Chapter One

A Critical Review of Events during

the Hong Kong Protests of 2019
Ben Siu-pun Ho
All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.

The Standing Committee of China’s National People’s Congress passed the

national security law for Hong Kong on June 30, 2020. Signed the same day
by President Xi Jinping, the details of the law were finally revealed to the
people of Hong Kong and the world at 11:00 p.m. that night. The broadly
defined offenses include “secession, subversion, terrorism and collusion with
foreign forces to endanger national security” and the law carries a maximum
penalty of life imprisonment.1 The law is the Chinese government’s reac-
tion and suppression of the social unrest in Hong Kong since 2019. The law
threatens the “one country, two systems” policy and judicial independence in
Hong Kong. As the city has started a new chapter, it is a proper time to review
its protests of 2019.
Hong Kong has witnessed tension, division, and violence since the middle
of 2019 as protests erupted in the community in reaction to a proposed
extradition bill by the Hong Kong government. The bill would extend the
extradition of local people and even visitors to mainland China and other
jurisdictions with which Hong Kong does not have a formal and legally bind-
ing extradition agreement. The underlying concern of Hong Kong’s people
over this bill was a lack of faith in the judicial system across the border in
mainland China; people fear it is susceptible to manipulation by government
officials and especially leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.
It is within this context that this chapter seeks to serve three purposes:
(1) compiling scattered news and information into a single and hopefully
comprehensive explanation of events, although it is impossible to furnish
2021. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

every detail of the protests; (2) depicting crucial incidents during the pro-
test movement and explaining remote and proximate causes of them; and
(3) suggesting several characteristically distinguishable, though chrono-
logically overlapping, phases of the confrontation. However, this essay is not
15

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 16 Ben Siu-pun Ho

merely a presentation of facts; it also offers evaluations of the protests from

my perspective as a Hongkonger. Finally, this chapter projects a future trend
of the protests and the movement they have engendered, based on the under-
standing of the current situation.

PRESAGE: EROSION OF AUTONOMY AND THE

FEAR AND STRUGGLES OF HONG KONG PEOPLE

The causes of the protests can only be grasped by first considering Hong Kong
people’s complicated feelings about China in the past twenty years. Hong
Kong was a British colony for more than 150 years, and its sovereignty was
passed to China in 1997. Under the principle of “one country, two systems”
and a “high degree of autonomy,” the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s mini-consti-
tution, states that the socialist system in China shall not be practiced in the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) and that HKSAR “shall
safeguard the rights and freedoms of the residents” for fifty years. The confi-
dence of Hong Kong people in the Chinese government was severely shaken
in 2003, when the Hong Kong government proposed the national security bill
to the Legislative Council (LegCo) in February that year. Many Hong Kong
people were afraid that their freedom of expression would be undermined in
the name of national security by the government. The bill, together with other
dissatisfactions with the government, caused a demonstration of an estimated
five hundred thousand people on July 1 that year, the sixth anniversary of the
handover of Hong Kong. The bill was eventually withdrawn by the govern-
ment, and about one-and-a-half years later, the chief executive of the HKSAR,
Tung Chee-hwa, stepped down, citing a deterioration of his health.
Studies find that the Chinese government adjusted its policies toward Hong
Kong affairs after 2003.2 The first wave of the adjustment was the imple-
mentation of the Individual Visit Scheme in 2003, which allowed individual
mainland Chinese to visit Hong Kong to boost Hong Kong’s economy that
had been depressed by the outbreak of SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory
Syndrome). This scheme was a response to Hong Kong people’s political dis-
content in 2003,3 and since then, providing economic opportunities and ben-
efits has become the Chinese government’s main strategy to manage Hong
Kong’s unrest. Although Hong Kong’s political unrest temporarily calmed
down in the next five years, the 2008 global financial crisis created unease
and anxiety. The economic strategy was further challenged by the anti–Hong
Kong Express Rail Link movement that took place between mid-2009 and
early 2010, in which protesters asserted that certain nonmaterialistic values,
for instance, the maintenance of neighborhoods and democratic citizenship

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 17

of a local community, should not be sacrificed by the economic development

of the city.4 Many Hong Kong people began to identify the nondemocratic
political system as the root cause of numerous unjust incidents, and five
legislators seized the chance to initiate the Five Geographical Constituencies
Referendum Campaign in early 2010 to electorally reflect to both the Chinese
and Hong Kong governments the people’s desire for political reform.5
It seems that the more Hongkongers express their desire for autonomy, the
more tightly the Chinese government grips Hong Kong. This tightened con-
trol is evident since President Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Hong Kong
people were frightened again, and more than ten thousand of them rallied at
the government headquarters, when the Education Bureau proposed a school
curriculum of moral and national education in 2012. The government was
eventually forced to postpone the commencement of this educational policy
indefinitely. Civil society strengthened afterward, and its power exploded
into the well-known Umbrella Movement in 2014 that aimed at exerting
pressure on the Chinese government to initiate “true” universal suffrage in
Hong Kong as stated in the Basic Law.6 Unlike the previous movements,
the Umbrella Movement ended without substantial achievements, and since
then, a series of direct and indirect political interventions in Hong Kong by
the Chinese government have been observed. These include the abduction of
five staff members of a bookstore, Causeway Bay Books, by Chinese “special
forces”7 and pro-democracy legislators being disqualified.8 The Hong Kong
government’s efforts to serve two masters (the Chinese government and the
Hong Kong people)9 seemed to be impossible, and various forms of freedom,
human rights, and individual safety were devastated during these incidents.
In the meantime, Hong Kong people’s impression of China (not only the
Chinese government) continuously fell and reached its lowest point since
1997 in 2019.10 Calls by some members of the community supporting lo-
calism began to take root, and a small number of people advocated for the
independence of Hong Kong. One scholar noted the emergence of “one
country, two nationalisms” as the “one country, two systems” is doomed to
failure.11 The confrontation with the Chinese government and the desire for
the autonomy promised in the Basic Law incandesced in Hong Kong to an
unprecedented degree in 2019.

THE FIRST PHASE: THE GOVERNMENT’S TURN

OF A DEAF EAR AND THE PUBLIC’S CONNECTION

Only when we grasp Hong Kong people’s mixed feelings of fear of the Chi-
nese government, their determination to fight for the city’s autonomy, and

