CHAPTER V MANAGING PROCESS INNOVATIONS

Introduction
A process is simply a set of activities designed to produce a specified output for a particular customer or market. A process orientation implies an emphasis on how work is done rather than on what work is done. Traditionally, R&D activities have focused more on product innovations. But in many industries, especially in services, product and process innovations go together. Moreover, by correctly viewing a process as a group of activities that create value for the customer, there is significant potential for changing the rules of the games. Most benchmarking and best practices initiatives, launched by well-managed companies are the result of a strong process orientation. A careful examination of existing processes will throw up opportunities to innovate. Take the case of manufacturing firms. The various processes employed include product development, customer acquisition, procurement, manufacturing, logistics and after sales service. Besides, there are various supporting processes like information management, human resources management and planning. Process innovation implies creating a significant improvement in one or more of these processes. Process innovation must not be confused with process improvement which is incremental in nature. Process improvements take the existing process as given, but process innovations question the basic assumptions. Michael Hammer1 uses the term operational innovation which for all practical purposes refers to process innovation. As he puts it, Operational innovation should not be confused with operational improvement or operational excellence. These terms refer to achieving high performance via existing modes of operation ensuring that work is done as it ought to be to reduce errors, costs and delays but without fundamentally changing how that work gets accomplished. Operational innovation means coming up with entirely new ways of filling orders, developing products, providing customer service or doing any other activity that an enterprise performs. Process innovation begins with a good understanding of who the customers of the process are and what they expect from it. Successful process innovations typically demand technological and organizational enablers. While information technology has driven many process innovations in recent times, there are various other drivers that must not be ignored. For example, the concept of lean manufacturing pioneered by Toyota, is driven more by common sense and a new mindset than by technology.

The process life cycle

As a new product moves along its life cycle, the performance criteria that serve as the basis for competition change from ill defined and uncertain to well articulated and more certain. At this time, product innovation tends to slow down. As obvious improvements are introduced, it becomes increasingly difficult to improve upon past product performance.
1

Harvard Business Review, April 2004.

2 Users begin to develop loyalties and preferences. The practicalities of marketing, distribution, maintenance, and so forth demand greater standardization. Product differentiation becomes increasingly difficult. Just like the product life cycle, there is also a process life cycle. During the formative period of a new product, the manufacturing processes are usually crude and inefficient. Typically, such processes employ skilled labor working with general-purpose machinery and tools. There are no specialized tools or machines. It is the product itself, at this point that matters to innovators and to those customers who are daring enough to try it out. But processes tend to improve as the rate of product innovation decreases. Finally, when an industry standard is determined, products are likely to become similar in terms of functions and features. Incremental changes in products made by competitors will tend to be copied rapidly. Under these circumstances, processes hold the key to stealing a march on competitors.

Utterbacks Model
We can understand the shift in importance from product to process innovations by a more detailed examination of the product life cycle. We use a classic framework provided by the famous technology expert, James Utterback. Three phases can be identified in a typical product life cycle-fluid, transitional, and specific. During the fluid phase of a technologys evolution, a great deal of change happens and outcomes are highly uncertain. In the fluid phase, the rate of product change is rapid. The new product is often crude, expensive, and unreliable, but it is able to provide a utility in a way that is highly desirable in some niche markets. Product innovation in the fluid phase proceeds in the face of both target and technical uncertainties. Target uncertainty refers to the fact that most early innovations do not enjoy an established market. Markets tend to grow around these innovations. Technical uncertainty results from the diffused focus of research and development. When the technology is in a state of flux, firms have no clear idea where to place their R&D bets. Frequent and major changes in product design and specifications are an impediment to process innovations. So process innovation generally takes a back seat to product innovation in this early fluid stage. The period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s in the PC industry falls in this category. As the market for a new product grows, the industry enters the transitional phase. Market acceptance of the product and the emergence of a dominant design are its hallmarks. Here, the emphasis is on making products for more specific users whose needs become more clearly understood. The focus of the firm shifts from the inventors workbench to the factory floor, where the large-scale manufacture of the new product must be carried out. In the transitional phase, product and process innovations start to become more tightly linked. Materials become more specialized. Expensive specialized equipment begin to be used in the plant, while automation increases. Companies which can streamline their processes and improve operational efficiency, without diluting customer satisfaction will forge ahead. In the specific phase, product specifications become clearly defined. The differences between products of competitors are often marginal. The linkages between product and

3 process are now extremely close. By now the fully automated operations are geared to highly efficient, low-unit-cost production or clearly specified products. A company which can come up with a radical improvement in the process at this stage can generate a significant competitive advantage. That is exactly what Dell has done by finding a superior way of getting products to customers. The model given by Utterback is useful though it may not be uniformly applicable across industries. In some industries, a dominant design may not emerge. In others, given the commodity nature of the industry, process innovations will be very important right from the start. Oil exploration and mining are good examples. So, the potential for process innovation must be assessed in the context of the specific industry in which the company is operating.
Process innovation at Gujarat Ambuja Cements Process innovation should not be equated with process improvements. But when a company achieves extraordinary operational excellence due to a variety of process improvements, it certainly deserves to be called process innovation. Gujarat Ambuja, one of Indias leading cement manufacturers, falls in this category. Its relentless focus on improving productivity and reducing energy consumption has given it an invincible cost leadership position in the Indian cement industry. In 1999, Gujarat Ambujas average production cost was Rs. 847/tonne, 65% lower than its nearest rival, ACC (Rs. 1302/tonne). Gujarat Ambujas coal consumption was 170kg/tonne of cement against the industry average of 250kg/tonne. According to one report 2, Gujarat Ambujas operating margin of 36% (2001) is one of the highest in the world. The company is currently the lowest cost cement producer in the world. These achievements have not been a matter of luck. Gujarat Ambuja has motivated its engineers to pursue total cost management with a missionary zeal. The company uses a variety of unconventional raw materials like husk and crushed sugarcane, which are not easy to handle as water content varies. By benchmarking against Japanese plants, the company has minimized overheating of clinker and has reduced the power costs by 30kwh/ton. Similarly, the company has adopted best practices in limestone mining from Australia. Information technology is the driver for many process innovations. Gujarat Ambuja uses a computerized process control system that can monitor quality and machine performance in real time. The company has understood the importance of cutting freight costs. It was the first to move cement by ship along the west coast to tap the strategic Mumbai market. (See case at the end of this chapter for a more detailed account).

Selecting Processes for Innovation

Process innovation must begin with the identification of processes that are ripe candidates for innovation. Focusing on those processes which require immediate improvement, makes sense because, like in any other change initiative, quick results will help maintain the momentum. If the company is striving for incremental improvement, it is sufficient to work with many narrowly defined processes. The risk of failure is relatively low, particularly if those responsible for improving a process are also responsible for managing and executing it. But when the objective is radical process change, a process must be defined as broadly as possible. Risk is more but the potential returns are also more. A company like Toyota has been able to get well ahead of competitors by ongoing improvements in all aspects of
2

Business Today, January 19, 2003.

