TEAM CODE :

108

THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

AT THE PEACE PALACE,

THE HAGUE, NETHERLANDS

2ND AMITY INTERNATIONAL MOOT COURT, COMPETITION,

2024
MEMORIAL FOR DEFENDANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ICJ International court of justice

UN United Nations
UN Charter United Nations charter
ICSFT International Center for scholars and
Future Technologies
CEDR Centre for Effective Dispute resolution
PCIJ Permanent court of International justice
Art Article
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human
rights
DRTD Declaration on the Right to Development
PROP preposition
LOAC Law of Armed Conflict
IHL International humanitarian law
ILC International law commission
ICC International criminal court
US United States of America
ADR Alternative dispute resolution
URSS United Republic state of sover
URA United Region of Anreeca
JAN Joint Action Nations
ILO International labour organisation
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
UNSC United Nations security Council
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the
former YUGOSLAVIA
DPH Direct Participation in Hostillities
NMT Nuremberg Military Tribunal

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Books
Dugard J, International Law: a South African 2
Perspective 468 (4th ed 2011).
Brownlie, General Course on Public 10
International Law, 255 RDC 9, 199 (1995).

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D. Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant 11

Legal Concepts, (E. Wilmshurts (ed), Oxford
University
2012) (1478).
Elizabeth Wilmshurts, Principles of International 11
Law and the Use of Force by States in Self-
Defense, 9 (2005).
Theodora Christodoulidou & Kalliopi Chainoglou, 13
The Principle of Proportionality in Self-Defence and
Humanitarian Intervention, 20 JILPAC 79 (2007).

GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED 15, 16

CONFLICT, 254, (2010).

Articles
Oliver Lissitzyn, The International Court of 2
Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance of
International Peace and Security, New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
234 (1951).
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 15
Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I:
OUP, 3, (2005).
Cases referred to ICJ
Legal Consequences for states of the Continued 2, 6
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 1970 1971 ICJ Reports 16.
Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO 2
upon Complaints made against UNESCO 1956 ICJ
Reports.
Status of Eastern Carelia PCIJ Reports Series B 2
No. 5 (1923)
Reservations to the Convention on the 2
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide 1951 ICJ Reports.
Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 2
17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter) 1962 ICJ
Reports
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, 2, 5
Hungary and Romania 1950 ICJ Reports
Admission of a State to the United Nations 3,7
(Charter, Article 4) case 1948 ICJ Reports
The Interpretation of Agreement of 25 March 3
1951 between the WHO and Egypt case 1980
ICJ Reports
Judith Gail Gardam, “Proportionality and Force 17
in International Law,” 87–3 AJIL (July 1993),
391.
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 3, 5
Weapons ICJ Reports 1996.
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and 4
Morocco PCIJ Reports Series B No. 4 (1922).
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a 5
Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004

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ICJ Reports
Legal Consequences of the Separation of the 6
Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965
2019 ICJ Reports
Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ Reports 5, 6
Accordance with International Law of the 5
Unilateral Declaration of Independence in
Respect of Kosovo 2010 ICJ Reports.
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 7
Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. (June 27).
Armed Activities on The Territory of The Congo 9
(Democratic Republic of The Congo v. Uganda)
2005 I.C.J. 222, ¶ 146 (19 December).
Gabéíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 12
Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 40, ¶51 (25 Sep
Congo v. Uganda, ICJ GL No 116 (Official Case No) 18
[2005] ICJ Rep 168
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 ICJ Reports. 18
Articles
Cecilia Yue Wu, Challenging Paternalistic
Interference: The Case for Non-Intervention in a
Globalized World,65 HILJ, (2024).
Online Articles
D. J. Llewelyn Davies, Domestic Jurisdiction: A 4
Limitation on International Law Transactions of the
Grotius Society, vol. 32, 60-67, (1946 ), JSTOR
http://www.jstor.org/stable/743188. Accessed 11 April
2024.

Martin Achimugu, A Surface Study of the

International Principle of non-intervention, UNILAG
LAW REVIEW, (Apr. 12, 2024, 10:04 A.M., A
SURFACE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION – Unilag
Law Review.
Cases of other Court
William Madbury v. James Madison, Secretary of
State of the United States, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Pursuant to Article 65 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice read with Article
96(1) of the Charter of United Nations, the United Nations Secretary General hereby submits

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to this Court to render advisory opinion apropos the present dispute between the state of
ROOS and URAINE.

The International Court of Justice, being the principal advisory body of the United Nations, is
hereby requested to render its opinion on the present dispute with regard to its advisory
jurisdiction in accordance with the rules and principles of International Law, including any
applicable treaties.

Article 65 of Statute of International Court of Justice

1. The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal question at the request of
whatever body may be authorised by or in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations to make such a request.

2. Questions upon which the advisory opinion of the Court is asked shall be laid before
the Court by means of a written request containing an exact statement of the question
upon which an opinion is required, and accompanied by all documents likely to throw
light upon the question.