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 18 Ben Siu-pun Ho

their frustrations in the process in the above social context do we comprehend

why the 2019 Hong Kong protests were triggered. What sparked the protests
was the controversial handling of a murder case by the Hong Kong govern-
ment in which a young woman, Poon Hiu-wing, was murdered on February
17, 2018, in Taiwan by the suspect, her boyfriend Chan Tong-kai; both Poon
and Chan are from Hong Kong.
In February 2019, the Hong Kong government proposed that, in order to
handle the case, the “loopholes” of two ordinances regarding the fugitive
needed to be plugged. These amendments would allow fugitives to be sent
to China, Taiwan, and Macao and other legal jurisdictions with which Hong
Kong does not have an extradition agreement. Nevertheless, as explained by
the Hong Kong Bar Association (HKBA), there were no “loopholes,” but
rather the ordinances had been deliberately drafted as such to provide a neces-
sary firewall to ensure fair trials and protect human rights.12 The association
reiterated that the government “ought to explain why it considers that circum-
stances have changed since 1997 in terms of both the human rights record and
the criminal justice system in the Mainland to justify major changes now,”
and it counterproposed that “amendments might be made to other legislation
to ensure that the Taiwan case will be dealt with.”13 Several thousand mem-
bers of the legal sector also marched silently from the Court of Final Appeal
to the government headquarters on June 6.
Meanwhile, the Taiwan government lucidly stated that it would not ask for
Chan to be returned to Taiwan because otherwise it implied that it accepted
the Hong Kong government’s bill and it put Taiwanese people at risk of be-
ing seized by China.14 In other words, the amendments being proposed by the
Hong Kong government were in vain to handle the murder case. Neverthe-
less, Chief Executive Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor insisted on amending the
ordinances and regarded all the above worries and suggestions in LegCo as
“nonsense.”15 This reaction made people much more suspicious that the true
intent of the bill was to serve political purposes, and this time the fear of
losing not only Hong Kong’s autonomy and judicial independence but also
personal safety shaded gloomily over Hong Kong’s people as well as foreign
investors and businessmen who would be affected too.
The fear caused a huge amount of formal and informal signed petitions
and declarations against the bill, and this fear was so extensive and threaten-
ing that even some businessmen in the pro-Beijing camp openly expressed
their worries as they feared they could be apprehended for political reasons
or inadvertent business offenses. Both the United States and European Union
expressed concerns about the bill,16 and the Hong Kong government did make
several adjustments to it, but it failed to reduce the worries of the majority.
With numerous doubts and questions, the bill was carried to the Bills Com-

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 19

mittee of LegCo to be scrutinized in April, yet the committee was eventually

paralyzed by a fight (a bodily encounter as well as verbal debate) between
the pro-establishment and pro-democracy camps. The government decided in
May to bypass the committee and to force the bill to have its second reading
in the full chamber of the legislature. This move fueled the anger of Hong
Kong’s people. Several demonstrations against the bill had been organized
previously, and one of them in April had drawn more than one hundred thou-
sand participants. However, people’s boiling point had not yet been reached
then—not until June.

THE SECOND PHASE: THE FURIOUS BURST

AND DETERMINATION TO FIGHT AT ANY COST

Many Hong Kong people were pessimistic about the government’s change
of mind by the end of May, but they simultaneously recalled what they
had achieved in the 2003 demonstration. With an intricate feeling of fear,
determination, and worry about the next generation, protesters marched on
the streets on June 9 with the number of participants reaching more than
one million, according to the organizer, the Civil Human Rights Front.
The demonstration was the largest expression of people’s discontent in the
history of Hong Kong at that time. Although the demonstration caught the
attention of the international community, it was incapable of shaking the
government’s stance. Carrie Lam responded in a press conference the next
day that, out of “conscience” and “commitment to Hong Kong,” she had
no intention of withdrawing the legislation.17 Her response incensed many
Hongkongers. A number of shops and organizations went on strike on June
12—the day the bill was scheduled for its second reading in LegCo. People
gathered around the LegCo building, and some protesters occupied nearby
streets. Confrontation occurred between the protesters and the police, who
fired pepper spray, tear gas, and rubber bullets indiscriminately and without
warnings.18 Unarmed protesters and journalists were beaten and hurt, and the
police’s improper use of tear gas trapped people in one commercial building,
almost causing a stampede.19 The police’s abuse of force opened another
battle line that would become a major point of contention in the later phases
of the movement. At any rate, the government on the next day characterized
the June 12 protest as a “blatant organized riot,”20 which further inflamed
many others in the community.
Carrie Lam dramatically conceded to suspend the bill on June 15. Critics said
the large-scale protests and discontent in Hong Kong had, and would, highly
embarrass President Xi Jinping during the ongoing trade war with the United

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 20 Ben Siu-pun Ho

States and at the G20 summit to be held at the end of June, so Lam needed to
calm the community and minimize the unrest.21 Her decision nonetheless did
not satisfy protesters’ demands because they wanted her to “withdraw” rather
than “suspend” the bill so that their fear could be completely alleviated. One
protester, Leung Ling-kit, fell from a mall and died while expressing his sup-
port for the protesters’ demands on the same day Carrie Lam suspended the
bill. His death was the first fatality related to the protests, and grief and indig-
nation quickly spread among the people. The Civil Human Rights Front orga-
nized another demonstration on June 16 and listed five demands: withdraw the
bill, drop all charges against protesters, cancel the “riot” characterization of
the June 12 protest, investigate police brutality, and for Carrie Lam to resign.22
A historic number of more than two million participants joined the demonstra-
tion according to the organizer, not including demonstrations in various parts
of the world on the same day to show their solidarity.23 Other tactics besides
demonstrations employed by the protesters included crowdfunding an open
letter that appealed to the international community to stand with Hong Kong;
it appeared in more than ten leading newspapers around the world.24 However,
Hongkongers’ despair led to actions that shocked the world further on July 1.
Militant protesters25 stormed the LegCo building, sprayed graffiti, vandalized
paintings inside, and read aloud their manifesto to signify the dysfunction of
LegCo and poured out their wrath on the government. The astonishing scenes
greatly embarrassed Carrie Lam, who said on the same day that she would
humbly listen to the people in the banquet “celebrating” the twenty-second
anniversary of the establishment of the HKSAR.
Militant protesters’ fury on July 1 flooded LegCo and was out of the po-
lice’s control, who evaporated mysteriously after standing inside the LegCo
building for hours as protesters tried to smash the glass façade of the building
with a makeshift battering ram. There were rumors that the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) would be sent out of their barracks to suppress the
storm, but the Chinese government did not issue this order on this day nor
throughout the entire movement. It can be plausibly deduced that the Chinese
government preferred not to do so, for this move would be, in effect, an offi-
cial announcement of the end of one country, two systems. China, moreover,
would lose Hong Kong as an international financial center. (This consider-
ation, however, seems to be offset later by China’s determination to stabilize
Hong Kong amid its unrest as the protests proceeded.26) This restraint by the
Chinese government, on one hand, allowed the protesters to assess the “hole
card” in the Chinese government’s hand for bargaining; on the other hand, it
implicitly endorsed the Hong Kong police to crack down on the protesters. As
illustrated below, this endorsement has ruined the relationship between the
public and the police irrecoverably, at least in the foreseeable future.

