FIRST SECTION

CASE OF P. v. POLAND

(Application no. 56310/15)

JUDGMENT

Art 10 • Freedom of expression • Dismissal of a secondary school teacher for,

among others, writing an Internet blog for adults featuring some sexually
explicit content, considered by the authorities to be an affront to the prevailing
domestic social mores • Lack of relevant and sufficient reasons • Applicant’s
personal blogging activity did not threaten the protection of morals of minors
in a manner justifying the sanction imposed • Interference neither
corresponded to a pressing social need, nor proportionate

Prepared by the Registry. Does not bind the Court.

STRASBOURG

13 February 2025

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

In the case of P. v. Poland,

The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Ivana Jelić, President,
Alena Poláčková,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Lətif Hüseynov,
Péter Paczolay,
Gilberto Felici,
Alain Chablais, judges,
and Ilse Freiwirth, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 56310/15) against the Republic of Poland lodged with
the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national,
Mr K.P. (“the applicant”), on 5 November 2015;
the decision to give notice to the Polish Government (“the Government”)
of the complaints under Articles 8, 10 and 14 of the Convention concerning
the applicant’s dismissal on disciplinary grounds from his workplace and to
declare the remainder of the application inadmissible;
the decision not to have the applicant’s name disclosed;
the observations submitted by the Government and the observations in
reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by the Polish Society of Anti-Discrimination
Law, the European Region of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans
and Intersex Association, and Campaign Against Homophobia, who were
granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
Having deliberated in private on 14 January 2025,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:

INTRODUCTION
1. The case concerns the dismissal of a secondary school teacher for,
among other things, writing an internet blog for adults featuring some
sexually explicit content. The case mainly raises an issue under Article 10 of
the Convention.

THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Koszalin. He was
represented by Ms A. Stach, a lawyer practising in Szczecin.
3. The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr J. Sobczak,
subsequently replaced by Ms A. Kozińska-Makowska, of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.

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4. The facts of the case may be summarised as follows.

I. BACKGROUND

5. The applicant is a qualified teacher of Polish and English.

6. From 1 September 2007 to 16 December 2013 the applicant worked as
a teacher and a form tutor in a secondary school in Koszalin. Secondary
school students in Poland are between fifteen and eighteen years old.
7. Each year from 2008 to 2012 the school principal awarded the applicant
a prize for the best teacher. In 2010 and 2013 the applicant also won national
competitions for the best form tutor.
8. The applicant did not receive any reprimands and no complaints were
made about him.
9. The school principal stated in the disciplinary proceedings described
below that since 2010 she had suspected that the applicant was homosexual.
She stated that she had not taken issue with his sexual orientation and had
considered him to be a very good teacher.
10. As part of his job the applicant occasionally took his students on
school excursions.
11. Pursuant to the 2001 Ordinance of the Minister of Education on the
organisation of tourism by schools, a school trip may only be attended by
persons who have been registered, prior to the event, with the school’s
principal in the trip record (section 10 of the Ordinance). According to the
well-established practice of the applicant’s school, third parties could not be
invited to attend such activities. That rule was expressly stated in the file of
each school trip. It was undisputed between the parties that the applicant had
known about the rule.
12. In June 2013 the applicant oversaw two school trips. During one of
those trips, his same-sex partner accompanied him to a ceremony at the
Presidential Palace in Warsaw. He left immediately after the ceremony and
was not present throughout the rest of the trip. The applicant’s partner also
accompanied him on a school camping trip. The applicant explained that he
had asked his partner to keep him company as he had suffered sunburn. On
both occasions, the applicant introduced his partner to everyone as his cousin.
The applicant’s partner was not listed as a participant in any of the trip
records. The applicant stressed that, during both trips, he had done his night
shifts and he had diligently watched over his students.
13. From April or May 2012 until 1 July 2013 the applicant wrote
approximately a hundred posts on a public blog on a website aimed at
homosexual men, at times posting almost daily. In order to access the website
a prospective user had to declare that they were an adult. The applicant wrote
under a pseudonym. He wrote in the first person and, at times, referred to
himself in the text by his real first name.

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14. The content of his blog posts comprised photographs and text in the
style of a diary.
15. The photographs mainly depicted men, alone or interacting with other
men, dressed, half-dressed or nude, in various situations, such as holding
hands, hugging while asleep, having fun on a beach or in water, doing
household chores, sharing a bed, kissing in the street, mowing a lawn,
urinating in a men’s toilet, repairing a car, posing for a picture, holding a
phallic-shaped object, removing underwear, or having sex. Other
photographs depicted the applicant – either alone or hugging or kissing
another man. None of the photographs, whether of the applicant or otherwise,
displayed sexual organs or actual sexual intercourse.
16. The applicant’s writings mainly described his daily life; his dreams
and feelings of love and loneliness; and his intimate thoughts or desires in
respect of his partner. Several dozen passages had clear erotic connotations
or explicitly depicted, named or described erotic or sexual acts between men.
17. In several of his blog posts he expressed his frustration with his job as
a junior teacher or employed swear words with respect to his superiors. He
also wrote in general terms about his students.
18. The applicant’s blog registered 39,000 visitors.
19. The applicant claims that he kept the blog a secret from his colleagues
and students. It appears however that his blog was read and commented on
by the school staff. It also appears that the students knew about his internet
activity. In particular, one student left a comment, either on the blog or on the
applicant’s Facebook page, saying “This guy ... is my teacher of Polish”.
20. During the disciplinary proceedings described below, the school
principal stated that she had not received any complaints about the applicant’s
blog from the students or their parents. She knew that the teachers at her
school had been reading the blog, but submitted that they had been appalled
not by the applicant’s sexual orientation, but rather by the defamatory
comments about the school staff members that he had made separately on
Facebook. During the same disciplinary proceedings, the applicant submitted
that he had never heard any whisper about the blog from his students.
21. On 1 July 2013 the school principal, who had been informed about the
applicant’s blog, reprimanded him in that connection and asked him to delete
it. The applicant did so on the same day.

II. DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE APPLICANT

22. On 4 July 2013 the school principal asked the disciplinary officer for
teachers (rzecznik dyscyplinarny) to open disciplinary proceedings against the
applicant on the grounds that he had breached his duties as prescribed in the
1982 Teacher’s Charter Act (Karta Nauczyciela). In particular, he was
reported for allowing a third party (his partner) to attend two school trips
without informing the school principal or asking for her authorisation. The

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applicant had thus treated both school events as private and had failed to
ensure adequate care and supervision of his students. He was also reported
for running an internet blog which contained text and images “full of
eroticism (erotyzm) and profanities (wulgaryzmy)”. No details were given
about the blog’s content. The principal feared that the applicant was not fit to
“shape his students’ moral attitudes”. The principal’s letter did not mention
the applicant’s statements regarding his students or colleagues, or his
Facebook activity.
23. The disciplinary officer from the Zachodniopomorski Governor’s
Office brought proceedings with the Disciplinary Commission for the
Teaching Profession and lodged an application to have the applicant
reprimanded for introducing an unauthorised third party during two school
trips and for “running a blog containing texts and images unworthy of the
teaching profession”.
24. According to the record of the hearing held by the Disciplinary
Commission on 16 December 2013, the questioning of the school principal
and the applicant focused, firstly, on the applicant’s bringing a third party on
the school trips, and, secondly, on the blog posts in so far as they contained
“profanities” and “obscene” photographs and scenes – considered to “attest
to the applicant’s morality” – and in so far as they contained offensive
comments about the applicant’s students and colleagues. As to the comments
about the colleagues, the school principal mainly referred to another activity
of the applicant, namely his Facebook posts that contained negative
comments about the school staff, who were depicted as slackers (nieroby),
and clarified that profane language had not been used in those posts.
Throughout the hearing, the members of the Disciplinary Commission
explicitly stated that the profanities were distinct from the applicant’s sexual
orientation, the latter not being the subject of the disciplinary proceedings.
The applicant admitted to the breach of the rules regulating school trips and
to the writing of his blog. He stated that his blogging activity had been a form
of therapy and a foolish mistake. He reassured the Commission that the blog
had been deleted and that he was not going to make similar publications
again.
25. At the above-mentioned hearing, the disciplinary officer reiterated his
request that a punishment be imposed on the applicant in the form of a
reprimand with a warning (see paragraph 40 below).
26. After the hearing, on 16 December 2013, the Disciplinary
Commission found the applicant responsible for “a breach of the dignity of
the teaching profession and of the duties set out in section 6 of the Teacher’s
Charter Act” (see paragraphs 39 and 40 below) in that on two school trips he
had been accompanied by an unauthorised third party and that he had run a
public blog with “texts and images unworthy of the teaching profession”. The
Commission ordered that the applicant be dismissed from his position at the

