Family Law Overview: Hindu, Muslim, Christian
Family Law Overview: Hindu, Muslim, Christian
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SYLLABUS
FA3E - FAMILY LAW - I
Unit - I Source:
Traditional and modern sources of personal Laws. Evolution of the Hindu Joint
Family - The Classical schools
Unit - II Law of Marriage:
Hindu, Muslim and Christian Laws of marriage and divorce. The nature of the
institution of marriage and its development, the capacity and nuptial rights and the effect
of void and voidable marriage under the aforesaid systems of law. Hindu law of marriage
and divorce with reference to the changes brought about by modern legislation. Muslim
law of marriage and divorce will include Law of Dower.
Unit - III Law of Adoption:
Hindu law of Adoption with special reference to the juristic concept and development
of case laws and changes brought about by the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956. The Muslim Laws of Legitimacy. Parentage and the Doctrine of Acknowledgement
of paternity.
Unit - IV The Law of Guardianship:
The Hindu Law of Minority and Guardianship and Maintenance and changes brought
about by modern legislation. Muslim Law of
minority and Guardianship and Maintenance.
Unit - V Maintenance:
The Hindu, Muslim and Christian law relating to Maintenance.
Statutory Materials with Amendments
1. Hindu Widows Re Marriage Act, 1956.
2. Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929.
3. Special Marriage Act, 1954.
4. Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
5. Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
6. Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956.
7. Hindu Women's Right to separate Residence & Maintenance Act, 1956.
8. Prohibition of Child Marriages
9. Guardianship and Wards Act, 1890.
10. Guardianship Act.
11. Indian Majority Act, 1875.
12. Personal Laws (amendment Act) 2010.
13. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriage Act, 1939.
14. The Christian Marriage Act, 1872.
15. Indian Divorce Act, 1896.
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Books for Reference:
1. Mulla - Hindu Law
2. Thakir Mohammed - Hindu Law
3. N.R. Raghavachari - Hindu Law
4. Mulla - Mohammedan Law
5. Thakir Mohammed - Muslim Law
6. A.A. Fyzee - Outlines of Mohammedan Law
7. S.N. Gupta - Maintenance and Guardianship Act.
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UNIT-1
INTRODUCTION TO HINDU LAW.
In India, the Hindus are not fully governed by Hindu law. Limited matters, the Hindu
are governed by Hindu law. But for the remaining matters, the Hindus are governed by
Indian territorial laws. The origin of Hindu society and Hinduism is prior to 4000BC.
Originally, the Hindu law was comprehensive system of law. So, therefore, the Hindu
law dealt all kinds of law that is, criminal law, civil law, law of evidence, law of
contract, law of transfer etc. in India, 85% of the people are Hindu and are governed by
Hindu law. Originally the Hindu law consists of body of principles or rules which are
contained in various Sanskrit books. The Hindu law is neither pure customary law nor
pure state made law. These Hindu laws were recognized and enforced by ancient Hindu
rulers without any modification though they had power to modify it. After
establishment of British power in India, the British Government adopted and applied the
English policy to Hindus in India.
In the beginning stage of British rule, the rights and obligations of a Hindu were
determined by Hindu law unless otherwise any part of such laws may be altered or
abrogated or modified by legislation. As per Warren hasting plan of 1772, the Hindus
were governed by Hindu law in respect of Inheritance, marriage, caste and other
religious usages or institutions. In independent India, the Hindus are governed by Hindu
law in the following matters, namely,
1. Succession (inheritance)
2. Marriage and dissolution of marriage
3. Guardianship
4. Maintenance
5. Joint family and partition
6. Adoption
7. Religious Institutions
If one of the parents is Hindu and the other is non Hindu, the children are
called Hindu provided that they are brought as Hindu.
Offshoots of Hinduism:
1. Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are offshoots of Hinduism; they are governed by
Hindu law.
2. The followers of Brahma Samaj, Prathana Samaj and Arya Samaj and the followers
of Lingayats and Virashaivas are sect of Hindus and they are, now, governed by Hindu
law.
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2. Hindu by conversion:
The concept of Hindu law is that “A Hindu is born, but is not made”. It
means that “No one could claim to be governed by Hindu law by simply professing
Hinduism if he was not a Hindu by birth”. Now this concept is not sound and the
Hindu law recognised not only Hindu by birth but also Hindu by. Conversion
The Supreme Court held that though there was no formal process for reconversion, he
could be treated as a person belonging to Hindu faith. But he could be treated as having
reverted to his previous sub caste only if the said caste re-admitted him into its fold
unequivocally. In this case, there was no such evidence for re admission of Rajagopal
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by the said Adi-Dravida community. So the Supreme Court held that Rajagopal could
not be entitled to stand for election for seat reserved for Adi-Dravida community.
2) Such converted person may elect either to abide by the old Hindu law
notwithstanding that he has renounced the old religion or to abide by Christian
law.
3) The converted party’s course would show what law he had elected to be governed.
Under the 3rd principle it was found that M. Abraham had married a Christian
woman and adopted English dress code and manner. Therefore, the court held that he
had elected against the Hindu law and rejected the contentions of the F. Abraham.
2. Right of inheritance:
From the date of conversion, he would not be governed by Hindu law for
inherit property.
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3. Effect of conversion on marital status
The other party to the marriage is entitled to obtained decree for divorce
according to Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
*****
SOURCES OF HINDU LAW.
The sources of Hindu law may be either literary or material sources of Hindu law.
In literary sense, it is a source from which we seek our knowledge of the law. In
material sense, it is a method by which law is evolved. The legislation, judicial
decisions and custom are material sources of law. The sources of Hindu law may be
either Traditional or Modern sources of law.
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Traditional sources of Hindu law:
SRUTIS:
The “Srutis” means that which has been heard. It is the voice of the God. It is
fundamental sources of law for other sources. The Srutis consists of,
1. Vedas
2. Upanishads
1. VEDAS:
It consists of revelation made by Supreme Being and experiences received by
the Rishis. It is voice of the God. So it cannot be altered by anyone. It is a primary
source of Hindu law. It is said to be sources for all other sources of Hindu law. Vedas
do not contains any direct statement of law, but it contains disconnected statement on
different aspects of dharma from which the law has been gathered.
Types of Vedas:
They are four Vedas, that Is,
1. RIG VEDA
2. YAJUR VEDA
3. SAMA VEDA
4. ADHARVANA VEDA
Rig Veda:
It is the oldest among the four Vedas. It consists of hymns and songs in the praise
of the God. It consists of 1028 slogams and arranged in ten mandalams.
Yajur Vedas:
It deals with rituals and sacrifices and mandaras pertaining there to.
Sama Vedas:
It consists of prayers composed to metre and set to music.
Adharvana Vedas:
It is devoted to magic, spell and incantation.
Upanishads: It is nothing but philosophical treaties in Sanskrit language and forming
pare of Vedas.
SMRITIS:
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In literary sense, Smritis means that which has been remembered. It is
recollection of Rules of Dharma handed down by authorised Sages or Rishi of antiquity
of the precept of God. Rishi had no temporal authority. They did not have any rule
making powers, but on the other hand, they were only exponents of rules of Dharma.
Types of Smritis:
The Smritis are classified into,
1. Sutras
2. Dharma Sastras
SUTRAS:
Sutra is anterior in point of time. The time of Sutras is 800BC to 200BC.
1. It is mainly prose in nature, but some time it partly prose and partly verses in nature.
2. It is very sort one.
3. It is very concise in its meaning.
4. It is comprehensive in nature.
5. It is easy memorable one.
6. It deals with the duties of man in various ways.
Types of Sutras:
They are three types of Sutras,
1. Srauta Sutra: It deals with rituals, sacrifice and mandaras.
2. Grahaya Sutra: It deals with domestic ceremonies.
3. Dharma Sutra: It deals with secular law, that is civil and criminal law. It plays a
very important roles of human being.
Examples of Dharma Sutras:
They are so many examples of Dharma Sutra, the followings are important one:
1. Gouthama Dharma Sutra
2. Bauthayana Dharma Sutra
3. Apastamba Dharma Sutra
4. Vishnu Dharma Sutra
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1. Gouthama Dharma Sutra:
It was written Gouthama. He belonged to Sama vedin. It deals with both
religious and legal matters. In legal matters, it deals with Srithana property, inheritance
and partition. In his works, he recognized the practice, tradition, usage and custom of
Hindu law.
2. Baudhayana Dharma Sutra:
It was written by Baudhayana. He belonged to Yajur vedin. He lived in Andhra-
Pradesh. It deals with both religious and legal matters. In legal matters, it deals with
Sonship, Adoption, Partition and inheritance. In his work, he mentioned several
customs, in which three are important, namely,
a) South-Indian Custom: It permitted a male Hindu to marry his maternal uncle’s
daughter or his sister’s daughter.
b) North-Indian Custom: It permitted a man for trading into arms and going to sea
c) Another custom permitting the king to impose excise duties
DHARMASASTRAS:
It is posterior in point of time to compare with Sutras. The period of Dharma
Sastras is above 200BC. It is verses in nature. It deals with the subject of Hindu law
very systematically and a logically. Every Dharma Sastra consists of three parts,
namely,
1. Acharya- deals with rituals and sacrifices
2. Vyavahara- deals with Secular law
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3. Prayaschitta- Deals with Penance and Expiation
Manusmriti:
The period of Manusmriti is 200 BC. It is complete work and deals both legal and
religious matters. It consists of 2694 slokas, arranged in 12 chapters. Out of 12 chapters,
4 chapters deals with religious matters and remaining 8 chapters deals secular law, that
is civil, criminal and domestic law and pointed out all these laws into 18 titles of law,
these are,
1. Recovery of debt
2. Pledge and deposit
3. Sale without ownership
4. Concerns among partners
5. Resumption of gift
6. Disputes regarding boundaries
7. Dispute between master and servants
8. Sale and purchase
9. Non-payment of wages
10. Unfulfilled agreement
11. Assault
12. Defamation
13. Theft
14. Robbery and violence
15. Adultery
16. Duties between husband and wife
17. Partition
18. Gambling and betting
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If the right of man comes under any one of the above titles and if it is violated,
he can seeks relief before the court of law. But on the other hand, if there is violation of
any other right apart from it, he cannot claim remedy before the court.
2. Yajnavalkaya’s Smriti:
The period of this Smriti is 100AD. Yajnavulkaya belongs to Yajur vedin and
Mithila School. It is verses in nature. It is mainly based upon Manusmriti. However, his
work is more logical, scientific and constructive. This work consists of three parts, these
are
1. Acharya
2. Vyavahara
3. Prayaschitta
This work deals both civil and criminal law which consists of,
1. Law of Mortgage and Hypothecation
2. Marriage and divorce
3. Adoption
4. Inheritance
5. Sale
6. Partnership
7. Assault
8. Defamation
9. Theft and robbery
10. Adultery
As per Yajnavalkaya's Smriti, the rights of human being are not restricted within
the above titles of law, but if any right of human being is violated by anyone, he can
seek relief before the court of law.
In his work, he also pointed out and recognized 12 kinds of sons, these are,
1. Legitimate son
2. Son of appointed daughter
3. Son of wife
4. Son of hidden origin
5. Damsel’s son
6. Widow’s son
7. Adopted son given by parents
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8. Son made
9. Son bought
10. Son self given
11. Adopting a forsaken son
12. Son of wife pregnant at the time of marriage
Naradha’s Smriti:
The period of this Smriti is 200AD. It is a social code, dealing with secular law.
This work is divided into two parts,
First part dealt with judicature and administration of justice.
Second part dealt with 18 titles of law specified by Manu in his work.
This Smriti pointed out 4 fold stages for deciding every dispute, these are,
1. By means of Dharma
2. By means of Vyavahara (evidence of witnesses, in the absence of Dharma)
3. By means of Charitra (evidence of documents, in the absence of above two)
4. By means of Raja Sasana (Edicts or knowledge of the king)
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2. Yajnavalkaya's Smriti
3. Naradha's Smriti
Commentaries on Manusmriti:
1. Manutika written by Govindha Raja
2. Manubhashyam written by Medhatithi
3. Manu Vartha Mutha Valli written by Kulluka Bhatta
Digest:
Alongside the commentaries, digest literature grew with a minimum of
comment. Digest is not complete interpretation of other sources, but is a codification of
law that are prevalent in particular area. The followings are some examples of digests,
1. Daya Bhaga written by Jumootavahana
2. Smriti Chandrika written by Devanna Bhatta
3. Vivadha Chinthamani written by Vaschaspathi Misra
4. Vivadha Rathanakara written by Chandeswara
1. CUSTOM:
The custom is one of the sources of Hindu law not only in traditional period but
also in modern period.
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Custom is one of the fruitful sources of Hindu law. In ancient time, custom is
recognised as secondary source of law, but now it is recognised as primary source of
Hindu law. Hindu law originated from customs and conventions. During the course of
time, the customs was defined and reshaped by great Rishi and Sages and the Smritis
took the place of unrecorded customs.
Definition:
Custom signifies a rule in which a particular family or class or district has from long
usage obtained the force of law.
Where there is a conflict between a custom and the text of the Smritis, the custom will
prevail and overrule the text. That is “ under Hindu system of law, clear proof of
usage will outweigh the written text of law”
According to Goudhama, regarding country or family custom which was not opposed to
Smriti and Sruti, is one of the sources of Hindu law. The Privy Council also has
recognized the supreme authority of custom in Hindu law. In the famous case of
“Collector of Madura vs Mootoo Ramalinga Sethupathy”, the question arose
whether in the Dravida country, a widow could make an adoption even in the absence
of express authority from her husband. In this case, the Zamindar of Ramnad died
without sons. The Zamindar of Ramnad did not give authority to his widow Rani
Parvathavardhani to adopt a son. But she adopted a son with the permission of the
nearest sapindas of her husband and then died. If the adoption would be valid, the
Zamindari would be vested in adopted son. If the adoption would not be valid, the
Zamindari would have escheated to Government. The collector of Ramnad notified on
the death of Rani Parvathavardhani, the Zamindari would escheat to the state.
So, the adopted son, Mooto Ramalinga Sethupathy filed a suit for declaration of the
validity of the adoption. The question rose before the court was whether under Dravida
school of Hindu law, an adoption made by a widow without the consent of the husband
was valid when there was consent of her husband’s sapindas.
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In this time, the Privy Council elaborately and carefully noticed the various authorities
for sources of Hindu law. The Privy Council found that in the Dravida School, the
Smriti Chandrika and Parasara Madhaviya are authorities of law. The above authorities
authorize the widow to adopt a son for her husband with the consent of her father in law
and other husband’s Sapindas. This is a received authority of the Dravida School.
Therefore, the Privy Council concluded that in Dravida School, in the absence of
authority from her husband, the widow may adopt a son with the assent of her
husband’s Sapindas. So, therefore, the Privy Council held that the adoption made by
widow with consent of her husband’s Sapinda was valid.
2. It must be in certain
It should be in certain in respect of nature, locality and person who claim custom.
3. It must be reasonable:
It means, it should not be unreasonable that is it should be in accordance with justice,
equity and good conscience.
5. It should not be immoral: So it should be moral and morality is nothing but a social
value.
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7. It should not be oppose to law:
The custom should not be opposed to any law for the time being in force.
Kinds of customs:
Hindu law recognized three kinds of customs, these are,
1. Local customs
2. Family customs
3. Caste customs
1. Local customs: This is a custom prevailing in particular locality. The Ramnad case
deals this type of custom.