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 21

THE THIRD PHASE: THE LAUNCH OF THE BATTLE

BETWEEN THE PROTESTERS AND THE POLICE

Carrie Lam emphasized that the bill was “dead” on July 9, but her an-
nouncement was incapable of erasing people’s fear and anger because they
demanded a legal term, “withdraw,” from her. Demonstrations appeared in
various districts every weekend after the historically large June 16 protest,
and some protesters blocked roads after nearly every demonstration. The
frequency of the demonstrations, the guerrilla-like tactics, the nimbleness
of the protesters, and their intelligent use of social media seemed to exhaust
the police. The police began to act abnormally, however. For instance, they
entered aggressively into New Town Plaza, a mall in Shatin, on July 14 to ar-
rest protesters. While the move shocked the people shopping in the mall, the
police were embarrassingly besieged by people who threw various objects at
them, and one policeman’s finger was cut off during the confrontation.
July 21 is one of the days of the movement that has most horrified Hong
Kong’s people, not because of the abnormal violent actions that occurred, but
because of the unusual inaction of the police. On July 20, information had
been circulated saying that triad members in Yuen Long, a northern district
of Hong Kong near the border with mainland China, would beat the protesters
on the next day. By that time, black clothes had become the “uniform” of the
protesters; and on the evening of July 21, several men in black were identi-
fied and beaten by a mob of men dressed in white. Later that night dozens of
thugs holding bamboo sticks got into the Yuen Long subway train station and
bloodily beat the passengers, passersby, and journalists indiscriminately, in-
cluding one pro-democracy LegCo member, Lam Cheuk-ting. Videos offered
by passersby show that two police constables walked away when they saw
the beatings, and pro-establishment legislator, Junius Kwan-yiu Ho, shook
hands with some of the thugs and praised them by giving them a thumbs-up.
Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) investigated this attack that created so
much terror through the footage of closed-circuit television (CCTV) given by
several shops and restaurants in Yuen Long. The CCTV recordings show that
the police did not stop and search the thugs even though hundreds of them, all
dressed in white, gathered on streets, and some policemen even chatted with
them.27 The police station in Yuen Long was closed, and the police explained
that it was due to “safety” reasons.28 Residents in Yuen Long were helpless,
and others watching this violence live were terrified. That night is still a
nightmare for all Hongkongers.
Mobs attacked protesters in other districts as well, for instance, in Tsuen
Wan after the July 21 incident. History tells us that authoritarian governments
have employed similar tactics in the past, using paramilitaries to do “dirty

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 22 Ben Siu-pun Ho

jobs.”29 Indeed, scholars have suggested that triad members may have been
paid to attack protesters during the Umbrella Movement.30 In the aftermath
of the Yuen Long incident, various conspiracy theories have maintained that
the police intended not to take action in order to make the public “recognize”
their significance. In any case, the public—rightly or wrongly—accused
the police of colluding with triad members during the July 21 incident, and
people’s animosity toward the police intensified.
The police, nevertheless, have received open support from the Hong Kong
and Macao Affairs Office of the State Council in Beijing for suppressing what
they call “riots” since July 29. This endorsement seems to have made the
police more fearless in their misbehaviors as illustrated through numerous ex-
amples:31 superiors have blindly supported colleagues by telling lies and spin-
ning stories to cover the wrongs of the frontline police;32 they have arbitrarily
arrested people, including journalists and social workers, with the number
of arrestees reaching more than eight thousand, a number that is expected to
increase if the protests continue;33 they have fired more than twenty thousand
rounds of tear gas and rubber bullets,34 reportedly causing an Indonesian jour-
nalist, a secondary school teacher, and a young girl to become blind in one
eye; they refused to wear their identification numbers on their uniforms for a
period of time, making it difficult for people to complain about the actions of
individual policemen; and while protesters referred to the police as “popo,” the
police called the protesters “cockroaches,” justifying this label by saying that
this insect is “full of vitality”35 (we know how dangerous this dehumanization
is if we reflect on the past in which the Jews were called “rats” by the Nazis).
Not only does conflict exist between the protesters and the police, but it is
also present within Hong Kong society as the community has become divided
into the yellow camp, which stands with the protesters, and the blue camp,
which supports the police and the government. The blue camp has organized
various assemblies supporting the police, and the government constantly
reminds the public that militant protesters have vandalized targeted shops
(i.e., those considered as belonging to the blue camp and pro-Beijing section
of society)36 and that it is the police’s obligation to restore social order. The
government has also sought to divide the yellow camp and gain the support
of the people, but this strategy seems to be futile, for various surveys indicate
that the majority of the public is extremely dissatisfied with the government
and the police.37 Meanwhile, the yellow camp has been highly solidified as
many peaceful protesters sympathize with, or even appreciate, what militant
protesters have been doing, for “the maximum impact could only be achieved
when peaceful assembly and confrontational actions work together.”38 While
militant protesters confronted the police by blocking roads, throwing pet-
rol bombs to drive them off, and directly beating them, peaceful protesters

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 23

played their role by participating in various peaceful and creative protests, for
instance, by posting Post-it notes with messages on the colorful Hong Kong
Lennon Walls,39 taking part in lunchtime protests,40 joining the noncoopera-
tive movement disrupting train and flight services,41 forming human chains
by holding hands in the “Hong Kong Way” campaign,42 and so on.

THE FOURTH PHASE:

IRRETRIEVABLE BREAKDOWN OF TRUST

Both the government and the protesters were increasingly aware of the impor-
tance of propaganda in this phase. While the police held a press conference
every day, protesters organized a “Citizen’s Press Conference” at times. The
latter was first held on August 6, and it invited people to correct or confront
what government officials had said. The Citizen’s Press Conferences signi-
fied the public’s dubious attitude toward the government as the trust between
the two parties collapsed after several incidents.
The first incident on August 31 occurred when the police entered a subway
train in Prince Edward station to arrest protesters, but it turned out that the po-
lice beat people who were most probably passengers and not protesters.43 The
police did not allow first aid personnel to enter the station right away, and the
Mass Transit Railway Corporation did not release the CCTV footage until the
High Court on March 18, 2020—nearly seven months later—ordered the cor-
poration to give it to a student who pursued a civil case against the police.44 At
any rate, there was enough time for rumors to spread in which it was believed
that several people were killed by the police and that the police covered up
their crimes in the incident on August 31. A reflection of this conviction was
that many people put white flowers and memorials outside the Prince Ed-
ward subway station, and these “memorials” have been appearing outside the
Prince Edward station on the 31st of almost every succeeding month.
The second incident was the death of a fifteen-year-old girl, Chan Yin-lam,
whose body was found naked in the sea by the police on September 22. The
police claimed that Chan, who was allegedly a competitive swimmer and a
regular participant in the protests, committed suicide. The public was not
convinced by the police’s assertions, and some suspect that Chan was killed
by the police while being arrested or detained and, in order to cover their
crime, Chan was said to have committed suicide. The public has demanded a
thorough investigation, but Chan’s body was cremated about two weeks after
the discovery of her body. A public ceremony of remembrance for Chan was
held, and such messages as “Strive for justice for you” and “Revenge for you”
were found at the ceremony.45

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 24 Ben Siu-pun Ho

The third incident also involved the death of a youth when a university
student, Chow Tsz-lok, was found unconscious in a car park during a protest
on November 4. Chow suffered a severe brain injury and passed away after
several days. Police said he fell from the third to the second floor, and vari-
ous causes of Chow’s death were suggested by the public, including the ob-
struction of an ambulance from assisting him by the police, which the police
denied. While the real cause of his death remains unclear, it is certain that it
is the first death on a site near the protests. The public mourns and insists that
the government and the police are responsible for Chow’s death.
By this time, many people in the community no longer trusted the gov-
ernment, which was reflected in several expressions of discontent. For
instance, thousands of civil servants gathered on August 2 to express their
dissatisfaction with Carrie Lam. Moreover, some protesters did not trust the
police to deal fairly with the conflicts, and it is tragic that these protesters
carried out siliao (illegal punishment) to people in the blue camp and off-
duty police officers.
In response, Carrie Lam attempted to gain back trust from the people by,
for example, announcing officially at last the “withdrawal” of the extradition
bill on September 4 and promising to hold a “community dialogue” to meet
citizens. Nevertheless, these reactions were not only too little and too late but
also exposed the government’s insincerity: the “community dialogue” only
took place once on September 26, and Carrie Lam has refused to establish an
independent commission of inquiry to investigate the actions of the govern-
ment, the police, and the protesters, which is largely a consensus demand
of the public.46 On the contrary, Carrie Lam has sought to remain strong by
invoking the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to prohibit people from cov-
ering up their faces in public gatherings.47 Meanwhile, the police tightened up
the approval of demonstrations and further incensed the public by shooting
two young protesters on October 1 and November 11. Fortunately, the two
youths did not die in the shootings, but people’s trust in the government and
the police had already ceased by then.