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school (section 76(1)(2) of the Teacher’s Charter Act – see paragraph 40

below).
27. The decision’s reasoning contained, among other things, the following
statements and observations. The applicant’s blog contained “texts of an
erotic character and obscene photos”. A teacher who published profane
comments on social media undermined the dignity of the profession.
Teachers had to act with dignity at school and in their private environment.
Teachers who in their spare time were active on the internet had to act in a
dignified manner. Teachers, while enjoying freedom of expression, had to
show restraint because of their mission as educators of a new generation and
because of the responsibility for their expression, especially given that when
publishing on the internet they did not enjoy the right to privacy. Content
published on Facebook was widely accessible and aimed at an unrestricted
public readership. According to the decision, “[b]y using profane terms, by
breaching good mores (dobre obyczaje) through his expression, and by
posting obscene photographs, a teacher breaches the dignity of the teaching
profession”. In the light of the decision’s reasoning, the Commission did not
make an assessment of any specific blog posts.
28. The applicant appealed against that decision, asking that the sanction
imposed on him be changed as it was disproportionately severe. He argued,
inter alia, that the Disciplinary Commission had wrongly found that he lacked
morals and posed a threat to the ethical education of his students. He further
stated that the Commission’s decision was grounded on the information about
his “disturbed sexual orientation” (his own words). He acknowledged that
writing the blog was reprehensible behaviour. He explained, however, that
his conduct had not been the result of “depravity” but rather his complicated
and difficult personal situation and identity issues, as well as his traumatic
childhood. The applicant concluded that the disproportionate severity of the
punishment which had been imposed on him indicated that the Commission’s
decision had been based, possibly subconsciously, on homophobic prejudices
and stereotypes.
29. The applicant was assigned a legal-aid lawyer to represent him in the
proceedings. Before the Appellate Disciplinary Commission (“the Appellate
Commission”), the applicant’s lawyer argued firstly that the sanction that had
been imposed on the applicant was disproportionately severe. In respect of
the first ground for the applicant’s punishment, the lawyer stated that the
applicant had indeed breached the regulations, but he had not neglected his
duties during the school trips in question. In respect of the second ground, the
lawyer argued that the problem was more complex. In particular, he alleged
that the reason for the disciplinary proceedings had been the discovery of the
applicant’s homosexual orientation, which was revealed in his blog. The
disciplinary proceedings and their outcome had therefore been
discriminatory. The applicant was an excellent teacher who had been teaching

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his students values such as love for their country, respect for the Constitution,
freedom of conscience and respect for every human being.
30. On 24 September 2014 the Appellate Commission quashed the
decision of 16 December 2013 and discontinued the disciplinary proceedings
against the applicant.
31. In its decision the Appellate Commission took into consideration the
applicant’s conduct during the proceedings, namely the fact that he had
admitted all of the acts imputed to him and had expressed remorse for them,
as well as the fact that he had ceased writing the blog and had deleted it on
the same day on which the school principal had reprimanded him for it. The
Appellate Commission also found that there had been no proof that he had in
fact neglected his duties as tutor during the trips. Moreover, in the Appellate
Commission’s view, the applicant had written the blog for therapeutic
purposes on the recommendation of his psychiatrist to note down his feelings
in order to overcome his childhood psychological trauma. In the light of the
decision’s reasoning, the Appellate Commission did not make an assessment
of any specific blog post. Lastly, the Appellate Commission attached
importance to the lack of any evidence that the applicant’s blog had had any
negative impact on the youth at the school.
32. The disciplinary officer from the Ministry of National Education
appealed, reiterating: firstly, that the applicant had not complied with
regulations aimed at ensuring the safety of students on school trips; and
secondly, that he had breached the dignity of his profession by writing the
blog. As to the latter, the officer stressed that, contrary to what had been
argued by the applicant’s lawyer, the problem at hand was not the applicant’s
sexual preferences, but only the indecent content of his public blog. The
officer also noted that the applicant’s blog contained “erotic texts”, “obscene
photographs”, “profanities”, “erotic and profane descriptions of intimate
situations, and “obscene photographs of the teacher with his partner”. The
officer also noted that the “comments full of profanities also referred to the
school staff and school affairs”. The officer raised the additional point that
the applicant had admitted to the conduct attributed to him and, in his appeal,
had merely asked for a more lenient punishment. In the officer’s view, the
applicant had thus not questioned the legitimacy of the punishment as such.
The disciplinary officer concluded that “the applicant did not fulfil one of the
statutory requirements for a teacher, namely compliance with basic moral
principles”. In his view, the applicant had “breached that requirement by
posting on his blog entries and photographs violating good mores”. In the
light of those considerations, the officer argued that the sanction imposed on
the applicant was appropriate.
33. On 7 May 2015 the Szczecin Court of Appeal reversed the decision of
24 September 2014 and dismissed the applicant’s appeal, at the same time
upholding the Disciplinary Commission’s decision, including the part
ordering his dismissal.

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34. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant, by bringing an

unauthorised person on two school trips, had neglected his duties and
compromised students’ safety, in breach of section 6(1) of the Teacher’s
Charter Act. Moreover, it considered that the fact that the applicant had been
“writing a blog with the content (including the photographs) that was profane,
obscene and sexual” was unworthy of the teaching profession and in breach
of the obligation laid down in section 6(5) of the same Act to shape students’
moral and civic attitudes. To that end, the Court of Appeal listed more than
thirty dated blog entries and described them as: “obscene and pornographic
photos” (“photos of men”, “photos of the applicant”, “sexual content”);
descriptions of “the applicant’s sexual life”; and “comments about the
students and [the applicant’s] work at the school”. It singled out the following
excerpts, among others: (i) those regarding the applicant’s work: “I am now
the school’s prostitute, who can be used, as I will agree to anything anyway”;
“have I mentioned that I will be used at my work? Regrettably, not sexually
... my period has started ... the period of apprenticeship”; “the first class has
already got on my nerves. I will show those dicks in the English exam!”, “Is
there anything that makes you prouder than having your students resemble
you? I am raising a whole host of future little psychopaths who are already
my equals in sarcasm”; (ii) those regarding his youth: “Those were the days
of rebellion. I was thrown out of school for absences and a sexual approach
to education – I fucked education, or alternatively, I had everything up in my
ass”; or (iii) those regarding life in general: “It’s a holy day. And, in protest,
I can die of humiliation. I want to be found dead, with my penis erect, with
my pants lowered and stained with white sperm, among wheat coloured in
blood-red gore ... 7 June – international day of sex ... remember to celebrate
the holy day”. The Court of Appeal noted that, as submitted by the school
principal at the hearing before it, the applicant’s blog contained terms such as
“blow you” or “you have a big one”, which the principal considered
unacceptable and demeaning. The Court of Appeal did not make any
reference to the applicant’s Facebook activity. The Court of Appeal also
noted that the applicant’s colleagues and the school principal had described
the photographs as being “pornographic” and “obscene”, and the text as being
“very immoral”, “profane” and “sexual”. In its reasoning, the court observed
that, as the time had gone by, “the applicant [had] made more and more
entries breaching the dignity of the profession, [by] describing or
commenting on his sexual and professional life, [and] uploading
photographs”. In that context, the court observed that teachers were not only
there to convey knowledge, but also to influence children’s conduct or
perception of the world. The Court of Appeal expressly stated that the
applicant’s sexual orientation was irrelevant, in the sense that it could not
constitute a valid justification for the public expression of obscenities.
Responding to the Appellate Commission’s arguments, it also found it
irrelevant that the applicant’s conduct had not had any negative effect on his