4 operations including procurement, manufacturing, vendor management and logistics. (See Box Item).
Process innovation at Toyota3 Toyota, the famous Japanese carmaker has been a master of process innovation. The Toyota Production System (TPS) has been well researched and written about. But other companies including Japanese rivals such as Nissan have found it difficult to replicate the system. On the other hand, Toyota seems to have overcome cultural barriers and successfully replicated several features of the system at various overseas plants, especially in the US. TPS has attempted to eliminate waste, reduce costs and respond quickly to the changing customer needs. By drastically reducing the set up time 4, Toyota has been able to combine the efficiency of a mass production system with the ability to respond quickly to customer needs. Workers on the shop floor have developed multi-functional skills with the ability to manage a wide variety of machines. The system has been designed in such a way that process improvement becomes a built-in feature. Toyota specifies all jobs clearly in terms of content, sequence, timing and outcome. Exact specifications are laid down not only for repetitive assembly line jobs but also for infrequent or one-time activities (such as changing over a production line or shifting equipment from one part of the plant to another). For example, when a car seat has to be installed, the order of fixing, the torque to which bolts are to be tightened, and the time taken to turn each bolt are clearly specified. The rigid specification allows shop floor supervisors to detect any kind of discrepancy, analyze the causes of deviation and take necessary action, either to change the specification or to retrain the worker. Toyota firmly believes that when a worker makes a request for parts, there must be no confusion about the number of units to be supplied, the identity of the supplier and when the part has to be delivered. Even in the case of service activities such as repair of a machine, Toyota has clearly laid down rules to prevent any ambiguity about how the assistance will be triggered, who will provide it, when and how. Whenever there is a problem, Toyota understands that corrective action, including process modification, is necessary. Only learning organizations can be successful innovators. Constant learning has been an integral part of TPS. Employees are expected to learn from their mistakes and introduce process improvements on an ongoing basis. Learning is not a new concept for Toyota. Indeed, the company drew the idea of Just-inTime, from the American retail stores. In the 1930s, keeping in mind the advantage America had over Japan in automobiles, Toyota decided to learn new automobile production techniques from the American manufacturers. But the company realized that to catch up with the Americans, it had to master basic production techniques and reorganize the production system in a unique way. It was this vision, which gradually led to the Just-In-Time concept. Taichi Ohno, the father of lean production, developed the kanban to coordinate the flow of parts within the supply system on a day-to-day basis. Kanban eliminated practically all inventories. Parts were produced at each step to meet exactly the demand of the next step. When one small part of the production system failed, the whole system came to a stop. This was precisely the power of Ohnos idea. It removed all safety nets and focused the attention on anticipating problems and improving the process. Over the years, Kanban has evolved into a sophisticated information system that ensures production in required quantities at the right time in all manufacturing processes within the factory. The system is also used to coordinate the movement of parts from suppliers to Toyotas plants. Toyota's efforts towards perfecting Just-in-Time (JIT) have ensured that it has to maintain only a few hours of inventory. This is a remarkable achievement when we consider that most companies all over the world talk in terms of weeks, if not months, of inventory.
3 4

A more detailed account is given in the case in Part II of this book. Time required to rearrange the machine set up and change over to a different job.

According to Davenport5 four criteria can be used to guide process selection: Centrality of the process: The processes that are most central to accomplishing the organizations goals must be selected. Process health: Processes that are currently problematic and in obvious need of improvement must be chosen. Process qualification: The cultural and political climate of a target process must be guaged. Only processes that have a committed sponsor and exhibit a pressing business need for improvement must be selected. Manageable project scope. The process must be defined in such a way that the project scope is manageable. Ideally, all four factors should favor the selection of a particular process. In practice, results are often ambiguous, and differential weighting of the factors must be applied.

Using Information Technology to drive process innovation

As we saw briefly earlier, information can play a number of supporting roles in a companys efforts to make processes more efficient and effective. Just the addition of information to a process can sometimes lead to radical performance improvements. Information can also be used to measure and monitor process performance, integrate activities within and across processes, customize processes for particular customers, and facilitate longer-term planning and process optimization. The role of information in monitoring process performance has been familiar to industrial engineers and systems analysts. Information is also important to quality experts, since quality cannot be improved without measuring the current quality levels. The use of information in process monitoring is even more important when information technology is used to automate some aspect of the process. The benefits of performance reporting systems are clearly tied to the real-time, fully accurate nature of the information they convey. Information is the glue that holds an organizational structure together. Information can be used to better integrate process activities both within a process and across multiple processes. Often, information gathered for one process proves to be useful in another. A key role of information from the customers perspective is to tailor process output to meet customer needs. Today, vast stores of customer information and powerful technologies to search through and manipulate it are available. So there is no need to serve mass markets with standardised products. A firm, can know enough about its customers to be able to tailor its product (or service) offering to individuals. In many businesses, there is no longer a market, only individual customers who may have to be offered customized products. This phenomenon is referred to as mass customization.

Davenport, Thomas H., Process Innovation Reengineering Work through Information Technology, Harvard Business School Press, 1993.

6 To leverage information effectively, the way it is used must change. Many executive information systems tend to use information in a functional, rather than process-oriented, manner. So few senior managers have information about how long it takes to develop a new product or the average time it takes to fill customer orders. The functional data, such systems provide are difficult to combine in a way that facilitates the monitoring of process performance. To be really effective, information systems should be designed to support entire processes. Davenport6 has listed nine different ways of supporting process innovation with Information Technology (IT). Automational. The most commonly recognized benefit of information technology is a more structured process that can also reduce labour requirements. Informational. IT can be used within a process to capture information about process performance. This information can then be analyzed to improve the process. Analytical: In processes that involve analysis of information, IT can make the decisionmaking process more efficient and effective. Sequential. IT can enable changes in the sequence of processes or transform a process from sequential to parallel in order to reduce process cycle-time. This opportunity is at the core of the concurrent engineering phenomenon in product development. Tracking. Effective execution of some process designs, notably those employed by firms in the transportation and logistics industries, requires a high degree of monitoring and tracking. Federal Express scans a package several times to locate errant packages readily and to respond to customer queries regarding package status. Trucking firms use satellite based tracking systems to know the precise location of each truck in their fleets. Geographical. A key benefit of IT, has been the ability to overcome geographical barriers. Global companies are increasingly realizing the importance of seamless and consistent process execution around the world. IT is playing an important role in this regard. Integrative. More and more companies are finding it difficult to radically improve process performance for highly segmented tasks split across many jobs. So they are moving to a case management approach. In this type of process, an individual or team completes, or at least manages, all aspects of a product or service delivery process. Intellectual. Many companies are increasingly using IT to capture and disseminate knowledge.

Davenport, Thomas H., Process Innovation Reengineering Work through Information Technology, Harvard Business School Press, 1993.

7 Disintermediating. In some industries, human intermediaries are inefficient for passing information between parties. This is particularly so in case of transactions such as stock brokerage or parts location. IT is very useful here.
Process innovation in high-tech industries7 Contrary to popular perception, process innovation has an important role to play even in high-tech industries. When product technology is rapidly evolving, process innovation can be a good complement to product innovation. But according to Pisano and Wheelwright 8, high-tech companies are often obsessed with product innovations and do not devote adequate resources and attention to process R&D. In the past, successful products commanded significant price premiums. Manufacturing costs were small relative to revenues. So executives did not view manufacturing as a strategic capability. But the situation has changed today. Superior processes can facilitate accelerated time-to-market for new products, rapid production ramp-up and enhanced product functionality. Process development can also influence product development lead times in more subtle ways. Weak processes can cause long lead times for prototypes, and delay the introduction of a new product. Delays can also occur if the process technology developed early on, is incapable of producing sufficient quantities of test materials. A poorly understood and out-of-control process technology may also result in prototypes whose quality is low or erratic. This may lead to inaccurate or unreliable test results. Product consistency, purity, size, weight, reliability, and environmental impact are directly determined by the quality of the production process. Innovative process technologies can help organizations to protect and extend the proprietary position of their products. For example, in pharmaceuticals, when a drugs patent expires, proprietary process technology is one of the best defences, against intrusion by generic manufacturers. Similarly in the microprocessor industry, Intel backs its enormous investments in R&D with strong manufacturing capabilities. The shrinking of product life cycles has underscored the importance of fast time-to-market and rapid ramp-up. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly important to develop manufacturing processes that have relatively low capital-investment requirements and relatively high capital productivity at the start of commercial production, and that consequently offer short payback horizons. In most high-tech companies, concerns about the technical feasibility of product designs tend to overshadow concerns about manufacturing. There is a natural tendency to postpone dealing with process technology and manufacturing issues, till the product reaches the market and demand takes off. The goal at this stage is to produce as much and as fast as one can, not necessarily in the most efficient way. Adding physical capacity and finding outsourcing partners become expedient strategies. If the manufacturing process is upgraded in tandem with a new product development activity, significant benefits can result. Proactive development of manufacturing capabilities through process innovations is preferable to moving down the learning curve later on. Process innovation can enable a company to get on to a lower-cost learning curve at the outset and generate significant competitive advantages. A company with a superior, fine tuned production process before the launch of a new product will be at a tremendous advantage. Just as it is costly and time consuming to let a product with a quality problem make it through the factory and into the customers hands, it is costly and time consuming to improve processes on the factory floor. Innovative processes that eliminate design problems early in the development cycle hold the key to reducing the time-to-market.