THE FIFTH PHASE: THE SPREAD OF THE CONFRONTATION

TO VARIOUS SOCIAL GROUPS AND SECTORS

Schools were swirled into these turbulent times when the new semester
started in September. About ten thousand students from two hundred second-
ary and tertiary institutions joined the class boycott on the first school day,48
and secondary school students in their uniforms formed human chains to
express their solidarity.49

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 25

However, it was only when several university campuses became battle-

fields between protesters and the police that the protests caught the attention
of the world again. At this time, the police claimed they had the right to enter
universities to arrest illegal protesters who blocked roads nearby and then fled
onto the campuses, and they stated that no campuses should be havens for
criminals, which enraged students and professors in the universities as they
believed the police presence on campuses would heavily disturb the academic
environment of universities. The university community maintained that the
police should be crystal clear about the details of the people they intended
to arrest and should communicate extensively with the universities. Students
and protesters blocked the entrances of campuses to prevent the police from
entering, and the police escalated the tension by firing numerous rounds of
tear gas and rubber bullets inside the campuses. The police even employed a
water-cannon truck around the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
The siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU), though, is the
most shocking confrontation among these battles. PolyU was sieged by the
police for about two weeks in November with hundreds of people trapped
inside and the logistics of food and daily necessities cut off. Many frightening
scenes appeared during this battle, including protesters attempting to crawl
through a narrow sewer tunnel to escape50 and climbing down long ropes
from a bridge to be taken away by volunteers driving motorbikes.51
The police’s provocative behavior, however, was not confined only toward
students but also toward religious groups. The police fired a blue-dyed liquid
from a water cannon outside the Kowloon Mosque in Tsim Sha Tsui on Oc-
tober 20, hurting several non-protesting Muslims and staining the gate of the
mosque. An Anglican church nearby was also fired at and stained. The police
said it was an accident and embarrassingly cleaned the gate of the mosque
that night. Carrie Lam also went to the mosque to apologize to the imam and
the Muslim community the next day.
The protests and the mood and sentiment in the community the police cre-
ated influenced another arena in Hong Kong: people’s voting power. Locally,
with the help of the protest milieu, the pro-democracy camp won about 85
percent of the seats in the district council election on November 24, taking
control of 17 of the 18 district councils. The result also increased resistance
to the Chinese government’s ability to manipulate the election results for the
upcoming chief executive in 2022 as about 117 seats reserved for district
councilors out of 1,200 seats on the Election Committee that selects the chief
executive will most likely come from the pro-democracy camp.52 Moreover,
the pro-democracy camp generally controls an additional 325 seats on the
Election Committee, meaning they will potentially hold more than one-third
of the votes that could sway the outcome.

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 26 Ben Siu-pun Ho

Internationally, after witnessing the aggravation of the situation in Hong

Kong and the manifestation of Hongkongers’ voting power in the district
council elections, the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate passed the
Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, and it was signed by
President Donald Trump on November 27. The law requires an annual report
by the U.S. State Department to Congress assessing the autonomy of Hong
Kong that could affect Hong Kong’s trading status with the United States
and imposes sanctions on those responsible for human rights violations by
freezing their assets in the United States and denying them visas or revoking
any visas they currently hold. In short, the law sends a warning to both the
Chinese and Hong Kong governments with the intent to cause them to recon-
sider how they deal with the unrest in Hong Kong.53
While the power of the protesters spread to various social groups and sec-
tors, so did the government’s power of suppression. As an example, the Edu-
cation Bureau has been applying pressure on school principals and teachers
to forsake support for the protests.54 In addition, the police froze the money in
the bank account of a fundraiser for the protests, the Spark Alliance, saying it
is suspected of engaging in “money laundering,”55 and the police complained
about RTHK for mocking them in one of the public broadcaster’s programs,
causing the program to be halted in the subsequent season.56 In any case, the
government seems to be intervening in various arenas in order to produce a
“chilling effect” on the public.
The festive atmosphere of the holidays in December did not relieve the
tension between the protesters and the police as physical confrontations and
demonstrations continued to take place on Christmas and New Year’s Day.
The protests faced an obstacle, though, at the end of January 2020 in the form
of the outbreak and spread of the coronavirus, COVID-19, that originated in
Wuhan, China. While the fear of infection largely has reduced the number
and size of demonstrations, it seems that the protests have not ceased but have
become more diverse, more invisible, and more fluid as they are assimilated
more into the fabric of people’s daily lives—one reason why the protests are
called a “Water Revolution.”57

AN EVALUATION OF THE LASTING MOVEMENT:

FACTOR OF “FIRE TETRAHEDRON”

It is quite unusual for a protest movement to continue for more than six
months. Obviously, there were factors maintaining the momentum of the pro-
tests. Throughout the phases delineated above, we can observe that the gov-
ernment, led by Carrie Lam, continuously fueled the movement. Carrie Lam

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 27

had chances to calm the unrest or just let it die out, but she missed all these
opportunities and even further combusted people’s anger. For instance, by
the time she announced the withdrawal of the bill, people’s wrath had already
extended to the police, and her introduction of the anti-mask ban and refusal
to form an independent commission of inquiry prolonged people’s detestation
toward her. In any case, Carrie Lam could not respond to the protests in this
manner without support from others.
Although the Chinese government received pressure from other countries,
it did not want to compromise in order to maintain its authoritarian image,
especially toward Hong Kong’s people. For example, it has not asked for the
resignation of Carrie Lam nor even one relevant politically appointed official
of the Hong Kong government since the crisis began in June 2019. President
Xi Jinping even openly expressed support for Carrie Lam in December 2019.
While the Chinese government knows very well that Carrie Lam’s govern-
ment has no more ability to deal with the unrest and no more credibility with
the public, it has not sent out the army to assist and suppress the protests
because the Chinese government prefers not to contend with the devastating
consequences of such a response, as I have mentioned previously.
Instead, the Chinese government has left it to Carrie Lam to pick up the
pieces of the political crisis by herself. The Chinese government’s reaction,
however, indirectly endorses the Hong Kong police to take up the task. Carrie
Lam at an unofficial occasion expressed that, apart from the thirty thousand
police officers, she politically has nothing more to offer to resolve the crisis.58
The police, with support from the Chinese government and the perception
that Carrie Lam needs to depend on them, thus gradually became fearless in
regard to their misbehaviors, which continuously outrages the public. While
Hong Kong has not yet been internationally recognized as a police state, it
has been described as a “failed state” as one interpretation of the situation in
Hong Kong, for the Hong Kong government has almost no governance effi-
ciency or efficacy.59 The government led by Carrie Lam, the Chinese govern-
ment, and the Hong Kong police thus constitute a “Fire Triangle,” a model
which I analogically adopt from fire science.60 It is the subtle interactions
between these three parties in this Fire Triangle that has fueled the protests to
burn for an unusually long period of time.
However, scientists later found that the exothermic chemical chain reac-
tion in the material is another factor for combustion, and thus, a model of
“Fire Tetrahedron” is suggested. Analogically, the protests were sustainably
combusting also by the fourth factor: the unexpected and persistent “chain-
ing” among protesters. Social movements in Hong Kong in the past few years
were usually divided internally because of disputes on the various strategies
employed; for instance, protesters argued whether peaceful demonstrations