2. LEGISLATION:
Legislation is one of the modern sources of Hindu law. Before and after British
period, it plays a vital role for deciding disputes among Hindu. Some of the legislations
are,
1. The Cast Disabilities Removal Act, 1850
2. The Hindu Widows Remarriage Act, 1856
3. The Native Converts Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866
4. Indian Majority Act, 1875
5. The Guardian and Wards Act, 1890
6. The Indian succession Act, 1925
7. The Hindu Inheritance Disabilities Removal Act, 1928
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8. The Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929
9. The Hindu Gains of Learning Act, 1930
10. The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937
11. The Hindu Women’s Right to Separate Residence and Maintenance Act, 1946
12. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955
13. The Hindu Succession Act, 1956
14. The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956
15. The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act. 1956
16. The Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 1976
3. JUDICIAL DECISIONS:
Binding nature of previous judicial decisions on a subsequent similar case is one of the
modern sources of Hindu law. The principle of Stare decisis is applied by the Indian
courts. It may be noted that the judicial decisions on Hindu law have superseded the
commentaries.
The view of law enunciated and expressed by the Privy Council and the Supreme court
in particular cases serve as a guide in similar cases arising subsequently.
Now, the judicial decisions of the Supreme Court are binding upon all courts except
upon itself and the Judicial Decisions of the High Court are binding upon all of its
subordinate courts.
The principles of justice, equity and good conscience can also be regarded as one of the
sources of Hindu law. In the event of conflict between the Smritis or in the absence of
any specific law on particular subject matter, the principles of justice, equity and good
conscience would be applied
Since the customs are not uniform throughout the countries and customs plays an
important role for commentaries, different schools of Hindu law arose as a result of the
emergence various commentaries on Smritis.
2. Right of survivorship:
Mitakshara law recognized the doctrine of survivorship for acquiring brother’s
coparcenary’s property before 1956. But the Dayabhaga law does not recognized the
doctrine of survivorship for acquiring brother’s property.
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3. Widow’s Right:
Dayabhaga law recognized the right of widow to inherit property from her
deceased husband. But Mitakshara law does not recognized the right of widow to
inherit property from her deceased husband
4. Sapinda Heirship:
In Mitakshara law, the Sapinda relationship arises by propinquinity or
community of blood. But in Dayabhaga law, Sapinda relationship arises by offering
Pinda to deceased ancestors. So, Spiritual benefit is the main criteria for heirship under
Dayabhaga law, whereas consanguinity is guiding principle under Mitakshara law.
All the above sub schools are followed Mitakshara commentary as their main
commentary, but they followed their own sub commentary which recites the customs
and usages prevalent in that places.
1.Dravida school:
i. Parasara Madhaviya– Written by Madhavacharya, commentary on Parasara
Smriti.
ii. Smritichandrika– Written by Devanna Bhatta
iii. Saraswativilas– Written by Prataparudra Deva
iv. Vyavakhara Nirnaya – written by Varadharaja
2. Maharashtra:
i. Vyavahara Mayukha– Written by Nilakantha Bhatta.
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ii. Nirnaya Sindhu– Written by Kamalakara
3. Benaras school:
i. Viramitodaya – written by Mitra Misra
ii. Nirnasindhu– written by Kamalakara
4. Mithila school:
i. Vivid Chinthamani– written by Vaschaspati Misra.
ii. Vivada Ratnakara—written by Chandeshwara
iii. Madhanaparijatha– written by Visweswarabhatta.
*****
SOURCES OF MUSLIM LAW.
By sources of any law, we mean the original materials where the contents of that law are
to be found and are made available to us. Study of these sources is necessary because
without having any knowledge of the origin of a particular law, its proper explanation and
interpretation is not possible. Sources of Muslim law may be classified into two
categories:
Primary sources are those which the Prophet himself directed to be the sources of Muslim
law. There is an old tradition according to which once the Prophet asked Muadh, one of
his companions, as to what law he would apply in deciding a case?
The companion replied that first he would judge a case according to the words of God;
failing that, according to the traditions (precepts) of the Prophet and failing that too he
would interpret with his own reason. The Prophet approved these sources in the same
order.
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These sources are, therefore, of highest quality and importance in their respective order of
merit. The whole of Muslim personal law is based on the primary sources. They are also
called the formal sources of Muslim law.
Secondary sources explain or modify the primary sources of Muslim Personal Law
according to the changing needs of the Islamic society. To meet the requirements of the
society, Muslim law has been developed or modified also by local customs, judicial
decisions and the State.
Therefore, the rules of Muslim law are found also in the customs, legislations and the
judicial decisions. Local customs, legislation and judicial decisions are, therefore, the
secondary sources of Muslim law. Secondary sources are also called as extraneous
sources.
As pointed out earlier, the first revelation (Wahi) came to the Prophet in 609 A.D. Since
then the revelations continued to come to the Prophet in fragments during a period of 23
years, till 632 A.D. when the Prophet expired.
The revelations were the communications of God and were made by angel Gabriel to the
Prophet. These communications or messages from God were conveyed to the society by
the Prophet through his preachings.
The Prophet from time to time used to deliver preachings to his followers saying that
these were the messages to them from God. The communications were in the form of
verses and were remembered by the followers of the Prophet. Some of them were also
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reduced to writing on palm-leaves, camel hide or even on mud so that they may not be
forgotten.
The communications were in scattered form and were not systematically revealed. After
the Prophet’s death, the revealed verses were collected, consolidated and systematically
written under the authority of Osman who was the third Caliph.
A peculiar feature of the verses of Quran is that they are believed to be the very words of
God; Prophet Muhammad was simply the messenger of God to the society. Quran is of
divine origin, therefore, in importance it is the first source of Muslim law.
(iii) Structure:
Quran is in the form of verses. Each verse is called ‘Ayat’. There are 6237 verses in
Quran which are contained in 114 Chapters. Each Chapter of Quran is called ‘Sura’. The
various chapters are arranged subject-wise and have their specific titles. The first ‘Sura’
of Quran is Surat-ul-Fatiha which is an introduction to the holy book and consists of
verses in the praise of Almighty God.
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Similarly, other chapters contain generally the verses on the subject which justify their
titles. Some of the important chapters of Quran are, Surat-un-Nisa (rales relating to
women), Surat-ul-Talaq (rules relating to divorce), Surat-ul-Baqr (rules relating to
religion and morality), Surat-ul- Ikhlas (principle of absolute surrender to God) and,
Surat-ul-Noor (rules relating to home-life).
For example, in Vedas and Smritis (the fundamental sources of Hindu Law), the legal
rales are mixed with the moral code of conduct.
It is believed that the verses of Quran pertaining to religion and morality were revealed at
Mecca and those pertaining to ‘law’ were revealed at Medina. The whole of Quran,
therefore, may not be treated as a source of law. Only the law-making Ayats, which are
about 200 scattered in different chapters, may be regarded as the fundamental source of
Muslim law.
Some of them have laid down specific law-making ‘rules’ to settle the question that
actually arose in day-to- day life. Quran contains also the general injunctions which have
formed the basis of important juristic inferences.
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(vi) Unchangeable:
The words of Quran are the words of God; therefore, it is the most authoritative source of
Muslim law. If any specific meaning has been attributed to a particular verse of Quran,
either by Shia or by Sunni authorities then, the courts have no power to give any other
meaning to that verse.
(vii) Incompleteness:
Quran is not a complete code of Muslim personal law. It generally contains verses
relating to the philosophy of life and religion. Only about 200 verses deal with legal
matters. Out of these, only about 80 verses deal with personal law. Thus, only basic
principles of Muslim personal law are given in Quran.
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In Islam it is believed that the revelations were of two kinds, manifest (Zahir) and internal
(Batin). Manifest or express revelations were the very words of God and came to the
Prophet through angel Gabriel; such revelations, as pointed out earlier, formed part of
Quran.
Internal or implied revelations on the other hand, were those which had been ‘Prophet’s
own words’ but the ideas contained in the slayings were inspired by God. Such internal
revelations formed part of Sunna. Tradition therefore differs from Quran in the sense that
Quran contains the very words of God whereas a Tradition is in the language of the
Prophet.
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As the narration of a tradition amounted to the creation of a new rule of law, the Narrator
was required to be a qualified person. According to Abdur Rahim a person must possess
following qualifications for being a competent Narrator: (i) he must have understanding
(sane and adult), (ii) he must possess the power of retention, (iii) he must be a Muslim,
and (iv) he must be of righteous conduct. Having these qualifications, following class of
persons was recognised as Narrators:
Kinds of Traditions:
Recognition and acceptance of a tradition as a source of law depends upon its authority
and, its authority depends upon its proof given by the Narrators. From the point of view
of their authority and acceptance in the society, traditions may be classified as under:
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(ii) Ahadis-i-Mashhoor (Popular Traditions):
Traditions, which have been narrated by some Companion of the Prophet but
subsequently accepted by majority of the people, are called Ahadis-i-Mashhoor or the
well known traditions. These traditions are not accepted unanimously by all Muslims but
a great majority has always recognised them as a source of law.
Traditions are narrations of law and religion which were communicated from one
generation to another and thus became the practices in the society. They were for a long
time neither written nor systematically arranged.
For the first time, Abu-Ibn-Zuhri attempted to collect and write down the scattered
traditions. But Muvatta of Malik Ibn- Anas is regarded to be the first systematic
collection of traditions, arranged and classified according to subjects. Traditions are in a
very large number. Ibn Hanbal has collected about 80,000 traditions in his book Masnad.
Drawbacks of Traditions:
The importance of traditions as a source of Muslim law is unquestionable. But as source
of law it suffers from following drawbacks:
(1) There are many traditions of doubtful origin. On several occasions, the prevalent
customs were treated as a rule of law in the name of the practices of the Prophet.
Narrators of such traditions are unknown persons.
(2) There are several traditions which are contradictory to each other. There is, therefore,
no uniform and certain law on many issues.
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(3) Traditions have laid down religious, moral and also the legal codes of conduct for the
society. Sometimes it is difficult to separate a religious or moral principle from a legal
rule.
(4) Traditions got their authority from the narrators. After sometimes when successor of
the successor also died, the formation of this source of law was stopped. For any new
situation, therefore, traditions, as a source of law were not available.
Because of the above-mentioned reasons, some other source of law was necessitated for
the rapidly increasing Islamic society. The next source of Muslim law is Ijma, which is
discussed below.
Such consensus opinion or unanimous decision of the jurists was termed Ijma, and is the
third primary source of Muslim law. According to Abdur Rahim, Ijma may be defined as
the agreement of the jurists among the followers of the Prophet Mohammad in a
particular age on a particular question.
This source of Muslim law has played a very important role in the subsequent
development of Muslim law because; through Ijma it was possible to lay down new
principles in accordance with the changing needs of the Islamic society. Validity of Ijma
as a source of Muslim law is based on a tradition of the Prophet. In this ‘tradition’ he has
said that, ‘God will not allow His people to agree on an error.
Formation of Ijma:
When a new principle of law was required, the jurists (Mujtahids) used to give their
concurrent opinion and a new law was laid down. Every Muslim was not competent to
participate in the formation of Ijma. Only Mujtahids could take part in it.
Qualification for being a Mujtahid was that he must be a Muslim having adequate
knowledge of law and was also competent to give independent judgments. This process of
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formulating a law through the consensus of the jurists was termed as Ijtihad which
technically means exercise of one’s own reasoning to deduce a new rule of law. But, the
jurists were not free to give the decisions without any basis. They had to justify their
opinions in the light of some well settled principles already given in Quran or the
traditions. Public policy, ‘interest of the community’ and equity were also taken into
account as the basis for a new explanation of law.
Kinds of Ijma.
Authority of Ijma depended upon the merit of the participator in its formation. There were
different categories of the jurists. Better was the category of jurists, greater is the value of
their opinions. From the point of view of authority and importance, there are three kinds
of Ijma:
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Importance of Ijma:
New facts and new situations required new laws. Quran and traditions were adequate only
for the past and not for the future society. Fyzee rightly observes that, “Quran and Sunna
look to the past; consensus and qias deal with the future of Islamic jurisprudence”. In fact
a major portion of the positive Muslim law (fiqh) came through Ijma. As a source of law
importance of Ijma is twofold:
First, further explanation and clarification of Quran and traditions was possible through
consensus opinions of the jurists.
Secondly, new principles of law, not found in the words of Quran or the traditions were
also formulated according to the changing needs of the society.
Quran and Traditions being rigid, no change was possible in their words. But Ijma had
opened the doors for new interpretations of Islamic legal rules. Ijma has rightly been
termed as a ‘movable element in law. It is movable element in law because it is flexible
and not rigid like Quran or Traditions.
Defects of Ijma:
As a source of Mulsim law, Ijma had following defects:
(i) The consensus of opinion of the jurists was based on several grounds, such as Quran,
traditions, custom, public policy, equity etc. This led to differences in the approach of
scholars in arriving at a decision. The result was that different schools and sub-schools
were formed and law became complicated.
(ii) After sometime, it was doubted whether the consensus or unanimity in the opinions,
was at all necessary. Different views were expressed regarding the nature of consensus.
According to some, a unanimous decision was necessary but according to others, opinions
of the majority were sufficient to constitute the Ijma.
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(iii) Except the Ijma of the Companions, other two kinds of Ijma could be modified or
overruled by a subsequent Ijma. There was, therefore, no certainty in law.
(iv) In a very short period, Islam spread to distant places. It became practically difficult to
consult all the jurists and obtain their opinions.
(v) Only learned scholars could take part in the formation of Ijma. By and by these
scholars died and it was felt that no jurists are available for its formation. The result was
that about the 10th century, Ijma had to be abandoned.
It was a method of comparing the problem of society with a similar problem for which
solution was given in the texts. Wilson defines Qiyas as an analogical deduction from the
reason of a text to a case not actually covered by its language.
In obtaining a law through Qiyas, following method was applied by the jurists
(Mujtahids):
(a) A similarity was established between the new problem (for which the law was
required) and an identical problem given in the text. For establishing similarity, ‘reason’
or the sense behind a text was taken into account rather than the meaning of its apparent
words. In this manner, the ‘common cause’ (Illat) of the two problems was found and
analogy was established between the given problem and a similar problem available in
the text.
(b) After establishing the analogy, the solution of the problem given in the text was
applied to the new problem. Thus, the required law was directly deduced from the texts of
Quran or Sunna or the Ijma. It is significant to note that in this method new principles
were not formulated. The law was simply discovered from the spirit or the implied
meaning of the text.
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In drawing conclusion through Qiyas, unanimity among the jurists who used to establish
the analogy, was not necessary. Only following conditions were required:
(1) The person who established analogy was a Mujtahid (jurist) and that,
(2) He deduced the law from a definite text of Quran or Sunna or the Ijma.
Qiyas may be distinguished from other similar concepts namely, Istihsan and Istidlal.
This too is a rule of interpretation and, is recognised by Maliki and Shafei Schools only.
Thus, under the principle of Istidlal only an inference is drawn and analogy is not
established whereas, in Qiyas the rule of law is deduced by establishing analogy.
(2) Traditions (only those which have come from the Prophet’s family).
It may be noted that Shia sect does not recognise Qiyas as a source of law. Traditions too
are recognised as source of law only if they have come from the Prophet’s family. But,
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besides such Traditions of the Prophet, Shia law recognises also the ‘sayings and doings’
(conduct) of Imams as source of law.
It is significant to note that in addition to Quran, other sources are recognised under Shia
law only where such sources have come through Imams. Generally, it is believed that
whatever has been laid down by Imams shall be accepted as law. Fyzee observes thus:
“The Imam is the law-giver himself, the speaking Quran; he may in a proper case even
legislate, make new laws and abrogate old ones; but as he is hidden…, the Mujtahids who
are present at all times are his agents, the recognised interpreters of the law.”
B. Secondary Sources:
(1) Custom (Urf or Taamul).
Before Islam, the Arabs were governed by customary laws. When Islam came into
existence, most of the customs were found by the Prophet to be evil and bad. Such bad
customs were totally abolished by him and he declared them to be un-Islamic. But there
were certain pre-Islamic customs (e.g. dower, talaq etc.) which were good and tolerable.
The Prophet did not abolish them, and they continued in the society because the Prophet
sanctioned them by his silent approval. In this manner some of the good customs became
a part of the traditions of the Prophet i.e. Sunnat-ul-taqrir.
