Art. 136: Appeal by special leave. 1.

Notwithstanding provision for regular

Appeals from proceedings before the High Courts in Arts. 132-134, there may
still remain some cases, where justice might require the interference of the
Supreme Court with decisions not only of the High Courts outside the
purview of the foregoing articles, but also of any other Court or tribunal of
the land. The power of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal
from the decision of any Court or tribunal save military tribunals, is not
subject to any constitutional limitation, and is left entirely to the discretion of
the Supreme Court.3-4

2. Under this Article the Supreme Court shall have the power to grant special
leave to appeal

(a) From any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order,

(b)In any cause or matter,

© passed or made by any Court or tribunal, in the territory of India.

3. Articles 133-134 relate to civil and criminal proceedings, respectively. If a

proceeding is neither civil nor criminal and does not involve any question of
constitutional interpretation (Art. 132), the only way in which a party may
appeal from an order made in such a proceeding is by obtaining special leave
of the Supreme Court itself, under the present Article.

4. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal upon the party but merely
vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to interfere in exceptional cases. 6

Hence, this power, or rather the duty, to interfere in cases of serious

miscarriageof justice is not circumscribed by any limitation as to who may
invoke this discretionary jurisdiction. Thus, it can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal even on the motion of a private party.”

5. On the other hand, leave under Art. 136 can be granted even where the
High Court has refused leave under Art. 133 or 134.8

Jurisdiction under Art. 136 cannot be barred by statute. The extraordinary

power conferred by Art. 136 cannot be taken away by any legislation short of
constitutional amendment. Conclusiveness or finality given by a statute to
any decision of a court or tribunal cannot deter the Supreme Court from
exercising this jurisdiction.

Effect of dismissal of petition. 1. Mere dismissal of special leave petition does

Not amount to acceptance of correctness of the High Court decision sought

to be appealed against. 10

2. When Supreme Court gives reasons while dismissing a special leave

petition under Art. 136, the decision attracts Art. 141. But when no reason is
given and the petition is summarily dismissed the Court does not lay down
any law under Art. 141. In such cases the only conclusion that can be drawn
is that the Supreme Court had decided only that it was not a fit case for
granting special leave.”

General principles relating to the granting of special leave under Art. 136. 1.
Though the discretionary power vested in the Supreme Court under Art. 136
is not subject to any limitation, the Court has imposed certain limitations
upon its own powers. 12 Thus, it has laid down that this power is to be
exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases only.3. 13 By virtue of this
Article, the Supreme Court can grant special leave to appeal in ‘any cause or
matter’ – civil, criminal or otherwise, and from any court or tribunal in India.
The only uniform standard that can be laid down regarding these varieties of
cases is that the power shall be exercised only where special circumstances
are shown to exist. 7. 12
2. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court would refuse to entertain appeal under Art.
136 from the order of an inferior tribunal where the litigant has not availed
himself of the ordinary remedies available to him at law, e.g., a statutory
right of appeal or revision;¹¹ 9 or has not appealed from the final order of an
appellate tribunal on appeal from the decision of the inferior tribunal. 15

This may be allowed only in exceptional cases, such as, a breach of the
principles of natural justice by the order appealed against;16 or where the
appeal to the Supreme Court is on a point which could not have been
decided in the appeal under the ordinary law. 17

3. It is implicit in the reserve power that it cannot be exhaustively defined,

butdecided cases do not permit interference unless by disregard to the forms
of legal process or some violation of the principles of natural justice or
otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done. 18

4. It is, however, plain that when the Supreme Court reaches the conclusion
that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or tribunal has
not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like
the finality of finding of facts, or otherwise, can stand in the way of the
exercise of this power.7. 19

5. On the other hand,

(a) In the exercise of this extraordinary power, the Supreme Court will not
assume a jurisdiction which is not warranted by the provisions of the
Constitution nor offer to provide a relief which has been omitted in the
Constitution, for, that will be tantamount to making legislation which is
never the function of the Court. 20

(b)The same principle should be applied at the stage of granting special

leave as at the stage when the appeal is finally disposed of. 21 In other
 words, the Court would not grant special leave on grounds which would
not sustain the appeal itself.”

© Special leave to appeal would not, as a rule, be granted where the appeal
had become academic, for instance, where the relief sought in the
proceeding had become nugatory owing to subsequent events. It may,
however, be granted

Where though the relief sought had become nugatory, there are
pronounncements in the judgment or order appealed against which would
affect the appellant substancially. 23

(c) Since this relief is at the discretion of the Supreme Court, the Court
may refuse special leave where the conduct of the Petitioner has been
unconscionable, e.g., where the employment, the termination of which
is challenged by him, had been obtained by him by suppression of
material facts from the employer. 24

€ The Court would not interfere with a decision of the High Court where it has
sought to further social justice without depriving any party of existing legal
rights. 25

Delay in filing application. 1. An application for special leave must be filed

Within the time limited by the Rules of the Supreme Court. The fact that the
Petitioners had to collect money from a large number of persons who were
interested in the case, is not sufficient for condoning delay in filing an
application. 26

2. An intending appellant who has not applied for or obtained the leave of
the High Court and who does not say a word by way of explanation as to why
he did not apply to the High Court and as to why there has been great delay
in applying to the Supreme Court should not get special leave from the
Supreme Court for the mere asking. 27

3. At any rate, an application for condonation of delay would not be granted

without hearing the respondent.2

4. On the other hand, delay may be condoned where it is not due to any fault
of the appellant; 29 or where the rights of members of the public are
involved and it is just and proper that the question should be settled.305.
Applications under Art. 136 are a special class. If a separate and distinct
provision is made for applying for condonation of delay under Art. 136 of the
Constitution, it cannot be contended that this is violative of the Art. 14 of the
Constitution. Article 136 is the residuary power of the Court to do justice
where the Court is satisfied that there is injustice.31

6. When the Writ petitions of the respondents were entertained by the High
Court and disposed of on merits, the Supreme Court would not dismiss the
appeal merely on ground of laches. 32

Where relief would be nugatory. 1. Special leave to appeal would not, as a

Rule, be granted where the appeal had become academic, for instance,
where the relief sought in the proceeding had become nugatory or
infructuous owing to subsequent events, 33 e.g., the subject-matter having
been disposed of by previous judgments of the Supreme Court,34 or lapse of
time. 35

2. It may, however, be granted

Where though the relief sought had become nugatory, there are
pronouncements in the judgment or order appealed against which would
affect the appellant substantially.23
Existence of alternative remedy. 1. The existence of an alternative remedy,

Such as a Letters Patent appeal from the decision of a Single Judge of the
High Court, is no ground for taking away the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court under Art. 136. But if this fact is brought to the notice of the supreme
court in proper time, it may refuse to grant special leave or may even revoke
a leave already granted. 36

2. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court would not entertain an appeal directly

against order of an administrative authority where statutory or other
alternative remedies are available to the aggrieved party.” To this practice an
exception may be made where the High Court has already expressed its view
on the point at issue in another case, so that it would be futile for the party
to appeal to the statutory appellate authority and then to the High Court
before coming to the Supreme Court. 37

3. When the decision in Letters Patent appeal appears to be a foregone

conclusion, the appropriate course for the Supreme Court would be to grant
leave.38

Practice and Procedure. 1. Untrue or misleading statements should not be

made in applications for special leave.39

2. In the exercise of its discretion, the Court may refuse leave on the ground
of misrepresentation or suppression of material facts. 40

3. Where the petitioner obtained special leave by suppressing the fact that
the earlier petition was dismissed the Court ordered that the release of
appellant on bail would be recalled.”Whether leave may be revoked. 1. It
cannot be stated as a general proposition” that leave once granted cannot
be revoked.42
2. Where special leave to appeal under this Article has been granted after
notice to the Respondent and giving him a hearing, the Supreme Court will
not permit the Respondent to urge any argument regarding the correctness
of the order granting leave and the Court would not revoke the leave, except
in extraordinary circumstances, e.g., -

(i) Where the ground urged for revocation arose subsequent to the
grant of the special leave; or

(ii) Where it could not be ascertained by the Respondent at the date of

the grant of leave, notwithstanding the exercise of due care.

3. Leave would not be revoked on the ground –

That the appellant before the Supreme Court preferred no appeal against the
order of the High Court by which his Petition under Art. 226, challenging the
impugned order of the Industrial Tribunal, was summarily dismissed.” The
reason is that the scope of a proceeding under Art. 226 and an appeal under
Art. 136 are different and an order summarily dismissing a petition under Art.
226 would not constitute res judicata to bar appeal under Art. 136.”

4. But, where the special leave was granted after ex parte hearing, it would
be open to the Respondent to urge at the final hearing that-

(a) The judgment or order appealed against was not pronounced by a

Court or a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136(1) and that,
accordingly the leave should be revoked; or

(b)The leave was obtained by a misrepresentation or suppression of

material facts, 40 e.g., where the appellant deliberately inflated the
valuation of the property; or 46
© There was no proper case for granting leave, 21. 36 or the appellant had
not complied with a Rule of the Court.”

(c) The plea taken by a public authority as appellant was merely technical,
as against a just claim, supported by the administrative authority
concerned.”

In such cases, the Supreme Court may revoke the special leave at the
hearing.” ‘Judgment’, ‘decree’. See under Art. 133(1), pp. 394ff., ante.

‘Order’. It is to be noted that while the words ‘final order’ occur in Arts. 132-
133, the word ‘order’ is used in Art. 136. Hence, if the other conditions are
satisfied the Supreme Court can interfere even with interlocutory orders,
under Art. 136, e.g..

(i) An order of appointment of a Receiver made by the High Court,

under s. 115, C.P. Code, in a case where no prima facie case for the
exercise of its powers under s. 115 has been made out.49

(ii) An order of temporary injunction, if the relevant circumstances have

not been considered. 50

‘Determination’. 1. This word, which does not occur in Arts. 132-133, has
been inserted in Art. 136 to cover decisions which do not come within the
ambit of aformal judgment, decree or order, e.g., the decision of a High Court
under s. 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939.51 Since these cases
stand outside Art. 133, special leave may be sought under Art. 136, without
asking for a certificate from the High Court under Art. 133.51

2. But no appeal would lie from mere observations made by a High Court.
‘Any cause or matter’. This expression is of a very wide import. It covers
proceedings other than civil or criminal, e.g.,

(i) Decision of a High Court in a reference under s. 57, Stamp

Act; or ss. 162, 153C, the Companies Act; or s. 432, C.P.
Code,” or s. 66(1), Income-tax Act, (1922);% or s. 21 of the
Bihar Sales Tax Act; or similar provisions in the Excess
Profits Tax Act. 58

(ii) Order of the High Court under ss. 13-14 of the Legal
Practitioners Act; or s. 12, Bar Councils Act. 60

‘Tribunal’. 1. This term, used in juxtaposition with the word ‘Court’, refers to
quasi-judicial tribunals, other than the ordinary courts, which have the
‘trappings of a Court Broadly speaking, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
under Art. 136(1) to entertain appeal by special leave from decisions of
Tribunals, includes any tribunal against whose decision the Court has the
jurisdiction to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition, 62-63

Thus, under the present Article, the Supreme Court has entertained appeals
from-

(1)The Central Board of Revenue and Central Government, exercising

powers of appeal and revision under Customs Act.M

(iii) Industrial Tribunal. 65

(iv) The Central Government, exercising power under s. 111(3)

of the Companies Act, 1956,66
(v) The State of Punjab, exercising appellate power under the
Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment and Conditions of
Service Rules, 1952.6

(vi) The Election Commission, allotting a symbol under the

Election Symbols (Reservation & Allotment) Order, 1968.67

(vii) Railway Rates Tribunal under s. 34 of the Railways Act.68

(viii) Central Government exercising power of revision under the

Mineral Concession(viii) The Settlement Commission under
the I.T. Act, as amended by the Taxation Laws Amendment
Act, 1975.70

(ix)