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 28 Ben Siu-pun Ho

or militant vandalization should be used. Nevertheless, the strategy of “no

splitting, no severing of ties, and no snitching” (不分化、不割席、不篤灰)
is embraced by both peaceful and militant protesters in the anti–extradition
bill movement. The solidarity is formed partly because, after striving for
more than twenty years, protesters became desperate and perceived that it
is “game over” for the fight for the autonomy of Hong Kong if the extradi-
tion bill is enacted. The fear and the power to overcome it are so enormous
that they bind themselves together. In addition, protesters have experienced
the effectiveness of a “division of labor”—a strategy of “brothers climb a
mountain together, each has to make his own effort” (兄弟爬山，各自努力).
Peaceful protesters have witnessed how the storm brought about by militant
protesters caused the government to concede to a certain degree, and peace-
ful protesters have played their roles by participating in various campaigns to
arouse international attention. The entire movement began at the right time
as the G20 summit and the trade war between China and the United States
were taking place, and peaceful protesters caught this timing, stepped out to
demonstrate, and explained the situation of Hong Kong to various countries,
for example, attending international meetings for lobbying61 and spreading
the so-called anthem “Glory to Hong Kong” worldwide by translating the
lyrics into various languages.62 The government has tried hard to steer public
opinion by blaming the extremists, like the strategy of the colonial govern-
ment during the 1967 riots, but it has not been successful because it cannot
attain the support of the majority of the community.63

WHAT’S NEXT?: PROVOCATIVE GOVERNMENT

AND TRANSFORMATIVE PROTESTS

The government’s policies on preventing the spread of COVID-19 are per-

ceived by the public as ineffective and even threatening people’s health. A
survey published in February 2020 showed that the satisfaction and trust in
the government had reached the lowest level since the HKSAR was estab-
lished.64 Carrie Lam is deemed by the public to be merely a servant of the
Chinese government and has betrayed Hong Kong’s own interests, which
became even more salient after she announced Hong Kong would not close
all border crossings with mainland China when cases of COVID-19 were
exponentially increasing and mainland people were flooding into Hong Kong
around the end of January 2020 and with her complete obedience to China
regarding the implementation of the national security law for Hong Kong.
Consequently, many Hongkongers believe that they must save their com-
munity by themselves. They have established and are maintaining liaison

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 29

with governments and organizations in other countries and have used creative
materials, combined with people’s dissatisfaction with the government’s
policies on prevention of the disease, to remind people “never forget why you
started” (毋忘初心). In addition, more people are aware of the importance of
their votes, especially after the pro-democracy camp’s victory in the district
council election. The number of trade unions is also rapidly proliferating as
a result of the protest movement, resulting in a significant increase of the
number of voters in various sectors of functional constituencies. Meanwhile,
a record 401,900 citizens have registered to vote in the past year—a 7.8 per-
cent increase of new registered voters from about 4.13 million voters in 2019
(or 18 percent more voters than in the previous LegCo election in 2016).65 It
seemed that people were looking forward to voting out the pro-establishment
candidates in the LegCo election, but the election was postponed.66
Furthermore, it seems that protesters have been assimilating the protest
into their daily lives. Certain shops and restaurants have been classified as
being affiliated with either the yellow or blue camp. While the blue establish-
ments are boycotted by the protesters, patronage of the yellow businesses is
encouraged. The so-called yellow economic circle is forming in which pro-
testers are weaponizing their purchasing power.67 In sum, it can be foreseen
that, while protesters’ direct confrontations with the police will continue but
less frequently due to the government’s restriction on the size of groups to
prevent the spread of COVID-19 and people’s concern about how the na-
tional security law will be enforced in Hong Kong, the form and scope of the
protests are diversifying and multiplying. The protest movement is penetrat-
ing various social groups and sectors, as noted in the last phase of the protest
movement explicated earlier. As a result, Hong Kong’s people are experienc-
ing the transformative power of the protests in their daily lives.
However, although the assimilation of the protests into the fabric of ev-
eryday life increases the width and depth of the movement, it is not without
difficulties and risks, for the division in society may become sharpened, and
associating many aspects of daily life with political stances may overlook the
ambiguities of reality.68 In any case, people in the yellow camp will either
choose to emigrate as they fear or cannot bear anymore both the Chinese and
Hong Kong governments, or they will remain with a determination to fight
and protect their rights. The latter will try to employ whatever means they
can to create difficulties for the government and to seek their democratic
goals. Moreover, like the civic power accumulated during the post–Umbrella
Movement period that then exploded into the 2019 protests, the post-2019
protest period may be another preparation time for the next round of political
eruptions in the community if both the Chinese and Hong Kong governments
do not positively respond to people’s demands.

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 30 Ben Siu-pun Ho

Some critics compare Hong Kong in 2019 with West Berlin in the Cold
War.69 China’s system and culture of authoritarian power have spread exten-
sively in recent years, causing many Western countries to feel threatened.
With the promises of “one country, two systems” and a “high degree of
autonomy,” Hong Kong is at the frontline of the battle between totalitarian
China and democratic Western society. Hong Kong people are witnessing
not only political clashes but conflicts of value systems. The imposition of
the national security law for Hong Kong by China’s legislature, regardless
of international condemnations and warnings, nakedly exposes the Chinese
government’s intolerance of others’ voices and people’s freedom. The future
of the protests depends on the solidarity not merely of Hong Kong’s protest-
ers but also of those who cherish the values of human rights, freedom, and
the principle of democracy.

NOTES

1. SCMP Reporters, “National Security Law: Tough New Reality for Hong Kong
as Offenders Face Maximum Sentence of Life in Jail,” South China Morning Post,
June 30, 2020, [Link]/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3091241/national
-security-law-chinese-president-xi-jinping-signs?fbclid=IwAR3CwWJqzwHpQTr1P
5d4nVRMbG8R_s-A-TzPQrbo8B2mv0hNcvQz9X0C5Go.
2. Tai-lok Lui, Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep, “Introduction: The Long
Transition,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Hong Kong, ed. Tai-lok Lui,
Stephen W. K. Chiu, and Ray Yep (New York: Routledge, 2019), 25.
3. Ngok Ma, “The Rise of ‘Anti-China’ Sentiments in Hong Kong and the 2012
Legislative Council Elections,” China Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 45.
4. This is a protest against the proposed Hong Kong section of the Guangzhou-
Shenzhen-Hong Kong Express Rail Link, a high-speed railway that would link Hong
Kong with mainland China’s high-speed rail network. Post-materialistic ideologies
and grievances toward upward mobility are observed in various phases of this social
movement.
5. Five legislators from the League of Social Democrats and Civic Party resigned
to force the Legislative Council by-election to become a referendum on universal
suffrage. See Michael F. Martin, Prospects for Democracy in Hong Kong: The 2012
Election Reforms (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1,
2011), [Link]/sgp/crs/row/[Link].
6. Article 45 of the Basic Law stipulates for “the selection of the Chief Executive
by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating com-
mittee in accordance with democratic procedures”; see “Full Text of the Constitu-
tion and Basic Law,” [Link]/en/basiclawtext/. However, the “8.31”
decision by the Chinese government stated that voters can only choose from two to
three candidates who will be selected by a 1,200-person nomination committee. The
nomination committee is considered by many as not being “broadly representative”