7 8

See case on Ranbaxy Laboratories in Part II of this book. Harvard Business Review, September- October, 1995.

Organizational enablers
For process innovation to succeed, human and organizational enablers must be aligned and in synch with other key aspects of the organization. If, for example, the technological innovations in a process enable greater worker empowerment and autonomy, the organizational culture must support such changes. Conversely, if an organizations culture supports control and efficiency, systems to enable process innovation must be consistent with these objectives to succeed. Organizational enablers of process innovation fall into two categories: structure and culture. By grouping activities together, structure plays an important role in process innovation. Structure also determines how activities are controlled and the reporting relationships. One of the most powerful structural changes that can facilitate new, process-oriented behaviors, involves the use of cross-functional teams. Such teams facilitate functional interfaces and parallel design activities. Moreover, a broad set of skills and perspectives increases the likelihood that the output will meet multifunctional requirements. Most human beings seem to prefer jobs that have some social interaction. Work teams provide opportunities for small talk, development of friendships and empathic reactions from other employees. So working in teams also improves job satisfaction. Cultural factors play a key role while implementing process innovations. In general, for an innovation driven company, it is desirable to have a cultural shift in favour of greater empowerment and participation in decision-making and more open, less hierarchical communication. Participative cultures, which are often consistent with flatter organizational hierarchies or broader spans of control, lead to both higher productivity and greater employee satisfaction. IT has the potential to support both control and empowerment. It can provide employees information that enables them to make their own process decisions. At the same time, it can provide detailed instructions that dictate precisely how to perform each process step. This dual nature of IT may enable individuals or teams to manage themselves with information, or result in information being used to monitor closely individual or team performance. IT must mesh into the business process to be effective. Otherwise, unintended and undesirable consequences may result. One of the major stumbling blocks in implementing process innovation is that organizational culture often undermines the importance of operations. As Hammer 9 has put it, Making acquisitions, planning mergers, and buying and selling divisions will get the companys name and the CEOs picture in business magazines. Redesigning procurement or transforming product development will not, even through it might be much more important to the companys performance operations simply arent sexy This is the state of our business culture. The core, value-creating work of enterprises has become low status.
9

Hammer, Michael, Deep Change, Harvard Business Review, April 2004.

9
Process innovation in the photographic industry10 The photographic industry illustrates the power of process innovations and how they can make a product affordable to the masses. The first wave of technological innovation originated in France in 1839 with the development of daguerreotype, a method of producing images on sensitized silver-coated copper plates. By the mid-1850s, the daguerreotype imaging technology had given way to the use of glass plates. This process used a transparent and sticky substance called collodion to coat a glass plate. Just before taking a picture, the photographer would photosensitize the collodion-coated plate with silver nitrate. When the glass was exposed to light, a photonegative image could be developed on it, fixed in a darkroom, and then printed on photosensitive paper by exposing the glass plate and paper to bright sunlight. This technology became known as collodion plate photography. The use of wet collodion plates greatly improved photography and provided images of good quality. But the plates had to be sensitized and developed immediately before and after exposure. This required equipment, a dark room, and knowledge of chemistry. Another drawback was the sheer weight and size of the dozens of glass plates that a photographer had to use. The cumbersome method of processing photographs limited the market to professionals and dedicated amateurs. In the late 1870s, the introduction of glass plates coated with a dry gelatin emulsion made it possible to produce non-perishable photosensitized glass plates in factories. This made photography less complicated and more convenient. Cost also came down because of the large-scale production of one of the key components. Dry plates were also faster that the wet plates. George Eastman who started a dry plate supply company in 1878, developed the processes and equipment to achieve large-scale production. He pursued process improvements and production capabilities in a range of other photographic products: cameras, enlargers, printing paper, and assorted supplies. The availability of dry plates simplified the job of professional photographers and serious amateurs but cameras still remained large, bulky contraptions. The dry plates were just as heavy and breakable as the old wet ones. A photographer still needed the wherewithal to develop and print photo negatives. In his search for a material to replace glass plates, Eastman eventually turned to celluloid. It was light, flexible, transparent, durable, and did not react with the chemicals, used in photo processing. By 1889, Eastman had succeeded in developing a photosensitive celluloid film and the production processes to manufacture it commercially. At about the same time, Kodak developed a simple and inexpensive camera for using the new roll film. With film, camera, and production processes in place, Eastman created a new business model. Eastman realised the importance of process improvements to manufacture the new celluloid film in large quantities. He strongly believed in producing in large quantities through automation. Following his early invention of a mechanized system of cleaning, coating, and drying glass plates, Eastman also developed an ingenious system for coating and drying very long strips of photographic paper. These were later run over a roller that was partially submerged in a trough of gelatin emulsion. The very long strips of paper were suspended from the ceiling in long, serpentine loops (to save room) until the emulsion dried, then cut into individual sheets. Eastman systematically patented every step of his manufacturing process, as he understood their importance to the success of his business. Before coating, drying and cutting of roll film, celluloid had to be produced from liquid ingredients. Initial production was done by a batch method, which used 12 glass tables, each 3 feet wide by 50 feet long. A solution of nitrocellulose and solvents was spread evenly over these tables by a hopper and allowed to dry overnight. The next day, the resultant celluloid was coated with emulsion in darkness, stripped off the glass tables, and cut into long ribbons of film ready to be rolled. At a new film
10

This box item draws heavily from James Utterbacks book Mastering the dynamics of innovation.

10
production facility built outside Rochester in 1890-1891, the same process was employed, but the 12 tables were extended from 50 to 200 feet. A young MIT graduate named Darragh de Lancey, was instrumental in buying the patents and creating the designs that would allow Eastman in 1899 to successfully operate the first machine to both cast and photosensitize continuous ribbons of celluloid film. By 1902, Kodak was producing 80-90 percent of the worlds celluloid film. By the 1930s, Kodak operated dozens of huge, specially designed filmmaking machines. The raw material for these was film dope a solution with the viscosity of honey that was produced from cotton treated with nitric and sulfuric acids and dissolved in solvents. The film dope was spread over the polished surfaces of gigantic circulating wheels. Heat speeded the evaporation of the solvents, leaving a thin film of clear celluloid. These machines were designed to run night and day, turning out continuous ribbons of film.

Concluding Notes
Process innovation has an important role to play in creating new business models. The importance of process innovations is often underestimated. Process innovation should not be equated to generating efficiencies and cutting costs. It should also not be equated with moving down the learning curve. Some of the most innovative business models have been driven by process rather than product innovation. The best examples are Toyota, WalMart, Dell and McDonalds. As Hammer11 has put it, Operational innovations fuel extra ordinary results. But the stories are also repeated because there are frankly not many of them. Operational innovation is rare. By my estimate, no more than 10% of large enterprises have made a serious and successful effort at it. It is time that companies give process innovation the importance it deserves.

11

Hammer, Michael , Deep Change, Harvard Business Review, April 2004.