Read with Article 96(1) of the Charter of United Nations

1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of
Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

-Parties-

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URAINE [hereinafter referred to as “Applicant”] was one of the region formed after split of
United Republic State of Sover (URSS). Consequent to the split, the applicant opted to form
an independent country and became the 3rd largest nuclear weapon state in the world. On
pursuance of United Region of Anreeca (URA) and ROOS, applicant entered into a treaty to
destroy all its nuclear weapons based on certain conditions. Consequently, the applicant
entered into an agreement with both ROOS and URA in 1994. Many regions of applicant
state were culturally associated with ROOS.

ROOS [hereinafter referred to as “Defendant”] was the largest region of former United
Republic State of Sover (URSS). After the split of URSS, the defendant state became an
independent state with communist model of governance and a presidential form of
government. The defendant state shared borders with the applicant state.

-Ensuing Events-

Prior to split of URSS, there was continuous tussle between United Region of Anreeca
(URA) and URSS to become the super power of the world. In subsequent years, both
defendant and URA strategically fostered their strength and the applicant on the other hand
suffered severe economic hardships. An alliance of countries termed as “Joint Action
Nations” was formed by URA. This alliance was based on the terms that if any foreign state
targets any member state then all other member states will co-jointly act against the foreign
state.

In March 2012, the defendant caught 9 people in its territory who were allegedly planning to
create civil unrest in the state. After investigation, it was admitted by the applicant state that
the people caught were ex-army men of their state. In May 2013, the defendant state
witnessed a civil unrest against the government. A minister of the defendant state, along with
some police personnels was killed in mob lynching. As per the reports of intelligence agency,
URA has indirectly supported the civil unrest caused in the state by way of providing arsenal
aids. The defendant has formally charged URA for commission of military unrest.

Meanwhile, the Government of the applicant state changed. The new government favoured
the native Urainians and was against the tribes who were ethnically associated with the
defendant state. The policies made by the authority in power evidently supported the rights of
native Urainians while neglecting the rights and demands of the tribal groups and termed
them as “Pro-Roos” groups. This lead to civil protest in an island city called “KREMA”. The
major inhabitants of the island were allegedly “Pro-Roos” tribal groups and they protested

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against the atrocities caused by the present government. They alleged the terrors of holocaust
against them by the government forces.

As a response to the alleged terrors and governmental atrocities, the inhabitant of KREMA
largely comprising of tribal groups, claimed right of self-determination. They formed an
interim government and held a referendum whereby the tribal groups voted to become a part
of the defendant state in order to secure their interest. The interim government proposed their
request to the defendant state. The defendant state accepted the proposal to protect the
inhabitant from indiscriminate behaviour of the applicant state.

The applicant approached UN against this arbitrary action of defendant. The UN, by way of
passing a resolution declined to recognise the interim government. This action of annexing a
part of sovereign state was condemned by UN along with URA, the referendum was declared
as void and consequently the annexation of KREMA by defendant was also held void.

In 2022, the applicant declared the intention of becoming a part of JAN. The president of
URA and the heads of other member nations issued a public statement of considering the
applicant’s proposal. The defendant state objected on this development on the ground of
possible threat to its border security and internal peace, which might be effect by alliance of
URA with the applicant state by way of joining JAN. The defendant asserted that the
applicant is the natural ally of its state since they have shared cultures, economic interests and
historical past.

The defendant, further asserted to react in its self-defence and interest of nation in case of
mischievous operation by the applicant in connivance with URA and JAN group. However, in
February 2023, an official meeting was proposed to be conducted for considering applicant to
make a part of JAN on 23rd July, 2023. This created a state of panic in the defendant state,
since JAN members headed by URA are capable of disturbing border security and effecting
the economy of defendant.

In response to this panic state, the defendant launched military action against the applicant in
self-defence and to protect the interest of its citizens. The action by defendant was alleged to
secure the peace in the applicant state by way of protecting the neglected minority from the
government atrocities. The defendant also alleged that the government of the applicant state
has been formed fraudulently.

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The applicant also gave strong reply of the defendant’s military action. This lead to loss of
lives and property on both sides. URA condemned the actions of the defendant and approved
to provide military support to the applicant.

Both applicant and defendant are the member states of UN. The defendant state is the
permanent member of UN. The applicant raised the dispute before the United nations General
Assembly and sought relief on Humanitarian grounds. UN took notice of the matter on 1st
July.

The United Nations Secretary General raised the matter before International Court of Justice
by filing a written request and sought its advisory opinion on the concerned issue.

ISSUES PRESENTED

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ISSUE I: Whether the request made by United Nations Secretary General for an
advisory opinion fulfil the requirements for the International Court of Justice to
exercise jurisdiction?

ISSUE II: Whether the sovereignty of the State of URAINE has been violated by
ROOS?

ISSUE III: Whether ROOS has violated International Law?