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students. To that end, the court attached importance to the public nature of
the applicant’s internet blog and the fact that in it, he had exposed his
profession and discredited his colleagues, his supervisors and his students.
35. The court’s reasoning does not elaborate on the statements concerning
the applicant’s colleagues or school administration. In this context, the court
did not examine the case from the perspective of defamation.
36. Lastly, the Court of Appeal observed that the sanction imposed on the
applicant was proportionate in that, taking into consideration his remorseful
attitude and his very good record as a teacher, it was sufficiently harmful to
the applicant, but it did not take away his career opportunities in other
schools.
37. No further appeal was available under the applicable law.
38. According to statistics provided by the Government, 109 sets of
disciplinary proceedings were instituted in Poland between 2013 and 2021
for “inappropriate activity of teachers on the internet” (including blogging,
Facebook posts, messaging students). Ninety-six of those cases had resulted
in disciplinary sanctions against the teacher concerned. It is unknown how
many of those cases concerned posts with sexual content.

RELEVANT DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND

PRACTICE
39. The conduct of teachers in Poland is regulated by the Teacher’s
Charter Act of 26 January 1982 (Karta Nauczyciela), which, in so far as
relevant, reads as follows:
“Taking into account the important role of education and upbringing in the Republic
of Poland, and wishing to express the special social importance of the teaching
profession in accordance with the needs and expectations [of society] by opening the
way to further legal regulation of the national education system with this Act, it is
hereby established:
...”

Section 6
“A teacher is obliged to:
1) reliably perform tasks related to the position entrusted to him and to the basic
functioning of the school: teaching, education and caring, including tasks related to
ensuring the safety of students during classes organised by the school;
2) support each student in his or her development;
...
4) educate and raise young people in love for the Homeland, in respect for the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and in an atmosphere of freedom of conscience
and respect for every person;

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5) take care to shape moral and civic attitudes in students in accordance with the
idea[s] of democracy [and of] peace and friendship between people of different nations,
races and worldviews.
...”

Section 9
“1. The position of teacher may be held by a person who:
1) has a higher education with appropriate pedagogical preparation or has graduated
from a teacher training institution ...;
2) adheres to basic moral principles;
...”
40. The Teacher’s Charter Act further regulates the disciplinary liability
of teachers. The relevant parts read as follows:

Section 75
“1. Teachers are subject to disciplinary liability for breaches of the dignity of the
teaching profession or the obligations referred to in section 6.
...
2a. ... Where there is a suspicion that a teacher has committed an act violating the
rights and well-being of a child, the school principal ... shall notify the disciplinary
officer no later than within 14 days from the date of receiving information about the
suspicion that such an act has been committed, unless the circumstances clearly indicate
that no such act has been committed.”

Section 76
“1. The disciplinary penalties for teachers are:
1) reprimand with warning;
2) dismissal from position;
3) dismissal from position with a ban on employment as a teacher for a period of 3
years from the date of punishment;
4) expulsion from the teaching profession.
...
3. Imposing the disciplinary penalty referred to in subsection 1 point 4 is tantamount
to a prohibition on employing the punished person as a teacher.
...
5. A copy of the final judgment imposing a disciplinary penalty together with its
justification shall be included in the teacher’s personal file.”
41. Pursuant to section 85s of the Teacher’s Charter Act, a disciplinary
sanction such as dismissal from his or her position is expunged from a
teacher’s records after three years and the disciplinary decision is removed
from the teacher’s professional file.

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THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
READ ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONVENTION

42. The applicant complained, relying on Articles 8 and 14 of the

Convention, that his disciplinary dismissal from his position as a teacher at a
secondary school had breached his right to respect for his private and family
life, as well as the prohibition of discrimination. In that connection, he
explicitly argued that the sanction in question had stemmed from prejudice
against his sexual orientation and his relationship with a partner of the same
sex. The provisions in question read as follows:

Article 8
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right
except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in
the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals,
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”

Article 14
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”

A. Article 8 of the Convention taken alone

43. The Court notes that neither party contested the applicability ratione
materiae of Article 8 of the Convention to the facts of the case. That,
however, does not release the Court from the obligation to examine proprio
motu the question of its jurisdiction at every stage of the proceedings, even
where no objection has been raised in that respect (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü
v. Turkey, no. 76730/12, § 53, 22 June 2021).
44. The Court must assess whether the applicant’s dismissal from the
position of a teacher at a secondary school affected his private life, thus
rendering Article 8 applicable (see, mutatis mutandis, Denisov v. Ukraine
[GC], no. 76639/11, § 118, 25 September 2018).
45. The Court reiterates that the concept of “private life” is a broad term
that is not susceptible to exhaustive definition. It covers the physical and
psychological integrity of a person. It can therefore embrace multiple aspects
of a person’s physical and social identity. Article 8 protects in addition a right

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to personal development and the right to establish and develop relationships

with other human beings and the outside world (see Mile Novaković
v. Croatia, no. 73544/14, § 42, 17 December 2020, with further references
therein).
46. Employment-related disputes are not per se excluded from the scope
of “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see
Fernández Martínez v. Spain [GC], no. 56030/07, §§ 110 and 113,
ECHR 2014 (extracts), with further references, and Denisov, cited above,
§ 115). There are normally two ways in which a private-life issue would arise
in such a dispute: either because of the underlying reasons for the impugned
measure (in that event the Court employs the reason-based approach) or – in
certain cases – because of the consequences it has for private life (in that event
the Court employs the consequence-based approach – see Denisov, cited
above, § 115). Where a consequence-based approach is at stake, a certain
threshold of severity must be attained, and the applicant has to present
evidence substantiating the consequences of the impugned measure. The
Court will only accept that Article 8 is applicable where these consequences
are very serious and affect his or private life to a very significant degree
(ibid., § 116, and see Mile Novaković, cited above, § 43). In determining the
seriousness of the consequences in employment-related cases, it is
appropriate to assess the subjective perceptions submitted by the applicant
against the background of the objective circumstances existing in the
particular case. This analysis would have to cover both the material and the
non-material impact of the alleged measure (see Denisov, cited above, § 117).
The Court notes that the applicant, in formulating his Article 8 complaint
relied solely on what amounts to the reason-based approach, never raising,
even in essence, any arguments pertaining to the consequence-based
approach.
47. Turning to the facts of the present case, and taking the reason-based
approach first, the Court observes that the direct reason for the applicant’s
dismissal from his post was a breach of the duties prescribed in the Teacher’s
Charter Act. The breach in question was twofold. Firstly, the applicant had
been accompanied by an unauthorised person on two school trips. Secondly,
he had been writing a blog that was viewed as obscene (see paragraphs 22-34
above). The applicant, in his complaints, focused on the fact that the person
who had accompanied him on the two trips was his same-sex partner and that
the blog he had written had homosexual content.
48. In so far as the applicant has argued that the situation had been
underpinned by homophobic prejudice, the Court would make the following
observations.
49. The applicant’s dismissal from his school was not based on any
official policy against homosexual people (contrast Lustig-Prean and Beckett
v. the United Kingdom, nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96, 27 September 1999, and
Smith and Grady v. the United Kingdom, nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96,