(x) (ix) The educational institution, exercising statutory

authority.
(xi)
(xii) 2. But the presence of all of the trappings of a court is not
an essential characteristic of a ‘tribunal’ in order to come
in under Art. 136.72 The basic tests are
(xiii)
(xiv) (a) That the power of adjudication has been conferred on
the authority in question by statute;
(xv)
(xvi) (b) That such adjudicating power is a part of the State’s
inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial
function.”
(xvii)
(xviii) © If there is a lis and the decision of the authority is
binding and final, such authority is a ‘tribunal’, e.g., an
authority hearing an administrative appeal72 or revision,
64
(xix)
(xx) 3. On the other hand,
(xxi)
(xxii) (i) The word ‘tribunal’ in Art. 136 excludes ‘domestic
tribunals’ on the ground that they are not created by the
State nor do they derive their authority from it, but from
the agreement of the parties,” e.g., an Arbitrator appointed
under s. 10A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.73 (ii)
Again, a tribunal would be outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it
is not invested with any part of the judicial functions of the
State but discharges purely administrative or executive
functions. 72. 74
(xxiii)
(xxiv) (iii) Even the requirement to proceed judicially would not
make an authority a ‘tribunal’, if it does not possess the
power to pronounce a final and binding decision in a
dispute, e.g., the Conciliation Officer, acting under Cl. 29 of
the Order made in 1954 under the U.P. Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947.75
(xxv)
(xxvi) Scope of appeal under Art. 136. In granting special leave to
appeal, the Court may impose special limitations upon the
subject-matter of appeal; or the materials to be used at the
hearing. But in the absence of any such limitation, it is
open to the appellant to rely on any ground which would
have been open to him in a case of regular appeal subject,
of course, to the general limitations of an appeal under Art.
136, that is to say, an argument cannot be heard, nor an
appeal allowed, on a ground which would not have sufficed
for granting the special leave to appeal. 76
(xxvii)
(xxviii) On the other hand,
(xxix)
(xxx) 1. The circumstance that an appeal has been admitted by
special leave does not entitle the applicant to open out the
whole case and contest all the findings of facts and raise
every point which could be raised in the High Court. Even
at the final hearing, only those points can be urged which
are fit to be urged when special leave to appeal is asked
 for. It would be illogical to apply two different standards at
two different stages of the same case, 77-78
(xxxi)
(xxxii) 2. This does not mean that once special leave has
been granted (on ex parte motion) restrictions cannot be
imposed by the Court at the time of hearing of the
appeal.3. In the appellate jurisdiction, the Supreme Court
will not decide hypothetical ⚫ questions.79
(xxxiii)
(xxxiv) A. Appeal by Special Leave in civil cases.
(xxxv)
(xxxvi) 1. The Supreme Court has entertained appeal by
Special Leave from Judgments in civil cases where
substantial questions of law have been involved, even
though the conditions laid down in Art. 133(1) were not
fulfilled 80-83 or the certificate granted was defective, e.g.,
(xxxvii)
(xxxviii) (i) Where the High Court came to a wrong conclusion
from the evidence as to non-access between the parents of
the plaintiff, thus making an erroneous decision on a
substantial question of law, the question of legitimacy
being one of law in view of the presumption of law
contained in s. 112 of the Evidence Act. 80
(xxxix)
(xl) (ii) Where the High Court erred on the question of law
whether a property bequeathed by a father to his sons and
intended to be the absolute property of the legatees is
ancestral property in which the heirs of the legatees were
to have interests. 82
(xli)
(xlii) (iii) Where the High Court had allowed an amendment at
the appellate stage after the period of limitation for the suit
had already expired. #3
(xliii)
(xliv) (iv) Where the High Court had dismissed an appeal against
an order refusing an objection under s. 47 of the C.P. Code,
involving substantial questions of law; or decreed a suit
rejecting the objection that it was barred under s. 47, C.P.
Code.
(xlv)
(xlvi) (v) Where the decree in a suit for declaration of title and
partition involved a substantial question of law, viz., of
adverse possession between co-heirs.#6
(xlvii)
(xlviii) (vi) Where a suit for declaration of the plaintiff’s
status as adopted son raised the question as to whether a
widow’s power to adopt terminates by reason of
subsequent changes in the family.
(xlix)
(l) (vii) Where the decision in a mortgage suit rested upon the
question of limitation; or contribution between co-
mortgagors; or the extinction of the right of redemption.
(li)
(lii) (viii) Where in an appeal against an order of appointment
of a Receiver in an execution proceeding, the point
involved was whether execution at all lay against a
compulsory deposit in a Provident Fund due to the
judgment-debtor.”
(liii)
(liv) (ix) Where, in a suit upon a contract, the question involved
was the applicability of the doctrine of frustration of
contract as embodied in ss. 32 and 56 of Contract Act; or
the scope, at law, of the authority of an agent to conclude
a contract on behalf of his principal.
(lv)
(lvi) (x) Where a memorandum of appeal had been rejected for
non-payment of court-fee directed to be paid, the question
of application of the proper provision of the Court-fees Act
being in dispute.
(lvii)
(lviii) (xi) Where in an appeal against a revisional order of the
High Court, the point involved was whether the High Court
had a revisional jurisdiction in the matter under the law
95(xii) Where the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to try the
suit was in question.
(lix)
(lx) (xiii) Settlement by the Supreme Court in Bhopal gas leak
disaster.”
(lxi)
(lxii) 2. If such substantial questions are involved, the Court may
grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 where the
High Court had rejected an application for certificate
(lxiii)
(lxiv) Under Art. 133(1)©, e.g.,
(lxv)
(lxvi) (a) Where the High Court had dismissed a petition under
Art. 226 in limine, without inquiring into the allegation of
mala fides against the Government.*
(lxvii)
(lxviii) (b) Where the decision of the High Court in revision
against the order of the Rent Controller involved a
substantial question of law, viz., whether the W.B. Premises
Rent Control Act applies to the premises in question.”
(lxix)
(lxx) 3. On the other hand
(lxxi)
(lxxii) The Court would refuse special leave where the Petition is
an abuse of the process of Court and is a part of the
Petitioner’s plan to resort to multiple proceedings to claim
the same relief arising out of the same cause of action. 100
(lxxiii)
(lxxiv) Principles governing disposal of Civil appeal by
Special leave.
(lxxv)
(lxxvi) 1. Under Art. 136, minor technicalities of procedure
should not come in the way of doing substantial justice.
Thus, where the appellant had filed appeal against the final
order of abatement of appeal in the High Court without
appealing against the order rejecting his application for
substitution, the Supreme Court treated the appeal on
special leave as an appeal against both orders.