ISSUE IV: Whether the actions of ROOS make it liable to provide any sort of relief on
humanitarian grounds to Uraine?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE I: Whether the request made by United Nations Secretary General for an
advisory opinion fulfil the requirements for the International Court of Justice to
exercise jurisdiction?

It is humbly submitted that ICJ have jurisdiction to render advisory opinion in the present
matter. The questions are legal in nature, issue is not domestic in nature, the question is not of
political nature, the questions are not of contentious form, and the questions are not abstract
in nature.

ISSUE II: Whether the sovereignty of the State of URAINE has been violated by
ROOS?

The military operations carried out by ROOS in URANIAN territory along with its support to
pro-ROOS groups and unlawful annexation of KREMA is a complete violation of URAINE’s
sovereignty. The actions of ROOS have violated the UN Charter as well the principle of non-
intervention.

ISSUE III: Whether ROOS has violated International Law?

The air strikes carried out by ROOS in the URANIAN territory is violative of international
Law, as ROOS has not exercised a valid right of self-defence. Its actions have grossly
violated its treaty obligations including the UN Charter, and the International Humanitarian
Law.

ISSUE IV: Whether the actionns of ROOS make it liable to provide any sort of relief to
URAINE on humanitarian grounds?

It is humbly submitted that the actions of ROOS make it liable to provide relief to URAINE
on humanitarian grounds. The applicant would be establishing it on the following grounds,
ROOS violated territorial integrity of URAINE, ROOS is bound to provide economic
reparations to URAINE, ROOS is bound to provide humanitarian support to URAINE, and
security guarantee should be provided to URAINE.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE I: ICJ has jurisdiction in the present dispute.

[¶1.] The advisory function of ICJ specifically elucidates the interconnectedness

between United Nations and the Court. Article 65, paragraph 1 of ICJ Statute gives
discretionary power to the Court to render an advisory opinion on the legal questions,
upon the request emanated from an organ authorised to make such request under UN
Charter.1 Article 96, paragraph 1 of UN Charter authorises General Assembly to
request advisory opinion from the Court on any legal question. 2 They have an original
right to request advisory opinion. The connected reading of the articles provides the
general understanding that General Assembly can request the Court to render advice
on any question concerning legal issue. Further, Article 36, paragraph 1 of ICJ Statute
provides that the jurisdiction of Court includes all matters provided for in the UN
Charter.3 Its paragraph 6 authorises the Court to settle any dispute relating to its
jurisdiction.4
[¶2.] It is humbly submitted that ICJ have jurisdiction to render advisory opinion in
the present matter. The applicant would be establishing its case on the following
grounds: First, the questions are legal in nature; Second the issue is not domestic in
nature; Third, the question is not of political nature; Fourth the questions are not of
contentious form, Fifth, the questions are not abstract in nature.
[¶3.]

A. The questions referred to the court by the United Nations Secretary General are
legal questions

[¶4.] Any question which involves a legal element falls under the Jurisdiction of
ICJ. Article 36, paragraph 2 of ICJ Statute mentions that all legal disputes ranging
from interpretation of a treaty to identifying the obligations to which a state is bound
by the international laws, fall under the jurisdiction of ICJ. 5 “Legal Question” has
been attempted to be defined by scholars as any question capable of being answered
1
ICJ Statue, art. 65.
2
UN Charter, art. 96.
3
ICJ Statute, art. 36, par. 1.
4
ICJ Statute, art. 36, par. 6.
5
ICJ Statute, art. 36, par. 2.

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by judicial techniques within existing framework of law. 6 The question referred to the
Court by the General Assembly revolves around the identification of the obligations to
which the State of ROOS is bound under international laws. The questions submitted
here are required to be answered with reference to the international law,
notwithstanding the fact that while answering these questions certain political or
factual questions has to be dealt by the Court.
[¶5.] The advisory Jurisdiction of the Court stretches to the extent of deciding a
legal matter upto which the question answered does not decide a dispute between the
States.7 The advisory opinion in the present case has the sole purpose to assist the
United Nations regarding the manner in which it could assure the establishment of
international peace and security. The purpose of request made here by United Nations
Secretary General to the Court is not to settle the dispute between URAINE and
ROOS, instead it is concerned with dealing a legal question regarding compliance of
the international obligations by ROOS. United Nations, being a political organ with
the duty of maintaining peace and security, is concerned with its own function in the
present case.
[¶6.] In the case of Namibia8, the court affirmed its advisory jurisdiction after
observing that the state raising objection regarding competency of the Court was a
member of the United Nations and the matter raised was a legal issue concerning the
function of UN. In ILO Administrative Tribunal Case9, wherein the matter concerning
advisory jurisdiction has not been raised by the parties, still the Court before
rendering advisory opinion affirmed its jurisdiction rationae materiae since the
question raised was legal in nature. In the present case both ROOS and URAINE are
members of the United Nations. ROOS is even a permanent member of the UN since
when it came into existence in 1945. The Court has reiterated the view that unless a
compelling reason could be established10, the request for an advisory opinion should

6
Oliver Lissitzyn, The International Court of Justice: Its Role in the Maintenance of International Peace and
Security, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 234 (1951).
7
Dugard J, International Law: a South African Perspective 468 (4th ed 2011).
8
Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 1970 1971 ICJ Reports 16 pp. 23-24.
9
Judgement of the Administrative Tribunal of the ILO upon Complaints made against UNESCO 1956 ICJ
Reports.
10
Status of Eastern Carelia PCIJ Reports Series B No. 5 (1923) p. 7.

