2/17/25, 9:16 PM G.R. No.

175241

Today is Monday, February 17, 2025

Constitution Statutes Executive Issuances Judicial Issuances Other Issuances Jurisprudence International Legal Resources AUSL Exclusive

Republic of the Philippines

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 175241 February 24, 2010

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H.
HARRY L. ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA, Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines1 (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the
June 28, 2006 Decision2 and the October 26, 2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then mayor of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a
venue other than the one applied for by the IBP.

On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of
the City Mayor of Manila a letter application4 for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006
from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral
organizations.

Respondent issued a permit5 dated June 16, 2006 allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated
therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on June 21, 2006 before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 94949.6 The petition having been unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this
Court on June 22, 2006 a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the appellate court’s
inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.7

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the
petition for being moot and academic, denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.

The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo
Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding
thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.

The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action,8 docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against Cadiz
for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge Cadiz
filed a Counter-Affidavit of August 3, 2006.

In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition
became moot and lacked merit. The appellate court also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration by the
second assailed issuance.

Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his Comment of November
18, 2008 which merited petitioners’ Reply of October 2, 2009.

The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBP’s rally permit
does not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

[Link] 1/5
2/17/25, 9:16 PM G.R. No. 175241
Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their
constitutional right to freedom of expression and public assembly.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.

Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on June 21, 2006 became moot upon the passing of the date
of the rally on June 22, 2006.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events,
so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases where supervening events had made the cases
moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question
otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.9

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms of
an intended rally are altered by the concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing
the application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of
recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.

Respecting petitioners’ argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to
the criminal case against Cadiz, the Court finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.

Under the Rules,10 the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in a
criminal action. Since suspension of the proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not
at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,11 the latter cannot take cognizance of a claim of
prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the
criminal action,12 the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in
the criminal action, and not before this Court in an appeal from the civil action.

In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent because the Public Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the denial or modification of the permit and merely
mandates that the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The appellate
court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of
public assembly which are not absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Miranda’s
designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit.

The Court finds for petitioners.

Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is
clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.

(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from
the date the application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason
the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall
be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.

(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the
denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.

(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within twenty-four hours.

(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his
permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of law.

(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the
appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal
shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be
immediately executory.
[Link] 2/5
2/17/25, 9:16 PM G.R. No. 175241
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing.
Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence,
to the next in rank.

(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied)

In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,13 the Court reiterated:

x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of
matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited,
much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice
Malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements
the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and
of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition
the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case,
therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the
effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise of this
right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public
interest.14 (emphasis supplied)

The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling
in Reyes v. Bagatsing.15 In juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the
Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:

x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or
to its grant but at another public place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether
favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have
recourse to the proper judicial authority.16 (italics and underscoring supplied)

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the
IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit,
since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit. 1avvphi1

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear
and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic
appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still
the assumption – especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place – is that the permit must
be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place."17 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and
caprice for respondent to just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place.
It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific
statutory

provision, not to have modified the permit "in terms satisfactory to the applicant."18

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are
REVERSED. The Court DECLARES that respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the rally
permit issued on June 16, 2006 insofar as it altered the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda.

SO ORDERED.
[Link] 3/5