11 References 1. Abernathy, William J. and Wayne, Kenneth, Limits of the Learning Curve, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1974, pp. 109-118. 2. Hayes, Robert H. and Wheelwright, Steven C., The Dynamics of Process-Product Life Cycles, Harvard Business Review, March-April 1979, pp. 127-136. 3. Cusumano, Michael A., Manufacturing Innovation: Lessons from the Japanese Auto Industry, Sloan Management Review, Fall 1988, pp. 29-39. 4. Womack, James P., The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production, Perennial, November 1991. 5. Tully, Shawn and Welsh, Tricia, The modular corporation, Fortune, February 8, 1993, pp. 106-111. 6. Davenport, Thomas H., Process Innovation Reengineering Work through Information Technology, Harvard Business School Press, 1993. 7. Pisano, Gary P. and Wheelwright, Steven C., The new logic of high-tech R&D, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1995, pp. 93-105. 8. Utterback, James M., Developing technologies: The Eastman Kodak Story, The McKinsey Quarterly, No.1, 1995, pp. 130-143. 9. Quinn, James Brian; Baruch, Jordan J., Management Review, 1996, pp. 11-24. Software-based innovation Sloan

10. Utterback, James M., Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, 1996. 11. Christensen, Clayton M., The Innovators Dilemma, Harvard Business School Press, 1997. 12. Cusumano, Michael A. and Nobeoka, Kentaro, Thinking beyond Lean: How Multi-Project Management Is Transforming Product Development at Toyota & Other Companies, Free Press, 1998. 13. Dell, Michael and Fredman, Catherine, Direct from Dell: Strategies that Revolutionized an Industry, Harvard Business School Press, 1999. 14. Womac, James P. and Jones, Daniel T., Lean Thinking: Banish Waste and Create Wealth in Your Corporation, Simon & Schuster, 2003.

12 15. Christensen, Clayton M. and Raynor, Michael E., The Innovators Solution, Harvard Business School Press, 2003. 16. Hammer, Michael, Deep Change: How Operational Innovation Can Transform Your Company, Harvard Business Review, April 2004, pp. 91-101.

13

Case Illustration: 5.1 -Process innovation in the glass industry12

The glass industry is a good example of the kind of impact process innovation can have. The modern glass industry is divided into two major segments, flat glass and blown glass. Until the 1880s, the flat glass industry was made up of small producers employing highly skilled artisans. The first flat glass was made through the entirely manual crown-glass method. With the end of a metal rod, the glassmaker pulled a clump of molten glass out of the furnace pot. The rod was then spun rapidly so that centrifugal force shaped the still-molten glass into a large flat disk. Panes were cut from the outer surface of this disk, the maximum dimensions of a piece being 34" x 22". Crown glass was replaced with sheets of flat glass produced by blowing molten glass into the shape of the long cylinder. The glassmaker cut off both rounded ends, slit the cylinder down its length, and, using tongs, folded it open to make it a flat piece. Though the glass remained wavy and had many imperfections, cylinder glass was an important advancement both in productivity and quality. This method became even more efficient and cost effective in 1903, with the development of a cylinder-blowing machine that eliminated the need for highly skilled workers. Other methods of producing sheet glass eventually replaced the cylinder method. Each of these methods improved efficiency and product uniformity, while reducing cost. The Colburn sheet-drawing machine, which appeared in 1917, for example, pulled a continuous sheet of glass, out of the furnace pot and sent it to the annealing and cutting steps. Incremental improvements made to this method over the next five decades not only reduced unit costs but also lessened the dependence on skilled labor. But capital costs and constraints on product variation increased. Plate glass had different product characteristics, compared to crown and sheet glass. It was thicker and stronger, made in larger dimensions, its surface, ground and polished. Sand, lime, soda, and cullet (bits of old broken glass) were mixed together in a clay pot. The pot was then placed in a wood-fired (later coal-fired) furnace maintained at 1,2000 1,5000 centigrade, at which temperature the ingredients melted. Air bubbles, and impurities accumulated on the surface and were skimmed off. The molten glass was then poured onto large table moulds with raised edges. Workers with heavy copper rollers smoothed the glass to a uniform thickness. The moulds were carted off to a beehive annealing oven where they remained for several days. The annealing step helped the finished plates to develop the strength to withstand the grinding and polishing that followed. In its casting, different thicknesses and different rates of cooling produced strains in the glass, which made the plate weak at particular points and easily shatterable. Holding the glass in an annealing oven at high temperatures,
12

This case draws heavily from James Utterbacks book, Mastering the Dynamics of Innovation, Harvard Business School Press, 1996.

14 and reducing its temperature very gradually, allowed these strains to dissipate. finished product was a thick plate of glass with perfectly flat surfaces. The

But plate glassmaking was heavily dependent on artisans. The process employed roughly three times as much labor per unit of output than did blown and cylinder glass. Each phase of the production process was performed separately. Glass was moved from one step to another. Special-purpose equipment played a minor role. The Siemens brothers of Germany introduced a major improvement in flat glass manufacturing in 1861, through their gas-fired furnace, which preheated gas and air before they entered the fire chamber. This improved thermal efficiency. The cleaner burning fuel eliminated the smoke and ash that contaminated the melting pot in case of wood and coal furnaces. This resulted in better process control. By 1880, Siemens furnaces were equipped with continuous melting tanks. Workers added ingredients to one end of the melting tank even as molten glass was taken out of the other end. This was a tremendous productivity advancement over the traditional method of mixing and melting at night in day tanks so that glass could be poured and worked during the day. The new process combined mixing and melting, and allowed old molten glass to be continuously drawn off for casting. This eliminated the traditional waiting, improved quality and increased efficiency. Fewer and less-skilled workers were required to tend and charge the furnace. In the 1880s, the idea of using a tunnel-annealing kiln, was introduced. As plate was cast on to tables, the tables were hooked together to form a train that rolled through a long tunnel. The temperature was kept high at the front end of the tunnel and gradually reduced at the far end. The tunnel kiln converted annealing from a batch process to a continuous sub process. While the traditional annealing ovens typically took days, tunnel kilns completed the annealing process in a matter of hours. In 1952, Alastair Pilkington introduced the float process. Molten glass from a furnace floated on the perfectly flat surface of molten tin a denser non-reactive substance that, could support glass. It took the Pilkington company millions of pounds, five years, and some 100,000 tons of scrapped glass to develop the float process and build a pilot plant to make it work. In the new process, a continuous ribbon of molten glass was drawn from the furnace tank onto a long pool of melted tin. The pool was enclosed in a controlled atmosphere of nitrogen and a small amount of hydrogen to prevent oxidation of the tin. As the glass ribbon entered the tin pool, heat was applied to keep it in a molten state to ensure its perfectly smooth and parallel surfaces. As the ribbon progressed through the tin bath chamber, the temperature was progressively dropped. The glass cooled and solidified while still in contact with the liquid metal. After passing across the tin bath, the glass was conveyed on rollers through the annealing tunnel. Since the surface of the tin was perfectly smooth, the annealed glass needed no grinding or polishing. The resulting product was a lustrously smooth glass of uniform thickness.

15 Besides improved product quality, the process reduced the length of the production line by more than half (to 640 feet). In the older process, grinding and polishing reduced the output of finished glass by 15 to 25 percent, required tons of costly abrasives, and produced process wastes that had to be removed at considerable expense. All these drawbacks were eliminated in the new process. Labor costs were reduced by 80 percent and energy costs by 50 percent. Large panels of plate glass for windows, mirrors, display cases, and other applications were now affordable to the common people. The Pilkington float glass plant linked together all the islands of automation into one continuous process. This completed the transformation of glassmaking from a laborintensive craft process into a highly efficient and automated industry. Within a few years, various problems in the process were ironed out. Float glassmaking became remarkably trouble free. Sir Alastair Pilkington reported running a plant for 24 months without a major breakdown. An important point made by Utterback is that process innovations have a more profound impact on productivity and costs in case of non-assembled products, compared to complex assembled products. There have not been any process changes that have cut the assembly cost of automobiles in half. This is because complex assembled products have many more process steps than do non-assembled products. The production process for an automobile engine has more than 100 steps: drill, turn, drill, grind, attach component, transfer to next station, and so forth. The combination of two or three of these steps into one has only a limited impact on the overall process. In glass making, on the other hand, there are only a few steps. Elimination of even one step results in a disruptive change.