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ECHR 1999-VI). Moreover, it has not been argued that the Teacher’s Charter
Act, which does not contain any references to sexual orientation (see
paragraphs 39 and 40 above), had, as its underlying legislative intent, a
restriction on imparting information about same-sex relationships to students
(contrast, mutatis mutandis, Macatė v. Lithuania [GC], no. 61435/19,
§§ 195-200, 23 January 2023).
50. As to whether the applicant’s homosexuality played a role in shaping
the assessment made by the school principal and the authorities of his
conduct, the Court notes that both the school principal and the authorities
explicitly denied that that was the case (see paragraphs 9, 32 and 34 above,
and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Macatė, cited above, §§ 189 and 194). The
Court has previously found in other cases that, notwithstanding the
precautions taken by the domestic authorities to justify their decision by
reasons other than an applicant’s sexual orientation, the inescapable
conclusion was that the applicant’s homosexuality had in fact been at the
centre of deliberations and omnipresent at every stage of the judicial
proceedings (see E.B. v. France [GC], no. 43546/02, § 88, 22 January 2008,
and X v. Poland, no. 20741/10, § 79, 16 September 2021). No such inference
can, however, be made in the present case, given the absence from the case
material of any innuendo to that effect and the presence of explicit statements
to the contrary, and given the fact that the applicant’s sexual orientation had
seemingly been known to the school’s principal for a number of years (see
paragraph 9 above), without any negative consequences for him (contrast
A.K. v. Russia, no. 49014/16, §§ 43 and 44, 7 May 2024). If anything, it
appears that the argument about the applicant’s sexual orientation was
presented by him as an explanation for his behaviour and, as such, was
rejected by the Court of Appeal (see paragraph 34 in fine above).
51. In the light of these considerations, it cannot categorically be said that
the real or crucial reason for the impugned measure was the applicant’s
homosexual orientation (see the preceding paragraph; contrast, mutatis
mutandis, Mile Novaković, cited above, §§ 48 and 49, and X v. Poland, cited
above, §§ 73-93).
52. The Court observes that the personal sphere protected by Article 8 can
indeed include, irrespective of one’s sexual orientation, a person’s sexual life
(see Chocholáč v. Slovakia, no. 81292/17, §§ 53-56, 7 July 2022). In the
present case, however, it cannot be said that the applicant’s impugned
conduct related to his sexual life as such (contrast with Chocholáč, cited
above, in which an applicant prisoner, who was unable to receive intimate
visits, received a disciplinary sanction for possession of pornographic
material in his cell).
53. In the light of these considerations, the Court is not satisfied that the
underlying reasons for the applicant’s dismissal from work were sufficiently
linked to his private life (contrast Travaš v. Croatia, no. 75581/13, § 56,

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4 October 2016) to justify the applicability of Article 8 to the facts of the

present case under its reason-based approach.
54. Turning to the consequence-based approach, the Court must first
reiterate the Gillberg exclusionary principle according to which, where the
negative effects complained of are limited to the consequences of unlawful
conduct which were foreseeable by the applicant, Article 8 cannot be relied
upon to allege that such negative effects encroach upon private life (see
Gillberg v. Sweden [GC], no. 41723/06, § 71, 3 April 2012, and Denisov,
cited above, § 121). It has to be noted in this context that the applicant did not
dispute that he had knowingly breached the rules relating to school trips when
he had, on two occasions, been joined on such trips by his partner, who did
not have the necessary authorisation (see paragraph 11 above). In these
circumstances, a form of disciplinary sanction was a foreseeable consequence
of the applicant’s conduct in his capacity as a teacher (see Gillberg, cited
above, § 71, and compare Denisov, cited above, § 121; Gražulevičiūtė
v. Lithuania, no. 53176/17, § 102, 14 December 2021; and Juszczyszyn
v. Poland, no. 35599/20, § 231, 6 October 2022). In so far, however, as the
sanction foreseeable for the above conduct could, under the applicable law,
be of a lesser degree than dismissal (reprimand was another possibility, see
paragraph 40 above), and more importantly, in so far as the applicant entirely
contests the existence of misconduct with regard to the second ground for his
dismissal, namely, his blog activity, the case may be distinguished from
Gillberg (compare with Denisov, cited above, § 121).
55. The Court will therefore continue its assessment of the applicability
of Article 8, based on the assumption that the Gillberg exclusionary principle
cannot be relied on fully in the circumstances of the present case.
56. The Court would first reiterate that it is an intrinsic feature of the
consequence-based approach under Article 8 that convincing evidence
showing that the threshold of severity was attained has to be submitted by the
applicant. Applicants are obliged to identify and explain the concrete
repercussions on their private life and the nature and extent of their suffering,
and to substantiate such allegations in a proper way (see Denisov, cited above,
§ 114). The Court thus notes that the applicant was dismissed from a stable
job and that the disciplinary sanction taken against him was recorded in his
professional file. That said, the Court would stress that he was not suspended
or barred from exercising his profession, and that the record of the
disciplinary sanction was automatically expunged after three years (see
paragraph 41 above). While the applicant’s life was inevitably negatively
affected by his losing a salary (see, mutatis mutandis, Pişkin v. Turkey,
no. 33399/18, § 185, 15 December 2020; Xhoxhaj v. Albania, no. 15227/19,
§ 363, 9 February 2021; and Ţîmpău v. Romania, no. 70267/17, § 159,
5 December 2023), the Court reiterates that the financial element of the
dispute does not make Article 8 of the Convention automatically applicable
(see Denisov, cited above, § 122; Camelia Bogdan v. Romania, no. 36889/18,

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

§ 86, 20 October 2020; and Miroslava Todorova v. Bulgaria, no. 40072/13,

§ 137, 19 October 2021). As for the broader context of losing a job, the
applicant has not submitted any evidence in support of his claim (see
paragraph 64 in fine below), that it was impossible for him to resume
exercising his profession, for instance, by securing employment at another
school (see, mutatis mutandis, Calmanovici v. Romania, no. 42250/02,
§§ 137-39, 1 July 2008, and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Juszczyszyn, cited
above, §§ 235-36; Pişkin, cited above, § 186; and Ţîmpău, cited above,
§§ 160-61). The applicant had a long record of excelling in his roles as a
teacher and a form tutor (see paragraph 7 above). Moreover, it has not been
argued that the grounds for his dismissal were made public or that substantial
damage to his professional or social reputation were caused (compare
Denisov, cited above, § 130, and contrast Gražulevičiūtė, cited above, § 109).
The Court cannot therefore conclude that the impugned disciplinary sanction
affected the applicant’s long-term opportunities for establishing and
maintaining his professional life to the extent that is deemed necessary under
the consequence-based approach (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü, cited above, § 60;
and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Budimir v. Croatia, no. 44691/14, § 47,
16 December 2021; Ovcharenko and Kolos v. Ukraine, nos. 27276/15
and 33692/15, § 86, 12 January 2023).
57. Having measured the applicant’s subjective perceptions against the
objective background and having assessed the material and non‑material
impact of his dismissal on the basis of the evidence presented before the
Court, it has to be concluded that the effects of the dismissal on the applicant’s
private life did not go beyond the “threshold of seriousness” necessary for an
issue to be raised under Article 8 (see, mutatis mutandis, Denisov, cited
above, § 133). Consequently, Article 8 does not apply to the facts of the
present case.
58. It follows that the applicant’s complaint under Article 8 is
incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4.

B. Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 8

59. In the light of the above considerations, and noting, on the one hand,
that Article 14 of the Convention has no independent existence (see, among
many other authorities, Molla Sali v. Greece [GC], no. 20452/14, § 123,
19 December 2018), and, on the other hand, that the scope of Article 14 read
in conjunction with Article 8 may be more extensive than that of Article 8
taken alone (see Beeler v. Switzerland [GC], no. 78630/12, §§ 47-48 and 62,
20 October 2020, and Valiullina and Others v. Latvia, nos. 56928/19
and 2 others, §§ 136 and 145-47, 14 September 2023), the Court finds that
the situation complained of fell within the ambit of Article 8, given that the
applicant’s blog activity was an expression of his intimate life. As such,

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Article 14, taken in conjunction with Article 8, is thus applicable to the facts
of the case at hand.
60. The applicant alleged that he had been discriminated against on
account of his sexual orientation. In view of its analysis regarding the
reason-based approach to the issue of the applicability of Article 8 of the
Convention (see paragraphs 47-50 above), and the conclusion it has reached
in this respect (see paragraph 51 above), the Court considers that it cannot be
said that the real or crucial reason for the applicant’s dismissal was his sexual
orientation. Consequently, there is no basis for concluding that he has been
discriminated against on that ground.
61. Accordingly, this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the
Convention.

II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION

READ ALONE AND IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONVENTION

62. The applicant complained, relying on Articles 10 and 14 of the

Convention, that his disciplinary dismissal had also breached his right to
freedom of expression and the prohibition of discrimination. To that end, he
essentially argued that the authorities had been wrong to conclude that his
blog was unethical, and, again, that they had discriminated against him on the
grounds of his sexual orientation.
Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows, in so far as relevant:
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom
to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ...
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security,
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others ...”
Article 14 of the Convention is cited at paragraph 42 above.

A. Admissibility

63. The Court notes that this complaint is neither manifestly ill-founded
nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention.
It must therefore be declared admissible.

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

B. Merits

1. The parties’ submissions

64. The applicant argued that the disciplinary proceedings against him
had been motivated by prejudice against persons of homosexual orientation.
He also denied that his blog had contained pornographic content or that it had
been accessed by his students. As to the severity of the sanction imposed, he
argued that his dismissal from his school had prevented him, in practice, from
resuming his profession as no other school establishment would want to hire
him given his disciplinary record.
65. The Government argued that the interference with the applicant’s
right to respect for his freedom of expression pursued the legitimate aim of
protecting the morals of students and that it was proportionate. In particular,
teaching was a public trust profession, and a teacher should be a role model
for students. The profane, obscene, erotic and pornographic content of the
applicant’s writings had undermined the dignity of his profession. The
Government stressed that the applicant’s internet blog had not in fact been
anonymous because he had uploaded photos of himself. Moreover, the blog
could not be classified as literary fiction because he had described real
situations from his personal and professional life in, at times, defamatory
terms. The Government emphasised that the authorities’ reaction had not had
anything to do with his sexual orientation. They also argued that by agreeing
to delete the blog the applicant had condemned his own behaviour. Lastly,
the Government argued that the sanction imposed on him had not been
disproportionately severe, given that it reflected cumulative shortcomings
such as the breach of the safety rules concerning school trips and the blog
entries that were both obscene and defamatory of students and the school
staff. The Government also stressed that the record of the disciplinary
sanction against the applicant would be automatically expunged from his
teaching file after three years. There was therefore no theoretical or practical
obstacle to the applicant resuming work in his profession.

2. The third parties’ submissions

66. Three non-governmental organisations: the European Region of the
International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
(ILGA-Europe); Campaign Against Homophobia (CAH); and the Polish
Society of Anti-Discrimination Law (PSAL), acting jointly as a third party,
made the following observations, in so far as relevant.
67. Referring to, among other things, the views of the United Nations
(UN) Human Rights Committee (CCPR) as adopted in the communication
concerning Fedotova v. Russian Federation (Communication No. 1932/2010,
UN Doc. CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010, 30 November 2012, paragraph 10.7),
they submitted that the right to freedom of expression of Lesbian, Gay,

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Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) persons protected the right to express

themselves publicly concerning their sexual identity or gender identity and to
seek understanding for it.
68. They also noted that in a joint statement by UN human rights experts,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Special Rapporteur
on Human Rights Defenders in Africa of the African Commission on Human
and Peoples’ Rights, and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in
Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, “Free expression
and association key to eliminating Homophobia and Transphobia”, dated
15 May 2014, the argument that banning the dissemination of information
about sexual orientation or gender identity issues was necessary to protect
public morals or the well-being of vulnerable people had been categorically
rejected.
69. The third parties also relied on ILGA-Europe’s Rainbow Europe
Index 2021, according to which Poland ranked 43rd of 49 European countries
and last among the member States of the European Union (EU) in terms of
legal and policy practices concerning LGBTI persons. Poland’s overall score
in the various categories of legal protection provided to LGBTI persons was
13%. Referring to the Memorandum on the Stigmatisation of LGBTI People
in Poland, issued by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human
Rights (CommDH(2020)27) on 3 December 2020, and to the report of the
EU Fundamental Rights Agency entitled “A long way to go for LGBTI
equality” published on 14 May 2020, the third parties described the prevailing
social attitude towards LGBTI persons in Poland as negative.

3. The Court’s assessment

(a) General principles
70. The Court refers to the recapitulation of its general principles
concerning freedom of expression in Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and
Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina ([GC], no. 17224/11, § 75, 27 June 2017).
“(i) Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual’s self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not
only to ‘information’ or ‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive
or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are
the demands of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no
‘democratic society’. As set forth in Article 10, this freedom is subject to exceptions,
which ... must, however, be construed strictly, and the need for any restrictions must be
established convincingly ...
(ii) The adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 § 2, implies the
existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States have a certain margin of
appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with
European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it,
even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give

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the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcilable with freedom of expression as

protected by Article 10.
(iii) The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to take the place
of the competent national authorities but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions
they delivered pursuant to their power of appreciation. This does not mean that the
supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its
discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at
the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine whether
it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced
by the national authorities to justify it are ‘relevant and sufficient’... In doing so, the
Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in
conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they relied
on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ...”

(b) Application of the above principles to the present case

71. The Court notes, at the outset, that the applicant was dismissed for two
reasons, namely for having been accompanied by an unauthorised third party
during school trips and for running a public blog with content that was
unworthy of the teaching profession (see paragraphs 24 and 34 above). Only
the latter ground for his dismissal is the subject matter of his complaint under
Article 10 of the Convention.
72. It is undisputed by the parties that the applicant’s dismissal from his
position as a teacher at a secondary school for publishing a blog constituted
an interference with his right to freedom of expression.
73. The legal basis for the interference in the present case, as indicated by
the authorities, was section 6 of the Teacher’s Charter Act (see paragraphs 24
and 39 above). The interference was therefore in accordance with the law for
the purposes of the Convention.
74. The Government and the domestic authorities relied on the protection
of morals and of the rights and freedoms of others as a legitimate aim that
justified the impugned interference.
75. The Court observes that the statutory obligation, prescribed by the
above-mentioned section 6(5) of the Teacher’s Charter Act, namely that a
teacher should “take care to shape” moral attitudes in students (see
paragraph 39 above), inherently presupposes a prohibition on the
transmission of inappropriate material to them. Additionally, the Court notes
that under section 9 of the same Act, a teacher should “adhere to basic moral
principles” (ibid.). That provision may be seen as indicative of an interest in
protecting morality in a more general sense that might be seen as extending
into the sphere of a teacher’s private life (compare, mutatis mutandis,
Chocholáč, cited above, § 61). The authorities in the instant case did not rely
on section 9 in the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant.
76. The Court would stress that, according to the authorities and the
Government, the applicant’s blog was an affront to the social mores
prevailing in Poland because it talked in explicit terms about sexuality in and

