UK’s June 2016 vote to quit the
EU, many thought that further changes were possible, with
France’s President Macron calling for a ‘re-founding’ of the
Union. However, Brexit was negotiated within the terms of
the Treaty of European Union. Equally, despite limits to the
EU’s treaty responsibility for health, measures to deal with
the COVID-19 pandemic were agreed. Calls for treaty
revision, including from populist leaders, have continued
but, despite EU member states committing in 2020 to a
Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE), active steps to
re-negotiate the consolidated treaties have not yet begun.
3.1 Introduction

Given the political tensions in the EU that accompanied the process

of treaty reform in the 1990s (see Chapter 2), it is perhaps surprising
that the EU continued to pursue its own reform so doggedly during
the first decade of the 2000s, initially with a Future of Europe debate
and a European Convention, then with a Constitutional
Treaty (CT) in 2004, and later with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007.
Moreover, the pursuit of reform in the second half of the decade
occurred against the backdrop of the CT’s decisive rejection in
referendums in France and the Netherlands in 2005, its rapid
abandonment in a number of other member states, and increasing
evidence of rising Euroscepticism and concerns about the popular
legitimacy of the EU. Eurosceptics and opponents put this
seemingly unrelenting commitment to more integration down to an
unholy and ideological lust for power on the part of a basically anti-
democratic European elite seeking to replace national and popular
sovereignty by a centralized, and probably neo-liberal, superstate
(see Chapter 15).

The truth is less dramatic. Many European decision-makers and

commentators believed that enlarging EU—which would increase in
size during 2004–07 from 15 to 27 member states—needed
substantial institutional reform if it was to develop effectively. This
had to take precedence over the opposition of those who queried
integration and the EU project. Moreover, the opposition overlooked
the fact that the reforms contained in the much-maligned CT were
far less radical than many assumed and had been more
democratically devised and directed than in previous treaty reforms.
In other words, treaty reform was not a Manichean war between
good and evil, but a normal political conflict over the governance
and direction of the EU.

So, although many observers assumed that with the blows inflicted
by the French and Dutch electorates in 2005 the CT was dead, during
the so-called ‘period of reflection’ that followed, other states
continued to ratify it. Little serious reflection actually took place.
Eventually, however, the German Council presidency during the first
half of 2007 led a push for a new deal, securing agreement among
the member states on a detailed mandate for a new
intergovernmental conference (IGC) that would preserve many
of the innovations of the CT but within an orthodox treaty that would
have nothing of the ‘constitutional’ about it. A rapid and technical
IGC followed, and the new Treaty was signed in Lisbon in December
2007. The thought behind this strategy was that it was the
constitutional element that had alarmed people; removing this would
therefore permit easy parliamentary ratification.

To begin with, this was indeed the case. However, on 12 June 2008,
the Irish electorate rejected the Treaty of Lisbon, just as they had
initially rejected the Treaty of Nice. The reasons for this were
partly related to the text itself, but also to specific Irish issues and,
especially, to an underlying popular angst. The rejection nevertheless
threw the EU into a new crisis. This time, there was no reflection
period, the ball being quickly and firmly left in the Irish court. By the
end of the year, with all except three other member states having
completed ratification, the Irish government, having secured various
clarifications and concessions, committed itself to holding a second
referendum. This it won, and ratification of the new Treaty was soon
completed, despite the obstructionism of Czech President Vaclav
Klaus. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on 1 December 2009.

Although many expected—and hoped—that this would usher in a

period in which the EU might cease tinkering with its treaty base,
treaty reform was soon back on the agenda. This was essentially
driven by the eurozone crisis and in particular the decision to create
a European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to help address the
sovereign debt crisis and to establish more effective mechanisms for
coordinated economic governance and improved fiscal discipline,
particularly within the eurozone. In the face of UK opposition to a
treaty amendment, extra-EU means had to be found to establish a
Fiscal Compact (see Chapter 25). As the sense of crisis
surrounding the eurozone began to abate from mid-2012, calls for
treaty reform to provide for banking union, fiscal union, and
economic union dissipated.

This scuppered UK government plans to use eurozone reform as an

opportunity to leverage a renegotiation of its membership status in
advance of an ‘in–out’ referendum. Instead, it had to settle for a deal
that postponed associated treaty amendments (e.g., to remove the
applicability of ‘ever closer union’ to the UK) to an unspecified later
date (see Chapter 27). While integrationists continued to murmur
about the need for further treaty reform, and with the prospect of
Brexit failing to induce a sense of existential crisis for the EU, it was
not until the election of Emmanuel Macron in France in 2017 and his
call for the ‘refondation d’une Europe souveraine, unie et
démocratique’ that there was any sense of a real political impetus for
reform emerging (see Chapter 29). This was followed by plans in
2020 for a new Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFE).

This chapter explores the background to the CT and the emergence

and adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. It explains and assesses the
Treaty’s main points, before reviewing its ratification and assessing
the significance for the EU of the Treaty and the experience of
securing its ratification. The chapter then explores how the EU and
its institutions have adapted to the reforms introduced by the Treaty
and have also eschewed further major treaty reform in response to
the eurozone and subsequent crises (see Chapter 26). It concludes
with a discussion of the prospects for further treaty reform in the
light of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU and the various new calls
for reform, noting the continuing resistance to treaty change.
3.2 From the ‘Future of Europe’
debate to the Constitutional Treaty

The origins of the Treaty of Lisbon owe much to the ‘Future of

Europe’ debate started by the Nice European Council in 2000 and
the Constitutional Treaty which grew out of it. Awareness of the
Treaty of Nice’s own weaknesses together with pressures from
outside for clarification and constitutionalization were key
drivers. The initial terms of reference for the ‘Future of Europe’
debate were outlined by the 2000–01 IGC that drew up the Treaty of
Nice. It was to focus on: how to establish and monitor a more precise
delimitation of powers between the EU and its member states; the
status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), proclaimed
at the Nice European Council; a simplification of the treaties, with a
view to making them clearer and better understood; and the role of
national parliaments in the EU’s institutional architecture. In
addition, ways of bringing the EU closer to its citizens would be
sought. However, by the time the debate was formally launched with
the European Council’s Laeken Declaration in December 2001, a
whole raft of new and often wide-ranging questions had been tabled
for discussion.

Although the ‘debate’ attracted little popular input, this time the
question of how to reform the EU would not be left simply to an IGC
(see Box 3.1). Instead, drawing on the approach for the CFR in 1999–
2000, a ‘Convention on the Future of Europe’ was established
to debate options and to make proposals. This ‘European
Convention’ comprised representatives of national governments,
and members of the EP (MEPs) and of national parliaments, as well
as representatives from the Commission and the 13 candidate
countries, including Turkey, along with observers from other EU
institutions and bodies. It met from February 2002 until July 2003
and was chaired by a Praesidium, led by former French President
and MEP Valéry Giscard d’Estaing.
BO X 3 . 1
Background: Key dates in European integration: from
the Treaty of Nice to the Constitutional Treaty

2001 26 February Treaty of Nice signed

7 March ‘Future of Europe’ debate launched

15 Laeken Declaration
December

2002 1 January Introduction of the euro as single currency in 11 member

states

28 February Inaugural plenary session of the European Convention

2003 20 June Parts I and II of the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution

for Europe presented to the Thessaloniki European
Council

18 July Complete Draft Treaty presented to the President of the

European Council

29 IGC opens
September

2004 1 May Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,

Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia join the
EU

10–13 June European Parliament election

18 June European Council agrees a Treaty establishing a

Constitution for Europe

29 October Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe signed

2005 29 May French electorate reject the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in a

referendum

1 June Dutch electorate reject the CT in a referendum

 16–17 June European Council announces a ‘pause’ in ratification

Although there were doubts about the potential of the Convention, it

proved itself an active and, up to a point, open forum. It followed
Giscard’s advice that it was best to produce a single text rather than a
set of possibilities. Through a mixture of plenary sessions, working
groups, study circles, and Praesidium meetings, it began to move
towards a European constitution and not just a new treaty. In a spirit
of openness and transparency, all its papers were posted on the
Internet and its plenary sessions were opened to the public. Yet the
Convention failed to attract media or popular attention, leaving
things to an essentially self-selecting EU elite, skilfully steered by
Giscard.
Key Points

• The Treaty of Nice’s weaknesses explain the agreement

on the need for further EU reform.

• The Laeken Declaration provided the parameters for the

next stage of treaty reform.

• The European Convention attempted to be both more

open and more innovative than a typical
intergovernmental conference.

• The Convention failed to attract popular attention and

was perceived as an elite-driven process.
3.3 The 2003–04
Intergovernmental Conference and
the Constitutional Treaty

The Convention was only just able to meet its deadline and present
its draft to the European Council in June 2003. Although a minority
of Eurosceptics sketched an alternative vision, the vast majority of
conventionnels accepted it, which made it hard to ignore. The
Thessaloniki European Council duly declared that the draft was a
‘good basis’ for further negotiations and the IGC began soon
afterwards, in September 2003. However, no member state was
willing to adopt the draft without amendment. In particular, Spain
and Poland objected to a proposed new double majority voting
system in the Council. Others had doubts about provisions on the
Commission, the proposed Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, the
reformed European Council presidency, the respective powers of the
EP and the Council, the extension of qualified majority voting
(QMV), and the new treaty revision processes. Given this, it proved
impossible to get agreement until the European Council in Brussels
in June 2004. The Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe—90
per cent of which had come from the Convention draft, despite the
IGC’s 80 amendments—was subsequently signed on 29 October
2004 at a ceremony in Rome, in the same building where
representatives of the original six member states had signed the
1957 Treaty of Rome.

The document that they signed was a lengthy one: 482 pages in
length, complex and sometimes impenetrable, and doing little to
promote transparency and accountability. It was designed to
replace all the existing treaties and become the single constitutional
document of the EU. It began with a Preamble, setting out the
purpose of the EU. This was followed by a core Part I outlining the
fundamentals of the EU. This included everything one needed to
know about the EU’s institutions, competences, and procedures,
making it the most innovative and constitutional of the four parts.
Part II contained the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The longest
element was Part III, which contained detailed rules expanding on
the provisions of Part I by bringing much of the existing Treaty on
European Union (TEU) and Treaty establishing the European
Community (TEC) into line with them. Part IV and the Final Act
contained legal provisions common in international treaties, such as
revision and ratification procedures. The protocols and declarations
provided more detailed specifications and interpretations of what
was found in the four parts.

In terms of content, not much was new. The vast bulk of the CT came
from the existing treaties, albeit slightly altered. Innovations were
mainly structural. Policy and powers changed rather less. The nature
of the EU, its style of operation, its institutions, and the revision
process were all altered. The CT abolished the three-pillared Union
with a more singular EU. This inherited the legal personality of the
Community, along with its symbols and the primacy of its law.
However, the EU committed itself to respecting its member states,
which were recognized as conferring powers on it, and, significantly,
were given the right to leave.

The CT changed the way the EU made rules through the ordinary
legislative procedure (OLP). Directives and regulations were
renamed ‘laws’. There was also a new focus on values and rights,
along with democratic improvements, including new powers for both
the EP and national parliaments. The CT also envisaged citizens’
initiatives (see Chapter 9). Accompanying all of this was an
extended use of QMV, although unanimity was still required for a
range of sensitive and constitutional issues, such as measures
relating to tax harmonization, the accession of new members,
and treaty revisions. A change to what constitutes a qualified
majority was also planned, with a double majority consisting of 55
per cent of member states representing 65 per cent of the EU’s
population becoming the norm.

The CT also upgraded the European Council and gave it a permanent

president, limited the size of the EP and the Commission, formalized
the use of team presidencies in the Council, and established a new
post of Union Minister for Foreign Affairs. The holder was to be at
the same time a member of the Commission and Chair of the Foreign
Affairs Council, while heading a European External Action
Service (EEAS; see Chapters 10, 11, and 19). The constitutional
nature of the CT was intensified by the addition of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights. This was made binding on the member states,
but only when they were applying EU law. Guarantees were given to
the UK that the CFR did not increase EU powers. Part IV also
introduced simplified revision procedures, to avoid the EU being
forced to call an IGC for all alterations to its treaties.

As to what the EU could do, the CT clarified its policy

competences, dividing them into exclusive competences—
customs union, competition, monetary policy for the euro area,
and common commercial policy—and those in which competence is
‘shared’ with the member states, including the internal market, social
policy, the environment, and the area of freedom, security, and
justice (AFSJ). In other areas, the EU’s role was restricted to
supporting and coordinating complementary actions. Few new
competences were conferred. A number of areas—tourism, civil
protection, administrative cooperation, and energy—were
specifically mentioned for the first time in any detail, but each of
these was an area in which the EU had already been active.

Generally speaking, the CT simplified the EU, and attempted to

make it more comprehensible, democratic, and efficient.
Unfortunately, people rarely recognized this, and Eurosceptics in
particular were quick to seize on the CT’s more constitutional
features as proof of a relentless drive towards the establishment of a
European superstate. Moreover, the Convention and the IGC failed
to involve the people and to increase the EU’s legitimacy in the
desired way.

With little popular and, in many cases, political understanding or

appreciation of the CT, ratification by all 25 member states was
always going to be a challenge. At first, it proceeded relatively
smoothly even if not in a uniform or coordinated manner, since some
member states, as was their right, chose to hold referendums. Most
stuck with parliamentary ratification. Spain was the first to hold a
referendum in February 2005. The outcome was, as expected,
positive, although low turnout and scant knowledge of the CT meant
that the vote was essentially an expression of support for EU
membership. The second member state to hold a referendum was
France. On 29 May, 53.3 per cent of voters—mainly rural, low-
income, and public-sector based—rejected the CT, albeit often for
reasons not associated with the EU. Three days later, Dutch voters
also failed to offer their support for the CT: 61.1 per cent said nee.
These popular rejections placed the future of the CT in doubt with
opponents quick to declare the CT dead. A far-from-overwhelming
endorsement in the Luxembourg referendum in July did little to
create a sense that the CT was a text that commanded popular
support even if, by then, national parliaments were voting in favour.
Unsurprisingly, the UK government postponed its planned
referendum, as did the Irish and Danes.

It was clear that the CT itself was only one of the reasons for the ‘no’
votes in France and the Netherlands and for the lack of overt
enthusiasm for it elsewhere. Certainly, the text was problematic and,
as a complicated compromise document, it was hard for its
supporters to sell. The issues that it addressed were also poorly
appreciated. Not that it had really mattered in France where detailed
studies of the referendum make little reference to the CT’s
substantive content. Voters’ worries were essentially national and
social, seeing the EU as becoming too liberal. Paradoxically, the
portions of the CT that seem to have motivated this were those that
actually came straight from the existing treaties, suggesting that
people were only now coming to realize what had been agreed in the
original treaties, which had been rarely, if ever, read. Popular
rejection of the CT was also part of a broader malaise that had at its
roots a general dissatisfaction and frustration with national
governments as they struggled with unemployment, threats from
globalization, and social welfare difficulties. However, some
‘European’ issues such as the Bolkestein Directive on services,
Turkey’s potential membership, and the increasing regularity and
pace of treaty reform and the unsettling implications of
enlargement in 2004 did feature (see Chapter 15).

Key Points

• The 2003–04 IGC produced a slightly amended text.

• The CT was designed to replace all the existing treaties

and become the single constitutional document of the
EU.

• The CT attempted to establish a streamlined and more

democratic EU.

• The constitutional dimension of the CT proved to be

highly controversial.

• ‘No’ votes in the French and Dutch referendums

reflected a range of concerns and was regarded as
evidence of popular discontent with the EU.
3.4 From Constitutional Crisis to
‘Negotiating’ the Treaty of Lisbon

Although ratification continued well after the two ‘no’ votes, the CT
was effectively dead, leaving the EU with a constitutional crisis. For
much of 2005 and 2006, EU leaders were at a loss as to what to do.
The UK Council presidency deliberately sought to avoid discussion;
neither the French nor the Dutch could decide what they wanted in
place of the rejected CT. The Austrian Council presidency in 2006
talked bravely of the CT’s resuscitation, but was unable to overcome
national disagreements. Many in Germany, including Chancellor
Angela Merkel, made it clear that they supported the revival of the
CT at the right time, but others preferred to see the text abandoned
to history. Eurosceptic voices dominated debate. Not surprisingly, in
June 2006, the reflection period announced the previous June was
extended for a further year. The best that the Commission could
come up with was the idea of a declaration for the fiftieth anniversary
of the Treaty of Rome on 25 March 2007.

Some new ideas were, however, being proposed, notably the option
of a ‘mini-traité’ from France’s soon-to-be President, Nicolas
Sarkozy. Enquiries were also carried out into the cost of not having a
constitution, and the Spanish and Luxembourgers began to rally
ratifiers in an umbrella movement known as the ‘Friends of the
Constitution’. More significantly, Germany was making
preparations for its Council presidency during the first half of 2007.
Chancellor Merkel felt the CT’s reforms—which included an increase
in Germany’s voting power—were absolutely necessary for the EU. In
October 2006, she declared that it would be the German Council
presidency’s intention to produce a ‘road map’ for action by June
2007. Her underlying assumption seems to have been that the real
problems lay with a select number of member states and, if
identified, their issues could be settled confidentially. Discussions
could take place between a very small group of nationally appointed
‘focal points’ and followed by a short ‘technical’ IGC (see Box 3.2).

Not everybody shared Merkel’s enthusiasm. The UK was very

cautious; Poland and the Czech Republic wished that the CT would
simply go away. However, a Berlin Declaration commemorating the
fiftieth anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome, which was
designed to reassure people about the EU’s ambitions and
achievements, was adopted in March 2007 and provided an
opportunity for the Germans to intensify discussions on how to
proceed. A questionnaire on how certain issues might be addressed
was soon being circulated and in May there were contacts with
various EU leaders. The election of Sarkozy to the French presidency
added political weight to Merkel’s plans to push for more than
simply a ‘road map’. On 14 June a list of outstanding issues was
circulated. Less than a week later, an unprecedentedly detailed IGC
mandate envisioning the adoption of the bulk of the CT’s reforms in
a new amending treaty was produced. This was then approved, along
with a decision to launch an IGC, by the European Council on 21
June 2007 after last-minute concessions, notably to the UK and
Poland.
BO X 3 . 2
Background: Key dates in European integration: from
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty to the Treaty of
Lisbon

2005 29 May French electorate reject the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in

a referendum

1 June Dutch electorate reject the CT in a referendum

16–17 June European Council announces a ‘pause’ in ratification

2006 15–16 June European Council agrees extension to the ‘period of

reflection’

2007 1 January Germany assumes presidency of the Council

1 January Bulgaria and Romania join the EU

25 March Berlin Declaration adopted on fiftieth anniversary of the

signing of the Treaties of Rome

21–22 June European Council adopts IGC mandate for new ‘reform
treaty’

23 July IGC opens

18–19 Informal European Council adopts Treaty of Lisbon

October

13 Treaty of Lisbon signed

December

2008 12 June Irish electorate reject Treaty of Lisbon in a referendum

11–12 European Council agrees concessions to Irish

December government in exchange for commitment to complete
ratification before 1 November 2009

2009 1 January Original scheduled date for the entry into force of the
Treaty of Lisbon
 18–19 June European Council finalizes Irish ‘guarantees’

30 June German Constitutional Court ruling on the Treaty of

Lisbon

2 October Irish accept Treaty of Lisbon in a second referendum

29 October European Council agrees ‘Czech Protocol’

1 December Treaty of Lisbon enters into force

The incoming Portuguese Council presidency made completing the

negotiations on a new amending treaty its overriding objective. The
IGC quickly commenced work. Foreign ministers, assisted by MEPs,
considered progress at Viana do Castelo on 7–8 September and a
final draft was produced in early October. Various loose ends were
sorted, notably offering concessions to Bulgaria, the Czech Republic,
Poland, and Italy, which threatened to veto a deal over the allocation
of EP seats. An informal European Council in Lisbon on 18–19
October brought the negotiations to a close. Following legal
refinements to the text, a replacement to the CT was signed in Lisbon
on 13 December. In less than a year the EU had moved from a forlorn
period of unproductive reflection on what to do with the CT to a new
271-page text restating its essential content.
Key Points

• The reflection period failed to produce any clear answer

to the ongoing constitutional crisis.

• The German Council presidency followed a tightly

controlled strategy to secure member state agreement
on an IGC mandate to transfer much of the CT into a
conventional amending treaty.

• Discussions about the new amending treaty occurred

against the background of the fiftieth anniversary of the
signing of the Treaty of Rome.

• Under the Portuguese presidency, a technical IGC

rapidly produced the Treaty of Lisbon.
3.5 The main elements of the
Treaty of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon was an amending treaty. With its entry into
force on 1 December 2009, it altered the existing TEU and TEC—
renaming the latter the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU)—and then, in effect, disappeared from
view, although commentators still mistakenly assume that it replaced
existing treaties, hence erroneous references in the Brexit context to
‘Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon’. In one sense, the Treaty was a
simple document with only seven articles. However, the first two
were extremely long, because they contained a whole series of
amendments to the existing treaties. Article 1 contained 61
instructions on amending the TEU, while Article 2, amending the
renamed TEC—now TFEU—contained eight horizontal changes and
286 individual amendments. The remaining articles made it clear
that the Treaty of Lisbon had unlimited temporal effect, that
accompanying Protocols were also valid, and that the TEU and TFEU
would be renumbered. In addition, there were 13 legally binding
Protocols, an Annex, a Final Act, and 65 numbered Declarations.
Five of the Protocols—covering the role of national parliaments,
subsidiarity and proportionality, the Eurogroup, permanent
structured cooperation, and the EU’s planned accession to the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)—were
originally part of the CT. The remaining eight were new, including
some dealing with the continuing significance of competition, the
application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the UK and
Poland, or interpreting shared competences, values, and public
services. There were also various transitional institutional
arrangements. These amendments and changes meant that the TEU
and TFEU, in force from 1 December 2009, were significantly revised
versions of their immediate predecessors.

The resulting TEU provides a fairly succinct outline of the purpose

and structure of the EU, notably in terms of aims, objectives,
principles, and institutions (see Box 3.3). It also now includes a good
deal of detail on enhanced cooperation and, especially, on
external action. It also has a more constitutional feel, since it deals
with major facets of the EU, and has the same legal status as the
TFEU and cannot be used to override it. The TFEU is even longer,
with seven Parts and 358 Articles, and many Declarations (see Box
3.4). It starts with a set of common provisions and rules on
European citizenship, which are followed by the longest section,
Part III, which deals with policies. External relations, institutional,
and budgetary provisions make up the bulk of the rest.
BO X 3 . 3
Case Study: Structure of the Consolidated Treaty on
European Union (TEU)

Preamble

Title I Common Provisions

Title II Provisions on Democratic Principles

Title III Provisions on the Institutions

Title IV Provisions on Enhanced Cooperation

Title V General Provisions on the Union’s External Action and Specific

Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy

Title VI Final Provisions

BO X 3 . 4
Case-Study: Structure of the Treaty on the Functioning
of the European Union (TFEU)

Preamble

Part One Principles

Title I Categories and Areas of Union Competence

Title II Provisions having General Application

Part Two Non-Discrimination and Citizenship of the Union

Part Union Policies and Internal Actions

Three

Title I The Internal Market

Title II Free Movement of Goods

Title III Agriculture and Fisheries

Title IV Free Movement of Persons, Services and Capital

Title V Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

Title VI Transport

Title VII Common Rules on Competition, Taxation and Approximation of

Laws

Title VIII Economic and Monetary Policy

Title IX Employment

Title X Social Policy

Title XI The European Social Fund

Title XII Education, Vocational Training, Youth and Sport

Title XIII Culture

Title XIV Public Health

Title XV Consumer Protection

Title XVI Trans-European Networks

Title XVII Industry

Title XVIII Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion

Title XIX Research and Technological Development and Space

Title XX Environment

Title XXI Energy

Title XXII Tourism

Title XXIII Civil Protection

Title XXIV Administrative Cooperation

Part Four Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories

Part Five External Action by the Union

Title I General Provisions on the Union’s External Action

Title II Common Commercial Policy

Title III Cooperation with Third Countries and Humanitarian Aid

Title IV Restrictive Measures

Title V International Agreements

Title VI The Union’s Relations with International Organizations and Third

Countries and Union Delegations

Title VII Solidarity Clause

Part Six Institutional and Financial Provisions

 Title I Provisions Governing the Institutions

Title II Financial Provisions

Title III Enhanced Cooperation

Part General and Financial Provisions

Seven

Together, the amended TEU and TFEU provide for a simplified and
somewhat more efficient EU. First, in structural terms, the Treaty of
Lisbon brought matters into line with common practice. Hence the
Community disappeared, and the EU became the sole structure of
integration, inheriting the Community’s powers, legal personality,
institutions, and policy mix. Apart from the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), everything now functions according to the
basic Community method. Equally, there are still many opt-outs,
while the facilities for enhanced cooperation were increased.

Second, despite the talk of a ‘superstate’, the Treaty of Lisbon made it

abundantly clear that the EU is a body based on powers conferred by
the member states, enshrined in the treaties, and subject to
subsidiarity and proportionality. Member states have rights of
action, consultation, recognition, support, and, significantly,
withdrawal. The EU can also give up competences, and legal
harmonization is subject to clear limits. Equally, the institutions can
operate only within defined boundaries. The EU’s powers are
categorized as exclusive, shared, or supportive, which makes it clear
that they are not all-embracing or self-generated (see Chapter 16).
Third, EU policies were not greatly expanded by the Treaty of Lisbon.
Energy, tourism, and civil protection were written more clearly into
the TFEU, while space, humanitarian aid, sport, and administrative
operation were added for the first time. In energy, there is now
specific reference to combating climate change and providing for
energy solidarity. The main change concerned rules on justice and
home affairs (JHA). These are no longer subject to special, largely
intergovernmental arrangement, but governed by normal EU
procedures. This is a significant development. And since 1 December
2014, all JHA activities have fallen under the jurisdiction of the
Court (see Chapter 21).

Fourth, in terms of decision-making, the Treaty of Lisbon renamed

co-decision as the ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) and
established it as the default legislative process. The procedure was
also extended to some 50 new areas. Inside the Council, QMV was
extended to some 60 new instances with a new and simpler double-
majority system replacing it from 1 November 2014. Under the new
system, a majority of the member states (55 per cent) and the
populations that they represent (65 per cent) is required. This has
increased the proportional weight of larger member states. Member
states have also retained unanimity or emergency brakes in areas
such as tax harmonization, the CFSP, criminal matters, and social
security—and, to satisfy the Poles, old-style QMV was available until
2017. Since then a form of the Ioannina Compromise applies.

Fifth, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced significant changes to

institutional arrangements. The EP received extra powers, notably
over the budget and treaty change. It also now has a virtual veto on
the appointment of the Commission President. The European
Council emerged strengthened and formalized as an ‘institution’,
meeting every three months, and with a new role in external
relations and overall strategy, which points to the continuing
influence of member states. Special arrangements for the Eurogroup
were also provided. The Commission gained an expanded role in the
area of freedom, security, and justice (AFSJ) and in foreign affairs.
Thus, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs
and Security Policy is now a ‘double-hatted’ Vice-President of the
Commission as well as chair of the Foreign Affairs Council. The High
Representative is assisted by an External Action Service. The General
Affairs Council (GAC) as well as other Council formations continues
to be chaired by the rotating Council presidency. The Courts’
jurisdiction was extended, albeit not to the CFSP. Other institutions
were largely unchanged.

A sixth facet was a new emphasis on values and rights. The former
were expanded and given more prominence, while the latter were
given a dual boost. Hence, the CFR was given legal status, subject to
safeguards for national jurisdictions insisted on by the UK.
Additionally, the EU can now sign up to the wider, independent,
ECHR, although it has failed to do so. Lastly, the Treaty of Lisbon
tried to make the EU more democratic. Thus, democracy was
accorded a separate title in the TEU. This includes provision for a
citizens’ initiative. National parliaments also gained new rights to
query proposed EU legislation on subsidiarity grounds, although
these are not as extensive as some wished.
Not all the CT made its way into the revised TEU and TFEU. The
constitutional language was dropped; so too was mention of the EU’s
symbols. Thus, EU acts are not called ‘laws’. Equally, the term
‘Minister for Foreign Affairs’ was rejected. This abandonment of
‘constitutional’ language marked a significant change from the CT,
but many critics preferred to ignore it.

Key Points

• The Treaty of Lisbon was not designed to have a lasting

existence of its own, since its function was to amend the
two treaties—the TEU and TEC—on which the EU is
based.
• The TEU and TEC were extensively altered and
modernized, and, in the case of the latter, renamed as
the TFEU.
• Together, the TEU and TFEU create one structure, the
EU, with characteristics fairly close to those of the past.

• The Treaty of Lisbon introduced changes to institutional

arrangements affecting all key institutions.
3.6 The Treaty of Lisbon: an
appraisal

The first question is whether the Treaty of Lisbon succeeded in its

intention of increasing the democratic legitimacy and the efficiency
of the EU. Given it was initially rejected in a referendum in Ireland
(see Section 3.7 ‘Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon’), many would
claim that it failed. However, this ignores the clear democratic
improvements giving more powers to national parliaments and the
EP, introducing the citizens’ initiative, and commitment to the ECHR
and the EU’s own Charter. And, in the UK, the insistence on
referring, incorrectly, to Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty shows that it
had become accepted even in the most hostile quarters. The more
precise delimitation of EU powers and the insistence that these are
‘conferred’ by the member states underlines the role of national
democracy in the EU. This was reinforced by the elevation of the
European Council’s role, equal status among member states, and
their right to secede. The expansion of the Courts’ jurisdiction can
also be seen as reinforcing the legal and democratic nature of the EU,
even if critics saw this as an example of competence creep.
Conversely, some believed that the changes in the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) downgraded the Commission to the
benefit of the member states. As to efficiency, the introduction of a
European Council President, the linking of the High Representative
with the Commission, the use of simpler voting procedures, and the
extension of co-decision involving the European Parliament and the
Council have all had an impact on the operation of the EU. However,
such changes have hardly transformed the EU.

Thus, Lisbon introduced a wide-ranging series of changes, the actual

importance of which is always difficult to determine in practice given
the significance of the economic and political context in which
reformed institutions function, new structures operate, and
competences are used. Much of the decade or so since the Treaty of
Lisbon entered into force has been one of almost perpetual crisis, at
least as far as the eurozone is concerned, and so, given the need for
leadership, has ensured a very high profile for the European Council.
Merkel and others certainly intended the Treaty to shake things up.
However, the new EU remained remarkably like the old one. And, if
it failed to turn the world upside down, the Treaty did give the EU a
new and surprising stability, enabling it to cope with crises which
were soon to beset it.
Key Points

• The Treaty of Lisbon was complex and difficult to

understand.

• The Treaty of Lisbon sought to make the EU more

democratic and efficient, but this has not always been
acknowledged.
• Despite the range of changes introduced, and the
criticisms made of it, its effects have not been
revolutionary.

• Article 50 TEU sets out the procedure for a member

state’s exit from the EU.
3.7 Ratification of the Treaty of
Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force in December 2009. It did so

almost a year later than planned thanks to a protracted and
contested ratification process. An initial period where member states
completed the process relatively easily via parliamentary
endorsements was interrupted in June 2008 by popular rejection in
Ireland. However, ratification did not grind to a halt and, by the end
of the year, very few approvals remained outstanding. This was in no
small part owing to the nature of the Treaty of Lisbon. As a reworked
version of the Constitutional Treaty, minus its constitutional and
other symbolic trappings, the Treaty was deemed to be sufficiently
far removed from its predecessor for member states previously
committed to ratification via referendum to obviate the need for
popular endorsement.

Much to the relief of Eurosceptic groups and other opponents of the

Treaty, Ireland had to hold a referendum. Its result was very much to
their liking. On a turnout of 53.1 per cent, a majority of 53.4 per cent
voted against ratification, many signalling a lack of knowledge and
understanding of the text and its significance. If the rejection was a
bitter blow to the Treaty’s supporters, it did not, however, bring the
process of ratification to an end. Various non-ratifiers made a point
of pushing ahead, notably the UK, which completed parliamentary
ratification a week later. Others followed suit. By the end of 2008,
only three countries, apart from Ireland, had still to complete
ratification: Germany, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

On Ireland, EU leaders decided to leave it to Dublin to come up with

a solution. A general assumption was that, if all other member states
were to ratify, it would increase the pressure on Ireland and oblige
voters to consider the possible threat to Irish membership when they
voted again. Ratification therefore continued. Lisbon was far from
dead. Nor was it open to further revision. However, the European
Council in December 2008 did signal that concessions could be
made and some ‘legal guarantees’ agreed if the Irish government
committed itself to completing ratification before 1 November 2009.
It did, and a second Irish referendum was held on 2 October 2009.
The outcome was a clear ‘yes’. On a turnout of 59 per cent, more than
two thirds (67.1 per cent) of the 1,816,098 voters who cast their vote
voted in favour of ratification. With the German Constitutional Court
having ruled that there were ‘no decisive constitutional objections’ to
ratification, provided that improvements were made to the
Bundestag’s rights of scrutiny, all that stood in the way of the Treaty
of Lisbon’s entry into force was ratification in Poland and the Czech
Republic. Polish President, Lech Kaczyn´ski, soon penned his
signature to Poland’s Ratification Act, leaving only the objections of
his counterpart, President Vaclav Klaus, in Prague to be overcome.
Once a ‘Czech’ protocol with an ‘exemption’ from the Charter of
Fundamental Rights had been agreed, Klaus finally signed off on
Czech ratification. The Treaty of Lisbon then duly entered into force
on 1 December 2009.
Key Points

• Parliamentary ratification proceeded without undue

difficulty into summer 2008.

• The main causes of the ‘no’ vote in Ireland were a lack of

knowledge and understanding of the Treaty of Lisbon,
together with specific national concerns.
• Ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon continued despite the
‘no’ vote in Ireland, with the Irish government committing
itself to holding a second referendum before 31 October
2009.

• Irish voters’ concerns were addressed through

‘guarantees’ and a dedicated ‘Irish’ protocol, thus paving
the way for a ‘yes’ vote in a second Irish referendum.
3.8 The significance of the Treaty
of Lisbon

The Treaty of Lisbon was a second attempt to realize reforms that

many EU leaders thought necessary to make an enlarging EU fit for
the world into which it was moving in the first decades of the 2000s,
but in a format more acceptable to popular opinion. Critics, and not
just Eurosceptics, have suggested that the determination to press on
with reforms apparently rejected in 2005 was a piece of arrogance
that was either mindless, or a deliberate attempt to foist a superstate
on the nations and peoples of Europe. There may be something to
this argument, but the Treaty of Lisbon was mostly a more pragmatic
matter of ensuring that the EU changed in line with its expanding
membership and policy challenges. That the idea was endorsed by
those who actually have to work the system deserves to be
remembered.

The Treaty of Lisbon substantively repeated that the Constitutional

Treaty was its starting point and not something that needed be
concealed. Pretending that this was not so was a peculiarly British
phenomenon produced by the sulphurous nature of UK anti-
Europeanism. It was also an argument that placed too much stress
both on understanding the difference between a ‘constitution’ and a
‘treaty’, and on the importance attributed by opponents to the CT’s
constitutional status. Stripping off the constitutional element was
seen as the way to defuse opposition. This overlooked the fact that
opposition to the CT was based on a whole range of often
contradictory stances and beliefs, many of them related more to the
EU in general and the way in which Western European society had
been developing than to the Treaty’s actual terms. Another important
factor was the way the 2005 ‘no’ votes mobilized, deepened, and
organized opposition to the EU. Hence the ratification crisis was
again seen as symbolizing an underlying popular alienation from the
EU, which was decreasingly being accepted as a wholly good thing.
The crisis was also revelatory of governments’ failure to give real
attention to dealing with opposition concerns.

All this strengthened the argument that the EU was facing—and

continues to face more than a decade on—a crisis of legitimacy. By
the mid-2000s it was clear that there was a major problem in the old
member states of Western Europe, the populations of which were
now much less inclined to identify with the EU than they used to be.
This was because of their economic unease, their lack of confidence
in the future, and their feeling that their interests were not being
taken into account by a distant ‘Brussels’. Yet much of the opposition
to Lisbon, as with the CT, came from people who described
themselves as ‘good Europeans’. Their objections were not to
integration as such, but to the EU’s style and strategy over the
previous 15 years. Lisbon served as a symbolic surrogate for such
doubts. However, if the Irish ‘no’ vote was a hammer blow for EU
elites, it was not a death warrant for the Treaty of Lisbon. As in 2005,
it opened a period of crisis, thanks in part to the way in which it
revived anti-EU and Eurosceptic forces across Europe, which did
well in the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections but less so
in 2019. It certainly forced the EU to give more attention to
institutional questions at the expense of the policy issues that both
friends and foes alike believe should be its main concern. However,
talk of the demise of the EU remained, and remains, much
exaggerated. While there was clearly vocal and active opposition to
the Treaty of Lisbon, this needed something special, such as a
referendum, to make an impact. Ultimately, however, ratification
was completed, and the new arrangements began to work with more
effectiveness than many had expected, paradoxically sometimes to
the benefit of some of those who had opposed the new Treaty.

Key Points

• Abandoning the language of ‘constitution’ in the Treaty of

Lisbon failed to pacify opponents.

• The Irish ‘no’ opened a new period of crisis over EU

reform.

• Despite the success of Eurosceptic parties in European

Parliament elections, talk of the demise of the EU
remains much exaggerated.
3.9 Implementing the Treaty of
Lisbon

It was never intended that the Treaty of Lisbon would transform the
EU, so its actual entry into force on 1 December 2009 passed with
very little fanfare. It nevertheless introduced some important
institutional changes in the European Council President and the
High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy. In both cases, EU leaders passed up the
opportunity to appoint a prominent political leader with a view to
them setting agendas, raising the EU’s profile and challenging the
member states, and instead opted for high profile fixers to oversee
policy implementation and operate very much in line with
instructions. So, Belgian Prime Minister, Herman Van Rompuy,
became the first European Council President and Baroness Catherine
Ashton, with just over a year’s EU experience as Commissioner for
trade, the first to hold the upgraded High Representative post.

Neither would have an easy ride in their new posts. Van Rompuy’s
time was soon being dominated by the eurozone crisis. This certainly
ensured him a profile, but equally it involved much reactive
firefighting and so limited his opportunities to define his new
position, particularly given the central role that Germany was playing
under Merkel. The barely known Ashton was meanwhile faced with
not only taking on preparations for and chairing the Foreign Affairs
Council and implementing its decisions, but also setting up the
External Action Service. The latter was a tall order indeed and would
prove to be a challenging and drawn-out process; the former
demanded a sense of strategy and decisiveness not always evident.

Beyond these institutional appointments, the immediate impact of

the Treaty of Lisbon was rather muted. This would soon change as
the European Parliament, Council, and Commission came to terms
with the realities of the ordinary legislative procedure’s extension to
most remaining areas of EU competence. For the first time, MEPs
had a legislative role with regard to the Common Agricultural Policy
(see Chapter 23); their budgetary powers were also increased. And so
the voice of the EP on these as well as other issues was soon
becoming louder, and it was a voice to which the Commission, and
especially the Council, had to listen. The voice of citizens and
national parliaments was also enhanced by the Treaty. The citizen’s
initiative was eventually launched in 2012 and national parliaments
gained new opportunities to ‘orange card’ Commission proposals.
Few citizens’ initiatives have, however, impacted on EU legislation
and national parliaments have faced considerable logistical
challenges in securing coordinated responses. All this, while well-
intentioned, has done little to address the EU’s democratic deficit
and bring the EU closer to its citizens (see Chapters 9 and 12).

In advance of the 2014 and 2019 EP elections, the political groupings

sought to personalize the process more. Exploiting the EP’s
enhanced role in the appointment of the Commission President, each
grouping identified its own Spitzenkandidat (‘lead candidate’)
who, it was expected, would be accepted by the European Council as
the nominee for Commission President if that group secured the
largest number of MEPs. The move failed to stimulate popular
engagement and turnout in 2014 once again fell, this time to 42.6 per
cent. It did, however, result in the candidate of the largest grouping,
Jean-Claude Juncker from the European People’s Party, being
elected by MEPs as Commission President. As Luxembourg’s Prime
Minister from 1995 to 2013, Juncker was a veteran of European
Councils and so very much part of the EU establishment rather than
the youthful and fresh face that many critics of the EU thought it
required.

The same could not be said for Ashton’s replacement as High

Representative. Here, the European Council opted for the much
younger and relatively inexperienced Italian Foreign Minister,
Federica Mogherini. The challenges she faced were no less daunting
than those that Ashton had taken on, at least in policy terms. Once
again, rather than appoint a ‘big-hitter’ the European Council had
opted for a less high-profile appointment. Assuming an established
role, however, Mogherini was able to engage in diplomatic initiatives
more than her predecessor. Thanks to Juncker’s reorganization of
the Commission into Project Teams each led by a Vice-President,
with the High Representative leading on ‘A Stronger Global Actor’,
Mogherini was supported by a cluster of fellow Commissioners thus
improving EEAS-Commission cooperation as responsibilities
become clearer.

As for the European Council President, in replacing Van Rompuy

with the former Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, EU leaders
made their first appointment to a senior position of a colleague from
one of the ‘new’ member states in Central and Eastern Europe.
Symbolically, at least, this was an important move. Unlike Van
Rompuy, Tusk was spared the firefighting associated with the
eurozone crisis, yet he too had only limited space to shape the still
relatively new role owing to tensions and divisions over the
migration crisis and the need to manage the protracted Brexit
process. Both Mogherini and Tusk completed their terms of office
without major incident. Their successors were appointed without
controversy or fanfare in 2019, suggesting the posts were settled:
Josep Borrell, former EP President and Spanish Foreign Minister,
became High Representative; former Belgian Prime Minister,
Charles Michel, became European Council President. The same
could not be said for the Spitzenkandidat process, which was
effectively ignored after the 2019 EP elections when EU leaders
nominated and MEPs elected Ursula von der Leyen as European
Commission President (see Chapter 10).
Key Points

• The implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon occurred

against the background of the economic crisis.