16

Case Illustration 5.2 - Gujarat Ambuja: Cost Leader in the Indian Cement Industry
Introduction
In 2004, Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd (GACL), was the third largest producer of cement in India, next only to Associated Cement Companies (ACC) & Birla Group (the combined operations of Grasim and L&T). GACL had a capacity of about 12.5 mn tonnes, generated revenue in excess of Rs. 2,500 crores and posted a net profit of Rs 221.73 crore for the year ended June 30, 2003. Widely considered to be the lowest cost producer in the Indian cement industry, GACL had won various awards for management excellence, quality, and environmental management. Ever since its inception, the company had believed in doing things in innovative and unconventional ways. GACLs quest for cost leadership had been driven by various productivity improvement and cost cutting measures. The companys modern plants, large kilns, high degree of automation, low power and fuel costs had helped it to control costs in a way which was unmatched in the industry. GACL had cut energy costs by reducing the usage of coal through use of substitutes like crushed sugarcane. GACL operated most of its plants at above 100% capacity utilisation. The company's engineers had picked up best practices in mining and manufacturing during visits to overseas plants in countries like Japan and Australia. The company had pioneered the use of ship transportation to cut freight costs and also established the necessary infrastructure like ports, freight and handling terminals. Low-cost funds had helped GACL to cut the cost of capital.

Background Note
GACL was established as Ambuja Cements Private Ltd. (ACPL) in 1981 by Narotam Satyanarayan Sekhsaria (Sekhsaria), a businessman from Gujarat in western India. Originally a cotton trader, Sekhsaria liked the cement business because of stable demand and limited competition. With the support of Gujarat Industrial Investment Corporation (GIIC), Sekhsaria and his two partners, Suresh Neotia and Vinod Neotia, set up ACPL. Suresh Neotia was appointed Chairman while Sekhsaria took charge as the Managing Director. In 1983, the company floated a public issue and its name was changed to GACL. The same year, production started at a 0.7 million tons per annum (mtpa) plant, named Ambuja Cements, in Ambuja Nagar, Gujarat. GIIC sold its stake in GACL to Sekhsaria in two tranches in 1987 and 1990. In 1993, GACL commissioned its second cement plant at Ambuja Nagar (capacity 1 mtpa), named Gujambuja Cements. Attracted by buoyant cement demand in the northern region, GACL set up a 1.5 mtpa plant at Suli in Himachal Pradesh (HP), in 1995. In the same year, GACL floated a wholly owned subsidiary in Mauritius - Cement Ambuja International Ltd. (CAIL). In 1996, GACL floated another subsidiary, Ceylon Ambuja Cements (Private) Ltd., through which it acquired a small company, Midigama Cement, in Sri Lanka. In 1996, GACL set up its third plant at Ambuja Nagar, named Guj Line - II (capacity 1 mtpa). GACL also established grinding and packing units at Ropar (Punjab) and Panvel

17 (Maharashtra). In 1997, GACL acquired Modi Cements' sick 1.4 mtpa plant at Raipur (Madhya Pradesh) for Rs 1.66 billion. This plant was renamed Ambuja Cement Eastern Ltd. After the acquisition, GACL revamped its processes to bring them on par with the standards of its other plants. In 1998, GACL acquired limestone mines in Nadikudi (about 100 kms from Guntur) and Proddatur (near Cuddapah) in Andhra Pradesh. In December 1999, GACL paid Rs 3.5 billion to acquire a 51% stake in Delhi based DLF Cement, which had started its operations in 1997 in Rajasthan with a plant capacity of 1.4 mtpa. After this merger, GACL became the fourth largest cement manufacturer in India after ACC, L&T and Grasim. In the same month, GACL also acquired a 7.2% stake in ACC for Rs 4.55 billion. With 14 manufacturing units in India, ACC had a total capacity of over 11 mtpa. It was one of the largest integrated cement companies in the world. In December 2001, GACL began trial production at a new 2 mtpa plant in Chandrapur, Maharashtra, taking its total capacity to 12.5 mtpa. The company recorded a sales figure of Rs 2025.10 crores and a PAT of Rs 221.73 crores in the year ending June 30th 2003.

Manufacturing
In 2003, GACL had manufacturing plants in five different locations (Table I). GACL also had three grinding mills at Ropar (Punjab). Along with ACC, CACL had plants in Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The cement manufacturing process involved four stages: quarrying and crushing; grinding and blending of raw materials; clinker production; and finish grinding. The basic raw materials used in cement manufacturing were limestone, clay, silica and gypsum. Normally about 1.2 1.5 tons of limestone, 0.25 ton of coal, 120 kwh of power, and 0.05 ton of gypsum were needed per ton of cement. Limestone was clearly the key raw material. The quality of limestone significantly affected the operating efficiency of the plant. The raw materials after grinding and blending were fed into a pre-heater followed by a rotating kiln, which typically completed one revolution per minute. The material flowed towards the hot end of the kiln and was heated to a temperature of 1300-1400 degree centigrade for 1 hour. Crushed and pulverized coal was used as the fuel. The heating process in the kiln resulted in dehydration (removal of water vapor) and calcination (removal of carbon dioxide), leading to the formation of a dark and hard nodule, which was cooled to form clinker. After air cooling, clinker was mixed with retarders 13 such as gypsum, plaster or calcium lignosulfonate. Then air entraining14, dispersing and water proofing agents were added. The mixture was fed to the grinding mills, which produced cement. When mixed with water, cement formed a hard mass due to the hydration of the constituent compounds.
13 14

The components used to reduce the setting time of cement. A chemical, which does not allow air to be trapped between the cement molecules during hardening.

18 Table I GACL: Plant Locations and Capacities (June 2003)

Location Ambujanagar (Amreli, GUJ) Bhatinda (Bathinda, PUN) Chandrapur (Chandrapur, MAH) Daburji (Rupnagar, PUN) Suli (Solan, HP) Source: CMIE Database. Capacity Production qty '000 tonnes '000 tonnes 4150 4876.45 520 335.42 1730 1734.67 1400 1918.96 1200 974.8

Table II Capacity by Region: GACL & its Subsidiaries (2003)

Capacity '000 tonnes 4.00 3.00 1.50 2.00

State Gujarat Himachal Pradesh/ Punjab Rajasthan Chhattisgarh/ West Bengal

Source: www.gujaratambuja.com

Three types of Maharashtra 2.00 processes wet, semi- Total 12.50 dry and dry were used to produce cement. In the wet process, the raw material was prepared by mixing limestone and water (called slurry), and blended with soft clay. The slurry had 30 to 40 % water content. Before it was powdered, the slurry was evaporated to remove water content. The wet process consumed more energy compared to the dry process. Table III Cement Capacity in India (Break up by process)
Process Dry Semi-Dry Wet Total: Capacity (TPD ) 3,21,695 5,930 13,220 3,40,845 % to Total 94 2 4 100

Source: www.indiacements.co.in (April 2003).

19 Figure I The Cement Manufacturing Process

Raw Material Supply:

Quarrying, mining, supply

Fuel Preparation:
Crushing, grinding, drying

Additive preparation:
Crushing, drying Additives

Materials Preparation:
Grinding, Homogenising, drying or slurring

Pyro-processing:
Pre-heating, calcination, clinkering, cooling Clinker nodules

Cement Grinding:
Grinding, blending

Clinker Production

Bagging & transport

Source: www.ghgprotocol.org

The dry process had become popular over the years. It reduced fuel consumption from 330 kg (in the wet process) to 250 kg of coal for a ton of cement. Also, for a given kiln size, the output in the dry process was two and a half to three times more than in the wet process. However, the dry process required high capital investment. The vertical shaft technology employed by mini-cement units used the wet process whereas the rotary kiln technology employed by the large plants used the modern dry process. There were different varieties of cement based on their composition and use. Some of the popular ones were Ordinary Portland cement, Portland Pozzolona cement, Portland Blast Furnace Slag cement, and White cement. These grades differed in the percentage of clinker used in making cement. Ordinary Portland Cement (OPC) required 95 percent clinker, the balance being mostly gypsum. It accounted for 70 percent of the total consumption of cement in the country. OPC was the most common cement used in general concrete construction when there was no exposure to sulphates in the soil or groundwater. It was capable of bonding mineral fragments into a compact whole when mixed with water. This hydration process resulted in progressive stiffening, hardening and strength development. Portland Pozzolona Cement (PPC) required 80 percent clinker, 15 percent pozzolona and 5 percent gypsum. It accounted for 18 percent of the total cement consumption in the country. Pozzolona materials were siliceous and aluminous materials and did not possess cementing properties but developed these properties in the presence of water.