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of itself, not because the type of sexuality it described was homosexual (see
paragraphs 20, 32, 34 and 65 above, and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Bayev
and Others v. Russia, nos. 67667/09 and 2 others, §§ 65, 67, 69 and 74,
20 June 2017).
77. The Court reiterates that it is not possible to find in the legal and social
orders of the Contracting States a uniform European conception of morals.
The view taken of the requirements of morals varies from time to time and
from place to place, especially in our era, characterised as it is by a
far-reaching evolution of opinions on the subject (see Pryanishnikov
v. Russia, no. 25047/05, § 53, 10 September 2019). By reason of their direct
and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State
authorities are in principle in a better position than an international judge to
give an opinion on the exact content of those requirements, as well as on the
“necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet those
requirements (see Müller and Others v. Switzerland, 24 May 1988, § 35,
Series A no. 133; Kaos GL v. Turkey, no. 4982/07, § 49, 22 November 2016;
Pryanishnikov, cited above, § 53; and Chocholáč, cited above, § 70). It
remains, however, incumbent on the respondent State to demonstrate the
existence of the pressing social need behind an interference (see Khoroshenko
v. Russia [GC], no. 41418/04, § 118, ECHR 2015, and Chocholáč, cited
above, § 64).
78. In the present case, the Court does not find it necessary to take a
definitive stance as to whether the disputed measure in fact pursued any of
the indicated legitimate aims because it considers that, in any event, it was
not necessary in a democratic society, for the reasons set out below (see,
mutatis mutandis, Biržietis v. Lithuania, no. 49304/09, § 54, 14 June 2016,
and Chocholáč, cited above, § 63).
79. As regards the necessity of the interference, the Court reiterates that
the breadth of the margin of appreciation left to the national authorities varies
depending on a number of factors, among which the type of speech at issue
is of particular importance. Whilst there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of
the Convention for restrictions on political speech, a wider margin of
appreciation is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating
freedom of expression in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal
convictions within the sphere of morals or, especially, religion (see
Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, § 61, ECHR
2012 (extracts), with further references).
80. Turning to the present case, the Court must first and foremost examine
the reasoning adopted by the national authorities that conducted the
disciplinary proceedings against the applicant in order to assess whether his
dismissal from his post as a secondary school teacher was justified by relevant
and sufficient reasons (see Pryanishnikov, cited above, § 56, and Kaos GL,
cited above, § 57).

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81. The Court notes that the applicant had not raised any explicit argument
before the domestic authorities in terms of his right to freedom of expression
and he had acknowledged that writing the blog was reprehensible behaviour.
At the same time, however, the applicant argued that the authorities had
wrongly perceived his blogging activity as attesting to his lack of morals and
posing a threat to the ethical education of his students, and that the sanction
imposed on him was disproportionate in the circumstances of the case (see
paragraphs 24 and 28 above). In this context, the Court notes that the
Disciplinary Commission observed that teachers, while enjoying freedom of
expression, had to show restraint because of their mission as educators (see
paragraph 27 above). The Court considers that despite the merely implicit and
somewhat contradictory form of the applicant’s arguments put forward at the
hearing before the Disciplinary Commission and in his appeal, the
disciplinary proceedings against him were, in part, clearly directed at
activities falling within the scope of freedom of expression, and the applicant
was punished for engaging in such activities (see, mutatis mutandis, Müdür
Duman v. Turkey, no. 15450/03, § 30, 6 October 2015).
82. The Court also observes that the applicant’s argument about the
disproportionality of the sanction imposed on him is inherently linked to the
broader issue of how the domestic authorities weighed the various elements
of the case. Despite this context, in the proceedings conducted at three levels
of jurisdiction in the applicant’s case, it was only at the last level – before the
Szczecin Court of Appeal – that the reasoning referred to specific examples
of content from the applicant’s blog, namely a number of photographs and
statements (see paragraph 34 above). Apart from describing that content as
“profane”, “obscene” and “sexual” (see paragraph 34 above), the court did
not, however, elaborate on why, in its view, those particular texts and images
violated the social mores prevailing in Poland (compare, mutatis mutandis,
Pryanishnikov, cited above, § 58, and Kaos GL, cited above, § 57). In this
context, the Court would stress that the domestic proceedings regarding the
applicant’s blog did not focus on the comments that were considered
offensive to the applicant’s students and colleagues (see paragraph 35 above),
or the statements that were considered profane, but rather on the blog’s erotic
and sexual content that was considered obscene (see paragraphs 27 and 34
above). The Court of Appeal, in particular, did not make any reference to the
applicant’s Facebook activity (see paragraphs 34 and 35 above). It attached
importance to the public nature of the applicant’s blog and found that he had
exposed his profession and discredited his colleagues, his supervisors and his
students (see paragraph 34 above). Conversely to the Appellate Commission
(see paragraph 31 above), the Court of Appeal thus did not give any weight
to considerations such as the fact that access to the blog was restricted to adult
readers, that the applicant had deleted it or that it had not been demonstrated
that his activity, while it had lasted, had had any negative impact on the
students (see paragraph 34 in fine above).

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

83. Even if weighed against the fact that the applicant had not explicitly
formulated his freedom-of-expression grievance, the Court cannot conclude
that the national authorities duly examined the criteria to be taken into
account before restricting the applicant’s freedom of expression for the
following reasons.
84. First, the Court would stress that the domestic authorities did not take
into consideration the fact that the applicant had not engaged in actively
transmitting allegedly immoral content to the students (contrast, mutatis
mutandis, X. v. the United Kingdom, no. 8010/77, Commission decision of
1 March 1979, Decisions and Reports 16, p. 101), but in writing a blog that
did not have any affiliation to the school.
85. While the applicant claimed that his blog served purely private ends,
it was nevertheless hosted on a public website and read by many thousands
of readers, a readership that could, and seemingly did, include some of his
students and colleagues (see paragraphs 19 and 20 above). Although the blog
was anonymous, it could be and indeed was traced back to the applicant
(ibid.).
86. On the other hand, the Court considers that the applicant’s conduct
did not constitute an intrusion in the field of educational policies or parental
choices on ethics or sexuality. Nothing in his actions diminished the right of
parents to enlighten and advise their children, to exercise with regard to their
children their natural parental functions as educators, or to guide their
children on a path in line with the parents’ own religious or philosophical
convictions (see, mutatis mutandis, Bayev and Others, cited above, § 82). In
this context, the Court notes that it has not been argued that the impugned
disciplinary proceedings were triggered by the students or by parents fearing
for their children’s moral integrity or indeed safety (see, mutatis mutandis,
Klein v. Slovakia, no. 72208/01, § 53, 31 October 2006, and contrast Müller
and Others, cited above, § 12). As to the latter concern, there is no indication
that the applicant has ever been convicted of a sexual offence, or that he has
suffered from any condition owing to which the material in question could
trigger violent or otherwise inappropriate behaviour (see, mutatis mutandis,
Chocholáč, cited above, § 68).
87. Second, the Court notes that the domestic authorities did not take into
consideration the fact that the applicant’s activity was not considered illegal
in the sense that no civil or criminal proceedings appear to have been
instituted against him in respect of the allegedly profane or offensive
language that he used. They also did not weigh up the factor that the internet
platform on which he wrote abided by regulations pursuant to which the
ticking by a prospective reader of a box affirming that he or she was an adult
was considered sufficient for the purposes of the operation of websites with
adult content. The Court also notes that similar and even more explicit – indeed
pornographic – material is commonly available on the internet as well as via
the press to the adult population in the respondent State and beyond