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not be refused.11 In absence of the compelling reasons the Court has legal duty to
comply with the requests.12
[¶7.] In several cases13, the Court has opined and affirmed its jurisdiction wherein
the wordings of the question posed are abstract in nature and does not confine to what
constitutes as “truly legal” in nature and appear infelicitous in nature at first glance.
[¶8.] The question set forth by the UNSG is clearly a legal question as it requests
the Court’s opinion on the violation of legal obligations and ultimately the legal
consequences of the actions of the state of ROOS by referring to the relevant
principles under international law including the Fourth Geneva Convention 14, IHL,
IHRL and relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council. The
question of law, the source of law and the facts leading to the application of law are
clear in the present case, consequently, there are no compelling reasons to not render
the advisory opinion.15

B. The question referred to the Court does not qualify as a Domestic Matter

[¶9.] Article 2, paragraph 7 of UN Charter refrains United Nations from intervening

in domestic matters of the state.16 In the Peace Treaties Case17, the question posed
was, whether before delivering any advisory opinion it is important to consider that
UN is barred from intervening in such matter under Article 2, paragraph 7. The court
asserted that any opinion rendered in order to provide aid to the international
organisation is exercise of its obligations is justiciable and within the jurisdiction of
ICJ. The object of the request in the present case is to provide assistance to UN
concerning the obligations of ROOS under the international laws and is not aimed at
resolving the controversy between the two states.
[¶10.] The request made by the United Nations Secretary General seeking advisory
opinion of ICJ in the present case falls under the obligation of UN as adopted under

11
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1951 ICJ Reports
p. 19; Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter) 1962 ICJ Reports p.
155; Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 1950 ICJ Reports 65 p. 71-1.
12
Supra Note 8.
13
Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4) case 1948 ICJ Reports p. 61; The Interpretation
of Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt case 1980 ICJ Reports, p. 88.
14
Geneva Convention Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
UNITS 3.
15
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996.
16
UN Charter, art. 2, par. 7.
17
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 1950 ICJ Reports 65 p. 72.

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Article 55 of UN Charter.18 The words used under Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN

Charter expressly refrains the organisation from intervening in the matters which are
“essentially” within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. Once there is existence of a
threat to the peace, or breach of peace or security or act of aggression then the dispute
does not “essentially” lie within the domestic jurisdiction of the state. 19 International
organisation being the upholder of international peace and security is required to
intervene in such dispute, further, submitting such matter to ICJ for rendering
advisory opinion lies within its function. Rendering advisory opinion on such a
dispute wherein action of the state party is impairing international peace and security
lie within the jurisdiction of ICJ.
[¶11.] The state of ROOS grossly violated the fundamental principles of UN Charter
including respecting the sovereignty of other member nations, suppressing the acts of
aggression, fostering human rights and refraining the use of force against territorial
integrity of other members.20 The gross violation of primary principles of UN Charter
excludes the matter from being under domestic jurisdiction of any state. The question
that whether a matter solely belong to domestic jurisdiction is a relative question 21 and
depends upon its approach and extent. The present issue is neither narrow nor
restricted in its approach to be confined to domestic jurisdiction of the states.

C. The questions referred to the Court is not of a political nature

[¶12.] The term political question is a legal term which refrains the Court from
exercising its Jurisdiction.22 It is submitted by the applicant that the present questions
before the Court is not fundamentally political in nature. The Court while interpreting
the nature of the issue does not consider the motive behind the request 23, instead it is
concerned with the judicial task involved in the issue 24. The Court here is involved in
dealing with the question of international law 25 which falls within its exercise of
normal powers. The question raised in the present case involves the application of the

18
According to Article 55 of UN Charter.
19
D. J. Llewelyn Davies, Domestic Jurisdiction: A Limitation on International Law Transactions of the Grotius
Society, vol. 32, 60-67, (1946 ), JSTOR http://www.jstor.org/stable/743188. Accessed 11 April 2024.
20
UN Charter, art. 1 and art. 2.
21
Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco PCIJ Reports Series B No. 4 (1922).
22
William Madbury v. James Madison, Secretary of State of the United States, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
23
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations ICJ Reports 1948 p. 61.
24
Ibid p. 61.
25
ICJ Statute, art. 36