20 Figure II Cement Manufacturing Flow Diagram

Source: www.r2002.com

Portland Blast Furnace Slag Cement (PBSF) required 45 percent clinker, 50 percent blast furnace slag and 5 percent gypsum and accounted for 10 percent of the total cement consumed in India. It was useful in marine construction. White cement was a slight variation of OPC. It contained a small quantity of iron oxide to act as a filler between ceramic tiles. The cement was used for decorative purposes like rendering of walls, flooring, etc. The ash content in white cement had to be low. Hence, gas was used as fuel instead of coal. Relatively small amounts of white cement were produced in the country, because it was almost three times more expensive than ordinary cement. GACLs total cost management (TCM) drive had concentrated on two key areas productivity and consumption of coal and power. In 2003, GACLs average production cost was Rs. 1316 per tonne, significantly lower than any of its nearest rivals. GACL had achieved more than 100 % capacity utilization from 1999. While its total installed capacity was around 5 mtpa, the company produced almost 6 mtpa (excluding the Modi Cements plant). The major input costs during the year were: raw materials, furnace oil and power. GACL had attempted to cut input costs in various ways. The company took full advantage of its own port at Muldwarka to feed imported coal to its Ambujanagar plants. Indigenous coal was used at other plants. The company had obtained necessary Government approval for the supply of required coal from various collieries of Coal India. GACLs coal consumption of 170 kg per tonne of cement was the lowest in the

21 industry against an industry average of 250 kg per tonne. In terms of calorific value, it was 743 kcal per ton of clinker compared to the industry norm of 850 kcal. GACLs power requirements at Ambujanagar were met by a liquid fuel captive power plant that used furnace oil. GACL again used its own port at Muldwarka to import the entire requirements of Ambujanagar. In spite of a steep increase in the furnace oil cost, the average power cost for the company had increased only marginally to Rs.2.67 kwh as against Rs.2.59 kwh in the previous year. GACL consumed only 96 kwh of power per ton of cement against the industry average of 110-115 kwh per ton. Its captive power plants (40 MW and 12 MW added in Gujarat and Himachal Pradesh respectively during 1998) had reduced dependence on the more expensive power supplied by State Electricity Boards and supplied around 60.3% of its total power requirements. In the early 2000s, GACLs captive power generation cost was only Rs. 1.30 per kilowatt (excluding interest and depreciation), compared to Rs. 4.50 per kilowatt for power supplied by Electricity Boards. Table IV Power Cost
Oct-Dec 2003 Units consumed Cost (Rs./Ton) Source: www.gujaratambuja.com 85 180 2002 86 187 Jul-Sept 2003 90 183

Table V Fuel Cost

Oct-Dec 2003 2002 718 729 229 224 Jul-Sept 2003 727 230

K. Cal/ Kg of Clinker Cost (Rs./Ton) Source: www.gujaratambuja.com

Table VI Cost of Production (Rs/Ton)

Oct-Dec Power Fuel Raw material Consumables Direct cost Source: www.gujaratambuja.com 2003 180 229 146 51 606 2002 187 224 134 56 601 Jul-Sept 2003 183 230 140 67 620

22 GACL also replaced V belt drives (which consumed more energy due to friction) by flat belt drives. Even though mechanical conveyors gave problems like spillages and breakdowns, GACL did not shift to pneumatic conveyors, which consumed more power. Instead, the company devised an improved version of the mechanical conveyor to eliminate the drawbacks. Cement plants often overcooked the clinker. In the early 1990s, during a visit to a plant in Japan, GACLs engineers observed that clinker pieces were being extracted from the kiln and scanned under the microscope. By studying the crystal structure, the Japanese engineers determined whether the clinker had been heated to the right temperature. GACLs engineers quickly replicated this practice and reduced power costs, from 120 units/ton to 90 units/ton, by adjusting the retention time, maximum temperature and the rate of cooling. The Kodinar plant was located in the agricultural belt of Saurashtra. GACL attempted to reduce coal consumption by using groundnut husk, which was available in plenty to fire the kilns. In the second plant in Ambuja Nagar, GACL replaced coal with crushed sugarcane. This created problems because water content differed with every batch, leading to fluctuations in the kiln temperature. GACL designed a special mechanical system that could adjust the rate of feeding to ensure a stable temperature in the kiln. In the process, GACL brought the energy bill down by Rs. 20 for every tonne of crushed sugarcane used. The use of Fluorspar15, a waste dumped by Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation reduced power requirements by 1 to 1.5 units per tonne. Cement companies normally operated their own limestone mines. Mines were not only environmentally destructive, but were also expensive to operate. Since explosives were used in mining, substantial costs were involved in implementing safety measures. GACL had launched many initiatives to reduce mining expenses. In 1997, GACL sent its engineers to Australia to study the extraction of metals. On their return, GACL implemented the ripping technology that could access limestone in smaller areas where blasting was not possible. To reduce the noise and vibration, which occurred during drilling, blasting and crushing, GACL introduced an Australian device called Surface Miner, which was not only energy efficient, but also recovered more material from a given area. Table VII Operating Expenses (Rs. / Ton)
FY 2003 187 227 136 47 597 FY 2002 179 254 133 48 614 Increase / (Decrease) (%) 4 -11 2 -2 -3

Power Fuel Raw material Consumables Direct cost Source: www.gujaratambuja.com

15

Calcium Fluoride

23 GACLs information system facilitated easy data access by different departments. The entire plant was monitored by a computerized process control system from a central control room, which had visual display screens, and an interlocking system connecting crucial stacks. The input of raw materials into the kiln was also regulated from the control room. Figure III Trends in Operating Margin
45 40 35 30 25 20 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Source: UTI Securities.

GACL had significantly improved its quality control practices over the years. The earlier practice had been to report quality control data once a day. Later, GACL introduced the practice of reporting the data 48 times a day. Starting with the optimum raw material mix, the computerized control over 3,000 operational parameters helped in improving quality at each step of the production process. Machines were also continuously monitored for any malfunctioning. Improvement in efficiency and lower shutdown rate had led to a significant increase in capacity utilization over the years. Figure IV GACL: Cost trends-freight, power
350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Rs/tonne

Domestic Freight on domestic sales Total power

Source: UTI Securities.

Cement was traditionally packed in jute bags, as per the provisions of Jute Packaging Materials (Compulsory Use in Packing Commodities) Act, 1987 (JPMA). The industry was freed from the controls of JPMA in 1998 after intense lobbying. GACL was the first to introduce paper bags, which resulted in lower pilferage, better preservation and improved