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

(see, mutatis mutandis, Chocholáč, cited above, § 68). That said, it does not
appear that the applicant was ever suspected of distributing pornography to
children. In such circumstances, the Court cannot subscribe to the argument
that the aim of the applicant’s dismissal from his post was, among other
things, to protect his students from sexually explicit material (see, mutatis
mutandis, Pryanishnikov, cited above, § 61).
88. Third, the Court observes that online content creators, like artists and
writers, are certainly not immune from the possibility of limitations as
provided for in paragraph 2 of Article 10 of the Convention. In accordance
with the express terms of that paragraph, anyone who exercises his or her
freedom of expression takes on “duties and responsibilities”, and the scope
of those duties and responsibilities will depend on his or her situation and the
means used (see Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, no. 68354/01,
§ 26, 25 January 2007; Akdaş v. Turkey, no. 41056/04, § 26, 16 February
2010; and Pryanishnikov, cited above, § 51).
89. In this context, the Court recognises that teachers exercise a
profession of public trust and provide an important public service (see
Grzelak v. Poland, no. 7710/02, § 87 in fine, 15 June 2010). Moreover, since
teachers are figures of authority to their pupils, their special duties and
responsibilities to a certain extent also apply to their activities outside school
(see Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995, § 60, Series A no. 323).
90. The Court has acknowledged the need to take account of the
vulnerability and impressionability of minors (see Macatė, cited above,
§ 205, and F.O. v. Croatia, no. 29555/13, § 58, 22 April 2021). It notes
however, that the Court of Appeal, when finding that the applicant had
breached his duty under section 6(5) of the Teacher’s Charter Act to shape
the moral and civic attitudes of his pupils (see paragraph 34 above), did not
see force in the argument that the applicant had not sought to interact with his
students through his blog or to intrude into their private space (see, mutatis
mutandis, Bayev and Others, cited above, § 80, and contrast, mutatis
mutandis, Vejdeland and Others, cited above, §§ 56 and 57). To the extent
that the students who read the applicant’s blog were exposed to his ideas on
sexuality, the Court attaches importance to the fact that the students in
question had actively sought to read a blog restricted to adult readers.
91. The Court would also stress that the applicant was employed in the
context of a neutral legal relationship between an authority and an individual.
Put differently, he was not employed by a religious school, and he did not
teach religion or ethics. Such a status might indeed require allegiance towards
a singular vision of morality or create between religious education teachers
and their students a special bond of trust marked by certain specific features
extending into the teachers’ private conduct and lifestyle (contrast Travaš,
cited above, §§ 97 and 98, and Ţîmpău, cited above, § 197). The applicant’s
status as a teacher must therefore be distinguished as only requiring, under
section 9 of the Teacher’s Charter Act, that he adhere to “basic moral

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

principles” (see paragraph 39 in fine above). It was therefore unreasonable in

the present case to impose on him a heightened duty of loyalty that would bar
him from expressing his sexuality in the context of a legally operating internet
blog for adults (contrast Fernández Martínez, cited above, § 85). Moreover,
the Court reiterates that the applicant’s blog activity was formally condemned
by the authorities under a different standard, namely, a duty to shape “moral
... attitudes” in students, within the meaning of section 6(5) of the Teacher’s
Charter Act (see paragraph 75 above).
92. Furthermore, while remaining mindful of its conclusion that the real
reason for the applicant’s dismissal was not his sexual orientation (see
paragraph 51 above), the Court cannot, however, disregard the fact that his
blog depicted homosexual relations and that the Council of Europe’s
Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU Fundamental Rights Agency
reported that the prevailing social attitude towards LGBTI persons in Poland
was negative (paragraph 69 above). Owing to this, the Court considers it
important to refer to the observations made in its recent Grand Chamber
judgment in the case of Macatė (cited above, §§ 210, 212-13 and 215,
concerning restrictions on the distribution of a book that depicted marriage
between persons of the same sex, which sought to limit children’s access to
information depicting same-sex relationships as essentially equivalent to
different-sex relationships and labelled such information as harmful).
93. Finally, as to the severity of the disciplinary sanction imposed on the
applicant, the Court duly notes that his dismissal was based on two grounds,
namely his blogging activity and the fact that he had brought an unauthorised
third party on the school excursions. The Court observes that while this
sanction was not the most severe under the applicable law (see paragraph 40
above), it was nevertheless harsher than the one that the disciplinary officer
from the Governor’s Office had sought, namely a reprimand with a warning
(see paragraphs 23 and 25 above). As the proceedings progressed, the
sanction of dismissal was considered appropriate by the intervening
disciplinary officer at the Ministry level (see paragraph 32 above).
Ultimately, the Court of Appeal considered the sanction of dismissal
proportionate, taking into consideration the applicant’s remorseful attitude
and his very good record as a teacher, and found that it did not take away his
career opportunities in other schools (see paragraph 36 above). The Court
notes, however, that the Court of Appeal did not give consideration to the fact
that the applicant, as it would appear from the case material, did not have any
previous record of disciplinary sanctions. The Court cannot therefore adhere
to the domestic authorities’ conclusion, and considers that the applicant’s
punishment was disproportionate to the legitimate aims purportedly pursued
(see, mutatis mutandis, Gülcü v. Turkey, no. 17526/10, § 116, 19 January
2016).
94. Having regard to the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes
that the domestic authorities did not provide “relevant and sufficient reasons”

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

for dismissing the applicant from his position. Even allowing for a certain
margin of appreciation, it cannot be held that the applicant’s personal
blogging activity threatened the protection of morals of minors in a manner
justifying the sanction imposed on him. Therefore, the interference with his
right to freedom of expression neither corresponded to a pressing social need,
nor was it proportionate to the legitimate aim purportedly pursued. It thus was
not “necessary in a democratic society”.
95. It follows that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the
Convention.
96. Having regard to that conclusion, the Court considers that no separate
issue arises under Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with
Article 10 (see, mutatis mutandis, Association Ekin v. France, no. 39288/98,
§ 65, ECHR 2001-VIII).

III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION

97. Article 41 of the Convention provides:

“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the
injured party.”

A. Damage

98. The applicant claimed 70,000 euros (EUR) in respect of

non-pecuniary damage.
99. The Government submitted that this amount was exorbitant,
unsubstantiated and unjustified.
100. In the circumstances of the present case, the Court considers that the
applicant must have sustained non-pecuniary damage which the finding of a
violation of the Convention in this judgment does not suffice to remedy.
Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,600 in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.

B. Costs and expenses

101. The applicant did not make any claim for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court or in the course of the domestic disciplinary
proceedings.

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT,

1. Declares, unanimously, the complaint under Article 10 of the Convention

read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention
admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;

2. Holds, by 4 votes to 3, that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the

Convention;

3. Holds, unanimously, that no separate issue arises under Article 14 of the

Convention taken in conjunction with Article 10 of the Convention;

4. Holds, by 4 votes to 3,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 2,600 (two thousand six
hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a
rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;

5. Dismisses, unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just

satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 February 2025, pursuant to

Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Ilse Freiwirth Ivana Jelić

Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of

the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judges Wojtyczek, Poláčková and
Paczolay is annexed to this judgment.

