Fabian v.

Desierto,

G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 1998

FACTS: Fabian filed an administrative charge for grave misconduct against Agustin
committed by him as then DPWH Assistant Regional Director of Region IV-A. The
Ombudsman found Agustin guilty but upon reconsideration, he was exonerated. Fabian
elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme
Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written
notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: May administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of

the Office of the Ombudsman be appealed to the Supreme Court without its advise and
concurrence.

RULING: The court ruled No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 was declared INVALID.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an
appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court. The constitutional
prohibition was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under
its appellate Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging
its appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

Bengzon vs Drilon

208 SCRA 133 (1992)

FACTS: In 1990, Congress aimed to reenact laws providing retirement benefits for
judges, but President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill, citing unfair preferential treatment.
Retired judges contested this, arguing that Republic Act No. 1797 was never repealed
due to its lack of publication, leading the Supreme Court to readjust their pensions. In
response, Congress allocated additional pension funds in the 1992 General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) under a "General Fund Adjustment." However, President Aquino
vetoed these pension allotments, asserting they were included in her previous veto of
House Bill No. 16297. This led retired judges, including Cesar Bengzon, to challenge the
constitutionality of the President's veto.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
RULNG: NO . The Justices have vested rights to their pensions under Republic Act No.
1797, which was never repealed, and the President cannot override the Supreme Court's
decision or repeal existing laws.

RATIO DEDICENDI: The Supreme Court ruled that the President's veto was
unconstitutional because she tried to veto only part of an item in the appropriations bill
while retaining the rest. The Court clarified that the Executive must either veto a bill or a
line item in its entirety. In this case, the President only vetoed the portion pertaining to
justices' pensions. As a result, she did not reject the entire line item for the General Fund
Adjustment, which violated constitutional principles.

Gonzales v. Macaraig,

G.R. No. 87636, Nov. 19, 1990

FACTS: Neptali Gonzales and 22 other senators challenged the constitutionality of

President Cory Aquino's veto of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill and Section 16
of the 1990 Appropriations Bill. Gonzales argued that the President's line-veto power is
limited to items and does not extend to provisions, thus exceeding her authority with
these vetoes. He stated that if the President objects to a provision, she must veto the
entire bill, and that item-veto power does not include striking out conditions or
restrictions, which would violate the separation of powers. Additionally, he asserted that
the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 of the 1987 Constitution must be
defined by law, allowing Congress to impose restrictions on its exercise.

ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto “provisions” of an
Appropriations Bill.

RULING: The Supreme Court held No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Supreme Court ruled that Congress cannot include matters in a
general appropriations bill that should be enacted as separate legislation; if it does,
those provisions must be treated as "items" that the President can veto. Furthermore,
the Court determined that even if "provisions" fall outside the executive's veto power,
Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90) are considered "inappropriate provisions" and should
be treated as "items" eligible for the President's veto.

Miller vs Mardo

GR No 15138 31 July 1961

Facts: Republic Act 991 provided that the reorganization plan drafted by Department of
Labor and Employment and submitted it to the president for approval shall deemed as
approved by the Congress after its adjournment unless in the meantime, Congress by
resolution disapproved the plan and assailed its constitutionality.

Issue: Whether or not enactment of law by legislative inaction is valid.

RULING: The enactment of law by legislative inaction is not valid.

RATIO: The contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring

positive and separate actions of each house. It is contrary to the “settled and well-
understood parliamentary law” which requires that the “two houses are to hold separate
sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a proposed law is
to be submitted to the separate determination of the other.”