• The new post of European Council President and the

revised post of High Representative have been
established and appear settled.

• MPs have seen their role in EU decision-making

increase through the extension of the OLP.

• Whereas MPs in 2014 successfully used the

Spitzenkandidat process to determine the next European
Commission President, the process was effectively
abandoned in 2019.

• Despite the measures introduced by the Treaty of

Lisbon, the EU is still perceived as suffering from a
democratic deficit.
3.10 Beyond the Treaty of Lisbon:
crises, Brexit, and the future of the
EU

When the Treaty of Lisbon was agreed, and later when it eventually
entered into force, EU leaders appeared eager to call time on more
than 20 years of seemingly interminable discussions about
institutional reform and treaty change. Hence, on the day after the
signing ceremony in Lisbon in December 2007, they declared that
the new Treaty provided the EU with ‘a stable and lasting
institutional framework’. Furthermore, they expected ‘no change in
the foreseeable future’ (Council of the European Union, 2008: point
6). Such sentiments were widely shared. The mood was that the days
of treaty reform were now over. Ideally, there would be no major
treaty for the next 25 years.

However, the Treaty of Lisbon was never conceived as a definitive

text establishing the finalité politique of the EU. In fact, rather
than limiting the options for treaty change and primarily in order to
facilitate further treaty revision, it introduced two generally
applicable ‘simplified revision procedures’, and increased the
number of provision-specific simplified revision procedures and so-
called passerelle clauses in the TEU and TFEU. It therefore allowed
simple, uncontentious changes to be made as needed without
opening up to bigger and more contentious changes. It would not be
long before these, as well as existing provisions, were being put to
use. An initial change followed from the Spanish-led demand for the
reallocation of seats originally planned for the 2009 European
Parliament elections to be brought into effect post-haste. On 23 June
2010, a brief ‘15-minute’ IGC was held to adopt the so-called ‘MEP
Protocol’, allowing for a temporary raising of the cap on the size of
the EP to 754 MEPs to accommodate 12 additional members. The
Protocol entered into force on 1 December 2011 (see Box 3.5).

By then, two European Council Decisions amending the TFEU had

also been introduced. The first—altering the status of Saint-
Barthélemy, a French overseas collectivity—was a minor affair and
barely attracted any attention. The second, coming in the midst of
the deepening eurozone crisis, provoked far more debate. This was
the amendment to Article 136 TFEU to enable the creation of a
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to provide financial
assistance to eurozone countries in funding sovereign debts. Adopted
on 25 March 2011, this entered into force on 1 May 2013. By then, an
initial Treaty Establishing the European Stability
Mechanism (TESM) had been signed by the 17 members of the
eurozone on 11 July 2011. With eurozone leaders adopting additional
decisions to strengthen the ESM in July and December 2011, this
Treaty soon required modifications which were contained in a
revised TESM signed on 2 February 2012. With Germany completing
ratification in September, the ESM began operations on 8 October
2012 (see Chapter 25).
BO X 3 . 5
Background: Key dates in European integration: the EU
and treaty reform beyond the Treaty of Lisbon

2010 23 June ‘Fifteen-minute’ IGC adopts ‘MEP Protocol’

2011 25 March European Council adopts treaty amendment to enable the

creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM)

11 July 17 eurozone member states sign Treaty Establishing the

European Stability Mechanism (TESM)

1 MEP Protocol enters into force

December

2012 2 February 17 eurozone member states sign modified TESM

1–2 March 25 EU member states sign Treaty on Stability,

Coordination and Governance in the Economic and
Monetary Union—the Fiscal Compact

16 May IGC agrees Irish Protocol

8 October ESM becomes operational

2013 1 January Fiscal Compact enters into force

1 July Croatia joins the EU

2014 March Czech Government abandons Czech Protocol

1 Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union

December extended to outstanding areas of judicial and police
cooperation

Irish Protocol enters into force

2016 23 June EU referendum in UK

2017 1 March White Paper on the Future of Europe

25 March European Council adopts Rome Declaration

 29 March UK government triggers Article 50 TEU

2017 19 June Start of Withdrawal negotiations

2019 December European Council agrees to Conference on the Future of

Europe (CoFE) during 2020–2022

2020 31 UK withdraws from the EU

January

24 June Council agrees position for Conference on the Future of

Europe

2021 9 June The Conference on the Future of Europe is launched

The TESM was not the only new treaty undergoing ratification. At
Germany’s insistence, a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union had been
drawn up following a fractious European Council in December 2011.
Signed on 1 March 2012, its core purpose was to create between EU
member states a ‘Fiscal Compact’ fostering budgetary discipline,
greater coordination of economic policies, and improved governance
of the euro area. However, in what was widely regarded as a
portentous move, the Treaty created, thanks to the UK’s obstinate
refusal to countenance an agreement signed by all 27 member states,
an intergovernmental, extra-EU arrangement to which neither the
UK nor the Czech Republic were originally party, although the Czech
Republic did subsequently sign up. This not only further
marginalized the UK within the EU, but also raised questions about
the position of the EU’s supranational institutions within EMU,
their influence over national economic policy, and general economic
policy coordination. Such fears proved unfounded in practice (see
Chapter 25), even if the substance of the Fiscal Compact has not been
incorporated, as envisaged, into the TEU and TFEU.

Further treaty changes have also occurred, since March 2011, to alter
the status of Mayotte, a French department (July 2012), and twice to
adjust the organization of the Court of Justice (August 2012 and
December 2015), the second adjustment providing for a staged
increase in the number of judges at the General Court to 54 from 1
September 2019. The General Court does not require this many
judges, but member states could not agree on an alternative to two
judges per member state (see Chapter 13). A European Council
decision has also been adopted (May 2013) reversing the reduction
in the size of the Commission introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon and
reinstating the principle of one Commissioner per member state (see
Chapter 10). This was in line with the deal which saw Ireland hold its
second ‘Lisbon’ referendum. Part of the package was the adoption of
the ‘Irish’ Protocol which was agreed in a brief IGC in May 2012.
Ratification took longer than anticipated owing to delays in Italy and
so the Protocol failed to enter into force as planned when Croatia
acceded to the EU on 1 July 2013. Entry into force eventually took
place on 1 December 2014. By this time, a new Czech government
had announced it was abandoning the goal of securing a ‘Czech’
Protocol. Croatia’s accession therefore saw only a few minor
adjustments to the TFEU.

The years since the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force have therefore
seen only minor adjustments to the EU’s treaty base. Things have
proceeded quietly and efficiently, without rousing public ire, thus
justifying the introduction of the new processes. In line with
expectations, and in a context of popular apathy towards the EU,
increasing populism, and Euroscepticism, there has been very little
enthusiasm for further major treaty reform over the last decade. This
is not to say that proponents of reform have remained silent. Indeed,
rarely was there a moment during the most intense phases of the
eurozone crisis when EU leaders and officials were not being made
desperately aware of the EU’s limited capacity to respond effectively.
Appropriate mechanisms and formal competences were often either
inadequate or demonstratively absent. Consequently, there was no
shortage of calls for treaty reform to provide the EU with the
necessary competences and improve the institutional framework for
economic governance. For many observers and commentators,
banking union, fiscal union, and effective economic governance have
appeared vital to safeguard the future of at least the eurozone if not
the EU; and each of them would require treaty reform.

Nothing came of the calls for treaty reform beyond the establishment
of the ESM and Fiscal Compact. The preference was to exploit
existing EU competences to the full. Equally, nothing came of the
hopes of more federalist-minded MEPs for a new Convention
following the 2014 EP elections. Instead, the prevailing sense of
economic crisis during the first half of the 2010s—soon exacerbated
by the worsening migration crisis from 2015 onwards—either curbed
or muffled the political ambitions for the EU of many of its
supporters. Even if they had been minded to pursue further reform,
the prospect of facing electorates with further treaty reform simply
did not appeal to EU leaders, particularly for those (e.g., France and
the Netherlands) who would have come under enormous pressure to
submit any text to a referendum for ratification. Others were simply
opposed to any further deepening of integration. This was
particularly so for the UK, although under David Cameron there was
in 2014–15 a clear readiness to exploit any eurozone treaty reform to
secure a major reform of the EU. Attention then turned to a
renegotiation of the terms of UK membership. The agreement
reached in February 2016 was much less far-reaching than Cameron
had hoped and proved insufficient to prevent a ‘leave’ victory in the
UK’s EU referendum four months later.

Despite the eurozone and migration crises the EU continued to

function. Responses to the eurozone crises, while often at least
seemingly sub-optimal and tardy, nevertheless came, and primarily
because of the commitment to maintaining the EU and European
integration. A sense of existential crisis hung over many European
Council and Council meetings during the 2010s, with no member
state wishing to contemplate failure and a potential disintegration of
the EU. The same was true in reaction to the UK government’s
decision to trigger Article 50, which was met with a remarkable sense
of unity among the remaining 27 member states and an apparent
determination to ensure that Brexit did not distract the EU
unnecessarily (see Chapter 27). Also testing the EU was the state of
democracy and the rule of law in Hungary and Poland where
governments talked of tearing up the treaties when faced with
accusations that they were failing to uphold core EU values. A far
greater test was the COVID-19 pandemic, which stretched the EU’s
crisis response capabilities and posed major challenges to its free
movement fundamentals. Collective action has, nevertheless, been
pursued, as evidenced by the fiscal response and the coordinated
approach to the procurement of vaccines, although these have not
been without their tensions and problems (see Chapter 28).

The pandemic also, understandably, pushed less pressing issues to

one side. Among these was whether there should be a further
substantive debate on the future of the EU. Indeed, since 2017, there
had been tentative signs of renewed confidence in integration, and
even some suggestions that a further round of treaty reform and
more integration might be in the offing. In the March 2017 Rome
Declaration marking 60 years since the signing of the Treaty of
Rome, the EU27 leaders spoke of making the EU ‘stronger and more
resilient, through even greater unity and solidarity’. And, parallel to
this, the Commission produced a White Paper on the Future of
Europe setting out possible future strategies for the Union.

No plans for any new convention or treaty reform were, however,

agreed. A key purpose of the Rome Declaration was to demonstrate,
at least at a rhetorical level, a sense of unity and commitment to
shared values and solidarity as the UK government finally triggered
Article 50 and began formally its withdrawal. However, some were
keen to raise ambitions and breathe some new life into the EU. The
new French President, Emmanuel Macron, eager to assert French
leadership of the EU, launched an ‘Initiative for Europe’ and
demanded a ‘refondation d’une Europe souveraine, unie et
démocratique’. There were other calls too, with federalists, such as
former EP President, Martin Schulz, and the MEP and former
Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, once again seeking
progress towards a ‘United States of Europe’. Other ideas circulating
included those from the ‘New Pact for Europe’ network of prominent
Brussels-based and national think tanks.

EU leaders generally responded hesitantly. The European Council in

December 2019 did, however, discuss the idea of holding a
Conference on the Future of Europe during 2020–2022, and agreed
to engage the Commission and European Parliament. In June 2020,
it was agreed that the conference would involve ‘a large variety of
different views and opinions—of EU institutions, Member States’
governments, national parliaments, citizens, civil society, academia,
social partners and other stakeholders’ (Council of the EU, 2021).
The focus would be on issues of concern to citizens and so include
sustainability, societal challenges, innovation and competitiveness,
fundamental values, and the EU’s international role. It would be ‘a
broad and open-ended process’ and report to the European Council
in 2022 which would decide on the next steps. The CoFE was
eventually launched on 9 May 2021, Europe Day.

Whether the CoFE will lead to any major reform of the EU remains
to be seen. EU leaders continue to be cautious, and generally avoid
any commitment to treaty change. For the present, the focus is on
seeking to manage the COVID-19 pandemic and deal with the
significant social and economic disruption this is causing. This could
lead to a reconsideration of the role of the EU and reform, as was
seen in the 2010s with the eurozone crisis. As then, however, further
substantive treaty reform may not be necessary and cannot be
assumed. Some tidying up of the TEU and TFEU will be needed at
some point to remove the 30 plus references and provisions relating
to the UK now that it has left the EU. This could end up being the
limit of treaty of changes for the foreseeable future. Even amongst
people like Chancellor Merkel, who has often spoken of her openness
to treaty change, there is immense caution. The likelihood is that the
adapted treaties will continue to guide the Union for some more
years yet.

Key Points

• The Treaty of Lisbon was never intended to provide

closure on EU treaty reform.

• The eurozone crisis led to calls for treaty reform to

provide the EU with the necessary competences and
improve the institutional framework for economic
governance but only piecemeal, ad hoc treaty
amendments were introduced.

• There continue to be calls for closer European

integration. The CoFE aims to facilitate citizens’
deliberation on the EU’s priorities.

• Now that the UK has left the EU, the TEU, TFEU, and
other treaty texts will need stylistic revision, but this is
low on the EU agenda.

• There remains limited appetite to pursue reform,

particularly given increased Euroscepticism.
3.11 Conclusion

Despite all of the talk of the Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of
Lisbon creating a superstate, what has emerged from the successive
rounds of treaty reform over the last three decades or so is an EU
dependent on its member states and defined by its treaties. There is
no universally shared sense of ‘Europe’ on which to fall back as there
is a Denmark, a Netherlands, or a Slovakia. It is because of this
dependence on the treaties that amendments to them have been so
sensitive and controversial. Treaty reform raises questions of what
the EU is, what it should be, and where it might go. Given this, it
should come as no surprise that the existing treaties have already
been revised and supplemented as the EU has sought to deal first
with the eurozone crisis, then with Brexit, and now with the
pandemic. Further revisions will follow either out of a pragmatic
need for minor change or because of new problems unforeseen back
in 2007, or even as a result of idealists pushing for more integration.
Pressure for reform, while somewhat muted for the last 15 years has
not, and will not, go away. ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe’
will not be the last time when such ideas are floated.

However, as much as the EU might need or its leaders and engaged

citizens desire reform, the process of effecting change is fraught with
difficulties and so further treaty change, at least on the scale of past
treaties, cannot be taken for granted. Essentially an elite-driven
project, the question of ‘more EU-rope’ has become increasingly
politicized as substantial levels of popular Euroscepticism and
contention around EU policies and action continue to show. EU
leaders were only able to secure many of the reforms contained in
the Constitutional Treaty by ensuring that the Treaty of Lisbon was
drafted in a secretive and technocratic manner and ratified almost
exclusively through parliamentary processes. It would be unwise for
such an approach to be repeated. Not only must any substantial
treaty reform process now involve a convention, but the formal
commitment of EU leaders and the EU institutions to greater
transparency and citizen engagement mean that voters simply
cannot be marginalized. A key challenge, however, is ensuring that
debate is informed. As experience with the Constitutional Treaty and
the Treaty of Lisbon amply demonstrated, many of the arguments
deployed by their advocates and, especially, their opponents were
decidedly inaccurate. Unfortunately, little by way of debate on the
EU since the late 2010s appears to have narrowed the knowledge gap
surrounding understanding of the EU, how it functions and what it
does and does not do. This was amply reflected in the Brexit
referendum. This all points, and certainly not for the first time, to the
need for the EU’s institutions and, more importantly, its member
states to engage citizens in meaningful and informed debate on what
the EU is, can, and should be.

It needs to be recognized, however, that the EU is far from static.

Although the institutional and other reforms introduced by the
Treaty of Lisbon have now bedded in, the EU remains a work-in-
progress and therefore subject to, and often in need of, revision. This
was amply demonstrated in the eurozone crisis where the EU was
shown to lack any real fleetness of foot but rather a propensity
simply to muddle through. Problems over vaccination strategies
seem to have reinforced this. Given that it is ultimately a union of
member states, each of which is committed to pursuing its own
preferences, not infrequently with scant regard for the collective EU
interest, reaching agreement on any increase in EU competence,
institutional innovation, or change in the decision-making process
will be slow if it can be achieved at all with such a sizeable
membership.

UK withdrawal from the EU may change some of the dynamics of

treaty reform. The EU will, after all, have lost one of its members
least supportive of closer integration. However, other member states
remain equally sceptical of lofty ambitions for the EU.
Euroscepticism has become part of the political mainstream and, just
as there are calls for more integration, so there are as many calls for
reining in the powers of the EU if not abandoning the EU, and not
just from populist politicians. The EU also faces challenges to
fundamental principles as the clashes with Poland over judicial
reform and the rule of law, and with Hungary demonstrate.

It cannot, therefore, be taken for granted that the unity of the EU27
expressed in the 2017 Rome Declaration and evident in the UK
withdrawal process will translate into enthusiastic responses to calls
for ambition from the likes of Macron. That said, as noted, the EU
remains a work-in-progress and a far from perfect set-up for
addressing the policy challenges that it and its member states face.
Pressure for reform will continue, whether out of need or ambition;
and adjustments and additions will be made to the imperfect ‘union’
that is the evolving EU. So, the Treaty of Lisbon was always unlikely
to be the last chapter in the history of EU treaty reform.
Q UEST I O NS

1. How and why did the EU move towards adopting the

Treaty of Lisbon?

2. What were the main features of the consolidated TEU

and TFEU?

3. How well have these consolidated treaties bedded

down?

4. How has the EU’s treaty base changed since the Treaty
of Lisbon came into force?
5. Does Brexit necessitate further EU treaty change?

6. How well have the treaties coped with the eurozone

crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic?

7. What are the prospects for future treaty revision?

8. What role do the treaties play in developing the EU?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Craig, P. (2010) The Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics, and Treaty

Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A comprehensive
legal analysis of the Treaty of Lisbon.
Dinan, D., Nugent, N., and Paterson, W.E. (2017) The European
Union in Crisis (Basingstoke: Macmillan). A collection of
assessments of selected crisis and key challenges facing the
EU.
Eriksen, E. O., Fossum, J. E., and Menéndez, A. J. (eds) (2005)
Developing a Constitution for Europe (London: Routledge). An
academic study of the rationale for a European constitution and
the process that led to the adoption of the Constitutional Treaty.
Fabbrini, F. (ed.) (2017) The Law and Politics of Brexit (Oxford:
Oxford University Press). An initial assessment of some of the
constitutional and political implications for the UK and the EU of
Brexit.
Phinnemore, D. (2013) The Treaty of Lisbon: Origins and
Negotiation (Basingstoke: Palgrave). A comprehensive account
of how the Treaty of Lisbon was negotiated and came into force.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
PA RT 2
T H E OR I E S A N D
C ON C E P T U A L
A P P R OA C H E S

4 Neo-functionalism
Carsten Strøby Jensen

5 Intergovernmentalism
Michelle Cini
6 Theorizing the European Union after Integration Theory
Ben Rosamond
7 Governance in the European Union
Thomas Christiansen

8 Europeanization
Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke
9 Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union
Stijn Smismans
4
Neo-functionalism
Carsten Strøby Jensen
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
4.1 Introduction
4.2 What is neo-functionalism?

4.3 A brief history of neo-functionalism

4.4 Supranationalism and spillover

4.5 The formation of supranational interest groups

4.6 Critiques of neo-functionalism

4.7 The revival of neo-functionalism

4.8 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

This chapter reviews a theoretical position, neo-

functionalism, which was developed in the mid-1950s by
scholars based in the United States. The fundamental
argument of the theory is that states are not the only
important actors on the international scene. As a
consequence, neo-functionalists focus their attention on
the role of supranational institutions and non-state actors,
such as interest groups and political parties, who, they
argue, are the real driving force behind integration efforts.
The chapter that follows provides an introduction to the
main features of neo-functionalist theory, its historical
development since the 1950s and how neo-functionalism is
used today.
4.1 Introduction

Neo-functionalism is often the first theory of European

integration studied by students of the European Union. This is
largely for historical reasons, because neo-functionalism was the first
attempt at theorizing the new form of regional cooperation that
emerged at the end of the Second World War. The chapter begins by
asking: ‘What is neo-functionalism?’ The purpose of Section 4.2 is to
outline the general characteristics of the theory. Section 4.3 then
summarizes the rise and fall from grace of neo-functionalism
between the 1950s and the 1970s. Section 4.4 examines three
hypotheses that form the core of neo-functionalist thinking:

1. the spillover hypothesis;

2. the elite socialization hypothesis; and

3. the supranational interest group hypothesis.

These three arguments help to expose neo-functionalist beliefs about

the dynamics of the European integration process. Section 4.5
reviews the main criticisms of the neo-functionalist school, while the
final section turns to more recent adaptations of neo-functionalist
ideas, accounting for the renewal of interest in this approach to the
study of regional integration. The chapter concludes that neo-
functionalism remains part of the mainstream theorizing of EU
developments, even though there have been some major changes in
the way in which neo-functionalism is used today compared to its
original application in the 1950s.
4.2 What is neo-functionalism?

The story of neo-functionalism began in 1958 with the publication by

Ernst B. Haas (1924–2003) of The Uniting of Europe: Political,
Social, and Economic Forces 1950–1957 (Haas, 1958). In this
seminal book, Haas explained how six West European countries
came to initiate a new form of supranational cooperation after the
Second World War. Originally, Haas’s main aim in formulating a
theoretical account of the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) was to provide a scientific and objective explanation of
regional cooperation, a grand theory that would explain similar
processes elsewhere in the world (in Latin America, for example).
However, neo-functionalism soon became very closely associated
with the European Community (EC) case and, moreover, with a
particular path of European integration.

Three characteristics of the theory help to explain what neo-

functionalism is. First, neo-functionalism’s core concept is
spillover. It is important to note at this point, however, that neo-
functionalism was mainly concerned with the process of integration
and had little to say about end goals—that is, about what an
integrated Europe would look like. As a consequence, the theory
sought to explain the dynamics of change to which states were
subject when they cooperated. Haas’s theory was based on the
assumption that cooperation in one policy area would create
pressures in a neighbouring policy area, placing it on the political
agenda, and ultimately leading to further integration. Thus ‘spillover’
refers to a situation in which cooperation in one field necessitates
cooperation in another (Hooghe and Marks, 2007). Member states’
willingness to cooperate, for example, on creating a common market
for cars would spill over to cooperation on car safety equipment to
establish a common market. Without common rules on safety
equipment, car producers would face difficulties in selling their
products in all member states because of differences in safety
standards.

This might suggest that the integration process is automatic or

beyond the control of political leaders, but when we look at the
various forms of spillover identified by Haas, we will see how this
‘automatic’ process might be guided or manipulated by actors and
institutions, the motives of which are unequivocally political.

A second, albeit related, point that helps to explain neo-

functionalism concerns the role of societal groups in the process of
integration. Haas argued that interest groups and political parties
would be key actors in driving integration forward. While
governments might be reluctant to engage in integration,
transnational interest groups would see it as in their interest to push
for further integration. This is because groups would see integration
as a way of resolving the problems they faced. Although groups
would invariably have different problems and, indeed, different
ideological positions, they would all, according to neo-functionalists,
see regional integration as a means to their desired ends.
Multinational companies would argue for further economic
integration in order to strengthen their market position and
environmental organizations would argue for increased cooperation
in order to handle cross-national problems with pollution. Thus one
might see integration as a process driven by the self-interest of
groups rather than by any ideological vision of a united Europe or by
a shared sense of identity.

Finally, neo-functionalism is often characterized as a rather elitist

approach. Although it sees a role for groups in the European
integration process, integration tends to be driven by functional and
technocratic needs. Although not apolitical, it sees only a minimal
role for democratic and accountable governance at the level of the
region. Rather, the ‘benign elitism’ of neo-functionalists tends to
assume the tacit support of the European peoples––a ‘permissive
consensus’––upon which experts and executives rely when
pushing for further European integration.
Key Points

• Neo-functionalism is a theory of integration that seeks to

explain the process of (European) integration.
• The theory was particularly influential in the 1950s and
1960s but is still widely used as a theoretical point of
reference.

• Its main focus is on the ‘factors’ that drive integration:

interest group activity at the European and national
levels; political party activity; and the role of
governments and supranational institutions.

• European integration is mostly seen as an elite-driven

process—that is, as driven by national and international
political and economic elites.
4.3 A brief history of neo-
functionalism

Neo-functionalism is very much connected to the case of European

integration. Indeed, most neo-functionalist writers have focused
their attention on Europe (Lindberg, 1963; Lindberg and Scheingold,
1970, 1971). This was not their original intention. Rather, an early
objective was to formulate a general or grand theory of international
relations, based on observations of regional integration processes.
Political and economic cooperation in Latin America was one of the
cases investigated (Haas and Schmitter, 1964). It was in Europe,
however, that political and economic integration was best developed
and most suited to theoretical and empirical study. Therefore,
Europe and European integration became the major focus of neo-
functionalism during the 1960s and 1970s.

With the benefit of hindsight, the success of neo-functionalism is

understandable because it seemed that the theory explained well the
reality of the European integration process at that time. Until the
1970s, neo-functionalism had wide support in academic circles.
However, by the 1980s it had lost momentum as a credible
theoretical and empirical position in the study of European
integration. One reason for this is that the incremental political
integration that neo-functionalism had predicted had not taken
place. From the mid-1970s, political cooperation seemed less
compelling and researchers became more interested in other kinds of
theories, especially those that stressed the importance of the nation
state. Even Haas was among those who recognized the limitations of
neo-functionalism. On this point, he wrote that ‘the prognoses often
do not match the diagnostic sophistication, and patients die when
they should recover, while others recover even though all the vital
signs look bad’ (Haas, 1975: 5).

After the early 1990s, neo-functionalism underwent a revival. The

new dynamism of the EC/EU, a consequence of the Single Market
programme (see Chapter 20), made theories that focused on
processes of political integration relevant once again (Tranholm-
Mikkelsen, 1991). Despite huge differences in interests among the
member states and continuous crises in European cooperation—
including Brexit—political integration somehow continues to develop
in Europe. Neo-functionalism offers an explanation of why this is.

Since this revival of interest in neo-functionalism, a number of

scholars have sought to adapt the theory to their own research
agendas—whether on the European integration process writ large, on
specific policy areas, or on the role of the supranational institutions.
Correspondingly, there were, following Haas’s death in 2003, several
attempts to evaluate and re-evaluate the importance of the neo-
functionalist contribution to our understanding of the development
of the European Union (for example, in a special issue of the Journal
of European Public Policy in 2005). Even trends towards
disintegration in connection with Brexit have been analysed by
taking neo-functionalism as a starting point (Schmitter and
Lefkofridi, 2016); and, today, neo-functionalism—together with
intergovernmentalism (see Chapter 5)—constitute one of the basic
theoretical points of reference in European studies (Rosamond,
2016).

Key Points

• Neo-functionalism was fashionable among elites and

academics until the 1970s.

• From the 1970s, other theoretical and conceptual

approaches seemed to fit the reality of European
integration much better than neo-functionalism, and the
theory became unpopular.

• In the 1990s, with the revival of the integration process,

there was also a renewed interest in neo-functionalism.

• From the mid-2000s, there have been further attempts to

develop the theoretical framework of traditional neo-
functionalism and to re-evaluate its contribution to both
European integration and disintegration.
4.4 Supranationalism and
spillover

The key questions asked by neo-functionalists are whether and how

economic integration leads to political integration, and if it does,
what kind of political unity will result? In this respect, neo-
functionalism differs from other traditional approaches to
international relations. Realist positions stress the power games
that occur among states. By contrast, neo-functionalists believe that
economic integration would strengthen all states involved and that
this would lead to political integration. Economic integration leads to
economic growth which in the long run implies increased welfare
among EU citizens. The fundamental idea, therefore, was that
international relations should not be considered a zero-sum game,
and that everybody wins when countries become involved in
economic and political integration.
Neo-functionalist theory also sheds light on the development of
supranational institutions and organizations, which are likely to have
their own political agendas. Over time, neo-functionalists predict,
this supranational agenda will tend to triumph over member state
interests. As an example, one might look at how the European
Parliament (EP) operates. Members of the European Parliament
(MEPs) are directly elected within the member states. One would
therefore expect the EP to be an institution influenced very much by
national interests. In the Parliament, however, MEPs are not divided
into groups relating to their national origin; rather, they are
organized along party-political and ideological lines (see Chapter 12).
In other words, Social Democrats from Germany work together with
Labour members from the UK, and Liberals from Spain work with
Liberals from Denmark. According to neo-functionalist theory, MEPs
will tend to become more European in their outlook because of these
working practices. This is often referred to as ‘elite socialization’. The
fact that MEPs work together across borders makes it difficult for
them to focus solely on national interests. This also makes the EP a
natural ally for the European Commission in its discussions with the
EU Council, even if the institutions do not always agree on matters of
policy (see Box 4.1).
BO X 4 . 1
Key Debates: Loyalty shift in the European Parliament

Although members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are

elected at national level (in direct elections), their loyalty tends
very often to be oriented towards the European level (Hix et al.,
2005). This is also predicted by neo-functionalists when they
talk about loyalty shifts among the participants of the European
institutions. This ‘shift in loyalty’ among the parliamentarians
could be observed in the election of a new President of the
European Commission in 2014. The majority of MEPs decided
that they would propose a candidate from the largest political
party in the European Parliament (see also Chapter 12 on this
procedure). After the election to the European Parliament in
2014, Jean-Claude Juncker was proposed as President of the
Commission. After some debate, this was accepted by the
member states. The process leading to the appointment of
Juncker can be seen as a way of increasing the influence of the
European Parliament at the expense of national governments
(and national parliaments). Neo-functionalists argue that MEPs
gradually shifted their loyalty preferences from the national
level towards the European level. This happens partly because
of changes in norms among the parliamentarians (with MEPs
normatively influenced by the ‘Brussels atmosphere’) and partly
because of their interest, once they become MEPs, in
increasing the influence of the European Parliament on
European politics. However, this neo-functionalist view has to a
certain degree been challenged in connection with the
 increasing number of explicitly Eurosceptic MEPs. After the
2014 election the Eurosceptic party groups in the European
Parliament were strengthened (represented by Europe of
Nations and Freedom (ENF) and European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR) (Whitaker et al., 2017)).
In the election to the European Parliament in 2019, and in
connection with the nomination of a new President for the
European Commission, Members of the Parliament expected
that they could again force the Council to accept a President
suggested by the Parliament (as in 2014). Candidates for the
presidency of the Commission were even performing in
debates similar to what is known from national election
processes, and Manfred Weber from the European People’s
Party was one of the favourites. However, in the end the
Council decided to elect Ursula von der Leyen as President for
the European Commission, despite protests coming from the
European Parliament. This indicates that the member states
(and especially core member states like France and Germany)
are still very central actors in the European Union. It also
illustrates some of the weaknesses of neo-functionalism. Neo-
functionalist theory would not predict nor expect this kind of roll
back of the integration process.

Political integration is therefore a key concept for neo-

functionalists, although it is possible to identify different
understandings of this concept in neo-functionalist writings.
Lindberg and Scheingold (1971: 59), for example, stressed that
political integration involves governments doing together what they
used to do individually. It is about setting up supranational and
collective decision-making processes. Haas also saw political
integration in terms of shifts in attitudes and loyalties among
political actors. In 1958, he famously wrote:
Political integration is the process whereby political actors in several distinct national
settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities
toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-
existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new
political community, superimposed over the pre-existing ones (Haas, 1958: 16).

Neo-functionalist writers developed at least three different

arguments about the dynamics of the integration processes: the
spillover hypothesis; the elite socialization hypothesis; and the
hypothesis on supranational interest groups.

4.4.1 Spillover
Spillover is neo-functionalism’s best-known concept. The concept of
spillover refers to a process in which political cooperation conducted
with a specific goal in mind leads to the formulation of new goals in
order to assure the achievement of the original goal. What this
means is that political cooperation, once initiated, is extended over
time in a way that was not necessarily intended at the outset.

To fulfil certain goals, states cooperate on a specific issue. For

example, the original aim may be the free movement of workers
across EU borders, but it may soon become obvious that different
national rules on certification prevent workers from gaining
employment in other EU states. For example, nurses educated in one
member state may not be allowed to work in another because of
differences in national educational systems. As a consequence, new
political goals in the field of education policy may be formulated so
as to overcome this obstacle to the free movement of labour. This
process of generating new political goals is the very essence of the
neo-functionalist concept of spillover:
Spillover refers … to the process whereby members of an integration scheme—agreed
on some collective goals for a variety of motives but unequally satisfied with their
attainment of these goals—attempt to resolve their dissatisfaction by resorting to
collaboration in another, related sector (expanding the scope of mutual commitment)
or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of
mutual commitment), or both (Schmitter, 1969: 162).

Functional (or technical), political, and cultivated spillover constitute

three different kinds of spillover process:

• An example of functional spillover—where one step

towards cooperation functionally leads to another—can be
seen in the case of the Single Market (see Chapter 20). The
Single Market was functionally related to common rules
governing the working environment. This meant that some of
the trade barriers to be removed under the Single Market
programme took the form of national regulations on health
and safety, because the existence of different standards across
the Community prevented free movement. The functional
consequence of establishing a Single Market was, therefore,
that the member states ended up accepting the regulation of
certain aspects of the working environment at European level,
 even though this had not been their original objective (Jensen,
2000) (see Box 4.2).

• Political spillover occurs in situations characterized by a more

deliberated political process, in which national political elites
or interest groups argue that supranational cooperation is
needed to solve specific problems. National interest groups
focus more on European than on national solutions and tend
to shift their loyalty towards the supranational level. Interest
groups understand that their chances of success increase
when they support European rather than national solutions
(Turkina and Postnikov, 2012). This type of spillover is closely
related to a theory that argues that European integration
promotes shifts of loyalty among civil servants and other elite
actors (see Box 4.3).
• Cultivated spillover refers to situations in which
supranational actors—the European Commission in particular
—push the process of political integration forward when they
mediate between the member states (Tranholm-Mikkelsen,
1991; Niemann, 2006; Stephenson, 2010). For example, the
Commission may take heed only of arguments that point
towards further political integration (‘more’ Europe) during
the negotiation process, while ignoring or rejecting arguments
that are primarily based on national interests (see Box 4.4).
BO X 4 . 2
Case Study: Functional spillover: from the Single Market
to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance

The Single Market has increased the opportunities for

companies in Europe to trade across borders. This was
intended to encourage a growth in trade among the countries of
the European Community. However, the increased level of
transnational trade in the EC caused companies and countries
to be more exposed to exchange rate fluctuations, and this
demonstrated the functional advantages inherent in a common
European currency. From that perspective, economic and
monetary union (EMU) embodies a functional logic connecting
growth in trade across borders in the EU with the functional
need for a common currency to reduce risks related to
expanding trade. However, the 2008 financial crisis
demonstrated the weakness of EMU. When the member states
agreed to set up a monetary union, they chose not to give the
EU the ability to influence directly national fiscal policies. When
the financial crisis hit Europe, this serious institutional
weakness was exposed. In that respect, the agreement of the
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance of 2012 can
also be seen as an unintended consequence of functional
spillover. The financial crisis revealed that if a group of
countries has a common currency, there is a fundamental
functional need to have a coordinated fiscal policy, even if it
were not the original intention of the member states of the euro
area when the common currency was first set up. In this sense,
the establishment of supranational institutions such as the EU
may be seen to be the result of unintended consequences of
actions among the actors involved in decision-making.

BO X 4 . 3
Case Study: Political spillover in the Brexit process

Although the UK’s departure from the EU might be seen as a

major setback for European integration, it may also encourage
supranational actors to argue for increased political integration
among the remaining member states. This might be interpreted
as an example of political spillover. Supranational actors like
the European Commission or pro-European interest groups
might argue that Brexit and the underlying dissatisfaction with
the EU is not a consequence of ‘too much political integration’,
but of ‘too little political integration’ and that dissatisfaction
among part of the British population with the free movement of
labour (and with Eastern European workers coming to the UK)
is a result of the EU’s failure to introduce a developed social
policy. A push for further social policy integration in the EU
might therefore emerge from the Brexit process.
BO X 4 . 4
Case Study: Cultivated spillover in the area of health
policy—the use of antibiotics in the veterinarian sector

Health policy is traditionally an area with no or very little EU

involvement (Vollard et al., 2016). It is an area where the
national interest prevails, and where member states have been
reluctant to transfer competence to the EU. Increasingly,
however, member states’ health policies are influenced by the
EU, especially when the policy is linked to the Single Market.
Greer, for example, talks about spillover from Single Market to
health policy (Greer, 2006: 143). The spillover effect can also
be seen in the linkages that exist between the veterinarian area
and health policy. The development of resistance to antibiotics
is increasingly seen as a potential health problem both globally
and in the EU (European Commission, 2011b). The overuse of
antibiotics in both the human health sector and in the veterinary
sector has led to resistance problems, which means that
infections that used to be treated with antibiotics are
increasingly non-treatable. The legal basis for EU regulation in
the health area is rather weak, but in 2014 the Commission
proposed a regulation on ‘marketing authorizations’ for
veterinary medicine (European Commission, 2014). This
proposal includes rules on the use of antibiotics in the
veterinary sector, especially so-called critical antibiotics.
Governing the use of antibiotics in the veterinarian sector for
the sake of human health through a ‘marketing authorization
regulation’ can be viewed as a case of cultivated spillover. Here
 the Commission has deliberately tried to create a new agenda
to resolve a cross-border problem in an area where EU
competences are weak. The lack of health policy has also been
important in relations to the COVID-19 crisis.

Supranational institutions may use special interests as a means of

driving forward the integration process. These special interests may
be promoted through so-called ‘package deals’, in which steps are
taken to treat apparently discrete issues as a single (composite) item,
enabling all (or the majority of) actors to safeguard their interests.
For example, if a member state has an interest in a certain policy
area, such as preventing cuts in agricultural spending, while another
has interests in industrial policy, these member states may agree,
formally or informally, to support each other in negotiations. As a
result, the two policy areas can be easily linked within the bargaining
process, particularly when an entrepreneurial actor such as the
Commission takes the initiative.

Thus, spillover processes may be seen partly as the result of

unintended consequences. Member states might deliberately accept
political integration and the delegation of authority to
supranational institutions on an issue. However, as a result of that
decision, they may suddenly find themselves in a position where
there is a need for even more delegation. As a result, Lindberg and
Scheingold (1970) are right to stress that political integration need
not be the declared end goal for member states engaging in this
process. The latter have their own respective goals, which are likely
to have more to do with policy issues than with integration. As
Lindberg and Scheingold write:
We do not assume that actors will be primarily or even at all interested in increasing
the scope and capacities of the system per se. Some will be, but by and large most are
concerned with achieving concrete economic and welfare goals and will view
integration only as a means to these ends (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1970: 117).

The neo-functionalist concept of spillover has also recently been used

to analyse possible EU-integrational effects of the so-called
migrant/refugee crises, although this is an area often conceptualized
as primarily being more related to intergovernmental dynamics
(Niemann and Speyer, 2018; Börzel and Risse, 2018). The recent
inflow of migrants and refugees to different EU countries put
pressure on the Schengen agreements and the lack of border control
between the Schengen countries. As Börzel and Risse write:
‘Functional pressures to strengthen the common asylum and
migration policy in order to preserve Schengen by establishing a
centralized relocation mechanism or by creating a common border
control have been strong’ (Börzel and Risse, 2018: 93). Schengen
makes it difficult to hinder movements among migrants and refugees
across borders between the Schengen countries. Therefore, the need
for a common asylum and migration policy in the EU increases. This
can be seen as an example of (potential) functional spillover.

4.4.2 Elite socialization

The second aspect of neo-functionalist theory concerns the
development of supranational loyalties by participants such as
officials and politicians in the decision-making process. The theory
here is that, over time, people involved on a regular basis in the
supranational policy process will tend to develop European loyalties
and preferences. For example, Commission officials are expected to
hold a European perspective on problem-solving so that their loyalty
may no longer be to any one national polity, but rather to the
supranational level of governance (see Box 4.5). Even civil servants
representing member states in Brussels will develop a more
European perspective on how politics should develop. They will
increasingly, according to the elite socialization theory, conceptualize
their own role as being oriented towards mediating views at
European level instead of primarily representing the narrow
interests of the member state from which they come.

We can well imagine how participants engaged in an intensive

ongoing decision-making process, which may extend over several
years, bring them into frequent and close personal contact, and
which engages them in a joint problem-solving and policy-making,
might develop a special orientation to that process and to those
interactions, especially if they are rewarding.
 BO X 4 . 5
Key Debates: ‘Elite socialization’ and ‘loyalty transfer’

Neo-functionalism stresses the process of socialization and

‘loyalty transfer’. In an analysis of political integration in the
educational sector, Warleigh-Lack and Drachenberg (2011:
1006) quote a Director-General in the Commission who made
the following observation: ‘[T]he typical socialization process
would begin with the Member States’ representatives being
very hesitant at first. Then they call each other by first names,
and then they want to change the world together’ (see also
Chapter 11). Socialization leads actors to look beyond their own
roles, allowing them to leave behind the attitude that their own
system is the best.

Participants may come to value the system and their role within it,
either for itself, or for the concrete rewards and benefits it has
produced or that it promises.