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION

JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES

WOJTYCZEK, PACZOLAY AND POLÁČKOVÁ
1. We respectfully disagree with the view that Article 10 has been
violated in the instant case.
2. In our view, the majority’s assessment of the case is based upon
erroneous factual findings and a problematic analysis of how the domestic
remedies operate.
The majority’s reasoning emphasises, in particular, the importance of the
following elements (see paragraph 90 of the judgment):
“[The Court] notes however, that the Court of Appeal, when finding that the applicant
had breached his duty under section 6(5) of the Teacher’s Charter Act to shape the
moral and civic attitudes of his pupils (see paragraph 34 above), did not see force in the
argument that the applicant had not sought to interact with his students through his blog
or to intrude into their private space (see, mutatis mutandis, Bayev and Others, cited
above, § 80, and contrast, mutatis mutandis, Vejdeland and Others, cited above, §§ 56
and 57). To the extent that the students who read the applicant’s blog were exposed to
his ideas on sexuality, the Court attaches importance to the fact that the students in
question had actively sought to read a blog restricted to adult readers.”
We contest the accuracy of this analysis. It is not true that the blog was
restricted to adult readers, because no effective mechanisms were put in place
to prevent minors from accessing it. In fact, as established by the domestic
authorities, the applicant’s blog and Facebook account attracted growing
interest among many minor students and became a topic of conversation
among them. The minors in question were therefore induced to actively check
and read a blog run by a teacher of their school. That interest further incited
some students to comment on the blog on social media, creating some form
of interaction between the applicant and students. The applicant set in motion
a process which resulted in transmitting the content of the blog to at least
some students in his school.
The majority further stressed the argument that “... it [was] not ...
demonstrated that [the applicant’s] activity, while it ... lasted, had ... any
negative impact on the students” (see paragraph 82).
In our view, in the framework of disciplinary proceedings in an individual
case, it would be simply impossible to demonstrate that any specific content
had a negative impact on students. We note in this context that there is
currently an increasing international trend towards effective restrictions on
access by minors to obscene internet content. That such content has a negative
impact on minors is a widely accepted assumption which underlies legislation
imposing effective bans on their access to obscene material.
It is true that it has not been argued that the impugned disciplinary
proceedings were triggered by parents fearing for their children’s moral
integrity (see paragraph 86), but in our view this does not mean that, had the
parents known about the situation, none of them would have had such fears.

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION

Most probably, the disciplinary proceedings started before the parents

concerned became fully aware of the problem. In any event, the authorities
which brought the disciplinary proceedings had clearly in mind that once the
parents became aware of the situation, many of them would fear for their
children’s moral integrity.
We further note that the blog in question included a wide variety of
material and comments, but we consider some of them to be of a very vulgar
nature. The majority failed to address this aspect of the case. In our view, it
is one of the most important elements justifying the sanction imposed.
3. We note the following assessment by the majority (see paragraph 81,
emphasis added):
“The Court notes that the applicant had not raised any explicit argument before the
domestic authorities in terms of his right to freedom of expression and he had
acknowledged that writing the blog was reprehensible behaviour. At the same time,
however, the applicant argued that the authorities had wrongly perceived his blogging
activity as attesting to his lack of morals and posing a threat to the ethical education of
his students, and that the sanction imposed on him was disproportionate in the
circumstances of the case (see paragraphs 24 and 28 above). In this context, the Court
notes that the Disciplinary Commission observed that teachers, while enjoying freedom
of expression, had to show restraint because of their mission as educators (see
paragraph 27 above). The Court considers that despite the merely implicit and
somewhat contradictory form of the applicant’s arguments put forward at the hearing
before the Disciplinary Commission and in his appeal, the disciplinary proceedings
against him were, in part, clearly directed at activities falling within the scope of
freedom of expression, and the applicant was punished for engaging in such activities
(see, mutatis mutandis, Müdür Duman v. Turkey, no. 15450/03, § 30, 6 October 2015).”
We agree in general with this assessment.
We further note that the finding of a violation is based mainly upon the
alleged failure by the domestic authorities to address certain issues and to
consider some arguments (see paragraphs 82, 83, 84, 87, 90 and 93). We
observe in this context that the disciplinary bodies and especially the Court
of Appeal focused on the arguments raised by the parties. As the applicant
acknowledged that writing the blog was reprehensible behaviour, the breach
of professional ethics and the excessive nature of the speech were not
disputed between the parties in the proceedings. In his submissions the
applicant focussed on the severity of the sanctions. In the disciplinary
proceedings it does not appear that it was necessary to address proprio motu
all the arguments listed by the majority, as many of those issues were not
disputed by the parties. The majority’s approach, based upon the implicit
assumption that in domestic proceedings – whatever the parties’ pleadings –
the appellate authorities have an obligation to examine of their own motion
issues not raised by the parties, constitutes an unjustified interference with
the system of domestic remedies.
4. We note that the majority refrained from taking a stance on the question
whether the impugned measure pursued a legitimate aim (see paragraph 78).
In our view, the disciplinary sanction did pursue a legitimate aim, namely the

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION

protection of the rights of others; that is, the protection of minors and of the
rights of parents to ensure education and teaching in conformity with their
own religious and philosophical convictions. It further served to protect
public order, namely the authority of schools and teachers.
In the majority’s view, “the domestic authorities did not provide ‘relevant
and sufficient reasons’ for dismissing the applicant from his position” (see
paragraph 94). We respectfully disagree with this opinion. The reasons
provided by the authorities were clearly relevant. In our view, they were also
sufficient.
The majority, when assessing the severity of the sanction, made the
following statement, with which we agree:
“56. ... The Court cannot therefore conclude that the impugned disciplinary sanction
affected the applicant’s long-term opportunities for establishing and maintaining his
professional life to the extent that is deemed necessary under the consequence-based
approach (see Ballıktaş Bingöllü, cited above, § 60; and contrast, mutatis mutandis,
Budimir v. Croatia, no. 44691/14, § 47, 16 December 2021; Ovcharenko and Kolos
v. Ukraine, nos. 27276/15 and 33692/15, § 86, 12 January 2023).
57. Having measured the applicant’s subjective perceptions against the objective
background and having assessed the material and non-material impact of his dismissal
on the basis of the evidence presented before the Court, it has to be concluded that the
effects of the dismissal on the applicant’s private life did not go beyond the ‘threshold
of seriousness’ necessary for an issue to be raised under Article 8 (see, mutatis
mutandis, Denisov, cited above, § 133). Consequently, Article 8 does not apply to the
facts of the present case.”
In our view, unlike Article 8, Article 10 of the Convention does apply to
the interference complained of, but given the limited effect of the sanction on
the applicant’s life, the interference with his freedom of expression cannot be
considered disproportionate.
5. We note the following argument by the majority (see paragraph 92):
“Furthermore, while remaining mindful of its conclusion that the real reason for the
applicant’s dismissal was not his sexual orientation (see paragraph 51 above), the Court
cannot, however, disregard the fact that his blog depicted homosexual relations and that
the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights and the EU Fundamental
Rights Agency reported that the prevailing social attitude towards LGBTI persons in
Poland was negative (paragraph 69 above). Owing to this, the Court considers it
important to refer to the observations made in its recent Grand Chamber judgment in
the case of Macatė (cited above, §§ 210, 212-13 and 215, concerning restrictions on the
distribution of a book that depicted marriage between persons of the same sex, which
sought to limit children’s access to information depicting same-sex relationships as
essentially equivalent to different-sex relationships and labelled such information as
harmful).”
If we understand this argument correctly, the outcome of the case could
have been different had the applicant depicted heterosexual relations. We
would also note that the material published by the applicant did not really
seek to depict same-sex relationships as essentially equivalent to different-
sex relationships.

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 P. v. POLAND JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINION

6. In conclusion, we would like to emphasise that, according to the

Preamble, as modified by Protocol No. 15:
“... the High Contracting Parties, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have
the primary responsibility to secure the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention
and the Protocols thereto, and that in doing so they enjoy a margin of appreciation,
subject to the supervisory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights
established by [the] Convention.”
The majority reassessed the case as if they were in a higher domestic court,
thereby undermining the subsidiarity of the Convention system. Given the
vulgar nature of some of the material published on the applicant’s blog and
the fact that it induced some minor students to actively seek to read it, many
people and especially many parents of school-age children throughout Europe
will rightly consider disturbing the finding that Article 10 has been violated
in the instant case.

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