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relevant principles and rules of international law and apply them for identifying the
liability of the state of ROOS.
[¶13.] The Court in the advisory opinion in Nuclear Weapons Case26 observed that
any question which raises problem of international law is a question of legal nature.
The mere fact that the legal question has political aspects intertwined with it, does not
suffice to deprive the Court of its competence to deal with the issue as expressly
provided by ICJ Statue, similar view was held by the Court in the Construction of a
Wall27 case. In the case of Western Sahara28 that neither the political nature of motive
which might be the genesis of the request nor the political impact which the advisory
opinion would ultimately render is of relevance while establishing the jurisdiction of
the Court.
[¶14.] According to the Statue of ICJ, there is a fundamental structural
interrelationship between the Court and the United Nations. The Court is the primary
dispute settlement organ of the United Nations and thus, it is obliged to respond to the
legal elements of the question even though there are political aspects of the questions,
this was opined by the Court in its advisory opinion in the Kosovo Case.29 The
advisory opinion sought in the present case invites the court to answer an essential
legal question regarding the application of international laws by way of interpreting
them and thus, by rendering the opinion the Court would discharge its judicial task.

D. The question referred to the Court is not of contentious nature between two states

[¶15.] The advisory proceedings of the Court are different from its contentious
proceedings. The Court derives its advisory jurisdiction from Article 65 of the ICJ
Statute and Article 96 of the UN Charter. Rendering advisory opinion represents the
participation of ICJ in the activities of United Nations by way of providing it legal
opinion rather than deciding a bilateral or contentious matter between the two states. 30
[¶16.] The states could not prevent the Court from rendering an advisory opinion to
the United Nations. The final determination of the usefulness of the opinion is left on
the requesting organ which is the General Assembly in the present case. In the Peace

26
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ICJ Reports 1996 p. 226.
27
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory 2004 ICJ Reports p.
162 par. 58.
28
Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ Reports 12.
29
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo ICJ
Reports 2010 p. 403.
30
Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ Reports p. 12 pp. 32.

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Treaties Case31 the Court ruled that the states could not form an impediment in order
to seek advisory opinion which would be desirable by the United Nations to obtain
enlightenment as to the action it should take against the violation of international
obligations by its member state.
[¶17.] In the present issue the Court is not asked to pronounce on the merits of the
dispute between the applicant and the defendant. The mere reason that in the process
of rendering advice the Court might pronounce on legal questions upon which the
states would be having divergent views does not result into converting the matter as
contentious.32 The advisory opinion rendered by the Court would not effect the legal
position of the states it would merely be of assistance to UN in exercising its
jurisdiction.
[¶18.] Every State being a sovereign authority is free to choose the means of
settlement of dispute. The mechanism to be chosen by the parties depends on the prior
consent of the parties to the dispute. This is referred to as principle of consent. This
principle is enshrined both in UN Charter and ICJ Statute and in the resolutions
adopted by the General Assembly,33 however, consent of the interest State has no
bearing in the advisory Jurisdiction.34
[¶19.] In Construction Wall Case35 similar arguments were raised before the Court.
The state of Israel professed that since the subject matter raised by the General
Assembly is an integral matter between the states thus, the Court has no jurisdiction to
render an advisory opinion. The Court opined that mere lack of consent to the Court’s
contentious Jurisdiction does not establish that it has no jurisdiction under advisory
proceedings.
[¶20.] The advisory opinion sought by the UN is located in a broader frame of
reference than a bilateral dispute between the states. 36 The mere presence of
differences of views between the states in the legal interpretation of the issues does
not render the subject matter of the question to be political.

31
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania 1950 ICJ Reports 65 p. 72.
32
Legal Consequences for states of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 1970 1971 ICJ Reports 16
33
General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), “Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.”
34
Supra Note 30.
35
Supra Note 29
36
Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 2019 ICJ Reports.

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E. The nature of the question posed is not abstract

[¶21.] Article 65 of the UN Charter provides that the question asked for rendering
opinion must be “exact” in nature.37 This criterion provided under Article 65 must be
sufficed in order to limit the vagueness of question posed. Abstract nature of the
question is not limited to the criterion of being vague. The abstract nature of the
question posed revolves around the remote question which could not be seen
evidently. The court has opined to refrain from going too deep or having a far-flung
approach while exercising its advisory function.38
[¶22.] The questions asked for rendering advisory opinion in the present case is not
abstract in nature. There is a presence of concreteness in the questions as is desirable
by the court for exercising its advisory jurisdiction. 39 The Court has affirmed in its
almost every advisory opinion that the court can give advice on any legal question,
abstract or otherwise. Since the question posed in the present case is concrete in
nature thus, it is submitted by the applicant that the Court should render the advisory
opinion in the present matter.

ISSUE II: ROOS has violated URAINE’s sovereignty.

It is humbly submitted that the actions of ROOS has violated URAINE’s sovereignty. The
applicant would be establishing its case on the following grounds: First, ROOS violated
treaty obligations; Second ROOS violated principle of non-intervention.