2. The Supreme Court is not only a court of law but a court of

equity as well. Hence, the court would not deny to a party any
relief he may be entitled to on purely equitable considerations
though not under law.2
(lxxvii) On the other hand
(lxxviii)
(lxxix) Where the Appellant has taken recourse to reckless
steps without regard to law, in exercising its discretionary
jurisdiction under Art. 136, the Court will not come to the
assistance of such a party.
(lxxx)
(lxxxi) Interference with second appellate decision. 1.
Normally special leave against
(lxxxii)
(lxxxiii) A second appellate decision will not be granted
unless the remedy of a Letters Patent Appeal has been
availed. But it cannot be laid down as an inflexible rule that
leave must be refused if the appellant has not moved for
leave under the Letters Patent.
(lxxxiv)
(lxxxv) 2. In any case, special leave would be granted from a
second appellate decision only where the judgment raises
issues of law of general importance.
(lxxxvi)
(lxxxvii) 3. But the Supreme Court would interfere with an
order of the High Court passed in a second appeal, in cases
like the following:
(lxxxviii)
(lxxxix) Where the High Court has remanded the case,
without pointing out what relevant considerations were
ignored or what irrelevant considerations had been taken
into account by the first appellate Court.5Interference with
orders in revision. Matters which could be raised before the
High Court in revision cannot be raised before the Supreme
Court in appeal by special leave from the order passed by
the High Court in revision. In short, the limitations placed
upon the powers of the High Court under s. 115 of the C.P.
Code also circumscribe the powers of the Supreme Court to
interfere, under Art. 136, in regard to the same matter.
(xc)
(xci) Interference with discretionary orders. 1. Where the
granting of relief was at the discretion of the High Court,
the Supreme Court would not interfere unless the
discretion was exercised by the High Court improperly or
 arbitrarily even though the Supreme Court might have
exercised the discretion in a different way if the application
for writ had been presented to the Supreme Court, in the
first instance.”
(xcii)
(xciii) 2. Though no hard and fast rules can be laid down in
matters relating to the exercise of a discretion, the
Supreme Court will interfere where the discretion is
exercised arbitrarily, or is based on a misunderstanding of
the principles that govern its exercise, 10 e.g., in the
matter of adding an unnecessary party under O. 1, r. 10,
C.P. Code,” or improperly demanding security as a
condition of defence under O. 37, r. 3, or granting or
refusing injunction, 12
(xciv)
(xcv) 3. But the Supreme Court would not interfere with a
discretionary order merely on the ground that if the
Supreme Court were required to exercise the discretion, it
would have made a different order. 12
(xcvi)
(xcvii) 4. Where the High Court has interfered with a wrong
exercise of discretion by a subordinate authority, the
Supreme Court would not under Art. 136, interfere with the
order of the High Court, which was clearly in the interest of
justice.”
(xcviii)
(xcix) Interference with interlocutory order. 1. As a general rule,
the Supreme Court would not interfere, under Art. 136,
with interlocutory orders, unless there exist exceptional
circumstances for such interference.”
(c)
(ci) 2. Instances of such exceptional circumstances are
(cii)
(ciii) (i) Where the High Court has made the order in disregard of
the basic principles governing the exercise of the
jurisdiction, e.g., where an order for appointment of
Receiver has been made, without determining whether a
prima facie case for such order existed.
(civ)
(cv) (ii) Where interference of the Supreme Court is necessary
in order to promote uniform standards on basic questions
for a sound administration of justice, e.g., in a matter of
leave to amend a plaint.”
(cvi)
(cvii) Interference with findings of fact. The Court would not go
behind the findings of fact unless there is a sufficient
ground for doing so. 16-17
(cviii)
(cix) I. It has been held that there was no such sufficient
reason(a) Where the High Court, but for a confusion
between two of the alleged gifts which were in question,
came to a correct conclusion upon a consideration of the
oral evidence, 16
(cx)
(cxi) (b) Where the High Court has accepted the view taken by
the Trial Court in preference to that taken by the Appellate
Court on a question within its competence. 18
(cxii)
(cxiii) II. But the Supreme Court would interfere
(cxiv)
(cxv) 1. Where on the evidence on the record no Court could, as
a matter of legitimate inference, arrive at the conclusion
that the lower Court has, or, in other words, where the
finding is perverse or supported by no evidence. 20
(cxvi)
(cxvii) 2. Where the two lower Courts of appeal were under
a misapprehension as to the finding of the trial Court of a
material fact, the Supreme Court will examine the evidence
on the point, itself.21
(cxviii)
(cxix) 3. Where the approach of the Court below is radically
wrong, or important and crucial evidence has been
overlooked or wrongly appreciated in arriving at the
finding, leading to injustice;22 or involves an error of law.
23
(cxx)
(cxxi) Interference with concurrent findings of fact. Where the
finding of fact is concurrent, the Supreme Court will not
interfere with it unless there are any special reasons, e.g.,
 a manifest error of law in arriving at the finding, 25-26 or a
disregard of the judicial process or of principles of fair
hearing, 25 or of material circumstances or probabilities,
resulting in failure of justice;” or the decision is manifestly
unjust owing, e.g., to a change in the circumstances during
pendency of the proceedings.28
(cxxii)
(cxxiii) Setting aside execution order. Even if a decree which
is made without jurisdiction and is a nullity is allowed by
the Courts below to operate and is executed during the
pendency of special leave petition, the Supreme Court
would grant relief to the aggrieved party from injustice by
setting aside the execution order. 29
(cxxiv)
(cxxv) Setting aside of decree incorporating arbitration
award. When a decree of Court incorporates an arbitration
award which contains a part which is outside the
jurisdiction of the arbitrator, the Supreme Court will set
aside that part only which is invalid, provided it is
severable. 30
(cxxvi)
(cxxvii) Practice and Procedure. 1. The Supreme Court will
not allow a party to set up a case not made in his pleading
and which was not allowed to be argued by the High Court;
e.g., as to the invalidity of a statute.32
(cxxviii)
(cxxix) 2. The Court will not allow the scope of an appeal to
be enlarged beyond that of the appeal before the High
Court even at the instance of a Respondent who is
entitledto support a decree in his favour even upon a
ground found against him by the High Court.33 But the
Court may make an exception to this rule where the
question raised is one of considerable importance and may
be raised in other similar pending suits. 33
(cxxx)
(cxxxi) 3. Where the Petition for special leave is directed
against an order passed by a Division Bench of the High
Court dismissing an appeal against the order of a Single
Judge, the Supreme Court will not allow the Petitioner to
take a ground which was not taken before the Single Judge
 or in the appeal before the Division Bench, but was taken
in a petition for review filed before the High Court. 34
(cxxxii)
(cxxxiii) 4. Ordinarily, a question of law is allowed to be raised
before the Supreme Court, even though not taken in the
High Court, such as the interpretation of a statute, 25 but
not where it would result in grave miscarriage of justice:35
or where it demands inquiry into facts not raised in the
Courts below;36 or where it goes against an undertaking
given by the appellant to the High Court."
(cxxxiv)
(cxxxv) 5. A question of fact or a mixed question of law and
fact is not allowed to be raised for the first time before the
Supreme Court. 38
(cxxxvi)
(cxxxvii) 6. Where a plea was not raised before the lower
authorities or the High Court, the Supreme Court will not
allow the Appellant to produce any documentary evidence
in support of such plea, even if it be a Government
notification. 40
(cxxxviii)
(cxxxix) 7. The High Court is a Court of Record and unless an
omission is admitted or demonstrably proved the Supreme
Court will not consider an allegation that a point was raised
before the High Court but was not dealt with by the Court.
Ordinarily, the details of the arguments as given in the
judgment will be taken as correct.”
(cxl)
(cxli) 8. The Supreme Court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
refuse to grant special leave from the decision of a Single
Judge when the appellant did not avail of the right to
appeal under the Letters Patent. 42
(cxlii)
(cxliii) 9. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court will not exercise its
jurisdiction under Art. 136, unless the appellant has
exhausted all other remedies open to him. 43
(cxliv)
(cxlv) 10. Since normally a party in whose favour a judgment has
been given cannot appeal from it, where a special leave to
appeal has been granted, the Court may, in appropriate
 cases, permit the respondent to support the judgment in
his favour even upon grounds in which the finding was
against him.”
(cxlvi)
(cxlvii) 11. The Supreme Court discourages unnecessary
appeals by the Government from judgments of the High
Court, at public expense, e.g. where only monetary liability
has been incurred.4612. Where there have been changes
in the circumstances or in the law during pendency of the
appeal, the Court should mould the decree accordingly, so
that the rights of the successful party may not be defeated
by delay of the Court in disposal of the appeal. 47
(cxlviii)
(cxlix) Amendment. 1. An amendment of the pleading may
be allowed at any stage of the proceeding, including an
appeal before the Supreme Court, according to the
principles embodied in O. 6, r. 17 of the C.P. Code.
(cl)
(cli) 2. But the Supreme Court will not allow amendment of the
plaint in an appeal from a judgment of the High Court in
second appeal, which would introduce a substantive relief
beyond the period of limitation. 48
(clii)
(cliii) Remand. (i) The Supreme Court would set aside a dismissal
and direct a hearing on the merits
(cliv)
(clv) Where the High Court refused to entertain a paper-book
which had been filed soon after the appeal had been
dismissed for default in filing the paper-book within the
time prescribed by the High Court rules. 49
(clvi)
(clvii) (ii) Conversely, it would set aside an ex parte order of the
High Court, allowing the appeal for absence of the
Respondent, where there was sufficient cause for non-
appearance of the Respondent. 50
(clviii)
(clix) (iii) Where an appeal had been disposed of by the High
Court in the absence of a finding of fact on a material
point, the Supreme Court would set aside the judgment of
 the High Court and remand the case to the trial Court for
disposing of the suit in accordance with law.51
(clx)
(clxi) Compromise. A compromise may be entered into at the
stage of appeal before the Supreme Court under Art. 136,
and the Court may pass a decree in substitution of the
decree under appeal where the compromise is reasonable
and would promote the best interests of the parties. 52
(clxii)
(clxiii) Applicability of O. 45, r. 8, C.P. Code to appeals under
Art. 136. The applicability of O. 45, r. 8, C.P. Code to
appeals under Art. 136 is restricted. Ordinarily, when a
High Court grants a certificate for appeal to the Supreme
Court, it is the High Court which retains full control and
jurisdiction over the subsequent proceedings till the appeal
is admitted. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court begins
after the appeal is finally admitted.
(clxiv)
(clxv) When, however, the appeal comes to the Supreme Court
on the strength of a special leave granted by it, the
position is different. In such cases, the order of the
Supreme Court itself operates as an admission of the
appeal as soon as the conditions in the order relating to
security or deposit are complied with. In such a case, it is
not necessary for the appellant to move the High Court
again, for a formal admission of the appeal. As soon as the
directions laid down in the order granting special leave are
complied with, it would be the duty of the Registrar of the
Supreme Court to issue a notice of admission of the appeal
for service upon the respondent. In default of issue ofsuch
notice, the appellant cannot be held responsible for laches
in the prosecution of his appeal. 53
(clxvi)
(clxvii) B. Principles relating to interference with orders of
High Court under Art. 226.
(clxviii)
(clxix) 1. The Supreme Court would interfere with an order
of the High Court under
(clxx)
(clxxi) Art. 226
(clxxii)
(clxxiii) (i) Where the High Court has refused to interfere with
the proceeding before a statutory tribunal which is patently
ultra vires or unconstitutional, say, because it infringes a
fundamental right;55 or violates a mandatory provision of
the Constitution; or because, being a quasi-judicial
proceeding, it violated the principles of natural justice. 57
(clxxiv)
(clxxv) (ii) Where the High Court has exceeded its
jurisdiction by entering upon an inquiry into facts in the
absence of a showing that the decision of the Board of
Revenue was fainted by excess of jurisdiction or an error
apparent on the face of the record, resulting in manifest
injustice. 58
(clxxvi)
(clxxvii) (iii) Where the High Court has upheld an order of the
University by which the latter had refused to declare the
results of Law Examinations at which the petitioner sat, on
the ground that he was not eligible for admission which
ground the University was estopped from taking, in the
circumstances of the case. 59
(clxxviii)
(clxxix) (iv) Where the High Court set aside the acceptance
of a tender on the ground of ultra vires though the Tender
Committee had waived a technical irregularity in a case of
substantial compliance, in favour of the highest bid.60
(clxxx)
(clxxxi) (v) Where the High Court has directed an educational
institution to create additional seats without its consent or
without hearing it.61
(clxxxii)
(clxxxiii) 2. On the other hand, the Supreme Court, under Art.
136, will not interfere with the decision of the High Court
unless the High Court has set aside the order of an
administrative authority, sitting as a Court of appeal on
matters within the jurisdiction of the authority, unless the
decision is tainted with (a) want of jurisdiction; or (b) mala
fides. 62
(clxxxiv)
(clxxxv) Thus,
(clxxxvi)
(clxxxvii) (i) Where a Court of appeal has reversed the order of
a Single Judge dismissing in limine a petition under Art.
226, the Supreme Court would not interfere if the petition
raises questions of importance.63
(clxxxviii)
(clxxxix) (ii) As a rule, the Supreme Court will not interfere
under Art. 136 unless there is a substantial question of law
of public importance; or a flaw in law which is fraught with
manifest injustice. 64 The question whether a commodity
answers the terms of a taxable item under the Excise or
Sales Tax Act would be such a question. 65
(cxc)
(cxci) (iii) The Supreme Court may not interfere where the
Petitioner before the High Court was guilty of laches. 66
(iv) Where, though the High Court had passed an order
which was adverse to the petitioner,without serving any
notice to the petitioner, contrary to natural justice, no
prejudice was caused to him since he was on the Petition
as eo nominee party and was fully aware of the pendency
of the writ petition and had adequate opportunity to enter
appearance. 67
(cxcii)
(cxciii) 3. After quashing an order, the Supreme Court may,
instead of remanding the matter to the administrative
authority, itself make the appropriate order, with suitable
directions, where necessary.69
(cxciv)
(cxcv) In service matters. 1. In general, the relief under Art.
136 being extraordinary, the Supreme Court would not
interfere with orders of the High Court in disciplinary
matters on mere technical grounds. It must be further
shown that it would serve some useful purpose. These
principles would also apply to the Tribunals created by the
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.
(cxcvi)
(cxcvii) (i) Where a Probationer’s services were terminated
after holding a summary inquiry as to his suitability to
continue in service, but the contention of the Probationer
was that the order being penal in substance, a fuller
 inquiry under Art. 311 of the Constitution should have been
made. The High Court rejected this contention upon the
finding that the order was not penal, and that, accordingly,
a formal proceeding under Art. 311(2) was unnecessary.
The Supreme Court agreed with this view and also held
that the circumstances did not disclose that if a fuller
inquiry had been held, the Appellant would have been
found blameless. Hence, the Court refused to grant special
leave under Art. 136.70
(cxcviii)
(cxcix) Similarly, no question of holding an enquiry or an
opportunity to be heard before terminating the services of
a probationer arises where the relevant Rules expressly
provide that passing of the prescribed examinations was a
condition precedent for confirmation and that at any time
before confirmation the authority is empowered to
terminate the Probationer’s services by issuing one
month’s notice.”
(cc)
(cci) (ii) Where the Petitioner had obviously no right to continue
in his officiating post so that the reversion to his
substantive post would not attract Art. 311(2), the
Supreme Court would not interfere merely because the
authority gave a wrong reason in his order of reversion.72
(ccii)
(cciii) 2. The Supreme Court will not interfere with a finding of
fact arrived at by an Enquiry Officer, which has been
upheld by the High Court, in the absence of bias on the
part of the Enquiry Officer; or non-compliance with any
statutory rule or the requirements of natural justice, 73
(cciv)
(ccv) 3. On the other hand, the Supreme Court would interfere
where there has been a violation of Art. 311(1) on the facts
on the record, which had been misconstrued by the High
Court. 74
(ccvi)
(ccvii) 4. In the matter of selection of candidates for
appointment to a part, the Court would be reluctant to
interfere with the assessment of the needs of the
administration, made by the appointing authority,” and the
 Supreme Court would set aside the order of the High Court
by which it has quashed an appointment made in
pursuance of the recommendation of the Selection
Cominittee, without valid reasons. 76Equitable or
humanitarian considerations. Even where the Supreme
Court allows an appeal, holding the appointment of the
Respondent to have been illegal, the Court may not set
aside the appointment but allow the Respondent to
continue, on humanitarian grounds, e.g., the latter’s
successful service for a long period,” and the distress of his
family.”
(ccviii)
(ccix) Interference with discretion. 1. Where the High Court has
granted relief under Art. 226 notwithstanding the existence
of an alternative remedy, the Supreme Court would not
interfere unless the High Court has acted arbitrarily or
unreasonably in exercising its discretion, 78
(ccx)
(ccxi) 2. Nor would the Supreme Court interfere with the exercise
of discretion of the High Court in moulding the relief.79
(ccxii)
(ccxiii) Interference with interlocutory orders passed in
proceedings under Art. 226.
(ccxiv)
(ccxv) 1. Ordinarily, the Supreme Court would not interfere
with interlocutory orders passed by a High Court in a
proceeding under Art. 226 while it is still pending before
the High Court, 80-81
(ccxvi)
(ccxvii) 2. But it would interfere with an interlocutory order in
a case pending before the High Court where there are
exceptional and unusual features justifying such
interference, e.g.,
(ccxviii)
(ccxix) (i) The High Court in an application under Art. 226
brought by the respondents made an interim order on 10-
6-1957 that “status quo ante be maintained”. By a
misapprehension of this order, the Excise Commissioner
directed that possession should be recovered from the
appellant and given to the respondents. The appellant
 moved the High Court for quashing this order of the Excise
Commissioner which was palpably wrong. The High Court
issued a rule but refused to grant an interim stay of the
order directing possession to be given. This petitioner went
on moving petitions for vacating the order of possession
but the High Court could not hear these petitions until after
the Long Vocation in September, 1957, because no Division
Bench could be constituted for want of a Judge.
(ccxx)
(ccxxi) The Supreme Court found that the order directing the
appellant to be dispossessed was without any authority of
law and also found that there was no merit in the case
made by the respondent in the application under Art. 226
itself where the interlocutory order of the High Court was
made. Hence, the interlocutory order was quashed.2
(ccxxii)
(ccxxiii) (ii) Where the plying of the appellant’s bus was
stayed at the instance of one who was not a party before
the High Court,
(ccxxiv)
(ccxxv) (iii) Where an order of stay had been made by the
High Court, stultifying the order of an expert body such as
the Company Law Board, in the matter of investigation into
the affairs of a company which, according to the Board,
were prejudicial to the public interest, pending hearing of a
petition under Art. 226,4
(ccxxvi)
(ccxxvii) Interference with finding of fact. 1. Ordinarily the
Supreme Court will not interferes with the appreciation of
the affidavit evidence by the High Court, but inexceptional
cases, the Supreme Court may examine the finding of the
High Court, e.g., where it affects the status of a person
holding the office of a quasi-judicial tribunal on the ground
of bias.”2
(ccxxviii)
(ccxxix) 2. In the absence of very strong reasons, the
Supreme Court will not interfere with a finding of fact
concurrently arrived at by a Single Judge and an Appellate
Bench of the High Court. 86
(ccxxx)
(ccxxxi) 3. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art.
136 is wider than that of the High Court under Art. 226,
because it can go into questions of fact as well, which the
High Court, in a proceeding for certiorari, cannot. 87
(ccxxxii)
(ccxxxiii) Appeal from dismissal in limine. 1. In an appeal from
an order of the High
(ccxxxiv)
(ccxxxv) Court dismissing a petition under Art. 226 in limine,
the scope of the appeal before the Supreme Court is
confined to the ambit of the writ petition in the High Court,
viz., whether the grounds set forth in the Petition can be
established on the averments therein.
(ccxxxvi)
(ccxxxvii) 2. Where the Petition raises a prima facie case or an
arguable issue, but requires further investigation, the Court
would reverse the order of the High Court and send the
case back, e.g., where the question raised is of
considerable importance or there is an allegation of mala
fides, or the question raised is one of statutory
interpretation, without involving any disputed question of
fact; or there is an error apparent on the face of the
record.92
(ccxxxviii)
(ccxxxix) 3. Where a special leave petition has been dismissed
in limine, such dismissal cannot preclude the Supreme
Court from considering on merits the same issues involved
in a subsequent appeal.3
(ccxl)
(ccxli) Practice and Procedure. 1. A point of law which can
be decided on the
(ccxlii)
(ccxliii) Material on record can be allowed to be raised for the
first time before the Supreme Court in special appeal.
(ccxliv)
(ccxlv) But-
(ccxlvi)
(ccxlvii) The Supreme Court would not entertain a plea, which
was not made before the High Court and was introduced
 for the first time in the application for special leave, such
as the following –
(ccxlviii)
(ccxlix) (1) Mala fides, or arbitrariness.
(ccl)
(ccli) (ii) That the impugned acquisition was not for a public
purpose.”
(cclii)
(ccliii)(iii) The constitutional validity of a statutory provision.”
(ccliv)
(cclv) 2. Unless there are specific allegations against the inferior
tribunal whose order is sought to be set aside by certiorari,
such tribunal need not appear by a lawyer eitherbefore the
High Court or in appeal before the Supreme Court and, if it
does, it must bear its own costs.99
(cclvi)

3. In a fit case, the Supreme Court may, in an appeal from an order

under Art. 226, remit the case to the inferior statutory Tribunal to
deal with the case according to law. 100