Moreover, there were customs on the basis of which the jurists gave their unanimous
decisions on a given point of law and they formed part of Ijma. Thus, we see that custom
is not any independent source of Muslim law. A customary law exists in Islam either
because it has got the approval of the Prophet or, has been incorporated in Ijma.
Importance of Customs.
Although custom is not any formal source yet, its importance in Muslim law cannot be
under-estimated. In the absence of a rule of law in the texts of any of the four primary
sources, the customary practices have been regarded as law.
The four formal sources namely, Quran, Sunna, Ijma and Qiyas being fundamental
sources, could not include minute details in respect of certain matters. In such specific
cases the customs and usages became a rule in order to complete the law.
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Therefore, the customary law has been used to supplement the four primary sources of
Muslim law. British courts in India had on several occasions recognised the legal force of
customs and usages. Those courts have made the maximum use of customary practices in
respect of Muslim law and recognised a custom even if it was opposed to a clear text of a
primary source. For example, in Abdul Hussein v. Sona Dero, the Privy Council observed
that if proved, a custom would prevail over a written text of law provided the custom was
ancient and invariable.
The orthodox Muslims felt that by giving general application to this rule, the courts have
attempted to violate the original Muslim law (Shariat). They demanded that there should
not be any place for customs in the Muslim personal law as it was un-Islamic.
Accordingly, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 was enacted and
is still in force. Now, under this Act, custom is not any independent source of Muslim
personal law.
But customs are still applicable to Muslims in the matters, relating to their (a) agricultural
lands, (b) charities, and (c) religious and charitable endowments, because these matters
have not been included in Section 2 of this Act.
Moreover, Section 3 of the Shariat Act provides that adoption, wills and legacies would
be regulated by customary law unless a Muslim had expressly declared that in these three
additional matters too his rule of law should be Muslim personal law (Shariat).
The result is that at present Muslims in India may still be governed by the customary law
except in the ten matters enumerated in Section 2 of the Shariat Act. In Jammu and
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Kashmir, where the Shariat Act, 1937 is not applicable, the rules of Muslim law have
always been subjected to custom and usage. The custom of adoption by Muslims of this
State is valid although under Muslim personal law adoption is not possible.
There is not much scope for the judicial decisions as source of Muslim law. But, in the
absence of any clear text of Muslim law, the courts may interpret a rule of law according
to their own concepts of justice. In such cases, the Muslim law becomes what the courts
say.
For example, generally the taking of interest in a loan is prohibited in Islam, but the Privy
Council allowed simple interest on die amount of unpaid dower. Accordingly, the
realisation of interest on unpaid dower has now become a rule of Muslim law through
precedent.
Similarly, in Katheessa Umma v. Narayanath Kunhamu the Supreme Court has held that
a gift by a husband to his minor wife above the age of fifteen years but under eighteen
years is valid even if the gift was accepted by any incompetent guardian under Muslim
law. Although such a gift is invalid under pure Muslim law but after this decision the law
in India is that under the given circumstances a gift is valid.
Judicial decisions have played an important role in laying down rules of Muslim law in
accordance with the socio-economic conditions of the Indian Muslims. The courts have
given some very important judicial decisions. In Begum Subanu v. Abdul Gafoor the
Supreme Court has held that despite the fact that a Muslim husband has legal right to
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contract second marriage, if the first wife lives separately only on the ground of
husband’s second marriage, she would be entitled to get maintenance from husband.
Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 provides eight grounds on
the basis of any one of which a wife may seek dissolution of her marriage.
Clause (ix) of this Act provides ‘any other ground recognised under Muslim law’. Under
this clause the Indian courts used to pass decree of dissolution on ground of ‘false charge
of adultery by husband against wife’ (Lian) because this ground is not included
specifically.
But, in Muhammad Usman v. Sainba Umma the Kerala High Court has held that Section
2(ix) is a ‘residuary clause’ under which the court at its discretion may dissolve the
marriage on any ground if it is satisfied that the dissolution is necessary in the case. It
may be noted that in this case the ground on which wife wanted dissolution of marriage
was her ‘hate towards her husband’.
This was found a reasonable ground and the court dissolved the marriage under clause
(ix) of the Act. Law of pre-emption is a glaring example where judicial decisions have
modified the rules of pure Muslim law according to the changing needs of the Indian
Muslims.
It may be concluded therefore, that to some extent, the courts in India have attempted to
modify the rules of Muslim personal law as applied in India. Unless overruled or negative
by some legislative enactment, these rules through the decisions, continue to be a source
of Muslim law.
(3) Legislation:
In Islam it is generally believed that God alone is the Supreme Legislator and no other
agency or body on earth has authority to make laws. This belief is so deep-rooted that
even today; any legislative modification may be treated as an encroachment upon the
traditional Islamic law. The result is that as independent source of Muslim law, the
legislative enactments are almost insignificant.
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However, there are certain Acts which modify or otherwise lay down principles of
Muslim law, and for the modern courts in India these enactments are the only source of
law on the points covered by them. Some important enactments on Muslim personal law
are given below:
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(v) Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986:
Besides other provisions, this Act gives statutory recognition to the established rule of
pure Muslim law that a former husband is liable to pay maintenance to his divorced
woman only up to her period of Iddat.
In the controversial Shah Bano’s case the Supreme Court held that under Section 125 Cr.
P.C., 1973 a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to get maintenance from her former
husband even beyond the period of Iddat. Under pure Muslim law, a divorced Muslim
woman is entitled to get maintenance only upto the period of her Iddat which is normally
three months.
It was argued that Section 125 of the Cr. P.C. was un-Islamic and was inapplicable to
Muslim women. But the Supreme Court held that Section 125 is not un-Islamic and is
equally applicable to Muslims as well. However, on demand of a section of the Muslim
community, the Parliament negatived the effect of Shah Bano’s case and passed this
enactment. Besides other things, The Muslim Women Act, 1986 now enacts the rule of
pure Muslim law in respect of maintenance of a divorced Muslim woman.
Besides these Acts, there are also enatcments which regulate the law of pre-emption and
the law of waqfs. For example, the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, the Rewa State Pre-
emption Act, 1946 etc. and the Mussalman Waqf Act, 1923 or the Waqfs Act of 1954.
The Pre-emption Acts do not lay down any new provision regarding the well-known right
of pre-emption under Muslim personal law; they simply provide that the right is available
to all persons within the jurisdiction of respective Act.
Similarly, the various Waqfs Acts provide generally the rules for the supervision and
administrative control of a waqf and waqf-properties. The Family Court Act, 1984 is
applicable also to Muslims. This Act too does not modify the substantive rules of Muslim
personal law. It generally deals with the procedure
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UNIT-2
HINDU LAW OF MARRIAGE.
Historical development of marriage:
Now we have seen well established marriage. This type of marriage did not exist
among the primitive men. At the time man lived more or less like any other animals. He
was so much engaged in the satisfaction of his primary needs, hunger and shelter. There
was no time or occasions to think of refinement. Sex promiscuity was absolutely free.
Sex promiscuity was rule. During the course of time, primitive society underwent
several changes. In the changed society, two discoveries are made,
1. Discover of Milch cattle
2. Discovery of fire
In the initial stages of discovery of fire, man used fire to ward or escape of his
enemies, wild animals and other group of man who attacked him. The use of fire for
cooking purpose was made latter. With the emergence of herds of cattle, the idea of
possession and ownership also emerged. Men started leading some civilized life.
So long as the sex relationship remained unregulated, the maternity alone could be
known, but paternity could not be determined. Whenever the idea of property came into
exist, the idea of marriage also emerged. That is the man was seized with the idea of
knowing of his own children. If sex promiscuity was rule, it is not possible to identify
his children. If sex relationship could be made an exclusive union of man and woman, it
is possible to identify his own children.
The idea of marriage would not sudden origin. But it was slow and prolonged
process. In development of marriage, there are five important stages, these are,
1. In the primitive society, woman belonged equally to every man. The sexual relation
prevailed throughout entire society without any restriction.
5. In the time of final stage, the idea of property came into existence. For giving his
property to his own children, the man was seized with the idea of knowing his children.
So they ruled an exclusive union of man and woman.
c). Marriage means a “Holly union between male and female” for the performance of
religious duties and for the begetting of male progeny.
There are 10 Samskaras in Hindu law. The last one is marriage Samskaras and is
enjoined by every Hindu for “regeneration of man” and “purifying the body from
inherited taint”. Since the marriage is not a civil contract, there are three essentials:
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1. As the marriage is sacramental, it cannot take place without the performance of
sacred rites and ceremonies.
2. Sacramental union implies that it is a permanent union. Marriage is a tie which once
tied cannot untie. This implies that marriage cannot be dissolve
3. Thirdly, the sacramental union means that it is an eternal union. It is valid not merely
in this life but in lives to come.
2. Marriage: compulsory?
Every Hindu, male and female, could marry whatever be his or her age. In the case of
female, it was compulsory without any exception. If there was no competent guardian
or where such had neglected to arrange her marriage, such girl might choose herself a
husband and marry him.
But in the case of male, the marriage was also compulsory subjected two exceptions,
that are,
1. If he could remain perpetual student
2. If he desire to become sanyasi
3. Marriage: monogamy?
1. In the case of female, monogamy was compulsory. A second marriage of female
during subsists of 1st marriage would be void. But after the death of the husband, she
could be allowed for second marriage if custom allowed.
2. But in the case of male, monogamy was also compulsory, but they are some
exception for second marriage on the basis of legal justification. Therefore monogamy
was recommended, but not compulsory for male. As a result of this, a male could be
allowed to have more than one wife.
4. Forms of marriage:
Hindu marriages are 3 kinds:
1. Sastra Marriage; 2. Customary Marriage; and 3. Statutory Marriage.
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Sastra Marriage: If a marriage has been solemnized by the performance of sacred rites
and ceremonious, it is called as Sastra Marriage.
There are 8 forms of Sastra Marriage among Hindus.
(i) Brahma Marriage:
A marriage is said to be Brahma marriage, if there was a gift of a daughter by her
father or in the absence of father by the next guardian to a man learned Veda whom he
voluntarily invited. It is to be considered as best form of marriage.
Originally this type of marriage is available only to persons belongs to three
superior castes.
The main requirement is that the girl was decked with jewels and costly garments
and bridegroom should be learned in the Vedas.
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(vi) Gandharva Marriage:
With her own consent, if the bride gives herself away to the bridegroom, the
marriage is called Gandharva Marriage. Therefore it is voluntary union of maiden and
her lover. If the bride and bridegroom mutually bind themselves and bride says that you
are my husband and bridegroom says that you are my wife, the marriage is called
Gandharva marriage.
5. Ceremonies of Marriage:
Whatever the form of marriage, the marriage was marked by the performance of
certain religious ceremonious. Usually there were 3 stages in ceremonious.
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marriage complete. But on the other hand, on the performance of Saptapathi, the
marriage became complete and irrevocable.
Under the Dayabhaga law, the following persons are entitled to give the girl in
marriage successively,
1. Paternal grand father
2. Brother
3. Father
4. Paternal kinsmen
5. Maternal grand father
6. Maternal uncle
7. Mother
9. Divorce:
According to Sastra, marriage was irrevocable. Divorce was not known to the
general Hindu law. Unless the custom allowed, there is no divorce. In the three upper
caste, there is no custom for divorce. But only under certain caste in Sutra, there is a
divorce as per custom.
The Native Convert’s Marriage Dissolution Act, 1866.
This Act enables a convert from Hinduism to Christianity to obtain dissolution of
marriage with a Hindu spouse contracted to prior to conversion.
2. A Hindu marriage under this Act is more or less secular than sacramental.
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3. The conditions and requirements of a valid marriage have been very much simplified.
4. Monogamy has been made compulsory for both male and female.
5. Under this Act, caste considerations are irrelevant and all restrictions on inter caste
marriages have been eliminated.
6. The restrictions based on Gotra and Sapinda relationship are either abolished or with
held.
7. The different form of marriage are no longer material since the only form of marriage
will be that which are adopted by the parties to the marriage as prevailing in his or her
community.
9. The children of void and voidable marriages shall be treated as legitimate children
irrespective of passing of a decree of nullity.
10. Provisions have been made for award alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony
and maintenance.
11. Courts are vested with wide discretion to pass suitable orders relating to the
custody, maintenance and education of the minor children of the parties, in any
proceeding under the Act.
12. Provision has been made for registration of marriage under this Act for facilitating
proof of such marriage.
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Definition of Hindu marriage:
A Hindu marriage is a marriage solemnised between two Hindus in accordance
with the customary rites and ceremonious of at least one of the parties to the marriage
after satisfying the prescribed requirements.
2. Full blood :
Two persons are said to be related to each other by full blood when they are
descended from common ancestor by the same wife
3. Half blood:
Two persons are said to be related to each other by half blood when they are
descended from common ancestor but by different wife.
4. Uterine blood:
Two persons are said to be related to each other by uterine blood when they are
descended from common ancestress but by different husband.
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5. Sapinda relationship:
“Sapinda relationship” with reference to any person extended as far as third
generation (inclusive) in the line of ascend through the mother, and the fifth generation
(inclusive) in the line of ascend through the father, the line being traced upwards in
each case from the person concerned, who is to be counted as the first generation.
6. Sapinda:
(a) Two persons are said to be “Sapinda” of each other if one is a lineal of the
other within the limits of Sapinda relationship
(b) Two persons are said to be “Sapinda” of each other if they have a common
lineal descendant who is within the limit of Sapinda relationship with reference to each
of them.
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Kinds of Marriage:
Under the Hindu Marriage Act,1955, there are 3 types of marriage, these are:-
1. Valid Marriage– Section 5
2. Void Marriage –Section 11
3. Voidable Marriage –Section 12
VALID MARRIAGE:
Under section 5 of this Act, there are 5 conditions for valid marriage, these are:-
1. First condition relating to monogamy
2. Second condition relating to sound mind
3. Third condition relating to age limits
4. Fourth condition relating to degree of prohibited relationship
5. Fifth condition relating to Sapinda relationship
1. Monogamy:
Neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage. So the bride must be a
spinster or widow or divorced wife and bridegroom must be a bachelor or widower or
divorced husband at the time of marriage. During subsists of 1st marriage, if any one of
the party to marriage enters into another marriage, is void marriage. Such party is liable
for punishment for bigamy under section 494 & 495 0f IPC. Section 17 of this Act also
gives punishment for violation of this condition.
In “Surjeet Singh vs Mahendra Paul Singh”, the husband entered into 2nd
marriage during the subsist of 1st marriage. The court held that it is not only a ground
for divorce, but also the wife is entitled to get degree of Nullity of her husband’s second
marriage under section 9 of the CPC and section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.
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at the time of marriage, neither party,--
(a) is incapable of giving valid consent to it in consequence of unsoundness
of mind; or
(b) though capable of giving valid consent, has been suffering from
mental disorder of such kind or to such extent as to be un fit for marriage and
procreation of children; or
(c) has been subject to recurrent attacks on insanity;
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iv. If the child is sold for the purpose of marriage and is made to go through a form of
marriage
v. If the child is sold or trafficked or used for immoral purposes after marriage.
4. Degree of prohibited relationship:
According to clause iv of section 5,
“The parties are not related with the degree of prohibited relationship unless custom
governing each of them permit of marriage between the two”
What is Degree of Prohibited Relationship?
3(g) deals with degree of prohibited relationship.
Two persons are said to be within the “degree of prohibited relationship”—
1. one is the lineal ascendant of the other
2. one was the wife or husband of a lineal ascendant or descendant of the other
3. one was the wife of the brother of the other
4. one was the wife of the father’s brother of the other
5. one was the wife of the mother’s brother of the other
6. If one was the wife of the grandfather’s brother of the other
7. If one was the wife of the grandmother’s brother of the other
8. If two are brother and sister
9. If two are uncle and niece
10. If two are aunt and nephew
11. If two are children brother and sister
12. If two are children of two brothers
13. If two are children of two sisters
If this condition is violated, the marriage is void under section 12 and punishable under
section 18
In “Jaganathan vs Sadhu Ram”, the bride was widow of the lineal ascendant
of the bridegroom. The court held that the marriage was void on the ground of
prohibited relationship. Even though the party contented that custom permits, the court
otherwise decided.
