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The document pertains to a Special Leave Petition filed by J. Vedhasingh against R.M. Govindan regarding legal proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Indian Penal Code. It discusses jurisdictional issues, conflicting legal interpretations, and the precedence of special enactments over general laws. The respondent's counsel argues for the dismissal of the petition and quashing of IPC proceedings based on established legal principles.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
53 views12 pages

2206

The document pertains to a Special Leave Petition filed by J. Vedhasingh against R.M. Govindan regarding legal proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Indian Penal Code. It discusses jurisdictional issues, conflicting legal interpretations, and the precedence of special enactments over general laws. The respondent's counsel argues for the dismissal of the petition and quashing of IPC proceedings based on established legal principles.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

2206/R/Problem 1

IN THE

HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF

INDIA

IN THE MATTERS OF

J VEDASINGH

(APPELLANT)

V.

R.M. GOVINDAN & Ors.

(RESPONDENT)

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. XXXX/2024

[UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 READ WITH

ORDER XXI OF THE SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013]

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDEENT

DRAWN AND FILED BY THE COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT


TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATEMENT OF FACTS
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The counsel for the respondent most humbly and respectfully submits that this Hon’ble

Supreme Court has both, pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction, to hear the present matter of

Special Leave Petition No. XXXX/2024 filed under article 136 of the Constitution of India,

1950 read with order XXI of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013.
ISSUES RAISED
1. Whether the ratio of the judgment in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav

Rao lay down the correct law or the view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai

Patel as followed in M/s V.S.Reddy and Sons which is subsequent and conflicting, lay

down the correct proposition of law?

2. Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under

NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior

conviction or acquittal and, the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

1. Whether the ratio of the judgment in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav

Rao lay down the correct law or the view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai

Patel as followed in M/s V.S.Reddy and Sons which is subsequent and conflicting, lay

down the correct proposition of law?

The view taken in the case of Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel as followed in M/s V.S.Reddy

and Sons which is subsequent and conflicting as it inccorectly interprets section 300(1) of the

CrPC, and therefore the judgment in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao

lay down the correct law.

2. Whether on similar set of allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under

NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior

conviction or acquittal and, the bar of Section 300(1) Cr.P.C. would attract for such trial?

On similar set of allegations of fact the accused can be tried for an offence under NI Act

which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the prior conviction

or acquittal as the operation of the Negotiable Instruments Act gains precedence over the

Indian Penal Code in the current scenario.


ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

1. The ratio of the judgment in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Kolla Veera Raghav Rao

lay down the correct law.

1.1. A person who has once been tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence

and convicted or acquitted shall, while such conviction or acquittal remains in force,

not be tried again for the same offence, nor on the same facts for any other offence

for which a different charge from the one made against him might have been made

under 221(1), or for which he might have been convicted under sub-section (2).1

1.2. As per section 221(1) of CrPC,2 if an act or series of acts is of such a nature that it is

doubtful which of several offences the facts which can be proved will constitute, the

accused may be charged with having committed all or any of such offences, and any

number of such charges may be tried at once; or he may be charged in the alternative

with having committed some one of the said offences.

1.3. As per the Sangeetaben Mahendarbhai Patel,3 the subsequently charged offence in

the case of section 300(1) of CrPC4 should have the same ingredients as the initial

offence. This reading would be contrary to the provision as there is no requirement

under section 221(1) or 221(2) of the CrPC that the charges framed should have the

same ingredients. Therefore, the M/S. V.S. Reddy & Sons5 judgement is also

erroneous as it follows the same line of reasoning.

1
§ 300, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
2
§ 221(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
3
Sangeetaben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2012) 7 SCC 621, paragraph 35.
4
§ 221(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
5
V.S. Reddy & Sons v. Muthyala Ramalinga Reddy, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1925
1.4. As there cannot be prosecution under section 406/420 of IPC 6 after conviction or

acquittal under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 7 the position laid

down by Kolla Veera Raghav Rao8 can be said to have laid down the correct law.