(cclvii) 4. When a concession has been made by a party

before the High Court on a question of fact or mixed
question of fact and law, the Supreme Court will not allow
that to be withdrawn.¹
(cclviii)
(cclix) 5. In an appeal by the State against the order of the
High Court partially allowing a Petition under Art. 226, the
Petitioner-respondent can support the order in his favour
on grounds other than those on which the order is founded,
but cannot ask for a larger relief, in the absence of a cross-
appeal against the partial rejection of his claim by the High
Court.2
(cclx)
(cclxi) 6. No appeal would be heard against an order in a
Writ proceeding to challenge relaxation of Rules relating to
admission to a Medical College in favour of Scheduled
Caste candidates in the absence of the selected candidates
who would be affected by the decision in the appeal.
(cclxii)
(cclxiii) 7. The Court would not interfere where the appeal
has become infructuous, say, by lapse of time; or where to
disturb the existing state would not be conducive to
justice.5
(cclxiv)
(cclxv) Costs. 1. Though ordinarily the Supreme Court does
not award costs in appeals against writ proceedings. The
Court may award heavy costs where the Government
showed its reluctance to perform a constitutional duty and
also tried to disobey orders of the Court for production of
documents.
(cclxvi)
(cclxvii) 2. On the other hand, even while dismissing an
appeal of the Revenue against an assessee, the Supreme
Court may set aside an order of costs made by the High
Court against the Revenue which was founded on a wrong
principle.”
(cclxviii)
(cclxix) Conversely, while allowing an appeal the Supreme
Court may direct the appellant to pay costs to the
Respondent in view of the appellant committing procedural
error of a technical nature.”
(cclxx)
(cclxxi) C. Principles relating to orders of High Court under
Art. 227.
(cclxxii)
(cclxxiii) 1. The Supreme Court would interfere with an order
under Art. 227-
(cclxxiv)
(cclxxv) (i) Where the High Court refused jurisdiction upon a
misconception of law, e.g., as to the nature of the tenancy
in respect of which the landlord has applied for possession
before the Rent Controller.
(cclxxvi)
(cclxxvii) (ii) Where the High Court has set aside a finding of
fact made by a tribunal. 102. But the Supreme Court will
not interfere where the High Court has, in a proper case,
set aside the decision of an inferior Court merely on the
ground that it was erroneous.”
(cclxxviii)
(cclxxix) 3. In such appeal the Supreme Court can exercise
those powers which the High Court could, under Art.
227.12
(cclxxx)
(cclxxxi) 4. Filing of Writ Petition under Art. 227 against High
Court’s order in revision would not bar appeal under Art.
136 raising the same issue.13
(cclxxxii)
(cclxxxiii) 5. Even where the Court dismisses the appeal, the
Supreme Court may vacate an observation in the High
Court judgment which was not warranted or called for. 14
(cclxxxiv)
(cclxxxv) D. Principles relating to interference with orders of
High Court in cases of professional misconduct.
(cclxxxvi)
(cclxxxvii) The Supreme Court is most reluctant to interfere with
the orders of the High Court in this sphere, in view of the
delicate and responsible task of the High Court in
maintaining a high standard of professional rectitude, save
in exceptional cases where any question of principle is
involved or where the Supreme Court is pursuaded that
any violation of the principles of natural justice or
miscarriage of justice has taken place. 15 The findings of
the High Court on points of fact are not open before the
Supreme Court and the latter would only consider whether
on the facts found, the charge of professional misconduct
is established.15
(cclxxxviii)
(cclxxxix) E. Appeal by Special Leave in Criminal Cases.
(ccxc)
(ccxci) L. Principles relating to grant of special leave in
criminal cases. 1. In a criminal case, the Supreme Court will
grant special leave to appeal only in those cases where it is
shown that exceptional and special circumstances exist or
that substantial and grave injustice has been done or that
the case in question presents features of sufficient gravity
to warrant a review of the decision appealed against. 16-18
It would not grant special leave to appeal on grounds which
would not sustain the appeal itself, 16 that is, unless it is
 manifest that, by a disregard of the forms of legal process
or by violation of the principles of natural justice or
otherwise, substantial and grave injustice has been done,
19
(ccxcii)
(ccxciii) 2. The Supreme Court has granted special leave to
appeal from the judgment of the High Court in a criminal
case:
(ccxciv)
(ccxcv) (a) Where the High Court reversed a judgment of
acquittal and sentenced the accused to transportation for
life [so that Art. 134(1)(a) was not applicable], and there
was a passage in the judgment of the High Court which
suggested that the Court had ignored the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused. 20
(ccxcvi)
(ccxcvii) (b) Where there is a serious question of law affecting
the foundation of the conviction, e.g.,Whether the
conviction of an accused under s. 120B, I.P.C., is
maintainable where other alleged conspirators have been
acquitted.21
(ccxcviii)
(ccxcix) © Special leave was granted to the State
(ccc)
(ccci) (i) Where the High Court, reversing a conviction, acquitted
the accused.22
(cccii)
(ccciii) (ii) Where the order of discharge passed by a
Magistrate at the instance of the Public Prosecutor, under
s. 494, Cr. P.C., was set aside by the High Court on the
ground that the Court should not have granted the consent
to the withdrawal of the Public Prosecutor and it was
contended on behalf of the State that the view taken by
the High Court was erroneous and was likely to have
repercussions in the State beyond what was involved in the
particular case. 23
(ccciv)
(cccv) (iii) Where the High Court based itself on wrong
premises for setting aside the well reasoned judgment of
 the Session Judge, the Court found the case eminently
suitable for interference. 24
(cccvi)
(cccvii) 3. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, such
as a decision which shocks the conscience or involves a
question of law of general public importance, the Supreme
Court would not grant special leave from a concurrent
finding of fact as to the guilt of the accused, even though
there might be some improbabilities in the prosecution
case. 25
(cccviii)
(cccix) 4. The Supreme Court does not generally interfere
with interlocutory orders, e.g., (i) order of remand 26
particularly where revision lay to the High Court which has
not been availed of;27 (ii) order directing special officer for
inquiry where the criminal case itself has in the meantime
been quashed, 28
(cccx)
(cccxi) 5. The Court may not grant leave where the
Petitioner has not placed before the Court all the facts and
necessary documents. 29
(cccxii)
(cccxiii) Appeal against acquittal. 1. The implication of ‘fair
procedure’ in Art. 21 is
(cccxiv)
(cccxv) Telescoped into Art. 136. Hence, in granting special
leave to a private party to appeal against acquittal, where
the State has considered it fit not to appeal, the Court
should consider the peril to the personal liberty of the
accused which is involved. 30
(cccxvi)
(cccxvii) 2. When such person is other than the complainant,
the Court would scrutinise the motives of the appellant and
entertain a special leave petition only in those cases where
it is convinced that public interest justifies an appeal
against the acquittal and that the State has refrained from
the petitioning for special leave for reasons which do not
bear on the public interest but are prompted by extraneous
considerations or private influence, 30
(cccxviii)
(cccxix) 3. As to instances where public interest would justify
the grant of special leave to appeal against acquittal may
be mentioned
(cccxx)
(cccxxi) Where the acquittal was based on a judgment of the
Supreme Court which has subsequently been overruled.”
(cccxxii)
(cccxxiii) Practice and Procedure. The Supreme Court would
not entertain an applicationfor special leave where the
appellant did not move the High Court for a certificate
under Art. 134(1)©.32
(cccxxiv)
(cccxxv) II. Principles governing disposal of criminal appeal on
special leave. The primary principle is that the Supreme
Court, under Art. 136, is not a regular Court of Appeal
which an accused may approach as of right.33 It is an
extraordinary jurisdiction which is exercisable only in
exceptional cases when the Court is satisfied that it should
interfere to prevent grave or serious miscarriage of justice,
as distinguished from mere errors in the appreciation of
evidence; or where the decision is so perverse as to shake
the conscience of the Court.34
(cccxxvi)
(cccxxvii) (I) 1. The Court will not interfere with judgments or
orders of Criminal Courts, on special leave
(cccxxviii)
(cccxxix) (i) To assume a jurisdiction which is not warranted by
the other provisions of the Constitution. 35
(cccxxx)
(cccxxxi) (ii) Where the plea of misjoinder of charges is without
substance. 36
(cccxxxii)
(cccxxxiii) (iii) Merely to question a finding of fact which is in
favour of the accused. 37
(cccxxxiv)
(cccxxxv) (iv) To examine the reasons for coming to certain
conclusions of fact.
(cccxxxvi)
(cccxxxvii) (v) On ground of mistakes of a technical nature which
have not occasioned any failure of justice. 39 Thus,
(cccxxxviii)
(cccxxxix) (a) Whether action should be taken under s. 195 of
the Cr. P.C. (1898) is a matter primarily for the Court which
hears the application, and is not a matter for interference
by the Supreme Court in exercise of its extraordinary
powers under Art. 136.40
(cccxl)
(cccxli) (b) Every error or omission not in compliance with s.
342 of the Cr. P.C. (1898) does not necessarily vitiate the
trial. Errors of this type fall within the category of curable
irregularities, and the question whether the trial is vitiated
depends upon the degree of error and upon whether
prejudice has been or is likely to have been caused to the
accused. On the other hand, the Court would set aside the
conviction where omission to examine the accused under
s. 342 was not a mere technical error.47
(cccxlii)
(cccxliii) It is not a sufficient compliance with the section to
generally ask the accused that having heard the
prosecution evidence what he has to say about it. He must
be questioned separately about each material
circumstance which is intended to be used against him.
The questions must be fair and be couched in a form which
any ignorant or illiterate person will be able to appreciate
and understand. Where there is a violation of these
principles, the Supreme Court will interfere by special
leave.43
(cccxliv)
(cccxlv) © Where the High Court has refused to exercise its
inherent jurisdiction under s. 561A, Cr. P.C., 1898, unless
the decision is erroneous in law, even though the Supreme
Court may not agree with the conclusion arrived at by the
High Court.”
(cccxlvi)
(cccxlvii) 2. On appeal by the State, the Supreme Court will not
interfere to resuscitate a stale matter, where public
interest does not so require.3. The only function of the
Supreme Court being to find whether the judgment
appealed from is legally correct or not, the Court cannot
 take into account the result of a later case against the
accused. 46
(cccxlviii)
(cccxlix) (II) On the other hand, the Court will interfere in case
of substantial injustice, e.g..
(cccl)
(cccli)(i) Where the Court below had committed an error of law
which constituted the very foundation of the offence, viz.,
upon the question whether mens rea was an essential
ingredient for conviction for contravention of Cls. 22 and
27 of the Motor Spirit Rationing Order, 1941, promulgated
under s. 81(22) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, or
failed to consider the plea of private defence in the light of
the ingredients laid down by the law.”
(ccclii)
(cccliii) (ii) Where of the many items set out in the charge
under s. 147 of the Indian Penal Code as constituting the
common object of the alleged unlawful assembly,
dispossession of the complainant is the most important
one, it is incumbent on the Appellate Court to record a
clear finding as to possession and its failure to record it on
the vital issue in the case, without deciding which the
question as to who was the aggressor could not properly
and satisfactorily be determined, is apt to lead to injustice
of such a serious and substantial character as to warrant
interference of the Supreme Court on special leave.”
(cccliv)
(ccclv) (iii) Where, in a charge under s. 34, I.P.C., the
evidence of sharing a common intention by the appellant
was neither convincing nor reliable, having been inferred
from his mere presence at the place of occurrence.”
(ccclvi)
(ccclvii) (iv) Where the inferior Court adopted a procedure
unknown to law, e.g., holding a preliminary inquiry under s.
488, Cr. P.C., 1898, and the circumstances of the case were
strong enough to show that he had made an unjudicial
approach to the case. 50
(ccclviii)
(ccclix) (v) Where the High Court dismissed in limine an
application for revision against an order allowing
 withdrawal of prosecution against some of the accused
without having any material to warrant the conclusion that
sufficient evidence would not be forthcoming to sustain the
charges against those accused.51
(ccclx)
(ccclxi) (vi) Where the High Court quashed proceedings on
the ground of delay in putting the case before the Court,
ignoring that investigation of an offence of conspiracy is
necessarily prolonged. 52 (vii) Where the High Court
refused to set aside an order of confiscation of a truck
belonging
(ccclxii)
(ccclxiii) To the Appellant, made under s. 7(1)(b) of the
Essential Commodities Act, which was hired and used for
carrying prohibited goods, even though the Appellant was
not a party to the proceeding and he was given no
opportunity to show cause against the proposed order and
there was no evidence that the Appellant had knowledge of
such contraband use of his truck. 59
(ccclxiv)
(ccclxv) Interference with findings of fact. 1. In a criminal
appeal on special leave the
(ccclxvi)
(ccclxvii) Supreme Court will not constitute itself into a third
Court of fact and re-weigh the evidence which has
impressed the Courts below. Hence, (a) It will not interfere
with the judgment of the Courts below only on ground
(ccclxviii)
(ccclxix) Of credibility of witnesses, when the prosecution
story is not prima facie incredible or improbables or the
alleged error of the Court has not resulted in a failure of
justice.56
(ccclxx)
(ccclxxi) (b) Where the High Court has considered all the
evidence, the Supreme Courtwill not examine the reasons
of the High Court for coming to the conclusion from
them;5” or interference on merely technical grounds.58
(ccclxxii)
(ccclxxiii) © If two views as to the appreciation of an evidence
are possible, the Supreme Court will not interfere with the
 view taken by the High Court even if it is inclined to take a
different view. 59
(ccclxxiv)
(ccclxxv) (d) As an abstract proposition of argument every
case affords potential for two views to be taken but it has
to be realised that the alternate view must have some
content of plausibility in it. Otherwise it cannot be taken to
be a plausible alternative. 60
(ccclxxvi)
(ccclxxvii) € Where, in a case, depending solely on
circumstantial evidence, the Court relied on conjectures
and suspicions. 61
(ccclxxviii)
(ccclxxix) 2. On the other hand, though the Supreme Court will
not, ordinarily, look beyond the findings of fact arrived at
by the Court below, the Supreme Court will interfere in
exceptional cases, 62 e.g.,
(ccclxxx)
(ccclxxxi) 1. Where there has been in substance no fair and
proper trial or the findings of the fact are such as are
shocking to the judicial conscience of the Court, 63-64 that
is, where the evidence is such that no tribunal could
legitimately infer from it that the accused is guilty of the
offence, 62, 65 e.g.,
(ccclxxxii)
(ccclxxxiii) (a) Where the Courts below have arrived at a
decision on the plea of alibi in disregard of the principle
that the standard of proof which is required in regard to
that plea must be the same as the standard which is
applied to the prosecution evidence and that in both cases
it should be of reasonable standard: 66-67 or where the
circumstances relied upon by the Courts were not
inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, or,
(ccclxxxiv)
(ccclxxxv) (b) Where the Court below relied upon the confession
of a co-accused or the testimony of an accomplice without
sufficient independent evidence in corroboration; or where
the Courts below, in coming to the conclusion that the
confession was voluntary, failed to note that the
prosecution offered no explanation why the C.L.D.
 Inspector kept the accused in prolonged custody preceding
the making of the confession.
(ccclxxxvi)
(ccclxxxvii) © Where a finding of fact has been arrived at on the
testimony of a witness who is not person on whom any
reliance could be placed and who was himself a party to
the preparation of a forged document in the suit and the
Courts below have departed from the rule of prudence that
such testimony should not be accepted unless it is
corroborated by some other evidence on the record, a
finding of that character may be reviewed even on special
leave if the other circumstances of the case require it, and
substantial grave injustice has resulted.
(ccclxxxviii)
(ccclxxxix) (d) Where the appellant has been convicted
notwithstanding the fact that the evidence was wanting on
a most material part of the prosecution case; or where the
charge has not been brought home to the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt€ Where it appears that the High
Court has not at all applied its mind to the appreciation of
the evidence and grave injustice has resulted therefrom;”
or where the High Court has overlooked a well-laid
principle relating to appreciation of evidence;72 or arrived
at a conclusion without considering a glaring fact. 73
(cccxc)
(cccxci) (f) Where the accused has been convicted of murder,
without apprehending the true effect of a material change
in the versions given by the witnesses immediately after
the occurrence and at the trial with respect to the nature
and character of the offence.74
(cccxcii)
(cccxciii) (g) Where the accused has been convicted of murder
on the opinion of a third Judge (in view of difference as to
guilt between two Judges) who, again, has differed on the
question of sentence. 75
(cccxciv)
(cccxcv) (h) Where the finding of fact leads to a conclusion
which is not tenable at law, e.g., where the accused was
convicted for having entered into a conspiracy to murder,
 though the persons with whom he was said to have
conspired, were acquitted.76
(cccxcvi)
(cccxcvii) (i) Where the accused has been sentenced to death
on the sole testimony of a single witness whose testimony
was rejected with reference to a co-accused (who was
sailing in the same boat);” or on the sole testimony of
prosecution witnesses who were cross-examined as
‘hostile’;” or whose testimony suffers from serious
infirmities.79
(cccxcviii)
(cccxcix) (j) Where grave injustice has been done by disregard
of forms of legal process or violation of principles of natural
justice, e.g.,
(cd)
(cdi) Where the High Court proceeded on the erroneous legal
assumption that identification parades constituted a
substantive piece of evidence, 82
(cdii)
(cdiii) If any of the foregoing conditions are present, the Supreme
Court will make no distinction between a judgment of
conviction or acquittal by the High Court. 83
(cdiv)
(cdv) II. Where the High Court has reversed a finding of acquittal
of the subordinate Court, in disregard of the principles laid
down by the Supreme Court in this behalf, 84-85 but not
otherwise, e.g., -
(cdvi)
(cdvii) (a) Where two views of the evidence were possible,
and the High Court substituted its view for that of the lower
Court.
(cdviii)
(cdix) (b) Where the High Court had reversed a finding of fact
which had become final at an earlier stage of the
proceeding. 86
(cdx)
(cdxi) Interference with concurrent findings of fact. 1. The
Supreme Court will not reassess the evidence at large and
come to a fresh opinion as to the innocence or guilt of the
accused, 7 so as to interfere with a concurrent finding of
 fact by the Courtbelow, 87-90 except where there is some
serious infirmity in the appreciation of the evidence,” and
the finding is perverse.92
(cdxii)
(cdxiii) 2. But even in cases of concurrent findings, the Court
may interfere
(cdxiv)
(cdxv) (i) Where there has been in the trial a violation of the
principles of natural justice, 57. 93 or some fundamental
rule of procedure.94
(cdxvi)
(cdxvii) (ii) Where on the proved facts wrong inferences of
law have been drawn; or an error of law has been
committed in the appreciation of evidence. 95
(cdxviii)
(cdxix) (iii) Where there are ‘inherent improbabilities’ in the
story relied upon to convict the accused, or important
circumstances have not been considered.”
(cdxx)
(cdxxi) (iv) Where the conclusions reached by the Courts
below are so patently opposed to the well-established
principles of judicial approach as to amount to a
miscarriage of justice; 89,99 or to shake the conscience of
the Court; 92 where the Courts below relied merely on
suspicion and conjectures; 100 or where the evidence was
such that no tribunal could legitimately arrive at the
inference that the accused was guilty.¹
(cdxxii)
(cdxxiii) (v) Where the Courts have committed an error of law
or of the forms of legal process or procedure by which
justice itself has failed. 87
(cdxxiv)
(cdxxv) (vi) Where there has been an improper reception or
rejection or received, would leave the conviction
unsupportable.7 of evidence which, if discarded
(cdxxvi)
(cdxxvii) (vii) Where there has been a misreading of vital
evidence or the Court omits to notice very important points
in the accused’s favour which would swing the balance the
other way. 97.2.3
(cdxxviii)
(cdxxix) (viii) Where the finding is based on no evidence.
(cdxxx)
(cdxxxi) (ix) Where on the evidence two possibilities are open,
the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt, specially
where the guilt of the accused is sought to be established
by circumstantial evidence.5
(cdxxxii)
(cdxxxiii) (x) In an appeal against conviction the High Court
can interfere with concurrent judgments of criminal Courts
where the interest of justice so requires.
(cdxxxiv)
(cdxxxv) Of fact: Instances of findings of facts. The following
are some instances of findings(i) The evidence of any
witness is not necessary for a just decision of the case.
(cdxxxvi)
(cdxxxvii) (ii) That the testimony of a witness is to be accepted
or rejected.95
(cdxxxviii)
(cdxxxix) Consideration of evidence by Supreme Court. 1. The
Supreme Court would not, ordinarily, enter into
reappreciation of the evidence, in an appeal by special
leave.”
(cdxl)
(cdxli) 2. This is, however, a self-imposed restriction, and
not a jurisdictional bar. Hence,
(cdxlii)
(cdxliii) Where the finding of fact by the High Court is
perverse, inadequate and violative of natural justice or
there is some glaring infirmity in the prosecution
evidence,” and has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, 12
the Supreme Court may itself hear the appeal on the
evidence, instead of remanding the case to the High Court
for a reconsideration of the evidence, where the latter
course would lead to unnecessary delay or hardship, e.g.,
where the appellants are under a sentence of death.”
(cdxliv)
(cdxlv) 3. The Supreme Court may examine the evidence
and substitute its own finding in cases like the following:
(cdxlvi)
(cdxlvii) (i) The High Court relying on the entire evidence
which had been rejected in toto by the Sessions Judge as
unworthy of belief.14
(cdxlviii)
(cdxlix) (ii) The High Court failing to go into the evidence in a
reference under s. 366, Cr. P.C., 1973.15
(cdl)
(cdli) (iii) Where the prosecution story is opposed to ordinary
human conduct or is inherently improbable.”
(cdlii)
(cdliii) (iv) Where the conclusion arrived at by the High
Court is not justified in law.. 16
(cdliv)
(cdlv) (v) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by
the High Court on suspicion and surmises.”
(cdlvi)
(cdlvii) (vi) Where the approach of the Courts below has
resulted in failure of justice necessitating the corrections.”
(cdlviii)
(cdlix) (vii) Where the High Court has completely missed the
real points requiring determination and has on erroneous
grounds discredited the evidence, the Supreme Court
would be justified in going into the evidence to avoid grave
injustice.19
(cdlx)
(cdlxi) Interference with sentence. 1. It is not the practice of
the Supreme Court to interfere by special leave in the
matter of punishment imposed for crimes committed20-
21except in exceptional cases” where the sentences are
unduly harsh²¹ and do not really advance the ends of
justice. Thus, the Court has reduced the sentence in the
following cases
(cdlxii)
(cdlxiii) (i) Though the offence of black-marketing calls for a
certain amount of severity, yet, when a substantial
sentence of imprisonment with fine (e.g., a fine of Rs.
42,300 in addition to a year’s imprisonment for black-
marketing in 115 barrels of kerosene oil) has been awarded
especially to a commission agent, the imposition of unduly
heavy fines, which may be justified to some extent in the
 case of principals, is not called for in the case of
commission agents; the Supreme Court, accordingly,
reduced the fine to Rs. 4,000/- in all.20
(cdlxiv)
(cdlxv) (ii) Upon a consideration of the age or sex or family
conditions of the accused, at the same time having regard
to the gravity of the offence and its impact on the public.
25
(cdlxvi)
(cdlxvii) (iii) Where the murder was committed without
premeditation and in sudden heat of anger, without being
cruel or brutal to the victim. 26
(cdlxviii)
(cdlxix) (iv) Where, in imposing the sentence, the inferior
Court has omitted to take into account relevant
circumstances or has exercised its discretion arbitrarily or
capriciously. 27
(cdlxx)
(cdlxxi) (v) Where the appellant has already undergone a
good portion of the sentence, either as under-trial prisoner
or on conviction, the Supreme Court may reduce the
sentence to the period already undergone by him, and
impose a fine with compensation to the family of the
victim.29
(cdlxxii)
(cdlxxiii) 2. But the severity of the fine imposed would not, per
se, be a consideration for reducing it where the social evil
which is sought to be checked by the punishment is such
that only a deterrent fine would be effective, e.g., in the
case of illegal importation of gold.30
(cdlxxiv)
(cdlxxv) 3. In a case of murder, the Supreme Court would be
slow to interfere with a sentence of death where the
murder is premeditated or brutal, unless there are
exceptional circumstances for commutation thereof to
imprisonment for life. 32
(cdlxxvi)
(cdlxxvii) 4. The lapse of a long period between the award of
death penalty and the hearing of appeal by the Supreme
Court is a factor which may be taken into consideration,
 along with other circumstances, in commuting the death
sentence; but this is not an absolute rule justifying
interference in every case. 33
(cdlxxviii)
(cdlxxix) 5. Where the accused has been convicted by the
lower Courts of two offences, but through inadvertence no
sentence has been imposed for one of such offences, the
Supreme Court may, in an appeal against the sentence
passed for one of such offences, set aside such sentence
and yet pass a sentence on the other offence for which no
(cdlxxx)
(cdlxxxi) Sentence had been passed by the High Court through
inadvertence.” 6. The Supreme Court has no power to
reduce the sentence in any collateralproceeding other than
an appeal from the judgment in which the sentence had
been passed. 35
(cdlxxxii)
(cdlxxxiii) 7. Conversely, the Supreme Court would be slow to
interfere with the discretionary power of a High Court to
enhance the sentence, either under s. 377, Cr. P.C., 1973,
or under its inherent jurisdiction. 36
(cdlxxxiv)
(cdlxxxv) 8. Even where the Supreme Court refuses to interfere
with a sentence of imprisonment, it may issue directions
upon the Jail authorities to treat young offenders liberally
with a view to their correction. 37
(cdlxxxvi)
(cdlxxxvii) 9. In appeal against the sentence, the Court has
power to issue notice for enhancement of the sentence.
But then, the accused would be entitled to challenge the
correctness of the conviction itself, in the proceeding for
enhancement. 38
(cdlxxxviii)
(cdlxxxix) 10. Even after a death sentence has been confirmed
and is not open to review, the Supreme Court may, in a
Petition under Art. 32, read with Art. 21, commute the
sentence of death into one of life imprisonment on the
ground of undue delay in execution of the sentence of
death since it was confirmed, because a sentence of death
 is one thing and the sentence of death followed by lengthy
imprisonment prior to execution is another. 39
(cdxc)
(cdxci) Interference with order of acquittal by High Court. 1.
In an appeal against a finding of acquittal by the High
Court (reversing conviction), the Supreme Court would not
interfere unless that finding as vitiated by some glaring
infirmity in the appraisement of evidence;40 or where it is
perverse; 41-42 or where the facts are such that no
tribunal could legitimately arrive at the conclusion that the
guilt of the accused had not been proved beyond any
reasonable doubt,43 or where the acquittal is based on
irrelevant grounds, resulting in a failure of justice,45 e.g..
(cdxcii)
(cdxciii) Where the High Court accepted as correct all the
essential facts constituting the offence with which the
accused was charged, but passed an order of acquittal on a
misconception as to the effect of a decision of the Supreme
Court; or where the evidence accepted by the trial Court is
rejected after a perfunctory consideration; or crucial
evidence, such as the dying declaration of the testimony of
direct witnesses has been ignored; or where there has
been a gross violation of procedural law, resulting in a
serious miscarriage of justice.2. A. The Supreme Court
would not interfere with the order of acquittal passed by
the High Court –
(cdxciv)
(cdxcv) (i) Where the Sessions Judge relied entirely on
circumstantial evidence, which is explained away by the
High Court, by cogent reasons. 49
(cdxcvi)
(cdxcvii) (ii) Where the trial Court’s conviction was entirely
founded on the dying declaration which. As the High Court
shows, is open to two interpretations and the High Court
has accepted that interpretation which is favourable to the
accused. 50
(cdxcviii)
(cdxcix) (iii) Broadly speaking, the Court will not interfere
where the evidence is equally balanced,” and view taken
by the High Court cannot be said to be unreasonables even
 though the Supreme Court would have taken a different
view of the evidence, 52
(d)
(di) (iv) Where the High Court has acquitted the accused,
reversing conviction by the Sessions Judge, the Supreme
Court will not interfere if the view taken by the High Court
was reasonably possible upon the evidence on the record.
59
(dii)
(diii) (v) Where the incident took place a long time ago.54
(div)
(dv) B. On the other hand, the Supreme Court would set aside
the acquittal by the High Court
(dvi)
(dvii) (i) Where the appreciation of evidence by the High Court is
tainted by speculation.”
(dviii)
(dix) (ii) Where the High Court has rejected the testimony of the
eye-witnesses, without coming to the conclusion that they
were not trustworthy.55
(dx)
(dxi) (iii) Where the High Court has brushed aside incriminating
evidence of a satisfactory character, relying upon
circumstances which do not detract from the value of such
incriminating evidence. 57
(dxii)
(dxiii) (iv) Where both sets of witnesses being interested
witnesses, the High Court relied upon the defence
witnesses to reverse the conviction of the accused,
rejecting the corroborated evidence of prosecution
witnesses.58
(dxiv)
(dxv) (v) Where the judgment is tainted with serious legal
infirmities; or is founded on a legal construction which is
wrong.
(dxvi)
(dxvii) (vi) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court
would be justified to interfere when approach of the High
Court is far from satisfactory.61
(dxviii)
 (dxix) (vii) Where the High Court has completely misdirected
itself in reversing the order of conviction by the trial
court.2
(dxx)
(dxxi) 3. There is no difference between an appeal against
conviction and an appeal against acquittal except that
when dealing with an appeal against acquittal the Court
keeps in view the position that the presumption of
innocence in favour of the accused has been fortified by
the acquittal and if the view adopted by the High Court is
reasonable and founded on the materials on record, the
Supreme Court would not interfere with it.
Where, however, the Supreme Court comes to the conclusion that
the acquittal is not based on a reasonable view, the Supreme Court
may review the entire material and there would be no limitation
upon the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136, to come to a just
decision, quashing the acquittal. In short, where the conclusion
arrived by the Court below is such as to shake the conscience of the
Supreme Court would strike it down whether the judgment is one of
conviction or acquittal.