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5. SAPINDA RELATIONSHIP
According to section 5 (v), “the parties are not Sapinda of each other unless
custom governing each of them permit the marriage between the two”
(a) Two persons are said to be “Sapinda” of each other if one is a lineal of the
other within the limits of Sapinda relationship
(b) Two persons are said to be “Sapinda” of each other if they have a common
lineal descendant who is within the limit of Sapinda relationship with reference to each
of them.
3. Saptapathi: The taking of seven steps by the bride and bridegroom before sacred fire
or holly fire. Consummation of marriage was not essential to make a marriage complete.
But on the other hand, on the performance of saptapathi, the marriage became complete
and irrevocable.
If the parties do not observe any ceremonies, it is void marriage.
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friends. The court held that since the customary ceremonial for marriage cannot be
altered by society or association, the marriage was void.
(b) by each party to the marriage garlanding the other or putting a ring upon any
finger of the other; or
Matrimonial Remedies:
The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 provides five kinds of matrimonial reliefs.
1. Restitution of Conjugal Rights
2. Judicial Separation
3. Annulment of Marriage by Decree of nullity
4. Divorce
5. Divorce by Mutual consent
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1. RESTITUTION OF CONJUGAL RIGHTS
Section 9 of the Act deals the Restitution of Conjugal Rights. The aim of this section is
to preserve the marriage and bringing the parties together. After marriage, each party to
the marriage is bound to live together for conjugal society and entitled to conjugal
society of other.
If the wife or husband has withdrawn the conjugal society without any reasonable
cause, the aggrieved party may apply by petition to the District Court for Restitution of
Conjugal Rights.
There are certain conditions for granting decree for Restitution of Conjugal Rights.
These are:
1.The court satisfied that the respondent has withdrawn the conjugal society without
reasonable excuses.
2.The court satisfied that the statement made in the petition is true.
3.The court satisfied that there is no legal ground why the application should not be
granted.
If all these conditions are fulfilled, the court may decree restitution of conjugal
rights accordingly.
On the behalf of Sareetha, it was argued that the right to privacy confers on a
woman “a right to free choice as to whether, where and how her body is to be used for
the procreation of children and also the choice of when and by whom the various parts
of her body are to be sensed”.
The Andhra Pradesh High Court accepted this argument and struck down
section 9 holding that it violates the wife’s right to privacy by compelling her to have
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sexual intercourse against her will. The husband’s petition for conjugal rights was
accordingly dismissed.
However a different view was taken by Delhi High Court in “Harvinder Kaur
vs Harmander Singh Chouhry”. Though the decision of Andhra Pradesh High Court
was cited in support of the argument that section 9 is invalid, but the Delhi High Court
held that section 9 of the Act does not violate of Articles 14 and 21.
The above controversy was set at rest by Supreme Court in “Saroj Rani vs
sudharsan Kumar Chadha”, where the court expressly overruled the judgment of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court and held that section 9 of the Act is not violative of
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.
The Court pointed out that a decree for restitution of conjugal rights serves a social
purpose as an aid to the prevention of break up in a marriage. Even if such an order of
the Court is willfully disobeyed, the Court cannot enforce sexual intercourse between
the spouses. The only remedy of the other party would be to apply for attachment of the
property of the defaulting spouse, presuming that he or she has any property.
2. JUDICIAL SEPARATION
A Decree of judicial separation permits the parties to the marriage to live apart.
Judicial Separation suspends active marital life between the parties. The decree does not
dissolve the marriage tie, but the marriage tie continues to subsist. The Judicial
separation gives an opportunity for reconciliation and adjustment. The parties are
allowed to reconciled to join together and in that case the marital rights of the parties
are restored.
Even though a decree for judicial separation has been passed, it shall not be
obligatory for either party to conjugal society with each other.
After passing decree of judicial separation, the parties are not allowed to
another marriage. If any one of the party commits adultery, it will be a good
ground for divorce.
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If there is no cohabitation for a period of one year or upwards after passing
decree, it is one of the ground for divorce.
The Hindu marriage Act distinguishes between void and voidable marriage.
1. The void marriage is totally nullity. It does not affect or alter the status of the parties.
It does not create any rights and obligations between them.
But voidable marriage is not a totally nullity. It remains valid and binding the parties
and continue unless the decree of nullity is passed under section 12.
2. In the case of void marriage, the parties are criminally liable, but in the case of
voidable marriage, the parties are not criminally liable.
4. In the case of void marriage, the parties are allowed for subsequent marriage before
the decree of nullity is granted.
But in the case of voidable marriage, the parties are not allowed for subsequent
marriage before the decree of nullity is granted.
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5. The only remedy available for void marriage is Annulment of Marriage by Decree of
Nullity But in voidable marriage, all remedies which are granted for valid marriage, are
available to party.
The children of void and voidable marriage are called legitimate children.
Void marriage:
As per section 11 of the Act, A marriage is said to be void marriage if it
contravenes any of the grounds specified in clauses I, iv and v of section 5.
In regards to void marriage, either party to the marriage may present a petition
against the other party for declaration of nullity of his or her marriage.
Voidable marriage:
Section 12 deals with voidable marriage. A voidable marriage is valid until set
aside by the parties by a decree of nullity It is not void abinitio. But initially it is valid,
but it is annulled by decree of nullity. Any marriage shall be voidable and may be
annulled by Decree of Nullity on any of the following grounds, namely:
1. The marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotence of the
respondent.
3. The consent of the petitioner was obtained by force or fraud as to the ceremony or
as to any material fact or circumstances concerning the respondent.
4. The respondent was at the time of marriage pregnant by some other person other
than the petitioner.
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1. Impotency (sub section 1 of clause (a) of section 12 )
If the marriage has not been consummated owing to the impotency of any one of
the party to the marriage, it is voidable and annulled by decree of nullity. This clause
was amended in 1976. before 1976, it runs as follows:
“that the respondent was impotent at the time of marriage and continues to be so
until the institution of the proceeding”
Therefore for decree of nullity on the ground of impotency, it had been shown that
the disability existed from the time of marriage onwards. Now this stringent condition is
removed.
In “Kanti vs Harry”, the marriage could not be consummated in the ordinary and normal
way on the account of abnormal size of husband’s male organ, so a decree was passed in
favor of the wife.
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In “Lakshmi Devi vs Babulal”, since the wife had no vagina at all, though by surgical
treatment an artificial vagina was formed, the court held that the husband is entitled to a
decree for nullity.
In “Samar son vs Sadhana”, the wife’s uterus was removed before marriage. It does not
furnish a cause for annulment of marriage on the ground of wife’s impotency. Though, in
the absence of procreation or conceptive power, the wife is capable of complete sexual
intercourse in the absence of uterus. So no decree for annulment of marriage was granted.
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2. Fraud means deception as to the nature of ceremonies being performance
In “Raja ram vs Deepa bai”, the respondent had concealed the fact that he had been
already married once before. It was held that the fraud did not relate to the identity of
other party or the nature of ceremonies. So it was held not to be a fraud for which relief
under section 12 (1) (c) could not be obtained.
After amendment, this clause runs,
If the consent of the petitioner or the consent of guardian as the case may be, was
obtained by force or fraud as to the nature of ceremony or as to any material fact or
circumstance concerning the respondent, is voidable marriage.
In “Aunjona Dasi vs Prahlad Chandra”, when a minor girl was staying with
her sister, she was abducted forcibly and her marriage was solemnised without the
knowledge of guardian. Her mother sued set aside the marriage. It was held that there was
a fraud upon the policy underlying the religious ceremony and so it was held that there
was no valid ceremony at all and granted the declaration sought by mother for a decree of
nullity.
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4. Respondent being pregnant by someone else
(clause (d) of sub section 1 of section 12 )
The marriage shall be voidable and may be annulled by decree of nullity on the
ground that the respondent was pregnant by some other person other than the petitioner
at the time of marriage.
3. that the marital intercourse with the consent of the petitioner has not
taken place since the discovery by the petitioner of the existence of wife’s
pregnant.
Sub section 1 of section 13 provides the following grounds for divorce for both the
parties to the marriage-
1.Adultery
2.Cruelty
3. Desertion
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4. Conversion to another religion
5. Unsound mind
6. Leprosy
7. Venereal disease
8. Renouncing the world by Entering religious order
9. Unheard of seven years or more by the respondent
Sub section 1A of section 13 which is inserted in the year 1964, which provides the
following grounds for divorce for both the parties to the marriage-
1. Non resumption of cohabitation for one year or more after passing decree for judicial
separation.
2. No restitution of conjugal rights for one year or more after the passing the decree for
restitution conjugal rights.
Sub section 2 of section 13 provides the following four grounds for divorce for wife only,
1. Subsequent marriage of husband during the subsists of 1st marriage.
2. Guilty of husband for rape, sodomy or bestiality
3. After passing decree or order for maintenance for wife against husband, no
resumption of cohabitation between the parties for one year or more.
4. Repudiation of marriage by wife after she attain the age of 15 but before 18 years.
This clause was amended in the year 1976. Before amendment, living in adultery was a
ground for divorce, while even an isolated act of adultery is not ground for divorce.
But after amendment, an isolated act of adultery is sufficient to claim divorce. Adultery
is consensual sexual intercourse between a married person and a person of opposite sex
during the subsists of marriage. A mere attempt to commit adultery is not enough for
divorce. If sexual intercourse has taken place under coercion, fraud or mistake, it cannot
adultery and it is not ground for divorce.
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Who may prove the adultery?
The petitioner is bound to prove the adultery. It may be proved either direct or
circumstantial evidence.
The circumstantial evidence are,
1. Adultery can be inferred from non access and long period of gestation of a
child born to the wife.
3. Adultery can be inferred from the presence of a unrelated young man with the wife in
her bed room in mid night
4. Adultery can be inferred from confession and admission of the party and other
person.
The evidence should be established not only opportunity to that commit adultery but
also opportunity could be used.
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Examples of cruelty:
By husband:
1. False charge of immorality and adultery against the wife
2. Beat his wife
3. Taking her salary entirely
4. Returning to home late at midnight to the house in drunken condition frequently.
5. Husband leads immoral life
6. Demand dowry
By wife:
1. Threat by wife to commit suicide
2. Threat by wife to set house on fire
3. Threat by wife to make the husband loss his work
4. The wife undergone abortion willfully against wishes of the husband
5. Leaving the husband’s house without informing the husband or his family member
6. Making police complaint against husband about matrimonial different.
7. Writing a letter to her husband’s office address about their matrimonial differences
8. Calling the husband an impotent person in the presence of public, friends and
relations.
9. Refusal for sexual intercourse with the spouse without reasonable causes.
In “Sree Padachan vs Vasantha Bai”, the wife abusing the husband in public place
and insulting him and threatening the husband to burn herself and bring her husband to
police trouble. The court held that it was amount to mental cruelty to husband.
In “ Kasinath Sahu vs Devi”, the insulting the behavior of husband’s relative. The
court held that it amounted to mental cruelty to husband.
In “Rooplal vs Rooplal”. The wife was suffering from atrophic rhinitis. As a result a
bad smell coming from her nose always. The court held that it was amount to mental
cruelty to husband.
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3. Desertion- (clause (I b) Sub section 1 of section 13
This clause was inserted in the year 1976, by way of amendment laws. It runs,
The respondent has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than
two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition.
Desertion means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage
without reasonable cause and without the consent of such other party and include the
willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.
For the offence of desertion, two conditions must be present. These are,
1. Factum of separation: That means the respondent living apart and away from the
petitioner.
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6. Leprosy - (clause (iv) Sub section 1 of section 13
This clause was amended in the year 1976. Before amendment, it runs,
The respondent has, for a period of not less than three years immediately
preceding the presentation of the petition, been suffering from a virulent and incurable
form of leprosy.
The Marriage laws Amendment Act, 1976 removed the time period. Now it runs
as follows,
The respondent has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy.
8. Renouncing the world by Entering religious order- (clause (vi) Sub section 1 of
section 13
The respondent has renounced the world by entering any religious order.
9. Unheard of seven years or more by the respondent- (clause (vii) Sub section 1 of
section 13
The respondent has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or
more by those person who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive.
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2.No restitution of conjugal rights for one year or more after the passing the decree for
restitution conjugal rights.
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2. Guilty of rape, sodomy and bestiality-
As per clause (ii), The husband has, since the solemnization of the marriage, been
guilty of rape, sodomy and bestiality
3. No resumption of cohabitation after passing decree or order for maintenance for
wife
As per clause (iii), in a suit under section 18 of the Hindu Adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956, an decree has been passed or in a proceeding under section 125
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, a order has been passed against the husband
awarding maintenance to the wife notwithstanding that she was living apart and that
since the passing of such decree or order, cohabitation between the parties has not been
resumed for one year or upwards.
4. Repudiation of marriage by wife after she attain the age of 15 but before 18
years.
As per clause (iv), her marriage (whether consummated or not) was solemnized
before she attained the age of fifteen years and she has repudiated the marriage after
attained that age but before attaining the age of eighteen years.
On the motion of both the parties made not earlier than six months after the date
of presentation of the petition and not later than eighteen months after the said date, if
the petition is not withdrawn in the mean time, the court shall pass a decree of divorce
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declaring the marriage to be dissolved provided that the following two conditions are
fulfilled,
1. The court is satisfied, after hearing the parties and making such enquiry as it
think fit, that marriage has been solemnized.
2. The court is satisfied that the averments in the petition are true.
But in fit cases, by special leave, the may allow a petition to be presented even before
one year after the marriage on the ground that the case is one of the exceptional
hardship to the petitioner or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent.
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2. Contravention of section 5 (ii)- Liable for punishment under the Prohibition of Child
Marriage Act, 2006
3. Contravention of section 5 (iii)- Liable for punishment of simple imprisonment up to
15 days or fine up to Rs1000 or both- s.18
4. Contravention of section 5 (iv) & (v)- Liable for punishment of simple imprisonment
up to one month or fine up to Rs1000 or both – section-18
*****
In Baillie’s Digest, marriage has been defined to be ‘a contract for the purpose of
legalizing sexual intercourse, and procreation of children.’
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Ashabah says :- ‘Marriage is a contract underlying a permanent relationship based on
mutual consent on the part of man and woman’.
Abdur Rahim says:- ‘The Mohemmadan jurist regard the institution of marriage as
partaking both of the nature of ibbadat or devotional acts and muamalat or dealings
among men.
According to Ameer Ali:- ‘Marriage is an institution ordained for the protection of the
society, and in order that human beings may guard themselves from foulness and
unchastity.
Mulla defined Nikah as “a contract which has for its object, the procreation and
legalizing of children.” As per Section 2 of Law of Marriage (Compendium of Islamic
Laws compiled by All India Muslim Personal Law Board), ‘Marriage is an agreement
between a man and a woman, based on the Shariat principles as a result of which mutual
sexual relation becomes legitimate, paternity of obligation becomes enforceable.’
Section 4 of the Law of Marriage (Compendium of Islamic Laws compiled by All India
Muslim Personal Law Board), says, ‘Marriage is compliance with injunctions of God’s
Book and His Prophet’s Sunnat. In the eyes of Shariat, therefore, marriage is not just a
civil contract; it is also a worship.’
A glossary on Tarmizi sets out five objectives of marriage : i) The restraint of sexual
passion ii) The ordering of domestic life iii) The increase of the family iv) The discipline
of the same in the care and responsibility of wife and children, and v) The upbringing of
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virtuous children. The Prophet said – ‘Men marry women for their piety, or their
property or their beauty, but man should marry for piety. The purpose of marriage are
perpetuation of human race and attainment of chastity,continence, mutual love, affection
and peace.