Tanada vs. Tuvera,

136 SCRA 27 (1985)

FACTS: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to
publish and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters
of implementation, and administrative orders. Respondents, on the other hand, claimed
that this case has no legal personality or standing. Further, they argued that the
publication in the Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law where the law
themselves provides for their own effectivity dates

ISSUE: Whether or not the statutes in question which contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette

RULING: Yes. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary

RATIO DECIDENDI: Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where
the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of
publication is material for determining the date of the effectivity which must be 15 days
following the completion of its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes to effect. Publication of laws is part of substantive due process

Armault vs. Nazareno,

87 Phil. 29 (1950)

FACTS: The Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, purchased the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates, with the payment allocated to Burt via
representative Arnault. Due to anomalies in the sale, a Senate committee was formed to
investigate the transaction. Arnault testified about delivering checks totaling P1.5 million
to Burt and cashing a check for P440,000 but refused to disclose the recipient of that
cash, citing his right against self-incrimination. The Senate committee cited Arnault for
contempt and ordered his imprisonment until he revealed the name. Arnault then filed
for habeas corpus, arguing that the Senate lacks the power to punish him since the
information sought is immaterial to any intended legislation.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the Senate has the power to cite Arnault in contempt and
order his imprisonment?- YES

(2) Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit Arnault for contempt for
a term beyond its legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950? – YES

(3) Whether or not Arnault may be relieved from answering the query simply by
declaring that doing so is self-incriminating?- NO

HELD: (1) The Senate has the power to cite Arnault in contempt and compel him to
answer questions relevant to its inquiry, while respecting his constitutional right against
self-incrimination. Arnault's refusal to disclose the recipient of the P440,000 is pertinent
to determining responsibility for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal.

(2) The Senate also has the authority to commit Arnault for contempt beyond the end of
its legislative session, as it is a continuing body that requires the ability to perform its
functions without obstruction. Limiting this power would undermine the legislative
process, although the courts are available to address any potential abuses.

(3) Lastly, Arnault cannot claim self-incrimination as a reason to withhold information,

since he testified that the transaction was legal and conducted under Burt's instructions,
indicating no grounds for incrimination.

Armault vs. Balagtas,

97 Phil. 358 (1955)

FACTS: Jean L. Arnault, an attorney-in-fact involved in the government’s purchase of the

Buenavista and Tambobong Estates for P5,000,000 in 1949, became the center of a
Senate investigation to assess the transaction’s propriety. During the inquiry, Arnault
refused to disclose the recipient of P440,000, part of the transaction’s payment, leading
the Senate to detain him until he answered satisfactorily. His continued refusal resulted
in ongoing imprisonment, challenged through various legal motions, culminating in
Supreme Court involvement. Arnault’s later submission of an affidavit naming Jess D.
Santos as the recipient failed to convince the Senate of his compliance, leading to a
continuation of his detention via Senate Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952.
Arnault’s habeas corpus petition challenged his detention’s legality, asserting self-
purging of contempt and questioning the Senate’s power to continue his incarceration.

ISSUE:

1. Whether the Senate Special Committee’s disbelief in Arnault’s disclosure was

subject to judicial review.
2. The legality and validity of Arnault’s continued confinement based on Senate
findings.
3. The extent of legislative power and authority to punish for contempt and the
 correctness of its exercise in this context.
4. Whether Arnault’s disclosure concerning Jess D. Santos constituted a sufficient
purging of contempt.

RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, thereby denying the
habeas corpus petition

RATIO DECIDENDI:

1. Judicial courts cannot review legislative findings in the exercise of legislative

functions unless there’s a clear violation of constitutional rights or arbitrary use of
legislative discretion.
2. The Senate has inherent authority to punish contempts that obstruct legislative
processes, with such power deemed necessary for legisprative efficacy.
3. The court found no arbitrary exercise of power in the Senate’s decision to
continue Arnault’s detention, interpreting his refusal as both a continuation of the
original contempt and an affront to the Senate’s authority.
4. The period of Arnault’s confinement did not exceed legal limits for contempt;
thus, the Senate’s ongoing detention to compel truthfulness was warranted.