Thus, neo-functionalists predicted that the European integration

process would lead to the establishment of elite groups loyal to the
supranational institutions that hold pan-European norms and ideas
(see Box 4.6). These elites would try to convince national elites of the
advantages of supranational cooperation. At the same time, neo-
functionalists also predicted that international negotiations would
become less politicized and more technocratic. The
institutionalization of the interactions between national actors and
the continued negotiations between different member states would
make it more and more difficult for states to adhere to their political
arguments and retain their credibility (Haas, 1958: 291). As a result,
it was expected that the agenda would tend to shift towards more
technical problems upon which it was possible to forge agreement.
BO X 4 . 6
Key Debates: Neo-functionalist expectations about
European institutions

Neo-functionalists have formulated theories that they have

used to predict the behaviour of the European institutions.
• The European Commission is expected to act as a
‘political entrepreneur’ or a ‘policy entrepreneur’, as well
as a mediator. The Commission will, according to neo-
functionalist theory, try to push for greater cooperation
between the member states in a direction that leads to
more and more supranational decision-making.
• The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) is expected not
only to rule on the basis of legal arguments, but also to
favour political integration. In this way, the Court will
seek to expand the logic of Community law to new
areas.
• The European Parliament is expected to have a
supranational orientation and to be the natural ally of the
European Commission. Although MEPs are elected by
the nationals of their home country, they are divided
politically and ideologically in their daily work. Neo-
functionalists expect MEPs to develop loyalties towards
the EU and the ‘European idea’, so that they will often
(although not always) defend European interests against
national interests.
• The EU Council is expected to be the institution in which
national interests are defended. However, neo-
functionalists would also expect member states to be
influenced by the logic of spillover, which would lead
them to argue for greater economic and political
integration, despite their national interests. The member
states are also expected to be influenced by the fact that
they are involved in ongoing negotiations in a
supranational context. This makes it difficult for a
member state to resist proposals that lead to further
political integration.
4.5 The formation of
supranational interest groups

According to neo-functionalist theory, civil servants are not the only

groups that develop a supranational orientation; organized interest
groups are also expected to become more European as corporations
and business groups formulate their own interests with an eye to the
supranational institutions (see Chapter 14). In that respect neo-
functionalism to a much higher degree than intergovernmentalism
stresses the importance of non-state actors in international relations
and politics (see Chapter 5). As economic and political integration in
a given region develops, interest groups will try to match this
development by reorganizing at the supranational level. For example,
national industrial and employers’ organizations established a
common European organization, the Confederation of European
Business, BUSINESSEUROPE, in 1958 (originally called UNICE, the
Union des Industries de la Communauté Européenne) at much the
same time as the European Community was established. In so doing,
their intention was to influence future Community policy. Early neo-
functionalists also foresaw a similar role for political parties.

In a similar way, the financial crises also made some international

organizations—like the Basel Committee—more visible. The Basel
Committee is an international organization—situated in Basel—that
develops global standards on prudential regulation of banks. The
members are national Central Banks (including the European
Central Bank). The importance of this kind of international financial
organizations has increased, especially since the financial crises
around 2007/08. The Basel Committee has, since the financial
crises, developed international banking standards like Basel III and
Basel IV in order to reduce uncertainty in the international financial
system. The Basel Committee is a good example of the kind of
international institution/organization that neo-functionalist theory
predicts would develop. It is an international organization that
creates international standards within the financial area without
having any formal legal competence. However, the standards are to a
high degree transformed into legislation in the EU and other
countries.

Furthermore, neo-functionalists believed that interest groups would

put pressure on governments to force them to speed up the
integration process. These groups were expected to develop their
own supranational interest in political and economic integration,
which would ally them to supranational institutions, such as the
European Commission. Thus, ‘in the process of reformulating
expectations and demands, the interest groups in question approach
one another supranationally while their erstwhile ties with national
friends undergo deterioration’ (Haas, 1958: 313).

Transnational organized interests can also be observed in policy

areas such as climate policy. Environmental organizations such as
Greenpeace often try to influence policy-making, while cutting across
national boundaries and national interests. They act as transnational
organized interests in the way in which neo-functionalists predicted
and argue that it is necessary to increase the competences of the
EU in relation to climate issues to push forward the climate agenda.

Key Points

• Neo-functionalists believe that there are different types

of spillover.

• Functional, political, and cultivated spillover account for

different dynamics in the integration process.

• Elite socialization implies that, over time, people involved

in European affairs shift their loyalties to the European
institutions and away from their nation state.

• Neo-functionalists believe that interest groups also

become Europeanized, placing demands on their
national governments for more integration.
4.6 Critiques of neo-functionalism

Neo-functionalism has been criticized on both empirical and

theoretical grounds. At an empirical level, the criticism focuses on
the absence (or slow pace) of political integration in Western Europe
during the 1970s and early 1980s. Neo-functionalism had predicted a
pattern of development characterized by a gradual intensification of
political integration—a development that, by the 1970s, had clearly
not taken place. The French boycott of the European institutions in
the mid-1960s had led to a more cautious phase in the evolution of
the Community and recognition of the importance of political leaders
as constraints on the process of integration. Indeed, with the
European Community having suffered numerous crises, it could even
be argued that the integration process had reversed. Moravcsik
writes that:
Despite the richness of its insights, neo-functionalism is today widely regarded as
having offered an unsatisfactory account of European integration … The most widely
cited reason is empirical: neo-functionalism appears to mispredict both the trajectory
and the process of EC evolution. Insofar as neo-functionalism advances a clear
precondition about the trajectory in the EC over time, it was that the technocratic
imperative would lead to a ‘gradual’, ‘automatic’ and ‘incremental’ progression toward
deeper integration and greater supranational influence (Moravcsik, 1993: 476).

Haas even talked about the possibility that there might be a

disintegrative equivalent to spillover: ‘spillback’. In many ways,
Brexit can be conceptualized as the prime example of a ‘spillback’
process in the EU. That a major country would choose to leave the
EU was not foreseen among scholars advocating within a neo-
functionalist framework. However, one could also use neo-
functionalist theory to argue that spillback processes are often
followed by processes of spillover. In that sense, it would not be a
surprise if Brexit in the long run leads to increased political
cooperation and integration among the remaining member states.
The Brexit crisis also indicates that it is difficult for a country to
break out of the European Union. The cost of disintegration is very
high, for example if it implies leaving the common market (Cavlak,
2019). Therefore, the UK ended up accepting a deal that in many
ways continues its close relationship with the EU. The Brexit deal can
in that sense be seen as a process where the UK leaves and stays in
the EU at the same time due to the functional ties that exists between
the UK and the EU. The second set of objections was based on
criticism of the theories formulated by Haas himself. By the late
1960s, Haas had accepted that his prediction—that regional
organizations such as the European Union would develop
incrementally, propelled forward by various dynamics such as
spillover—had failed to encapsulate the reality of European
cooperation (Haas, 1975, 1976). He recommended a different
approach to regional integration, based on the theories of
interdependence that were being developed in the mid-1970s by
Keohane and Nye (1975, 1976), among others. This approach argued
that institutions such as the EC/EU should be analysed against the
background of the growth in international interdependence, rather
than as regional political organizations. Referring to European
integration, Haas (1975: 6) wrote that ‘[w]hat once appeared to be a
distinctive “supranational” style now looks more like a huge regional
bureaucratic appendage to an intergovernmental conference in
permanent session’. In so arguing, Haas abandoned the theory that
he had been so instrumental in developing.

In some later writings, Haas argued that neo-functionalism had a

common ground with constructivist thinking (see Chapter 6).
Constructivists argue that institutions, discourses, and
intersubjectivity are important factors when international relations
are analysed (Haas and Haas, 2002). It means that the way political
problems are ‘talked about’ in itself influence policy decisions made
by the politicians. If tax fraud (as in the Panama case) is ‘talked
about’ as a common European problem, it stimulates European
political initatives. If it is ‘talked about’ as primarily a national
problem for the single member state it stimulates national solutions
and tends to hinder European initiatives. The importance of
discourses also attracted major attention from neo-functionalists
(although the vocabulary was different), especially with regard to
how political elites are socialized. Socialization can be viewed as a
process in which values and beliefs are constructed. Haas (2001: 22)
writes: ‘A case can easily be made that the Neo-functionalist
approach, developed in order to give the study of European regional
integration a theoretical basis, is a precursor of what has lately been
called Constructivism.’

In the third group of objections to the theory, it was argued that neo-
functionalism had placed undue emphasis on the supranational
component of regional integration. Critics suggested that greater
importance should be attached to the nation state and that regional
forms of cooperation should be analysed as intergovernmental
organizations. This line of attack was adopted by Moravcsik (1993,
1998, 2005), among others, under the rubric of liberal
intergovernmentalism (see Chapter 5): ‘Whereas neo-
functionalism stresses the autonomy of supranational officials,
liberal intergovernmentalism stresses the autonomy of national
leaders’ (Moravcsik, 1993: 491). Intergovernmentalists argue, for
example, that although the President of the European Commission
plays an important role in EU decision-making, it is the German
Chancellor, who, together with other heads of government (or state)
from the largest member states, has the decisive say.

Neo-functionalism first and foremost focused on political and

administrative elites, and on the processes of cooperation among
national elites (Risse, 2005: 297). The assumption was that if the
elites started to cooperate, then the populations would follow. The
experience of ‘no’ votes in national referendums on the EU treaties
and on Brexit demonstrates that this focus on political elites is a
major weakness in neo-functionalist theory. Although political and
administrative elites at the national and European level agreed, for
example, on the Lisbon Treaty, this did not mean that the voters
followed them. And although the major political parties and the
business and financial establishment in the UK argued for the UK to
stay in the EU, the vote ended in a ‘no’. In this respect, one could say
that neo-functionalism as a theoretical tradition has a blind spot in
its lack of understanding of the need for the EU to establish
legitimacy among the peoples of Europe (see Chapter 9). This can
especially be seen as a problem in times when EU policies are
increasingly involved in most aspects of national policy and where
identity policies are high on the agenda (Kuhn, 2019).
Key Points

• Neo-functionalism has been criticized on both empirical

and theoretical grounds.

• On empirical grounds, neo-functionalism has been

criticized for failing to live up to the reality of the EC.

• On theoretical grounds, critics have denied the existence

of elite socialization and have stressed the importance of
the global dimension of integration.

• Critiques of neo-functionalism have also sought to

reposition the nation state at the heart of the study of the
European integration process.
4.7 The revival of neo-
functionalism

After years of obsolescence, there was a revival in interest in neo-

functionalism at the beginning of the 1990s. There are several
reasons for the theory’s renewed popularity. The first concerns
general developments in the European Community. The Single
European Act (SEA) and the creation of the Single Market (see
Chapter 20) marked a new phase of economic and political
cooperation in Western Europe in the mid-1980s. The processes of
integration associated with these developments seemed very much in
line with the sort of spillover predicted by neo-functionalist theory
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen, 1991).

However, this renewed interest in neo-functionalism involved much

more than just a step back to the 1960s. Rather than simply adopting
the traditional or classical model, many of those who sought to reuse
neo-functionalist theory accepted it only as a partial theory or as a
middle range theory—that is, as a theory that explained some, but
not all, of the European integration process. This contrasts with the
earlier ambition of the neo-functionalists––to create a grand theory
of European integration.

An important contribution to this new approach was made by Stone

Sweet and Sandholtz (1998; see also Stone Sweet, 2010, and
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012). Although these authors are not
neo-functionalists in any traditional sense, they claim that their
theoretical considerations have ‘important affinities with neo-
functionalism’ (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1998: 5). They argue that
the traditional distinction made in the theoretical literature on
European integration––that it is either supranational or
intergovernmental––is no longer sufficient. While both tendencies
are represented in the real world of European politics, they appear
differently in different policy areas within the Union, so that some
are characterized by intergovernmentalism and others by
supranationalism. However, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz do not
use the spillover concept when they seek to explain processes of
political integration and the formation of supranational institutions.
Instead, they develop what they call a ‘transaction-based’ theory of
integration (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012). This draws attention
to the increasing levels of transactions (such as in the field of trade,
communications, and travel) across EU borders, which in turn
increases demands for European-level regulation. In time, these
demands generate a process of institutionalization, leading to the
establishment of what the authors call ‘supranational
governance’.

Along similar lines, references to neo-functionalist theory have

increased dramatically since the beginning of the 1990s. In policy
areas such as defence (Guay, 1996), social policy (Jensen, 2000), and
telecommunications (Sandholtz, 1998), attitudes among European
civil servants (Hooghe, 2001, 2012), regional economic integration in
Asia (Sultan and Mehmood, 2020), competition policy (McGowan,
2007), enlargement (Macmillan, 2009), air transportation (Rauh
and Schneider, 2013), health policy (Greer, 2006; Brooks, 2012), and
transnational liberties (Newman, 2008), authors have discussed
neo-functionalism as a possible frame for explaining specific forms
of integration.

During the 2000s, there have also been some important attempts at
further developing the original neo-functionalist framework. Arne
Niemann (2006, 2015), for example, argues that the process of
integration should not be seen as an inevitable process. Integration is
no longer viewed as an automatic and exclusively dynamic process,
but rather occurs under certain conditions and is better
characterized as a dialectic process—that is, the product of both
dynamics and countervailing forces. In addition, instead of a grand
theory, the revisited approach is understood as a wide-ranging, but
partial, theory. Thus, ‘[w]hile elites are still attributed a primary role
for decision outcomes, the wider publics are assumed to impact on
the evolution of the European integration process, too’ (Niemann,
2006: 5). Niemann discusses the original neo-functionalist concepts
of spillover and argues for the relevance of a new form of spillover:
‘social spillover’ (Niemann, 2006: 37ff). Through this concept, he
tries to combine the traditional spillover concept with the
socialization theory discussed in Section 4.4.2 on ‘Elite socialization’,
arguing that this new concept of social spillover can capture
processes that lead to a low level of European integration: ‘In
contrast to early neo-functionalism, which assumed constant
learning and socialization, the revisited framework departs from the
presumption and is concerned with delimiting the scope of social
spillover’ (Niemann, 2006: 42).
Philippe Schmitter—one of the ‘old’ neo-functionalists—has also
argued that neo-functionalism is still useful. He has even talked
about the need for developing a neo-neo-functionalism that can
conceptualize the disintegrating logics of the European integration
(Schmitter, 2004; Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2016). One of the key
points in Schmitter’s concept of neo-neo-functionalism is that
European integration tends to develop as a consequence of crises
(Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2016). Crises can be drivers for increased
integration and can even speed up integration processes, as
happened after the post-2008 financial crisis. One highly relevant
question is the extent to which the COVID-19 crisis will lead to
increased political integration, especially in relation to health policy.
This crisis has shown that the member states are sometimes left very
much to themselves, as was Italy in the early months of the
pandemic. This may change, although political integration on health
policy has traditionally—despite the spillover effects described above
in relation to antimicrobial resistance—been hindered due to what
Scharpf has called constitutional asymmetry (Scharpf, 2010).
Constitutional asymmetry implies that only market integration
within a policy area is covered by positive integration through the
creation of market-regulating rules (Schmitter and Lefkofridi, 2016),
while the non-market aspect is primarily an area of national
competence with low levels of political integration and European
coordination. While this situation has generally been observed in
relation to health policy (Clemens et al., 2014; Jensen, 2020), it is
seriously challenged by the COVID-19 crisis.

In specific areas, the COVID-19 crisis has already led to increased

political integration in the EU. This is the case in relation to the
handling of the economic impact of COVID-19. The EU recovery plan
of 2020 (Council of the European Union 14310/20) implied, for
example, that the European Union would have an extended right to
revenue from direct tax (on non-recycled plastic packaging waste);
and that the European Union on a collective basis would borrow
money to finance the recovery. This initiative was heavily debated by
the member states in mid-2020 because it implied that states
collectively are liable for government debt. From a neo-functionalist
perspective this can be seen as a major step forward in the political
integration of the EU’s economic policy.

Key Points

• Interest in neo-functionalism re-emerged in the 1990s as

the theory seemed to clearly describe key dynamics in
the integration process such as the Single European Act
and the Single Market.

• The role of the CJEU as a typical example of

supranational governance validates the relevance of
neo-functionalism as an explanatory theory.

• In more recent contributions neo-functionalists

acknowledge that European integration is not an
automatic and inevitable process.

• Social spillover explains low levels of European

integration.
4.8 Conclusion

Since the first writings of Haas in the 1950s, theories of regional

integration, or ‘neo-functionalism’ as it is more popularly called,
have had their ups and downs. As a means of explaining cooperation
among states in the 1960s, neo-functionalism became very popular.
New forms of cooperation developed after the Second World War,
especially in Europe, and these demanded new research
perspectives. Neo-functionalism was able to describe and explain
these developments in a way that was novel and of its time. In the
period after 1945, the fashion was for grand theorizing—that is, the
construction of scientific theories that would explain the ‘big picture’.
Nowadays, most theorists (and particularly those working on the
European Union) are content to devote their energies to the
generation of less ambitious middle-range theories (see Chapters
6 and 7) that explain only part of the process.

Focusing on the supranational aspects of the new international

organizations, neo-functionalism explained cooperation using
concepts such as spillover and loyalty transfer. States were expected
to cooperate on economic matters to realize the economic advantages
that come with increased levels of trade. This would lead to demands
for political coordination across state borders and, in some cases, to
the establishment of supranational institutions. Cooperation in one
policy area would involve cooperation in new areas, thereby
initiating an incremental process of political integration. Over time,
the supranational institutions would become more and more
independent and better able to formulate their own agendas, forcing
the national states to delegate further competences to the
supranational level. Yet, by the mid-1970s, neo-functionalism was no
longer a credible position to hold. States remained key actors and it
became hard to distinguish supranational institutions from more
traditional international organizations.

Supranationalism did experience a revival, however, at the beginning

of the 1990s and during the 2000s. The establishment of the Single
Market, the creation of the European Union at Maastricht, and its
enlargement opened the door to new interest in supranational
developments and institutions. The EU suddenly began to look much
more like the kind of institution that Haas and others had predicted
would emerge out of regional economic and political integration. But
although there was some interest in neo-functionalism at this time,
most of the ‘new’ neo-functionalists felt free to pick and choose from
those elements of the theory that best suited their research agendas.
Today, neo-functionalism is not the most frequently used theoretical
framework. It is, however, still an approach that contributes to the
understanding of how EU institutions develop and of how political
integration in the EU might be explained as the unintended
consequence of cooperation among countries; and by introducing the
concept of spillover, neo-functionalism has contributed to the
understanding of the internal dynamics that have pushed political
integration forward.
Q UEST I O NS

1. What do neo-functionalists mean by ‘political

integration’?

2. How can private interest groups influence the processes

of political integration?

3. According to neo-functionalist theory, what role do the

supranational institutions play in the European
integration process?

4. What evidence is there that ‘loyalty-transfer’ among the

civil servants in the supranational institutions occurs?

5. Does the conduct of the Court of Justice of the European

Union support neo-functionalist theory?

6. Why is it very difficult for neo-functionalism to analyse

and explain: (a) the rejection of the constitution by the
French and Dutch voters in the 2005 referendums; or (b)
the 2016 Brexit vote in the UK?

7. Can neo-functionalism be used to explain the Treaty on

Stability, Coordination and Governance?

8. How, according to neo-functionalism, will the COVID-19

crisis influence health policy development in the EU?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Journal of European Public Policy (2005) ‘Special issue: The

disparity of European integration: revisiting neo-functionalism in
honour of Ernst Haas’, 12/2. A special issue of this journal with
contributions from Phillip C. Schmitter, Andrew Moravcsik, Ben
Rosamond, Thomas Risse, and others. This is the best recent
evaluation of neo-functionalism and its contribution to the study
of European integration.
Niemann, A and Ioannou, D. (2015) ‘European economic
integration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?’,
Journal of European Public Policy, 22/2: 196–218. This article
discusses the financial crisis using a neo-functionalist
perspective.
Sandholtz, W. and Stone Sweet, A. (eds) (1998) European
Integration and Supranational Governance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press). An edited volume that develops the notion of
supranational governance, drawing on aspects of neo-
functionalist theory.
Schmitter, P.C. and Lefkofridi, Z. (2016) ‘Neo-Functionalism as a
Theory of Disintegration’, Chinese Political Science Review, 1,
1–29. This article discusses how crisis can influence integration
processes.
Tranholm-Mikkelsen, J. (1991) ‘Neo-functionalism: obstinate or
obsolete? A reappraisal in the light of the new dynamism of the
EC’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20/1: 1–22.
This is the key reference for examining the application of neo-
functionalism to the post-1985 period.
Wolfe, J. D. (2011) ‘Who rules the EU? Pragmatism and power
in European integration theory’, Journal of Political Power, 4/1:
127–44. This article provides a theoretical and methodological
overview of the differences between neo-functionalism and
realism.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
5
Intergovernmentalism
Michelle Cini
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
5.1 Introduction
5.2 What is intergovernmentalism?

5.3 Classical intergovernmentalism and its critics

5.4 Variants of intergovernmentalism

5.5 Liberal intergovernmentalism and its critics

5.6 New intergovernmentalism

5.7 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

This chapter provides an overview of intergovernmentalist

integration theory, focusing on classical, liberal, and
‘newer’ variants. It first introduces the basic premises and
assumptions of intergovernmentalism, identifying its realist
origins and the state-centrism that provides the core of the
approach, before examining in more detail the specific
characteristics of the classical approach associated with
the work of Stanley Hoffmann. The subsequent section also
examines some of the ways in which intergovernmentalist
thinking has contributed to different explanations of
European integration. The topics covered in this section
are: confederalism; the domestic politics approach; and
institutional analyses that emphasize the ‘locked-in’ nature
of nation states within the integration process. Next, the
chapter introduces liberal intergovernmentalism, an
approach developed by Andrew Moravcsik, which, since
the mid-1990s, has become a focal point for
intergovernmentalist research and addresses. This section
also identifies some of the criticisms directed at the liberal
intergovernmentalist approach. The chapter ends by
introducing new intergovernmentalism, the most recent
intergovernmentalist approach.
5.1 Introduction

From the mid-1960s to the present day, intergovernmentalism has

continued to provide a useful way of studying the European
integration process. For many years, students of European
integration learnt about the two competing approaches that
explained (and, in some cases, predicted) the course of European
integration: neo-functionalism (covered in Chapter 4); and
intergovernmentalism (the focus of this chapter). Although this
dichotomy between these two ways of understanding European
integration has been supplemented by alternative approaches (see
Chapters 6 and 7), intergovernmentalism—or rather contemporary
variants of intergovernmentalism—continue to resonate within the
mainstream academic discourse on European integration. As such, it
remains a dominant paradigm for explaining European integration.

This chapter provides a general introduction to the arguments and

critiques of intergovernmentalist theory. It focuses on the works of
Stanley Hoffmann, whose early writings date from the 1960s, and
Andrew Moravcsik, who began to make an impact on the field in the
early 1990s. It also examines some of the premises and assumptions
underpinning intergovernmentalist thinking. The chapter begins by
addressing the question, ‘What is intergovernmentalism?’ It then
introduces classical intergovernmentalism and its main criticisms.
Hoffmann’s groundbreaking insights into the phenomenon of
European integration, together with critiques of his work, led to new
developments in European integration theory from the 1970s
onwards. Although these might not always be termed
‘intergovernmentalist’ in any narrow sense of the word, they are
premised upon a ‘state-centrism’ that owes much to Hoffmann’s
work. Important examples of these ‘variants’ of
intergovernmentalism highlight the confederal characteristics of the
European Union; the importance of domestic politics; and a more
institutionalist kind of research agenda that shows how states, as
central actors, become ‘locked into’ the European integration
process. The following section discusses the ‘liberal
intergovernmentalist’ (LI) theory of European integration and
addresses criticisms of this approach. The final section covers the
most recent form of intergovernmentalism, new
intergovernmentalism.
5.2 What is
intergovernmentalism?

Intergovernmentalism provides a state-centric explanation of the

European integration process (see Box 5.1). In other words,
intergovernmentalism privileges the role of states and state actors
within European integration. The approach is drawn from classical
theories of international relations and, loosely, from realist or neo-
realist accounts of inter-state bargaining (Pollack, 2012). Realism
views international politics as the interaction of self-interested states
in an anarchic environment in which no global authority is capable of
securing order (Morgenthau, 1985). States are rational, unitary
actors that define their interests based on an evaluation of their
position in the system of states (Dunne and Schmidt, 2011). State
interest is therefore primarily about survival, with other concerns,
such as economic growth, of secondary importance.

Neo-realism, like realism, sees states as self-regarding actors

coexisting in an anarchical system (Waltz, 1979). According to neo-
realists, regimes are arenas for the negotiation of zero-sum
agreements, with the outcomes of those negotiations shaped by the
distribution of state power within the regime. However, neo-realists
also accept that there is some potential for order through
international cooperation if only as a rational means to state survival
(see Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1988). However, states’ policy
preferences (or interests) will often fail to converge, meaning that
any attempt to build a community beyond the state is likely to be
fraught with difficulties and may even intensify the sense of
difference among states. Neo-realists accept that international
institutions are established to reduce the level of anarchy within the
states system and see the European Union as an example of this kind
of institution, albeit within a highly institutionalized setting (de
Grieco, 1995, 1996). Their influence on intergovernmentalism is
clear, even if intergovernmentalism and (neo-)realism are not one
and the same thing (Church, 1996: 25).
 BO X 5 . 1
Key Debates: Intergovernmentalism as description,
theory, and method

In this chapter, intergovernmentalism is a theory of European

integration. This means that intergovernmentalism offers a
plausible explanation of regional integration (or international
cooperation). From a normative, political theory perspective,
democratic intergovernmentalism argues that the EU ought to
shift decision-making to arenas where democracy is most
vibrant, namely national parliaments and national public
spheres (Wolkenstein, 2020; Bellamy, 2019).
Intergovernmentalism may also serve as a description of or as
a model of European integration. The former simply describes
the current state of the EU, its institutions or policies. The latter
understanding of intergovernmentalism is prescriptive, in that it
advocates a more central role for national governments and a
reduction in the role of the supranational institutions (the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the
Court of Justice of the European Union). It might also imply the
repatriation of European policies to the EU’s member states.

According to intergovernmentalists, there are costs and benefits

attached to involvement in European integration (or ‘cooperation’).
Involvement in the EU will rest on a weighing up of the pros and
cons of membership, and questioning the extent to which European
integration improves the efficiency of bargains struck among its
member states. The main aim in engaging in this qualitative cost–
benefit analysis is to protect national interests. This tendency
becomes especially important at times of treaty change, where inter-
state negotiations shape the future direction of the Union.

Cooperation within the EU is, therefore, conservative and pragmatic.

It rests on the premise that common solutions are often needed to
resolve common problems. To put it another way, cooperation has
nothing to do with ideology or idealism, but is founded on the
rational conduct of governments as they seek to deal with the policy
issues that confront them in the modern world. For
intergovernmentalists, European integration is normal or even
‘mundane’ (O’Neill, 1996: 57) behaviour on the part of state actors.
There is nothing particularly special about it, other than the highly
institutionalized form it has taken in the European context. As
international cooperation occurs on a variety of levels, taking many
different forms, cooperation within the EU is, therefore, deemed to
be only one example of a more general phenomenon. This is why
intergovernmentalists are reluctant to admit that there is a European
integration process. Rather, they see cooperation occurring in fits
and starts, sometimes less cooperation, sometimes more—and not as
a trend heading inexorably in one direction towards some sort of
political community or federal state.

As an institutionalized form of inter-state cooperation, European

integration facilitated the survival of the Western European state
after 1945 and during the subsequent Cold War (see Box 5.2). It is
perhaps not surprising to find, therefore, that in the early 1990s
some intergovernmentalists believed that European integration
would not survive the end of communism in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE) (Mearsheimer, 1990).

BO X 5 . 2
Key Debates: The European rescue of the nation state

In his seminal book The European Rescue of the Nation State

(1992), the economic historian Alan Milward analysed
European integration in the 1940s and 1950s. He argued that
the European integration process ‘saved’, rather than
undermined, the nation state. Governments at this time had
many difficult problems to resolve, arising out of increased
interdependence and increased disaffection from social
actors. The successful delivery of policy programmes was a
matter of survival for the states of Western Europe. European
integration became a means to this end. As Rosamond (2000:
139) notes: ‘The idea of integration as a progressive transfer of
power away from the state managed by emerging
supranational elites is given little credence by this hypothesis’
(see also Chapter 6). Rather, the key actors in European
integration are governmental elites.

At the heart of intergovernmentalism lies a particular conception of

state sovereignty. Sovereignty is a very emotive word, particularly
when used in the context of EU politics. It has various meanings,
holding associations with power, authority, independence, and the
exercise of will. One useful definition views sovereignty as the legal
capacity of national decision-makers to take decisions without being
subject to external restraints; another definition sees sovereignty as
the right to hold and exercise authority. However, many use the word
sovereignty as little more than a synonym for independence, and this
is particularly the case in public discourse (for example, when
journalists or politicians use the word). This was certainly the case in
the campaign that led to the UK’s Brexit referendum in early 2016,
when the theme of ‘taking back control’ was used as a point of
reference by Leave campaigners (see Chapter 27).

Intergovernmentalists claim that the EU member states, or national

governments, are the most important actors by far, and that they
remain very much in control of European-level decision-making.
Accordingly, European integration implies at most a pooling or
sharing of sovereignty, and not a transfer of sovereignty from the
national to the supranational (European) level (Keohane and
Hoffmann, 1991: 277).

Intergovernmental cooperation can also involve a delegation of

sovereignty (Pollack, 2002; Maher et al., 2009). From this
perspective, intergovernmentalists accept that European integration
implies a transfer of functions from the state executive or from the
parliaments of the member states, to the European institutions—to
the Commission and the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in
particular, but also to the European Central Bank (ECB) in the case
of monetary policy for eurozone members. They argue that national
governments find it in their interest to hand over certain (regulatory)
functions in order to make cooperation work more effectively—that
is, to make more credible the commitments they have entered into.
This emphasis on delegation colours how intergovernmentalists
understand the role of the EU institutions. Rather than assuming
that these institutions are capable of playing an independent or
autonomous role within the European integration process,
intergovernmentalists tend to see European institutions, the
Commission in particular, as little more than the servants or agents
of the member states. Mark Pollack makes this point when he shows
how member states delegate particular functions to the Commission
to reduce transaction costs (Pollack, 1997). For example, the
European Semester, the governance architecture for
socioeconomic policy coordination in the EU, incorporates an ex
ante review by the Commission of euro area national budgets (see
Chapter 22). While these institutions may be permitted a more
important role in less controversial areas of policy, the functions that
they perform in more sensitive policy domains, such as foreign
policy, will be severely circumscribed. The European institutions that
really matter are, therefore, the EU Council (of national ministers)
and the European Council (of heads of state and government),
whereas other European institutions play a more peripheral role.
Key Points

• Intergovernmentalism has been influenced by realist and

neo-realist assumptions that privilege the role of the
state and national interest in explaining European
integration or cooperation.

• Intergovernmentalists believe that sovereignty rests with

the EU member states.
• It may be in states’ interests to cooperate and to
delegate functions to European-level institutions to
ensure that commitments made by states are taken
seriously.
• The supranational institutions are usually considered
servants or agents of the member states.
5.3 Classical
intergovernmentalism and its
critics

Intergovernmentalism, as a theory of or approach to the study of

European integration, emerged in the mid-1960s, from a critique of
neo-functionalist theory (see Chapter 4) and as a reaction to
assumptions that the European Community (EC) would eventually
transform itself into a fully fledged federal state. By the end of the
1960s, it had become a convincing explanation of European
integration, more so than the neo-functionalist orthodoxy, as it
reflected more accurately, it seemed, the practice of European
integration at that time. After the French President General Charles
de Gaulle’s ‘boycott’ of the European institutions in mid-1965, the
so-called ‘empty chair’ crisis, and the signing of the Accord that
came to be known as the Luxembourg Compromise in early 1966
(see Chapter 2), a tide turned in the history of European integration.
The persistence of the national veto after 1966, instability in the
international political economy, and institutional changes that
privileged the Council of Ministers (now the Council of the European
Union or EU Council) and institutionalized the European Council as
key decision-makers within the Community all suggested the limits
of supranationalism, and the continued primacy of state actors in
European politics. That the Commission began to play a more
cautious role after 1966, as evidenced by the period of
‘Eurosclerosis’ in the years that followed, was also an important
factor supporting the intergovernmental hypothesis.

It was Stanley Hoffmann who laid the foundations of the

intergovernmentalist approach to European integration. Most of the
state-centric variants of integration theory in and after the 1970s
drew upon his work. Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism, which is
referred to as ‘classical intergovernmentalism’ in this chapter, began
by rejecting neo-functionalist theory, claiming that, in concentrating
on the process of European integration, neo-functionalists had
forgotten the context within which it was taking place. This not only
pointed to the importance of states, but also of other factors, such as
the global context. More specifically, intergovernmentalism rejected
neo-functionalist claims that European integration was driven by a
sort of snowball effect known as ‘spillover’ (see Chapter 4), arguing
that the neo-functionalists’ attachment to spillover was more an act
of faith than based on proven facts.

There was nothing inevitable about the path of European integration

from this perspective; neither was there evidence of any political will
to create a federal state in Europe (O’Neill, 1996: 63). If anything, the
federalist rhetoric did little more than highlight the enduring
qualities of the nation state which it sought to replicate on a
European scale. As for neo-functionalism, not only did it ignore what
was happening outside of Europe, notably the global nature of the
Cold War, but it also missed the importance of cultural differences,
such as attitudes to agriculture and the land, that were continuing to
influence how states perceived their interests. The neo-functionalist
idea of ‘the logic of integration’ was contrasted with a more
intergovernmentalist ‘logic of diversity’, which saw European
integration as a dialectic of fragmentation and unity (Hoffmann,
1966). This diversity was a consequence of the unique context of
internal domestic politics and of global factors (that is, the situation
of the state in the international system), both of which contributed to
inexorable centrifugal forces placing limits on European integration
(Rosamond, 2000: 76).

Intergovernmentalism therefore offered a ‘systematic

contextualization’ (Rosamond, 2000: 75) of the situation as it was in
the mid-1960s. It was much more than just an application of realist
theory to the European Community case. In the post-1945 period,
nation states were dealing with regional issues in very different ways
than had earlier been the case. While traditional, exclusive notions of
sovereignty now seemed obsolete, and there was a blurring of the
boundaries between the national state and international
organizations (Hoffmann, 1966: 908), this did not mean that nation
states and national governments had lost their significance.
National sovereignty and the nation state were being tamed and
altered, but not superseded (Hoffmann, 1966: 910–11). While the
national dimension may well have seemed less important in the
immediate post-1945 period than it had in earlier times, it had not
taken long for states to reassert themselves. Indeed, national states
had proven themselves extremely resilient actors in international
politics. As Hoffmann (1966: 863) put it: ‘The nation-state is still
here, and the new Jerusalem has been postponed because the
nations in Western Europe have not been able to stop time and to
fragment space.’ The nation state was said, famously, to be
‘obstinate’ not ‘obsolete’ (Hoffmann, 1966). Even though societal
changes posed serious challenges for the nation state, state
governments remained powerful for two reasons: first, because they
held legal sovereignty over their own territory; and second, because
they possessed political legitimacy (Bache et al., 2014: 14).

Although the successes of European cooperation, its distinctive

characteristics, and the possibility that it was likely to produce more
than zero-sum outcomes, were not to be underestimated (Hoffmann,
1995: 4), discord over the course of the 1960s, such as over UK
accession to the EEC, highlighted the differences between member
states as much as they pointed to their common interests. This was
an important argument, since ‘preference convergence’ (Keohane
and Nye, 1997) (the term itself was coined later) was earlier assumed
to be a prerequisite for European integration. For
intergovernmentalists, the starting point for explaining European
integration was the political rather than the technocratic. Whereas
high politics (the political sphere) touched on national sovereignty
and issues of national identity, low politics (the economic sphere)
was more technocratic and seemed much less controversial. There
were said to be clear boundaries between the economic integration
possible in areas of low politics, such as transport, and the
‘impermeable’ and very ‘political’ domain of high politics, foreign or
economic policy for example, in which integration would not occur
(O’Neill, 1996: 61). While intergovernmentalists conceded that
functional spillover might occur in the former, there could be no
assumption that states would allow it to transfer to the latter.
Although classical intergovernmentalism was based upon realist
assumptions, it differed in its concept of the state. Thus, states are
more than just ‘black boxes’ that contain no clear substantive
content; rather, they represent communities of identity and
belonging. They ‘are constructs in which ideas and ideals, precedents
and political experiences and domestic forces and rulers all play a
role’ (Hoffmann, 1995: 5). Hoffmann was particularly critical of the
early theorists of European integration who had adopted a simplistic
and unrealistic view of how governments defined their interests:
interests were not reducible to power and place alone (Hoffmann,
1995: 5), but were calculated on the basis of various historical,
cultural, and indeed political concerns.

However, this early form of intergovernmentalism has been subject

to various critiques, which included rejecting Hoffmann’s rigid
demarcation between high and low politics. Even in the 1970s,
European political cooperation (EPC), the forerunner to
today’s European foreign policy (see Chapter 19) and an area of ‘high
politics’, seemed to disprove this particular aspect of his theory.
Subsequently, the establishment of the euro and the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)—pointed in that direction as
well. Indeed, after the 1960s, even Hoffmann softened his position
on this issue.

Classical intergovernmentalism has also been criticized for playing

down the constraints imposed on states resulting from their
increasing ‘interdependence’. One example of this phenomenon is
the way in which business ownership across Europe became
increasingly global or multinational, especially after the 1980s.
Moreover, it was argued that intergovernmentalism failed to take
into account the novelty and the complexity of the European
integration project. European integration was about more than just
the creation of a regional regime, and bargains struck at the
European level could not simply be reduced to a set of national
interests (Rosamond, 2000: 79).

At this stage, intergovernmentalism was also subject to the criticism

that it was not a theory in any systematic sense (Church, 1996: 26),
but was rather part of an approach that dealt with the wider
phenomenon of regional cooperation. As such, it was extremely
influential in shaping how scholars of European integration thought
about the (then) European Community and set the agenda for future
research undertaken in the field of integration theory from the 1970s
onwards. Thus accepting the limits of intergovernmentalism as it
was constructed in the 1960s did not mean opting for a
supranational theory of integration; rather, it allowed the door to be
opened to new variants of intergovernmentalism, some examples of
which are dealt with in the section that follows.
Key Points

• Stanley Hoffmann was the originator and key proponent

of intergovernmentalism in the mid-1960s.

• Hoffmann distinguished between high and low politics,

arguing that, while functional integration (or spillover)
might be possible in less controversial, technical areas of
public policy, states would resist any incursion into areas
of high politics.

• Critics have questioned Hoffmann’s use of the high/low

politics distinction and his failure to take into
consideration the novelty and the complexity of the
European integration project.
5.4 Variants of
intergovernmentalism

This section presents some examples of how classical

intergovernmentalism has been supplemented and adapted since the
1960s. While setting aside for the moment the most important
example of this adaptation, liberal intergovernmentalism, and its
newest version, new intergovernmentalism, this section deals with
confederalism, the ‘domestic politics approach’, and with analyses
that have sought to explain how states become ‘locked into’ the
European integration process.

5.4.1 Confederalism
As a model or framework for European integration, the idea of
‘confederation’ is closely allied to intergovernmentalism. A
confederation may be viewed as a particular type of
intergovernmental arrangement, in which national sovereignty
remains intact despite the establishment of a common institutional
framework as exemplified by the agreement in 1777 of the 13 original
US states to work together in the hope of creating more effective
government. This could be understood as a concert of sovereign
states (O’Neill, 1996: 71; Laursen, 2012). However, despite the US
experience, there can be no assumption that confederation will lead
ultimately to greater unity, even if some authors like to talk of a
‘confederal phase’ within the integration process (Taylor, 1975;
Chryssochoou, 2009). Rather, confederalism implies that the EU lies
somewhere ‘between sovereignty and integration’ (Wallace, 1982:
65).

Confederal approaches draw attention to the institutionalized nature

of the European integration process, recognizing (in contrast to
intergovernmentalism) its distinctiveness. Confederalism is a helpful
supplement to intergovernmentalism, moving it beyond its inherent
constraints, while retaining its state-centric core. There are many
different ways of differentiating between confederalism and
intergovernmentalism, however. Confederalism may be more likely
to involve supranational or international law. Alternatively, ‘a
confederalist approach may be said to apply where the scope of
integration is extensive … but the level of integration is low’ (Taylor,
1975: 343). It may also be characterized by a defensive posture from
national governments against the further extension of the powers of
supranational actors, by an interpenetration of European politics
into the domestic sphere, and by an oscillation between advanced
proposals for integration and retreats into national independence.
Much of this argument is state-centric, assuming that the nation
state is likely to be strengthened through confederation. At the same
time, it adds to intergovernmentalist understandings of European
integration by defining the framework within which cooperation and
integration take place.
5.4.2 The domestic politics approach
In the 1970s and 1980s, an approach that focused on domestic
politics and policy-making became fashionable in the field of
European integration studies. Although not a theory of European
integration per se, the approach was critical of
intergovernmentalism’s failure to capture the transnational nature of
the European policy process (Church, 1996: 26) and sought, as a
consequence, to focus attention on the relationship between
domestic politics and EC policy-making (Bulmer, 1983), for example,
on party politics, or public opinion. In this, we can identify the
origins of scholarly interest in Europeanization (see Chapter 8).
We might also see this approach as one that links classical
intergovernmentalism to later state-centric approaches—and to
liberal intergovernmentalism in particular (Rosamond, 2000: 76).

Proponents of the domestic politics approach argued that it is

impossible to understand the European Community without taking
domestic politics into consideration. It was therefore important to
identify the domestic determinants of preference formation by
undertaking in-depth case studies of the European policy process.
This would allow researchers to identify variations in patterns of
policy-making, emphasizing the linkages between the national and
supranational dimensions of European politics. Two dimensions of
domestic politics were deemed to be of particular interest: policy-
making structures, such as those that govern parliamentary scrutiny;
and attitudes towards the EC as expressed in opinion poll data
(Bulmer, 1983).
There are several elements involved in this approach, which, when
taken together, provide a framework for analysing the behaviour of
member states. First, the national polity is considered the basic unit
of the EC/EU. Second, each national polity differs in its unique
socio-economic characteristics, and it is these differences that shape
national interests. Third, European policy is only one facet of
national political activity. Fourth, the national polity lies at the
juncture of national and European politics. Finally, an important
lens through which one might understand these elements is that of
policy style (Bulmer, 1983: 360). The importance of the domestic
politics approach, therefore, is that it demonstrated how
intergovernmentalists had failed to look in any coherent way within
the member states when analysing the European integration process.

5.4.3 The ‘locking-in’ of states

Several analyses explain how states have become locked into the
European integration process. These draw heavily on an approach to
the study of federalism originating in Germany, in which
‘interlocking politics’ (Politikverflechtung) characterizes interactions
between different levels of government (Risse-Kappen, 1996). While
these approaches rest on state-centric premises, they move quite far
beyond classical intergovernmentalism and show how European
integration is about much more than inter-state bargains. In the
process, they emphasize the importance of institutional factors (see
Chapter 6) and show how intergovernmentalist ideas may provide a
starting point from which new arguments about and analyses of the
European integration process develop.