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 31

and the universal suffrage not “true”; see “Hong Kong’s Democracy Debate,” BBC
News, June 18, 2015, [Link]/news/world-asia-china-27921954.
7. Elizabeth Joseph and Katie Hunt, “Missing Hong Kong Bookseller: I
Was Kidnapped by Chinese ‘Special Forces,’” CNN, June 16, 2016, [Link].
com/2016/06/16/asia/china-hong-kong-booksellers/[Link].
8. Joshua Berlinger and James Griffiths, “4 Hong Kong Lawmakers Disquali-
fied, Fueling Worries about Beijing’s Influence,” CNN, July 14, 2017, [Link].
com/2017/07/14/asia/hong-kong-lawmakers-disqualified/[Link].
9. Kit Poon, The Political Future of Hong Kong: Democracy within Commu-
nist China (New York: Routledge, 2008), 46–69. The chief executive, Carrie Lam,
is aware clearly of this task; see “Exclusive: The Chief Executive ‘Has to Serve
Two Masters’—HK Leader Carrie Lam—Full Transcript,” Reuters, September 12,
2019, [Link]/article/us-hongkong-protests-lam-transcript-excl/exclusive
-the-chief-executive-has-to-serve-two-masters-hk-leader-carrie-lam-full-transcript
-idUSKCN1VX0P7. Nevertheless, various policies show that she fails to accomplish
the task as I have illustrated in this chapter.
10. This sentiment is reflected in a survey on how Hong Kong people perceived
their ethnic identity and national pride. For the details of this survey, see Public Opin-
ion Program, the University of Hong Kong, “HKU POP Final Farewell: Rift Widens
Between Chinese and Hongkong Identities, National Pride Plunges to One in Four,”
June 27, 2019, [Link]/english/release/[Link].
11. Brian Fong argues that Hong Kong is “an emerging case of peripheral nation-
alism under a centralizing state. . . . Beijing’s incorporation strategies toward Hong
Kong in recent years have resulted in waves of countermobilization, shaping the
dynamics of mainland-Hong Kong relations into a clash of nationalisms—the clash
of the state-building nationalism of mainland China and the peripheral nationalism
of Hong Kong. It is crystal clear that the OCTS [One Country, Two Systems] model
is nearing a make-or-break moment”; see Brian C. H. Fong, “One Country, Two
Nationalisms: Center-Periphery Relations between Mainland China and Hong Kong,
1997–2016,” Modern China 43, no. 5 (September 2017): 524.
12. Hong Kong Bar Association, A Brief Guide to Issues Arising from the Fugitive
Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amend-
ment) Bill 2019 (“the Bill”), June 6, 2019, 2–6.
13. Hong Kong Bar Association, Additional Observations of the Hong Kong Bar
Association (“HKBA”) on the HKSAR Government’s Proposed Further Changes to
the Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation
(Amendment) Bill 2019, June 6, 2019, 1.
14. “Taiwan Won’t Ask for Murder Suspect if Hong Kong Passes ‘Politically Mo-
tivated’ Extradition Law,” Hong Kong Free Press, May 10, 2019, [Link]
.com/2019/05/10/taiwan-wont-ask-murder-suspect-hong-kong-passes-politically
-motivated-extradition-law/.
15. Holmes Chan, “In Pictures: Democrats Ejected From Legislative Chamber
After Accusing Chief Exec. Carrie Lam of Lying Over Extradition Law,” Hong Kong
Free Press, May 9, 2019, [Link]/2019/05/09/pictures-hong-kong
-democrats-ejected-legislative-chamber-accusing-chief-exec-carrie-lam-lying/.

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 32 Ben Siu-pun Ho

16. The U.S. Department of State said it was “closely monitoring proposed amend-
ments to Hong Kong’s Fugitive Ordinance law”; see U.S. Department of State, “Hong
Kong: 2014 Occupy Movement Cases and Fugitive Ordinance Law,” U.S. Consulate
General Hong Kong & Macau, April 25, 2019, [Link]/n-2019042501/.
Eleven representatives of the European Union met Carrie Lam to express their con-
cerns; see Tony Cheung, Gary Cheung, Sum Lok-kei, and Alvin Lum, “11 EU Rep-
resentatives Meet Hong Kong Leader Carrie Lam to Protest Against Controversial
Extradition Bill as Government Gathers 100 Officials to Build United Front,” South
China Morning Post, May 24, 2019, [Link]/news/hong-kong/politics/ar-
ticle/3011627/hong-kong-government-gathers-100-officials-meeting-build.
17. Austin Ramzy, “Hong Kong Leader, Carrie Lam, Says She Won’t Back Down
on Extradition Bill,” New York Times, June 10, 2019, [Link]/2019/06/10/
world/asia/[Link]?_ga=2.85721945.174350453
.1581931691-810644880.1580280612.
18. For how the police cracked down on the people on that day, see 羅健熙 ，〈香
港警察暴力鎮壓和平示威者(合集) 〉[Law Kin-hei, “Hong Kong Police crack down
peaceful protesters (compilation)”], YouTube, June 14, 2019, [Link]/
watch?v=34oZjD8c5z4.
19. The New York Times has done a good visual investigation on the police’s
excessive force on that day; see New York Times, “Did Hong Kong Police Abuse
Protesters? What the Videos Show: Visual Investigations,” YouTube, July 15, 2019,
[Link]/watch?v=gHfWuUhrKQg.
20. “Carrie Lam Condemns ‘Life-Threatening Rioting,’” RTHK, June 12, 2019,
[Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
21. James Pomfret, Greg Torode, and Ben Blanchard, “Brusque to Bruised: Hong
Kong’s Lam Caves to Pressure on Extradition Bill,” Reuters, June 16, 2019, www
.[Link]/article/us-hongkong-extradition-lam-analysis/brusque-to-bruised-hong
-kongs-lam-caves-to-pressure-on-extradition-bill-idUSKCN1TG0HS.
22. Some of the contents of these demands varied after June 16. While the with-
drawal of the bill, not characterizing the protests as a “riot,” and amnesty for arrested
protesters remained unchanged, the demand of investigating the police was refined as
setting up an independent commission of inquiry into police brutality. The demand
of the resignation of Carrie Lam was replaced by the implementation of genuine uni-
versal suffrage. A sixth demand, restructuring the police force, was raised, especially
after Carrie Lam officially withdrew the bill and the public witnessed the July 21
incident and the performance of the police afterward. Protesters demanded all these
concessions, “not one less.”
23. Nectar Gan, Xinyan Yu, and Laura Ma, “Hong Kong Protests Go Global as
Marchers Take to Streets in US, Europe and Australia in Show of Solidarity,” South
China Morning Post, June 17, 2019, [Link]/news/hong-kong/politics/ar
ticle/3014771/hong-kong-protests-go-global-marchers-take-streets-us.
24. Jennifer Creery, “‘Stand With Hong Kong’: G20 Appeal Over Extradition
Law Crisis Appears in Over 10 Int’l Newspapers,” Hong Kong Free Press, June 28,
2019, [Link]/2019/06/28/stand-hong-kong-g20-appeal-extradition
-law-crisis-appears-10-intl-newspapers/.