Bengzon vs. Sen. Blue Ribbon Comm.,

203 SCRA 767 (1991)

FACTS: Benjamin “Kokoy” Romualdez, his wife, and the Marcoses were accused of
unlawfully enriching themselves through control of major businesses like MERALCO and
PCI Bank, aided by the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile
delivered a speech alleging Lopa violated the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
called for an investigation by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. Lopa and Bengzon
refused to testify, citing legal concerns and due process rights. Lopa denied the
allegations in a letter, but Enrile insisted on the inquiry. In response, Bengzon and others
filed a petition for prohibition, seeking a restraining order against the committee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

RULING: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course

RATIO DECIDENDI: Enrile's speech did not suggest any intended legislation; instead, he
called for an investigation into possible violations of Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The inquiry aimed to determine whether Cory Aquino's
relatives, particularly Lopa, violated the law regarding the alleged sale of Kokoy's
corporations to the Lopa Group. Therefore, the investigation by the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee was not truly “in aid of legislation,” as it focused on potential legal violations
better suited for the courts. Additionally, it is noteworthy that Mr. Ricardo Lopa passed
away during the case's proceedings.

Senate v. Ermita
 G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: This petition for certiorari and prohibition challenges Executive Order No. 464,
issued on September 28, 2005, which required executive branch officials to obtain prior
approval from the President before attending legislative inquiries. Between September
21-23, 2004, Senate Committees invited various executive officials to public hearings on
issues like the North Rail Project and electoral fraud, intending to conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation. However, several officials cited E.O. 464, claiming they could not attend
without presidential approval. This led the petitioners to argue that the Executive Order
infringes on Congress's power of inquiry and the public's right to information.

ISSUE: Whether the assailed E.O. 464 violates Congress’ power of inquiry.

RULING: Yes. Congress’ power of inquiry was upheld in aid of legislation by voiding
Sections 2(b) and 3.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The legislative body has the right to information essential for wise
legislating. However, the Court acknowledged the executive privilege doctrine, allowing
the withholding of certain information, including the President’s conversations, Cabinet
discussions, military secrets, and law enforcement investigations prior to prosecution.
Article VI, Section 21 states that Congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation
under its published rules, making attendance at public hearings compulsory. This
reinforces the principle of separation of powers, affirming the legislative branch's co-
equal status with the executive.

Sabio v. Gordon,

G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006

FACTS: On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate

Resolution No. 455 to investigate losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to alleged
Board improprieties. On May 8, 2006, Senator Richard Gordon invited PCGG Chairman
Camilo Sabio to participate as a resource person in a joint committee meeting, but Sabio
declined, citing a prior commitment and invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1, which
protects Commission members from testifying about matters within their official
cognizance. Despite this, Gordon's subpoena for Sabio to testify was repeatedly ignored,
prompting Gordon to threaten contempt proceedings against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.

RULING: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The Court strongly supports the power of inquiry, as seen in Senate
v. Ermita, which ruled that this power extends to executive branch officials. It
emphasized that government operations are valid subjects for investigation and that the
power of inquiry is linked to legislative authority. Article III, Section 7 of the Constitution
guarantees the public's right to access information on official acts and government
transactions. These provisions promote transparency and empower citizens to engage in
public discourse, enabling them to effectively exercise their constitutional rights and
contribute to government accountability.

Neri vs. Senate,

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: In April 2007, the DOTC contracted Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
(ZTE) for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project, worth about $329 million,
funded by China. The Senate raised concerns, with Joe De Venecia alleging that officials
were pressuring for approval. NEDA head Romulo Neri testified that Benjamin Abalos
attempted to bribe him with P200 million for the project. Neri informed President Arroyo,
who advised him to reject the bribe. When questioned about the President's involvement,
Neri invoked "executive privilege" and refused to answer. He later skipped further
hearings, prompting the Senate to cite him for contempt, while Executive Secretary
Ermita claimed their communications were privileged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the SBRC to be answered falls
under executive privilege.

RULING: YES. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory

process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The communications related to the three questions fall under
presidential communications privilege for three reasons:

1. They pertain to the President’s exclusive power to enter into executive agreements
with foreign nations, a recognized authority in Philippine law.

2. The communications were made to a close advisor, as Neri, being a cabinet

member, meets the “operational proximity” test.

3. There has been no compelling need demonstrated that would justify overriding this
privilege or indicate that the information is unavailable from other sources.