There has been a conflict of opinion as to the nature of Muslim Marriage. Some opine
that, Muslim Marriage is a mere civil contract and not a sacrament, while some other
opine that it is a religious sacrament in nature. Muslim Marriage, by some text writers
and jurists, is treated as a mere civil contract and not a sacrament. This observation seems
to be based on the fact that marriage, under Muslim Law, has similar characteristics as a
contract.
For instance: 1. As marriage requires proposal (Ijab) from one party and acceptance
(Qubul/ Qabool) from the other so is the contract. Moreover, there can be no marriage
without free consent and such consent should not be obtained by means of coercion, fraud
or undue influence.
2. Just as in case of contract, entered into by a guardian, on attaining majority, so can a
marriage contract in Muslim Law, be set aside by a minor on attaining the age of puberty.
3. The parties to a Muslim Marriage may enter into any post-nuptial agreement which is
enforceable by law provided it is reasonable and not opposed to policy of Islam. Same is
the case with contract.
4. The term of marriage contract may also be altered within legal limits to suit individuals
cases. The analogy of marriage contract with contract of sale as pointed out by Justice
Mahmood in the leading case of Abdul Khadir v. Salima, and Justice Mitter in
Saburannissa v. Sabdu Sheikh(AIR 1934) also emphasizes the contractual aspect of
Muslim Marriage. Another view is that marriage is not purely a civil contract but a
religious sacrament too. Anis Begum v/s. Mohammad Istafa (1993) is a leading case on
the point where C.J. Sir Shah Sulaiman has tried to put a more balanced view of this
While reviewing the Abdul Kadir’s case, Justice Sulaiman in Anis Begum’s case
observed : ‘ It may not be out of place to mention that Maulvi Samiullah collected some
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authorities showing that marriage is not regarded as a mere civil contract but as a
religious sacrament. Though the learned C.J. does not himself say that marriage is a
sacrament, but from the context in which he said, it is clear that he supported the view of
Maulvi Samiullah.
a) Proposal (Ijab) and Acceptance (Qabool) – The proposal is made by the bridegroom.
The proposal is called ‘Ijab’. The proposal consists the amount of dower. The bride sits
behind the curtain (pardah) with the relatives accumulated for this purpose.
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b) At one meeting: The Ijab and Qabool must be done at one meeting. The Ijab at one
time, and Qabool at another time, make the marriage void.
c) Consent : The consent of both the parties must be with free will, not under undue
influence, misrepresentation or coercion. Marriage under compulsion is not valid under
Sunni and Shia Schools. But it is valid under Hanafi Sub School. According to the Shias,
witnesses are not necessary. But, according to the Sunnis, two male witnesses, who are
sane and adults should be present. Absence of witness renders the marriage irregular, but
not void.
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marriage by the father or paternal grandfather, such marriage cannot be repudiated unless
such father or grandfather acted fraudulently or negligently. All the restrictions with
regard to the option of puberty have been abolished by the Dissolution of Muslim
Marriage Act, 1939. According to Sec. 2 of the Act, a Muslim wife is entitled to the
dissolution of her marriage if she proves that the marriage has not been consummated or
the marriage took place before she attained the age of 15years or she has repudiated the
marriage before attaining the age of 18years. Mere repudiation does not render
dissolution of the marriage. The dissolution must be confirmed by a competent court.
C) Free Consent : The marriage to be valid, the parties must be freely consented to. If
the consent is obtained by force or fraud, it is no consent and the marriage is not valid. It
is a general law among all sects that in case of an adult woman consent must come from
her. Without her consent, consent of her father, grandfather etc., only is not sufficient,
though in some cases permission to marry may be obtained from father or grandfather,
wherever it was possible. In order to validate the marriage of a boy or girl who has not
attained the age of puberty, the consent of the legal guardian is necessary. The marriage
of a minor girl without the consent of her guardian is void. Under Hanafi law if the
consent is obtained by fraud or compulsion, the marriage would be valid but only
irregular and not void. Suppression of certain facts by any of the contracting parties have
been held to amount to fraud.
Under Shia and Shafi law, such marriages where consent was obtained through fraud or
compulsion are void. A Shia adult (attained majority) woman should obtain permission of
her father or grandfather to marry, although she may be looking after her own affairs.
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(i) Consanguinity; (ii) Affinity; (iii) Fosterage
(A) (i) Consanguinity : It means ‘blood relationship” . A marriage between the following
relations is prohibited and void – a) Mother and Son b) Grandmother (how high so ever) ;
and c) Brother and Sister; (d) Uncle and Niece (e) Nephew and Aunt
(ii) Affinity : It means “relationship by marriage”. A man should not marry his (a) Wife’s
mother or grandmother how high so ever; (b) Wife’s daughter or grand daughter how low
so ever; (c) Wife of father or paternal ancestor; (d) Wife of son or son’s son or daughter’s
son how low so ever.
(iii) Fosterage : It means foster relationship. If a woman suckles the child of another,
foster relationship is created. Thus, a marriage between two persons having foster
relationship is prohibited.
(B) Polyandry
Polyandry: If a woman has two husbands, it is called “bigamy”. If she has several(more
than one) husbands, it is called “Polyandry”.
A Muslim man can have four wives at a time. But a Muslim woman cannot have more
than one husband. If so, the marriage is void. 2. Relative Prohibition : Relative
Prohibition viz. absence of witnesses, polygamy(having several wives) i.e., more than
four wives, marriage during “Iddat Period” etc. renders the marriage irregular and not
void.
Batil or Void Marriage : - Section 50 of the Law of Marriage (compiled by All India
Muslim Personal Law Board), ‘A void marriage is one which according to the Shariat
does not come into existence at all.’ Mulla defines Void Marriage as – ‘A void marriage
is one which is unlawful in itself the prohibition against the marriage being perpetual and
absolute. A marriage which has no legal results is termed batil or void. It is the
semblance of marriage without the reality. A marriage contracted by parties suffering
from absolute capacity i.e., prohibited on the grounds of consanguinity, affinity,
fosterage, etc. is void.
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Fasid or Irregular Marriage:- In Islamic law, Sunni school considers three kinds of
marriages namely valid, void and irregular marriage. According to Shia school there is no
irregular or invalid marriage and there are only two marriages : Valid and Void
Marriages. The irregular marriages stand in between the void and valid marriages. Fyzee
has classified irregular marriages into five classes, namely : i) A marriage without
witness, ii) A marriage with a woman undergoing iddat, iii) A marriage prohibited by
reason of difference of religion, iv) A marriage with two sisters, or contrary to the rules of
unlawful conjunction, and v) A marriage with a fifth wife.
According to Section 51 of the Law of Marriage (compiled by All India Muslim Personal
Law Board) “An irregular marriage is one which is neither valid nor void. Before
consummation such marriage is governed by the rules of marriage, and after
consummation it gives rise to the effect and rules of marriage. In both these situations
separation is necessary either by mutual renunciation or by the order of the qazi”.
According to Mulla, ‘An irregular marriage is one which is not unlawful in itself, but
unlawful ‘for something else’, as where the prohibition is temporary or relative, or when
the irregularity arises from an accident circumstances such as absence of witnesses.’
The Shia law recognizes two kinds of marriage, namely, permanent and muta or
temporary.
Muta Marriage:
Muta is a kind of temporary marriage recognized only in the Shia School of Muslim Law.
A Shia male may contract a muta marriage with a woman professing the Mohammedan,
Christian or Jewish religion or even with a woman who is a fire-worshipper (e.g.. –
Zoroastrian) , but not with a woman following any other religion and is into Idol worship.
The term ‘muta’ implies ‘enjoyment’ or ‘use’. Muta Marriage is a marriage for
temporary but a fixed period after specifying dower(amount to be paid). Muta Marriage
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is a kind of temporary marriage for a fixed period i.e., for a day, few days, few weeks,
few months or years. A Shia woman cannot contract Muta Marriage. The period of
marriage is fixed by entering into an agreement between the parties on payment of some
consideration.
Essentials of Muta Marriage: A muta marriage to be valid, the following conditions are
to be satisfied: i) The period of cohabitation should be fixed. ii) The amount of dower
should be fixed. Half of the amount would be paid if the marriage is not consummated.
The Muta marriage comes to an end on the expiry of the stipulated period. There is no
divorce in respect of a muta marriage. Even before the expiry of the term the Husband
may put an end to the marriage by making a gift of remaining term to her and paying the
full amount of dower. Children born during muta marriage are legitimate and are entitled
to inherit property from both the parents.
Iddat period:
When a Muslim marriage is dissolved by death or divorce, the woman is required to
remain in seclusion for a specified period. During this period, she is prohibited to
remarry. This period is called “Idda” or “Iddat”. Iddat is the period during which it is
incumbent upon a woman whose marriage has been dissolved by divorce or death, to
remain in seclusion and to abstain from marrying another man. In the words of Justice
Mahmood, ‘Iddat is the term by the completion of which a new marriage is rendered
lawful.’ Iddat is a period during which a woman is prohibited from marrying again after
the dissolution of her first marriage i.e., the period of waiting or the period during which
the previous existing marriage is considered to be undissolved for certain purpose
notwithstanding that the husband had died or if alive had pronounced a divorce. Muslim
Law lays down that one should not marry a woman, who is undergoing
During the period of Idda, her husband also cannot remarry. After the completion of
idda, the women can lawfully remarry. This prohibition is imposed with a view to
ascertain the pregnancy of the woman so as to avoid confusion of paternity. Ameer Ali
defines, “Idda” is an interval, which the woman is bound to observe between the
termination, by death or divorce of one matrimonial alliance and commencement of
another.” Duration or Period of Idda :- Different periods of ‘idda’ are provided
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depending upon the manner in which the marriage is dissolved as detailed below: i) Iddat
of widowhood : When a person dies living a widow, she is prohibited from marrying
before the expiration of 4 months and 10 days. ii) Iddat of pregnant woman: If the widow
is pregnant at the death of her husband, the Iddat will not terminate until delivery of
miscarriage. If delivery or its
Iddat of Talaq : The period of Iddat in case of Talaq is three courses, if the woman is
subject to menstruation, otherwise three lunar months. If the woman is pregnant at the
time of divorce, the Iddat will not terminate till delivery. iv) Iddat when marriage is
irregular : If the marriage is irregular and parties have separated before actual
consummation, there is no Iddat. If the consummation has taken place the wife is bound
to observe Iddat. v) If the marriage is not consummated, iddat has to be observed in the
case of death, but not in the case of divorce. vi) The period of iddat begins from the date
of the divorce or death of the husband and not from the date on which the woman gets the
information of the divorce or of the death of the husband.
The iddat due to the death of husband commences from the date of death. If the
information of death does not reach the wife until after the expiration of the period of
iddat she is not bound to observe iddat. When a husband divorces his wife, the iddat
period starts from the date of divorce. When the husband dies in the period of iddat for a
revocable divorce, the wife must observe fresh iddat for death. Effects of Iddat Period :
i) During the period of iddat, Muslim woman is not entitled to marry any other person. ii)
During the Iddat period, the wife is entitled to maintenance. iii) The wife is entitled to
Deferred Dower iv) During the Iddat period, if any one of the parties to the marriage,
dies, the other is entitled to inherit from him or her in his or her capacity of wife or
husband respectively as the case may be. v) If the husband has four wives including the
divorced one, he cannot marry a fifth one, until the completion of iddat of the divorced
wife. vi) Where the Husband pronounces talaq three times during death – illness and dies
before the completion of wife’s iddat, the wife is entitled to inherit from him even if the
divorce has become irrevocable prior to his death. A marriage performed during the
period of Idda is not void, but irregular. But, under the Shia Law, it is void. During Idda,
the woman is entitled to maintenance.
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Dower:
Dower is of four kinds. It may be (i) “specified’ or (ii) “proper”, according to the mode of
determination of its amount. It may also be (iii) “prompt’ or (iv) “deferred’, according to
the time when it is payable.
1. Specified Dower:
Specified dower is fixed by agreement between the parties, either before or at the time of
marriage or even after marriage.
Under Sunni law, specified dower must not be less than the value of 10 dirhams, the
money value of 1 dirham (today) being equivalent to about twelve or thirteen rupees. The
wife is entitled to this minimum amount even if the specified dower is less. (Under the
Shia law, there is no fixed minimum for dower.)
But there is no upper limit, and a dower is never invalid on the ground of its being
excessive. It is not uncommon to fix a figure which is beyond the means of the husband,
e.g., a dower of Rs. 51,000 in the case of a poor man. The Court must decree the whole
amount of the specified dower, though the husband had no means of paying it when it
was stipulated or though its payment would leave nothing to the heirs of the husband.
Thus, in an old Peshawar case, it was held that if a husband transfers a field to his wife as
dower, she is entitled, as against him, to a decree for possession. The Court further held
that if there are other sharers in the field, they need not be made parties to the wife’s suit,
and the Court’s decree does not affect their rights.
If, however, there is any specific legislative enactment on the point, the Court need not
decree the entire amount of the specified dower. Thus, the Oudh Laws Act, 1876,
contained a provision that the Court could not award the amount of dower stipulated in
the agreement, but only such sum as was reasonable, regard being had to the means of the
husband and the status of the wife.
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In such cases, the social position of the husband and his means are not of much
importance. As the Hedaya lays down, the wife’s “age, beauty, fortune, understanding
and virtue” must be kept in mind when fixing proper dower. Thus, the Prophet once
allowed the marriage of a poor Muslim for a silver ring, and on another occasion, merely
on condition that the husband would teach the Koran to his wife!
Under Shia law, the proper dower should not exceed 500 dirhams. (Baille, II, 71)
In one case, a Muslim married a Christian woman in England. The Court observed that
the marriage was governed by Muslim law, and therefore, the husband could divorce his
wife by talak. The Court also held that the wife, in turn could also claim dower, although
no dower was initially fixed at the time of the marriage. In such cases, proper dower
could be claimed, i.e. dower which would be payable to a woman of similar status and
circumstances. (Marina Jatoi v. Nuruddin Jatoi, P.L.D. 1967 S.C. 580)
It is only on payment of the prompt dower that the husband becomes entitled to enforce
his conjugal rights, unless the marriage is already consummated. The right of restitution,
so far from being a condition precedent to the payment of prompt dower, arises only after
the dower has been paid.
In Rabia Khatoon v. Mukhtar Ahmed (1966 A.A. 548), it was observed that the wife may
refuse to live with her husband and to admit him to sexual intercourse, so long as the
prompt dower is not paid. If the husband sues her for restitution of conjugal rights before
sexual intercourse takes place, non-payment of dower is a complete defence to the suit,
and the suit will be dismissed.
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If the suit is brought after sexual intercourse has taken place with her free consent, the
proper decree to pass is not a decree of dismissal, but a decree for restitution, conditional
on payment of prompt dower.
[This principle was first laid down in Abdul Kadir v. Salima, (1886) 8 All. 148.]
In a case in which no specific proportion of prompt and deferred dower has been fixed by
agreement at the time of the marriage, or by custom —
(i) The whole is regarded as prompt according to Shia law;
(ii) Part is regarded as prompt, and part as deferred according to Sunni law; the proportion
is regulated by the status of the parties and the amount of the dower settled. The Court
has, however, the power to award the whole as prompt. (Huseinkhan v. Gulab Khatun,
(1911) I.L.R. 35 Bom. 386)
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the suit is filed after consummation, the decree will be for restitution, conditional on
payment of the prompt dower.
There is another remedy also to recover the unpaid prompt dower. The wife, (and after
her death, her heirs) may sue for such dower within three years from the date when — (i)
it is demanded and refused; or (ii) the marriage is dissolved by death or divorce.