An example of this kind of approach is the ‘fusion hypothesis’

(Wessels, 1997). This approach rests on state-centric premises in that
it sees national interests as the primary driving force of integration,
but it also links integration processes to the evolution of the state. It
argues that, after 1945, Western European states became
increasingly responsible for the welfare of their citizens, enhancing
state legitimacy in the process. For the welfare state to persist,
national economies had to be strong; and in order to maintain
economic growth, states had to open up their markets. This tendency
led governments to rely ever more on the joint management of
shared policy problems, which amounted to much more than just a
pooling of sovereignties. As states became more interdependent, they
lost the ability to act autonomously, blurring the lines of
accountability and responsibility that connected citizens to the
state. These trends are increasingly difficult to reverse.

Also grounded in state-centrism is an approach that draws an

analogy between German federalism and the European Union. This
explains how European integration has become almost irreversible
because of the intense institutionalization to which it has been
subject. European decision-making offers states the ability to solve
problems jointly; yet the outcomes of those decisions are likely to be
suboptimal in that they do not emerge from any assessment of the
best available solutions, but are reached through a process of
bargaining that inevitably leads to the striking of compromises. In
other words, as national interests determine policy positions,
creative (and rational) problem-solving is not possible (Scharpf,
1988: 255). As such, no member state is likely to be entirely satisfied
by what European integration has to offer. Over time, this will
contribute to the slowing down of the integration process. However,
the institutionalization of the decision-making process means that
retreating from integration is not an option. As such, states are
trapped in a European Union from which they cannot escape, in a
paradox amounting to ‘frustration without disintegration and
resilience without progress’ (Scharpf, 1988: 256)—that is, a ‘joint
decision trap’.

Finally, historical institutionalists have sought to explain how states

become locked into European integration through a process of path
dependence. One element in this argument is that as states integrate,
future options become ever more constrained by past decisions
(Pierson, 2004; see Chapter 6). The only way of escaping this
integration path is when there is a dramatic break with past practice,
in the form of a so-called critical juncture.
Key Points

• Confederalism complements and extends

intergovernmentalism by acknowledging the
institutionalized character of the European Union.

• The domestic politics approach claims that it is

impossible to study European integration without looking
at policy-making within the member states.

• Wessels’s fusion hypothesis, Scharpf’s joint decision

trap, and Pierson’s path dependence explain how states
have, over time, become locked into the European
integration process.
5.5 Liberal intergovernmentalism
and its critics

In 1988, the scholar, Robert Putnam, published an influential journal

article in which he explored the dynamics of domestic and
international politics using the metaphor of ‘two-level games’
(Putnam, 1988). The first game deals with how states define their
policy preferences (or national interest) at home within the domestic
environment; the second is played on the international stage and
involves the striking of inter-state bargains. The insights from this
study provided a framework for analysing the myriad entanglements
involved in domestic–international interactions, as well as offering a
starting point for understanding European integration.

5.5.1 Liberal intergovernmentalism

Since the early 1990s, liberal intergovernmentalism (LI) has been
one of the most important theoretical approaches to European
integration (Moravcsik, 1998). It has become a touchstone against
which all integration theory has been judged, even for those who do
not agree with its assumptions, its methods, or its conclusions
(Kleine and Pollack, 2018). Drawing on and developing earlier
intergovernmentalist insights, it offers an approach that is much
more rigorous than those of its antecedents, incorporating within it
both realist and neo-liberal elements, and dealing explicitly with the
interface between domestic and international politics.

LI views the European Union as a successful intergovernmental

regime designed to manage economic interdependence through
negotiated policy coordination and which emphasizes the
importance of both the preferences and the power of states. While
national politicians advance state interests that reflect domestic
policy preferences, decisions made by the EU are ultimately the
result of bargaining among states. Agreements are usually reached
on a ‘lowest common denominator’ basis, with clear limits placed on
the transfer of sovereignty to supranational agents. Thus ‘[t]he broad
lines of European integration since 1955 reflect three factors:
patterns of commercial advantage, the relative bargaining power of
important governments, and the incentives to enhance the credibility
of inter-state commitment’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 3). When economic or
commercial concerns converge, integration takes place.

To begin with, there are two dimensions to LI: the supply side and
the demand side. Both the demand for cooperation, which derives
from the national polity, and the supply of integration, arising from
inter-state negotiations, are important in understanding European
integration. To explain the link between demand and supply, the
theory is composed of three steps, each of which is explained by a
different set of factors and each of which draws on complementary
theories of economic interest, relative power, and credible
commitments (Moravcsik, 1998: 4).
First, from liberal theories of national preference formation, the
theory shows how state goals can be shaped by domestic pressures
and interactions, which, in turn, are often conditioned by the
constraints and opportunities that derive from economic
interdependence (Moravcsik, 1998). Thus, underlying societal factors
provoke an international demand for cooperation. National political
institutions are subject to myriad pressures from domestic interests,
leading to a process of preference formation. State preferences are
formed, as groups compete for the attention of government elites and
these feed into inter-state negotiations. To put it another way,
national policy preferences are constrained by the interests of
dominant, usually economic, groups within society, whether
individual companies or sectors, such as the oil industry, or powerful
representative bodies. Resting on a pluralist understanding of
state–society relations, national governments represent these
interests in international forums. Thus, national interests are derived
from the domestic politics of the member states and not or rarely
from the state’s perception of its relative position in the states system
—that is, from geopolitical concerns. Thus ‘the vital interest behind
General de Gaulle’s opposition to British membership in the EC …
was not the pursuit of French grandeur but the price of French
wheat’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 7; see Box 5.3).
 BO X 5 . 3
Case Study: LI and De Gaulle

Moravcsik sought to apply his liberal intergovernmentalism to a

number of cases. One such case was that of French
agricultural policy. In line with the first element of LI, Moravcsik
finds that ‘the vital interest behind General de Gaulle’s
opposition to British membership in the EC … was not the
pursuit of French grandeur but the price of French wheat’
(Moravcsik, 1998: 7). In other words, French policy towards
Europe in the 1960s was shaped by important commercial
concerns, rather than by political factors. Critics have
questioned whether such a sharp distinction between de
Gaulle’s economic objectives and his political goals is helpful
given that his policy of French grandeur implied the use of
economic ambitions for political ends (Trachtenberg, 2006).

Second, the supply side in LI rests on intergovernmentalist theories

of inter-state relations, with European integration supplied by
intergovernmental bargains, such as revisions to the Treaty
(Moravcsik, 1998: 7). More specifically, this stage ‘draws on general
theories of bargaining and negotiation to argue that relative power
among states is shaped above all by asymmetrical interdependence,
which dictates the relative value of agreement to different
governments’ (Moravcsik, 1998: 7). It emphasizes the centrality of
strategic bargaining among states and the importance of
governmental elites in shaping inter-state relations. States are
considered to be unitary actors and supranational institutions are
deemed to have a very limited impact on outcomes. This generally
involves a two-stage process of negotiation: first, governments must
resolve the policy problems that confront them; they do this by
taking decisions, and only after these decisions are taken do they try
to reach agreement on institutional mechanisms that would allow
them to implement them. Various bargaining strategies and
techniques, such as ‘coalitional alternatives to agreement’—that is,
the linking of issues and threats of exclusion and inclusion—shape
outcomes. A bargaining space is formed out of the amalgamation of
national interests, with the final agreement determining the
distribution of gains and losses. This implies a limited range of
possible integration outcomes, although inter-state bargains can also
lead on occasion to positive-sum outcomes. Governments
bargain hard to gain the upper hand. The power of individual states
is crucial in determining whose interests win out in the end. This
means that LI focuses most of its attention on the preferences of the
largest and most powerful EU states: the UK (before Brexit), France,
and Germany. In stressing the points that integration benefits states,
that states face few constraints in the EU Council, and that inter-
state negotiations enhance their domestic autonomy, this part of the
theory addresses the question of why governments engage in
European integration when it might otherwise appear irrational to
do so (Rosamond, 2000: 138).

The third stage in LI is institutional delegation. The argument is that

international (European) institutions are set up to improve the
efficiency of inter-state bargaining, reflecting the desire for ‘credible
commitments’. Thus, governments delegate and pool sovereignty in
these institutions to secure the substantive bargains that they have
made by ensuring that all parties are obliged to commit to
cooperation (Moravcsik, 1998: 3–4). For example, in the case of the
EU, the European institutions create linkages and compromises
across issues on which decisions have been made under conditions of
uncertainty and in instances in which non-compliance would be a
temptation. An example of this kind of behaviour can be found in the
setting of environmental standards, particularly in the context of
negotiation of international environmental agreements.

In this respect, LI has been influenced by liberal institutionalism

(Keohane, 1989). That theory sees institutions as ways of facilitating
positive-sum bargaining (‘upgrading the common interest’) among
states, while denying that they undermine in any way the longer-
term self-interest of the member states. From this perspective, then,
‘[t]he entrepreneurship of supranational officials … tends to be futile
and redundant, even sometimes counterproductive’ (Moravcsik,
1998: 8).

Supplementing the core of the theory, Moravcsik has developed three

extensions: first, that the EU democratic deficit is defensible, and not
as severe as critics make it out to be; that the EU is a stable
constitutional settlement, and not threatened with disintegration
(see Box 5.4); and that the EU is a global superpower. Like the core
theory, these arguments are frequently criticized in the EU literature
(Kleine and Pollack, 2018).
BO X 5 . 4
Case Study: LI and Brexit

Andrew Moravcsik has described Brexit as ‘the exception that

proves the rule’ (Moravcsik 2020). In his view, the UK’s
departure from the EU only occurred due to the combination of
a set of specific circumstances that are unlikely to be
reproduced elsewhere, namely: the UK ‘is the only European
country where Euroskepticism attracts more than a tiny fringe of
the electorate’; David Cameron’s call for an unnecessary
referendum; and the intrinsic bias of the first past the post
system that delivered a comfortable majority for Boris Johnson
in 2019 on a promise ‘to get Brexit done’. The UK’s departure
has not weakened the EU. In fact, the EU27 were able to take a
‘tough stance’ during the Brexit negotiations while the UK
remains dependent on the EU for market access. At the same
time, the EU has managed to navigate the COVID-19 crisis and
retain its international influence.
Source: Moravcsik (2020) [Link]
europe-covid-19-trump-russia-migration/?
fbclid=IwAR1Saf9ZvGkdpK0ocJ5RvuQTVfuEXh4EBZP5-
ropiN593Me_leFViu4wYEs
5.5.2 Critiques of liberal
intergovernmentalism
LI remains an extremely useful way in which to organize data and to
construct empirical studies, based on a deductive (theory-testing)
methodology. As such, it is regarded as a baseline theory of regional
integration (Kleine and Pollack, 2018). At the same time, it offers a
framework for understanding European integration that some
scholars find hard to accept. Criticism has come from various
directions, such as from constructivists, institutionalists, and, more
recently, post-functionalists. In the case of the latter, LI has been
criticized for failing to take on board the impact of crises and the
implications of the politicization of the EU, and for viewing the
European Union too optimistically (Hix, 2018; Schimmelfennig,
2019; Hooghe and Marks, 2020; see also Box 5.5). Critics direct their
attention to the component parts of the theory. LI’s model of
preference formation has been criticized for failing to acknowledge
the relevance of EU norms and rules, and for failing to acknowledge
the impact of identity in driving domestic preferences. LI’s
bargaining theory is challenged for ignoring the deliberative nature
of EU decision-making, and for ignoring the importance of EU
institutions as actors in the EU policy process. LI’s third core
element is also criticized for ignoring the way in which internal
(endogenous) feedback can destabilise the EU, creating pressure for
reforms, whether in the direction of more or less integration (Kleine
and Pollack, 2018: 1494).
 BO X 5 . 5
Key Debates: LI and representation

In a 2018 article on Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI), which

was published in a special issue of Journal of Common Market
Studies, Simon Hix addresses the assumptions made by LI
regarding representation. If LI assumptions hold, he argues,
voter–government relations will lead to policy gridlock. If they
do not hold, there will be a growing gap between public and
elites. This insight leads Hix to suggest that LI may not be as
relevant in the highly politicised world of post-2010 EU politics
in which the EU has become a more salient issue for EU voters,
and in which populist anti-EU parties have gained substantial
support. He concludes by acknowledging that governments are
nowadays more constrained by public preferences than they
were in the past, and that LI’s optimism is misplaced.

Perhaps the most frequently repeated criticism of LI is a very basic

one: that it simply does not fit the facts. In other words, LI is too
selective with its empirical references. It was claimed by Scharpf
(1999: 165), for example, that applying the theory to cases of
intergovernmental negotiation, in which economic integration is the
main concern and in which decisions were taken on the basis of
unanimous voting in the Council, will invariably confirm the theory;
‘Given this focus for his attention, it is hardly surprising that
Moravcsik comes to the view that the EC is primarily motivated by
the aggregation and conciliation of national interests’ (Wincott,
1995: 602). The assumption is, therefore, that, in ‘harder’ cases,
where international negotiations are not the primary form of
decision-taking and where majority voting applies, which nowadays
covers most policy fields, LI may not produce such clear-cut results.
The criticism is often articulated in the following way: that liberal
intergovernmentalism may explain the majority of ‘history-making’
decisions—that is, high-profile changes of constitutional significance,
which often involve treaty change and which occur through inter-
state negotiations—but it is much less able to explain how the EU
works in matters of day-to-day politics.

A further criticism often directed at LI is that its conception of the

state is too narrow. Liberal intergovernmentalism pays little
attention to the way in which the state may be disaggregated into its
component parts. Critics argue that understanding how
governmental positions (or preferences) are determined requires a
more nuanced analysis of domestic politics. Indeed, ‘in some ways it
[LI] was less sophisticated in its account of domestic politics than
Hoffmann’s’ (Bache et al., 2014: 15). In LI, the primary determinant
of government preferences is socio-economic interests. In practice,
however, diverse influences, including those that are identity-based,
are likely to impinge on national preference formation.

Another critique of LI is that the theory understates the constraints

faced by national policy-makers. The case of the Single Market
programme is often used to back up this argument. As mentioned
earlier, LI plays down the role of supranational actors within the
European integration process. In other words, it does not provide a
full enough account of the supply side of the model when focusing
solely on inter-state negotiations. As the roles of the European
Commission and the CJEU are deemed relatively unimportant, if not
entirely irrelevant, in terms of policy outcomes, their interests and
strategies do not figure particularly strongly in LI explanations.

The LI depiction of the Commission as little more than a facilitator in

respect of significant decision-making has attracted particular
criticism, with numerous empirical studies claiming to show that the
Commission does exercise an independent and influential decision-
making role, be it as animateur, a policy entrepreneur, or a motor
force (Nugent, 2010: 135–7). A similar point also applies to non-state
‘transnational’ actors, such as European firms and European
interest groups. Business groups in the 1980s, for example, were
particularly important in influencing the Single Market (1992)
project (Cowles, 1995; Armstrong and Bulmer, 1998; see also
Chapter 14).
[I]ntergovernmental theory cannot explain the activities of the key non-state actors in
the 1992 process. The single market programme was not merely the result of
conventional statecraft. Nor were Member States’ actions predicated solely on the
basis of domestically defined interest group activity, as suggested by a recent version
of intergovernmentalism [LI] … Indeed, the story of the ERT [European Round Table
of Industrialists] points to the fact that non-state actors—and in particular,
multinational enterprises—also play two-level games in EC policy-making (Cowles,
1995: 521–2).

This criticism concerns not just which actors and institutions matter
in the process of European decision-making, it is also about how
much weight can be placed on the more formal aspects of European
decision-making at the expense of the informal, ‘behind the scenes’
dimension. If informal politics help to shape policy outcomes, this
may mean that actors who appear to be responsible for decision-
taking may not really be in control. As such, the substance of inter-
state negotiations may already have been framed well before
intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) and European summits
meet to take their formal decisions.

Finally, LI has been criticized for not really being a theory at all
(Wincott, 1995). This assumes that a rigorous theory ought to spell
out the conditions under which it might be refuted or disproved.
Some critics say that liberal intergovernmentalism does not do this
but engages in an act of closure on certain types of argument about
European integration. As such, LI should be considered an
‘approach’ rather than a theory, one that brings together three
existing theories (preference formation, intergovernmental
bargaining, and institutional delegation) to provide a ‘pre-theory’ or
‘analytical framework’ that can be applied to the European
integration process (Forster, 1998: 365). Not surprisingly, many of
these criticisms about LI are contested by advocates of the theory,
and not least by Andrew Moravcsik himself (see, for example,
Moravcsik, 2018).
Key Points

• Liberal intergovernmentalism provides an explanation of

European integration based on national preference
formation, inter-state bargaining, and institutional
delegation.

• Liberal intergovernmentalism supplements a rich

account of bargaining inside the European and EU
Councils, with a concern for how national interests (or
preferences) are formed from the pressures placed on
governments by domestic economic interests.

• Liberal intergovernmentalism is criticized for focusing

only on ‘history-making decisions’ (treaty change in
particular), and for ignoring day-to-day politics and the
multilevel character of the European Union.
5.6 New intergovernmentalism

The new intergovernmentalism is the most recent attempt to re-

theorize intergovernmentalism (see Bickerton et al., 2015a). Its
advocates claim that the post-Maastricht period—that is, the period
after 1991—opened a new phase in European integration, which has
been characterized by both constitutional stability and an
unrelenting expansion of EU activity, with the latter taking the form
of intensified policy coordination among member states. This
coordination has been possible because of the deliberative and
consensual quality of EU decision-making (deliberative
intergovernmentalism). Where policy functions have been delegated,
the traditional supranational institutions have not gained from those
decisions; rather, new bodies, such as agencies, set up to meet
specific functional aims have been the beneficiaries (see Chapter 7).
This, proponents argue, means that integration occurs without
supranationalism: an integration paradox.

This integration paradox, the authors argue, is the result of changes

in both Europe’s political economy, and within the domestic political
arena in the EU member states. In the former, an ideational
convergence around neo-liberalism, greater institutional diversity,
and an unravelling of post-war compacts (on the mixed economy, for
example) have opened the door to a new phase in European
integration. In the former, public disaffection with politics and the
rise of Euroscepticism have led to a separation of politics (at the
national level) from policy-making (at the European), and the
promotion of more informal decision-making by elites in the case of
the latter. With member states pressing ahead with integration, the
divide between integrationist leaders and sceptical publics widens,
casting doubt on the sustainability of the EU (Hodson and Puetter,
2019). This too has contributed to this new European integration
phase.

The new intergovernmentalism is ambitious in its attempt to explain

in very broad terms the latest phase in European integration.
However, to its critics it remains at best a work-in-progress. Some
even suggest that it might be better to adapt liberal
intergovernmentalism to a new era of EU politics, rather than set up
a new theory. Schimmelfennig (2015), for example, has remained
unconvinced by new intergovernmentalism, to the extent of
questioning whether it is entirely new or even intergovernmental. He
argues that European integration in the post-Maastricht period is not
that different from the earlier period; and that the new
intergovernmentalists fail to demonstrate that the changes that have
taken place since the early 1990s are—other than perhaps in certain
policy areas—representative of a new form of intergovernmentalism.
Others, however, identify weaknesses in the new
intergovernmentalism that might be corrected with some modest
adjustments or re-focusing (Baird, 2017 on non-state actors;
Morillas, 2020 on EU external action).
Key Points

• New intergovernmentalism aims to re-theorize European

integration for the post-Maastricht period.

• This approach argues that there has been a dramatic

expansion of EU activity in the form of policy
coordination since the early 1990s.
• New intergovernmentalism seeks to explain this
contemporary characteristic of European integration: the
so-called ‘integration paradox’.

• Critics of the new intergovernmentalism claim that it is a

work-in-progress, and that adapting liberal
intergovernmentalism might be a more productive way of
addressing recent developments in European
integration.
5.7 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the theory of European integration known

as ‘intergovernmentalism’. It has shown how intergovernmentalist
premises (and, more specifically, state-centrism) have provided the
foundations for a range of theories and models that have sought to
explain the nature of EU decision-making and the European
integration process. A particularly important variant, liberal
intergovernmentalism, became dominant in the mid-1990s, and
remains a touchstone for all researchers and students of European
integration to this day (Kleine and Pollack, 2018). A more recent
version—new intergovernmentalism—has sought to reinvent
intergovernmentalism for the post-Maastricht era.

While intergovernmentalist approaches continue to provide

inspiration for many scholars of European integration, new theories
have tested the resilience of intergovernmentalist arguments.
Intergovernmentalism has been flexible enough to adapt, however. It
has increasingly been allied to rational institutionalist approaches
(Puchala, 1999; Pollack, 2012; see Chapter 6), with the latter more
able to account for day-to-day policy-making, while based on many
of the same premises. Moravcsik and Schimmelfennig (2009) also
say that it is in line with recent research on Europeanization (see
Chapter 8). Even though there are many scholars who contest the
(liberal) intergovernmentalist account of European integration, no
student of the integration process can claim to be well informed
without an understanding of the contribution that
intergovernmentalism makes to past and to current debate on the
European Union.
Q UEST I O NS

1. How convincing are intergovernmentalist accounts of

European integration?

2. Why has liberal intergovernmentalism been so

influential?

3. What value does the ‘domestic politics’ approach add to

classical intergovernmentalism?

4. How useful a model for explaining the EU is

confederalism?
5. Is classical intergovernmentalism still a relevant
approach to European integration?
6. How central is the state within the process of European
integration?

7. What is new in new intergovernmentalism?

8. On what grounds do you find convincing critiques of

liberal intergovernmentalism?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Bickerton, C. J., Hodson, D., and Puetter, U. (eds) (2015) The

New Intergovernmentalism: States and Supranational Action in
the Post-Maastricht Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press). With
contributions from many experts in the field, this edited book on
new intergovernmentalism reflects on both the strengths and
limits of this approach.
Fabbrini, S. (2015) Which European Union? Europe after the
Euro Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Although
this book is not explicitly on intergovernmental theory, it offers a
fascinating, broadly intergovernmentalist, analysis of the EU,
emphasizing the diverse interests and visions of the EU member
states which will shape the EU’s future as a compound
democracy.
Hoffmann, S. (1995) The European Sisyphus: Essays on
Europe 1964–1994 (Oxford: Westview Press). An excellent
collection of Stanley Hoffmann’s work, showing how his ideas
changed (or not) over the years. Includes seminal articles
published in the 1960s, which set the scene for future
intergovernmentalist writings.
Moravcsik, A. (1998) The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose
and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: UCL
Press). The seminal liberal intergovernmentalist book, by the
founder of the approach. Chapter 1, ‘Theorizing European
integration’, both covers a critique of neo-functionalism and sets
out the characteristics of LI in some detail.
Moravcsik, A. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2018) ‘Liberal
intergovernmentalism’, in A. Wiener, T.A. Börzel, and T. Risse
(eds), European Integration Theory, 3rd edn (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), pp. 67–90. An interesting chapter on liberal
intergovernmentalism, which uses migration policy and the
introduction of the euro as case studies to show how LI might be
applied to contemporary European issues (see Chapter 7).

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
6
Theorizing the European Union
after Integration Theory
Ben Rosamond
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The limits of the classical debate and five ways forward

6.3 Political science, the ‘new institutionalism’, and the European

Union

6.4 Social constructivist approaches to the European Union

6.5 International relations and international political economy

revisited

6.6 Critical theories and the European Union

6.7 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

This chapter deals with recent theoretical work on the

European Union. Three broad analytical pathways that
depart from the classical debate are discussed in this
chapter: comparative political science; a revitalized
international relations (IR); and ‘critical theories’. Two
additional pathways—governance and normative political
theory—are considered in other chapters (see Chapters 7
and 9). This chapter discusses in turn the contribution to
EU studies of comparative political science in general and
new institutionalist political science in particular, the
emergence of social constructivist approaches to the EU,
IR’s contribution to the theorization of EU external action,
together with approaches from the subfield of international
political economy (IPE), and a variety of critical theoretical
readings of the EU. The chapter also explores how IR
theories might be brought back into EU studies. The
purpose of the chapter is to show how the EU still raises
significant questions about the nature of authority,
statehood, and the organization of the international system.
These questions are doubly significant in the present
period of crisis, where the issue of ‘disintegration’ comes
to the fore.
6.1 Introduction

It is still commonplace to introduce theoretical discussion of the

European Union in terms of the classical debate between neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism (see Chapters 4 and
5). There is a rationale for continuing to explore the opposition
between these two schools (see Bickerton et al., 2015a). Thinking in
this way forces us to address key issues of continuity versus change
in European politics.

However, recent years have witnessed concerted attempts to ‘think

otherwise’ about the EU. This chapter deals with some of these new
approaches (see also Chapters 7 and 9). It is worth pausing for
thought to consider what ‘new’ might mean in this context. The term
implies, after all, that some theories are old—or perhaps redundant.
In particular, many scholars who offer new theoretical prospectuses
tend to begin with the proposition that the classical terms of debate—
as represented by the rivalry between neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism—fail to capture adequately what is going on in
the contemporary EU. This chapter is attentive to this premise and
begins with a deeper discussion of its soundness as a proposition for
theoretical departure.

This discussion alerts us to the importance of thinking carefully

about theoretical work. Theory is not simply a self-indulgent
exercise, nor can it be sidestepped by any serious student of the EU.
Being conscious about the theoretical propositions chosen by authors
is important because alternative readings of the EU and European
integration follow from alternative theoretical premises. That said,
writers rarely (these days at least) attempt to construct ‘grand
theories’ of integration. Instead, since the 1970s, they have
tended to build theories to aid the understanding and explanation of
elements of: (a) the integration process; and (b) EU governance (so-
called ‘mid-range’ theorizing). Even the direct descendants of neo-
functionalism and intergovernmentalism have limited ambitions.
For example, Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s (1998) theory of
supranational governance explicitly ‘brackets’ (that is, sets
aside) the origins of the EU, because the theory has no way of
explaining this (see Chapter 4). By implication, that job can be left to
other theories. This suggests, in turn, an approach to the analysis of
politics premised on the idea that different theories can explain
different parts of the same phenomenon. Moreover, Moravcsik
(2001) has emphasized that his liberal intergovernmentalism is
not intended to be a comprehensive theory of European integration,
but rather a theory of intergovernmental bargaining only (see
Chapter 5).

These caveats still do not bypass the objection that the old neo-
functionalist–intergovernmentalist debate fails to capture highly
significant attributes of the present EU. The principal objection is
that ‘old’ theories are rooted in an outdated conception of what the
EU is. However, we need to be aware that the study of the EU is not
something that simply ebbs and flows with the real-world
development of European integration and the evolution of the
European Union—what we might call the ‘external drivers’ of
theoretical work (Rosamond, 2007). It is also—and perhaps more
predominantly—bound up with developments in social scientific
fashion, or ‘internal drivers’. Many scholars think about this issue in
terms of theoretical ‘progress’—that is, as social science in general
and political science in particular ‘improve’ their techniques and
refine their theories, so we can expect objects of study such as the
European Union to be treated more rigorously than previously. The
alleged consequence is that theoretical advancement delivers more
robust and reliable results, thereby advancing our empirical
knowledge of the EU. In contrast to this upbeat account of
theoretical progress, scholars approaching the history of academic
fields via the sociology of knowledge/science tend to see theoretical
choices as altogether more contingent and bound up with
disciplinary power structures, and institutional practices and norms
(see Rosamond, 2016).

In short, there are two overlapping meta-debates that help us to

think about the development of theory in EU studies. The first
discusses whether internal (academic) or external (real world)
drivers account for the changing shape of theoretical work over time.
The second involves a disagreement about whether theory
development follows a logic of scientific progress, or whether instead
it reflects the operation of disciplinary structures that enable some
kinds of work, while marginalizing others. It is worth keeping these
distinctions in mind as we examine the contemporary theoretical
landscape of EU studies in this chapter.
6.2 The limits of the classical
debate and five ways forward

The legacies of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism remain

intact in much current writing about integration and the European
Union. Even when analysts of the EU attempt to offer an alternative
point of theoretical departure, they often set their coordinates with
reference to the established neo-functionalist and
intergovernmentalist positions. There is always a danger that the
histories and trajectories of neo-functionalism and
intergovernmentalism can end up being caricatured in such
accounts; suffice to say that the early texts of integration theory
repay careful reading by present-day students. This is not only
because of the obviously useful legacies of ideas such as ‘spillover’,
but also because it is true to say that the ways in which these ‘old’
theories are criticized is open to contest. Indeed, the idea that there
is a convenient and rigid division between ‘new’ and ‘old’ theories is
open to considerable critical scrutiny (see Haas, 2001, 2004;
Rosamond, 2005, 2016; Börzel, 2006; Niemann and Schmitter,
2009).

The ‘old’ debate has been criticized on at least three interrelated

counts (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5): its alleged inability to
capture the reality of integration and the EU; its supposed
entrapment in the disciplinary wilderness of international relations;
and its so-called ‘scientific’ limitations.

It would be a mistake to think that these criticisms have been

completely decisive and have ushered EU studies into a new
theoretical age. Each is contested and, even where scholars agree
that there is some substance in the above argument, many argue that
the theoretical landscape is more nuanced and complex than many of
the critics of classical theory suggest. Yet not all critiques would take
the failures of neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism to match
‘reality’ as a legitimate starting point. Theorists working in what is
sometimes called the ‘constitutive’ tradition regard the relationship
between theory and reality as intimate and problematic, and would
choose altogether different criteria for evaluating theories than their
ability to correspond to and/or predict the ‘real’ world (see Jackson,
2011; Adler-Nissen and Kropp, 2015).

Moreover, the dismissal of international relations (IR) as a parent

discipline has been taken to task by those who suggest that what goes
on within IR departments and journals bears little resemblance to
the grand theorizing and state-fixated area of study depicted by the
critics. In any case, it is a bold claim that overstates the extent to
which the study of European integration was ever cordoned off as a
sub-field of IR. The likes of Ernst Haas, Karl Deutsch, Leon
Lindberg, and Philippe Schmitter studied the early communities as
self-conscious (and often pioneering) exponents of the latest political
science (Haas, 2001, 2004; Ruggie et al., 2005). Integration theory’s
most obvious connection to IR was its contribution to the emergence
of international political economy (IPE), a sub-area that explicitly
emphasizes the fuzziness of the boundaries between domestic
politics and international relations (Katzenstein et al., 1998). Others
suggest that IR theories retain a valuable place in EU studies because
they act as valuable tools for understanding the global environment
within which the EU operates (Hurrell and Menon, 1996; Peterson
and Bomberg, 2009).

The third point—the type of theorizing involved in the ‘old’ debate—

is less a criticism than an observation about how the study of a
phenomenon (in our case, the EU) is bound up with the ebbs and
flows of social science, as much as it is related to the context supplied
by that phenomenon. Markus Jachtenfuchs (2001) draws a
distinction between a classical phase of integration theory, during
which the ‘Euro-polity’ was the dependent variable, and the
contemporary ‘governance’ phase, in which the ‘Euro-polity’
becomes the independent variable. In the other words, the EU
has shifted from being a phenomenon that analysts seek to explain,
to become a factor that contributes to the explanation of other
phenomena. This amounts to moving from asking ‘Why does
integration occur?’ to posing the question ‘What effect does
integration have?’

Dissatisfaction with established modes of theorizing the EU and

European integration can be the starting premise for a number of
alternative theoretical projects. Within conventional political science,
research has tended to go in one of two broad directions. First, those
who think of the EU as a conventional political system have tended
to use EU studies as a space for the application and development of
some of the tools of comparative political science (see Hix, 2007).
Some of the key themes from this literature are discussed in this
chapter. Second, those who prefer to see the EU as a newer type of
political form are more inclined to align with the burgeoning
literature on governance (see Jachtenfuchs, 2007; see also Chapter
7). A further trend has been the very significant expansion of work
that brings the concerns of normative political theory to bear upon
the analysis of the European Union (Føllesdal, 2007). Normative
political theory is the consideration, using abstract philosophical
techniques, of how political systems should be organized. Such
questions have become especially urgent in the EU context with the
decline of the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ on integration.
Until the early 1990s, runs the argument, European integration was
a project that was driven and settled by elites. European mass
publics were compliant with, if not overly supportive of, the process.
The troubled ratification of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) set the
pattern for all subsequent treaty revisions as governments across the
member states encountered intense societal and parliamentary
opposition to the Treaty. The emerging disconnect between elites
and masses and the consequent ‘politicization’ of integration was an
obvious source of interest for those interested in questions of
legitimacy and democracy. In addition, Maastricht deepened
integration significantly, with explicit moves into areas of ‘high’
politics such as foreign and security policy and monetary union.
The Treaty also created the legal category of EU citizenship (see
Chapters 9 and 15). In other words, fundamental questions of
sovereignty came to the fore, together with intriguing questions of
how ‘post-national’ citizenship might work. In short, issues of
direct concern to normative political theorists were now of core
concern in EU studies (see also Bellamy and Attuci, 2009; Neyer and
Wiener, 2011; Eriksen and Fossum, 2012).

There has also been, as this chapter will note, something of a revival
in IR work on the EU. Internal and external drivers have been
equally prominent. The growth of EU external action generally, and
the evolution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in
particular, mean that the EU is an actor in world politics, while IR
itself has brought forth approaches such as constructivism, which
in turn have been exported to other subfields such as EU studies. We
will discuss some of the most prominent themes in this new IR
literature in this chapter.

Finally, beyond conventional analyses of politics and IR sit a range of

self-consciously ‘critical’ approaches. In so far as the growing body of
feminist, Foucauldian, post-structuralist, and neo-Marxist work has
a unifying theme, then it is a commitment to using social science as a
force for critique, social change, and human emancipation. Again,
this chapter will address some of the ideas about the EU contained in
such work.

There are several points of departure for such newer theories. Among
the most important are the literatures on comparative political
science, governance, and normative political theory (see Table 6.1).
In addition, a revival of IR scholarship in the EU and a growing body
of critical theoretical work has added to the substantial wealth of
contemporary theoretical work on the EU.
TA B L E 6 . 1 Five pathways beyond integration theory

Approach External drivers Internal drivers

Comparative EU as a source of authoritative Rise of rational choice

political science policy outputs theory
(this chapter) EU as a political system with The ‘new
identifiable executive, institutionalism(s)’
legislative, and judicial features

Governance EU as a source of regulation Theories of governance

(Chapter 7) Hybrid/incomplete EU political New theories of public policy-
system making
Multilevel character of the EU

Normative End of the ‘permissive Revival of political philosophy

political theory consensus’ Development of international
(Chapter 9) Emergence of EU citizenship political theory
Attempts to constitutionalize
the EU

International Growth of EU foreign and Emergence of constructivist IR

relations (this security policy competence theory
chapter) Growth of EU external action Growth of international
Reappearance of ‘regionalism’ political economy (IPE) as a
as a feature of world politics subfield of IR
Appearance of scholarship on
the ‘new regionalism’

Critical theories End of the ‘permissive Feminism

(this chapter) consensus’ Development of neo-marxist
Rise of neo-liberalism as the and neo-Gramscian political
EU’s dominant policy mode economy
Crises of the EU Critical and Habermasian
political theory
Post-structuralism
Key Points

• Recent years have seen renewed interest in theorizing

the EU.

• Most scholars accept that there has been a significant

shift towards newer styles of theoretical work.

• Critics of the classical debate regard neo-functionalism

and intergovernmentalism as theories that ask the wrong
sorts of question about the EU.
• Discussion of the obsolescence of ‘old’ theories raises
some interesting questions about the nature and
purpose of theory.
6.3 Political science, the ‘new
institutionalism’, and the
European Union

It is often argued that the term ‘integration’ fails to capture a great

deal of what actually matters in the European Union. This is because
the EU is a source of authoritative policy outputs. A range of
demands and supports are fed into that policy system, which means
that the EU would seem to conform to a political system as defined in
the classic work of David Easton (1965). The system that produces
those policy outputs is institutionalized and those well-established
institutions are assigned functions—executive, legislative,
bureaucratic, and judicial—that resemble the classical design of all
political systems. Moreover, the EU political system is full of actors
pursuing their interests and looking to secure a close correspondence
between their policy preferences and policy outputs. Interest
groups and even political parties are visible to the academic
observer of this system. In other words, the types of actors,
institutions, and processes studied by political scientists are all in
place within the EU system. If this is empirically valid, then it would
seem to be analytically valid to draw upon the theoretical toolkit
developed to study political systems.
The analytical case for moving towards the conceptual reservoir of
political science is bolstered further by the claim that treating the EU
as a political system solves the notorious n = 1 problem. This
describes a situation in which the object under scholarly scrutiny
cannot be compared to other cases. This renders generalization
beyond the case impossible (because there are no other instances of
what is being studied). For many scholars, this is a point at which
social science is no longer possible and, for some critics of
integration theory, this is precisely the situation in which EU studies
found itself by the 1980s. The European Communities had developed
in such a distinctive way that it was meaningless to talk about the
European case as an instance of a more general phenomenon
(‘regional integration’) (Hix, 1994). However, by redefining the
EC/EU as a political system, a move that seemed to have some prima
facie empirical credibility, the analyst had available not only the 200
or so functioning contemporary political systems, but also every
political system in recorded human history as comparators.

The move to comparative political science as EU studies’ ‘feeder’

discipline has spawned much research and, naturally, draws upon a
wide range of political science theories (see Hix, 2007; Hix and
Høyland, 2011). By the standards of regional integration schemes
worldwide, the EU is heavily institutionalized. It possesses a
distinctive set of supranational institutions, as well as a number
of intergovernmental bodies. The treaties define the roles of these
various institutions, as well as the ways in which they are supposed
to interact. Four points are worthy of note. First, the founders of the
European Communities sought to capture their desired balance
between national and supranational forces through careful
institutional design. Most accept that the balance has altered over
time, but the formal institutional structure of European integration
has remained remarkably resilient for over six decades. Second, close
observers of the EU often note the growth of distinct cultures within
the various institutions. It is not only that there is a particular
modus operandi within the Commission, but also that individual
Directorates-General (DGs) of the Commission possess distinct
institutional cultures. The same is true of different Council
formations. Third, scholarship has revealed the existence of various
informalities within the formal institutional shape of the EU. This
work suggests that much that is decisive within the policy process is
the consequence of regularized practices that do not have formal
status within the treaties. In spite of that, these established routines
are frequently defined as institutions. Fourth, much recent scholarly
effort has been directed at understanding the multilevel character of
the EU’s institutionalized polity (see Chapter 7). So much of the
corpus of EU studies involves the analysis of formal and informal
institutions, and the impact that institutionalized practices have
upon policy outcomes. At the same time as studies of the EU have
multiplied in recent years, so the wider world of political science
became infused with the so-called ‘new institutionalism’ (Hall and
Taylor, 1996).

It would be a mistake to regard the new institutionalism as a single

theoretical perspective. Institutionalists agree, more or less, that
‘institutions matter’ (see Box 6.1). Institutions contain the bias that
individual agents have built into their society over time, which in
turn leads to important distributional consequences. They structure
political actions and outcomes rather than simply mirror social
activity and rational competition among disaggregated units
(Aspinwall and Schneider, 2001: 2).
BO X 6 . 1
Key Debates: Institutions and the new institutionalism

For most students of politics, ‘institution’ brings to mind

phenomena such as the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of government—what we might think of as ongoing or
embedded sets of formalities, often underwritten or codified by
constitutional prescription. Early political science dealt with the
study of this sort of institution. Scholars explored how such
bodies operated, how they interacted, and how they supplied
sets of rules that helped to account for the ways in which
political systems operated. Often, such studies concluded that
institutional patterns reflected the character of a country’s
politics. This ‘old’ institutionalism was criticized—especially by
behaviouralists—for an overemphasis on the formal, codified
aspects of politics at the expense of looking at the nitty-gritty of
politics: the interaction of groups in pursuit of their interests and
the basis, form, and consequences of individual and collective
political behaviour. However, classical institutional studies did
bequeath a concern with the impact of rules upon the behaviour
of actors and thus upon political outcomes more generally.
‘New’ institutionalism proceeds from the axiom that ‘institutions
matter’ as shapers of, and influences upon, actor behaviour
(rather than as mere expressions of political culture). This is
combined with a broader definition of ‘institution’ to embrace not
only formal rules, but also forms of ongoing social interaction
that together make up the ‘compliance procedures and
standard operating practices’ in the political economy, to borrow
 Peter Hall’s well-established definition (Hall, 1986: 19). Thus,
from the new institutionalist vantage point, we may be talking
about anything from written constitutional rules through to
norms, or even collectively recognized symbols, when we
speak of ‘institutions’. With this in mind, it is hardly surprising
that the EU has become a favoured venue for the practice of
new institutionalist political science.

Importantly, institutionalists of different hues have alternative

accounts of just how much institutions matter. Aspinwall and
Schneider (2001) think about institutional political science as a
spectrum. At one end of this spectrum sits an economistic-rationalist
position that sees institutions as the consequence of long-run
patterns of behaviour by self-seeking agents. Institutions in this
account are both modifiers of the pursuit of self-interest and a
medium through which actors may conduct their transactions with
greater efficiency. At the opposite end of the spectrum is a
sociological position where actors’ interests are actually constructed
through processes of institutional interaction. Hall and Taylor’s
(1996) landmark discussion identifies three subspecies of
institutionalism: rational choice; historical; and sociological. Each of
these has a presence in EU studies (see Table 6.2).