Appeal against acquittal, under s. 378, Cr. P.C. 1973. 1. Though in

appeal against acquittal under s. 378 of the Cr. P.C. [s. 417 of the
old code], 65 the High Court has full power to review the evidence
upon which the order of acquittal was founded, the judgment of the
trial Court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and
hearing their evidence can be reversed by the High Court only in
extraordinary cases and for substantial and compelling reasons,
such as a clear error of law in the appreciation of the evidence.68

2. Since the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Art. 136 is limited

only by its own discretion, the Court has undoubtedly jurisdiction to
interfere even with findings of fact arrived at by the High Court in
appeal setting aside those of the subordinate court acquitting the
accused. 69

3. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the

judgment of acquittal
Where the accused, charged of murder, repudiated his confession at
the earliest opportunity as having been made under Police threats
administered to him at night while in jail custody and there was
evidence to show that the Police had access to him there, and there
was nothing to displace his statement that he was threatened, the
finding of the Sessions Judge that the confession was not voluntary
in character was fair and reasonable but the High Court had set
aside the order of acquittal, without any compelling reason. 70

4. On the other hand, the Court would not exercise this power to
reopen a stale matter, e.g., to quash an order of discharge in
respect of a statutory offence which is alleged to have been
committed several years ago; or where the High Court has not
committed any error of law or any error on the appreciation of
evidence.”