Deferred Dower:
Deferred dower becomes payable only on dissolution of marriage either by death or
divorce. If it is not so paid, the wife (and after her death, her heirs) may sue for it within
three years from the dissolution of the marriage.
The Prophet declared that among the things which have been permitted by law, divorce is
the worst. Divorce being an evil, it must be avoided as far as possible. But in some
occasions this evil becomes a necessity, because when it is impossible for the parties to
the marriage to carry on their union with mutual affection and love then it is better to
allow them to get separated than compel them to live together in an atmosphere of hatred
and disaffection. The basis of divorce in Islamic law is the inability of the spouses to live
together rather than any specific cause (or guilt of a party) on account of which the parties
cannot live together. A divorce may be either by the act of the husband or by the act of
the wife. There are several modes of divorce under the Muslim law, which will be
discussed hereafter.
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Modes of Divorce:
A husband may divorce his wife by repudiating the marriage without giving any reason.
Pronouncement of such words which signify his intention to disown the wife is sufficient.
Generally this done by talaaq. But he may also divorce by Ila, and Zihar which differ
from talaaq only in form, not in substance. A wife cannot divorce her husband of her own
accord. She can divorce the husband only when the husband has delegated such a right to
her or under an agreement. Under an agreement the wife may divorce her husband either
by Khula or Mubarat. Before 1939, a Muslim wife had no right to seek divorce except on
the ground of false charges of adultery, insanity or impotency of the husband. But the
Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 lays down several other grounds on the basis
of which a Muslim wife may get her divorce decree passed by the order of the court.
The category of extra judicial divorce can be further subdivided into three types,
namely:
The second category is the right of the wife to give divorce under the Dissolution of
Muslim Marriages Act 1939.
Talaaq: Talaaq in its primitive sense means dismission. In its literal meaning, it means
"setting free", "letting loose", or taking off any "ties or restraint". In Muslim Law it means
freedom from the bondage of marriage and not from any other bondage. In legal sense it
means dissolution of marriage by husband using appropriate words. In other words talaaq
is repudiation of marriage by the husband in accordance with the procedure laid down by
the law.
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The following verse is in support of the husband's authority to pronounce unilateral
divorce is often cited:
Men are maintainers of women, because Allah has made some of them to excel others and
because they spend out of their property (on their maintenance and dower) . When the
husband exercises his right to pronounce divorce, technically this is known as talaaq. The
most remarkable feature of Muslim law of talaaq is that all the schools of the Sunnis and
the Shias recognize it differing only in some details. In Muslim world, so widespread has
been the talaaq that even the Imams practiced it. The absolute power of a Muslim
husband of divorcing his wife unilaterally, without assigning any reason, literally at his
whim, even in a jest or in a state of intoxication, and without recourse to the court, and
even in the absence of the wife, is recognized in modern India. All that is necessary is that
the husband should pronounce talaaq; how he does it, when he does it, or in what he does
it is not very essential.
In Hannefa v. Pathummal, Khalid, J., termed this as "monstrosity" . Among the Sunnis,
talaaq may be express, implied, contingent constructive or even delegated. The Shias
recognize only the express and the delegated forms of talaaq.
2) Free Consent: Except under Hanafi law, the consent of the husband in pronouncing
talaaq must be a free consent. Under Hanafi law, a talaaq, pronounced under compulsion,
coercion, undue influence, fraud and voluntary intoxication etc., is valid and dissolves the
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marriage.
Shia law:
Under the Shia law (and also under other schools of Sunnis) a talaaq pronounced under
compulsion, coercion, undue influence, fraud, or voluntary intoxication is void and
ineffective.
According to Shias, talaaq, must be pronounced orally, except where the husband is
unable to speak. If the husband can speak but gives it in writing, the talaaq, is void under
Shia law. Here talaaq must be pronounced in the presence of two witnesses.
4) Express words: The words of talaaq must clearly indicate the husband's intention to
dissolve the marriage. If the pronouncement is not express and is ambiguous then it is
absolutely necessary to prove that the husband clearly intends to dissolve the marriage.
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Talaaq-i-sunnat is considered to be in accordance with the dictats of Prophet Mohammad.
Thus, if before the completion of iddat, the husband resumes cohabitation with his wife or
says I have retained thee" the divorce is revoked. Resumption of sexual intercourse before
the completion of period of iddat also results in the revocation of divorce.
The Raad-ul-Muhtar puts it thus: "It is proper and right to observe this form, for
human nature is apt to be mislead and to lead astray the mind far to perceive faults
which may not exist and to commit mistakes of which one is certain to feel ashamed
afterwards”.
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husband, H, pronounces talaaq, on her. This is the first pronouncement by express words.
Then again, when she enters the next period of purity, and before he indulges in sexual
intercourse, he makes the second pronouncement. He again revokes it. Again when the
wife enters her third period of purity and before any intercourse takes place H pronounces
the third pronouncement. The moment H makes this third pronouncement, the marriage
stands dissolved irrevocably, irrespective of iddat.
Talaaq-i-Biddat:
It came into vogue during the second century of Islam. It has two forms: (i) the triple
declaration of talaaq made in a period of purity, either in one sentence or in three, (ii) the
other form constitutes a single irrevocable pronouncement of divorce made in a period of
tuhr or even otherwise. This type of talaaq is not recognized by the Shias. This form of
divorce is condemned. It is considered heretical, because of its irrevocability.
The Supreme Court in Shayara Bano case (2017) had declared the practise of Triple
Talaq (talaq-e-biddat) as unconstitutional.
However, the penal provision of the Act i.e. a Muslim husband declaring instant Triple
Talaq can be imprisoned for up to three years is alleged to be disproportionate for a civil
offence.
What is Talaq-e-biddat?
If a man belonging to the religion of Islam pronounces talaq thrice either orally
or in written form to his wife, then the divorce is considered immediate and
irrevocable.
The only way to reconcile the marriage is through the practice of nikah halala,
which requires the woman to get remarried, consummate the second marriage, get
divorced, observe the three-month iddat period and return to her husband.
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Some key features of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act, 2019:
It is applicable in whole of India but it is not extended to the State of Jammu &
Kashmir.
Any pronouncement of “talaq” by a Muslim husband to his wife in any manner,
spoken or written, will be void and illegal.
Any Muslim husband who communicates the “talaq” orally or in writing may face
punishment up to three years in jail. The punishment may be also extended.
If a Muslim man pronounces “talaq” to his wife, then the woman and her children
are entitled to receive an allowance for subsistence. Such an amount can be
determined by a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class.
A Muslim woman is entitled to the custody of her minor children even if her
husband has pronounced “talaq” to her.
The offence is also compoundable (i.e. the parties may arrive at a compromise),
if the Muslim woman insists for the same and the Magistrates allows certain terms
and conditions which he may determine.
A person accused of this offence cannot be granted bail unless an application is
filed by the accused after a hearing in the presence of the Muslim woman (on
whom talaq is pronounced) is conducted and the Magistrate is satisfied with the
reasonable grounds for granting bail.
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Further, if the husband is imprisoned, how he can pay maintenance allowance to
wives and children.
Also similar to misuse of Indian Penal Code section 498A (Dowry Harassment)
which led to harassment of the affected men, the penal provision in Triple Talaq
can be subject to such harassment.
Triple Talaq has led to the subjugation of Muslim women even after 72 years of
independence but its solution must come through coexistence rather than coercion.
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Ila:
Besides talaaq, a Muslim husband can repudiate his marriage by two other modes, that
are, Ila and Zihar. They are called constructive divorce. In Ila, the husband takes an oath
not to have sexual intercourse with his wife. Followed by this oath, there is no
consummation for a period of four months. After the expiry of the fourth month, the
marriage dissolves irrevocably. But if the husband resumes cohabitation within four
months, Ila is cancelled and the marriage does not dissolve. Under Ithna Asharia (Shia)
School, Ila, does not operate as divorce without order of the court of law. After the expiry
of the fourth month, the wife is simply entitled for a judicial divorce. If there is no
cohabitation, even after expiry of four months, the wife may file a suit for restitution of
conjugal rights against the husband.
Zihar:
In this mode the husband compares his wife with a woman within his prohibited
relationship e.g., mother or sister etc. The husband would say that from today the wife is
like his mother or sister. After such a comparison the husband does not cohabit with his
wife for a period of four months. Upon the expiry of the said period, Zihar is complete.
After the expiry of fourth month the wife has following rights:
(i) She may go to the court to get a decree of judicial divorce
(ii) She may ask the court to grant the decree of restitution of conjugal rights.
Where the husband wants to revoke Zihar by resuming cohabitation within the said
period, the wife cannot seek judicial divorce. It can be revoked if:
(i) The husband observes fast for a period of two months, or,
(ii) He provides food at least sixty people, or,
(iii) He frees a slave.
According to Shia law Zihar must be performed in the presence of two witnesses.
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Holy Quran runs as: "And it not lawful for you that ye take from women out of that which
ye have given them: except (in the case) when both fear that they may not be able to keep
within the limits (imposed by Allah), in that case it is no sin for either of them if the
woman ransom herself." The word khula, in its original sense means "to draw" or "dig
up" or "to take off" such as taking off one's clothes or garments. It is said that the spouses
are like clothes to each other and when they take khula each takes off his or her clothes,
i.e., they get rid of each other.
In law it is said is said to signify an agreement between the spouses for dissolving a
connubial union in lieu of compensation paid by the wife to her husband out of her
property. Although consideration for Khula is essential, the actual release of the dower or
delivery of property constituting the consideration is not a condition precedent for the
validity of the khula. Once the husband gives his consent, it results in an irrevocable
divorce. The husband has no power of cancelling the 'khul' on the ground that the
consideration has not been paid. The consideration can be anything, usually it is mahr, the
whole or part of it. But it may be any property though not illusory. In mubarat, the
outstanding feature is that both the parties desire divorce. Thus, the proposal may
emanate from either side. In mubarat both, the husband and the wife, are happy to get rid
of each other . Among the Sunnis when the parties to marriage enter into a mubarat all
mutual rights and obligations come to an end.
The Shia law is stringent though. It requires that both the parties must bona fide find the
marital relationship to be irksome and cumbersome. Among the Sunnis no specific form
is laid down, but the Shias insist on a proper form. The Shias insist that the word mubarat
should be followed by the word talaaq, otherwise no divorce would result. They also
insist that the pronouncement must be in Arabic unless the parties are incapable of
pronouncing the Arabic words. Intention to dissolve the marriage should be clearly
expressed. Among both, Shias and Sunnis, mubarat is irrevocable. Other requirements are
the same as in khula and the wife must undergo the period of iddat and in both the divorce
is essentially an act of the parties, and no intervention by the court is required.
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Divorce by wife:
The divorce by wife can be categorized under three categories:
(i) Talaaq-i-tafweez
(ii) Lian
(iii) By Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939.
Talaaq-i-tafweez or delegated divorce is recognized among both, the Shias and the
Sunnis. The Muslim husband is free to delegate his power of pronouncing divorce to his
wife or any other person. He may delegate the power absolutely or conditionally,
temporarily or permanently . A permanent delegation of power is revocable but a
temporary delegation of power is not. This delegation must be made distinctly in favour
of the person to whom the power is delegated, and the purpose of delegation must be
clearly stated. The power of talaaq may be delegated to his wife and as Faizee observes,
"this form of delegated divorce is perhaps the most potent weapon in the hands of a
Muslim wife to obtain freedom without the intervention of any court and is now
beginning to be fairly common in India".
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Lian:
If the husband levels false charges of unchastity or adultery against his wife then this
amounts to character assassination and the wife has got the right to ask for divorce on
these grounds. Such a mode of divorce is called Lian. However, it is only a voluntary and
aggressive charge of adultery made by the husband which, if false, would entitle the wife
to get the wife to get the decree of divorce on the ground of Lian. Where a wife hurts the
feelings of her husband with her behaviour and the husband hits back an allegation of
infidelity against her, then what the husband says in response to the bad behaviour of the
wife, cannot be used by the wife as a false charge of adultery and no divorce is to be
granted under Lian. This was held in the case of Nurjahan v. Kazim Ali by the Calcutta
High Court.
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# That the husband has neglected or has failed to provide for her maintenance for a
period of two years: it is a legal obligation of every husband to maintain his wife, and if
he fails to do so, the wife may seek divorce on this ground. A husband may not maintain
his wife either because he neglects her or because he has no means to provide her
maintenance. In both the cases the result would be the same. The husband's obligation to
maintain his wife is subject to wife's own performance of matrimonial obligations.
Therefore, if the wife lives separately without any reasonable excuse, she is not entitled to
get a judicial divorce on the ground of husband's failure to maintain her because her own
conduct disentitles her from maintenance under Muslim law.
# That the husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of seven years
or upwards: the wife's right of judicial divorce on this ground begins from the date on
which the sentence becomes final. Therefore, the decree can be passed in her favour only
after the expiry of the date for appeal by the husband or after the appeal by the husband
has been dismissed by the final court.
# That the husband has failed to perform, without reasonable cause, his marital
obligations for a period of three years: the Act does define 'marital obligations of the
husband'. There are several marital obligations of the husband under Muslim law. But for
the purpose of this clause husband's failure to perform only those conjugal obligations
may be taken into account which are not included in any of the clauses of Section 2 of
this Act.
# That the husband was impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be so:
for getting a decree of divorce on this ground, the wife has to prove that the husband was
impotent at the time of the marriage and continues to be impotent till the filing of the suit.
Before passing a decree of divorce of divorce on this ground, the court is bound to give to
the husband one year to improve his potency provided he makes an application for it. If
the husband does not give such application, the court shall pass the decree without delay.
In Gul Mohd. Khan v. Hasina the wife filed a suit for dissolution of marriage on the
ground of impotency. The husband made an application before the court seeking an order
for proving his potency. The court allowed him to prove his potency.
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# If the husband has been insane for a period of two years or is suffering from
leprosy or a virulent veneral disease: the husband's insanity must be for two or more
years immediately preceding the presentation of the suit. But this act does not specify that
the unsoundness of mind must be curable or incurable. Leprosy may be white or black or
cause the skin to wither away. It may be curable or incurable. Veneral disease is a disease
of the sex organs. The Act provides that this disease must be of incurable nature. It may
be of any duration. Moreover even if this disease has been infected to the husband by the
wife herself, she is entitled to get divorce on this ground.
# That she, having been given in marriage by her father or other guardian before
she attained the age of fifteen years, repudiated the marriage before attaining the
age of eighteen years, provided that the marriage has not been consummated;
In Syed Ziauddin v. Parvez Sultana, Parvez Sultana was a science graduate and she
wanted to take admission in a college for medical studies. She needed money for her
studies. Syed Ziaudddin promised to give her money provided she married him. She did.
Later she filed for divorce for non-fulfillment of promise on the part of the husband. The
court granted her divorce on the ground of cruelty. Thus we see the court's attitude of
attributing a wider meaning to the expression cruelty. In Zubaida Begum v. Sardar
Shah, a case from Lahore High Court, the husband sold the ornaments of the wife with
her consent. It was submitted that the husband's conduct does not amount to cruelty.
In Aboobacker v. Mamu koya, the husband used to compel his wife to put on a sari and
In Itwari v. Asghari, the Allahabad High Court observed that Indian Law does not
recognize various types of cruelty such as 'Muslim cruelty', 'Hindu cruelty' and so on, and
that the test of cruelty is based on universal and humanitarian standards; that is to say,
conduct of the husband which would cause such bodily or mental pain as to endanger the
wife's safety or health.
Irretrievable Breakdown:
Divorce on the basis of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has come into existence in
Muslim Law through the judicial interpretation of certain provisions of Muslim law. In
1945 in Umar Bibi v. Md. Din , it was argued that the wife hated her husband so much
that she could not possibly live with him and there was total incompatibility of
temperaments. On these grounds the court refused to grant a decree of divorce. But
twenty five years later in Neorbibi v. Pir Bux, again an attempt was made to grant
divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This time the court granted
the divorce. Thus in Muslim law of modern India, there are two breakdown grounds for
divorce: (a) non-payment of maintenance by the husband even if the failure has resulted
due to the conduct of the wife, (b) where there is total irreconcilability between the
spouses.