Rational choice institutionalism is the most obvious way in which

rational choice approaches to politics have infiltrated EU studies
(Dowding, 2000; Pollack, 2007; see Box 6.2). This is a close relative
—in terms of foundational theoretical premises—of Moravcsik’s
liberal intergovernmentalism. Rational choice theory—perhaps the
dominant (although much criticized) strand in contemporary
American political science—is based on the idea that human beings
are self-seeking and behave rationally and strategically. The goals of
political actors are organized hierarchically. They form their
preferences on the basis of their interests. Institutions are important
because they act as intervening variables. This means that
institutions do not alter preference functions, but will have an impact
upon the ways in which actors pursue those preferences.
Consequently, changes in the institutional rules of the game, such as
the introduction of the co-decision procedure (now known as the
ordinary legislative procedure, or OLP), which gave the Council and
the European Parliament co-legislative power in certain areas, or
which altered the voting rules within the EU Council (from
unanimity to qualified majority) will induce actors to recalculate
the ways in which they need to behave in order to realize their
preferences.
BO X 6 . 2
Key Debates: Rational choice and the science of EU
studies

Supporters of rational choice institutionalism believe that this

approach to the EU is able to build knowledge in a systematic
way. Scholars working under the auspices of rational choice
subscribe to particular methods of theory-building. This usually
involves the development of models capable of generating
hypotheses, which can then be subjected to confirmation or
disconfirmation through exposure to hard empirical evidence.
Such work relies on the deployment of assumptions and the
use of game theory as a tool of analysis. The substantial work
of Geoffrey Garrett and George Tsebelis (for example, Tsebelis,
1994; Garrett and Tsebelis, 1996) yields the counter-intuitive
claim that the co-decision/OLP procedure has strengthened the
EU Council at the expense of the Commission and the
European Parliament. The analysis is sophisticated, but relies
on the assumption that institutions’ preferences are arranged
along a continuum according to the amount of integration that
they favour. For critics, this type of work may produce intriguing
results, but it relies too much on unrealistic assumptions and
describes games that bear no relation to the complex
interactions that take place between EU institutions on a day-
to-day basis. Another dimension to this debate is that rational
choice institutionalists often advance the view that theirs is a
more rigorous form of political science than that offered by
 either EU studies ‘traditionalists’ or those of a more
constructivist persuasion.

TA B L E 6 . 2 The ‘new institutionalisms’

Type of institutionalism Research objective

Rational choice The changing relative power of institutions

institutionalism

Historical institutionalism The long-term effects of institutions

Sociological institutionalism The role of culture OR persuasion and communicative

action

Source: Hall and Taylor (1996).

By and large, rational choice institutionalists have been interested in

how their theory develops propositions about the changing relative
power of institutional actors in the policy process. Scholars of this
persuasion assume that institutional actors seek policy outcomes
that correspond as closely as possible to their preferences. This is
why institutions are created in the first place (the so-called
‘functionalist’ theory of institutional design). The construction of
formal models, often deploying the type of reasoning found in
economic analysis, allows for empirical research on specific cases to
be mapped against formal decisions. A lively debate developed
within EU studies about matters such as the agenda-setting power
of the various institutions. Another key component of the rationalist
argument has been the application of ‘principal–agent analysis’ to
EU politics. Here, self-regarding actors (‘principals’) find that their
preferences are best served by the delegation of certain
authoritative tasks to common institutions (‘agents’). In the EU case,
this approach provides powerful explanations for member states’
decisions to create and assign tasks to supranational institutions
such as the Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU), and
the European Central Bank (ECB) (Pollack, 2002).

For their proponents, rational choice perspectives offer rigorous

foundations for the development and testing of falsifiable
hypotheses around a series of core shared propositions. This
improves knowledge in a progressive and cumulative way. Scholars
work from a set of (admittedly stylized) assumptions to produce
progressively improved understandings of how the EU works. For
their opponents, rational choice institutionalists miss the point: their
focus on formal rules leads them to ignore the various informal
processes that grow up around the codified practices, but it is these
informalities that better explain policy outcomes. Moreover, rational
choice accounts of actor preferences tend to leave these fixed rather
than recognize the ways in which processes of socialization can
mould interests and identities.

Historical institutionalists are interested in how institutional choices

have long-term effects. Institutions are designed for particular
purposes, at particular times, in particular sets of circumstances.
They are assigned tasks, and in this process acquire interests and
ongoing agendas. If institutions interact with one another in a
decision-making process, then patterns that are constitutionally
prescribed or evolve in the early lifetime of the institutions
concerned may ‘lock in’ and also become ongoing. This lock-in
means that a ‘path-dependent’ logic may set in. The ongoing
nature of institutional interests (their continuing bureau-shaping
agendas and their preference for self-preservation) means that
institutions become robust and may well outlive their creators. This
also means that institutions may have an impact that their creators
could not have foreseen, not least because they survive to confront
new circumstances and new challenges. But these new challenges are
met through the prism provided by pre-existing institutions; thus the
range of possible action and policy choice is constrained. Policy
entrepreneurs may attempt to redesign institutions to meet current
needs, but they do so in the face of institutional agendas that are
locked in and which are therefore potentially difficult to reform.

Like the other two variants of institutionalism, historical

institutionalism is not exclusive to EU studies. But its applications
are obvious. That said, scholars use this basic template in various
ways. Paul Pierson’s well-known discussion of path dependency
(Pierson, 1998) looks at the problem of unintended consequences.
He argues that the immediate concerns of the architects of the
European Communities led them, at a critical juncture, into acts
of institutional design that ultimately helped to erode the capacity of
national governments to control the governance of their economies.
So while the intention of Western European governments of the
1950s may have been to rescue the nation state (Milward, 1992),
Pierson’s work suggests that the long-term consequence of their
deliberations may have been to engineer precisely the reverse. The
implications for research from this theoretical insight are interesting.
They push students of the EU to think about policy pathways—that
is, how particular EU-level competences emerge over time as a result
of specific decisions. We are asked to think about how rational acts at
one point in time influence rational action in the future.

Less wedded to rational actor assumptions is other historical

institutionalist work such as that of Kenneth Armstrong and Simon
Bulmer (1998) in their classic study of the Single Market.
Armstrong and Bulmer are more interested in the way in which
institutions can become carriers of certain ideas, values, and norms
over time. Once again, we are directed to think about how such
normative and ideational ‘matter’ is loaded into institutions at their
inception. But students of the EU are also invited to explore how
institutional cultures (say, of the Commission generally, or of specific
DGs) impact upon all stages of the policy process, influence action
and policy choice, and (perhaps) assist in the conditioning of the
interests of actors.

This last comment provides a link to sociological institutionalism, a

strand of literature that is closely bound up with the constructivist
‘turn’ in international and European studies (discussed in Section
6.4, ‘Social constructivist approaches to the European Union’; see
also Wiener, 2006; Checkel, 2007; Risse, 2009). It is important to
note that sociological institutionalists tend to reject the other
institutionalisms because of their inherent ‘rationalism’. The
meaning of this term is discussed in Section 6.4, but for now it is
worth remembering that sociological institutionalists/constructivists
operate with a quite distinct ontology (that is, an underlying
conception of the world). This boils down to a very particular take on
the nature of actors’ interests. While rational choice and (most)
historical institutionalists see interests as exogenous (external) to
interaction, sociological institutionalists see them as endogenous
(internal). In other words, interests are not pre-set, but rather they
are the product of social interaction between actors.

This leads sociological institutionalists towards a concern with two

broad issues: the ‘culture’ of institutions; and the role of persuasion
and communicative action within institutional settings (Börzel and
Risse, 2000). ‘Culture’ is used to mean the emergence of common
frames of reference, norms governing behaviour, and ‘cognitive
filters’. In this account, ‘institutions do not simply affect the strategic
calculations of individuals, as rational choice institutionalists
contend, but also their most basic preferences and very identity’
(Hall and Taylor, 1996: 948). With this in mind, sociological
institutionalist analysis of the EU looks at the ways in which ongoing
patterns of interaction and ‘normal’ forms of behaviour emerge
within institutional settings. As one writer puts it, ‘institutions have
theories about themselves’ (Jachtenfuchs, 1997: 47). Thus
institutions contribute to actors’ understandings of who they are,
what their context is, and what might be the motivations of other
actors. This sort of work aims to add substance to often-heard claims
such as the idea that different DGs of the European Commission
function in quite distinct ways. Another area in which the application
of this sort of thinking seems appropriate is the investigation of
whether formally intergovernmental processes such as those
associated with the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
conform to established patterns of inter-state interaction, or whether
they bring about new norms of exchange between the envoys of
member states, thereby transforming long-established norms of
inter-state politics.
The roles of communication, argument, and persuasion are seen as
particularly important in these contexts. This is likely to occur in
settings in which norms have been established, but these deliberative
processes also contribute to the establishment of common
understandings. Thus sociological institutionalists often embark
upon empirical quests for so-called ‘norm entrepreneurs’—‘well
placed individual actors … [who] … can often turn their individual
beliefs into broader, shared understandings’ (Checkel, 2001: 31).
Sociological institutionalism is not simply interested in the EU level
of analysis. A lot of work is being done on the interaction of national
and European-level norms, and in particular the ways in which
‘European’ norms filter into the existing political cultures of the
member states.
Key Points

• The EU has become a major venue for the application of

‘new institutionalist’ political science and for debates
between its main strands.
• Rational choice institutionalists are interested in how the
relative power of actors shifts in accordance with
changes in institutional rules.
• Historical institutionalists focus on the long-term
implications of institutional choices made at specific
points in time.
• Sociological institutionalists pay attention to the ‘culture’
of institutions, and the ways in which patterns of
communication and persuasion operate in institutional
settings.
6.4 Social constructivist
approaches to the European Union

The rise of constructivism has been the big news in international

relations (IR) theory over the past two decades. The work of
constructivist scholars such as Alexander Wendt (1999) has come to
pose a serious challenge to the established schools of IR theory.
Constructivists attack formalized, rationalist versions of IR—that
is, the neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches that operate with a
view of the world that sees interests as materially given, which
adhere to a positivistic conception of how knowledge should be
gathered, and which involve a commitment to ‘scientific’ method, the
neutrality of facts, and the existence of observable realities (S. Smith,
2001: 227). Ranged against rationalism is a range of reflectivist
and interpretivist approaches—such as postmodernism and
critical theory—that begin from wholly different premises.

The appeal of constructivism—or at least the type of constructivism

that has entered the IR mainstream in the last decade—is that it
claims to offer a middle way between rationalism and reflectivism.
Constructivists such as Wendt see interests as socially constructed
rather than pre-given, which means that regularities in the
international system are the consequence of shared (or
‘intersubjective’) meanings. Constructivists are interested in how
these collective understandings emerge, and how institutions
constitute the interests and identities of actors. However, some
authors believe that constructivism can and should share the
rationalist commitment to developing knowledge through clear
research programmes, refutable hypotheses, and the specification of
causal mechanisms that produce regularities (see Checkel, 2007).
Many—although certainly not all—IR constructivists aspire to this
ambition.

Various authors occupy different positions along the continuum

between rationalism and reflectivism (Christiansen et al., 2001).
Moreover, the commitment to ‘break bread’ with rationalist theories
such as liberal intergovernmentalism varies from author to author.
That said, constructivists argue that they are best placed to study
integration as a process. While intergovernmentalists recommend
that the European Union be studied as an instance of inter-state
bargaining and comparativists think about the EU as a political
system, constructivists purport to investigate the character of the
move from a bargaining regime to a polity. Thus, if we think about
European integration as a process bound up with change, then it
makes sense to draw on a meta-theoretical position that treats reality
as contested and problematic. This means that constructivist-
inspired work should focus on ‘social ontologies and social
institutions, directing research at the origin and reconstruction of
identities, the impact of rules and norms, the role of language and
political discourse’ (Christiansen et al., 2001: 12).

More concretely, as Risse (2009) notes, constructivists are

predisposed to think about how human agents interact in ways that
produce structures (be they norms, institutions, shared cultural
understandings, or discourses) that simultaneously shape and
influence social interaction, and the possibilities for action that
follow. Constructivists endeavour to understand the constitution of
interests and (thus) identities. Moreover, they are interested in the
ways in which institutions act as arenas for communication,
deliberation, argumentation, persuasion, and socialization.
Constructivists also touch base with discourse analysts (Wæver,
2009) to emphasize the power resident in the capacity to create
meaning and so to frame policy choices in often non-negotiable
ways.

Perhaps the best way in which to present constructivism in EU

studies is to mention a few examples of what constructivists actually
work on. Many are interested in how European identities emerge. So
the idea of a ‘European economy’, a ‘European security community’,
or ‘European citizenship’ should not be read as a consequence of
actors’ interests changing rationally in response to external material
changes, such as the onset of globalization or the end of the Cold
War. Rather, constructivists insist that we need to investigate the
ways in which these identities are constructed through the use of
language, the deployment of ideas, and the establishment of norms.
We also need to pay attention to the ways in which these norms and
ideas are communicated, and to the processes of learning and
socialization that take place among actors. ‘Norms’ are particularly
important in the constructivist vocabulary. These are defined as
‘collective expectations for the proper behaviour of actors with a
given identity’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 5). It is through the
internalization of norms that actors acquire their identities and
establish what their interests are. This is what constructivists mean
when they talk about the ‘constitutive effects’ of norms.

The constructivist research agenda in EU studies (which has much in

common with that of sociological institutionalism) also pays
attention to the ways in which European-level norms, ideas, and
discourses penetrate into the various national polities that make up
the EU (Börzel, 2002).

Key Points

• Constructivism is not a theory of integration, but a

position on the nature of social reality (that is, an
ontology).

• There are many constructivist approaches and

significant disagreement about the compatibility of
constructivism with rationalist theories.

• Constructivists are interested in European integration as

a process.

• Constructivists focus in particular on questions of

identity, and the ways in which European norms are
established and play out within the EU institutions and
the member states.
6.5 International relations and
international political economy
revisited

In recent years, attempts have been made to ‘bring international

relations (IR) back in’ to the study of the European Union, of which
three in particular stand out:
1. the possibility that the EU can be studied as an instance of the
so-called ‘new regionalism’ that has emerged in recent
years across the world as (perhaps) a response to
globalization;

2. the growing significance of the EU as an actor on the world

stage; and

3. the attempt to locate the analysis of the EU within burgeoning

debates in international political economy (IPE).

6.5.1 The EU and the ‘new’

regionalism
Regional integration—especially in the form of free trade areas
(FTAs) and customs unions—is not a new phenomenon.
However, the period since the mid-1980s has been characterized by
the growth of many regional economic blocs in the global political
economy. Among the most conspicuous are the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation
(APEC), and the Mercado Común del Sur [Southern Common
Market], or Mercosur, in South America.

The most obvious explanation for the revival of regional integration

is the development of globalization. Globalization is a deeply
contentious topic, but is usually thought of as a combination of
things such as heightened capital mobility, intensified cross-border
transactions, the transnationalization of production, and the spread
of neo-liberal economic policy norms—in short, the growth of market
authority at the expense of formal political authority. This debate is
very complex, but one line of argument is that regionalism (as
represented by NAFTA or Mercosur) is the primary way in which
states have responded to globalization. The move to regionalism
suggests that states have seen fit to pool resources in order to
recapture some of the authority that globalization has taken away—a
type of collective insurance against globalization.

Debate exists over the extent to which states actually and effectively
lead the creation of regional integration schemes. This is where a
distinction between regionalism and regionalization is important in
the literature. While regionalism describes state-led projects of
institution-building among groups of countries, regionalization is a
term used to capture the emergence of a de facto regional economy,
propelled by the cross-border activities of economic actors,
particularly firms. The question here is whether the formal
institutions of regional integration are created to deal with and
regulate this emergent transnational economic space, or whether the
growth of cross-border activity is stimulated by the decisions of
governments. These are empirical questions at one level, but the two
positions in this particular debate emerge from two different
theoretical accounts of the world—one largely state-centric and
one not.

There is also a debate in international economics about the impact of

regional agreements on the global economy. All of the foregoing
instances mentioned are actual or aspirant FTAs. The question is
whether the creation of regional FTAs creates or diverts trade on a
global scale. Put another way, it asks whether we are heading for a
regionalized world (of competing regional blocs) or a globalized
world. Again, such matters can be measured empirically, but
theoretical intervention is needed if we are to fully understand the
meaning of a term such as ‘globalization’. Notice also how much of
the foregoing implies a particular type of relationship between
globalization and statehood, and, it should be said, between
structure and agency (see Box 6.3). Alternative accounts place
differential emphasis upon the structural qualities of globalization—
its ability to set imperatives and to shape the behaviour of actors.
BO X 6 . 3
Key Debates: The EU and statehood

Much of the routine political discourse on European integration

engages with the question of whether the EU is becoming a
‘federal superstate’, which, by definition, is supplanting the
powers of its constituent member states. Without doubt, the EU
lacks some of the classical indices of ‘statehood’, as it has
come to be understood (not least in Europe) over the past 350
years. For example, the EU lacks fixed territorial boundaries
and does not possess monopolistic control over the legitimate
means of violence. It does not engage in extensive
programmes of redistribution, yet it does exercise meaningful
and emphatic authority over the governance of its constituent
economies, and by extension over the lives of hundreds of
millions of Europeans. Moreover, the presumption of many
current theorists is that the EU is sufficiently similar to national
political systems to allow the deployment of the tools of normal
political science and policy analysis. But statehood also has
external dimensions. Thus, world politics has developed into a
game played between states with the notion of ‘sovereignty’ as
the ultimate rule. Much contemporary IR literature debates the
extent to which processes such as globalization have begun to
transform this system. Yet the language of statehood,
international politics, sovereignty, and diplomacy remains
central to world politics. We might argue that the condition for
admission to the world polity remains the achievement of
statehood. So, the question becomes whether the EU is being
 constituted and shaped by the existing world system, or
whether it is contributing to a radical reshaping of world politics.

The theoretical relevance of the questions raised in the preceding

paragraphs becomes especially apparent when we think about their
application to the EU. Thinking theoretically, as James Rosenau and
Mary Durfee (1995) point out, involves asking ‘Of what is this an
instance?’ The ‘new regionalism’ literature forces us to ask whether
the EU is a comparable case with, say, NAFTA. If the answer is ‘yes’,
then the study of comparative regional integration is brought back
into play, with the EU as one of the primary cases.

Of course, the EU is at best a deviant case of regionalism. Its

longevity rules out any claim that the EU was created as a response
to global economic upheavals in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Moreover, compared with other cases of regionalism, the EU is
considerably more institutionalized and much more deeply
integrated. To use the EU as a benchmark case against which other
regional projects should be measured is clearly a fallacy. Yet at the
same time the acceleration of economic integration through the
Single Market programme and progress towards monetary
union has coincided with the growth of regional projects elsewhere.

There are two suggestions as to how the field of EU studies might be

reunited with the study of comparative regional integration without
the EU becoming the paradigm case. The first follows Warleigh-
Lack’s (2006) argument that EU studies offer a rich and fertile range
of ideas for scholars interested in questions of governance beyond
the nation state, the interplay between domestic politics and
collective institutions, and the possibilities for post-national
democracy and legitimacy. The second suggested strategy involves
the rediscovery of some of the neglected themes of classical
integration theory, particularly neo-functionalism, in which there
was an overt emphasis on the study of the requisite material and
cognitive background conditions for the formation and consolidation
of regional projects (see Warleigh-Lack and Rosamond, 2010).

6.5.2 The EU as an international actor

What does the EU’s maturing external policy competence mean for
the ways in which we might conceptualize and theorize the EU’s role
in world politics? In addressing this question, it is important to
consider whether we can conceptualize the EU as an actor—that is, is
the EU a discernible entity with its own capacity to act on the basis of
its own interests? Certainly, the EU possesses certain formal roles in
world politics and in the management of the global economy. It
speaks with a common voice in international trade negotiations, and
has the makings of an embryonic foreign and security policy (Smith,
2008). On the other hand, it consists of 27 member states, all of
which operate as actors within the current international system (the
very phrase—‘inter-national system’—connotes an order founded on
the interaction of authoritative national states).

That the EU is not a state (at least in the conventional modern sense
of the term) is not really in dispute (Caporaso, 1996)—but is it
becoming one? If this is the case, then we might want to argue that
the EU is an embryonic state writ large, formed through the gradual
merger of its component member states. This might then allow us to
slot the EU—as a constituent unit of the international system—into
long-established theories of IR, such as realism. This would
construe the EU as an entity seeking to advance its own interests
and, particularly, to render itself secure from external threat.

However, we might be reluctant to arrive at this conclusion. The EU

might appear to be a unique entity, lacking those decisive
authoritative attributes normally associated with modern
(supposedly sovereign) nation states. If we think about the image of
the EU that is described by the literature on multilevel
governance (see Chapter 7) and then project outwards, students of
integration will be confronted with something that seems to fit very
badly with conventional theories of IR (Ruggie, 1998: 173–4).
Indeed, rather than trying to fit the EU into IR theory, perhaps IR
theorists need to look carefully at their established theoretical
toolkits if they are to properly comprehend the EU. Theories such as
neo-liberal institutionalism (which dominates theoretical discourse
in IR, especially in the US) are built around the idea of states as the
dominant units of analysis in the world system. The EU might be a
freak occurrence, specific to the peculiarities of Europe, but the ways
in which the boundaries between domestic and international politics
have become blurred, along with the styles of governance that have
evolved, may well have a much wider application.

One caveat to this is that the EU’s external action takes place,
whether in terms of foreign policy or commercial policy, in
conditions that still respond to the rules of state-centred
international politics. Thus, for the EU to acquire legitimacy and
recognition as a valid actor in the system, we might hypothesize that
it has to conform to the rules of that system; this, in turn, would
create pressures for the EU to become state-like. Therefore, the
paradox is that while the EU may appear to transcend the
international system, it is still in meaningful ways constituted (as
constructivists would put it) by the norms of that very system.

6.5.3 The EU and international

political economy
International political economy (IPE) is a well-established field of
inquiry that explores the relationship between political and economic
processes, and between states, markets, and international
institutions in the establishment, maintenance, and transformation
of world order. International political economy has been the venue
for intense debate about the conditions under which liberal
economic orders rise and fall. Economic order over the past 200
years is often depicted as vacillating between periods of economic
openness (during which free trade ideology is underpinned by
functioning international monetary institutions) and periods of
growing protectionism, rising economic nationalism, and the
spawning of international economic rivalries. Within IPE, several
explanations are offered for the rise and decline of open liberal
orders. The most popular focuses on state power, with the argument
that liberal international trading and monetary orders are possible
only when sponsored and underwritten by a hegemonic state. A
second explanation focuses on the presence or absence of
international institutions to create systems of rules for a market-
based order. Neo-realists acknowledge that states will create
cooperative institutions from time to time but point out that some
states will benefit more than others from the existence of the
institution. So even if every state is benefiting from the
arrangements, the fact that some states are accumulating more
power means that those states losing out in this pattern of ‘relative
gains’ have a substantial incentive to defect from the institution.
Neo-liberals, on the other hand, countenance the possibility that
institutions can deliver ‘absolute gains’, which means that
institutionalized cooperation will not exaggerate power
asymmetries. Moreover, neo-liberals see institutions as places where
relations of trust between states can be augmented and where the
transaction costs associated with international interaction can be
minimized. Neo-realists see a world in which the structural condition
of ‘anarchy’ (the absence of authority beyond the state) cannot be
overcome, whereas neo-liberals imagine the gradual replacement of
anarchy by a rule-bound and (increasingly pacific) market order
overseen by established institutions.

A third type of explanation emphasizes the power of ideas. From this

vantage point, liberal orders emerge and consolidate because of the
widespread acceptance of liberal narratives of how to organize the
relationship between state, society, and market both domestically
and internationally. For example, states come to believe in the
technical and normative propriety of liberal free trade ideas. This
means that both (a) the claim that allocative efficiency is best
achieved by countries minimizing tariff barriers and specializing
production in areas of comparative advantage, and (b) the moral
case that free trade is ethically superior to other economic doctrines,
become more or less commonsensical. The fall of liberal orders is
associated with the increasing persuasiveness of other sets of ideas—
in the twentieth century, left-wing and right-wing variants of the idea
that national economic welfare should prevail over liberal notions of
the universality of the market.

A fourth type of IPE explanation examines the relationship between

economic order and domestic social purpose. In his famous account
of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries written in 1944, Polanyi
(2001) held that the successful rise of the doctrine of the ‘self-
regulating market’ in the 1800s had created a situation in which
society was increasingly subordinate to the market (rather than the
market serving domestically negotiated social purposes). Polanyi saw
such a situation as unsustainable and insisted that society would
react in a counter-movement to the rise of the self-regulating market.
Thus, he was able to explain increasing protectionism in the latter
part of the nineteenth century and concrete governing projects—such
as social democracy, communism, and fascism—in the twentieth
century as instances of such societal counter-movements. This type
of analysis inspired Ruggie’s (1982) description of the post-war
international order as one of ‘embedded liberalism’—a
compromise under which the (desirable) goal of global economic
liberalization was tempered by allowing governments very significant
domestic policy autonomy. The product of this compromise was a
regime known as the Keynesian welfare state, which was able to
service domestic social purposes much more effectively.
How do these debates relate to the EU? The key to understanding the
relevance of these IPE debates to European integration is to
recognize that one of the main ways in which to read the EU is as a
sustained project of liberal market-making. This means that the four
IPE discussions just outlined can be applied to the EU in two broad
ways. The first simply tries to understand the origins and
sustainability of a pan-European liberal market order sitting
above, yet feeding from and also shaping, the national economies of
European states. The second revisits the question about the
relationship between the creation of a distinctively European
economic order, on the one hand, and the project of global market
liberalization (‘globalization’), on the other.

So, if we begin with the question of hegemony, IPE debates

immediately force scholars to think about whether the construction
of the European Single Market is dependent on a particular
configuration of state power—both internally and globally. The status
and importance of Germany as an internal hegemon and the USA as
an external hegemon are obvious follow-up questions here, but the
key from this perspective is to understand how much European
market integration relies upon a permissive environment in
which the most powerful states are prepared to bear the costs of
maintaining liberal order.

In terms of debates about institutions, there are at least two lines of

enquiry suggested by IPE debates. The first is to understand whether
the EU is a durable institutional order. This, of course, is an
especially pertinent question in times of economic crisis during
which states might be expected to draw back from international
commitments to liberalize markets and during which relative, rather
than absolute, gains might become more visible. The second
(following also from some strands of the new institutionalism) is to
assess the degree to which institutions shape the conditions of
possibility for addressing new challenges. A good example here is the
financial crisis that has been affecting the EU in general and the
euro area in particular since 2008. Did the eurozone’s
intergovernmental decision rules hamper the search for effective
solutions to the crisis? To what extent are solutions premised on
austerity budgeting in debtor states (notably the so-called PIIGS
group—Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain) and the
installation of technocratic governments direct consequences of
institutional design choices that date back to Maastricht? To what
extent has the drift of both EU decision-making in general and
eurozone governance in particular facilitated the pursuit of neo-
liberal policies (see Chapter 26)?

This last point bridges two questions about the relationship between
the EU and the influence of certain economic ideas and particular
conceptions of the economy. As we will note in Section 6.6, ‘Critical
theories and the European Union’, a number of critical political
economists have suggested that the EU represents a quasi-state form
that is particularly useful for the ‘constitutionalization’ of neo-
liberal policy frameworks (Gill, 1998). This position would suggest
that the institutionalization of European integration has been closely
related to, if not fundamentally determined by, the growing
legitimacy of neo-liberal ideas about the technical propriety and
normative appropriateness of a free market order with minimal
capacity for public authority to develop either welfare institutions or
social policies to compensate for the effects of markets (Scharpf,
2002). This raises an interesting debate regarding whether the EU is
ineluctably neo-liberal in character or whether it contains the
potential for both market-making and market correction (see Jabko,
2006).

This type of debate is directly related to the final IPE debate

mentioned here: the relationship between the construction of market
orders and social purpose. Over the past 30 years, much official EU
policy discourse has asserted that there is a ‘social dimension’ to
market integration, that the EU embodies something called the
‘European social model’, and that the EU, both internally and
externally, exists for the purpose of ‘managing globalization’. While
some analysts have broadly endorsed the idea that the EU is more
than a crude institutional device for promoting the subordination of
European society to the market (for example, Caporaso and Tarrow,
2009), there are interesting questions to be asked about how
precisely the EU manages to ‘embed’ itself within European social
purpose, especially given the problem of the democratic deficit
(see Chapter 9). At the same time, there is an influential line of
argument that insists that the EU should do no more than create the
conditions for a free market order. This normative position is central
to claims about the EU’s status as a ‘regulatory state’ (Majone,
2009). Moreover, it is the EU’s status as a market regulator that
spills over most conspicuously into the global political economy
beyond Europe (Damro, 2012). So, the question of whether the EU
represents a counterweight to the spread of neo-liberal market
discipline is not only localized to Europe. If the EU is a major source
of global market rules, or at least a major player in the negotiation of
those rules, then it is difficult to study IPE and think about the world
though the conceptual frames that it provides without bringing the
EU squarely into the analytical frame.

Key Points

• Much recent conceptual thinking in IR has been directed

towards the analysis of the growth of regionalism in the
global political economy, of which the EU may be a
(peculiar) instance.
• Also important is recent thinking that challenges the
state-centric vision of the world that has characterized
much mainstream IR theory.
• The particular character of the EU as a presence in the
global system confronts this traditional imagery by
pointing to a number of ways in which structures of
authority and patterns of politics may be changing.
• The important subfield of IPE raises a series of
questions about the politics of international market
orders which are of direct relevance for discussions of
the EU.
6.6 Critical theories and the
European Union

The term ‘critical theories’ is used here as an umbrella term to gather

together some important reflections about ‘alternative’ or non-
mainstream approaches to the European Union. We need to use the
term with caution, since it does have a precise meaning in the history
of ideas. The term is most associated with the neo-Marxist
Frankfurt School of social theory. In one of the key founding texts
of the Frankfurt School originally published in 1937, Max
Horkheimer (1982) talked about ‘critical theory’ as a self-conscious
attempt to theorize, in a non-dogmatic way, the conditions for
human emancipation. Built into critical theory from the start, then,
is a very clear commitment to unravelling the contradictions and
injustices of the present social order, combined with an equally clear
dedication to the pursuit of human freedom. This, of course, yields a
distinctive understanding of the nature and purpose of social science,
and one that is very different from most of the approaches to political
analysis discussed in this and the previous two chapters. The critical
theoretical position tends to see conventional social science as bound
up with the object that it seeks to analyse and demystify. Modern
economic theory, for example, is held to be complicit in the
perpetuation of power structures. Robert Cox makes this point very
effectively in a much-cited essay in which he writes that ‘[t]heory is
always for someone and some purpose … there is no such thing as a
theory in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space’ (Cox,
1981: 128). Cox goes on to distinguish between two types of theory:
‘problem-solving’; and ‘critical’. The former is the everyday matter of
most social science. It consists of finding solutions to puzzles that are
set by overarching and largely unquestioned frameworks for
understanding social reality and social order. Such work, at a
fundamental level, does not think about the possibilities for social
transformation. It thereby contributes to the reproduction of existing
social order. Thinking about EU studies in light of Cox’s discussion,
then, it is very likely that neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism,
comparative political science, a good portion of governance theory,
much contemporary international relations (IR) and international
political economy (IPE), and even a good chunk of normative
political theory would be placed in the ‘problem-solving’ category.
This point has been made forcefully by Ryner (2012) who asks why
EU studies failed to anticipate the debilitating effects of the financial
crisis. The answer, argues Ryner, lies in what he calls the ‘orthodox
codes’ of integration theory. Key to these is the presumption that
integration—whether economic, political, or social—is an expression
of rationality and progress. This tendency does not rule out
significant disagreement between theories about whether this
promise will be realized (this is the essence of the debate between
neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists). But it also means that
EU studies as a field (often separated into different disciplinary
clusters) suffers from serious blind spots that prevent it from
treating European integration in relation to the broader trajectories
of capitalism and the social forces that both constitute and contest
power structures in the political economy of the EU.

In contrast, for Cox, ‘critical theory’ does not take for granted the
prevailing social order as if it were fixed. Indeed, the task of critical
theory is to theorize the possibilities for change. A key step towards
that goal is the realization that all social theories—even those
purporting to be value-free and ‘scientific’—emerge from and seek to
reinforce particular perspectives, and, as such, can be tools of the
powerful. One of the things to look for from a broadly critical
theoretical perspective is silences in conventional academic work:
what is not discussed, and why is it not discussed? (Manners and
Whitman, 2016). An additional point, noted by Manners (2007), is
the question of where to look for non-mainstream or critical work. If
EU studies journals and book series are responsible for establishing,
policing, and reproducing orthodox ‘problem-solving’ work, then we
should hardly expect to find heterodox, critical work routinely
showing up in such outlets.

In so far as it is possible to classify non-orthodox or critical work in

EU studies, it seems to cluster around four broad approaches, all of
which tend to begin by noting a missing component of the standard
debate in EU studies. First, feminists have drawn attention to the
highly gendered nature of EU theoretical and policy discourses.
Kronsell’s (2005) critique of integration theory provides a very good
illustration of the extent to which standard political science
approaches screen out gender relations from their analysis. The
point is not simply to examine things such as the policy implications
of European integration for gender equality (although that is very
important, not least in the context of the UK’s recent exit from the
EU—see Guerrina and Masselot, 2018). A feminist-inspired
reconstruction of EU studies must also think about the ways in which
gendered practices are sustained and reproduced within both EU
policy discourses and the academic analysis of EU politics (see also
Locher and Prügl, 2009). The conception of politics that underpins
most accounts of integration reduces the political to what happens in
the public domain of the state. As such, it excludes most of those
often private sites that feminists have identified as crucial to the
practice of power relations. Moreover, most conventional political
science theories rest upon heavily masculinist conceptions of
rationality. As such, political science theories are actually affirming
the gendered self-narrative of public institutions by assuming that
they operate according to this very particular conception of
rationality.

Second, there have been long-standing Marxist analyses of the EU.

Marxists of various kinds insist on locating the EU’s development
within a broader analysis of the dynamics of capitalism. The earliest
Marxist analyses of European integration understood the evolution
of supranational institutions as a redesign of the capitalist state to
take account of the changing nature of European relations of
production. Thus Mandel (1970) saw European-level institutions as
central to the process of capital concentration in Europe. Likewise,
Cocks (1980) understood integration as crucial to the dynamic
development of capitalist productive forces. More recently, neo-
Gramscians (inspired by the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci) have
been interested in the ways in which the EU has drifted towards
treaty commitments and policy regimes (such as in corporate
governance or competition policy) in which neo-liberal frameworks
prevail and in which popular accountability is weak. Gill (1998)
sees the EU as part and parcel of a global trend to lock in and
constitutionalize neo-liberal conceptions of market society.

Third, writers inspired by Michel Foucault tend to think about the

EU as a particular expression of liberal rationalities of government
that seek to define the human subject in particular ways. This is
interesting in the European context because the development of the
Single Market regime requires the definition of the typical
transnational human agent that inhabits and moves across that
market space. Parker (2012) suggests that there are two potentially
contradictory versions of the liberal European subject imagined in
the treaties: one is a pure market actor—a ‘subject of interest’—using
European transnational space as an arena for economic transaction;
the other is a political actor, a transnational citizen—a ‘subject of
right’—whose cosmopolitanism extends well beyond the arena of
market transaction. Foucauldians are also interested in how
governing actors, as part of the governing process, contribute to the
statistical and discursive construction of the space over which they
exercise authority. From this point of view, the outputs of Eurostat
and Eurobarometer are not simply neutral data, but active
constructions of Europe and Europeans designed to render the EU
space governable from the European level.

Finally, post-structuralists (a category that usually embraces

Foucauldians as well) have focused on the importance of linguistic
constructions of Europe and its others, and the ways in which the
supposed removal of borders of one kind is often accompanied by the
imposition of bordering practices of other kinds. Diez (1999), for
example, shows how the academic efforts trying to define the EU are
not merely analytical moves, but active interventions in developing
widespread understandings of Europe in wider political debates.
Walters (2004) engages in a radical rethink of the EU’s external
borders—which we might think of straightforwardly as the point at
which the EU ends and other jurisdictions begin—as objects of
different types of governing strategy. As with all post-structuralist
work, the emphasis is on problematizing a facet of the social world
that may appear to be unambiguous and perhaps of little academic
interest, and on showing how that facet (in this case, borders) can be
rendered intelligible in different ways.

Key Points

• A wide range of so-called critical theoretical traditions

have been applied to the study of the EU.
• These include feminist, Marxist, Foucauldian, and post-
structuralist perspectives.

• Critical theories of this kind point to the limited problem-

solving qualities of conventional theory.

• They see a close relationship between orthodox

academic work and the reproduction of power relations.
6.7 Conclusion

The revival of interest in theory in EU studies has occurred within

the context of some serious thinking about the role of theory in
political science. Some of the ‘new’ theories discussed in this chapter
have emerged from a concern to render theoretical work more
rigorously ‘scientific’. Other approaches have emerged from
positions that explicitly challenge the positivist mainstream in social
science. Other theorists still—notably certain constructivists—try to
occupy a middle position between positivism and reflectivism. These
debates have begun to intrude into EU studies and have been played
out more extensively in the broader international relations (IR)
literature.

Theoretical reflection and debate simply bring out into the open
assumptions that reside in any empirical discussion of the European
Union. Alternative theories work from different accounts of social
reality and sometimes lead to quite different strategies for acquiring
valid knowledge about that world (Jackson, 2011). This translates
eventually into a set of disagreements about fundamental matters:
what sort of entity is the EU and how should it be studied?

Much of the ‘new’ theoretical work introduced in this chapter

represents a self-conscious departure from thinking about the EU in
terms of ‘integration’. Its status as a supplier of authoritative policy
outputs suggests that the toolkit of political science and policy
analysis might be useful. At the same time, however, the fact that the
EU is not a state as conventionally understood poses all sorts of
challenges to those seeking to understand not only European
integration, but also the nature of world order in the early twenty-
first century. The EU may offer a clear indication of what a
‘denationalized’ world order might look like. It sits between nation
states and the international system, and arguably transforms both
through its very existence.

Nevertheless, we are now at a point where many see the EU as facing

some sort of existential crisis. This is partly to do with the
coincidence of several serious individual crises—such as those that
have recently arisen as a consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic,
and which earlier emerged in the eurozone and because of the
governance of refugee flows into the EU—as well as the decision
taken by one member state (the UK) to leave the EU. This raises two
important questions that every student of the EU needs to consider.
First, do our existing political science theories blind us to the full
scope of these crises? Do they contain in-built assumptions about
institutional continuity and resistance that yield both a complacency
about the dangers facing the union and a neglect of the breakdown of
governing norms that have prevailed in European integration for
decades (Joerges and Kreuder-Sonnen, 2017)? The second question
is whether it has now become necessary to develop a theory of
disintegration (Jones, 2018; see also Chapter 29). ‘Disintegration’
implies the reversal of integration, although perhaps it needs to be
best understood in terms of processes and tendencies that work
against integrative processes and tendencies. The irony might be that
to build such a theory successfully, scholars might well need to bring
the concept of integration back in from the cold.

The facts that the EU is multidimensional, that integration is uneven,

that the EU is faced with countervailing disintegrative tendencies
and that EU governance is composed of multiple, coexisting policy
modes all force us to think carefully about how the nature of
authority is changing. The trick—as employers of the ‘multilevel
governance’ metaphor remind us (see Chapter 7)—is to think about
the EU as part and parcel of this changing pattern of governance. To
treat the EU as a political system ‘above’ national political systems
ignores the complex interpenetration of the domestic and the
supranational in contemporary Europe. The task of theories—
whether drawn from the formal disciplinary domains of
‘international relations’ or ‘political science’—is to offer ways of
organizing our thoughts about what is going on in this context. We
might continue to be confused about the complexity of the EU, but
the present vibrant theoretical culture in EU studies at least gives us
a chance of being confused in a reasonably sophisticated way.
Q UEST I O NS

1. Is it fair to say that comparative politics provides a better

disciplinary homeland for EU studies than international
relations?
2. Can there be a single institutionalist research agenda in
EU studies?
3. What added value do social constructivists bring to the
study of the EU?

4. How might we go about theorizing the EU’s role in the

world?

5. To what extent is it possible to compare the EU with

other instances of ‘regionalism’ in the global political
economy?

6. How can we explain conventional integration theory’s

silence about gender?

7. How have the post-2008 global financial crisis and the

subsequent euro crisis challenged standard theoretical
approaches to European integration?

8. Do recent developments in the European Union imply

that we need to develop a theory of disintegration? What
would such a theory look like?
For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read
the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E., and Wiener, A. (eds) (2001)

The Social Construction of Europe (London: Sage). A collection
of constructivist-inspired readings of aspects of European
integration, this contains critical responses and a notable late
essay by Ernst Haas, the founder of neo-functionalism.
Cini, M. and Bourne, A. K. (eds) (2006) Palgrave Advances in
European Union Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). A
collection on the state of the art in EU studies, with numerous
theoretical insights.
Rosamond, B. (2000) Theories of European Integration
(Basingstoke: Palgrave). A critical discussion of past and
present theories of integration.
Saurugger, S. (2014) Theoretical Approaches to European
Integration (London: Palgrave Macmillan). An up-to-date and
thorough discussion of the theoretical landscape in EU studies.
Wiener, A. and Diez, T. (eds) (2009) European Integration
Theory, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Practitioners
of a wide variety of theoretical perspectives discuss and apply
their approaches to the EU.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
7
Governance in the European
Union
Thomas Christiansen
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
7.1 Introduction
7.2 Conceptualizing governance in the European Union

7.3 Multilevel governance

7.4 ‘New governance’ and the European regulatory state

7.5 Normative debates about governance

7.6 Conclusion

Reader’s Guide

This chapter provides an overview of the ‘governance turn’

in the study of European integration. Opening with a
discussion of the reasons why governance as a concept
and as a practice has become so prevalent in Europe, the
chapter goes on to discuss the various ways in which the
governance approach has evolved. Two strands of this
literature—‘multilevel governance’ and the ‘regulatory
state’—are examined in greater detail here. The chapter
then introduces some of the important normative debates
to which the ‘governance turn’ has given rise, before
concluding with some observations about the relevance of
the governance approach in the current phase of European
integration.
7.1 Introduction

The concept of ‘governance’ has become ubiquitous over the past

couple of decades. Looking at European Union politics, in particular,
in terms of governance—that is, as a way of governing that does not
assume the presence of a traditional, hierarchical government at the
helm of the polity—is attractive from a conceptual point of view, not
least because it promises a systematic way of studying the European
Union (EU) that recognizes the particularities of the European
construction. At the same time, as a concept, governance has shown
itself to be rather open and flexible, facilitating a wide variety of
usages. Taking as its starting point a rather vague agreement on what
governance is not, it has been possible for scholars to find numerous
applications for the governance concept in empirical research.