A. ROOS Violated Treaty Obligations

[¶23.] URAINE is a sovereign nation formed after split of URSS in 20 th century. It is

humbly submitted that ROOS has violated URAINE’s sovereignty for the following
reasons:
[¶24.] Violation of the U.N. Charter- Art. 2(1) recognizes the sovereign equality of
all members.40 Furthermore, the member states are under the obligation resolve their
disputes peacefully.41 Further, Art. 2(7) precludes member states from interfering in

37
UN Charter, art. 65.
38
Supra Note 33, p. 85.
39
Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Article 4) case 1948 ICJ Reports.
40
U.N. Charter, art. 2(1).
41
U.N. Charter, art. 2(3).

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the domestic matters of other states.42 These Articles, read with Art. 2(4) 43 form the
basis of state sovereignty and territorial integrity of nation states. Thus, Art. 2 puts an
obligation on member states to respect the sovereignty of other members and to
resolve the disputes occurring therein, through peaceful means.
[¶25.] It is humbly submitted, that the annexation of KREMA by ROOS is in
violation of the UN Charter.44 ROOS acted unlawfully by not only interfering in
URAINE’s domestic matters but also by not resorting to peaceful means. 45
Furthermore, the force employed by ROOS against URAINE is direct violation of Art.
2(4) of the Charter.46
[¶26.] Breach of the Helsinki Final Act - The Helsinki Final Act of 1975, signed by
both URAINE (then part of URSS) and ROOS (then the URSS), affirms the principle
of sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of states. 47 ROOS’s
military intervention in URAINE48, including support for separatist movements and
armed groups49, constitutes a breach of its obligations under the Helsinki Final Act.
By interfering in URAINE's internal affairs and undermining its territorial integrity,
ROOS has violated the principles of sovereignty enshrined in this treaty.

[¶27.] Violation of the Budapest Memorandum – The Budapest Memorandum was

signed by URAINE, ROOS, UK and URA in 1994. 50 By virtue of this memorandum,
URAINE was provided security assurances in exchange of its voluntary
relinquishment of nuclear arms.

[¶28.] Furthermore, ROOS, under this agreement pledged to respect URAINE’s

independence, sovereignty and the existing borders decided in accordance with the
UN Charter.51 It is humbly submitted that the actions of ROOS, namely, a. military
intervention in URAINE; b. annexation of KREMA; and, c. support for separatist
movements and interference in URAINE’s political system, constitute a breach of
URAINE’s sovereignty.

42
U.N. Charter, art. 2(7).
43
U.N. Charter, art. 2(4).
44
Moot Prop, ¶13.
45
Moot Prop, ¶20.
46
Supra note, 46.
47
Helsinki Final Act, 1 Aug., (1975).
48
Moot Prop, ¶19.
49
Moot prop, ¶12.
50
Moot prop, ¶6.
51
Ibid.

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MEMORIAL FOR DEFENDANT

[¶29.] Violation of Minsk Agreements – The Minsk Agreements, negotiated in 2014

and 2015, aimed to de-escalate the conflict in eastern URAINE and uphold URAINE's
sovereignty and territorial integrity. ROOS, as a signatory to the Minsk Agreements
and a party to the conflict in eastern URAINE, has failed to fulfill its obligations to
respect URAINE's sovereignty and withdraw its support for separatist forces. By
continuing to interfere in URAINE's internal affairs and fueling the conflict in eastern
URAINE, ROOS has violated the spirit and letter of the Minsk Agreements, thereby
undermining URAINE's sovereignty.

B. ROOS violated Principle of Non-intervention

[¶30.] Principle of Non-intervention – The principle of non-intervention is a well-

established doctrine of customary international law, which prohibits states from
“coercively interfering” in the domestic affairs of other states. 52 This principle is
based on the concept of universal respect for a state’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity which forms the base for relations between states and their rights and
obligations.53

[¶31.] The Friendly Relations Declaration54 vocalizes the principle of non-

intervention and states that no State has the right to intervene, or interfere in the
external or internal affairs of a state, “directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever”.
Therefore, any form of intervention including use of force, violates the International
Law.55 Furthermore, Art.4156 of the Vienna Convention too recognizes this principle.

[¶32.] This Court, has recognized the principle in the case of Nicaragua57 where it
held that “the principle forbids all States or groups of States to intervene directly or
indirectly in the internal or external affairs of other States.”58 The principle was

52
Cecilia Yue Wu, Challenging Paternalistic Interference: The Case for Non-Intervention in a Globalized
World,65 HILJ, (2024).
53
Martin Achimugu, A Surface Study of the International Principle of non-intervention, UNILAG LAW
REVIEW, (Apr. 12, 2024, 10:04 A.M., A SURFACE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
NON-INTERVENTION – Unilag Law Review.
54
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States,
UN.G.A. (25th sess.:1970).
55
General Assembly: A/RES/2625(XXV), 1970
56
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.41, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
57
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Merits) (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. (June 27).
58
Ibid.