5. On appeal from acquittal, the Supreme Court is competent to

pass any sentence which the High Court could have passed.73

Interference with discretionary orders. 1. In general, the Supreme

Court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by the High
Court, where it has applied its mind to the relevant facts and
circumstances, e.g.

Where, setting aside an order of discharge, the High Court directs

the accused to be committed to the Court of Session, being satisfied
that a prima facie case exists for such commitment,Appeal from
order of withdrawal from prosecution, under s. 321, Cr. P.C. 1.
Appeal by special leave lies to the Supreme Court from an order of
the High Court, rejecting a revision petition against an order of the
trial Court, giving its consent to withdrawal of the prosecution.75

2. In this appeal, the Supreme Court can interfere only if there has
been a grave miscarriage of justice, upon a wrong application of the
law, and the Supreme Court will not go into the evidence recorded
or other materials collected by the investigating officer. 75

3. The Supreme Court would interfere where the consent of the trial
Court was improperly granted, e.g.
(i) Where the trial Court does not give its reasons for granting
consent. 75

(ii) Where the trial Court has given its consent without being
satisfied on the materials placed before it that the grant of it
subserves the administration of justice and that the
permission was not being sought covertly with an ulterior
purpose unconnected with the vindication of the law or the
ends of justice. 76

(iii) The trial Court performs a supervisory functioning in granting

consent and its duty is not to reappreciate the grounds which
led the Public Prosecutor to request with-drawal but only to
consider

(a) Whether the Public Prosecutor applied his mind as a free

agent;”

(b)Whether the Public Prosecutor acted upon ulterior or

extraneous considerations unconnected with the ends of
public justice, which however would include appropriate
social, economic and political purposes.”

4. On the other hand, the Supreme Court shall not interfere merely
because the trial Court, in granting the withdrawal, has not made a
fresh appraisal of the evidence and come to its own conclusion on
the question whether there is a triable issue to be investigated by
the Court;75 nor go into the evidence and materials for the purpose
of finding out whether the conclusions of the Public Prosecutor were
right or wrong, provided that P.P. has applied his mind and his
opinion is not perverse. 75

5. It cannot be said that the Public Prosecutor’s action is illegal

merely because he received some instruction from the Government,
because the P.P. cannot act without any instruction from the
Government, which is its client.75 It becomes illegal only if he
applies for withdrawal solely on the basis of such instruction,
 without exercising his independent judgment, as a limb of the Court,
for the administration of justice. 75

Appeal against interlocutory order. 1. Since the jurisdiction under

Art. 136 is discretionary, the Supreme Court may decline to
interfere with an interlocutory order of the High Court, even though
it was without jurisdiction (e.g., entertaining a second revision which
was not maintainable”), provided the order was just, having been
based on a recent decision of the Supreme Court. It may refuse to
interfere on the ground of delay and change in circumstances.”

2. But in exceptional circumstances, it may interfere even with an

interlocutory order, e.g.,) To quash an investigation, a complaint or
other pending proceeding, where the facts alleged in the complaint,
even if they are accepted at their face value, do not make out an
offence with which the accused is charged; or the order is so
manifestly perverse, grossly erroneous or palpably unjust, that the
Supreme Court must interfere, in the interest of justice.”

(iii) To modify an order for bail where an excessive cash security was
demanded from a poor man. 83

(iv) To cancel an order granting bail where, by a preponderance of

probabilities, it is clear that the accused is interfering with the
course of justice by tampering with witnesses or that there is a
reasonable apprehension that he will interfere with the course of
justice. 4

(v) To cancel an order granting anticipatory bail to a person accused of

a serious charge, e.g. murder, where the order gives no reason or is
founded on irrelevant considerations.85

(vi) To set aside an order appointing a Special Officer to inquire into the
circumstances of a mysterious death, while investigation still
pending, and without hearing the State Government or its Officers.
Such order may be made by the Court only after being satisfied that
investigation by the Police has not been proper or adequate.
 But the Court may not interfere where the criminal case itself has
been quashed and the Special Officer has already submitted his
report.

(vii) To set aside High Court order cancelling bail granted by the Sessions
Court, where the High Court’s approach was contrary to principles
governing cancellation of bail.

Appeal against order of anticipatory bail. The Court must be

circumspect in granting anticipatory bail as it intrudes into the
sphere of investigation of crime. Hence though the Supreme Court
would not ordinarily interfere with the discretion of the lower Court
in granting or refusing bail, it would interfere where anticipatory bail
has been granted on irrelevant considerations, such as the status or
influence of the person accused of the offence of murder. 85

Practice and Procedure. 1. The Supreme Court would not allow a

new point

(which was not taken or not pressed before the High Court) to be
raised before it, or which was sought to be introduced by filing
additional grounds to the Special Leave Petition, unless it is a
question of pure law.” E.g..

(i) Whether in a case triable by a Court of Session, the Public

Prosecutor can apply for withdrawal at the committal state, or
ximica

(ii) Question of interpretation of a statute.

(iii) Question of jurisdiction, except where, had the question been

raised before the High Court, it could have resorted to an
alternative jurisdiction. (iv) The bar to sentence of death
imposed by s. 6 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958.952.
For the same reason, the Supreme Court would not allow the
appellant to challenge a finding of fact which he did not
challenge before the High Court; or a question of fact which
needs fresh investigation.”
(iv)
(v) 3. Questions which, if admitted, would necessitate a retrial,
e.g., that the examination of the accused under s. 342 was
inadequate or misjoinder of charges,” cannot be raised for the
first time, before the Supreme Court in an appeal on special
leave. Nor would the Court admit a new plea if it would
require further evidence,” e.g., that no sanction of the
Government had been obtained for lodging complaint under s.
198B100 of the Cr. P.C., 1898; or under any other law, not
going to the root of the case.
(vi)
(vii) 4. But-
(viii)
(ix) (a) If a point of fact which plainly arises on the record, or a
point of law which is relevant and material and can be argued
without any further evidence being taken, was urged before
the trial Court and after it was rejected by it was not repeated
before the High Court, it may, in a proper case, be permissible
to the appellants to ask this Court to consider that point in an
appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution; after all in criminal
proceedings of this character where sentences of death are
imposed on the appellants, it may not be appropriate to
refuse to consider relevant and material pleas of fact and law
only on the ground that they were not urged before the High
Court.2
(x)
(xi) (b) If it is shown that the pleas were actually urged before the
High Court and had not been considered by it, then, of course,
the party is entitled as a matter of right to obtain a decision
on those pleas from this Court.2
(xii)
(xiii) © The Court may entertain a plea as to the age of the
accused, having regard to the Children Act and the Directive
under Art. 39(f).
(xiv)
(xv) (d) But even otherwise, no hard and fast rule can be laid down
prohibiting such pleas being raised in appeals under Art.
136.2
(xvi)
(xvii) 5. In an appeal under Art. 136, the respondent cannot, without
filing a cross-objection, attempt to support the judgment on
grounds which have been found against him.
(xviii)
(xix) The accused was convicted under s. 307, L.P.C. and convicted
to 10 years’ imprisonment. The accused appealed to the High
Court against conviction and the person injured filed revision
application for enhancing the sentence. The High Court
dismissed the appeal as the conviction was not challenged,
but reduced the sentence to imprisonment for the period
already undergone by the accused (1 year and 8 months).
There was no appeal to the Supreme Court against the
reduction of sentence, by the State. But the injured person
appealed by special leave against the dismissal of his revision
application for enhancing the sentence. Held, since the
judgment of conviction had become final, the Supreme Court
could not enhance the sentence on the appeal from the order
in the revision application of the injured even though the
Supreme Court was satisfied that the sentence passed by the
High Court was extremely lenient, and that the order under s.
428, Cr. P.C., 1898, was untenable.
6. Where special leave was granted only on a limited
question, the Court would not allow any other point to be
raised, unless there are good grounds for reviewing the order
of special leave.

7. The Appellant would not be permitted to raise a new plea

which would involve a complete departure from the grounds
of appeal taken in the Special leave petition.”

Appeal against summary dismissal of appeal. Though the High

Court has the power, under Cr. P.C. (s. 384 of the new Code of
1973), to summarily dismiss an appeal, the High Court should
not exercise this power without giving reasons, where there
are arguable points.

Remand. The Supreme Court would be slow to order a remand

in a criminal appeal, but may have to do it where the record
does not contain all the material evidence.
Abatement. Though a criminal appeal would ordinarily abate
on the death of the accused, it may be permitted to be
continued by the legal representative of the accused where
the sentence is one of fine. This exception would apply even
where the sentence was composite (i.e. fine with
imprisonment) and in such appeal by the legal representative,
the Supreme Court may set aside the conviction as a whole.
10

Where the sentence is one of imprisonment or death,

provision against abatement has now been made by s. 394,
Cr. P.C., 1973.

Power to arrest and send to prison the accused-respondent in

appeal against order of acquittal, while granting special leave.
Under s. 390 of the Cr. P.C., of 1973 (old Code: s. 427), the
High Court has power to compel attendance of the accused
pending appeal, by issuing a warrant of arrest and may send
him to prison or grant bail. It has been held that Art. 142, read
with Art. 136, gives similar power to the Supreme Court, while
granting special leave for appeal against an order of
acquittal.”

F. Principles relating to appeal by special leave from decisions

of tribunals.

(A)1. The general principle to be remembered in this context

is that the Supreme Court would not disturb the decisions
of specially constituted authorities or tribunals, as if it were
an appeal Court, and would not review findings of fact
except where they are perverse or shocking to the judicial
conscience or the like. 12-13

Thus, a liberal exercise of the power under Art. 136 to

interfere with decisions of Industrial

Tribunals may materially affect the fundamental basis of such

decisions, namely, a quick solution to such disputes to
achieve industrial peace.” The Court would not, therefore,
ordinarily interfere with the award of an Industrial Tribunal, in
the absence of substantial injustice. 15

2. The Supreme Court will not allow an appeal from the

decision of a quasi-judicial tribunal in the exercise of its
extraordinary powers under Art. 136, on any of the following
grounds:

(i) Where the determination of the tribunal has not been

affected materially by an alleged wrong interpretation of
any award. Similarly, an award which is within the
jurisdiction of the tribunal and based on relevant facts
cannot be challenged on abstract questions of law,” as
in the case of an arbitration tribunal dealing with
commercial matters, 18

(ii) That the tribunal has come to an alleged wrong

decision, having the jurisdiction to come to that
decision, 17

(iii) That the award of the tribunal is based on no evidence,

when this ground was not urged in the application for
special leave. At any rate, when the evidence that was
shut out relates to an isolated point which in the opinion
of the Tribunal had no bearing on the issue before them,
there is no sufficient ground for interference by the
Supreme Court, 12

(iv) That the award has been signed by only two members
of the Tribunal though it originally consisted of three
persons and the entire hearing had taken place before
the three persons, when the statute provided that it was
not obligatory upon the Government to fill the vacancy
when one of the members ‘ceases to be available’ at
any time during the proceedings. 12

(v) Where in a proceeding under the Bar Councils Act, the

High Court agreed with the Bar Council that the
 appellant was guilty of professional misconduct, the
Supreme Court would not re-examine on the merits this
concurrent finding of fact. 19

(vi) Where the question of jurisdiction is not a pure question

of law, but is mingled with a question of facts, a party
cannot be allowed to raise it for the first time in an
appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of a
Labour Appellate Tribunal. 20

(vii) Where the question involved has to be determined on

empirical considerations as distinguished from objective
data.21

(viii) Where the matter has become stale.22

(B)On the other hand, the Supreme Court has granted special
leave to appeal from decisions of tribunals, on the following
grounds

(i) Where the decision of the Tribunal was without

jurisdiction, or in excess of its jurisdiction, e.g.,

(a) Where an Election Tribunal allowed a material

amendment beyond the time limited in s. 81
of the Representation of the People Act, 1951,
for presenting an election petition.”