Beyond the academic community, the idea of governance also has

political appeal in allowing policy-makers to talk about EU decision-
making without invoking the idea that Europe is in the process of
becoming a state (if not a ‘superstate’). The succession of crises
that the EU experienced in the 2010s and early 2020s, requiring in
their management the close cooperation of policy-makers at the
national and European levels, of political and bureaucratic elites, and
of the public and the private sector, has further enhanced the
attraction of a concept that emphasizes the inclusive and non-
hierarchical dimension of European Union decision-making.
At the same time, governance has also come to typify the de-
politicized and technocratic aspects of EU policy-making often
criticized by Eurosceptics and populists. As a result, talk of
‘European governance’ and the use of the governance concept has
become extremely widespread, spawning a vast literature of policy
papers, scholarly articles, and books on the subject. But the extensive
and somewhat inflationary application of the concept has itself
become a problem. It is applied to an increasingly broad range of
phenomena and its diverse usage across different communities of
scholars makes it difficult to identify what ‘governance’ seeks to
describe (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2009).
7.2 Conceptualizing governance
in the European Union

In his seminal article, Jachtenfuchs (2001: 245) discussed the

‘governance approach to European integration’ in juxtaposition to
‘classical integration theory’ (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6). The
governance approach, in this perspective, is distinctive because it
treats the Euro-polity as an independent, not (as ‘classical’ theories
have done) as a dependent variable. In other words, those
studying governance are more interested in what the European
Union does, rather than how the EU has come about. In charting the
conceptual roots of the approach, Jachtenfuchs identified, inter alia,
network governance, regulatory politics, and Europeanization
research (see Chapter 8) as influential contributions to the
governance literature.

Other authors have helped to clarify what governance is (see Box

7.1). Rhodes (1996: 652) defined governance as ‘self-organising,
inter-organisational networks [which] complement markets and
hierarchies as governing structures for authoritatively allocating
resources and exercising control and coordination’. Stoker (1998: 17)
reminded us that while governance is seen increasingly in opposition
to government, it does actually perform the same functions, ‘creating
the conditions for ordered rule and collective action’. This implies
that its distinctive focus is not on outputs, as such, but on the process
of achieving those outputs. Hix (1998: 343), in his important
contribution to the debate, pointed out that the ‘new governance
conception of the EU emphasises the informal nature of the policy
process, the non-hierarchical structure of the institutions and the
non-redistributive nature of policy outputs’.
BO X 7 . 1
Background: Definitions of ‘governance’

(European) ‘Self-organising, inter-organisational networks [which]

Governance complement markets and hierarchies as governing structures for
authoritatively allocating resources and exercising control and
coordination’ (Rhodes, 1996: 652)

‘The development of governing styles in which boundaries

between and within public and private sectors have become
blurred [and a] focus on governing mechanisms which do not
rest on recourse to the authority and sanctions of government’
(Stoker, 1998: 17)

‘The intentional regulation of social relationships and the

underlying conflicts by reliable and durable means and
institutions, instead of the direct use of power and violence’
(Jachtenfuchs, 2001: 246)

‘A process and a state whereby public and private actors engage

in the intentional regulation of societal relationships and conflicts
[and which] denotes the participation of public and private actors,
as well as non-hierarchical forms of decision making’ (Kohler-
Koch and Rittberger, 2006: 28)

Multilevel ‘The dispersion of authority to multi-task, territorially mutually

governance exclusive jurisdictions in a relatively stable system with limited
Jurisdictional levels and a limited number of units [as well as the
presence of] specialized, territorially overlapping jurisdictions in a
relatively flexible, non-tiered system with a large number of
jurisdictions’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2001a: 1)

Regulatory ‘Reliance on regulation—rather than public ownership, planning

state or centralised administration—characterizes the methods of the
regulatory state’ (Majone, 1994: 77)

‘Relies on extensive delegation of powers to independent

institutions: regulatory agencies or commissions, but also the
judiciary’ (Majone, 1999:1)
From Box 7.1 we can see that most authors identify as important the
role of non-hierarchical networks; regulation rather than
redistribution in policy-making; and the use of new instruments and
procedures. However, contributors to the governance debate often
privilege one of these aspects over the others and, as a result, the
governance literature has mushroomed in a number of different
directions. The reliance on, and relation to, research on policy
networks and epistemic communities has been particularly
strong (see, for example, Börzel, 1997; Zito, 2001; Knill and Tosun,
2009; Faleg, 2012).

Building on such insights, the governance approach has also been

used to explore the way in which policy networks in the EU have
become institutionalized, whether through committee structures
(Christiansen and Kirchner, 2000) or through the growing number
of regulatory agencies (Coen and Thatcher, 2007; Trondal and
Jeppesen, 2008; Dehousse et al., 2010; Groenleer et al., 2010;
Wonka and Rittberger, 2011). Others have focused on the informal
dimension of governance (Christiansen and Piattoni, 2004; Kleine,
2013).

At the same time, governance research has also increasingly ‘drilled

down’ into the specifics of particular sectors or policy fields. See, for
example, the work done on European environmental governance
(Lenschow, 1999; von Homeyer, 2004), on EU economic governance
(Puetter, 2012), or on EU external governance (Lavenex, 2004;
Schimmelfennig and Wagner, 2004). While this proliferation of
sector-specific applications demonstrates the value of a governance
perspective in guiding research in a multitude of different arenas, it
contradicts the expectations of Jachtenfuchs (2001), for whom the
governance approach was a welcome departure from the
fragmentation of policy studies that had characterized EU research
in the 1970s and 1980s.

Matters are somewhat complicated by the fact that one of the first
and most important contributions on ‘supranational
governance’ (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 1997, 1999) did not
depart from the use of traditional concepts and debates. Indeed,
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet’s theory positioned itself within the
established theoretical arena of intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism. Their main contribution was to re-evaluate the role
of supranational institutions in the integration process, and in
particular to emphasize the importance of judicial rule-making as
one of the key drivers of this process.

What this example demonstrates is that, with respect to the

expanding field of governance research, it is becoming increasingly
difficult to identify it as a single, coherent approach. Beyond
agreement on the basic elements of what constitutes governance
(and what it is not), the selective focus of individual authors means
that governance denotes rather different things to different people.
Arguably, this suggests that the different strands of governance
research deserve, or even require, their own distinctive label in order
to maintain analytical clarity. An exercise in coming to grips with the
way in which the concept of governance has been used to study the
EU therefore needs to start by distinguishing some of the different
usages of this concept.
It is possible to identify three approaches that have been especially
important:
• the multilevel governance approach, which emphasizes the
nature of EU policy-making as involving a multiplicity of
actors on a variety of territorial levels beyond the nation state;

• the new governance approach (or agenda), which views the

EU as a ‘regulatory state’ using non-majoritarian decision-
making to engage in problem-solving; and

• the study of new modes of governance, drawing on the use of

non-binding instruments to make policies at the European
level (with the open method of coordination, or OMC, as a
prime example).

Each of these understandings of governance takes the view that there

is something fundamentally ‘new’ in the way in which the EU
operates that requires a departure from traditional approaches. As
such, their application in the study of European integration has
mainly been driven by external factors—that is, by perceived changes
in the empirical object of study, rather than (internal) developments
within integration theory (see also Chapter 6). A common feature of
these governance approaches is their emphasis on non-hierarchical
networks as a key aspect of EU policy-making and of the EU as a
whole. The presence of such policy networks, bringing together EU
officials, national administrators and regulators, business interests,
non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, and other
stakeholders, is analytically relevant, because networks ‘cut across’
the formal boundaries that exist between institutions, territorial
levels, and the public and private spheres.
However, despite such commonalities, there are also important
differences within this field; these, however, are in danger of being
overlooked. One difference lies in which ‘classical’ theory is being
critiqued. For example, multilevel governance is best seen as part of
the more established integration theory debate, and in particular as a
response to the dominance of liberal intergovernmentalism in
the 1990s. By contrast, the new governance agenda can be seen in
opposition to the comparative politics approach to the EU. In other
words, ‘governance’ is sometimes presented as an alternative to the
view that the EU is an intergovernmental arrangement among
sovereign states while on other occasions it is juxtaposed with the
view that the EU itself should be studied as an emerging state, with
its institutions and procedures comparable to those of nation states.

From this opposition to both (liberal) intergovernmentalist and

comparative politics perspectives to European integration resulted in
a perception that governance approaches could constitute some sort
of ‘third way’ to the study of the EU, one that eschews the reliance on
the Westphalian state as the underlying paradigm of EU politics
(Pollack, 2005). This not only justified the original designation of
governance as ‘new’ when it was first introduced during the 1990s,
but it also underpinned its perception of the EU as a sui generis kind
of polity—a new kind of political construct that departs from the way
in which both international and domestic politics have operated in
the past, or are operating elsewhere.

This presentation of governance as one corner of a triangular debate

about integration theories involving international relations and
comparative politics approaches might have helped to group together
a variety of perspectives, presenting these as an ‘approach’. But this
has become more difficult in view of the way in which governance
has also become widely used in the study of international and
domestic politics. In this sense, governance, be it global, regional, or
national, appears to be a universal phenomenon, albeit one that has
a strong and distinctive presence in the context of the EU. A
consistent and comprehensive understanding of EU governance
therefore also involves the recognition that technocratic decision-
making at the EU level goes hand in hand with greater policization of
European affairs at the national level, and that the ‘new dynamics of
EU governance’ also involve the participation of parliamentary actors
(Schmidt, 2018).

There is, also, an expanding literature on ‘global governance’. The

extent to which similar approaches and assumptions can be
employed to study global politics and EU politics raises questions
over the uniqueness of the EU as a political system (see Rosenau and
Czempiel, 1992, for an early discussion of global governance, and
Reilly, 2004, for a comparison of national, sub-national, and
European understandings of the concept).

What this discussion shows is that, even though the governance

approach has been seen by some as an argument for treating the EU
as sui generis (see Hix, 1998), it has at the same time helped others
to make a connection, if not a comparison, between research on the
EU and on phenomena elsewhere. This has helped to overcome the n
= 1 problem that arises when European integration is treated as
unique (Krahmann, 2003; see also Chapter 6). In this vein, research
on European governance can draw on insights from research in other
areas, or on other territorial levels, while in turn work on the EU can
inspire governance research elsewhere.

Key Points

• The concept of governance has successfully described

the transformation of policy-making in many parts of the
world over the past few decades.

• Using the governance concept has been particularly

useful in the context of the EU, given the difficulty
involved in categorizing the Euro-polity in terms of the
traditional distinction between international system and
nation state.

• The governance approach is a broad concept, capturing

a variety of different perspectives and applications. At its
core, it involves the understanding that policy is made
through non-hierarchical networks of both public and
private actors located across different territorial levels.

• Multilevel governance, the new governance or regulatory

state approach, and the study of new modes of
governance are the main expressions of the ‘governance
turn’ in EU studies.
7.3 Multilevel governance

Multilevel governance (MLG) was advanced in the 1990s as a

particular take on governance in the European Union, challenging
the state-centric nature view of the EU prevalent up to that point
(Marks et al., 1996). In their account of European integration, the
founders of MLG emphasized the independent role of supranational
institutions, such as the Commission and the Court of Justice of the
EU (CJEU), while also pointing out the internal differences that exist
within member states and the inability of national executives to
control how interests within individual states are represented.
‘Multilevel’ here referred primarily to the influence of EU-level actors
and regional actors alongside the representatives of national
executives (Marks, 1992). Whereas the former was very much in the
mould of earlier neo-functionalist and more recent supranational
governance accounts of integration, the addition of the regional level
as part of the analytical frame was new and innovative. This aspect of
MLG struck a chord with many researchers at the time, especially
because it connected to the analysis of the EU conducted in federal
systems such as Germany (Conzelmann, 1998; Benz and Eberlein,
1999; Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999).

From the mid-1990s onwards, MLG quickly established itself as one

of the main rivals to liberal intergovernmentalism. It starts from the
observation that much of EU policy-making relies on networks of
actors, but goes beyond this by emphasizing the significance of
different territorial levels in this process. On the back of a critique of
the liberal intergovernmentalist assumption that central
governments aggregate national preferences, MLG points to the
direct relations that have developed between EU actors and regional
and local representatives within states. These relations bypass
central governments and thereby prevent national executives
maintaining a monopoly over the representation of territorial
interests. Consequently, regions and municipalities become
recognizable as actors independent of their central state. Moreover,
their networking with the European Commission and among each
other creates regional and local levels of interest representation
within the EU. From this perspective, then, EU politics transforms
itself from a ‘two-level game’ (Putnam, 1988) to one that involves
multiple levels of government. Together with the incorporation of
insights from the study of policy networks, this perspective
constituted the basis of the MLG concept (see Box 7.2).

The appeal of this approach meant that its application, initially

centred on the study of EU regional policy (Sutcliffe, 2000; Bache,
2008), eventually expanded to cover numerous other policy
domains. Through the lens of MLG, authors have analysed the
influence of regional actors in areas such as employment policy
(Goetschy, 2003), research policy (Kaiser and Prange, 2002),
environmental policy (Bulkeley et al., 2003), and even foreign policy
(Smith, 2004; see also the expansive collection of sectoral case
studies in Tömmel and Verdun, 2008).
BO X 7 . 2
Case Study: The reform of EU regional policy and the
development of the multilevel governance approach

The EU has had a European Regional Development Fund

(ERDF) since 1974, resulting from a deal done at the time of
UK accession to ensure that the UK would receive further funds
from the EU’s budget, given that it did not stand to benefit that
much from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). In
subsequent years it became evident, however, that the
disbursements from the ERDF often did not provide additional
funding for regional development, but instead was used by
national administrations merely to substitute domestic regional
policy, effectively providing member state finance ministries
with opportunities to spend more money elsewhere.
However, a tool that was originally designed to facilitate a
just retour for some member states became the object of a
major reform following the Southern enlargement and the
agreement on the Single European Act (SEA) in the mid-1980s.
Given the concerns about the further centralization of economic
activity within the Single Market, there was an agreement that
regional policy in the EU ought to deliver additional funding to
lesser-developed and peripheral regions. In 1988, the EU’s
‘structural funds’—the ERDF plus certain elements of
agricultural and social policy funds—were significantly
increased and their management fundamentally reformed in
order to ensure that EU spending would focus on specific
territories defined according to EU-wide standards, that the
money would actually arrive at the intended destination, and
that local and regional stakeholders would be involved in the
decision-making. This new approach was enshrined in EU
regional policy through principles such as ‘concentration’,
‘additionality’, and ‘partnership’, respectively.
The ‘partnership’ principle, in particular, had a far-reaching
relevance in governance terms, because it meant that for the
first time local and regional authorities across the EU became
legitimate actors in the policy process. This involved their
participation in the programming committees that would
oversee the implementation of specific regional policy projects.
But it also led to a wider, political role for sub-state level actors
in the EU, initially as members of a consultative committee
convened by the Commission to provide general feedback on
the direction of regional policy and the territorial impact of other
European policies.
The reform of the structural funds, together with the
regulatory impact of the Single Market programme, had
demonstrated to regions across the EU that ‘Europe Matters’,
and subsequently mobilized regional and local actors to
campaign for a greater degree of involvement in EU decision-
making. What followed was an explosion of offices set by
regions, cities, and associations of municipalities in Brussels to
represent their specific and general territorial interests, creating
new channels of both vertical and horizontal networking for
regional actors (Hooghe and Marks, 1996; Jeffery, 1996;
Beyers and Donas, 2014). The creation of the Committee of
 the Regions (CoR) with the 1994 Maastricht Treaty was also a
direct result of these dynamics (Christiansen, 1996).
The 1988 reform of the EU’s structural funds, followed in the
1990s by further reforms, amounted to a ‘Europeanisation of
regional policy’ (Benz and Eberlein, 1999) and brought a new
‘third level’ into the mix of EU policy-making (Jeffery, 1997).
Scholars recognized that the nature of this Europeanized
regional policy differed from the domestic experience of both
unitary and federal states, and that a new conceptualization
was needed in order to understand and study these dynamics.
The multilevel governance approach was developed in
response, and subsequently became a widely used tool not
only in the study of EU regional policy, but also as more general
approach to the study of European integration and a critique of
liberal intergovernmentalism.

What these policy studies have shown is that there is added value to
incorporating actors beyond national executives and EU officials in
accounts of EU policy-making. At the same time, these studies
demonstrate the variation of such influence across different policy
sectors and over different points in time (Schultze, 2003).
Subsequently, MLG has also been applied to the implementation
stage of the policy process, a logical move in view of the
decentralized nature of the EU’s administrative system (Thielemann,
1998; O’Toole and Hanf, 2003).

Multilevel governance has therefore succeeded not only as an

effective critique of ‘state-centric’ integration theories, but also in
framing a growing body of research on various aspects of the EU
policy process; it addresses deeper questions about the potential for
transformation in the Euro-polity (Eising and Kohler-Koch, 1999;
Piattoni, 2009). However, while MLG has effectively exposed the
weaknesses of liberal intergovernmentalism, it has not developed
systematic and explicit statements about cause and effect, about
dependent and independent variables, or about the scope
conditions governing its explanatory power. In other words, it lacks
the credentials of a theory such as liberal intergovernmentalism. As
it stands, then, MLG constitutes an approach that has added valuable
insights, which allow for a more comprehensive understanding of EU
politics and policy-making, but it has not developed as a fully fledged
theory.

More recent advances in the literature have nevertheless sought to

advance MLG beyond the early claims that EU level and sub-state
level actors matter in the European policy process. These aim to
enhance its explanatory power and theoretical potential. Piattoni
(2009), for example, building on the earlier work of Hooghe and
Marks (2001a) and Skelcher (2005), has pointed out that territory in
the emerging Euro-polity is not neatly separated into European,
national, regional, and local levels, but that policies are often made
within or for overlapping, interstitial, or loosely defined spaces that
do not necessarily correspond to pre-existing territorial jurisdictions.
This distinction between the older (territorially defined) ‘type I’ form
of MLG and a more recently identified ‘type II’ approach helps
scholars to engage with the tensions between different forms of
MLG, while also bringing new normative dilemmas to light.
Although the initial statement of MLG was rationalist in its
emphasis on cost–benefit calculations, informational asymmetries,
and institutional self-interests, other contributions to the field have
sought to demonstrate the constructivist potential of MLG
(Christiansen, 1997). For example, in an interesting departure from
the usual application of MLG, Aalberts (2004) employs a
constructivist reading of the concept that seeks to reconcile the
empirical observation that the significance of sovereignty in the
Euro-polity has been declining with the apparent resilience of the
nation state.

Key Points

• Multilevel governance emphasizes the involvement and

potential influence of actors from different territorial
levels in the making of EU policy.
• Much of the literature making use of the insights of MLG
has focused on the role of regions in the politics of the
EU.
• Multilevel governance has demonstrated its usefulness
above all in research on the agenda-setting and
implementation phases of the EU policy process.
• Beyond the study of EU policy-making, MLG has also
informed research on constitutive politics and the
transformation of governance in the EU.
7.4 ‘New governance’ and the
European regulatory state

A rather different perspective on governance has been taken by

authors who have conceptualized the European Union as a
regulatory state. Rather than focusing on multiple levels of
governance or on networks of actors, here the focus is on the kind of
decisions being taken at the European level and the instruments that
are being employed in order to achieve outcomes. The ‘regulatory
state’ is seen in contrast to the traditional welfare state,
interchangeably labelled also as the ‘interventionist’, ‘positive’, or
‘dirigiste’ state—that is, one that is heavily involved in the
allocation of goods and the redistribution of wealth. The regulatory
state, by contrast, does not involve classic decisions about spending
and taxation, but is essentially concerned with socio-economic
regulation (Majone, 1994, 1996; Caporaso, 1996; McGowan and
Wallace, 1996).

While the rise of the regulatory function of the state has been part of
a wider phenomenon both within states as well as globally (Moran,
2002), the argument about the EU as a regulatory state built on a
number of factors that were specific to the EU. First, the EU’s
Budget, in relation to the combined gross domestic product
(GDP) of the member states’ economies, is comparatively small and
does not permit the kind of social expenditure that welfare states
have at their disposal. At the same time, the EU has no practical tax-
raising powers and cannot use taxes as an instrument of
redistribution.

As a result, the EU has no choice but to intervene in the economy

and in society through regulation. While regulatory activity at the
European level was modest until the mid-1980s, hampered by the
need for unanimous decision-making, a step-change occurred with
the Single European Act (SEA) and the roll-out of the 1992
Programme. The move to qualified majority voting (QMV)
made the passage of European legislation much easier. Re-regulation
at the European level, combined with the mutual recognition of
technical and product standards at the national level, opened up
member states’ markets, and created the conditions for regulatory
competition among national and regional jurisdictions (Young,
2006).

In terms of institutional foundations, scholars have focused on a

number of particular arrangements in the EU through which
regulatory activity takes place. Among these are the delegation of
powers to the European Commission, the creation of a large number
of decentralized agencies, and the growth of regulatory networks.
What these mechanisms have in common, and what has been
identified as a hallmark of the European regulatory state, is that
decision-making through these institutional arrangements is both
non-majoritarian and removed from the electoral process. This
means that regulatory decisions are not taken through the ‘normal’
channels used by liberal democratic systems—majority votes by
elected representatives in parliament or decisions by national
executives accountable to voters—but by non-elected technocrats.

This departure from standard norms of parliamentary democracy

has led to debate among scholars (see Section 7.5, ‘Normative
debates about governance’ for a discussion). For proponents of
regulatory governance, the immediate justification for this
independence from politics has centred on the following argument:
the kind of regulatory decisions that are taken in the EU are about
the search for the best solution to a given regulatory problem. As
such, they are about identifying what is called the ‘Pareto optimal’
outcome among a range of possible solutions—a Pareto optimum
being the outcome at which the greatest possible collective gain is
reached. Setting technical standards for industrial goods, regulating
financial services, preventing monopolistic tendencies and other
forms of market abuse, or supervising safety standards and
procedures for air travel and maritime transport, are all examples of
the kind of activities that should, from this perspective, be better left
to independent European regulators.

In the same vein, it is argued that it is not only right, but also indeed
imperative to entrust technocrats and experts with the search for the
best possible solutions. Equipped with access to information,
possessing expertise in the particular area in which regulatory
decisions are required, and insulated from political pressures,
technocrats will have the best chances of identifying the right
solution. Indeed, from the vantage point of the search for the Pareto-
optimal outcome, majoritarian institutions, which tend to decide
through voting on different options, cannot be trusted to come up
with the best solutions. Consequently, regulatory governance
arrangements involve the setting up of independent agencies that are
removed from political interference so that they can do their work
objectively.

The logic of non-majoritarian decision-making is most entrenched in

the area of monetary policy in which the independence of central
banks has become an article of faith. As long as the goal of stable
money and low inflation is accepted as beneficial to society as a
whole, it follows that the setting of interest rates and decisions
about money supply should not be subject to the shifting
preferences of electoral competition and party politics. Independent
central bankers can ignore the short-term pressures of elections and
instead can take decisions based on the long-term interests of
monetary stability.

In line with the central bank analogy, the ‘regulatory state’ school of
thought has identified a growing number of regulatory decisions that
may (or should) be ‘outsourced’ to independent agencies. This has
affected areas such as competition policy, utilities regulation,
financial services oversight, and the implementation of public
services more generally. The resulting rise of the regulatory state is
seen as a global phenomenon, driven by competitive pressures in
globalized markets, with the EU as a particular expression of this
trend. In the EU, negative integration—the removal of domestic
non-tariff barriers—has been accompanied, albeit to a more
limited extent by positive integration—the setting of minimum
standards at the European level. Re-regulation—the creation of new
standards applicable to the Single Market—has largely been left to
networks of national regulators meeting at the European level, either
informally through networks or in the more formalized settings of
agencies and committees.

In addition, the European Commission has been entrusted with the

centralized implementation of much of EU legislation through the
delegation of powers (see also Chapter 10). This leads to the
European Commission adopting thousands of implementing
measures each year, with many of these being of a regulatory nature.
Given that the Commission is exercising these delegated powers in
the place of national administrations, member states have insisted
on the setting up of a large number of advisory, management, and
regulatory committees composed of national representatives. These
committees oversee the adoption of implementing measures (Blom-
Hansen, 2011). The resultant system is known as ‘comitology’ and
not only provides a framework for member state control over the
Commission’s use of delegated powers (Brandsma and Blom-
Hansen, 2017), but also can be seen as a site for the systematic
cooperation—indeed the ‘fusion’—of national and EU-level
administrations (Wessels, 1998; Christiansen, 2010).

A number of issues have been highlighted in the new governance

literature. For example, the fact that European regulatory networks
tend to be only loosely coupled, and essentially rely on national
agencies to implement regulatory decisions agreed at the European
level, has led Eberlein and Grande (2005) and others to point out
that potential ‘supranational regulatory gaps’ may arise. The relative
weakness of regulatory networks, lacking formal powers to sanction
the uniform implementation of decisions, means that agreements
might either fall victim to distributive conflict, or otherwise not be
subject to democratic accountability (see also McGowan and
Wallace, 1996).

This dilemma between effectiveness and accountability has been a

common debating point among those studying the regulatory state.
Indeed, Majone (1994) himself has been quick to point to the need
for strong accountability structures that can go hand in hand with
the empowerment of independent regulators. However,
accountability is not understood in terms of political control in this
case—something that, from the new governance perspective, carries
with it the ‘danger’ of politicization—but rather relies on judicial
review. In an accountability structure compatible with the tenets of
the regulatory state, judicial control through courts, acting on behalf
of political institutions, and enforcing established standards,
constitutes the best way of ensuring compliance with agreed
standards (Majone, 1999). Courts therefore, together with central
banks and independent regulatory agencies, are the non-
majoritarian backbone of the regulatory state.
Key Points

• The literature on the ‘European regulatory state’ has

developed from a wider recognition of the changing role
of the state in society in the neo-liberal era.

• This variant of the new governance literature sees the

EU as important in the shift from redistributive to
regulatory politics in Europe.

• The regulatory state model advocates a de-politicization

of regulatory decision-making through the setting up and
strengthening of independent and non-majoritarian
institutions.

• The proposition that regulatory decision-making

constitutes the search for Pareto-optimal solutions that
can best be left to technocrats has given rise to
normative debates about the accountability of decision-
makers.
7.5 Normative debates about
governance

The previous sections have already alluded to the normative

challenges that the governance turn confronts. The main debate in
this regard has concerned the difficulties in reconciling the
governance approach with the traditional form of liberal democracy,
which is generally taken as the benchmark in this kind of
normative assessment. This debate can be broken down into two
distinct arguments in which scholars have engaged: first, do new
forms of governance require legitimation in terms of traditional
representative democracy; and second, does governance constitute a
move towards an alternative kind of democracy, distinct from
traditional models?

In terms of the first of these debates, the case ‘against democracy’

has already been presented in Section 7.4 ‘“New governance” and the
European regulatory state’. Advocates of the regulatory state
approach argue that what matters here is not democratic legitimacy
as expressed through the electoral process, but judicial means of
holding independent regulators to account. The essence here is
procedural control: ensuring that policy-makers have followed the
required steps in the regulatory process (Majone, 1999). As long as
that is ensured, the normatively desirable outcome of the policy
process will be reached. While this initial argument has been applied
to the delegation of power to the European Commission or the
further ‘outsourcing’ of particular decisions from the Commission to
independent agencies, others have taken this further, arguing that
the European Union deals only with technocratic decisions and that,
since it is not involved in ‘high politics’ of a kind that matters to
citizens, there is no reason to worry about the putative ‘democratic
deficit’ (Moravcsik, 2002; see also Chapter 9).

This argument is in part based on the assumption that decision-

making does not involve controversial choices and that, as such,
there is no need for the politicization of decision-making. Against
this assumption, critics have pointed to many regulatory decisions
that have had significant societal implications and which have the
potential to favour certain groups, sectors, or member states over
others. Decisions of this kind, it has been argued, require
legitimation in terms of representative democracy (Føllesdal and
Hix, 2006). Take, for example, the regulation of genetically modified
organisms (GMOs), which, in the EU, has been a highly contentious
issue that has divided both societies and member states (see Box
7.3). The question of whether or not to permit the cultivation and use
of GMOs in foodstuffs has shown itself to be more than a
technocratic challenge to find the ‘right’ solution, and has been
overlaid with ethical, emotional, and economic arguments that the
EU’s regulatory system has found difficult to integrate (Skogstad,
2003). The result is not only a perceived lack of legitimacy in this
area of EU policy-making, but also problems with the effective
regulation of this sector (Christiansen and Polak, 2009).
BO X 7 . 3
Case Study: The authorization of GMOs: A case study of
European regulatory governance

The authorization of GMOs in the EU can be seen as a good

example of the challenges and difficulties of the European
regulatory state. The need to regulate GMOs has arisen fairly
recently and, within the EU’s Single Market, requires the
involvement of supranational institutions in order to ensure that
such goods can be freely traded. In response to this challenge,
the European Parliament and EU Council have adopted a
number of regulations concerning both the cultivation of GMOs
in Europe, and the bringing into the market of food and animal
feed containing GMO ingredients.
Such legislation adopted under the ordinary legislative
procedure (OLP), however, does not permit or prohibit the use
of GMOs. Instead, these regulations delegate powers to the
European Commission, which then has the responsibility of
ruling on individual authorization applications from industry. The
Commission itself is then obliged, under the procedural rules
that have been adopted, to consult a number of other
institutions before taking its decision. This includes primarily the
scientific assessment of the proposed product by the European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in Parma, as well as the approval
of the Commission’s intended decision by a comitology
committee composed of representatives of member state
administrations. In addition, the examination process also
involves networks of national laboratories and committees of
experts in bio-ethics. It is an exhaustive process that has
frequently taken more than a year until the Commission was in
a position to adopt its decision. In fact, on several occasions
the process took so long that applicants have taken the
Commission to court for inaction.
One reason for delay has been that the comitology
committee overseeing the Commission’s use of delegated
powers is required, under the rules, to give its approval with a
qualified majority. The problem is that attitudes among member
states governments have usually been almost evenly divided
between supporters and opponents of authorizing GMOs, so it
has proven difficult for the Commission to achieve the
necessary majority for approval. The absence of qualified
majority voting (QMV) in favour of authorization has meant that
applications are regularly referred to the EU Council, which can
in theory overrule the Commission by QMV. But given the
foregoing situation, no such majority can be found here either,
which means that, in the face of ‘no decision’ in the Council, the
Commission has the final say after all. At the end of this
process, the Commission has regularly found itself faced with
(a) a favourable scientific report from EFSA, (b) no opinion
either way emerging from internally divided comitology
committees and Council meetings, and (c) threats of court
cases for inaction looming. The usual end result has been the
authorization of such GMO applications by the Commission,
albeit in the face of strong opposition from a number of national
governments (not to mention protests from NGOs and political
parties), leading in some cases to domestic bans for GMOs in
certain member states.
Opponents of GMOs have complained that the process
lacks transparency and is biased in favour of GMOs, whereas
industry has bemoaned the long delays in reaching a final
decision, which is seen to leave Europe uncompetitive in the
application of this new technology. By the early 2010s, the
difficulties experienced with the delegation of these regulatory
powers to the European Commission and EFSA led to the
search for a new legislative framework that would allow for
greater political input. In March 2015, an amendment of the
GMO regulations was agreed that allowed member states to
restrict or prohibit the cultivation of authorized GMOs (Directive
2015/412/EU), and soon afterwards the Commission proposed
to extend this reform so that member states would be able to
decide separately on the use of genetically modified food or
feed on their territory.
In sum, the case of GMO authorization demonstrates amply
the challenges to the delegation of regulatory powers to
independent agencies when issues at stake are contested and
carry the potential for politicization—something that has also
become apparent with respect to other regulatory decisions in
the EU, as highlighted by the controversies surrounding the
authorization of the pesticide glyphosate. Decision-making
through comitology also pitched the European Commission
against the EP and NGOs, in the face of conflicting positions
among the member states.
Authors have advanced many other examples of such ‘loaded’
decisions that, from a democratic theory point of view, would require
legitimation through representative rather than non-majoritarian
institutions. The EU’s response to the 2008 banking crisis and the
eurozone’s subsequent sovereign debt crisis have been further
triggers for debates about the legitimacy of European governance—
and indeed have led scholars to highlight the ‘crisis of EU
governance’ itself (Börzel, 2016). One observation made in this
context has been that the alleged flexibility and adaptability of
regulatory networks has been lacking (Mügge, 2011). In this reading,
close cooperation among financial market regulators sharing a neo-
liberal outlook has meant that financial regulations were devised by
an epistemic community based on a dogmatic worldview—a
regulatory paradigm that was not adaptable to the changing
requirements of the current crisis. This diagnosis echoes the earlier
critique by Gill (1998) of the bias in what he called the ‘new
constitutionalism’ of European economic governance.

From this perspective, regulatory decisions require democratic

legitimation—if not through representative institutions, then at the
very least through deliberative mechanisms. The presence of, or the
need for, deliberation in the policy process takes us to the second of
the normative debates. Some authors, focusing either on multilevel
governance (MLG) or new modes of governance (NMGs) have
explored the degree to which these forms of governance might meet
the expectations of deliberative democracy (Steffek et al., 2007).

While research has demonstrated that such opportunities exist, it has

also pointed out the limitations of such deliberation (Eriksen, 2011).
The involvement of ‘European civil society’ is generally translated
into the consultation of Brussels-based NGOs, casting doubts over
the representativeness of such cooperation (Kohler-Koch, 2010; see
also Chapter 14). Furthermore, observers have pointed out that many
of the organizations representing civil society are, in fact, dependent
on financial support from the European Commission, possibly
resulting in their co-option within a sphere of ‘approved’ participants
in the policy process (Bellamy and Castiglione, 2011). Authors have
also pointed to the normative problems inherent in the way in which
technocratic ‘good governance’ has been ‘exported’ to third
countries outside the EU (Karppi, 2005; Hout, 2010; Knio, 2010). At
the extreme, critics have argued that ‘far from laying the grounds for
a more inclusive, participatory and democratic political order, the
[European] Commission’s model to governance represents a form of
neoliberal governmentality that is actually undermining democratic
government and promoting a politics of exclusion’ (Shore, 2011:
287).

The normative debates about governance, technocracy, and the

regulatory state in the EU have received new impulses from the
recent rise of populism in Europe, and the critique of ‘elitist rule’ in
the EU that has come with it (Abazi et al., 2021). Populist discourses
—including statements such as ‘Let the people decide’ and ‘we have
had enough of experts’ which featured in the 2016 Brexit
referendum as well as in election campaigns in various European
countries—are a way of linking scepticism of the nature of
supranational governance to anti-European sentiments. As such,
these discourses have proven powerful in mobilizing significant parts
of the population against further integration or even, in the case of
the UK, withdrawal from it (see also Chapter 27).

Key Points

• The governance approach, as a departure from

traditional liberal democratic procedures of decision-
making, raises important normative questions.
• Some authors point to the normative benefits of
governance, such as greater opportunities for
deliberation, the potential of greater inclusiveness in the
policy process, and the advantages of depoliticized
regulatory activity producing the best result.
• Critics of the governance approach have pointed to the
way in which theoretical advantages do not materialize
in practice and have warned of the rigidity and
dogmatism that may arise if policy-making is left to an
exclusive community of experts.
7.6 Conclusion

In summarizing the main arguments advanced in this chapter, four

points need to be emphasized. First, the ‘governance turn’ has been
an important development in the literature on the European Union,
signifying the changing nature of the integration process since the
Maastricht Treaty and demonstrating the desire of scholars to
adapt their research tools accordingly. Second, the study of
European governance centres on the role of non-hierarchical
networks in the policy process, emphasizing their relevance in a shift
away from classic state-centric theories as developed in the subfields
of international relations and comparative politics. Third,
governance has become a broad and internally highly diverse
orientation, involving a range of different applications, based on a
variety of underlying assumptions, making it increasingly difficult to
talk of a single ‘governance approach’. Fourth, the governance turn
has raised, both explicitly and implicitly, a number of normative
questions, leading to debates about the limitations of, and the need
for, the democratic legitimation of EU governance arrangements (see
Chapter 9).

These normative debates are ongoing and would seem all the more
important as the study of governance has become part of the
mainstream of approaches analysing EU politics (see Box 7.4).
Indeed, the European Union’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic,
involving both close cooperation among, but also disagreements
between, EU institutions and member state governments, is likely to
spawn yet more research from a governance perspective. Yet, while
the ‘governance turn’ has certainly made its mark on the European
Union, the debate about the way in which such governance can be
legitimated remains as relevant as ever.
BO X 7 . 4
Key Debates: Managing the eurozone crisis:
Technocratic governance, representative democracy,
and normative debate

An important site of normative debate has been the discussion

about the future of economic governance in the EU. In view of
the severe problems that the eurozone faced from 2010
onwards following the global financial crisis, the criticism levied
at the weaknesses in both the financial services sector and the
management of the single currency, and the calls for a tighter
and more comprehensive gouvernement économique, the
2010s have demonstrated the tensions facing governance in
this area.
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) adopted earlier,
setting targets for member states in terms of permissible levels
of public debt and budget deficits, is perhaps the most
prominent example of the failure of the soft mode of
governance, given that the non-compliance of member states
with the SGP targets contributed to (if not caused) the crisis
(see Chapter 22). Nevertheless, negative experiences of this
kind do not mean that the EU will abandon this form of
governance. Indeed, future plans with regard to economic
governance include the tightening of the supranational
oversight of fiscal policies through the introduction of a
‘European semester’, which permits the European
Commission to monitor national budget plans more closely
before their domestic adoption (Hacker and van Treeck, 2010).
Other aspects of the response to the sovereign debt crisis—in
particular the close cooperation between the European
Commission, European Central Bank (ECB), and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (what came to be known
as the ‘Troika’) in negotiating and monitoring the conditionality
of national bailouts—appear as further evidence of the
significant role that technocrats are playing in the response to
the crisis (see Chapter 25). At the same time, this shift towards
technocracy at the European level frequently clashes with the
operation of representative democracy at the national level, as
the acrimonious relations between the Greek government and
the EU institutions following the election of the Syriza
government in January 2015 demonstrated. Critics of austerity,
such as the then Greek finance minister Yannis Varoufakis,
protested not only about the substance of what the creditors of
Greece were demanding, but also about the undemocratic and
non-transparent manner in which such demands were
articulated. Accordingly, the Syriza-led government sought an
end to the technocratic nature of structural reform negotiations
through the Troika, and succeeded in elevating discussions to
the political fora of the Eurogroup meeting of finance ministers
and the European Council—a preference reflecting the belief
that among elected politicians the Greek leadership would
finally agree to the submitted terms.
The acrimony that played out during the spring and summer
of 2015 therefore not only pitched one government against its
creditors in other countries and institutions, it also reflected a
wider debate about the relevance of representative democracy
and the meaning of sovereignty in such circumstances. In one
perspective, the Greek crisis of 2015 appeared to demonstrate
the limitations of majoritarian decision-making: the impositions
of structural reform requested by Greek creditors were rejected
repeatedly at the ballot-box—first in the election in January
2015, and again, more explicitly, in July 2015 as a result of a
hastily-called referendum on this issue. Yet despite such
consistent popular opposition to the measures, the ‘No’
campaign won more than 60 per cent of the votes in the
referendum; the Greek government ultimately agreed to a third
bailout programme that did include many of the measures that
had earlier been rejected.
From another perspective, representative democracy has
prevailed, since, ultimately, Prime Minister Tsipras was re-
elected at a second election in October 2015 and thereby
received the democratic legitimation for the change of course
that he had overseen.
In the second half of 2018 a new dispute arose between the
European Commission objecting for the first time to the
proposed budget from a member state and a populist
government in Italy defying these demands. This demonstrated
that the 2015 Greek crisis had not been a single event, but
rather the product of persistent tensions in eurozone
governance in which majoritarian democracy at the national
level is confronting supranational authority. Given the severity
of the crisis and the high stakes involved, the management of
the eurozone crisis is a good example of both the relevance of,
and the problems with, a greater reliance on governance in the
European Union. At the same time, the experiences—positive
and negative—from the management of the eurozone crisis
also informed subsequent decisions taken by EU decision-
makers in adopting a fiscal response to the COVID-19
pandemic which involved far-reaching reforms to the EU’s
finances.
Q UEST I O NS

1. How do you explain the success of the governance

approach?

2. How different is European governance from traditional

forms of governing?

3. Where can instances of non-hierarchical governing be

identified in the EU context?

4. What are the main elements of the ‘governance turn’ in

EU studies?
5. Does the governance approach constitute a convincing
critique of liberal intergovernmentalism?
6. What is distinctive about multilevel governance?

7. What are the strengths and weaknesses of multilevel

governance in analysing the process of European
integration?

8. How is decision-making by unelected technocrats

legitimized in the European regulatory state?
9. What are the main criticisms on normative grounds that
can be advanced against new governance?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Eising, R. and Kohler-Koch, B. (eds) (1999) The Transformation

of Governance in the European Union (London: Routledge).
Presenting the findings of a large-scale research project, this
volume includes chapters on governance in a range of different
sectors and member states.
Hooghe, L. and Marks, G. (2001a) Multi-Level Governance and
European Integration (London: Rowman & Littlefield). This is the
definitive statement of the key elements and findings of the
multilevel governance approach by its founders.
Majone, G. (ed.) (1996) Regulating Europe (London:
Routledge). A collection of contributions from the founder of the
European regulatory state approach and others.
Marks, G., Scharpf, F. W., Schmitter, P. C., and Streeck, W.
(1996) Governance in the European Union (London: Sage
Publications). A collection of essays by senior scholars exploring
different dimensions of the governance approach.
Scharpf, F. W. (1999) Governing in Europe: Effective and
Democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press). A collection of
essays exploring both the empirical and normative dimensions
of governance in the EU.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
8
Europeanization
Tanja A. Börzel and Diana Panke
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Why does Europeanization matter?