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further reaffirmed in Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda 59, whereby it was held
that Uganda violated DRC’s sovereignty by actively extending military, logistic and
other aids to irregular forces operating on DRC’s territory.60
[¶33.] In the instant case, ROOS intervened by supplying arms to tribal groups of
KREMA61, recognized KREMA’s referendum and unlawfully annexed the territory,
and use unlawful force against the URANIAN territory. Thus, ROOS has grossly
violated URAINE’s sovereignty.

[¶34.] ISSUE III: ROOS has violated International Law.

[¶35.] It is humbly submitted that the actions of ROOS has violated International
law. The applicant would be establishing its case on the following grounds: First,
ROOS violated territorial integrity of URAINE; Second ROOS is bound to provide
economic reparations to URAINE; Third, ROOS is bound to provide humanitarian
support to URAINE; Fourth, security guarantee.

A. Treaty Obligations

i. ROOS has violated the U.N. Charter and its ‘use of force’, does not amount to
valid exercise of self-defence.

[¶36.] It is contended that the actions of ROOS are violative of the U.N. Charter.
Article 2(4) of the Charter prohibits such use of force that is inconsistent with the
purpose of the U.N., set out in Article 1. 62 It reads as:“ All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations.”63

59
Armed Activities on The Territory of The Congo (Democratic Republic of The Congo v. Uganda) 2005 I.C.J.
222, ¶ 146 (19 December).
60
Supra note, 56.
61
Moot Prop, ¶12.
62
U.N. Charter, art.1.
63
U.N. Charter, art.2(4).

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[¶37.] The drafters of the Charter inserted the words ‘territorial integrity or political
independence’, especially to safeguard the rights of small states. 64 In the instant case,
this becomes significant since URAINE is comparatively much smaller than ROOS.65
The Applicant humbly submits that the strikes launched by the Air Force of ROOS in
URAINE’s territory is a prima facie violation of the Charter’s provisions.66
Furthermore, the action is not justified for the following reasons:

a. The Air Strikes constitute ‘Aggression’ under International Law.

[¶38.] As per the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, “the first use of armed
forces by a state in contravention of the charter shall constitute a prima facie
evidence of an aggression.”67 Further, when a state does not conduct in a manner as to
rightfully assert the right of self-defence, the state is prohibited from invading the
territorial integrity or political independence of the other state.68
[¶39.] It is humbly submitted that ROOS’s air strikes on URAINE’s territory
constitute an act of aggression as; wrongful force was used against URAINE, 69 the
attack was a clear violation of the peremptory jus cogens norm of non-intervention.
The military action, launched in various cities 70 of URAINE led to the death of many
soldiers and civilians.71 Therefore, the force was of sufficient gravity and character to
constitute an ‘armed attack’ under International Law.72

b. The military action of ROOS was not a valid exercise of its right to self-defence.

[¶40.] In order to invoke self-defense, a state needs to meet the following

requirements, namely: firstly, that it suffered armed attacks of sufficient gravity,
secondly, the attacks must have been perpetrated by another state, and, lastly, that the

64
Brownlie, General Course on Public International Law, 255 RDC 9, 199 (1995).
65
Moot Prop, ¶4.
66
Moot prop, ¶19.
67
G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974).
68
U.N. Charter, art.2(4).
69
Moot Prop, ¶19.
70
Ibid.
71
Moot Prop, ¶20.
72
D. Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts, (E. Wilmshurts (ed), Oxford University
2012) (1478).

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exercise of self-defense must confirm to the principles of proportionality and

necessity.73
[¶41.] First- Absence of an armed attack-Article 51 of the U.N. Charter grants an
inherent right of self-defense, in case of occurrence of an ‘armed attack’ against a
Member of the United Nations.74 In order to constitute ‘an armed attack’, the State
must send armed bands, groups etc. which carry out armed operations and use force
equivalent to an actual armed attack.75 Further, the attack must be of sufficient gravity,
in order to be classified as an ‘armed attack’.
[¶42.] In the instant case, no ‘armed attack’ occurred so as to cause threat to the
territorial integrity of ROOS. In the absence of essential ingredients, the use of force
by ROOS can’t be considered as a valid exercise of right to self-defense.
[¶43.] Furthermore, Article 21 of the ILC, precludes the wrongfulness of an act of a
State if it is used in self-defense in conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations.76 The military action by ROOS on the territory of URAINE 77, constitutes a
wrongful act and is not precluded since it is not in conformity with the Charter of the
United Nations.

[¶44.] Second- URAINE did not perpetrate an armed attack-The exercise of self-
defense as claimed by ROOS is based on the grounds of securing its borders. 78 It is
humbly submitted that URAINE neither perpetrated an armed attack nor caused any
imminent threat against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of ROOS. Therefore,
the military action by ROOS is unjustified and unlawful.

[¶45.] Third- ROOS did not adhere to the principle of proportionality and
necessity.