(b)Where the Railway Rates Tribunal entered into

the reasonableness of terminal charges levied
according to the provisions of the Railways
Act

© Where an award was passed beyond the time originally

fixed by the Government and the ex post facto extension of
time by Government was ultra vires. (d) Where, after
recording a finding that the impugned transfer order was quite
valid, theTribunal directed the Government to pay the
Petitioner arrears of emoluments for the period he was out of
office owing to his refusal to comply with the transfer order.
26

(ii) Where it ostensibly failed to exercise a patent

jurisdiction;” or did not perform its duty under the
law, or declined to exercise its jurisdiction upon an
erroneous view of the law. 29

(iii) Where the Tribunal misdirected itself upon a

material question and proceeded upon a
speculative view of things, 30

(iv) Where a Tribunal acted in violation of the

principles of natural justice, 31-32

e.g.,

(a) Where an Income-tax Tribunal, in making an

assessment, acted not on any material but on
pure guess and suspicion, did not disclose to
the assessee what information had been
supplied to it by the Department, did not give
to the assessee any opportunity to rebut the
material furnished to the Tribunal by the
Department, declined to take all the material
that the assessee wanted to produce in
support of his case.”

(b)Where a Sales Tax Officer, disbelieving the

returns filed by the assessee, makes an
assessment on any figure of gross turnover
without giving any basis to justify the
adoption of that figure.
 (v) Where the order of the Tribunal was vitiated by an
error of law, 35 apparent on the face of the
record. 36

Interference with decisions of Administrative Tribunal under

the Act of 1985. The Supreme Court would interfere with the
decision of an administrative tribunal in disciplinary matters.”

(a) If it seeks to exercise appellate jurisdiction

over the findings of the Inquiry Officer or
Competent Authority which are not arbitrary
or perverse, or violative of natural justice. The
Tribunal cannot interfere if the conclusion is
based on evidence, even though some of it is
found to be irrelevant or extraneous to the
matter. 37

(b)Nor can the Tribunal interfere with the

discretion of the authority as regards the
penalty to be imposed except where it is mala
fide." If there has been an inquiry consistent
with the Rules and the principles of natural
justice, what punishment for the proved
misconduct would meet the ends of justice is
a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of
the competent authority.” The Tribunal has no
jurisdiction either to enhance or to reduce the
penalty imposed by the competent authority.”

Exhaustion of alternative remedies, how far a ground of

refusal. 1. The Supreme Court generally does not entertain
appeals against orders passed by a Tribunal unless the
alternative remedies provided by the relevant statute by way
of appeal or revision have been pursued by the aggrieved2.
The Supreme Court would not entertain an appeal under Art.
136 direct from the decision of a Tribunal, while the effect
thereof would be to bypass the High Court from whose
decision the appellant has preferred not to appeal, e.g.,40
 (a) Where the High Court has refused to direct the
Tribunal to state a case and the person aggrieved
goes to the Supreme Court against the order of the
Tribunal without appealing against the order of
refusal by the High Court.

(b)The position would be the same where the High

Court gives its decision on a case stated by the
Tribunal or on revision and the assessee does not
appeal against that decision of the High Court. 40

3. This, however, is not a rule of exclusion of jurisdiction and

where questions of law of importance have been raised, and
those questions have otherwise been brought before it, the
Court may hear the appeal on such questions, even though
the statutory remedies have not been exhausted.44

4. This may be allowed where special circumstances” exist,

which cannot be corrected by the procedure of a case stated
on a question of law, e.g., 45.

(a) A breach of the principles of natural justice by the

tribunal.”

(b)Other remedies have been barred, for no fault of the

appellant.5

© Where the statutory revisional or appellate authority would

have felt bound by a decision of the High Court; ie., the
alternative remedy would have been futile.”

(c) Where the inferior tribunal surrendered its authority and

judgment to its administrative superior.46

Interference with a finding of fact. 1. When hearing appeals

under Art. 136, the Supreme Court does not sit as a Court of
further appeal” on facts, and does not interfere with findings
given by Tribunals on the ground that they are erroneous, or
based on a mis-appreciation of evidence unless

(a) They are perverse” or based on surmises and conjectures,

not supported by any evidence on record, 50-53

(b)They are based partly upon admissible and partly upon

inadmissible evidence. 50

© They are based upon a view of the facts which cannot be

reasonably entertained or in other words, the conclusions are
such that no tribunal of reasonable and unbiased men and
properly instructed as to the relevant law could have
reached.50

(c) Where the finding is arbitrary or is arrived at in violation of

the principles of natural justice, 55€ Where the Tribunal has
spoken in two voices and given inconsistent and conflicting
findings, of di ballon
(d)
(e) (f) Where the finding is not based on any legal evidence
and is wholly inconsistent with the material on the
record;57 or is based on conjectures. 58
(f)
(g)(g) Where the finding of fact is based on a consideration of
material which is irrelevant to the inquiry, or partly on
relevant and partly on irrelevant material and it is
impossible to say to what extent the mind of the Court was
affected by the irrelevant material, 58-59
(h)
(i) (h) Where the approach of the tribunal to the question is
erroneous.
(j)
(k) (i) Where, in spite of a remand, the Tribunal has failed to
make a definite finding on the point referred to.60
(l)
(m) Beyond this, the Supreme Court will not enter into
the soundness of the findings made by such a tribunal,
e.g., as to the reasonableness or fairness of the Standing
 Orders certified by the Certifying Officer under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946;62
whether particular staff are employees of a company for
the purpose of claiming bonus.63
(n)
(o) 2. Similarly, in the case of an Industrial Tribunal, the Court
has refused to interfere with findings of fact on the
following points, inter alia, dara
(p)
(q)(a) Whether certain employees were ‘workmen’ 64
(r)
(s) (b) Whether the workmen were guilty of go-slow tactics.64
(t)
(u)3. In general, the Court refuses to disturb concurrent
finding of fact, founded on appreciation of oral evidence.
65
(v)
(w) 4. In the absence of such extraordinary
circumstances as mentioned above, the Supreme Court will
not, in an appeal under Art. 136, examine the evidence
recorded by the Tribunal. 66
(x)
(y) 5. Nor will the Supreme Court entertain additional
evidence, in such appeal, to controvert findings of fact by
the Tribunal. 67 Interference with discretion. Where a
Tribunal has exercised its discretionary
(z)
(aa) Power after a consideration of all the relevant facts,
the Supreme Court would not
(bb)
(cc) Interfere, 66-69 except where the Tribunal has
contravened any principles of natural justice
(dd)
(ee) Or any important principle of law, or applied wrong
[Link] relating to disposal of appeal by special
leave against decision of a Tribunal. 1. In general, the
Supreme Court would apply the same principles at the
stage of disposal as at the stage of granting special leave,
namely, that though the power under Art. 136 is of the
widest amplitude, the Supreme Court would interfere only
 in exceptional cases, e.g., violation of the principles of
natural justice or because the appeal raises an important
principle of law which requires a final decision by the
Supreme Court. 73
(ff)
(gg) 2. On the other hand, the Supreme Court would
interfere where the Tribunal
(hh)
(ii) (i) has failed to consider the relevant evidence in the
case:74
(jj)
(kk) (ii) has no jurisdiction in the matter. 75
(ll)
(mm) Instances where the Supreme Court has interfered
with the decisions of Industrial Tribunals. A. The Supreme
Court has, on special leave, set aside the orders of
Industrial Tribunals on the following grounds, inter alia:
(nn)
(oo) I. Where the order of the Tribunal was without
jurisdiction.
(pp)
(qq) An Industrial Tribunal’s jurisdiction in respect of a
domestic inquiry resulting in disciplinary action against a
workman is limited, so that the award of such Tribunal
becomes without jurisdiction if it interferes in any case not
warranted by any of the conditions of its jurisdiction.
(rr)
(ss) Its duty, in short, is to ensure that the inquiry has
been fairly conducted. It can, accordingly, interfere with
the order of the management made after domestic inquiry
only
(tt)
(uu) (a) Where it is actuated by mala fides. 77-78
(vv)
(ww) But there is no mala fides merely because
(xx)
(yy) (i) The employer has refused to stay the domestic
inquiry because a criminal proceeding on the same charge
was pending before Court, though, in general stay was
desirable.
(zz)
(aaa) (ii) The conclusion of the inquiry officer is erroneous.
80
(bbb)
(ccc) (iii) The employer proceeded with the inquiry in spite
of the fact that a criminal case was pending.
(ddd)
(eee) Blad
(fff)
(ggg) (b) Where it constitute an act of victimisation or
unfair labour practice, 77-8
(hhh)
(iii) © Where the workman has been penalised without
holding any inquiry at all,” on the charges levelled against
him.
(jjj)
(kkk) (d) Where the inquiry was not conducted in
accordance with the principles of natural justice, e.g.,
(lll)
(mmm) Where the workman was not afforded reasonable
opportunity
(nnn)
(ooo) (i) To meet the charge,” e.g., because the proper
charge has not been served upon
(ppp)
(qqq) Him;” or he has not been informed in time of the
date fixed for inquiry so that the workman may prepare
himself for defence.
(rrr)
(sss) (ii) To lead evidence. 79But, in the absence of any
statutory power in this behalf, the Inquiry Officer at a
domestic inquiry has neither the power nor the duty to
summon any witnesses. It is for the parties to bring their
respective witnesses, and if, for no fault of his, the
workman fails to bring his witnesses, the Inquiry Officer
should offer him reasonable time and adjournments to
produce the witnesses. But the workman has no right to
ask for as many adjournments as he likes. 79
(ttt)
(uuu) (iii) To rebut the evidence led by the employer, e.g.,
(vvv)
(www) (a) Where the witnesses were not examined in the
presence of the employee and copies of the depositions
were not supplied nor read over before cross-examination
of such witnesses by the employee. At such domestic
inquiry, all the witnesses relied upon by the management
should, in the absence of compelling circumstances, be
examined in the presence of the workman charged. 84-85
(xxx)
(yyy) (b) Where the Inquiry Officer relied upon information
received from a document or otherwise, without notice to
the employee; or relied upon the inconsistency between a
statement of the employee and another document, without
giving the employee a chance to explain the inconsistency;
or relied upon the evidence recorded in an inquiry held
against another employee which employee charged had no
opportunity to cross-examine.
(zzz)
(aaaa) There is no prejudice, however, where the Tribunal,
after the close of the hearing. Merely sends for an
authenticated record to see whether the employee was the
secretary of the Union or not. 84
(bbbb)
(cccc) II. Where the award is made on violation of the
principles of natural justice causing substantial and grave
injustice to parties, 85-86
(dddd)
(eeee) (i) The onus being upon the management to
establish the guilt of the workman, the employer should
take steps first to lead evidence against the workman
charged, the workman should then be given an opportunity
of cross-examining those witnesses and to offer his
explanation, if any, against the evidence led against him.
The inquiry is, accordingly, vitiated where the employee is
closely cross-examined even before any evidence is led
against him.”
(ffff)
(gggg) (ii) Where the inquiry officer is actuated by personal
bias. 85
(hhhh)
(iiii) In the case of a domestic inquiry, special individual
bias is required to vitiate the proceeding. For, in the nature
of things, the inquiry by the private employer must be held
by its own officer or lawyer, and such persons cannot be
held disqualified to hold the inquiry merely because they
receive remuneration from the employer, if the inquiry has
been otherwise fairly conducted.87
(jjjj)
(kkkk) But the inquiry would be vitiated if it is held by an
officer who claims to have personal knowledge of the
alleged misconduct of the employee.83 tr
(llll)
(mmmm) € Where the finding of the Inquiry Officer is
perverse:5-89 e.g., -
(nnnn)
(oooo) (i) Where it is based on no evidence at all:89-90 or
(pppp)
(qqqq) (ii) Where on the materials on the record, the finding
is completely baseless.
(rrrr)
(ssss) The Inquiry Officer must record his finding with
reasons for the same, in his report.”(f) Where the finding of
the Inquiry Officer or the order of the management is ultra
vires, e.g.,
(tttt)
(uuuu) Where the employee has been found guilty on a
charge which is not a ‘misconduct’ according to the
relevant standing orders.”
(vvvv)
(wwww) III. Where the award of the Tribunal is arbitrary. The
Supreme Court would interfere
(xxxx)
(yyyy) (a) Where the award (say, directing payment of
bonus) is made on an arbitrary basis, 90-93 contrary to
settled principles.”
(zzzz)
(aaaaa) (b) Where the labour was not given proper
opportunity to test the correctness of the materials relied
upon by the management in determining the surplus for
the purposes of bonus.95
(bbbbb)
(ccccc) IV. The Tribunal’s award would also be liable to be
quashed where it is ultra vires, e.g.,
(ddddd)
(eeeee) (i) Where the Tribunal directed the payment of costs
of a party in advance by the other party, irrespective of the
final result of the proceeding such order not being
warranted by s. 11(7) of the Industrial Disputes Act.%
(fffff)
(ggggg) (ii) Where the dispute which was referred to the
Tribunal was not an ‘industrial dispute’ within the meaning
of the Industrial Dispute Act. 97-98
(hhhhh)
(iiiii) (iii) Where the Tribunal made an award on a matter
not included in the reference.98
(jjjjj)
(kkkkk) (iv) Where compensation was awarded under s.
25E(iii) to workmen of a ‘separate establishment’ 99
(lllll)
(mmmmm) 2. But the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal
is not confined to adjudicating industrial disputes strictly
according to law, in the same manner as courts. It has the
power to impose conditions and obligations upon the
employer to secure social justice and industrial peace, 100
provided, of course, they are not ultra vires the statute
which confers jurisdiction upon it.
(nnnnn)
(ooooo) V. Where the order of the Tribunal is vitiated by an
error apparent on the face of the record, e.g., as to the
interpretation of the agreement between the parties.
(ppppp)
(qqqqq) VI. Where the award raises an important principle of
industrial law requiring elucidation and final decision by the
Court. 2-3
(rrrrr)
(sssss) B. Speaking generally, an appeal by special leave
against an award is not intended to be an appeal on every
ground of fact and of law unless the Court considers it fit to
examine the matter from any special angle. Before a party
can claim redress, it must show that the award is defective
 by reason of an excess of jurisdiction or of a substantial
error in applying the law or some settled principle or of
some gross and palpable error occasioning substantial
injustice.C. If, however, the preceding conditions are
fulfilled, the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in dealing with
awards of Industrial Tribunals is wider than that of the High
Court under Art. 2265 and can be exercised even against
an interim award.
(ttttt)
(uuuuu) Tribunal’s jurisdiction to take additional evidence. I.
1. The whole issue as
(vvvvv)
(wwwww) To the dismissal of a workman is at large before
the Industrial Tribunal, and the Tribunal has the jurisdiction
to determine the question of validity of the order of
dismissal independently, in the following cases
(xxxxx)
(yyyyy) (i) Where there has been no inquiry at all;”
(zzzzz)
(aaaaaa)(ii) Where the domestic inquiry has not been fairly
conducted or a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges
has been denied to the employee;”
(bbbbbb)
(cccccc) (iii) Where the findings of the Inquiry Officer are
found by the Tribunal to be perverse; or not supported by
any evidence.7*
(dddddd)
(eeeeee)2. In all such cases the employer is entitled to
support the dismissal on the merits by leading additional
evidence before the Tribunal and the Tribunal should deal
with the question after giving the employee an opportunity
to meet that evidence.”
(ffffff)
(gggggg) 3. But if the inquiry has been fairly conducted
or the employee has been afforded reasonable opportunity
to lead evidence, the Tribunal cannot admit fresh evidence
on behalf of the employee simply because some of his
witnesses chose not to appear at the domestic inquiry.”
(hhhhhh)
(iiiiii) 4. Though in the foregoing cases, the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal to go into the merits or to take additional
evidence depends upon its finding that a proper inquiry
has not been made or the employee has not been given
proper opportunity or that the finding of the Inquiry Officer
is perverse, it does not mean that the Tribunal shall have
no jurisdiction to receive evidence until this question is
decided as a preliminary issue or that the employer would
be debarred from adducing additional evidence unless he
concedes that there has been no proper inquiry. Where the
employer seeks to adduce additional evidence, the Tribunal
should receive such evidence as on an alternative plea,
and then decide the preliminary issue and the merits,
successively, after such evidence has been recorded."
(jjjjjj)
(kkkkkk) II. Where, on a question of fact, the finding of the
Tribunal is not clear or unambiguous.10
(llllll)
(mmmmmm) Though the Supreme Court would not enter
into a question of fact where the determination of the
inferior tribunal is clear, the Court would itself enter into
the evidence to come to a finding where the Tribunal’s
finding is not clear or definite.10
(nnnnnn)
(oooooo)Instances where the Supreme Court has refused to
interfere with the decisions of the Industrial Tribunal. (8)
The court has refused to interfere with the decision of an
Industrial Tribunal on the ground that
(pppppp)
(qqqqqq) The employee was not a ‘workman’ as defined
by s. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, holding this
to be a question of fact.”(b) On matters which are
committed by the statute to the consideration of the
Industrial Tribunals, e.g., the provision with respect to leave
in an award, 12 the Supreme Court would not interfere
unless it appears that the impugned determination of the
Tribunal cannot be sustained on any reasonable ground or
that they mark a violent departure from the prevalent
practice or trend. 13
(rrrrrr)
(ssssss) © An award which is within the jurisdiction of the
tribunal and based on relevant facts cannot be challenged
on abstract questions of law, as in the case of an
arbitration tribunal dealing with commercial matters. 14
(tttttt)
(uuuuuu) (d) Where the High Court refused, under Art.
226 of the Constitution, to interfere with the proceedings
before the tribunal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
because the reference did not relate to an ‘industrial
dispute’, and the party did not appeal from that decision of
the High Court, the Supreme Court would not, in appeal
under Art. 136 against the award of the Tribunal, entertain
the plea that it was without jurisdiction, on the same
ground. 15
(vvvvvv)
(wwwwww) Some instances where the Supreme Court has
interfered with the decisions of the Income-Tax appellate
Tribunal. 1. The Supreme Court has interfered under Art.
136 with the decision of the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal
where –
(xxxxxx)
(yyyyyy) (i) The Tribunal made an assessment against the
principles of natural justice, on pure guess and
suspicion.16
(zzzzzz)
(aaaaaaa) (ii) The decision of the Tribunal is not supported
by any evidence whatever or shows that the tribunal did
not apply its mind to the evidence on the record. 16-17
(bbbbbbb)
(ccccccc) 2. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
refused to interfere, under Art. 136
(ddddddd)
(eeeeeee) (a) Where the appellant moved the High Court
under s. 66(2) of the Income-Tax Act, and after the decision
of the High Court dismissing the application had become
final, appealed to the Supreme Court under Art. 136
against the order of the Income-Tax Appellate Tribunal, on
the same grounds as were taken before the High Court.”
(fffffff)
(ggggggg) (b) Where there are no special circumstances
and the question raised could have been raised under the
statutory procedure.”
(hhhhhhh)
(iiiiiii) Appeal against Customs Authorities. Though
ordinarily the Supreme Court would not interfere with the
determinations of Customs Authorities which rest on their
special competence, 20 the Court may interfere with a
classification made by them where it is grossly erroneous
or based on irrelevant factors or where commercial words
used in a fiscal statute are interpreted in a technical
sense.22
(jjjjjjj)
(kkkkkkk) Remand. 1. Where the Supreme Court directs a
Tribunal to give its finding on a question but the Tribunal
disposes of that matter without answering that question,