8.3 Explaining top-down Europeanization

8.4 Explaining bottom-up Europeanization

8.5 Towards a sequential perspective on Europeanization?

8.6 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

The chapter first explains what Europeanization means and

outlines the main approaches to studying this
phenomenon. The second section describes why this
concept has become so prominent in research on the
European Union (EU) and its member states. In the third
section, the chapter reviews the state of the art with
particular reference to how the EU affects states (‘top-
down’ Europeanization). It illustrates the theoretical
arguments with empirical examples. Similarly, the fourth
section examines how states can influence the EU
(‘bottom-up’ Europeanization) and provides some
theoretical explanations for the empirical patterns
observed. This is followed by a section that presents an
overview of research that looks at linkages between
bottom-up and top-down Europeanization, and considers
the future of Europeanization research with regard to the
EU’s recent and current crises and challenges. This chapter
argues that Europeanization will remain an important field
of EU research for the foreseeable future.
8.1 Introduction

Europeanization (see Box 8.1) has become a prominent concept in

the study of the European Union and European integration.
While Europeanization generally refers to interactions between the
EU and its member states or third countries, the literature has
defined the term in different ways. Broadly, one can distinguish
between two different notions of Europeanization: ‘bottom-up’ and
‘top-down’ Europeanization.

BO X 8 . 1
Key Debates: Europeanization

Europeanization captures the interactions between the

European Union and member states or third countries
(including candidate countries and neighbourhood
countries). One strand of Europeanization research analyses
how member states shape EU policies, politics, and polity,
while the other focuses on how the EU triggers change in
member state policies, politics, and polity.

The bottom-up perspective analyses how member states and other

domestic actors shape EU policies, EU politics, and the European
polity. For bottom-up Europeanization approaches, the phenomenon
to be explained is the EU itself. This research analyses whether and
how member states are able to upload their domestic interests to EU
institutions and policies by, for example, giving the European
Parliament (EP) more powers, increasing the areas in which the
ordinary legislative procedure (OLP) applies, or extending the
content and scope of EU policies (as is the case in the
liberalization of services). European integration theories, such
as liberal intergovernmentalism, neo-functionalism, and
supranational institutionalism, complement bottom-up
Europeanization approaches since they also address such uploading
efforts by member state governments (see Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

The top-down perspective reverses the phenomenon to be explained

and its plausible causes. Here, the focus is on how the EU shapes
institutions, processes, and political outcomes in both member states
and third countries (Ladrech, 1994; Sanders and Bellucci, 2012). The
phenomenon of interest is whether and how states download EU
policies and institutions that subsequently give rise to domestic
change. Downloading EU policies presupposes that the EU has
corresponding competencies to adopt them in the first place. This is,
for instance, not the case with respect to pandemics, which explains
why there was no immediate European response to the COVID-19
outbreak in the form of uniform measures across the member states
to combat the pandemic (see Chapter 28).

Top-down Europeanization studies how the EU can impact domestic

institutions, policies, or political processes. It raises questions, such
as: to what extent, for example, has the shift of policy competences
from the domestic to the EU level undermined the powers of national
parliaments by reducing their function to that of merely transposing
EU directives into national law? Is the EU responsible for a decline
of public services by forcing France or Germany to liberalize
telecommunications, postal services, or their energy markets? And to
what extent has European integration empowered populist parties,
such as the Front National, Die Alternative für Deutschland
(Alternative for Germany), the United Kingdom
Independence Party (UKIP), or the Movimento 5 Stelle,
which seek to mobilize those who feel that they have lost out because
of the single European market, particularly since the economic
and the migration crisis? With youth unemployment still above 35
per cent as of early 2021 (Trading Economics, 2001a, 2001b),
citizens in Spain and Greece feel that EU policies and institutions are
a major cause of their socio-economic grievances (see Box 8.2). The
electoral success of populist movements, such as Podemos and Vox
in Spain, or the Brexit referendum of 2016 testify to the increasing
politicization of EU powers.
BO X 8 . 2
Case Study: Top-down and bottom-up Europeanization:
the case of the economic crisis

Prior to the economic crisis, Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and

Spain had benefited from the surge of cheap credit and
domestic demand-driven booms in real estate and construction
after the introduction of the euro. However, this made them
particularly vulnerable to the credit crisis which started in 2007.
The burst of the US housing bubble triggered chain reactions,
which threw EU deficit countries into a systemic crisis that
threatened the very existence of the economic and monetary
union (EMU). The rescue measures taken by the EU and its
member states led to encroachment on a number of domestic
policies that have been a classic domain of the democratic
state: for example, pensions and wages, higher education, and
healthcare, as well as other aspects of social policy.
The structural reforms the EU and its member states have
demanded as a condition for financial bailouts have
substantially reduced the economic well-being of the citizens in
crisis countries, particularly among the middle class, young
people, and women. Rocketing unemployment rates (over 35
per cent among young Greeks and Spaniards (Trading
Economics 2021a, 2021b)) and the virtual breakdown of many
social services (health, social welfare, pensions) transformed
the financial crisis into a social crisis, which has undermined
the legitimacy of elected governments in Greece, Spain, Italy,
Ireland, and France. The inability of these governments to
 respond to the pressing demands of their electorate for a
different course in their economic policy fuelled the mobilization
of protest by the most affected social groups. The EU has
become the lender of last resort for member states in times of
financial crisis. At the same time, Germany and some other
Northern European member states managed to upload their
austerity rules to the European level. The Stability and Growth
Pact turned the EU into an agent of a particular type of
economic and social policy, which, although highly contested at
the domestic level, does not leave member state governments
much possibility of deviating from the course of liberalism and
fiscal restraint imposed by EU conditionality. Domestic
opposition and political calculus led the Greek government to
call for a referendum on the conditions of the European
Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International
Monetary Fund for a bailout to resolve the debt crisis of June
2015. In early July 2015, the Greek citizens rejected the bailout
conditions by 61 per cent. Yet, since the vast majority of Greeks
want to stay in the euro, Prime Minister Tsipras had to negotiate
a third bailout in August 2015, which not only forced Greece to
implement reforms rejected in the referendum, but imposed
even stricter conditionality.

Top-down Europeanization approaches search for factors at the EU

level that bring about domestic change. They share the assumption
that the EU can (but does not always) cause adaptations of domestic
policies, institutions, and political processes if there is a misfit
between European and domestic ideas and institutions (Börzel et al.,
2010). The incompatibility of European and domestic norms
facilitates top-down changes only if it creates material costs or if it
challenges collectively shared knowledge or beliefs about how to
address societal problems. For example, it raises the question of
whether it is more appropriate to protect the environment by
preventing pollution (the German approach) or by fighting
environmental pollution where it becomes too damaging (the British
approach while the UK was an EU member state). Thus, top-down
Europeanization approaches complement compliance theories which
explain domestic change in the EU multilevel system, such as
enforcement theory, management approaches, or legalization
theories (Börzel et al., 2010, 2021), by combining EU- and domestic-
level explanatory variables.

In addition to analysing separately bottom-up and top-down

Europeanization, some scholars put forward a sequential perspective
by examining policy cycles or long-term interactions between the EU
and its members (Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999; Radaelli, 2003).
Member states are not merely passive takers of EU demands for
domestic change; they proactively shape European policies,
institutions, and processes, which they have to download and to
which they later have to adapt. Moreover, the need to adapt
domestically to European pressure may also have significant effects
at the European level, where member states seek to reduce the misfit
between European and domestic arrangements by shaping EU
decisions. For example, when Germany succeeded in turning its air
pollution regulations into the Large Combustion Plant Directive
adopted by the EU in 1988 (Directive 88/609/EEC), it did not have
to introduce any major legal and administrative changes, and
German industry had little difficulty in complying with EU air
pollution standards. The UK, then an EU member state, was forced
to overhaul its entire regulatory structure and British industry had to
buy new abatement technologies for which German companies were
the market leaders.

The sequential approach is not a new research avenue, but rather

synthesizes the top-down and bottom-up Europeanization
approaches. It analyses how member states shape the EU
(uploading), how the EU feeds back into member states
(downloading), and how the latter react in changing properties of the
EU (uploading) (see Börzel and Risse, 2007).

Key Points

• Europeanization has become a key but disputed term in

research on European integration.
• Top-down Europeanization seeks to explain how the
European Union induces domestic change in member
states or third countries.

• Bottom-up Europeanization analyses how member

states and other domestic actors shape EU policies, EU
politics, and the European polity.

• The sequential approach to Europeanization synthesizes

the merits of top-down and bottom-up Europeanization.
8.2 Why does Europeanization
matter?

The European Union has become ever more important for the daily
lives of its citizens. The EU has gained more and more policy
competences, which now range from market creation and trade
liberalization policies, health, environmental research, and social
policies, to cooperation in the fight against crime and foreign
policy, to no cooperation in the relocation of refugees and
migrants. The economic crisis has given rise to the establishment of a
new architecture to better regulate the banking sector and coordinate
national fiscal policy and the budgetary cycles of member states—
without changing the EU Treaty (see Chapter 25). Similar attempts
at delegating more power to supranational institutions failed in the
case of the migration crisis. The member states ultimately rejected
proposals for a semi-automated relocation of refugees. Nor did they
approve plans for European Return Intervention Teams to repatriate
illegally staying third-country nationals (see Chapter 26). How do we
explain this variation in Europeanization? Which actors and which
coalitions are active in shaping the EU? Why is it that we observe a
general broadening and widening of integration where the member
states have been willing to give the EU ever more power on
regulating the banking sector, while resisting any significant
sovereignty loss with regard to migration and asylum? Have
France and Germany been in a better position to make their interests
heard in the EU than Luxembourg, Ireland, Greece, or Malta? It is
also very important to examine how the EU affects the domestic
structures of its member states, because Europe has hit virtually all
policy areas penetrating the lives of its citizens in many respects. The
EU not only regulates the quality of their drinking water, the length
of parental leave, or roaming fees for mobile phones—
Europeanization has also fundamentally affected core institutions
and political processes of the member states and accession countries
by, for example, disempowering national parliaments (Schmidt,
2006). What kind of domestic change (of policies, institutions, or
political processes) does the EU trigger? Do Greece, Poland,
Luxembourg, France, and Denmark all download EU policies in a
similar way, or do national and sub-regional differences remain even
after Europeanization? To what extent has the EU’s crisis
management to save the euro resulted in the dismantling of the
European welfare state, not only undermining the democratic
legitimacy of member state governments in Greece, Italy, Spain, and
France, but also fuelling the politicization of the EU polity and the
rise of nationalist, authoritarian populism to the extent that the
future of European integration may be at stake because states such
as the UK choose to exit the EU or block institutional reforms?

Another reason why research on Europeanization has been thriving

is that European integration does not only affect member states, but
can also have intended or unintended side effects on third countries.
The EU is actively seeking to change the domestic structures of its
neighbours and other third countries by exporting its own
governance model. Examples of what is often referred to as
‘external Europeanization’ are the EU’s enlargement policy with
the famous Copenhagen criteria, which prescribe liberal
democracy and a market economy for any country that seeks to join
the club (see Chapter 18), and the European Neighbourhood
Policy (ENP) that stipulates similar requirements (see Chapter 19).
Both seek to induce third countries to implement parts of the
acquis communautaire. Thus the EU has not only talked France,
Germany, Spain, Greece, and the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries into granting their citizens general access to
environmental information. It has also asked Ukraine, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan to make data on the environmental impact
of planned projects accessible to the public. Conditionality and
capacity-building provide a major incentive for candidate and for
neighbourhood countries to Europeanize their politices and
institutions. Finally, Europeanization can have unintended effects on
member states and third countries. Domestic actors can use the EU
for their own ends and can induce domestic changes in the name of
Europe (Lavenex, 2001). For example, LGBT+ groups in Poland have
used the EU to push for the rights of sexual minorities in the absence
of any specific EU legislation. At the same time, the incumbent
governments of the European neighbourhood countries have
instrumentalized the EU’s demands to fight corruption in return for
accession to the Single Market and visa facilitations to undermine
the power of the political opposition. Former Ukranian Prime
Minister Julija Timoshenko was convicted of embezzlement and
abuse of power, and sentenced to seven years in prison. Likewise,
former President Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia faced criminal
charges filed by the Georgian prosecutor’s office over allegedly
exceeding official powers.

Countries that are not current or would-be members of the EU are

subject to the indirect influence of the EU too (Börzel and Risse,
2012). Norway, for example, became part of the Schengen
Agreement because it forms a passport union with the
Scandinavian EU member states. The Trade and Cooperation
Agreement (TCA) that governs the post-Brexit relationship
between the EU and the UK requires checks on British goods
entering the Single Market (see Chapter 27). Outside Europe,
farmers in developing countries in Latin America and Africa suffer
from consequences of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which
effectively shuts their products out of the Single Market (see
Chapter 17). Finally, the EU’s policies and institutions can also
diffuse into other regional organizations, such as the Andean
Community, the Southern African Development Community, the
Association of South East Asian Nations, or the Eurasian Custom
Union.
Key Points

• Europeanization has become a key concept in the study

of European integration.

• Europeanization research examines how the EU has

obtained a broad array of policy competences over the
course of more than 50 years of integration and also
how this triggers changes in member states affecting
various aspects of the daily lives of EU citizens.

• Students of Europeanization also investigate how the EU

affects third countries, which may or may not want to
become members, by pushing for market liberalization,
democracy, human rights, and good governance.

• Europeanization research shows that European

integration has had unintended effects on states both
within and outside the EU.
8.3 Explaining top-down
Europeanization

Top-down Europeanization seeks to uncover the conditions and

causal mechanisms through which the European Union triggers
domestic change in its member states and in third countries. It starts
from the empirical puzzle that European policies, institutions, and
political processes facilitate domestic change, but do not provoke the
convergence of national polities, politics, or policies. It also posits
that EU policies and institutions are a constant impetus of domestic
change for all states (Cowles et al., 2001; Sanders and Bellucci,
2012). To solve the puzzle, the literature has drawn on two different
strands of neo-institutionalism (see Chapter 6). While both assume
that institutions mediate or filter the domestic impact of Europe,
rationalist and constructivist approaches to top-down
Europeanization differ in their assumptions about exactly how
institutions matter. Rational choice institutionalism argues that
the EU facilitates domestic adaptation by changing opportunity
structures for domestic actors. In a first step, a misfit between the
EU and domestic norms creates demands for domestic adaptation.
In a second step, the downloading of EU policies and institutions by
the member states is shaped by cost–benefit calculations of the
strategic actors whose interests are at stake. Institutions constrain or
enable certain actions by strategic rational actors by rendering some
options more costly than others (Tsebelis, 1990; Scharpf, 1997).
From this perspective, Europeanization is largely conceived of as an
emerging political opportunity structure that offers some actors
additional resources with which to exert influence, while severely
constraining the ability of others to pursue their goals. Domestic
change is facilitated where the institutions of the member states
empower domestic actors to block change at veto points or to
facilitate it through supporting formal institutions (Börzel and Risse,
2007). For example, the liberalization of the European transport
sector (Regulations 96/1191 and 1893/91) empowered
internationally operating road hauliers and liberal parties in highly
regulated member states, such as Germany or the Netherlands,
which had been unsuccessfully pushing for privatization and
deregulation at home. But while the German reform coalition was
able to exploit European policies to overcome domestic opposition to
liberalization, Italian trade unions and sectoral associations
successfully vetoed any reform attempt (Héritier et al., 2001).
Likewise, while the UK was still in the EU, British public agencies
supported the appeal of women’s organizations in support of the
Equal Pay and Equal Treatment Directives (Directives 75/117/EEC
and 76/107/EEC, respectively) to further gender equality by
providing them with legal expertise and funding to take employers to
court. In the absence of such formal institutions, French women
were not able to overcome domestic resistance by employers and
trade unions to implement EU equal pay and equal treatment
policies (Caporaso and Jupille, 2001; Cowles et al., 2001).

Other research in the Europeanization literature draws on

sociological institutionalism. This specifies change mechanisms
based on the ideational and normative processes involved in top-
down Europeanization. Sociological institutionalism is based on the
‘logic of appropriateness’ (March and Olsen, 1989), which argues
that actors are guided by collectively shared understandings of what
constitutes proper, socially accepted behaviour. These norms
influence the way in which actors define their goals and what they
perceive as rational action. Rather than maximizing egoistic self-
interest, actors seek to meet social expectations. From this
perspective, Europeanization is understood as the emergence of new
rules, norms, practices, and structures of meaning to which member
states are exposed and which they have to incorporate into their
domestic structures. For example, consider a normative or cognitive
misfit between what the Greek government believes or knows about
managing public expenditure best and what EU policies prescribe is
a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for domestic change in
response to top-down Europeanization. If there is such a misfit,
norm entrepreneurs, such as epistemic communities or
advocacy networks, socialize domestic actors into new norms and
rules of appropriateness through persuasion and social learning.
Domestic actors then redefine their interests and identities
accordingly (Börzel and Risse, 2007). The more active norm
entrepreneurs are and the more they succeed in making EU policies
resonate with domestic norms and beliefs, the more successful they
will be in bringing about domestic change.

Moreover, collective understandings of appropriate behaviour

strongly influence the ways in which domestic actors download EU
requirements (see Box 8.3). First, a consensus-oriented or
cooperative decision-making culture helps to overcome multiple veto
points by rendering their use for actors inappropriate. Cooperative
federalism prevented the German Länder from vetoing any of the
Treaty revisions that deprived them of core decision-making powers.
Obstructing the deepening and widening of European integration
would not have been acceptable to the political class (Börzel, 2002).
Likewise, the litigious German culture encouraged German citizens
to appeal to national courts against the deficient application of EU
law, while such a culture was absent in France, where litigation is
less common (Conant, 2002).

BO X 8 . 3
Key Debates: Explaining ‘downloading’ and ‘taking’

The top-down Europeanization literature uses the concepts of

‘downloading’ and ‘taking’ as synonyms. Both terms capture the
response of member states and third countries to the European
Union. States are good at taking or downloading policies if they
are able to respond swiftly to impetuses for change coming, for
example, from the EU in the form of EU law, EU neighbourhood
policy, or EU development policy.

Second, a consensus-orientated political culture allows for a sharing

of adaptation costs, which facilitate the accommodation of pressure
for adaptation. Rather than shifting adaptation costs onto a social or
political minority, the ‘winners’ of domestic change compensate the
‘losers’. For example, the German government shared its decision
powers in European policy-making with the Länder to make up for
their EU-induced power losses. Likewise, the consensual
corporatist decision-making culture in the Netherlands and Germany
facilitated the liberalization of the transport sector by offering
compensation to employees as the potential losers of domestic
changes (Héritier et al., 2001). In short, the stronger informal
cooperative institutions are in a member state, the more likely
domestic change will be.

While Europeanization has affected the policies, politics, and polity,

of all member states, the degree of change differs significantly. If we
consider the example of environmental policy, the EU has promoted
change towards a more precautionary problem-solving approach,
particularly in the area of air and water pollution control. It also
introduced procedural policy instruments such as the Access to
Environmental Information and the Environmental Impact Directive
(Directive 90/313/EEC). Equally, EU policies have led to tighter
standards in virtually all areas of environmental policy. While the EU
has affected the policy content of all member states, the
environmental latecomers (Spain, Portugal, Greece, Ireland, the UK,
and more recently the CEE countries) have been much more
Europeanized than the environmentally progressive ‘leader’ states
(Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, and
Austria).

The Europeanization of administrative structures paints a similar

picture, although domestic change has been more modest. In old and
new member states, the domestic impact of Europe has fostered the
centralization of environmental policy-making competences in the
hands of central government departments and agencies at the
expense of subordinate levels of government. While regional
governments in highly decentralized states have, to some extent,
been compensated by co-decision rights in the formulation and
implementation of EU environmental policies, the main losers of
Europeanization are the national and regional parliaments. Thus, the
Europeanization of environmental policy-making has created new
political opportunities, particularly for citizens and environmental
groups, and has reinforced existing consensual and adversarial styles
rather than changed them. The only exceptions are the three
Northern countries that joined the EU in 1995. In Austria, Sweden,
and to a lesser extent Finland, the need to implement EU
environmental policies in a timely fashion has reduced the scope for
extensive consultation with affected interests, thus undermining
the traditionally consensual patterns of interest intermediation.
Moreover, the legalistic approach of the Commission in the
monitoring of compliance with EU law has constrained the
discretion public authorities used to exercise in the implementation
of environmental regulations in Ireland, and France.

External Europeanization also corroborates the differential impact of

Europe. Europeanization has had a more of a similar effect on
candidate and neighbourhood countries than it has on member
states when it comes to the strengthening of core executives and
increasing their autonomy from domestic, political, and societal
pressures. It has also led to the development of a less politicized civil
service and to a degree of decentralization and regionalization, at
least when compared with the Communist legacy (Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2005). At the same time, however, Europeanization
effects on institutions and politics vary considerably. EU political
conditionality was successful only in cases of unstable democracy, in
which it strengthened liberal politics (as in Slovakia or Serbia), while
being irrelevant in those countries that already had strong
democratic constituencies (most of the CEE countries) or in
autocratically ruled states such as Belarus or Azerbaijan
(Schimmelfennig et al., 2006). In general, there has been little
institutional convergence around a single European model of
governance.

Finally, some of the new member states show tendencies of

democratic back-sliding. Attempts by the Hungarian Prime
Minister, Viktor Orbán, and by Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS)
to undo some of the institutional changes introduced as a condition
for EU membership indicate that Europeanization is not necessarily
irreversible. The multiple crises the EU has been facing since 2008
including Brexit have reinforced concerns of de-Europeanization
and disintegration (see Schimmelfennig, 2018a). Europeanization
can analytically capture the reversing of domestic changes induced
by EU policies and institutions. It is less equipped to account for
such de-Europeanization. The opposite of Europeanization tends to
be conceptualized as no Europeanization in terms of resistance and
rejection. Domestic veto players and the absence of a cooperative
institutional culture explain why the domestic status quo is not
changed. They have less to say why change is undone (see Chapter
27).

In sum, the top-down impact of Europeanization is differential and

reversible. EU policies and institutions are not downloaded in a
uniform manner. Nor is their adoption and implementation equally
(un)controversial. Denmark and Sweden are better takers than
France, Italy, and Greece, because they have more efficient
administrations (Börzel et al. 2010, 2021). At the same time, EU
policies and institutions are politically more contested in Greece than
in Spain, as the 2015 bailout debate and the subsequent referendum
in Greece illustrates. Thus we should not be too surprised to find
hardly any evidence of convergence towards an EU policy or
institutional model: convergence is not synonymous with
Europeanization. Member states can undergo significant domestic
change without necessarily becoming similar.

By focusing on ‘goodness of fit’ and mediating factors, such as veto

players, facilitating formal institutions, or norm entrepreneurs, we
can account for the differential impact of Europe. These factors
increasingly point to complementary rather than competing
explanations of Europeanization. As such, students of
Europeanization primarily seek to identify scope conditions under
which specific factors are more likely to influence the downloading of
EU policies and institutions by the member states. Rather than lack
of convergence, the challenges are recent tendencies of de-
Europeanization with regard to the rule of law and the abolition of
border controls.
Key Points

• Top-down Europeanization explains how the EU triggers

domestic change. A central concept in this regard is
‘misfit’. Only if domestic policies, processes, or
institutions are not already in line with what the EU
requires can the latter causally induce domestic change.

• If misfit is present, the impact of the European Union can

be explained through different theoretical approaches—
namely, sociological or rational choice institutionalism.
• A frequent question of top-down Europeanization
research is whether the policies, politics, and polity of
states converge over time as an effect of membership, or
whether states maintain distinct features.
• Academic research and empirical evidence show that
convergence is not synonymous with Europeanization.
• The challenge for Europeanization is to explain the
reversal of EU-induced domestic change.
8.4 Explaining bottom-up
Europeanization

Bottom-up Europeanization research analyses how states upload

their domestic preferences to the EU level. These preferences may
involve EU policies, such as environmental standards; they may
relate to European political processes, such as how far day-to-day
decision-making should involve the European Parliament; or they
can touch on issues of institutional design regarding, for example,
whether the European Commission should get additional
competences in fighting global pandemics or the EU’s Cooperation in
the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ) matters (see Box
8.4). Bottom-up Europeanization studies can be divided into those
that analyse intergovernmental conferences (IGCs)
(Moravcsik, 1998) and those that examine the daily decision-making
process (Thomson et al., 2006; Panke, 2010, 2012a; Thomson, 2011).
In order to conceptualize how bottom-up Europeanization works and
how states are able to upload their preferences, students of the
European Union have drawn on rationalist and constructivist
approaches. Rationalist approaches assume that actors have fixed
and predefined interests, and pursue them through recourse to their
power resources (often economic strength or votes in the EU
Council) strategically calculating the costs and benefits of different
options. Constructivist approaches assume that actors are open to
persuasion and change their flexible interests in the wake of good
arguments.

BO X 8 . 4
Key Debates: Explaining ‘uploading’ and ‘shaping’

The bottom-up Europeanization literature uses two concepts

interchangeably in order to describe how states influence
policies, politics, or institutions of the European Union:
‘uploading’ and ‘shaping’. An EU member state is a successful
shaper (or uploader) if it manages to make its preferences
heard, so that an EU policy, political process, or institution
reflects its interests.

One of the most prominent rationalist decision-making approaches

is intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann, 1966, 1989) and its newer
version, liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1998; see also
Chapter 5). Intergovernmentalism assumes that states with many
votes in the EU Council and strong bargaining power are in a better
position to shape outcomes in EU negotiations than states with fewer
votes. Moreover, powerful states are more likely to influence
successfully the content of EU law if the policy at stake is very
important for them and if they manage to form winning coalitions
through concessions (package deals or side payments) or through
threats, such as the disruption of further cooperation, stopping
support on other issues, or reducing side payments. Hence the
higher the bargaining power of a state and the higher the issue
salience for that state, the more likely it is that this state will shape
the content of the European policy (successful bottom-up
Europeanization).

Quantitative studies of EU decision-making attribute different causal

weight to formal rules, ranging from traditionally power-based
studies to more institutionalist approaches (Panke, 2012a). The
former assume that political and material power is the crucial
explanatory factor governing EU negotiations (Widgren, 1994),
whereas the latter put more emphasis on formal rules such as
decision-making procedures or the share of votes (Tsebelis and
Garrett, 1997). The collaborative research project ‘The European
Union Decides’ showed that ‘powerful actors who attach most
salience to the issues receive the largest concessions from other
negotiators’ (Schneider et al., 2006: 305; see also Thomson et al.,
2006). Hence, the voting weight that a member state has in the EU
Council is an important negotiation resource, but does not determine
outcomes. This is the result of an informally institutionalized
consensus norm, according to which ‘powerful and intense actors are
conciliates, even when they might be legally ignored’ (Achen, 2006:
297). Moreover, in order to influence policies successfully, states
have to create coalitions. While there is evidence of the rationalist
account of bottom-up Europeanization, a considerable amount of
empirical variation is left unexplained.

Qualitative studies also demonstrate that bargaining and voting

weight are very important for bottom-up Europeanization, because
power influences the opportunities that states have to upload
national preferences to the EU level (Liefferink and Andersen, 1998;
Panke, 2012b). A study by Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt (2004) on
the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) highlights that power,
preferences, and preference intensity influence the outcomes of
complex, iterated negotiations under conditions of uncertainty (see
Box 8.5). Another example of the importance of bargaining power in
the shadow of votes is the Working Time Directive (Directive
2003/88/EC). During the two years of negotiations in the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) prior to
an agreement, a potential compromise shifted the outcome towards
the UK (then still an EU Member State) as a strong veto player. A
majority of states favoured the Directive. Although member states
could have voted according to qualified majority voting (QMV),
they abstained from proceeding in this way, seeking instead to bring
the UK on board as well. As a result, the UK achieved key
concessions before the Directive was passed (Lewis, 2003: 115–19).
In line with the findings of the ‘The European Union Decides’
project, the bargaining power of a big state with high preference
intensity mattered in the case of the Working Time Directive. Even
though proceeding to vote could have secured support for the
Directive against British interests, all large states’ interests were
accommodated. Therefore, it is clear that qualitative work lends
support to major quantitative findings in showing that, when it
comes to hard bargaining in the shadow of votes, the size of a
member state matters in shaping its influence (Panke, 2010).
BO X 8 . 5
Case Study: Bottom-up Europeanization: the Common
Fisheries Policy

The Common Fisheries Policy case is a good illustration of how

states make use of their voting power and the threat of a
negative vote in order to obtain better deals for themselves.
Back in 1976, the European Commission proposed rules on
fishing quotas and member states’ access to fishing areas. This
policy required unanimity among the member states. All
member states agreed to the proposal, with Ireland and the UK
opting for higher quotas and limitations of the equal access
principle. Ireland and the UK had high bargaining power
because their agreement was required to pass the policy. In the
course of several years of bargaining, the Irish government
accepted the Commission’s modified proposal because it
achieved concessions in the form of quota increases. The UK,
however, maintained its opposition and was brought back ‘on
board’ only later, when the CFP was linked to the UK’s budget
contribution in a comprehensive package deal. At that point,
however, Denmark turned into a veto player because it became
dissatisfied with the quota system. Denmark demanded higher
and more flexible fishing quotas, and created a stalemate by
evoking the Luxembourg Compromise. To the threat of
continued blockade, the Community responded with higher
offers. Only after Denmark received higher quotas as side
payments could the CFP finally come into existence in 1983.
 Source: da Conceição-Heldt (2006).

Constructivist approaches assume that the preferences of state and

non-state actors are not completely fixed during interactions, but
can change in the wake of good arguments (Risse, 2000). Actors
have an idea of what they want when they start negotiating in the
EU, but can change their preferences if another actor makes a
convincing statement, for example, should new scientific insights be
made available (Panke, 2011). According to this approach, policy
outcomes and integration dynamics are shaped by processes of
arguing among member states, typically involving supranational
institutions such as the Commission, or policy experts and
epistemic communities (Haas, 1970; Sandholtz and Zysman, 1989).
Good arguments are the ones that resonate well with all interests. If
an argument wins the competition of ideas, it influences outcomes.
States are more successful in shaping policy outcomes (successful
bottom-up Europeanization) the better their arguments resonate
with the beliefs and norms of other actors.

While quantitative studies do not (yet) test the power of ideas and
good arguments, qualitative studies can trace ideational processes.
They demonstrate that the power of argument is highly important for
influencing the opportunity that a member state has to influence the
content of European laws, European institutions, or EU political
processes. Concerning market creating and regulating policies, fewer
than 15 per cent of all Council positions on a Commission proposal
are actually decided at the ministerial level of the EU Council.
Coreper and, especially, the working groups of the Council are the
forums in which the vast majority of political decisions are taken (see
Chapter 11). In both lower-level arenas, hard political bargaining, in
which states resort to the threat of hierarchical delegation and
voting, is rare (Panke and Haubrich Seco, 2016). The usual way of
doing business is based on the exchange of arguments (Beyers and
Dierickz, 1998; Elgström and Jönsson, 2000). A comprehensive
study of negotiations within the EU Council shows, for example, that
high-quality arguments can convince others even if the point is put
forward by a small state with limited bargaining and voting power.
For example, Luxembourg used its EU and issue-specific expertise to
negotiate effectively in the Common Agricultural Policy health check
negotiations of 2007 (Panke, 2011). Back then, a major cleavage ran
between countries that favoured EU subsidies and countries that
wanted to limit the EU budget spend on the CAP. Luxembourg
belonged to the latter group. It had strong interests regarding land
parcel transfer rules, minimum thresholds for direct payments, and
in the correction scheme on milk quota. The Luxembourg expert had
been dealing with the CAP regulations for much longer than most
Commission staff, and knew the history of the files significantly well.
Thus, from the very start of the negotiations, Luxembourg actively
lobbied the Commission and the Council Presidency and circulated
lengthy constructive reform proposals that reflected a high level of
expertise. On this basis, Luxembourg successfully influenced the
CAP. This and other cases illustrate that the possibility of persuading
others with a convincing argument and norms of mutual
responsiveness both work as great equalizers in Coreper
negotiations. As a result—and in line with the constructivist
hypothesis on bottom-up Europeanization—smaller member states
can sometimes punch above their weight (Panke, 2011).

The two theoretical accounts of the shaping of European policies are

compatible rather than mutually exclusive. We know empirically
that, in EU institutions, actors sometimes engage in bargaining (as
expected by the rationalist intergovernmental approach) and
sometimes argue (as expected by the constructivist supranational
approach). Therefore, both explanations of bottom-up
Europeanization can account for different parts of social reality.
Key Points

• Bottom-up Europeanization explains how states can

trigger changes in the EU.
• Misfit is a necessary condition for EU-induced changes.
If states’ preferences are not already in accordance with
EU policies, politics, or polity, states can induce
European-level changes.
• Different theories focus on different means available to
states to make their voices heard, such as economic and
voting power, or argumentative and moral power.

• Two prominent questions of bottom-up Europeanization

research ask whether large states, such as Germany,
France, the UK, or Poland, are more successful in
influencing European policies than smaller states, and
under what conditions small states can punch above
their weight.
8.5 Towards a sequential
perspective on Europeanization?

As stated earlier, the sequential perspective on Europeanization

seeks to explain both the shaping and taking of EU and state-level
policies, procedures, and institutions. Few students of
Europeanization have made an attempt to bring the two approaches
together, although some studies consider ‘shaping’ as the cause of
‘taking’ or vice versa (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; van Keulen,
1999; Börzel, 2021). Member states that have the power and capacity
to upload their preferences successfully, and to shape EU policies
accordingly, have fewer difficulties in taking and downloading them.
This explains why southern European member states are laggards in
implementing EU environmental policies (Börzel, 2003). Portugal
and Greece simply lack the capacity and power to strongly shape EU
policy, and consequently face a higher ‘misfit’, incurring significant
implementation costs. Problems in taking EU policies can provide
member states with important incentives to engage in (re-)shaping
in order to reduce the ‘misfit’. France, for example, which had
already deregulated its transport sector when it met the EU demands
for liberalization, pushed for re-regulating the impact of
liberalization in order to safeguard public interest goals (Héritier et
al., 2001). The Greek referendum of 2015, by contrast, was a failed
attempt of the Greek government to renegotiate painful reforms that
previous governments had accepted in return for a bailout. Rather,
Germany and other creditor countries have managed to upload their
austerity policy to the EU level and impose it on the debtor states
(see Chapter 25).

The more successful member states are in shaping EU policies, the

fewer problems they are likely to face in taking these policies. For
example, if a state with high regulatory standards in the
environmental policy field, such as Denmark, manages to upload its
environmental policy preferences to the European level, it has to
invest fewer resources in implementing EU policies later on, which in
turn reduces the risk of Denmark violating EU environmental law
(Börzel, 2003). But are successful shaping and taking explained by
the same factors, or do the two stages of the policy process require
different explanations? Some factors might be more important to
shaping than to taking, or vice versa; they could also have
contradictory effects. However, so far only a small number of
Europeanization studies have systematically combined and
compared the causal influence of different factors in the two stages of
the EU policy process (Börzel, 2021). Bringing the two together could
help address the puzzle of de-Europeanization as in the case of Brexit
(see Chapter 27) and differential outcomes. Reversing EU-induced
domestic change and avoiding EU reforms are just as effective ways
to reduce or avoid misfit as adjusting EU institutions and policies.
Key Points

• The bulk of Europeanization research focuses either on

top-down or on bottom-up processes.

• Sequential approaches analyse interactions between the

shaping and the taking of European policies.

• There is limited research that identifies the interaction

between unsuccessful uploading of preferences to the
EU level and implementation problems at the national
level.

• There is great potential for future research that seeks to

integrate sequentially top-down and bottom-up
Europeanization approaches which may help explain de-
Europeanization processes such as Brexit.
8.6 Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the concept of Europeanization and has

reviewed existing research on this topic. We have focused attention
on the theoretical literature around the concepts of top-down and
bottom-up Europeanization by identifying their explanatory quality
and by contextualizing them in the wider political science literature.
The empirical examples have shown how the European Union has
contributed to changing structures, processes, and behaviour in
national arenas, but also under what conditions member states are
able to incorporate their preferences into EU policies, politics, and
processes. Moreover, the chapter has addressed the external
dimension of Europeanization as the EU is able to affect third
countries by pushing for socio-economic and political reform. The
chapter has also presented a sequential understanding of
Europeanization that brings together the merits of top-down and
bottom-up Europeanization approaches, and has outlined possible
avenues for future research. Ultimately, the chapter concludes that
Europeanization research will continue to be an important field of
EU research for the foreseeable future.
Q UEST I O NS

1. What is Europeanization, and what are the differences

between bottom-up and top-down Europeanization?

2. Why is Europeanization an important research field?

3. What is ‘misfit’?

4. How can we explain why member states respond

differently to Europeanization?

5. How can we explain member states’ ability to shape EU

policies and institutions successfully?

6. Are some states better equipped to shape EU policies

than others?
7. What do the terms ‘uploading’ and ‘downloading’ mean?

8. Can states be subject to Europeanization without being

members of the EU?

For tips on how to answer the end-of-chapter questions, read

the suggested answer guidance. Then, test your
understanding of this chapter with additional multiple-choice
questions, with instant feedback.
G UI DE TO F URT HER READI NG

Cowles, M. G., Caporaso, J. A., and Risse, T. (eds) (2011)

Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change
(Ithaca NY, Cornell University Press). This edited volume gives a
good overview of empirical studies on top-down
Europeanization in the pre-accession EU 15.
Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (eds) (2003) The Politics of
Europeanisation (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This book
gives a comprehensive overview of the various theoretical
approaches and dimensions of top-down Europeanization.
Sanders, D. and Bellucci, P. (eds) (2012) The Europeanization
of National Polities? Citizenship and Support in a Post-
Enlargement Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press). This book
offers interesting insights into top-down Europeanization.
Schimmelfennig, F. and Sedelmeier, U. (eds) (2005a) The
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press). This book provides an excellent
account of top-down Europeanization in accession countries
and new member states.
Thomson, R. (2011) Resolving Controversy in the European
Union: Legislative Decision-Making Before and After
Enlargement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). This
book provides insights into bottom-up Europeanization with and
without the new member states.

Explore this topic further with a curated selection of web links

to additional resources.
9
Democracy and Legitimacy in the
European Union
Stijn Smismans
Ch a p t e r Co n t e n t s
9.1 Introduction
9.2 From ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘democratic deficit’

9.3 Maastricht and the debate during the 1990s

9.4 EU democracy and the governance debate

9.5 The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon

9.6 The output gap, populism, and EU legitimacy

9.7 Conclusion
Reader’s Guide

This chapter discusses the extent to which decision-

making in the European Union can be considered
democratic and legitimate. The chapter clarifies the
concepts ‘democracy’ and ‘legitimacy’, and describes how,
although initially the legitimacy of the European polity was
not perceived as a problem, it became more problematic as
the EU gained more competences. The European
democratic deficit became an important issue of debate
only during the 1990s after the Maastricht Treaty had
transferred considerable powers to the EU. The main
solution to the democratic deficit has been inspired by the
parliamentary model of democracy and involves
strengthening the European Parliament (EP), while also
paying attention to the role of national parliaments and
regional and local authorities. The chapter also shows how
the governance debate at the start of the twenty-first
century broadened the conceptual understanding of
democracy in the EU by addressing the complexity of
European governance (see also Chapter 7). By looking at
different stages of policy-making and different modes of
governance, while dealing with issues such as
transparency and the role of civil society, the chapter
discusses a wider range of issues associated with the
democracy and legitimacy of the Union. It assesses the
impact on EU democracy of the Constitutional Treaty and
the Lisbon Treaty. The chapter concludes by warning that
three crises, namely the economic, migration, and security
crises, have revived nationalist and populist movements
exacerbating the challenges to the EU’s legitimacy.
9.1 Introduction

When one thinks about democracy, it is usually the political

institutions of nation states that first come to mind. Yet democracy
can also apply to the case of the European Union. Addressing this
question in the EU is particularly challenging because the European
Union is a supranational polity: it is less than a state, but more
than an international organization.

To help to address this question, we first need to distinguish between

two terms: democracy and legitimacy. According to Bobbio (1987:
19), ‘a “democratic regime” is … a set of procedural rules arriving at
collective decisions in a way which accommodates and facilitates the
fullest possible participation of interested parties’. Therefore,
democracy does not concern only states, but can also apply to any
regime arriving at collective decisions. It can therefore also be
applied to a supranational or multilevel polity such as the EU.

Whereas ‘democracy’ refers to a set of procedures guaranteeing the

participation of the governed, ‘legitimacy’ refers to the generalized
degree of trust that the governed have towards the political system.
Broadly speaking, this generalized degree of trust can result from
two elements. On the one hand, people might find a political system
legitimate because they are sufficiently involved in the decision-
making even if the outcome of those decisions is not always what
they desire (input legitimacy). On the other hand, people might
find a political system legitimate because they are satisfied with the
policy outcomes produced by the political system (output
legitimacy), even if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-
making. The first aspect of legitimacy can be identified with the
democratic process; the second with performance and efficiency.
Input and output legitimacy are normally combined, but one may be
emphasized more than the other. For example, it is often argued that
the EU has primarily been built on output legitimacy. However, as
the EU has become involved in more and more policy areas, it has
become increasingly difficult to base the legitimacy of the European
polity on policy outputs alone.
9.2 From ‘permissive consensus’
to ‘democratic deficit’

Back in 1957 when the European Economic Community (EEC)

was first set up, democratic accountability was not high on the
Community’s agenda. At that time, the European Community could
be considered a ‘special purpose association’ to which a limited
number of well-defined functions were delegated. The democratic
nature of the Community was not a matter of serious concern and
could, at this point, be guaranteed by the democratic credentials of
the member states. The ‘Monnet method’, the sector-by-sector
approach to European integration, was based on the idea of a
strong (technical) European Commission, composed of independent
Commissioners representing the general interest of the Community.
The Commission held the exclusive right of initiative and played a
central role as the executive body (see Chapter 10), while the
Council of Ministers acted as the final decision-maker (see Chapter
11). The Parliamentary Assembly was only indirectly elected and had
only consultative powers. As such, it had only as much importance as
the advisory Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which was
composed of representatives from national interest groups and
stakeholders in the areas of EEC competence (see Chapter 14).