24 appearance. GACL not only followed the international norms of specific colours of packaging for different types of cement, but also gave total information about the quality, date of manufacturing and location of plant (manufacturing unit). Each bag of cement contained the brand name, the ISI logo with identification number, price of the bag, and net weight of the bag. Cement was usually packed in 25 kg or 50 kg bags. GACL had attempted to ensure that bags contained the right quantity of cement. Zero Error Electronic Rotary machines checked the quantity of cement in randomly picked bags. In the case of 50 kg bags, GACL permitted a maximum variation of 200 gm. Since the companys inception, GACLs talented and committed engineers had recorded several impressive achievements. In March 2003, the demand in Asia and the Middle East had shot up and there was a surge in export orders. Though the Gujarat plants were already producing 4 lakh tonnes a month, which was far greater than their rated capacity, GACLs engineers decided to take up the challenge. The production team set itself to the task, while the distribution team, provided an uninterrupted flow of trucks, tankers and ships. At the end of the month, production touched 500,220 tonnes in a single month. And GACL could despatch 482,817 tonnes. Both were all-time records in India. In another case, to step up production, engineers at GACLs Himachal plant needed to increase the output of ground raw material. However, the raw material grinding mill was already running 26% higher than the guaranteed capacity. A further increase in production looked almost impossible. A brainstorming session revealed that by modifying the nozzle ring in the raw mill, the output of limestone could be increased. This was promptly implemented. Simultaneously, existing systems were redefined. Raw mill production jumped from 480 to 520 Tons Per Hour. As a result, plant production went up to 2.3 million tonnes per annum, an increase of 15%. World over, it took at least 1-2 years to stabilize a cement plant. The engineers entrusted with stabilizing the Maratha plant were well aware of this. However, they realised that if the stabilization time could be brought down, production could be pushed up, and the plant would be closer to breaking even. Though the task was difficult, GACLs engineers were determined to do it. They went back to the drawing board and examined ways to cut time. Three months later, their hard work and preparation paid off. The Maratha Plant was stabilized and began to function without a hitch. Even more remarkable, it went on to achieve over 100% production in the very first year of operation, further boosting GACLs profits.

Other Operations
Order Processing Order Processing Systems involved the flow of information from order generation to order fulfillment. Effective order processing systems involved transmission of customer order, paper processing, retrieval from the warehouse, dispatch to the transporters, adjustment of the inventory level and transmission of information to the production planning department. Orders once received, had to be processed quickly and accurately. GACL had linked all its

25 major offices through a Wide Area Network (WAN). Electronic Data Exchange (EDE) and Material Resources Planning (MRP) systems facilitated timely and accurate processing of orders. But GACL did not believe in employing technology for the sake of technologys sake. For example, GACL had not purchased any elaborate ERP software. GACL believed the pay offs from the technology had to be evident before any major technology investment was made. At the same time, GACL continued to pick up best practices from companies like Cemex, the well-known Mexico based cement manufacturer, who was known to use information technology heavily. Inventory Management Inventory decisions involved knowing, when to order (timing) and how much to order (quantity). Management had to balance the cost of carrying a larger inventory against the resulting increase in holding costs. GACL linked its inventory management process to most of the functions such as production planning, raw material planning, ordering etc. Online ordering, not only reduced time, but also transaction costs. Limestone, coal, gypsum, iron Ore and red ochre were the basic raw materials needed for the production of cement. GACL had a well-developed system for handling inbound raw materials. Limestone extracted from near by mines was transported to the production site with the help of Overland Belt Conveyer (OBC) and in some cases with the help of trucks. This process ran for 16 hours a day and provided sufficient stocks to enable the plant to run smoothly round the clock. GACL also sourced other raw materials from various places across India. (Coal, one of the basic raw materials, was sourced all the way from Bihar and sometimes from Meghalaya). At the production site, the company maintained a buffer stock of about 10 to 20 days depending upon the location of the production unit. Transportation Cement, being a freight intensive industry, various initiatives had been taken by GACL to streamline its logistics processes. GACL was one of the first cement producers in the country to introduce an Integrated Logistics System (ILS). At each manufacturing unit, a cross functional committee was responsible for managing logistics. The committee met at regular intervals and reviewed the working of the total system. The recommendations were forwarded to the top management for immediate action. Each tonne of cement involved the transportation of about 1.5 tonnes of limestone, 0.25 tonnes of coal and 0.05 tonnes of gypsum. Freight accounted for about 18 % of the total cost. Raw materials were transported either by rail or road. Since road transportation beyond 200 kms was not economical, the railways had traditionally played an important role. But due to the inadequate availability of wagons, manufacturers were looking seriously at sea routes. In 2003, 70% of the cement movement worldwide was by sea compared to only about 1% in India. GACL became the first cement company in India to use water transportation for moving domestic consignments. This reduced the transportation cost dramatically. In 2002, GACLs freight mix was road 40%, rail 30% and sea 30%.

26 For a 10,000-tpd plant in India, it took 1,000 dispatches per day using 10-tonne trucks or 250 dispatches using 40-tonne trucks. In 1997, a single ship could carry 40,000 tons, at a cost of only Rs. 190/tonne as against Rs. 580/tonne for rail and Rs.670/tonne for road transport. When the government allowed the privatisation of ports, GACL set up ports and freight handling terminals at Muldwarka (about 8 kms from the companys plant at Ambuja Nagar), Surat (South Gujarat), and Vashi (near Mumbai). In 2003, the terminal in Muldwarka, was equipped to export clinker and cement and import coal and furnace oil16. GACL also entered into an agreement with the Cochin Port Trust for building cement storing and packing infrastructure in Wellington Island (Kerala). To improve the transport infrastructure, GACL set up captive breakwater17 and jetty18 facilities in Gujarat, Maharashtra and Kerala. The company had also acquired five ships for transporting cement in bulk. GACLs port at Muldwarka had continued to perform impressively. In 2003, the port posted a 13% increase in the volume of cargo, at 39.12 lakh tones, against 34.68 lakh tonnes in the previous year. Apart from bulk cement, the port continued to handle bagged cement, coal, furnace oil, etc. Starting as a small jetty for loading bulk cement into small ships for coastal movement of cement in 1993, Muldwarka had transformed itself into a port. Though smaller in size, in terms of volume, it compared well with some of the large ports in India. GACL had hired two more ships during 2002-03 each with a capacity of 4000 DWT. With this, the company had a fleet of seven ships, which together carried 14.23 lakh tonnes of cement as against 13.22 lakh tonnes in the previous year. GACL believed it would be able to meet the demand of the entire South Gujarat market from its Bulk Cement Terminal at Surat. To facilitate movement by ships, GACL transported cement in sealed road tankers from the plant site to the shipping terminal, where it was transferred to silos19. From these silos, it was poured into airtight holds in the ships. At the destination, the cement was unloaded from ship holds, and again placed in silos, before being pumped into sealed road tankers. Customers were provided small storage tanks into which cement was pumped from the sealed tankers by a fluidisation20 process. For a customer who wanted bagged cement, GACL arranged special packing facilities at the unloading terminals. GACL had conveyor belts running up to the dispatch yard for loading trucks and wagons. A fleet of around 350 self-financed trucks and a railway siding in its factory premises facilitated speedy transportation. Routing and scheduling decisions were important in the cement industry. GACL conducted route surveys periodically to arrive at the best possible route for each destination. Key
16 17

Company Annual Reports. An artificial canal dug to bring the ships closer to the place of loading/unloading. 18 The place where the ship is loaded and unloaded. 19 Large containers that store cement till it is transferred to the ship for transport. 20 A process by which small particles are suspended in a liquid. This allows the material to be pumped through pipelines.

27 inputs that went into scheduling of the dispatch of the material were the location and distance of the destination, the road conditions, the unloading facilities available at the destination point, apart from scheduling instructions given in the order. Warehousing & Distribution GACL used two types of warehouses, the Dumps and Trans-shipment point storage. The warehouses were connected online with the marketing office and the production units to facilitate efficient delivery of goods. The Bulk Cement Terminal in Surat had a storage capacity of 15,000 tonnes and it also had a bulk cement unloading facility. In Panvel (a town strategically located near Indias biggest cement market Mumbai), GACL had a storage capacity of 17,500 tonnes and a bulk cement unloading facility. GACL also had a bulk cement terminal in Galle, 120 kms from Colombo, Sri Lanka. The location of the dumps and trans-shipment points, was decided taking into account the availability of transportation infrastructure, packing space, and trained and cheap manpower.