Pimentel v. Joint Com.,

G.R. 163783, June 22, 2004

FACTS: Pimentel Jr. filed a petition for Prohibition seeking a judgement declaring null and
void the continued existence of the Joint committee. The petition is seeking for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from
conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public Session of
Congress on Canvassing. The petitioner questions that the adjournment of the regular
session terminated and expired the Congress therefore all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of the Congress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Joint Committee performing election canvass even after the
termination of congress’ session is unconstitutional.

RULING: NO.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Sec. 15, Art VI states that Congress meets annually on the fourth
Monday of July, with a mandatory 30-day recess before its next session. The President
can call special sessions anytime. Contrary to the petitioner’s claim, the Twelfth Congress
did not end with the adjournment on June 11, 2004, as this section pertains to regular
sessions, not the overall term. While legislative functions concluded, non-legislative
functions, like canvassing votes for newly elected officials, continue until their tasks are
complete. A board of canvassers remains active until it finishes its duties, even if its
membership changes.

Republic v. Sandiganbayan,

G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

FACTS: The first Executive Order by President Corazon Aquino, EO No. 1, established the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover ill-gotten wealth from
former President Ferdinand Marcos. The Court has chosen to set aside technicalities in
cases filed by the PCGG, preferring resolution based on merits at the Sandiganbayan.
Nearly two decades have passed since the search for this wealth began, and a definitive
resolution is overdue. If evidence of illegal acquisition exists, it should be presented now,
allowing for a swift determination of ownership without delays from procedural issues.
The pursuit of justice for the Filipino people remains paramount, and the resolution of
these cases is essential for accountability. It is time to bring closure to this long-standing
issue and restore faith in the government’s commitment to integrity.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a
president during his term of office.

RULING: Yes. Committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his term of
office.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The only known lawful income of the respondents, totaling
$304,372.43, should be considered since they did not file a Statement of Assets and
Liabilities (SAL) as required by law. Under both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, as President, was prohibited from receiving any additional
emoluments from the government or managing businesses, which makes the
$304,372.43 a basis for a prima facie case for the forfeiture of Swiss funds. The
respondents argue that the petitioner did not establish a prima facie case for forfeiture,
citing the need for strict interpretation of the law. However, it is not the petitioner’s
responsibility to prove other sources of lawful income, as the respondents should have
disclosed such information in their response. For the Republic, specifying the known
lawful income was sufficient.

Estrada vs. Arroyo,

G.R. No. 146738, March 02, 2001

FACTS: Former President Joseph Estrada was succeeded by his Vice President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo. Due to the allegations against former president Estrada, he
eventually called for a snap election. The Supreme Court declared the seat of the
presidency vacant, saying that Estrada constructively resigned his post. On that same
day, Gloria Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA. Later
that same day, Estrada released a letter saying that he had strong and serious doubts
about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation as president.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Estrada truly resigned.

RATIO DECIDENDI: For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be
an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is
important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the
palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed
Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press release he issued regarding is
acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its
legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The
Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material
relevance on the issue

CLU vs. Exec. Secretary,

194 SCRA 317 (1991)

FACTS: President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed
members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other
government offices or positions in addition to their primary positions subject to
limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring that such
law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the
principal submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution. CLU
avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the
only exceptions against holding any other office or employment in Government are those
provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is
an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

RULING: Yes. EO 284 is unconstitutional

RATIO DECIDENDI: The 1987 Constitution clearly prohibits the President, Vice-
President, Cabinet members, and their deputies from holding multiple government
positions during their tenure, except as specified in the Constitution. References to
Cabinet members during debates should be viewed as personal opinions and do not
override the Constitution's intent. Given this interpretation of Sec 13, Art 7 and Sec 7,
par. (2), Art IX-B, EO 284 is unconstitutional. While it restricts Cabinet members to
holding no more than two additional positions in government, it ultimately allows
multiple offices, contradicting the explicit mandate of Sec 13, Art 7.