This functional approach to European integration (see Chapter 4)

was based on the idea of involving actors with particular expertise in
the specific fields for which the EEC had been given competence.
Functional expertise, rather than democratic participation, was the
central issue of concern. The initial stages of European integration
were thus said to be based on a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg
and Scheingold, 1970: 41). There was little popular interest in this
elite-driven and technocratic project, and this coincided with diffuse
support for the idea of European integration—or, put differently, the
legitimacy of the EEC was based on its output, without raising
particular concerns about input legitimacy.

However, as the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) defined more

clearly the features of the European legal order, based on principles
such as supremacy and direct effect (see Chapter 13), and with the
Community acting in new policy areas, the daily impact of the
European integration process became ever more evident and the
functionalist approach became insufficient as a way of addressing the
legitimacy of the European project. In this context, the concept of the
‘democratic deficit’ refers above all to the idea that the transfer of
policy-making power from the national level to the EU has not been
accompanied by sufficient democratic control at the European level.
At the national level, European integration had strengthened
executives to the detriment of parliaments (Moravcsik, 1994)
because European policy issues are decided and debated by the
government (represented at EU level in the Council) rather than by
national parliaments. At the same time, the European Parliament
(EP) was institutionally too weak to ensure democratic
accountability at the European level.
Framed in these parliamentary terms, there were two possible
solutions to the EU’s democratic deficit. Either one could
democratize European decision-making by increasing parliamentary
representation at the European level by way of the EP (the
supranational or federal solution), or one could argue that
democratic accountability can reside only in the national
parliaments, in which case the priority had to be to limit the transfer
of powers to the EU—and in as much as such transfer took place,
national parliaments should have the means of ensuring the
accountability of their minister in the Council (the
intergovernmental solution).

As the EEC’s influence grew during the 1970s and 1980s, political
decision-makers opted for the first solution, and thus the further
parliamentarization of the European level. In 1979, direct
elections to the European Parliament (EP) were introduced to
strengthen the direct democratic input at the European level. The
Parliament subsequently received increasing powers in the
budgetary and legislative process (see Chapter 12). In that way, the
EU began to resemble a bicameral parliamentary democracy in
which legislative power is shared by two branches: one representing
the population of the Union (the Parliament), and the other its
member states (the EU Council).

However, democratizing the EU by strengthening the role of the EP

faces two main difficulties. First, the parliamentary model of
democracy—in which government is accountable to the will of the
people expressed in a directly elected parliament—does not see the
role of parliament only as that of a legislature, but also expects a
parliament to have control over the executive through its
involvement in the appointment of the government and/or its use of
a vote of censure. While the EP has gained important legislative
powers, its control over the Commission is more limited. Although
the Treaty of Rome already allowed the Commission to be
dismissed by the then Assembly, this possibility remained theoretical
because the Parliament was deprived of any real power in the
appointment of a new Commission. The Commission is appointed by
the Council from candidates proposed by the member states and
thus tends to reflect the parliamentary majorities in power at the
national level at the moment of appointment (see Chapters 10 and
11). As such, when European citizens vote in European elections,
their opinion finds expression in parliamentary representation, but
this does not automatically affect the composition of the
Commission, which together with the Council forms the EU’s
‘executive’.

Second, the EU is neither a traditional international organization nor

a state. It is a sui generis political system, which is best described as
a supranational polity (see Chapter 7). Yet it has been repeatedly
argued that this polity has no demos—that is, a ‘people’ with some
common identity or shared values that might provide the basis for a
parliamentary expression of democracy. The parliamentary model is
based on the expression of the general will in parliament. The
general will is (mostly) expressed by parliamentary decisions based
on majority voting. In order to get these majoritarian decisions
accepted by the minority, the governed represented in a parliament
need to have a certain level of social unity, a common identity.
However, it is argued that there is no such common identity in the
EU, which, as Article 1 TEU states, is still based on a process of
integration ‘among the peoples of Europe’. Contrary to that, some
have argued that there does exist a certain common cultural basis in
Europe (Kaelble, 1994), that there is general acceptance of the ‘idea
of Europe’ and ‘a commitment to the shared values of the Union as
expressed in its constituent documents’ (Weiler, 1997: 270). This
process could strengthen the loyalty of European citizens vis-à-vis
the European polity in a similar way to that in which state action
strengthens the loyalty of national citizens vis-à-vis the state,
reinforcing the national demos. However, the shift in loyalty to the
European level and the creation of some common identity seems to
emerge very slowly (Risse, 2002). There is no European ‘public
sphere’ in which citizens are informed on, and take part in, political
discussions. There are no European media. Communication on
European issues is nationally coloured and split into different
languages (see Chapter 15). Although interest groups have started to
lobby and organize at the European level, their activities in Brussels
remain rather invisible to the wider public and do not create broader
debate on European issues (see Chapter 14). European political
parties are weak and European parliamentary elections are ‘second-
order elections’, thus citizens do not participate and when they do
most voters consider the European political arena to be less
important than the national one so they use their votes to express
feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with domestic parties or to
bring about political change in their own country. Hence, despite the
increased legislative powers of the EP, the Parliament struggles to
engage European citizens in a political debate that they can
understand as the democratic expression of their concerns and
interests.

Key Points

• The democratic character of the European Economic

Community was not a major issue of concern at its
creation, but became an issue of concern as more
competences were transferred to the Community.

• The preferred solution to the European democratic

deficit was to parliamentarize the European level by
directly electing the European Parliament and increasing
its powers.

• Parliamentarization faces two problems: the absence of

a European demos and a weak European public sphere.

• European citizens do not participate in a shared debate

about European politics and there is no direct connection
between voting preferences in the EP elections and the
composition of the Commission.
9.3 Maastricht and the debate
during the 1990s

The debate on the European Union’s democratic deficit over the

course of the 1990s continued to be inspired by the parliamentary
model. While this remained the conceptual reference point used to
frame democracy in the EU it also included an additional dimension
with the introduction of ‘European citizenship’. Potentially, this
could encourage the development of a common European identity
and partially address the ‘no demos’ problem.

The Maastricht Treaty strengthened the legislative power of the

European Parliament by introducing the co-decision procedure
(now the ordinary legislative procedure, or OLP); the
Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Nice Treaties attempted to create a
better link between the EP election results and the composition of
the Commission by ensuring that the Commission’s term of office
coincided with that of the Parliament. Moreover, although proposed
by the European Council, both the Commission President and
subsequently the entire Commission have to be approved by the EP.
The latter has used this new power to question and even oppose the
appointment of new Commissioners (see Chapter 12). Parliamentary
democracy at EU level has thus been strengthened, although the
latter is still far from a system in which the government is the direct
expression of the political majority in parliament.
The Maastricht Treaty also acknowledged the criticism of those
arguing that democratic accountability is best guaranteed at the
national level by introducing the principle of subsidiarity. This
meant that, with the exception of areas for which it has exclusive
competence, the EU can now act only if, and in so far as, the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by
the member states. Moreover, the 1990s also saw attempts to
strengthen the role of national parliaments in EU political decision-
making. Member states tightened their domestic regulations to
increase parliamentary control over their ministers in the Council,
and the EU began to provide a better and more direct information
flow to national parliaments so that they could fulfil this function
effectively.

The Maastricht Treaty also addressed the role of regional and local
authorities in European decision-making. While many European
countries had witnessed a process of devolution of political power
from the national to the regional level, some of these newly acquired
competences were diluted as the EU began to operate in those policy
areas. The member states agreed that regional and local actors also
needed a place in European decision-making, and as such the
Maastricht Treaty created an advisory Committee of the Regions
(CoR), representing both regional and local authorities. It also
allowed member states to be represented in the Council by a regional
minister in policy areas for which the regions held legislative
competence.

Citizenship was also introduced in the Maastricht Treaty as a way of

framing democracy. Citizenship has traditionally been defined in the
context of the nation state, and built on three elements: a set of
rights and duties; participation; and identity. By introducing the
concept of ‘European citizenship’, the Maastricht Treaty made it
clear that the EU provides citizens with a set of rights and duties that
means that they belong to the same community. They can participate
democratically in this community by voting in the EP elections, for
example, and through acquiring rights that they would not otherwise
be able to exercise, such as the right to reside in another member
state. European citizenship is therefore expected to strengthen the
feeling of a common European identity and to provide some extra
fuel to make parliamentary democracy at the EU level work.
However, the Maastricht Treaty and all subsequent treaties explicitly
state that European citizenship is complementary to national
citizenship, and is therefore not at odds with the idea that
democratic legitimacy can reside at the same time in the European,
national, or even sub-national parliaments.

The citizenship debate has focused primarily on output legitimacy

rather than on input legitimacy (although European citizenship also
provides participatory rights) (Smismans, 2009). The expectation is
that if citizens are better aware of all of the benefits that the EU
provides, they will identify more with the Union (see Chapter 15).
This link between European rights and belonging to a European
‘community’ has also been exemplified in the debate at the end of the
1990s about the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. With
the adoption of the Charter, the EU wanted to make a clear
statement of the fundamental rights and values for which it stands
and with which its citizens can identify (Smismans, 2010). The way
in which the Charter was drafted was also supposed to strengthen
the sense of citizens’ identification with the Union by making the
drafting process more participatory. The latter took place in the first
European Convention, which brought parliamentarians from the
EP and national parliaments together with representatives from
governments. Online consultations and debating activities made it
not only a more parliamentary, but also a more open and
participatory, process even if this mainly reached an elite of
informed and interested citizens, and failed to witness the
involvement of the broader citizenry.

Key Points

• The European Union’s democratic deficit was strongly

debated during the 1990s. Representative democracy
remained the central frame of reference.

• After the Maastricht Treaty, the European Parliament

was further strengthened, and national, regional, and
local authorities were given a role in European policy-
making. At the same time, subsidiarity set a limit on the
further transfer of powers to the EU.

• The introduction of European citizenship and the Charter

of Fundamental Rights of the EU offered a way of
developing a common European identity and thus
partially addressed the ‘no demos’ problem.
9.4 EU democracy and the
governance debate

Despite all previous efforts to strengthen European democracy on

the basis of the parliamentary model, the European Union was still
not perceived as more legitimate by European citizens. Events, such
as the resignation of the Commission in 1999 (see Chapter 10) after it
faced accusations of nepotism and financial management, made it
ever more evident that democracy was not only about the role of
parliament, but also about good governance and the parts played
by other actors in policy-making (see Box 9.1). Thus, at the turn of
the new century, the debate on democracy and legitimacy in the EU
became more diversified.
 BO X 9 . 1
Background: Good Governance according to the
European Commission

The European Commission established its own concept of

good governance in the White Paper on European Governance
(WPEG). The WPEG was adopted in 2001 by the European
Commission in order to improve both the efficiency and
legitimacy of European governance. Five principles underpin
good governance and the changes proposed: openness,
participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence.
Each principle is important for establishing more democratic
governance. The principles underpin democracy and the rule of
law in the member states, but they apply to all levels of
government—whether global, European, national, regional, or
local.
Source: European Commission (2001a).

Some scholars argued that the only way in which to resolve the EU’s
legitimacy problem was to strengthen the parliamentary model,
further politicizing European decision-making. This could be
achieved by creating a more direct link between the outcome of
European parliamentary elections and the composition of the
European Commission. European citizens could be offered a clear
choice between different (ideological) policy positions, while at the
same time the composition of the Commission could reflect the
parliamentary majority and its ideological orientation. European
citizens would therefore be able to elect their ‘executive’ on the basis
of a European-wide public debate about policy choices. European
decision-making would no longer be technocratic and ignored by
European citizens.

This strategy was built on the assumption that if European elections

were about clear ideological and political choices reflected in the
composition of the Commission, European citizens would engage
more with the European debate and identify themselves as active
participants in the EU polity. However, what if European political
choices were still translated into purely national interpretations
through national media? If this were to happen, the effect could be
the further delegitimization of the EU, which would be depicted as
imposing European-level policies at the national level. This could be
particularly problematic where the national government had a
different ideological orientation from the parliamentary majority in
the EP and the Commission. At the same time, this strategy would
fundamentally change the role of the Commission from a motor
driving European integration and representing ‘the European
interest’ to an explicitly political body. If a European public sphere
were not to emerge as a result of this strategy, such a supranational
political body would be criticized on the basis of nationally defined
interests and debates. As such, political leaders have been reluctant
to adopt such a radical approach (see Section 9.5, ‘The Constitutional
Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon’).

Another argument is that framing EU democracy exclusively in terms

of the role of parliament and parliamentary accountability is too
much of a simplification and may even be misguided. First, when
comparing the EU to a parliamentary democracy at the national
level, the perfect functioning of the latter is too easily assumed. The
EU is often criticized because the EP does not have the right of
legislative initiative (which is the prerogative of the Commission),
while assuming that this is always a central feature of parliamentary
democracy. Yet, in many countries, legislative initiatives emerge de
facto from the government.

Second, by focusing on representative democracy, the debate

addresses only part of the problem and neglects other aspects of
democratic accountability in European decision-making. The
assumption is that democratic decision-making is guaranteed by
means of parliamentary input, while the ‘neutral’ implementation of
the parliamentary mandate is guaranteed by government and
administration. However, this normative ideal has always been a
fiction and is increasingly so in modern governance, in which the
implementation of the parliamentary mandate is the result of the
complex interaction of many actors deploying a multitude of policy
instruments. If we want to conceptualize democratic accountability
in modern governance, it is not enough to think in terms of
parliamentary mandate; rather, we must address the question of who
is involved in direct interaction with government and administration
in the setting of the policy agenda and the drafting of new policy
measures, as well as during the implementation process.

Third, there are multiple ways of conceptualizing democracy. While

‘representative democracy’ focuses on the electoral process and the
representative role of parliament, theories of ‘participatory
democracy’ stress the importance of more regular and direct citizen
involvement in collective decision-making. This could involve
referendums or more decentralized governance mechanisms.
Theories of ‘deliberative democracy’ pay more attention to the
quality of deliberative processes, rather than focus on who represents
whom or ensuring direct citizen participation.

All of these arguments informed the debate on European governance

that emerged at the end of the 1990s and the early twenty-first
century. The so-called ‘governance turn’ in EU studies (see
Chapter 7) argued, among other things, that European policy-making
is not only about intergovernmental bargaining among member
states and power struggles among the European institutions, but also
involves many different actors at different stages and in different
modes of policy-making. This governance debate resets in several
ways the terms of the discussion about legitimacy and democracy in
the EU. First, it is attentive to the different stages of policy-making.
Democracy and legitimacy are not only about the legislative process
and the power of parliament in legislative decision-making; what
happens at the initial stage of policy-making, when the European
Commission consults widely and interacts with many actors when
drafting legislative proposals, matters too. Moreover, once legislative
acts have been adopted, the EU often adopts further regulatory
measures by way of delegated legislation (see Chapter 16). If one
wants to assess democracy and legitimacy in the EU, a closer look at
this process is required, as it affects the majority of EU decisions (see
Box 9.2).
BO X 9 . 2
Case Study: Delegated legislation

Delegated legislation is a common feature of modern

governance. Because adopting legislation often takes time,
legislators may decide to delegate secondary or implementing
decision-making to governments. While delegated legislation
allows for speedier and more effective policy-making, it also
takes decision-making out of the hands of the elected
representatives in parliament; this may raise concerns about
democratic accountability.
At the European level, delegated legislation occurs via the
delegation by the EU Council and the EP (as co-legislators, in
most cases) to the European Commission, as executive. This
does not mean that the Commission can act in an uncontrolled
way once it has been delegated the task to adopt further
regulatory acts. The EU has developed a process referred to as
‘comitology’, requiring the Commission to interact with a
‘comitology committee’ composed of representatives from the
member states when it adopts delegated legislation.
Comitology has often been criticized from a democratic
point of view. It is a rather technocratic process driven by
Commission officials and representatives from national
administrations, normally without the involvement of elected
politicians. Moreover, comitology is a rather opaque process,
with few knowing where, how, and why the decisions have
been taken. However, some scholars have described
comitology as ‘deliberative supranationalism’ (Joerges and
Neyer, 1997) indicating that it is not simply a technocratic
process, but a process that allows for informed deliberation at
the EU level on the basis of expertise and representation of
interests in the comitology committees. The Commission has
also taken initiatives that are intended to make the system less
opaque by providing online information on comitology.
The Lisbon Treaty sought to strengthen the democratic
character of further regulatory decision-making by creating a
distinction between delegated acts and implementing acts.
Legislative acts, which set out the most important provisions by
way of the ordinary or special legislative procedures (thus
involving the EP), now have two options to delegate to the
Commission to take further action. One option is to give the
Commission the power to adopt delegated acts, which can set
out provisions of a general scope, but cannot define the most
important provisions, which can only be set out in legislation.
The Commission can adopt delegated acts on its own, but
given that they are still rather important provisions, the EP and
the Council have the right to oppose such a decision, thus
allowing some democratic control over the process by elected
politicians. The second option, is to give the Commission the
power to adopt implementing acts, which are used for the less
generic and more technical provisions. Such acts are still
adopted through a (revised) comitology procedure, without
involving the Council or the EP. Compared to the situation prior
to the Lisbon Treaty, the new system of delegated regulation
thus increases democratic control because of the new category
of delegated acts. However, it can also be argued that, as far
 as the implementing acts are concerned, democratic control
may actually have weakened, since neither the Council nor the
EP can intervene any more in comitology, in situations in which
they occasionally had a role under the previous system. In
terms of reducing complexity and opaque governance, the new
system is not exactly an improvement either, because although
there are no formally empowered comitology committees any
more for delegated acts, similar committees with member state
representatives are still involved in an informal way.

Second, the governance debate has made clear that there are
different modes of European governance, and that democracy and
legitimacy may be addressed differently for each of them.
Traditionally, the legitimacy debate has focused on the
‘Community method’, based on legislative decision-making and a
central role for the EP. However, many ‘new modes of governance’
(NMGs), such as the open method of coordination (OMC),
hardly involve the European Parliament at all. The OMC was created
in 2000 to allow the EU to coordinate the policies of the member
states in particular policy fields, such as employment policy or
macro-economic policy, but without adopting binding legislation
at the European level. The OMC procedure is based on the adoption
of guidelines by the Council, based on a proposal of the Commission,
addressed to the member states. While such guidelines are not
binding, the member states have to adopt national action plans to
explain how they intend to reach the targets set in the guidelines.
They have to report to the European Commission on their initiatives,
after which the Commission and Council can propose new guidelines
and (for some policy areas) send recommendations to the member
states. It has been argued that the legitimacy of the OMC resides in
its participatory and decentralized character. Since the EU only
adopts guidelines and not binding measures in the OMC, the absence
of the EP is regarded as non-controversial. In the end, it is up to the
member states to take decisions to implement such guidelines and,
in that case, democratic accountability is guaranteed by national
parliaments. Moreover, the drafting of European guidelines and the
national measures that implement them are said to be participatory,
given the involvement of stakeholders. However, in reality, the
stakeholder involvement is often patchy and national parliaments
are not always well informed. By contrast, European guidelines,
despite the fact that they are not binding, may have a decisive
influence on policy options. Although there remain doubts about the
impact of the OMC, the democratic claims made in relation to this
mode of governance need to be nuanced (Smismans, 2008).

Third, three concepts have been particularly central to the debate on

the legitimacy of European governance—namely, ‘participation’,
‘civil society’, and ‘transparency’. Democracy is not simply about
participation in elections and representation through a parliament,
but it is also about the participation of multiple actors, such as
interest groups, experts, representatives from national
administration, and individual citizens. These actors are involved in
many different stages of policy-making, from the drafting of a new
legislative proposal to participation in the implementation of the
OMC at national level.
Since the end of the 1990s, the EU institutions have often
encouraged the participation of civil society in European governance.
The Economic and Social Committee (ESC) has presented itself as
the ideal institutional form of representation for civil society, while
the Commission has taken measures to ensure wider consultation at
the initial stage of policy-making. The EU institutions have mainly
sought the involvement of representatives from civil society
organizations in policy-making, although the Commission has also
taken initiatives to broaden general online consultations in which
individual citizens can also participate. This has been referred to as
‘participatory democracy’ or ‘participatory governance’.

The way in which the EU provides consultative processes at the

initial stage of policy-making is often more extensive than in many of
its member states. However, talk of civil society and online
consultations do not ensure equality of access to European decision-
making, because those with most resources and money are bound to
be the most effective lobbyists (see Chapter 14). The debate on
participation and civil society is therefore linked to that on
transparency. One can distinguish ex post and ex ante dimensions of
transparency when talking about EU legitimacy. Thus, by ensuring
the transparency of the activities of the EU’s institutions, one can
ensure ex post democratic accountability. For example, this might
involve the EP scrutinizing the Commission, national parliaments
controlling the action of their ministers in the Council, or citizens
voting for a particular party or group during EP elections. Many
initiatives have been taken to increase transparency of this kind. For
example, this has involved increasing the information sent by the
Commission to both European and national parliaments, and by
ensuring that Council meetings are public when dealing with
legislative issues. Moreover, the EU institutions, and in particular
the Commission, increasingly provide information during the
drafting of policy measures. Such ex ante transparency allows for
improved participation by civil society actors and stakeholders, and
would thus also allow for better-informed policy-making (and thus
increased output legitimacy). Compared again with the transparency
provided at the national level by many countries, even within the EU,
the EU’s initiatives on transparency are relatively far-reaching.
However, the EU governance system is so complex and remote that it
remains the preserve of an informed elite. With the European
Transparency Initiative (ETI), introduced by the Commission in
2005 to increase openness, transparency, and accountability of
European governance, the EU also aims to shed some light on this
elite when they participate in European policy-making. It does this
by providing for a Transparency Register that contains information
on interest groups’ lobbying of the EU institutions (see Chapter 14).
Key Points

• By 2000 the debate on democracy and legitimacy in the

European Union had become more diversified.
• It was argued that a further parliamentarization and a
politicization of the European Commission may not be a
suitable or practicable response to the EU’s democratic
deficit.
• The governance debate broadened the
conceptualization of democracy and legitimacy in the EU
beyond the legislative process, the electoral process,
and the power games that persist among the EU’s
institutions.

• Participation by multiple actors and civil society, as well

as transparency, are key elements in the
conceptualization of democracy.
9.5 The Constitutional Treaty and
the Treaty of Lisbon

The debate surrounding the Constitutional Treaty (CT) between

2001 and 2005 added another layer to the conceptualization of EU
democracy. This concerned the question of the ‘constituent power’
necessary to create and revise the constitutional rules of the EU.
Democracy is not only about participation in European governance,
but also raises questions about the initial design of the institutional
framework. Before the CT, the constitutional rules of the European
polity had always been drafted behind the closed doors of diplomatic
meetings at intergovernmental conferences (IGCs), leading to
treaty reform. The European Convention charged with drafting the
CT aimed at a more open and participatory debate on the
constitutional design of the EU by also involving European and
national parliamentarians, by using online consultations, and by
hosting broader debating events. However, the French and Dutch
‘no’ votes in referendums on the proposed CT in 2005, which led to
the demise of the CT, illustrate the difficulties involved in building
the EU’s legitimacy on the basis of a constitutional document.

Although not as innovative in democratic terms as the CT, the Lisbon

Treaty subsequently provides some new ideas on EU democracy and
legitimacy. First, and for the first time, the Treaty included an
explicit title, ‘Provisions on democratic principles’. In it, Article 10
clearly states that the Union ‘shall be founded on representative
democracy’, indicating the representative role of the EP, stating that
the Council and the European Council are accountable to the
national parliaments, and mentioning the role of political parties. By
contrast, Article 11 stresses elements that can be described as
‘participatory democracy’ (although the concept is not explicitly
used)—namely, the importance of dialogue with citizens and civil
society organizations (CSOs).

Second, the Treaty introduces the ‘Citizens’ Initiative’ as a new

democratic instrument and form of direct participatory democracy
(Article 11(4) TEU). This allows European citizens to gather a million
signatures to ask the Commission to draft a proposal for a legal act
on an issue on which they consider European action is required (as
long as it falls within the competences of the EU). In order to launch
a citizens’ initiative, citizens must form a ‘citizens’ committee’
composed of at least seven EU citizens being resident in at least
seven different member states. The citizens’ committee must register
its initiative before starting to collect statements of support from
citizens. Once the registration is confirmed and checked on whether
it falls within EU competence, organizers have one year in which to
collect signatures. The Citizens’ Initiative may stir up the European
debate, and make the EU both more visible and bottom-up.
However, it also entails risks if EU action does not live up to the
expectations of those taking the initiative (see Box 9.3).
BO X 9 . 3
Case Study: The European Citizens’ Initiative in practice

Launched on 1 April 2012, the first years of practice of the

Citizens’ Initiative show the limitations of this new democratic
instrument. The Citizens’ Initiative has created limited debate
and, above all, little impact. By July 2021, nearly a decade after
its launch, 81 initiatives have been started but only six
initiatives have reached the stage where the Commission has
provided an answer, and none so far has led to the adoption of
a legal act. Most initiatives failed to reach the number of
signatures required to be submitted to the Commission, or were
simply withdrawn by those launching the initiative. More
problematic is the fact that many Citizens’ Initiatives were
refused by the Commission on the grounds that the topic was
beyond its competence, sometimes on the basis of a very
restrictive interpretation. This has created a lot of frustration
among citizens who expected the Citizens’ Initiative to provide
them with a tool to set the EU’s political agenda in a bottom-up
way. A striking example of this was the Commission’s refusal of
a Citizens’ Initiative asking the EU to withdraw from negotiating
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) with
the USA. The TTIP was highly controversial, with the EU being
accused of secretly negotiating an agreement that only
favoured business interests and undermined social and
environmental standards (see Chapter 17).
Even in the case of the six Citizens’ Initiatives for which all
requirements were fulfilled and enough signatures were
gathered, the Commission, which is not obliged to propose a
new legal act, answered that the existing EU’s legislative
framework on the matter was sufficient. In one of the six cases
the Commission argued that no new action was needed. In
three other cases it promised that soft law measures and a
new consultation would suffice, rather than legislative action. In
the initiative concerning the pesticide glyphosate the
Commission did propose that it would take some legislative
action but it declined taking up the initiative’s key demand,
namely banning glyphosate, and instead limited itself to
developing new rules on transparency and quality of evidence
studies used in EU regulation. Only in a recently answered
initiative did the Commission live up to the expectation of
introducing legislation in a similar way as asked by the initiative.
The ‘End the Cage Age’ initiative aims to ban cages in animal
farming, and the Commission has committed to introduce by
the end of 2023 a legislative initiative to phase out cages for
animals that are not already covered by such bans in European
legislation.
One can conclude that there is clearly a wide gap between
the initial expectations created by the introduction of the
Citizens’ Initiative, which was perceived as an opportunity for
citizens to set the policy and legislative agenda of the EU, and
the way this operates in practice. As a result, after the initial
enthusiasm, the number of initiatives has gone down each year.
However, more recently, several positive developments can be
noted. The amount of Commission refusals has gone down.
Moreover, in 2019, the EU set out a new framework for the
 Citizens’ Initiative, by way of Regulation 2019/788, which
facilitates the registration procedure and conditions for
collecting signatures. That being said, the limits in legal
competence of the EU will always frustrate many of those
signing an initiative. Most importantly, with the exception of the
‘End the Cage Age’ initiative, practice so far shows that the
European Commission is reluctant to revise the existing legal
framework developed by the Council and European Parliament;
or to put it differently, to allow that participatory democracy
trumps representative democracy.

Third, the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the principle of

subsidiarity by giving national parliaments a way of controlling
whether new proposals made by the Commission respect this
principle. The new procedure allows control ex ante, before a
decision is taken, which is more efficient than ex post control by the
Court of Justice on whether a decision already taken respects
subsidiarity. This is because the Court is reluctant to contradict a
value judgement made by the European institutions. However, the
success of this new procedure depends on whether national
parliaments manage to collaborate within the short time span in
which the procedure allows them to act. Since its creation, national
parliaments only managed to trigger the subsidiarity control
mechanism three times. In none of these cases did the Commission
subsequently agree that subsidiarity had not been respected. In one
of them it withdrew its proposal as the reasoned opinion by the
national parliaments had made it clear that there was insufficient
political support for the measure.
Finally, the Lisbon Treaty has further strengthened the role of the EP
by turning the co-decision procedure into the ordinary legislative
procedure and by giving the EP a controlling role over the adoption
of a new type of delegated act. The Lisbon Treaty also contributes to
further parliamentarization of EU decision-making by strengthening
the links between EP elections and the Commission’s composition:
Article 17(7) TEU now requires the European Council to take into
account the outcome of the EP elections before nominating a
candidate for Commission President. To strengthen the link between
EP election result and choice of Commission President the political
groups in the EP each presented a candidate for Commission
President (or ‘spitzenkandidat’) during the campaign prior to the
2014 EP elections, arguing that the European Council should appoint
the candidate of the party acquiring most votes in the election. The
European Council did indeed appoint Jean-Claude Juncker, who was
the candidate of the party that came out first in the elections, namely
the European People’s Party (EPP) (see Chapter 12). However, this
new process remained modest in terms of politicizing the European
Union and offering European citizens a clear choice between
different politically orientated Commissions with clear and well-
debated political programmes. The national debates on the role and
impact of the different candidates remained limited. Moreover, while
the role of the Commission President in selecting Commissioners has
increased, it is still dependent on proposals made by the member
states (and thus on the political majorities present at national level at
the time of appointment). This limits the potential of any candidate
proposed by a political party in the EP to promise a clear electoral
programme. At the same time, the member states have always
remained reluctant about the Spitzenkandidat process and argued
that it remained the prerogative of the European Council to
nominate somebody else if they deemed that to be a better solution.
In fact, following the 2019 EP elections, the European Council did
not appoint the Spitzenkandidat of the EP party that obtained most
votes, but rather Ursula von der Leyen, a national politician who
belonged to the same political family but had not been campaigning
for the role. While this did respect the logic of appointing a
Commission President from the political group obtaining most votes,
it clearly undermined the EU’s capacity to make policy by way of
clear electoral programmes presented by Spitzenkandidaten.

Key Points

• The debate on the Constitutional Treaty raised the

question of who holds the constituent power to design
the constitutional rules of the European Union.

• The Constitutional Treaty failed to create a broad

participatory debate on the constitutional setting of the
Union.
• The Lisbon Treaty has, for the first time, explicitly defined
the democratic principles of the EU.
• The Lisbon Treaty strengthens both the representative
and participatory dimensions of democracy in the EU.
9.6 The output gap, populism, and
EU legitimacy

Our analysis so far shows how the EU has gradually strengthened

procedural mechanisms for democratic accountability, providing a
complex governance structure of multiple checks and balances. Yet,
at the same time it has faced increasing demands to deliver policy
outputs for the major challenges of our time, which has often
resulted in populist narratives using the EU as a scapegoat when
policy intervention struggles.

Over the last decade, Europe has faced major challenges, in

particular the economic crisis, the migration crisis, the terrorism
crisis, and the public health crisis of COVID-19. All these are not as
such ‘EU problems’, but they have amplified in an unprecedented
fashion the main features of the EU’s legitimacy challenge. As the
EU’s legitimacy is strongly based on ‘output’, not being able to
deliver effective policy solutions to the crises above has put into
question the legitimacy of the polity as a whole. While many people
take the existence of the nation state for granted, any (perceived)
policy failures by the EU quickly leads to questions about the raison
d’être and viability of the EU (see de Búrca, 2013). Although the
origins of the 2008 economic crisis do not lie in the European
integration process, but in the lending and speculative practices of
the banking sector and the lack of regulation of global financial
transactions, it illustrated in a dramatic way the shortcomings of
economic and monetary union (EMU) (see Chapter 22). EU
institutions were not fit for purpose and policy reaction was delayed
and patchy (see Chapter 25). Similarly, the migration and security
crises introduced new external challenges to the EU, for which its
institutional framework was ill-prepared and rather opened up the
opportunity to question one of the main achievements of European
integration, namely the border-free Schengen area (see Chapter
26). Equally, as the COVID-19 pandemic unfolded, people were
looking to the EU for coordinated action, and mutual support, for
instance on protective medical equipment, but EU action took time
to build up and was constrained by the EU’s limited legal
competence in the area of public health (see Chapter 28).

In fact, the expectations of what the EU should have done in relation

to all the above challenges illustrate perfectly the double challenge at
the core of the EU’s legitimacy conundrum. Coordinated action to
address these challenges requires ‘more’ rather than ‘less Europe’ but
this faces two difficulties.

Firstly, further transfer of sovereignty from the member states to

the EU exacerbates the European democratic deficit unless this is
accompanied by sufficient democratic accountability of the EU’s new
policy-making powers. The EU’s new fiscal policy governance, set
up following the 2008 economic crisis, is most troublesome in this
regard, as it limits member states’ sovereignty to decide on their own
budget without compensating with democratic input and control at
the EU level. Although national parliaments retain their formal role
in adopting the national budget, the budgetary margins and policy
options set out in the budget are increasingly drafted at the
European level, with the Commission in the lead, no intervention of
the EP, and with the EU Council acting only as a potential
(intergovernmental) blocking authority.

Secondly, appropriate EU action is only possible when the member

states provide the EU with the legal and financial means for that,
which requires that there is not only a sense of expectation of
European action but also one of European solidarity, which brings us
back to the question of a European demos and the deficient nature of
the European public sphere. The adoption of a common European
response has proved difficult because solidarity among European
countries cannot be taken for granted, and political decision-makers
tend to communicate with their own national electorate and media in
terms of defending their national interest while blaming the other
(see Chapter 15). Thus, efficient reaction to the economic crisis was
undermined by lack of solidarity between ‘credit’ and ‘defaulting’ EU
countries; while the EU’s attempt to share some of the burden of
immigration among all EU countries met with very hostile resistance
in several countries, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Also
in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the EU had to operate in a
context of member states’ (initial) reflex to act unilaterally, and the
EU’s limits in terms of legal capacity to act, while at the same time
being faced with public expectations to deliver efficient policy and
blame when the response did not immediately occur. In the end, the
EU common vaccine procurement scheme can be considered a
success. Particularly smaller EU countries, and those with no vaccine
production, would have faced more substantial vaccine shortages
had the EU been driven by the ‘vaccine nationalism’ shown by the
British government, for example. Equally, the pandemic has led to
the most extensive EU financial support scheme for those countries
that most suffered from the crisis, showing that EU solidarity can
and often does emerge in times of crisis.

The EU, though, has to operate in a context of rising populism, which

is challenging for each level of government, but particularly so for a
supranational polity as the EU. The causes of such general
emergence of populism are broader than the EU, as exemplified by
very similar developments in the USA with the presidency of Donald
Trump. Yet, the EU is a particularly attractive target for such
populist discourse; by depicting the EU as ‘foreign’ and an elitist
‘creation of the establishment’ populists aim to obtain the popular
vote presenting themselves as the representatives of the homogenous
single will of the people. Rising populism has gone hand in hand with
an increase in Euroscepticism, as illustrated by the surge in
support for anti-EU political parties in European elections and some
national elections or Brexit (see Chapter 27). While these parties
attack the EU for being undemocratic and inefficient, it is often due
to their lack of solidarity that more efficient EU action is impeded.
Moreover, criticizing the EU for being undemocratic is no guarantee
of ensuring more democratic decision-making at the national level.
Brexit has been the epitome of this.

Thus, Eurosceptic political parties and governments are themselves

showing little respect for democracy and the rule of law at the
national level. In fact, the biggest challenge to democracy in the EU
lies in the democratic backsliding happening at the national level in
some of its member states. In countries such as Hungary and Poland,
the basic principles of democratic governance and the rule of law are
being challenged, by governments undermining the independence of
the judiciary, curtailing pluralism of the media, changing electoral
systems to remain unchallenged in power, and undermining the
fundamental rights of minorities, such as the LGBT+ community.
Democratic backsliding and disrespect of the rule of law in member
states, is a problem for the EU for three reasons. Firstly, while the
European Economic Communities were initially set up as a
functional process of economic integration, the objective of ensuring
peace has always been at its core. The initial design did not provide
for the EEC to play a role in ensuring the respect of fundamental
rights and the rule of law in European countries, as this role was to
be played by the Council of Europe, and its European Court of
Human Rights in particular. However, EEC/EU enlargement had a
clear role in consolidating democracy in former dictatorships, such
as Greece and Spain, and later in relation to the former communist
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Respect for fundamental
rights and the rule of law became a key criteria for joining the EU,
and is now solidly enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on
European Union, which states that ‘the Union is founded on the
values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality,
the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the
Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men
prevail’. Democratic backsliding at the national level thus puts into
jeopardy the objectives and the legitimacy of the EU itself. Secondly,
when autocrats rule at the national level, they will also have a seat in
EU decision-making, from the (European) Council and the European
Parliament, to the Commission and the Court of Justice. Hence
disrespect of the rule of law at the national level thus has a direct
impact on EU decision-making. Thirdly, the EU is built upon trust
between member states. When some of these member states clearly
disregard the rule of law, that trusts falls entirely away.

However, the EU has struggled to ensure that member states respect

the rule of law. Since it was not created for that reason, it was not
given the powers to exert such control. The Court of Justice has
gradually built up case law on the respect of fundamental rights, but
this was first to ensure that EU institutions and EU decision-making
respect fundamental rights, and subsequently to ensure that member
states do so when they are implementing EU law. Hence the Court
of Justice has no general control over member states’ governments
not observing fundamental rights and the rule of law. Therefore, with
the adoption of Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, the EU
introduced a more political control mechanism to oversee the respect
of the rule of law, but it has been proven to be insufficient to avoid
democratic backsliding in several member states (see Box 9.4).
BO X 9 . 4
Background: The rule of law and democratic backsliding

The Amsterdam Treaty introduced for the first time a sanction

mechanism, now Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, in
case a member state does not respect the values of the EU, as
set out in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, including
democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. A member state
found in serious and persistent breach may first be warned, and
subsequently be suspended from certain of the rights deriving
from the Treaties, including the voting rights of the
representative of the government of that member state in the
Council. However, it has proven difficult to put this article into
practice. First, it is worth noting that Article 7 does not explicitly
provide the opportunity to expel a member state. Secondly, to
impose a sanction, the decision has to be taken unanimously
by the European Council (minus the state under investigation).
This is problematic when the EU faces several member states
that do not respect the rule of law, as they tend to support each
other in avoiding Article 7 sanctions. Imposing sanctions might
also not be very effective if the sanction is not perceived as
very painful by the disrespecting member state, and such
(threat of) sanction is used nationally as a way to further
consolidate power by calling on sentiments of national pride
against EU interference.
In order to improve the operability of Article 7, in 2014 the
Commission introduced an early-warning tool allowing it to
enter into dialogue with a member state to address systemic
threats to the rule of law to prevent escalation. More
importantly, in December 2020, the EU adopted Regulation
(EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality
for the protection of the Union budget. This Regulation finally
provides a tool that allows the EU to adopt sanctions that really
‘hurt’ a member state not respecting the rule of law, namely
limiting or blocking their receipt of EU funding. Governments
not respecting the rule of law are generally also characterized
by cronyism and paying off support via financial favours. The
reduction of EU funding may therefore contribute to
undermining national support for governments that do not
respect the rule of law. With several countries, in particular
Hungary and Poland, backsliding ever further, it is up to the EU
to make it a priority to use this new tool appropriately.
Key Points

• The European Union’s output legitimacy has been called

into question as a consequence of major challenges
such as the financial, immigration, security, and
pandemic crises.
• The EU’s reaction to these crises was often seen as
slow and debatable (as were many national policy
reactions) and partially amplified the EU’s democratic
deficit when it involved a transfer of sovereignty from the
member states to the EU with little democratic
accountability; such as in the new financial governance
mechanisms.

• The crises show a tension between, on the one hand,

the ongoing expectations of many Europeans for the EU
to address these major societal challenges; and on the
other hand, the reluctance of national politicians to
support more European solutions, or to defend them
publicly as the public debate remains mainly defined in
national terms, given the weak nature of the European
public sphere.
• Populism is on the rise in Europe. The EU is an easy
target for populist discourse and politicians who want to
retreat within national borders and look for an external
scapegoat.
• When national retreat is combined with democratic
backsliding, the EU is balanced on a tight rope, aiming to
ensure the rule of law is respected while not creating a
further Eurosceptic backlash that might favour
disintegration.
9.7 Conclusion

As the European Union became involved in a broader range of policy

areas, its legitimacy could no longer be taken for granted. Policy
outputs were no longer deemed an adequate way of improving the
EU’s legitimacy. However, organizing democratic participation and
accountability in a supranational polity is challenging, owing to the
EU’s distance from European citizens and the Union’s complexity.
The institutional set-up of the EU provides for some of the most
important elements needed to guarantee democracy—namely, that
the EU is based on a division of powers guaranteed through respect
for the rule of law. In a democracy, decision-making cannot be in the
hands of a single authority, but has to be shared by several bodies in
a system of checks and balances. Although the EU does not have a
strict separation of powers across its legislative, executive, and
judicial powers, it is based on a system of ‘institutional balance’
in which the Commission represents the Community interests, the
Council, the member state interest, and the European Parliament,
the European citizens’ interests (Lenaerts and Verhoeven, 2002).

The Court of Justice guarantees respect for this institutional balance,

so that none of the EU institutions can act beyond the powers that
they have been afforded by the treaties. Within this institutional set-
up, the body most directly representing Europe’s citizens, the
European Parliament, has gradually been given more powers. The
EU has also tried to strengthen its democratic credentials by
providing other checks and balances, for example, through the
principle of subsidiarity, and by ensuring transparency and by
institutionalizing consultation and participation. These initiatives
have their shortcomings but on some procedural issues such as
transparency and consultative practice they fare better than what
many member states offer at the national level; while the overall
design shows a system of checks and balances that definitely avoids
an authoritarian concentration of power.

The main challenge for EU democracy remains the difficulty of