Concluding Notes
In line with the company's vision to become the leader in the Indian cement industry, GACL had been pursuing a combination of strategies like alliances, capacity expansion, new plants, and aggressive takeovers. The company had set up a two million ton Greenfield cement unit in Maharashtra at an investment of Rs. 500 crores. It had expanded capacity at the existing Gujarat site from three million to four million tons at an incremental cost of just Rs. 100 crores. It had also set up one million ton grinding units, one at Bhatinda and another in West Bengal. To strengthen its presence in the south, the company planned to set up a Rs. 600 crores, two million ton Greenfield plant in Andhra Pradesh. GACL had also started offering ready-mix cement, the demand for which was expected to grow in the future. As 2004 got under way, GACL looked well placed in the Indian cement industry. But the management realised it could not afford to be complacent, in the wake of competition from multinationals like Lafarge, who were eyeing the Indian cement market with keen interest.

28 Exhibit I GACL: Profit & loss account

Jun 1998 Jun 1999 Jun 2000 Jun 2001 Jun 2002 Jun 2003

Rs. Crore (Non-Annualised) 12 mths 12 mths 12 mths 12 mths 12 mths 12 mths Income Sales 1145.78 1252.34 1303.23 1448.63 1584.05 2033.48 Other income 30.65 36.1 42.26 17.12 37.73 64.51 Change in stocks 0.64 -16.02 12.08 9.95 -12.41 5.94 Non-recurring income 9 13.42 294.24 18.41 6.72 12.37 Expenditure Raw materials, stores, etc. 131.49 139.12 168.53 202.58 229.32 309.52 Wages & salaries 30.76 33.55 44.32 46.31 53.29 69.2 Energy (power & fuel) 273.94 240.49 278.58 296.37 323.99 430.6 Indirect taxes (excise, etc.) 159.35 193.25 187.36 180.11 201.3 294.14 Advertising & marketing expenses 15.39 19.94 22.36 23.88 28.82 33.87 Distribution expenses 113.76 164.97 150.35 152.5 167.57 275.42 Others 86.71 89.41 92.79 107.71 121.37 145.79 Less: expenses capitalised 0 0 0 0 0 0 Non-recurring expenses 4.28 1.89 2.05 6.16 12.79 1.19 Profits / losses PBDIT 370.39 403.22 705.47 478.49 477.64 556.57 Financial charges (incl. lease rent) 126.84 129.58 125.45 141.71 115.77 131.1 PBDT 243.55 273.64 580.02 336.78 361.87 425.47 Depreciation 108.5 122.96 123.89 129.3 137.82 171.64 PBT 135.05 150.68 456.13 207.48 224.05 253.83 Tax provision 4.87 0.12 28.25 14.52 45.12 31.74 PAT 130.18 150.56 427.88 192.96 178.93 222.09 Appropriation of profits Dividends 56.2 68.01 78.97 84.78 93.11 122.64 Retained earnings 73.98 82.55 348.91 108.18 85.82 99.45 Source: CMIE.

29 Exhibit II GACL: Trends in Financial Performance

Financial Performance Equity Paid Up Net worth Capital Employed Gross Block Sales PBIDT PBDT PBIT PBT PAT CP Revenue Earnings In Forex Revenue Expenses In Forex Book Value (Unit Curr.) Market Capitalisation CEPS (Annualised)(Unit Curr.) EPS (Annualised)(Unit Curr.) Dividend (Annualised%) Payout (%) Cash Flow From Operating Activities Cash Flow From Investing Activities Cash Flow From Financing Activities Rate Of Growth (%) Net Worth Capital Employed Gross Block Sales PBIDT PBDT PBIT PBT PAT CP Revenue Earnings In Forex Revenue Expenses In Forex Market Capitalisation March March March March March 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 42.28 42.28 42.28 42.28 42.28 122.46 124.70 167.37 160.85 158.36 629.52 607.99 629.38 610.77 593.83 381.74 378.13 366.23 359.97 349.26 800.54 727.69 698.97 632.23 483.61 81.63 93.71 98.43 96.66 96.97 30.92 41.43 46.50 41.84 39.05 60.49 70.43 77.50 76.26 76.83 9.78 18.15 25.57 21.44 18.91 6.21 13.09 23.48 19.28 17.04 27.35 36.37 44.41 39.68 37.18 57.90 59.21 48.65 45.75 33.55 179.75 85.93 63.08 85.57 46.58 28.96 29.49 39.59 38.04 37.46 213.94 217.32 175.67 380.52 334.86 5.47 7.71 9.09 8.01 7.45 0.47 2.20 4.14 3.19 2.68 10.00 15.00 26.00 26.00 26.00 211.50 68.17 62.73 81.53 96.91 56.09 44.08 13.60 16.87 8.99 -17.74 -9.90 3.14 5.63 -17.67 -31.69 -44.37 -6.75 -10.01 6.08 March March March March March 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 -1.80 -25.49 4.05 1.57 0.22 3.54 -3.40 3.05 2.85 2.86 0.95 3.25 1.74 3.07 3.69 10.01 4.11 10.56 30.73 9.07 -12.89 -4.80 1.83 -0.32 10.17 -25.37 -10.90 11.14 7.14 11.38 -14.11 -9.12 1.63 -0.74 11.03 -46.12 -29.02 19.26 13.38 16.44 -52.56 -44.25 21.78 13.15 16.39 -24.80 -18.10 11.92 6.72 11.12 -2.21 21.71 6.34 36.36 -7.63 109.18 36.22 -26.28 83.71 38.10 -1.56 23.71 -53.83 13.64 38.10

Key Ratios Debt-Equity Ratio Long Term Debt-Equity Ratio Current Ratio Turnover Ratios

March March March March March 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999 2.78 2.33 2.04 2.02 1.97 1.02 1.13 1.03 1.04 1.03 1.16 1.46 1.58 1.55 1.54 March March March March March

30
2003 2.11 6.00 4.06 1.49 12.09 9.45 5.76 4.70 2.06 12.77 10.40 2002 1.96 5.37 3.97 1.35 12.88 9.68 5.69 5.00 1.80 11.47 6.55 2001 1.93 4.24 4.99 1.31 12.70 9.71 5.27 5.08 2.09 11.01 6.49 2000 1.78 3.56 5.68 1.20 13.65 10.42 4.98 4.80 1.57 10.98 3.64 1999 1.41 2.80 5.24 1.33 20.05 15.89 8.07 7.69 3.52 13.12 8.19

Fixed Assets Inventory Debtors Interest Cover Ratio PBIDTM (%) PBITM (%) PBDTM (%) CPM (%) APATM (%) ROCE (%) RONW (%) Source: www.capitaline.com

31

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32

17. Kasturirangan P., Cement selling gets imaginative, www.domain-B.com, June 15, 1999. 18. Schumacher, Katja and Sathaye, Jayant, Indias Cement Industry: Productivity, Energy Efficiency and Carbon Emissions, Environmental Energy Technologies Division, July 1999. 19. Upadhyay, Ashok and Kumar Krishna C N., Alive again, Business India, June 26, 2000, pp. 88-92. 20. Menon, Gopal Bala, Gujarat Ambuja - I can, I can, I can, www.5paisa.com, July 2000. 21. Bamzai, Sandeep, Cementing its hold, Business India, October 16, 2000, pp. 7075. 22. Nair, P.N.V., Straddling www.projectmonitor.com the Indian market, September 16, 2001,

23. An interview with Anil Singhvi, www.Myiris.com, September 30, 2002. 24. Parag Parikh Financial Advisory Services Ltd Report on Gujarat Ambuja, May 2003. 25. Agrawal, Arun, ICRA reaffirms high safety ratings assigned to Gujarat Ambuja Cements Limited, www.icraindia.com June 18, 2003. 26. An interview with Anil Singhvi, Leader Speak, www.indiainfolineline.com August 8, 2003. 27. Mandal, Kohinoor, Mandatory jute packaging Ministry yet to pin down errant cement, The Hindu Business Line, August 9, 2003. 28. An interview with Anil Singhvi, Executive Director, GACL, CEO Talk, HDFC Securities, September 23, 2003. 29. Singh, Sangeetha, Is 'India Shining' or is it mere hyperbole? Financial Express, April 7, 2004. 30. Gujarat Ambuja Cements Annual Reports. 31. www.gujaratambuja.com