Sure, here are more details about the case Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee v.
Som Nath Dass & Ors12:
• The case was heard by the Supreme Court of India on 29th March, 20001.
• The plaintiffs, under the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act, 1922, claimed that the
disputed property was a Sikh gurdwara2.
• The defendants denied this and challenged the plaintiffs’ locus standi to file the
objection to the notification2.
• The Tribunal ultimately decided in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that the disputed
property belonged to the Sikh Gurdwaras and Shrines Act, 19222.
• The case hinges on the question of whether the Guru Granth Sahib can be considered
a juristic person, with the plaintiffs arguing that it can hold and use gifted properties
given by its followers1.
• The defendants argued that it cannot be considered a juristic person as it is a sacred
book and not an idol or physical entity2.
• The Supreme Court held that the Guru Granth Sahib can be considered a juristic
person, and therefore can hold property, sue and be sued2.
• The Court rejected the defendants’ argument that the book could not be considered a
juristic person as it is not an idol or physical entity2.
• The Court also ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the disputed property
belonged to them and not the defendants2.
• The Court reasoned that legal personality can be granted to entities other than
individual human beings, such as groups of human beings, funds, and idols 2.
• The Court cited the example of Hindu law, which recognizes idols as juristic persons 2.
• The Court also noted that the Guru Granth Sahib is recognized as a living Guru in the
Sikh religion, and that once installed, it is recognized as a juristic person2.
• The Court held that the High Court erred in finding that the Guru Granth Sahib was
not a juristic person, and that the plaintiffs had a right to the disputed property2.
This case is of great significance to one of the major religious followers of this country as it
established the legal status of the Guru Granth Sahib 12.
Sure, here are more details about the case Parimisetti Seetharamamma vs Commissioner Of
Income-Tax, Hyderabad1:
• The appellant, Parimisetti Seetharamamma, submitted a return of her income from
property and business for the assessment year 1947-4812.
• She disclosed in a statement that the Maharani of Baroda had, between November
1945 and February 1948, given her some jewellery and money amounting to Rs.
5,20,00012. This was stated to be "out of natural love and affection"12.
• The Income-Tax Officer initially accepted this statement and did not treat the
jewellery and money as taxable income13.
• However, during the course of assessment proceedings for a subsequent year, the
Income-Tax Officer decided to issue the appellant a notice under section 343.
• The officer eventually held the gifts made by the Maharani during the years in
question to be remuneration for services rendered by the appellant as a maid-servant
or Secretary, and therefore to be taxable income3.
• The Appellate Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal substantially agreed with the
view taken by the Income-Tax Officer3.
• Upon a reference, the High Court also decided in favour of the respondent, mainly on
the ground that as the assessee was admittedly in receipt of large sums of money, in
order to claim exemption from tax, the burden was upon her to establish that these
amounts were voluntary payments by the Maharani out of natural love and affection3.
• The Supreme Court held that the burden of proof was wrongly placed on the
appellant1. The court stated that whether a receipt is liable to be treated as income
depends very largely upon the facts and circumstances of each case1.
This case is significant as it deals with the taxation of gifts and the burden of proof in tax
cases13. It highlights the importance of the nature and circumstances of the receipt in
determining its taxability13.
Sure, I can provide a more detailed explanation of the case Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy
v/s C.I.T1.
Facts of the Case: The respondent, Raja Benoy Kumar Sahas Roy, owned a 6000-acre forest
of sal and piyasal trees. The forest was of spontaneous growth and was 150 years old. The
respondent used to sell those trees and income was generated from that. The respondent
claimed that the generated income was agricultural income and therefore should be exempted
under section 10 (1) of the taxation act1.
However, the income tax officer did not consider it as agricultural income and deducted the
expenditure required on maintaining the forest1. The respondent disagreed with the decision
of the income tax officer and went to the Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Appellate
Tribunal1.
Tribunal Decision: The Appellate Tribunal held that the sowing of seeds were few and far
between and the income, derived as it was from jungle products, was not considered as
agricultural income under this act1. After going through all the facts of the case both
Appellate Assistant Commissioner and Appellate Tribunal agreed with the Income Tax
Officer1.
High Court Decision: The case was then transferred to the High Court. The High Court
stated that according to the Income Tax Act, land which has spontaneous growth will not
come under agricultural income1. The High Court also clarified that for income to be called
as agricultural income, some basic operations need to be conducted and human skill and
labour should be applied to that part, not for any basic care like weeding or preservation of
trees1.
Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court agreed with the decision of the High Court1.
The Court observed that planned and scientific exploitation of a forest of spontaneous
growth, though it might yield regular income, would not be income from agriculture as no
operations were carried out and no human skill and labour was expended in such a case, on
the land itself2.
Key Issue: The key issue raised in this case was whether the income from the sale of forest
trees was agricultural income or not1. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with costs1.
The citation for this case is 1957 AIR 768, 1958 SCR 1013.
“CIT v. Kamakhya Narayan Singh”:
Facts of the Case:
1. The case involved four appeals from judgments of the High Court of Judicature at
Patna1.
2. The references were made to that Court under Section 66 (2) of the Indian Income-tax
Act, 19221.
3. The question raised in all appeals was whether interest on arrears of rent payable in
respect of land used for agricultural purposes is exempt from income-tax as being
agricultural income within the definition of that phrase contained in Section 2 (7) of
the Indian Income-tax Act1.
4. In each case, there was included in the assessment of income made upon the assessee
interest in respect of arrears of rent payable for land which was used for agricultural
purposes and was either assessed to land revenue or subject to a local rate1.
5. That interest had been paid1.
6. The interest was, their Lordships understand, payable in all cases by virtue of various
statutes which prescribed that interest should be payable on rent in arrears 1.
7. The point put baldly is therefore "Is such interest rent or revenue derived from
land?"1.
Judgement:
1. The High Court of Judicature at Patna answered the references in favor of the
assessees, the respondents to the several appeals1.
2. The court held that the interest on arrears of rent payable in respect of land used for
agricultural purposes is exempt from income-tax as being agricultural income within
the definition of that phrase contained in Section 2 (7) of the Indian Income-tax Act1.
3. This judgement was significant as it dealt with the interpretation of “agricultural
income” under the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, and its implications for income tax
assessment1.
4. The argument on one hand was that interest payable (whether by statute or not) on
arrears of rent which have already become a debt due is not referable in any way to
the agricultural relationship of landlord and tenant, but is attributable solely to their
character as creditor and debtor1.
5. This case is notable for the diversity of judicial opinion it generated. The High Court
of Calcutta and the High Court of Madras answered the question in the negative,
while the High Court of Allahabad and the High Court of Patna answered in the
affirmative1.
This case is a landmark in the interpretation of “agricultural income” under the Indian
Income-tax Act, 1922, and has had significant implications for income tax assessment in
India1.
R. B. N. J. Naidu vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax, Madhya Pradesh, which was decided
on 9th February, 195512. The case is also cited as (1956) 29 ITR 194 (NAG)12.
The subject matter of the controversy in this case was the finding of the Tribunal that the sum
of Rs. 8,500 represents the assessee’s income from undisclosed sources 12. The question that
arose for judgment was: "Whether there was material on which the Appellate Tribunal could
come to a finding that the sum of Rs. 8,500 was the assessee’s income from disclosed
sources?"12.
The assessee, R. B. N. J. Naidu, ran the business of exhibiting pictures at various cinema
houses in Nagpur12. During the assessment year 1946-47, there were two credits, one of Rs.
10,000 on April 30, 1945, and the other of Rs. 8,500 on May 1, 1945, in his wife’s account
with the Bank of India Ltd., Nagpur12. The Income-tax authorities accepted the explanation of
the assessee for the amount of Rs. 10,00012.
As regards the amount of Rs. 8,500, the assessee submitted the following explanation: "As
regards the sum of Rs. 8,500, I may point out for the last so many years I drew from the
company various sums of money from time to time and paid the same to my wife to enable
her to defray the household and other expenses of the family. My withdrawals for years
ending March 31, 1943, March 31, 1944, March 31, 1945, and March 31, 1946, were Rs.
26,147-15-9, Rs. 20,100-2-9, Rs. 31,036-12-9, and Rs. 47,106-4-6 (this ought to be Rs.
37,106-4-6) respectively."12.
This case is often cited in discussions about the clubbing of income, particularly in relation to
the income of a spouse34. It has been interpreted to mean that when an assessee denies that he
is in receipt of income from a particular source, it is for the Income Tax Officer to prove that
the assessee received income and that the assessee cannot prove the negative 2.