Cruz v. COA,

G.R. No. 138489, Nov. 29, 2001

FACTS: On October 23, 1997, the NHA Resident auditor disallowed P276,000 in
representation allowances and per diems for NHA Board members, citing COA
Memorandum No. 97-038. The petitioners argued that this ruling only applied to cabinet
members, asserting that NHA Directors hold positions lower than Assistant Secretaries.
They appealed the notice, claiming their roles were not covered by the Supreme Court
decision. However, the COA denied the appeal, emphasizing that the petitioners served
as representatives of cabinet members. Consequently, they were constitutionally barred
from holding other compensated positions during their tenure.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to their representation allowances and
per diems as members of the NHA Board of Directors.

RULING: The court held No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Officials are not allowed to receive additional compensation for
positions held ex officio capacity as these positions are merely additional imposition of
duties. In this case, the petitioners are holding their positions as member of the board
are considered as alternatives, the prohibition likewise applies to them.

NAC v. COA,

G.R. 156982, September 8, 2004

FACTS: Petitioner National Amnesty Commision (NAC) is a government agency created

on March 25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of
seven members: A Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and
the Secretaries of Jutice, National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex
officio members. It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the
three ex officio members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who
were paid honorari beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC
resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these
representative amounting to P255, 750 for the period of December 12, 1994 to June 27,
1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-038.

ISSUE: Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio

members

RULING: The court ruled No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The representatives assumed their responsibilities not through new
appointments but by designation from ex officio members, who were also designated.
There is a considerable difference between an appointment and designation; an
appointment involves selection by the proper authority to exercise the powers and
functions of an office, while a designation merely imposes additional duties on someone
already in public service due to an earlier appointment. Designation does not entail
payment of additional benefits or grant the right to claim the salary of the position.
Without an appointment, a designation does not entitle the officer to receive the salary
of the position.

Marcos vs. Manglapus,

178 SCRA 760 (1989)

FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family spent three year exile in
Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos
family to order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to enjoin the petition of
the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

RULING: Yes. The President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines

RATIO DECIDENDI: According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution: "The
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines." The phrase,
however, does not define what is meant by executive power although the same article
tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President such as appointing power during
recess of the Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power (Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary power (Section 22),
informing power (Section 23). The Constitution may have grant powers to the President,
it cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. Whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor
judicial has to be executive. The President possesses unstated residual powers which are
implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution

DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees,

G.R. No. 149725, August 19, 2003

FACTS: DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order
issued by the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the
DENR 12 Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region
12 Office.

RULING: Yes. DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course
of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the
President as provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed." In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly
reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had
not expressly repudiated the same.

Blaquera v. Alcala,

G.R. 109406, September 11, 1998

FACTS: On February 21, 1992, President Aquino issued AO 268, granting government
officials and employees productivity incentive benefits for 1991, but prohibiting similar
grants for 1992 pending further study. Despite this, petitioners received incentive
benefits for 1992. On January 19, 1993, President Ramos issued AO 29, allowing a
maximum of P1,000 in benefits for 1992 and reiterating the prohibition on additional
payments without presidential approval. AO 29 required agencies that paid more than
P1,000 to refund the excess amounts. Consequently, the heads of the relevant
departments deducted the overpayments from the petitioners’ salaries or allowances.

ISSUE: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of
presidential control over the executive departments.

RULING: The Court ruled Yes.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The President serves as the head of government, exercising power
and authority over executive departments as outlined in the Constitution. This control
allows the President to modify or nullify actions taken by subordinate officers within the
executive branch. When President Ramos issued AO 29 to limit incentive benefits and
mandate refunds for excess payments, he was exercising his power of control to ensure
fairness and prevent dissatisfaction among government personnel. The issuance of such
orders aimed to regulate the distribution of limited government resources for incentives
and awards. Ultimately, the President’s authority to execute the law and oversee
executive departments is rooted in the Constitution.