1.5. G. Sagar Suri9 also laid down the correct law as it quashed the proceedings under the

Indian Penal Code due to the parallel proceedings under the Negotiable Instruments

Act as it was an abuse of process of law.

2. On similar set of allegations of fact the accused cannot be tried for an offence under

NI Act which is special enactment and also for offences under IPC unaffected by the

prior conviction or acquittal.

2.1. Where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more enactments, then

the offender shall be liable to be prosecuted and punished under either or any of those

enactments, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence.10

2.2. Though article 20(2) of the Constitution 11 protects the convict from a second trial, the

clause has a narrower ambit than section 300 of CrPC. 12 Section 300 debars a second

trial against the same accused on the same facts for a different offence if a different

charge against him for such offence could have been made under Section 221(1) of

the Code, or he could have been convicted for such other offence under Section

221(2) of the Code. 13

2.3. Laws concerning a special subject of legislation and therefore the provisions of such

subject-specific legislations must prevail and take precedence over the provisions of

a general law such as the IPC.14

6
§ 420, Indian Penal Code, 1860.
7
§ 138, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
8
Kolla Veera Raghav Rao v. Gorantla Venkateswara Rao, (2011) 2 SCC 703
9
G. Sagar Suri And Anr vs State Of Up. And Ors, (2009) 1 NIJ 138 (2000)
10
§ 26, General Clauses Act, 1897.
11
Art. 20(2), The Constitution of India, 1950
12
§ 300, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
13
State v. Nalini, (1999) 5 SCC 253, paragraph 238.
14
Independent Thought v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 800, paragraph 93.
2.4. Offence means any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in

force.15

2.5. The special provision of a specific purpose in an act has to be given effect as to make

the provision effective and true to the legislative intent.16

2.6. In the given situation, the act of giving the cheque by Mr. Govindan constituted the

offence both under the Indian Penal Code and the Negotiable Instruments Act, which

means that he is liable to be prosecuted and punished only under either of those

enactments.

2.7. Since the prosecution under both the enactments were for the same act (or series of

acts), the present situation comes under the ambit of section 300 of the CrPC and the

charges under the Indian Penal Code are meant to be quashed.

2.8. As the Negotiable Instruments Act is the special act in the current scenario and the

Indain Penal code is the General Act, the functioning of the Negotiable Instruments

Act will take precedence.

3.

15
§ 2(n), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
16
Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Govt. (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 2 SCC 18, paragraph 32.
PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited,

it is most humbly prayed before this Hon’ble Court, that it may be pleased –

1. To dismiss the petition.

2. Quash the proceedings under the Indian Penal Code.

And further, grant any other relief or pass any other order in favor of the Respondents, which

the Hon’ble Court may so deem fit in the ends of equity, justice and good conscience.

All of which is most humbly and respectfully submitted.

Date: 14th September, 2024. Sd/-

Place: Supreme Court of India. Counsel for the Respondents.


1. Background: J. Vedhasingh, a civil engineer, returned to India from Saudi Arabia in

2011 and purchased a site from R.M. Govindan’s father in Coimbatore. The

respondents owned seven other house sites in Coimbatore, which were mortgaged to

the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation12.

2. Agreement: Vedhasingh was approached by the respondents to invest money for the

development of these sites, with an agreement that profits would be

shared. Vedhasingh invested ₹62,32,754, but neither received profits nor any piece of

land23.

3. Legal Proceedings: Vedhasingh filed a complaint under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act after a cheque given by the respondents was

dishonored. He also lodged a complaint under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C., which led

to further legal actions23.

4. High Court Ruling: The High Court of Madras quashed the proceedings under

Sections 120B, 406, 420, and 34 of the IPC, stating that continuing these proceedings

alongside the Section 138 case would be an abuse of the court’s process12.

5. Supreme Court Decision: The Supreme Court referred the matter to a larger

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