Conclusion:
In contrast to the Western world where divorce was relatively uncommon until modern
times, and in contrast to the low rates of divorce in the modern Middle East, divorce was
a common occurrence in the pre-modern Muslim world. In the medieval Islamic world
and the Ottoman Empire, the rate of divorce was higher than it is today in the modern
Middle East. In 15th century Egypt, Al-Sakhawi recorded the marital history of 500
women, the largest sample on marriage in the Middle Ages, and found that at least a third
of all women in the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria married more than once, with
Usually, assuming her husband demands a divorce, the divorced wife keeps her mahr,
both the original gift and any supplementary property specified in the marriage contract.
She is also given child support until the age of weaning, at which point the child's custody
will be settled by the couple or by the courts. Women's right to divorce is often extremely
limited compared with that of men in the Middle East. While men can divorce their
spouses easily, women face a lot of legal and financial obstacles. For example, in Yemen,
women usually can ask for divorce only when husband's inability to support her life is
admitted while men can divorce at will. However, this contentious area of religious
practice and tradition is being increasingly challenged by those promoting more liberal
interpretations of Islam.
*****
CHRISTIAN LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.
The Christian Marriage Act, 1872 deals with Christian marriage and the Divorce Act,
1869 deals with matrimonial remedies for parties to the marriage.
After declaration, the Minister of Religion issue under his hand a certificate of such
notice for intended marriage.
Provided that no such certificates shall be issued until the expiration of four days after the
date of the receipt of the notice by such Minister.
In the case of minor marriage, no such certificates shall be issued until the expiration of
four days after the date of the receipt of the notice by such Minister.
Solemnization of marriage
After the issue of the certificate by the Minister, marriage may be solemnized
between the persons according to such form or ceremony as the Minister thinks fit to
adopt.
Provided that the marriage be solemnized in the presence of at least two
witnesses besides the Minister.
If the marriage is not solemnised within two months from the date of the
issue of the certificate, it becomes void and fresh notice is to be served.
The notice shall state the name and surname, and the profession or condition
of each of the parties intending marriage, the dwelling-place of each of them, the time
Publication of notice.—
Every Marriage Registrar shall affix a copy of the notice in some
conspicuous place in his office.
When one of the parties intending marriage is a minor, every Marriage
registrar shall, within twenty-four hours after the receipt by him of the notice of such
marriage, send a copy of such notice to each of the other Marriage Registrars(if any) in
the same district, who shall likewise affix the copy in some conspicuous place in his own
office.
Oath before issue of certificate.— The certificate shall not be issued by any Marriage
Registrar, until one of the parties intending marriage appears personally before such
Marriage Registrar, and makes oath—
(a) that he or she believes that there is no any impediment of kindred or affinity, or
other lawful hindrance, to the said marriage,
and
(b) that the party making such oath has usual place of abode within the
district of such Marriage Registrar,
“ I call upon these persons here present to witness that I, A.B., do take thee, C.D., to
be may lawful wedded wife (or husband)".
When marriage not had within two months after notice, new notice required:
Whenever a marriage is not solemnized within two months after the copy of
the notice has been entered by the Marriage Registrar, the notice and the certificate shall
be void and fresh notice is to be served.
Registration of marriages
After the solemnization of any marriage, the Marriage Registrar shall register the
marriage in duplicate; that is to say, in a marriage register-book, according to the form of
the Fourth Schedule and also in a certificate attached to the marriage-register-book as a
counterfoil.
The entry of such marriage in both the certificate and the marriage-register-book
shall be signed by the person by or before whom the marriage has been solemnized, if
there be any such person, and by the Marriage Registrar present at such marriage, whether
or not it is solemnized by him, and also by the parties married and attested by two
credible witnesses other than the Marriage Registrar and person solemnizing the
marriage..
Grounds of decree:
—Such decree may be made on any of the following grounds:
—(1) that the respondent was impotent at the time of the marriage and at the time of the
institution of the suit;
(2) that the parties are within the prohibited degree of consanguinity (whether natural or
legal) or affinity;
(3) that either party was a lunatic or idiot at the time of the marriage;
(4) that the former husband or wife of either party was living at the time of the marriage,
and the marriage with such former husband or wife was then in force. Nothing in this
section shall affect the 27 [jurisdiction of the District Court] to make decrees of nullity of
marriage on the ground that the consent of either party was obtained by force or fraud.
*****
If there is no objection within 30 days from the date of publication of the notice, the
parties to the marriage may be allowed for marriage.
If there is any objection within 30 days from the date of publication of notice, it shall
record in writing by the Marriage Officer in the Marriage Note book and shall be signed
by the person who raised the objection.
If an objection is made to an intended marriage, the Marriage Officer shall not solemnise
the marriage until he has enquired into the matter of the objection and is satisfied that it
ought not to prevent the solemnisation of the marriage or the objection is withdrawn by
the person making.
Within 30 days from the date of objection, the Marriage Officer shall have take enquiry
into the objection and arriving at a conclusion or decision.
If the Marriage Officer uphold the objection and refused to solemnise the marriage, the
party to the intended marriage may prefer an appeal to the District Court within whose
jurisdiction the Marriage Officer has his office within 3o days from the of refusal of
marriage. Then the decision of District Court on such appeal shall be final and then the
Marriage Officer shall act in conformity with the decision of the Court.
6. Certificate of marriage.—
(1) When the marriage has been solemnized, the Marriage Officer shall enter a
certificate thereof in the form specified in the Fourth Schedule in a book to be kept by
him for that purpose and to be called the Marriage Certificate Book and such certificate
shall be signed by the parties to the marriage and the three witnesses.
(2) On a certificate being entered in the Marriage Certificate Book by the Marriage
Officer, the Certificate shall be deemed to be conclusive evidence of the fact that a
marriage under this Act has been solemnized and that all formalities respecting the
signatures of witnesses have been complied with.
MATRIMONIAL REMEDIES.
The main function of matrimonial remedies is to give protection to innocent
party. This Act provides five kinds of Matrimonial remedies. These are:
1. Restitution of conjugal Rights.
2. Judicial Separation
3. Divorce
4. Divorce by Mutual consent
5. Annulment of marriage by decree of nullity.
2. Judicial Separation.
A petition for judicial separation may be presented to the district court either by
the husband or the wife,—
(a) on any of the grounds for divorce might have been presented; or
(b) on the ground of failure to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights.
The court, on being satisfied of the truth of the statements made in such petition
and that there is no legal ground why the application should not be granted, may decree
judicial separation accordingly.
Where the court grants a decree for judicial separation, it shall be no longer
obligatory for the petitioner to cohabit with the respondent, but the court may, on the
application by petition of either party and on being satisfied of the truth of the statements
made in such petition, rescind the decree if it considers it just and reasonable to do so.
3. Divorce.
A petition for divorce may be presented to the district court either by the
husband or the wife on the ground that the respondent—
(a) has, after the solemnization of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with
any person other than his or her spouse;
or
(b) has deserted the petitioner for a continuous period of not less than two years
immediately preceding the presentation of the petition;
(c) is undergoing a sentence of imprisonment for seven years or more for an offence as
defined in the Indian Penal Code
Voidable Marriage
Any marriage solemnized under this Act shall be voidable and may be annulled by a
decree of nullity if,—
*****
Hindu law of adoption have been study in two different categories, these are,
1. Hindu law of adoption prior to the passing of “The adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956”
2. Hindu law of adoption after the passing of “The adoption and
Maintenance Act, 1956
2. Kritrima
3. Dwyamushyayana
4. Illatom adoption
1.Dattaka Adoption
This type of adoption was prevalent in all over the India. In this kind of
adoption, the son was given in adoption by parents to a sonless person by the
performance of religious ceremonies (Datta homam).
1. The consent of the adopted son was necessary for validity. But if the son was
minor, he could be given in adoption with the consent of parent.
2. The adopted son must belong to the same caste as the adoptive father.
4. A female could adopt a kritrima son for herself. The wife could adopt a son without
consent of her husband. The widow could adopt a son without the consent of husband’s
Sapinda. But the wife or widow could not adopt a kritrima son for her husband, even
though she has been expressly authorized to do so.
5. A kritrima son did not lose his rights of inheritance in his natural family. In the
adoptive family, he could inherit from his adoptive father only, but not from others.
Incidents of Dwyamushyayana:
i.There must be an agreement.
ii.There must be ceremonies for giving and taking a son in adoption.
iii.The adopted son inherited property from both the natural and adoptive family.
iv.If the adopted son dies, his property is taken jointly and equally by the natural
v.and adoptive mother
5. Customary Adoption.
This type of adoption was prevalent in Punjab. It is nothing but a mere
appointment of heir. It creates a personal relationship between the adoptive father and
adopted son only. It does not create any relationship between adopted son and the
collaterals of the adoptive father. Now this type of adoption is abolished by “The
Hindu Adoption And Maintenance Act, 1956”
Objects of Adoption.
The objects of adoption are two fold:
1. Religious object:
It secures the spiritual benefit of the adopter and his family by having a son for
the purpose of offering funereal cakes and libations of water to the names of the adopter
and his family.
Person who may be lawfully take a son in adoption (who can adopt?)
1. If a male Hindu had no son, son’s son or son’s son’s son, he could alone adopt
a son.
2. A wife also could adopt a son only to her husband with his permission.
3. Any other female could not adopt a son for any other male relation.
4. Widow, in certain circumstances, could adopt a son for her deceased husband.
An unmarried Hindu woman could not adopt a son or daughter for herself.
Authority to co-widows:
1. If there are more widows, the authority to adopt a son is given to any one of them or
some of them jointly or severely or all of them jointly or severely.
2. If such authority is given to one widow, she may adopt a son for her husband
without the consent of other widows.
3. If such authority is given to all the widows jointly, all of them take a son jointly. If
any one of the widows died before the adoption, the others cannot adopt a son.
Form of authority:
1. The authority may be given either orally or in writing.
2. If the authority is in writing, it must be registered unless it is made by will.
3. The authority may be with or without condition. If there is any conditional
authority, it must be legal and it must be strictly followed.
4. The authority so given may be revoked.
Results of Adoption:
1. Adoption has the effect of transferring the adopted son from natural family to
adoptive family.
2. The adoptee gets the same right in the adopted family as like that of legitimate son of
the family.
3. Even though adopted son loss all rights in the natural family, it doesn’t severe the tie
of blood connection between him and the member of his natural family.
4. If a son is born after adoption, the adopted son is not entitled to get equal
share like that of natural son.
a). In Bengal, he gets 1/3 of adoptive father’s estate.
b). In Benaras, he gets 1/4 of adoptive father’s estate.
c). In Madras and Bombay, he gets 1/5 of adoptive father’s estate.
Effects of adoption:
As per section 12 of the Act,
1. From the date of adoption, the adopted child shall be deemed to the child of the
adoptive father and mother for all purposes.
2. From the date of the adoption, all the ties of the adopted child in the family of his or
her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in
the adoptive family.
3. The child cannot marry any person whom he or she could not have married if he or
she had continued in the family of his or her birth.
4. Any property which vested in the adopted child before the adoption shall continue to
vest in such person.
5. The adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or
her before the adoption.
Thus, we find that the basis of legitimacy under Muslim law is the existence of marriage
and the marriage itself may be presumed when a man acknowledges paternity to a child
bom to a woman (wife). It may be said that the marriage between a man and woman and
the legitimacy of their off-springs are corelated.
The object of a Muslim marriage is to legalise intercourse and to legitimatise the issues.
In Habibur Rahman v. Altaf Ali, the Privy Council while explaining the Muslim law of
legitimacy observed:
“A son to be legitimate must be the off-spring of a man and his wife….; any other off-
spring is the off-spring of Zina that is illicit connection, and cannot be legitimate. The
term ‘wife’ necessarily connotes marriage; but as marriage may be constituted without
any ceremonial, the existence of a marriage in any particular case may be an open
question. Direct proof may be available but if there be no such (direct proof), indirect
proof may suffice. Now, one of the ways of indirect proof is by an acknowledgement of
legitimacy in favour of a son.”
*****
After the passing of the Indian Majority Act, 1875, there is no difference of opinion
as to the age of majority. According to this Act, minor means a person who has not
attain the age of eighteen years. But if a court appoint a guardian for the person of the
minor or property of the minor or both custody and property, minor means a person
who has not attain the age of twenty one years. This definition is applicable to all
persons domiciled in India and to all maters except marriage, Mahr and divorce in
Muslim and adoption in Hindu.
KINDS OF GUARDIANS.
There are four types guardian in ancient time. These are,
a). Natural Guardian
b). Testamentary Guardian
c). Court Guardian
d). Defacto Guardian
b) Testamentary guardian:
The father could appoint any person as a guardian for person or property or both of
his minor children by his will. The appointment made by father superseding the mother.
c) Court guardian:
A court guardian is one who is appointed by the court under the Guardian and
Wards Act, 1890. In the absence of natural guardian and testamentary guardian, the
court appoint guardian for the person of the minor or his property or both.
d) Defacto guardian:
A Defacto guardian is one who, not being a natural guardian or testamentary
guardian or court guardian, voluntarily takes himself the care of the person of the minor
or his property or both as a guardian. An isolated act of a person in regards to person of
the minor or his property would not make him as a Defacto guardian. So there must be a
continuous course of conduct on his part to act as a guardian.
Definitions :
In this Act, –
(a) “Minor” means a person who has not completed the age of eighteen
years;
(b) “Major” means a person having the care of the person of a minor or of
his property or of both his person and property, and includes –
(i) a natural guardian,
(ii) a guardian appointed by the will of the minor’s father or mother,
(iii) a guardian appointed or declared by a court, and
(iv) a person empowered to act as such by or under any enactment
(2) The natural guardian shall not, without the previous permission of the court,—
(a) mortgage or charge, or transfer by sale, gift, exchange or otherwise any part of the
immovable property of the minor or
(b) lease any part of such property for a term exceeding five years or for a term
extending more than one year beyond the date on which the minor will attain majority.
(4) No court shall grant permission to the natural guardian to do any of the acts
mentioned in sub-section (2) except in case of necessity or for an evident advantage to
the minor.
3. Court Guardian:
There is no provision under the Act for appointment of guardian by the court. But
a court can appoint or declare any person as guardian for the person of the minor or
property of the minor (other than undivided interest in the joint family property) or both
under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
Natural Guardians
In all schools of both the Sunnis and the Shias, the father is recognized as guardian which
term in the context is equivalent to natural guardian and the mother in all schools of
Muslim law is not recognized as a guardian, natural or otherwise, even after the death of
the father. The father's right of guardianship exists even when the mother, or any other
female, is entitled to the custody of the minor. The father has the right to control the
education and religion of minor children, and their upbringing and their movement. So
long as the father is alive, he is the sole and supreme guardian of his minor children.
The father's right of guardianship extends only over his minor legitimate children. He is
not entitled to guardianship or to custody of his minor illegitimate children.
In Muslim law, the mother is not a natural guardian even of her minor illegitimate
children, but she is entitled to their custody.
Among the Sunnis, the father is the only natural guardian of the minor children. After the
death of the father, the guardianship passes on to the executor. Among the Shias, after the
father, the guardianship belongs to the grandfather, even if the father has appointed an
executor, the executor of the father becomes the guardian only in the absence of the
grandfather. No other person can be natural guardian, not even the brother. In the absence
of the grandfather, the guardianship belongs to the grandfather's executor, if any.'