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 33

25. In this essay, I employ “militant protesters” rather than “radical protesters”
as many people do to designate protesters who aggressively combat the government
and to differentiate them from “peaceful protesters” because, from my point of view,
peaceful protesters are also radical in terms of their thoughts and determination.
26. It seems that the Chinese government’s limit of tolerance was reached as the
social movement continued; and in 2020, it wagered the status of Hong Kong as an
international financial center, not through the dispatch of the PLA, but through the in-
troduction of the national security law. The Chinese parliament approved the national
security law for Hong Kong at the end of May that year in a hasty manner when other
countries were busy handling the COVID-19 pandemic.
27. RTHK, “Hong Kong Connection: 721 Yuen Long Nightmare,” YouTube,
October 4, 2019, [Link]/watch?v=zpkFRsSo30o. In addition to RTHK,
the New York Times and British Broadcasting Company News (BBC News) have also
made investigations of this incident; see New York Times, “When a Mob Attacked
Protesters in Hong Kong, the Police Walked Away: Visual Investigations,” YouTube,
July 30, 2019, [Link]/watch?v=fDtM3dEJdHo; and Helier Cheung and
Christopher Giles, “Hong Kong Protests: Were Triads Involved in the Attacks?” BBC
News, July 22, 2019, [Link]/news/world-asia-china-49071502.
28. Hong Kong Free Press, “Hong Kong Police Chief: Station Gates Closed
‘for Safety’ in Yuen Long,” YouTube, July 22, 2019, [Link]/watch?v=
mtxqDq6sE24.
29. Timothy Snyder, On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century
(New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2017), 42–46.
30. Varese Federico and Rebecca W. Y. Wong, “Resurgent Triads? Democratic
Mobilization and Organized Crime in Hong Kong,” Australian & New Zealand Jour-
nal of Criminology 51, no. 1 (March 2018): 23–39.
31. The following are only a few examples of the Hong Kong police’s misbehav-
iors. For more illustrations, see “Police Misconduct,” Hong Kong Democratic Move-
ment 2019, [Link]/en/police-timeline/.
32. One notorious example is of one pastor kneeling and begging a policeman in
Tsuen Wan not to shoot the people, but the policeman kicked away the pastor; and
in a subsequent press conference, a chief superintendent said the policeman was not
“kicking away” the pastor but was “using a leg to push away” the pastor and that it
was a “natural reaction”; see Holmes Chan, “‘Natural Reaction’ for Gun-Wielding
Officer to Kick Kneeling Man, Hong Kong Police Say,” Hong Kong Free Press,
August 26, 2019, [Link]/2019/08/26/natural-reaction-gun-wielding
-officer-kick-kneeling-man-hong-kong-police-say/. Another example involves the
police stating that one volunteer helper was an “object”; see Daniel Victor and Elaine
Yu, “A Man or a ‘Yellow Object’? Hong Kong Police Dispute Assault Allegations,”
New York Times, September 24, 2019, [Link]/2019/09/24/world/asia/
[Link]. These types of dehumanizing behaviors, the modera-
tion of grave events, and beautifying the unprofessional actions of the police shocked
many journalists and the public.
33. “Hong Kong Protests: Police Watchdog Clears Officers over Crackdown,”
BBC News, May 15, 2020, [Link]/news/world-asia-china-52680094.

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34. “Anti-government Protests Enter Their Seventh Month,” RTHK, December 9,

2019, [Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
35. “Cockroach Tag a Term of Endearment: Police,” RTHK, December 23, 2019,
[Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
36. Various tactics of vandalization are employed by protesters in which looting
and stealing are discouraged. For more details about militant protesters’ tactics, see
Kris Cheng, “Explainer: ‘Renovation,’ ‘Decoration’ and ‘Fire Magic’—The Busi-
nesses Targeted by Hong Kong’s Hit-and-Run Protesters,” Hong Kong Free Press,
October 9, 2019. [Link]/2019/10/09/explainer-renovation-decora
tion-fire-magic-businesses-targeted-hong-kongs-hit-run-protesters/.
37. Refer to two reports about these surveys: Francis L. F. Lee, “Our Research in
Hong Kong Reveals What People Really Think of the Protesters—and the Police,”
Independent, October 16, 2019, [Link]/voices/hong-kong-protests
-[Link]; and Kris Cheng,
“Hong Kong Police Receive Lowest Public Satisfaction Rating Among All Disciplin-
ary Forces—Survey,” Hong Kong Free Press, December 7, 2019, [Link]
.com/2019/12/07/hong-kong-police-receive-lowest-public-satisfaction-rating-among
-disciplinary-forces-survey/.
38. Francis L. F. Lee, Gary Tang, Samson Yuen, and Edmund W. Cheng, Onsite
Survey Findings in Hong Kong’s Anti-Extradition Bill Protests (Hong Kong: Centre
for Communication and Public Opinion Survey, the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, August 2019), 3, [Link]/ccpos/en/pdf/ENG_antielab%20sur
vey%20public%20report%[Link].
39. Inspired by the Lennon Wall in Prague, the Hong Kong Lennon Wall located
at the Central Government Complex during the Umbrella Movement first caught
the public’s attention. Lennon Walls appeared in various districts during the 2019
Hong Kong protests with the one in Tai Po considered the most magnificent. For a
glimpse of the Hong Kong Lennon Wall, see South China Morning Post, “‘Lennon
Walls’ Spring Up Across Hong Kong,” YouTube, July 10, 2019, [Link]/
watch?v=PAQ220gWVR4. Most Lennon Walls are, nevertheless, being cleared by
the government.
40. Sarah Wu, “Hong Kong Office Workers Begin Week of Lunchtime Protests,”
Reuters, December 2, 2019, [Link]/article/us-hongkong-protests/hong
-kong-office-workers-begin-week-of-lunchtime-protests-idUSKBN1Y60C8.
41. Lily Kuo, Christy Choi, and Kate Lyons, “Hong Kong Brought to a Stand-
still as City-wide Strikes and Protests Hit,” The Guardian, August 5, 2019, www
.[Link]/world/2019/aug/05/hong-kong-brought-to-a-standstill-as-city-wide
-strikes-and-protests-hit.
42. Andrius Sytas, “Lithuanian Human Chain Links Anti-soviet and Hong Kong
Protesters,” Reuters, August 24, 2019, [Link]/article/us-ww2-anniversary
-baltics/lithuanian-human-chain-links-anti-soviet-and-hong-kong-protesters-idUSKC
N1VD2C7.
43. The scene was recorded by a passerby; see BBC News, “Hong Kong Police
Storm Metro System After Protests—BBC News,” YouTube, September 1, 2019,
[Link]/watch?v=iejjwdxQDYw. RTHK did an investigation on this inci-