Ito v. Mahavir Irrigation Pvt. Ltd. case in detail:
1. Case Background: The case revolves around the assessment year 2005–06. The
assessee (Mahavir Irrigation Pvt. Ltd.) filed a return declaring a loss of Rs. 42,809/-.
However, the assessment was completed under Section 144 of the Income Tax Act,
1961, resulting in an income of Rs. 1,90,32,843/-. This income determination
included an addition under Section 68 of Rs. 1,89,31,694/-. The assessee was not
allowed to set off its Long Term Capital Gains with the brought forward losses.
2. Long Term Capital Loss Dispute: The assessee claimed a Long Term Capital Loss
of Rs. 78,31,627/- in the assessment year 2003–04 on the sale of shares. However, the
Assessing Officer (AO) admitted and assessed the long-term capital loss at Rs.
10,02,793/-, rejecting the balance amount. The assessee appealed against this
disallowance before the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT (A)), which
was pending for adjudication.
3. CIT (A) Decision: The CIT (A) observed that the appeal for the AY 2003–04 was
still pending. The AO was directed to allow the claim for the adjustment of brought
forward losses if the appellant’s claim for capital loss in the AY 2003–04 was upheld.
Consequently, the matter was restored to the AO for further consideration based on
the outcome of the AY 2003–04 appeal. The Department’s appeal was dismissed.
In simpler terms, the judgement was in favor of Mahavir Irrigation Pvt. Ltd. The company
had claimed a loss in the assessment year 2003-04, which was partially rejected by the AO.
The company appealed this decision, and while the appeal was still pending, the AO was
instructed to allow the company to adjust its brought forward losses if the appeal for the AY
2003–04 was successful. This meant that the final decision was dependent on the outcome of
the appeal for the AY 2003–04. The Department’s appeal against this decision was
dismissed.
Shiela Kaushish vs Commissioner Of Income-Tax decided on 18 August, 198112:
Facts of the Case2:
• Shiela Kaushish, the appellant, constructed a warehouse in Delhi in 1961 at a cost of
Rs 4,13,0002.
• The warehouse was let out to the American Embassy in different portions and at
varying rent amounts2.
• A new lease was entered into between the assessee and the American Embassy for
letting out the entire warehouse at the rent of Rs 34,797 per month on July 17, 1967,
and this lease came into effect from April 1, 19682.
What was the problem?
• The Income Tax officer said that the rent she was getting should be considered as the
annual value of the warehouse for tax purposes.
• But Shiela Kaushish argued that the annual value should be based on the standard rent
set by the Rent Act, which was lower than the actual rent she was getting.
Judgement2:
• The Supreme Court of India held that the annual value of the warehouse for the
purpose of chargeability to income tax for Assessment Years 1969-70 and 1970-71
would have to be determined on the basis of the standard rent of different portions of
the warehouse determinable under clause (b) of sub-section (2) and para (b) of sub-
clause (2) of clause (B) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 of the Rent Act2.
• The court ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the standard rent of different
portions of the warehouse determinable under the provisions of the rent act should be
taken to be the annual value of the warehouse within the meaning of sub-section (1)
of Section 23 of the Income Tax Act, 19612.
The case of Sri [Link] Naicker vs The Income Tax Officer was decided on 29
January, 2007 in the High Court of Judicature at Madras1. Here are the detailed facts and
judgement of the case:
Facts of the Case: The case pertains to the Assessment Year 1993-1994 and involves three
different assessments for the same property, wherein the assessees enjoyed undivided shares 1.
The main issue in question was whether the lands sold by the assessees were agricultural
lands, and hence, whether the profit from the sale of these lands could be assessed as capital
gains1. The assessees contended that the property in question, which was the subject matter of
the sale, was an agricultural property and hence, it could not be subjected to any liability
under the provisions of capital gains1.
Judgement: The court held that the purchaser who had no intention of carrying on
agricultural operations, the seller assessee should not lose the benefit as long as he had been
using the land for agricultural purposes2. This means that if the land was put to agricultural
use for a long period and the agricultural operations were temporarily suspended, the land
does not cease to be agricultural2. Therefore, the profit on the sale of the lands is not
assessable as capital gains1.
This case has been cited in several other judgments and has contributed to the legal discourse
on the classification of lands for tax purposes23. It has set a precedent that the use of the land
at the time of transfer is what determines its classification for tax purposes 2.