The Court would remand the matter to the Tribunal again for
giving its finding on the question. 23

2. The Supreme Court may send a case to the Tribunal on

remand where it had failed to apply its mind to a material
circumstance which had been brought to its notice.

Appeal to Supreme Court under statutory provisions. 1.

Appeal lay to the Supreme Court from a judgment of the High
Court delivered on a reference under s. 66 of the Income-Tax
Act, 1922, on the certificate of the High Court issued under s.
66A(2) of that Act, 25

2. This jurisdiction being statutory, neither the High Court nor

the Supreme Court can express opinion on any question other
than that referred to the High Court. 26-27

But
The Supreme Court may question the competency of
reference under s. 66(2) of the Income-Tax Act even where the
High Court itself has directed the Tribunal to state a case.

3. The foregoing principle extends to the Supreme Court

hearing appeal from decisions of the High Court under similar
statutory jurisdiction, e.g., under the Sales Tax Act That Court
is to answer the question with reference to the law as it stood
at the date of the disputed transaction, but the Court is not
precluded from applying a new law where it has superseded
the old law with retrospective effect.

4. Where the High Court has not considered the evidence, the
Supreme Court would normally remand the case for disposal;
but if the reference has been pending for a long time and the
assessee’s entire property has been attached In enforcement
of the order or assessment, the Supreme Court may hear and
decide the reference on the merits,”

5. There are certain statutes which confer a right of appeal to

the Supreme Court from the decision of a tribunal other than
the High Court, e.g., from an order of the Disciplinary
Committee of a Bar Council, under s. 38 of the Advocates. Act.
1961.3

6. Even where the appeal to the Supreme Court is of right,

under a statutory provision, still the Supreme Court would not
entertain an appeal for reassessment of evidence. It can
interfere only if it is established that the judgment under
appeal is wrong. E.g., the conclusion of the High Court on the
probabilities, and not where the conclusion of the High Court
depends upon the credibility of witnesses,”
 Appeal under S. 116A of the R.P. Act. 1. Appeal lies to the
Supreme Court from the decision of a High Court on an
election petition, under s. 116A of the R.P. Act.

2. In this appeal, the Supreme Court exercises its civil

jurisdiction as in cases of civil appeal where special leave to
appeal has been granted. Thus,(i) Though ordinarily, the
Supreme Court will not interfere with a finding of fact, it would
do so where the finding is perverse or has been made under a
wrong approach, or important and crucial material have been
overlooked or wrongly appreciated in arriving at the finding,
causing injustice to the party, 34-35

(iii) The principle of res judicata has been applied.36 Earlier orders
passed in the same proceedings which have become final cannot be
challenged, unless shown to be nullity. 37

(iv) The provisions of O. 9 and O. 17 of the C.P. Code are applicable.37

Appeal under Art. 136 from decision of High Court under

statutory jurisdiction. 1. When the High Court exercises a
jurisdiction vested in it by statute, it does so as a Court, so
that appeal under Art. 136 lies to the Supreme Court, 38 e.g.,
as Arbitrator under s. 19(1) of the Defence of India Act,
1939,38

2. In such cases, the Supreme Court can exercise only those

powers which the Court or tribunal below should exercise. 39

3. Though ordinarily the Supreme Court would not interfere

with inter-locutory orders, it may do so where the impact of
such order is similar to that of a ‘final order’, 40
Practice and Procedure. 1. A ground which was not raised
before the

Tribunal nor taken in the petition for special leave to appeal

will not be permitted to be raised in the appeal, e.g., a
question of mala fides, particularly when it involves a question
of principle which had not been considered by the Court in
any case before, 44

2. Where an order granting special leave limits it to certain

points, rejecting others, the appellant would not be allowed to
reopen that order to agitate the rejected grounds, on any
account. 45

3. The Court may allow a party to support the award of an

Industrial Tribunal on grounds other than those relied upon by
the Tribunal, on the basis of materials on the record, but not of
materials not already on the record. 46

4. A new case cannot be allowed to be set up on facts which

have not been admitted or established, and need
investigation.”

5. Nevertheless, where the point could have been urged

before the High Courtunder Art. 22649 or 227,50 the Supreme
Court would not permit the appellant to raise it for the first
time before it;50 nor to assail an undertaking given by him in
the High Court.5

6. An application for Special Leave may be summarily rejected

where the Court is satisfied that no substantial injustice has
been done. 52
7. Even after a hearing on the merits, the Court, if satisfied
that there has been no failure of justice, may dismiss the
appeal without deciding the question of absence of
jurisdiction of the original Court or tribunal where that
question has been considered by a higher tribunal from which
the appeal has come to the Supreme Court.52

8. In an appeal by special leave, it is not necessary to deal

with all the submissions made by the counsel.”

9. Under O. 13, r. 2 of the Supreme Court Rules, special leave

under Art. 136 would not be granted unless the appellant first
moved the high Court for a certificate under Art. 132. But the
Supreme Court may exempt an appellant from this
requirement. In proper cases. 55

10. Where the statute law has been changed with

retrospective effect since the transaction in dispute took place
but that change was not or could not be brought to the notice
of the Tribunal, the Supreme Court will apply that amended
provision, 56-57

11. But

(a) A new point may be entertained if it is a question of pure

law, e.g., that of construction of a statute. 58

(b)A question of jurisdiction, not depending upon facts to be

investigated, can be allowed to be raised at any stage. 50
Nature of order under Art. 136. 1. Since the jurisdiction under
Art. 136 is extraordinary and discretionary and the Supreme
Court, under this jurisdiction is not a regular Court of appeal,
the Supreme Court may not either dismiss or allow the
appeal. Even though a court of appeal would have passed
such order upon the findings arrived at, but may make any
order which, according to the Court would do justice to both
parties or would otherwise be conducive to meet the ends of
justice. 59

2. Thus,

(i) In an appeal from order of dismissal from Government

service, the Supreme Court may reduce the punishment
from dismissal to compulsory retirement, in order to
enable a poor man to earn pension for his livelihood,
even where he had no case in law.(ii) In a proceeding for
eviction of a tenant from a premises, the Court may
take account of a change in the landlord’s requirements,
brought about by a change in the state of affairs during
pendency of the proceedings till the hearing before the
High Court, except where an order has become final and
raise a vested right.
(ii)
(iii) (iii) Where, owing to a long unexplained delay on the
part of the Petitioner in seeking legal relief, there would
be a chaos in the service if the petitioner was given the
promotion, he was otherwise entitled to, the Supreme
Court granted him monetary compensation for his loss
instead of disturbing the intervening promotions. Even
after quashing an order of termination or reinstatment,
the Court may award compensation. Payment of
compensation has also been directed where an
application for extension of service of an Air Force
employee had been rejected upon a ground
subsequently found to be untenable.”
(iv)
(v) (iv) Even when the Court is unable to give relief owing
to a change in the circumstances, the Court may lay
down guidelines for future action by the Government or
other administrative authority, 67
(vi)
(vii) (v) While allowing an appeal, holding the assessee
respondent liable to pay additional excise duty, the
Court may, in view of the long lapse of time, hardship to
the assessee and other circumstances, direct the
assessee to pay the additional duty prospectively,
absolving him from liability for the years already
passed.
(viii)
(ix) Expunction of adverse remarks. Apart from the merits of
an appeal, the Supreme Court would expunge
derogatory remarks, or aspersions made in a High Court
judgment against a party or lawyer, which are not
absolutely necessary for the decision of the case before
the Court, 69-70 and, that, without giving him an
opportunity of explaining his conduct.
(x)
(xi) 137. Subject to the provisions of any law made by
Parliament or any rules made under article 145, the
Supreme Court shall have power to review any
judgment pronounced or made by it.
(xii)
(xiii) Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court.
(xiv)
(xv) Grounds of review. The Supreme Court Rules, made
under Art. 145(1)€, provide as follows
(xvi)
(xvii) The C.P. Code, e.g., error apparent on the face of the
record 71-72 1. In civil cases, review lies on any of the
grounds specified in O. 47, r. 1 of
(xviii)
(xix) On the other hand, the following are no grounds for
review-
(xx)
(xxi) (i) The fact that other parties have agreed to be
governed by the decision in the judgment under review
is no ground for review 71
(xxii)
(xxiii) (ii) That the views pronounced by the judges or any of
them during the arguments were different from the
judgment as delivered. 73
(xxiv)
(xxv) Pradin