Testamentary Guardian
Among the Sunnis, the father has full power of making a testamentary appointment of
guardian. In the absence of the father and his executor, the grandfather has the power of
appointing a testamentary guardian. Among the Shias, the father's appointment of
testamentary guardian is valid only if the grandfather is not alive. The grandfather, too,
Muslim law does not lay down any specific formalities for the appointment of
testamentary guardians. Appointment may be made in writing or orally. In every case the
intention to appoint a testamentary guardian must be clear and unequivocal. A
testamentary deposition made by a testator may be invalid, but appointment of the
executor may be general or particular. The testator must have the capacity to make the
will at the time when it was executed. This means that the feslat8r ghould be major and of
sound -mind, i.e., at the time of execution of the will, he should be in full possession of
his senses.
Guardian appointed by the Court.-On the failure of the natural . guardians and
testamentary guardians, the kazi was entrusted with the power of appointment of
guardian of a Muslim minor. Now the matter is governed by the Guardians and Wards
Act, 1890. This Act applies to the appointment of guardians of all minors belonging to
any community. The High Courts also have inherent powers of appointment of
guardians, though the power is exercised very sparingly.
Under the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, the power of appointing, or declaring any
person as guardian is conferred on the District Court. The District Court may appoint or
declare any person as guardian of a minor child's person as well as property whenever it
considers it necessary- for the welfare of the minor, taking into consideration the age,
sex, wishes of the child as well 'as the wishes of the parents and the personal law of the
minor.
*****
During the course of time, the idea of separate property and partition of joint
family property and the law of maintenance for some persons comes into existence.
What is maintenance?
Maintenance includes not only food, clothes and residence but includes all the
things necessary for the comfort and status of the parties in which the party is entitled to
live reasonably.
2. Step-Mother:-
If a step son had any property inherited from his father, he was legally bound to
maintain his step-mother out of his father’s estate.
3. Mother in law:-
If widow inherits any property from her husband after death, she is legally bound
to maintain her mother in law out of her husband’s estate.
4. Daughter in law:-
A male Hindu has moral obligation to maintain his daughter in law. If he refuses to
maintain his daughter in law, she cannot take any action against her father in law.
1. Personal liability:
This liability of a Hindu to maintain others arises from the relationship between parties.
Therefore a male Hindu is under legal obligation to maintain his wife, his minor son, his
unmarried daughter and aged parents.
1) Aged Parents:
A son was personally liable to maintain his aged parents whether or not he had any
inherited property or separate property or joint family property. But a Hindu was not
liable to maintain his grandparents unless he had any ancestral property in his
possession.
2) Legitimate Son:
A father was under a personal obligation to maintain his minor sons. There fore,
he is bound to maintain his minor sons out of his separate property. But the father is not
bound to maintain his adult sons out of his own separate property. If the father and sons
are members of Hindu joint family and the joint family property is in hands of the
father, he is bound to maintain his minor and adult son out of the joint family property.
Since the son takes a vested interest in the joint family property by birth, till partition of
family property, the adult son is entitled to maintenance out of joint family property.
In Dayabhaga law, since the son does not acquire any interest in the joint family
property by birth, the father has no obligation to maintain his adult son either out of his
separate property or out of ancestral property.
3) Adopted Son:
The law of maintenance for adopted son is the same as legitimate son.
(i) Illegitimate sons of a Hindu belonging to one of the higher classes by a dasi
The Illegitimate sons of a Hindu belonging to one of the higher classes
(Brahmin or Kshatriya or Vaisya) by a dasi is entitled only maintenance out of the
putative father’s property. But he is not entitled any share of the inheritance.
In first instance, the right of maintenance attaches to the separate property of
the father. If the father has no separate property, the right of maintenance attaches to the
property of the joint family of which he was a member. But if the father was the holder
of an impartiable estate, the illegitimate son has no right of maintenance out of that
estate unless the custom of the party allowed such maintenance.
In Mitakshara law, the illegitimate son is entitled to get maintenance as long as he
lives. He does not claim maintenance merely as a compassionate allowance.
5) Legitimate Daughter
A father was under a personal obligation to maintain his unmarried daughter,
whether or not he had any property. After father’s death, she could claim maintenance
out of father’s estate if any. If son inherited any property from his father after father’s
death, he was liable to maintenance his unmarried sister. If son did not inherit property
from his father after father’s death, he was not liable to maintenance his unmarried
sister.
After marriage, she was entitled to get maintenance from her husband. After
husband’s death, she was entitled to get maintenance from her husband’s estate. If her
husband had no property, she was entitled to get maintenance from her father in law
morally. If her father in law refuses to maintain the daughter in law or she is unable to
obtain maintain from her husband’s estate, her father was liable to maintain his
widowed daughter.
7) Wife
The husband had a personal obligation to maintain his wife from the date of
marriage. If the wife lived with her husband and perform her conjugal duties, she could
claim maintenance from her husband. If the wife lived away from her husband without
reasonable causes, she could not claim maintenance from her husband. But under
section 2 of “The Hindu Married Women’s Right to Separate Maintenance and
Residence Act, 1946, the Hindu married woman shall be entitled to separate
maintenance and residence from her husband on one or more of the following grounds,
i. If the husband is suffering from any loathsome diseases,
ii. If the husband is guilty of cruelty,
iii. If the husband has been deserted the wife without her consent or against her will,
iv. If the husband marries again,
v. If the husband has been converted into any other religion,
vi. If the husband keeps concubine in the same house,
vii. Any other justifiable causes,
If the wife was unchaste or ceased to be Hindu or refused to conjugal society, she
could not claim separate maintenance and residence from her husband. If the wife
becomes chaste or reconverted to Hindu, she could claim only starvation maintenance
from her husband.
If the husband forsakes his wife without any reasonable cause, she was entitled to
get 1/3 of the husband’s property for her maintenance during her life time.
8) Widow
Before the passing of “The Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937,” the
widow was entitled to maintain out of her husband’s property. If her husband was a co-
parcener, she was entitled to maintain out of the estate of joint family in which her
husband was a member. If her husband had no property either separate or ancestral
Page 156 of 174
property, she was not entitled to maintenance. But the only person to maintain the
widow in these circumstances was her son.
The widow had no obligation to live with her husband’s family. The widow had
discretionary power. If she lives with her husband’s family, the head of the joint family
is bound to maintain the widow. If she lives separately from her husband’s family, the
widow will be entitled to separate residence and maintenance out of her husband’s
estate or from husband’s joint family property. If the widow lived immoral life or
converted to another religion or married another person, she could not claim any
maintenance.
*****
2. HINDU LAW OF MAINTENANCE AFTER THE PASSING OF THE HINDU
ADOPTION AND MAINTENANCE ACT, 1956.
The law of maintenance applicable to Hindu is now statutory. Prior to this Act,
there are three kinds of obligation for maintenance, these are,
1. Legal obligation
2. Personal obligation
3. Moral obligation
This Act does not deal with interim maintenance and permanent alimony and
maintenance in matrimonial proceedings. Section 24 and 25 of “The Marriage Act,
1955” deals with type of maintenance.
Under section 125 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, certain kinds of persons
are empowered to get maintenance. This section lays down general rule of law, which is
applicable to all persons in India including Hindu.
The Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and Section 125 of Criminal
Procedure Code 1973:
Section 125 of CrPC of 1973 is not inconsistent with this Act. Both the Acts can
stand together. Section 4 of the Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 does not repeal
the provision of section 125 of CrPC.
Definitions-
"maintenance" includes-
(i).in all cases, provision for food, clothing, residence, education and medical
attendance and treatment;
(ii). in the case of an unmarried daughter also the reasonable expenses of and incident to
her marriage;
"minor" means a person who has not completed his or her age of eighteen years.
Person claiming maintenance under this Act of 1956
1. Wife (section18)
2. Widowed daughter in law (section19)
3. Children and aged parents(section20)
4. Dependants (section 21 and 22)
Guiding principles for making order as to the custody, maintenance and education
of minor children, broadly stated, are-
1. Paramount consideration is interest of children and not punishment of the guilty
spouse
2. The children should be brought up in the religion of the father and their future and
world care should be considered.
3. Usually innocent party is entitled to custody, though he or she cannot maintain the
children.
4. Custody of children may be given to third party, if the interest of the children
demands it and both parents are unfit or the innocent party is abroad.
5. Father is always liable for maintenance of the children even if the custody is with
mother
6. The court’s discretion in the matter is unlimited and it cannot be and it cannot be
fettered by any agreement between the parents as the quantum of maintenance or
custody.
*****
MUSLIM LAW OF MAINTENANCE.
Introduction.
The concept of Maintenance was introduced to provide support to those people who are
not capable to maintain themselves. It is basically provided to the spouse who is not
independent and is dependent on the other spouse. The principle of maintenance includes
financial support, means of livelihood and educational facilities.
In marriage, it is the obligation of the husband to maintain the wife and to provide her all
necessities. The whole concept of maintenance is to protect the rights of the wife and to
provide her a dignified life and even after the dissolution of marriage, the husband is in
the liability to provide maintenance to his wife if she is not able to maintain herself. The
concept of maintenance has broader aspect. It is not only provided to the wife but also to
children, parents, grandparents, grandchildren and other relations by blood. The amount
of maintenance depends on the financial position of the person who is bound to provide
maintenance.
Various laws and rules have been made on the principle of maintenance. The concept of
maintenance has also been added to personal laws. The Muslim Law also provides for
maintenance. Though Muslim Law does not properly define maintenance, its meaning has
been inferred from Hindu Law which provides that:
“in all cases, provisions for food, clothing, residence, education and medical attendance
and treatment; in the cases of an unmarried daughter, also the reasonable expenses of
and incident to her marriage.”
Under Muslim Law, women are considered weak as compared to men. It is believed that
they are not able to maintain herself on her own so it is the liability of the husband to
provide maintenance to her wife in all conditions even if she is capable of maintaining
herself. Maintenance is known as “Nafqah” which means what a man spends on his
family. Nafqah basically includes food, clothing, and lodging.
Page 165 of 174
The Muslim Law of maintenance may be discussed from the point of view of the persons
entitled to maintenance. Such persons are:
i. The Wife
ii. The Children
iii. The Parents and Grandparents
iv. The other relations.
But under Muslim Law, maintenance is provided to wife even if she is capable of
maintaining herself which differs it from other laws. But in case of Maintenance to
Children, Parents and other relations, it is given only when they are not able to maintain
themselves. Here, we are going to discuss the maintenance of wife and children under
Muslim Law.
Maintenance of wife
Under Muslim Law, as discussed above men are considered superior to women and
women in all cases is considered to be dependent on men. It is the liability of husband
under Muslim Law to maintain his wife even after divorce.
Quantum of Maintenance
The quantum of maintenance is not prescribed under any matrimonial statute. It is
decided as per the discretion of court depending upon the condition of husband and wife.
Under the Shia Law, the quantum of maintenance is decided by taking into consideration
the requirements of the wife. Under Shafei Law, the quantum of maintenance is
determined by the post of the husband.
An agreement which stipulates that wife is entitled to maintenance after divorce is also
valid. But she is entitled to maintenance only during the period of iddat and not beyond
that. The husband’s liability is only till the iddat period.
An allowance of Rs. 25.00 per month was fixed for Kharach-i-Pandan in addition to the
amount of maintenance which she is entitled to get from her husband. It was held that the
wife is entitled to it irrespective of the fact that she refuses to stay with her
husband. (Kharach-i-Pandan is a personal allowance and it cannot be transferred.)
Under section 125 of Cr.P.C., provides for maintenance to divorced wife of all religion.
It stated that after divorce if the wife is not able to maintain herself, she is entitled to
maintenance from her husband until she gets married. The act applies this provision to
Muslim women also who are not entitled to the maintenance after the period of Iddat.
This act creates liability over husband to provide maintenance to wife even after the
period of Iddat.
But the provisions of this act are in conflict with the provisions of Muslim Law and a
debate was going on as which law should be applied. This matter was seen by the
Supreme court in a landmark judgment
The magistrate, in this case, passed an order stating that the husband is entitled to provide
her maintenance of Rs.25 per month as per Section 125 of Crpc.
Shah Banu filed a revision petition against this order in the High court of Indore for
enhancement of the amount of maintenance. For which Indore High court has enhanced
the amount of maintenance to 179.20 Rs per month.
Against this order, Mohd. Ahmed Khan appealed to the Supreme court. Supreme court
rejected the appeal and stated that Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance even after the
period of Iddat if she is not able to maintain herself.
The Supreme court has observed that with this judgment the distinction between the
Muslim personal law and Criminal Procedure code will come to an end. But the judgment
has even increased the controversy as a result of which the legislatures have to make a
new law to govern Muslim divorce i.e. Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on
Divorce) Act 1986.
This act has enacted some provisions in support of Muslim Personal Law and has
restricted the application of Section 125 of Crpc regarding the maintenance of Muslim
wife. The Act has stated that the husband is entitled to provide maintenance only during
the period of Iddat and not beyond that. If the wife is not able to maintain herself after
iddat period then, in that case, she can seek maintenance through Wakf Board or relatives
of her or her husband. This act has not mentioned anything clearly and has created
various confusions in the judicial system and was considered as vague. The confusion of
this act has been solved by the Supreme Court of India under:
• Muslim husband’s liability under this act is not limited to iddat period. He has to make
arrangement within the period of iddat for her wife’s maintenance.
• A divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance under section 4 of this act from
her relatives who are entitled to her property after her death.
• If her relatives are not able to maintain her then, in that case, a Wakf board has been
created by this act who will take care of the maintenance of such women.
Under Shafi Law, even if the father is poor and mother is rich, then the mother is not
obliged on maintaining her child. In that case, it is the obligation of grandfather to
maintain the child.
Conclusion.
Thus, from the above article, it can be stated that the maintenance provisions of Muslim
Law are different from other personal laws. The provisions for maintenance of child are
not a matter of concern as they are provided adequate maintenance under the law but the
position of the wife is poor as compared to other laws. Though the legislature has enacted
*****
CHRISTIAN LAW OF MAINTENANCE.
Maintenance Under Christian Law.
A Christian woman can claim maintenance from her spouse through criminal proceeding
or/and civil proceeding. Interested parties may pursue both criminal and civil
proceedings, simultaneously, as there is no legal bar to it. In criminal proceedings, the
religion of the parties does not matter at all, unlike in civil proceedings.
If a divorced Christian wife cannot support her in the post divorce period she need not
worry as a remedy is in store for her in law. Under S.37 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869,
she can apply for alimony/ maintenance in a civil court or High Court and, husband will
be liable to pay her alimony such sum, as the court may order, till her lifetime. The Indian
Divorce Act, 1869 which is only applicable to those persons who practice the Christianity
religion inter alia governs maintenance rights of a Christian wife. The provisions are the
same as those under the Parsi law and the same considerations are applied in granting
maintenance, both alimony pendente lite and permanent maintenance. The provisions of
THE INDIAN DIVORCE ACT, 1869 are produced herein covered under part IX -s.36-
s.38
Maintenance
Provisions for maintenance under the Christian law are contained in The Indian Divorce
Act. 1869 as amended in 2001. The relevant sections are:
S. 36. Alimony pendente lite.-
In any suit under this Act, whether it be instituted bya husband or a wife, and whether or
not she has obtained an order of protection, ( The wife may present a petition for
expenses of the proceedings and alimony pending the suit.)
Such petition shall be served on the husband, and the court, on being satisfied of the truth
of the statements therein contained, may make such order on the husband ( for payment to
(Provided that the petition for the expenses of the proceedings and alimony pending the
suit shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days of service of such petition
on the husband.)
Provided that if the husband afterwards from any cause becomes unable to make such
payments, it shall be lawful for the court to discharge or modify the order, or temporarily
to suspend the same as to the whole or any part of the money so ordered to be paid, and
again to revive the same order wholly or in part, as to the court seems fit.
The following observations of the apex court in M.V Elisabeth v/s Harwan Investment
and Trading Pvt. Ltd, were relied upon in support of the case:
..where a statute is silent and judicial intervention is required, courts strive to redress
grievance according to what is perceived to be principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.
*****