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 35

dent; see RTHK, “Hong Kong Connection: Minimal Force?” YouTube, November 1,
2019, [Link]/watch?v=JUAQ3XhTtpM.
44. “MTR Ordered to Give Student CCTV from August 31,” RTHK, March 18,
2020, [Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
45. Eyepress TV, 〈數百名市民悼念疑「被自殺」示威學生陳彥霖〉[Hun-
dreds of people mourned suspected ‘suicided’ protester, Chan Yin-lam], YouTube,
October 11, 2019, [Link]/watch?v=iougPnstUu0.
46. The existing Independent Police Complaints Council (IPCC) is considered as
having less investigative power; see Hong Kong Bar Association, “On the events at
Legislative Council on 1 July 2019,” July 5, 2019; also Holmes Chan, “Explainer:
Hong Kong’s Five Demands—An Independent Investigation into Police Behavior,”
Hong Kong Free Press, December 24, 2019, [Link]/2019/12/24/ex
plainer-hong-kongs-five-demands-independent-investigation-police-behaviour/. This
is a reason why the public demands the establishment of an independent commis-
sion of inquiry into the police’s performance during the protests. Indeed, the report
released by the IPCC in mid-May 2020 is considered by many observers as impotent
and ineffective in correcting the police’s misbehavior; see Tom Grundy, Jennifer
Creery, Kelly Ho, and Rachel Wong, “Hong Kong Police Watchdog Clears Force of
Misconduct Citing Online ‘Propaganda,’ But Says ‘Room for Improvement,’” Hong
Kong Free Press, May 15, 2020, [Link]/2020/05/15/in-full-hong-kong
-police-watchdog-releases-report-on-protest-conduct-but-no-evidence-of-yuen-long
-mob-attack-collusion/.
47. Alan Leong Kah-kit, “Hong Kong’s Mask Ban Reveals Carrie Lam’s True
Face,” New York Times, October 7, 2019, [Link]/2019/10/07/opinion/
[Link]. The government insists on appealing the ruling over
the ban even though the court has considered it unconstitutional and the outbreak of
COVID-19 occurred; see “Gov’t Appeal Starts Over Court Mask Ban Blow,” RTHK,
January 9, 2020, [Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
48. “Students Boycott Classes on the First Day of the School Year in Hong Kong’s
Latest Democracy Protest,” Time, September 1, 2019, [Link]/5666731/hong-kong
-student-strike-class-boycott-protest/.
49. Jessie Pang, “Hong Kong Children Form Chains of Protest as Economic
Worries Grow,” Reuters, September 9, 2019, [Link]/article/us-hongkong
-protests/hong-kong-children-form-chains-of-protest-as-economic-worries-grow
-idUSKCN1VU03P.
50. “Hong Kong Polytechnic University: Protesters Attempt Sewer Escapes,”
BBC News, November 20, 2019, [Link]/news/world-asia-china-50486757.
51. The scene was recorded by several media companies, for example, South
China Morning Post, “Ropes and Motorbikes Used to Escape Hong Kong Polytech-
nic University Campus Siege,” YouTube, November 18, 2019, [Link]/
watch?v=oYS0pzUt24I.
52. Benny Tai Yiu-ting, “This Was Hong Kong’s Most Important Election Ever,”
New York Times, November 25, 2019, [Link]/2019/11/25/opinion/hong
-[Link].

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 36 Ben Siu-pun Ho

53. Paul LeBlanc and Steven Jiang, “Trump Signs Hong Kong Human Rights Act
as China Blasts ‘Plainly Bullying Behavior,’” CNN, November 28, 2019, edition.
[Link]/2019/11/27/politics/trump-hong-kong-human-right-democracy/[Link].
54. “Principals Who Back Problem Teachers Can Be Sacked,” RTHK, December
29, 2019, [Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
55. Joshua Berlinger, “Hong Kong Police Say They Froze $9 Million Meant for
Protesters,” CNN, December 20, 2019, [Link]/2019/12/20/asia/hong-kong
-protests-money-frozen-intl-hnk/[Link].
56. “RTHK Apologises, Will Halt Production of ‘Headliner,’” RTHK, May 19,
2020, [Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
57. “Water” implies flexibility and resilience, an idea that derives from Bruce
Lee, the kung-fu movie star. In a TV interview in 1971, he said: “Be formless, shape-
less—like water. Now you put water in a cup, it becomes the cup. You put water
into a bottle, it becomes the bottle. You put it in a teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now
water can flow, or it can crash. Be water, my friend.” The interview can be found on
YouTube: Calpeper Minutemen, “Bruce Lee Interview (Pierre Berton Show, 1971),”
YouTube, August 26, 2018, [Link]/watch?v=uk1lzkH-e4U.
58. “Apart from the Police, I Have Nothing: CE,” RTHK, September 13, 2019,
[Link]/rthk/en/component/k2/[Link].
59. Clara Ferreira Marques, “Hong Kong Is Showing Symptoms of a Failed State,”
Bloomberg, February 9, 2020, [Link]/opinion/articles/2020-02-09/
coronavirus-hong-kong-shows-symptoms-of-a-failed-state.
60. The Fire Triangle maintains that three elements—heat, fuel, and oxygen—are
all needed for a fire to ignite. If any one of the three is removed, the fire will not burn.
61. Examples are lobbying in a meeting of the United Nations and at the United
States’ Congressional-Executive Commission on China; see Joshua Berlinger, “China
Interrupts Hong Kong Pop Star During UN Speech,” CNN, July 9, 2019, [Link]
.com/2019/07/08/asia/denise-ho-un-intl-hnk/[Link]; and “Hong Kong Activists
Denise Ho and Joshua Wong Testify at US Congressional Hearing on Protests,” Hong
Kong Free Press, September 17, 2019, [Link]/2019/09/17/live-hong
-kong-activists-denise-ho-joshua-wong-testify-us-congressional-hearing-protests/.
62. A stirring orchestral version with English subtitles can be found on YouTube:
Wiring HK, “Glory to Hong Kong, Orchestra chorus version,” YouTube, September
11, 2019, [Link]/watch?v=ulera9c18F0.
63. Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Asian Affairs
50, no. 4 (October 2019): 478.
64. Hong Kong Public Opinion Program (HKPOP), “POP Releases Popularity of
CE and SAR Government, Trust and Confidence Indicators and Public Sentiment
Index,” Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute, February 25, 2020, [Link]
.hk/press-release/2020/20200225-eng.
65. Ng Kang-chung and Lilian Cheng, “Record 401,900 Hongkongers Sign Up
to Vote Following Opposition Campaign to Win Seats in September’s Legislative
Council Election,” South China Morning Post, June 1, 2020, [Link]/news/
hong-kong/politics/article/3087061/record-401900-Hongkongers-sign-vote-follow
ing-opposition.

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 A Critical Review of Events during the Hong Kong Protests of 2019 37

66. Sarah Wu, “Hong Kong Workers Flock to Labor Unions as New Protest Tactic,”
Reuters, January 10, 2020, [Link]/article/us-hongkong-protests-unions/
hong-kong-workers-flock-to-labor-unions-as-new-protest-tactic-idUSKBN1Z9007.
67. Verna Yu, “From Loo Roll to Dumplings: Hong Kong Protesters Weapon-
ize Purchasing Power,” The Guardian, January 23, 2020, [Link]/
world/2020/jan/23/from-loo-roll-to-dumplings-hong-kong-protesters-weaponise-pur
chasing-power.
68. For examples of difficulties faced by shops and restaurants, see RTHK, “Hong
Kong Connection: Yellow Blue Consumers Battle,” YouTube, January 24, 2020,
[Link]/watch?v=rlUJ_fFh-3U.
69. Laignee Barron, “Hong Kong Is a Rebel Enclave in a Sea of Totalitarianism.
Welcome to the New West Berlin,” Time, June 28, 2019, [Link]/5616804/hong
-kong-cold-war-battleground-us-china/.

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