Hutchison Ports vs. SBMA,

G.R. No. 131367, August 31, 2000

FACTS: In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) won a public bidding made
by the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project was to develop and operate
a modern marine container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA
Board of Directors already declared HPPL as the winner but later on, the Office of the
President reversed the decision of the Board and ordered a rebidding. In the rebidding
however, HPPL was no longer among the qualified bidders. Eventually, HPPL filed a
petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA from conducting the rebidding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case against SBMA.

RULING: The Court ruled No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct
control of the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or projects
undertaken by the SBMA entail substantial amounts of money. The declaration made by
the SBMA Board declaring HPPL as the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable.
Under LOI No. 620, all projects undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the approval of
the Office of the President. Hence, the Board of SBMA is under the control and
supervision of the President of the Philippines. Therefore, the declaration made by the
Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL. Further, HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines.
It is a foreign corporation registered under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It did not
register here in the Philippines
 NEA vs. COA,

377 SCRA 233 (2002)

FACTS: The President issued an executive order entitled “Implementing the Fourth and
Final Year Salary Increases Authorized by Joint Senate and House of Representatives
Resolution No. 01, Series of 1994.” It directed the payment of the fourth and final salary
increases in two tranches. However, the NEA did not implement the salary increases in
accordance with the schedule of payment and instead implemented in one lump sum the
two tranches. In other words, NEA accelerated the implementation of the salary increase
by paying the second tranche along with the first tranche. Hence, the Commission’s
resident auditor in NEA issued a notice of suspension and, consequently, a notice of
disallowance. The petitioner asked for a reconsidered but it was, however, denied.
Hence, the petition at bar.

ISSUE: Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disallowing the increased salaries? In other words, is NEA allowed to
accelerate the implementation of the salaries due to availability of funds?

RULING: The Court ruled No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The presidential power of control over the executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest
clerk. NEA’s accelerated release of salary is not in accordance with the law because it is
still requires the approval of the President

Pimentel vs. Aguirre,

G.R. 132988, July 19, 2000

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local
government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing
Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

ISSUE: Whether Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of President’s power of
general supervision over LGUs

RULING: The Court held No.

RATIO Decidendi: The President exercises supervision over local governments and their
officials, who are elected and accountable to the electorate, meaning they are subject to
supervision but not control by the President. While local government units enjoy fiscal
autonomy, this does not preclude national government intervention for consistency with
national goals. AO 372, issued by the President, is directory in nature and intended to
advise agencies on cost-reduction measures to maintain economic stability, without
imposing sanctions for noncompliance. The Local Government Code allows presidential
intervention in local fiscal matters under specific conditions, but Section 4 of AO 372,
which withholds 10% of the LGU’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), violates
constitutional mandates for automatic revenue sharing. Therefore, Section 4 cannot be
upheld as it contravenes both the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Bermudez v. Torres,

G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999

FACTS: Atty. Conrado Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos for the position of Provincial
ProsecutorPetitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the
ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of
the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and city prosecutors and
their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the
Secretary.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to

the President can be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

RULING: The Court ruled No.

RATIO DECIDENDI: The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec.
9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to
be a mere advice, exhortation or endorsement, which is essentially persuasive in
character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The
recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the
head of the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action
of all offices under the Executive.

Sarmiento vs. Mison,

156 SCRA 549 (1987)

FACTS: Respondent Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs by then President (Corazon) Aquino. The said appointment made by the
President is being questioned by petitioner Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla,
stating that the said appointment is not valid since the appointment was not submitted
to the Commission On Appointment (COA) for approval. Under the Constitution, the
appointments made for the "Heads of Bureau" requires the confirmation from COA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment made by the President without the confirmation
from COA is valid.

RULING: YES. The appointment made by the President without the confirmation from
COA is valid.

RATIO DECIDENDI: Under the 1987 Constitution, Heads of Bureau are removed from
the list of officers that needed confirmation from the Commission On Appointment. It
enumerated the four (4) groups whom the President shall appoint:

1. First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and
other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution;

2. Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law;

3. Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;

4. Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in
the President alone. All appointments, excluding the 1st group, necessitate the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.