Necessity- As per article 25 of ILC, necessity may be invoked by States only in those
situations where the imminent threat can only be prevented by exercise of the
wrongful act.79 It is exceptional in the sense that its not dependent on the prior
conduct of the state.80 It can be invoked only when there is no other option than to

73
Elizabeth Wilmshurts, Principles of International Law and the Use of Force by States in Self-Defense, 9 (2005).
74
U.N. Charter, art.51.
75
Supra note 75.
76
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 21, (2001) .
77
Moot Prop, ¶20.
78
Moot prop, ¶19.
79
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 25, (2001), (A/56/10).
80
Ibid.

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defy international obligations in order to safeguard essential interest of the state.

Further, it needs to meet “certain strictly defined conditions that must be cumulatively
satisfied”.81

[¶46.] The Caroline test sets out the requirements of necessity and proportionality in
self-defense. According to this test, necessity exists when the situation is instant,
overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of deliberation while
proportionality means that a State must use the force strictly confined to defensive
purposes.82 ROOS, without prior efforts to resolve the issue peacefully through UN
Security Council, attacked UARINE in a devastating manner, leaving civilians dead.
As ROOS’s attack was neither necessary nor proportionate, self-defense is unjustified.
[¶47.] In the instant case, the doctrine of necessity cannot be invoked by ROOS, as
no conditions qualifying as a threat to its essential interest are met. It carried out
military action on the pretext of URAINE planning to join ‘JAN’. 83 This in no way
meets the necessary conditions.
[¶48.] Proportionality- As per the Caroline test, the use of force by a State must be
strictly confined to defensive purposes.84 Furthermore, the force used must be
proportionate to the threat or danger. In the instant case, these requirements are not
met, as the force used by ROOS was confined to defensive purposes, nor
proportionate to the threat. Further, there existed no threat or danger to the territory of
ROOS in toto.
[¶49.] Furthermore, Article 51 of the Charter, requires states to immediately report to
the Security Council,85 regarding the use of force. This requirement allows the council
to determine whether or not the use of force was justified. 86 In the Armed Activities
case, this court has held that the failure to notify Security Council makes the
justification of use of force unreliable.87 Therefore, the absence of an imminent threat,

81
Gabéíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 40, ¶51 (25 Sep); Legal Consequences of
the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 2004 ICJ Advisory Opinion ¶140 (9 July).
82
Caroline Case, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1841), 1137-1138 (28 May 2019),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/br-1842d.asp; Theodora Christodoulidou & Kalliopi Chainoglou, The
Principle of Proportionality in Self-Defence and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 JILPAC 79 (2007).
83
Moot Para, ¶17.
84
Supra note, 85.
85
U.N. Charter, art. 51.
86
Ibid.
87
Armed Activities on The Territory of The Congo (Democratic Republic of The Congo v.
Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 145 (19 December).

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armed attack and further failure to report to the Security Council, makes ROOS’s
claims unreliable and its actions unjustifiable.

ii. ROOS has violated the UDHR.

[¶50.] UDHR enlists basic human rights available to everyone by virtue of being a
human. ROOS through its military operations has violated the following provisions:

Art.3 – The military intervention by ROOS resulted in loss of many civilian lives, and
destruction of various cities, thereby violating right to life.88
Art.25 – ROOS’s military action and the destruction caused thereby has deprived the
civilians of UKRAINE from an adequate standard of living.89

iii. ROOS has violated the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

[¶51.] Under the memorandum signed by URA, URAINE, and ROOS 90, ROOS was
under the obligation to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing
borders of URAINE.91 Further, the signatories were under the obligation to refrain
from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
URAINE.92 Thus, ROOS by virtue of its military operation has violated the said
obligations.

[¶52.] ROOS has violated the Vienna Convention

Contravening the objectives, ROOS has violated the following provisions of the
Vienna Convention:
Art.13 – This article entails consent to be bound by a treaty. 93 ROOS consented to be
bound by the treaties signed with URAINE, however it broke the very consent given
by it.
Art. 18 – This provision creates an obligation on states to not defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty entered into by them. 94 However, ROOS through its actions has
defeated the very objective of the treaties.

88
Universal Declaration on Human Rights art. 3, Dec. 10, 1948.
89
Universal Declaration on Human Rights art. 25, Dec. 10, 1948.
90
Moot Prop, ¶6.
91
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art.1, (1994).
92
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art.2, (1994).
93
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.13, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
94
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

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Art. 26 – Pacta Sunt Servanda, is a principle of the customary international law.

Enshrined in this provision, the principle creates an obligation on states to be bound
by a treaty in force and perform obligations in good faith. 95 ROOS through its military
operations has violated the said principle.

B. International Humanitarian Law (International Humanitarian Law)

i. Roos has not complied with the basic principles of the Law of Armed Conflict
(“LOAC”)
[¶53.] Under the LOAC, and IHL, four fundamental principles form the core of the
law of armed conflict. They are, (a) distinction, military necessity; (b) unnecessary
suffering; (c) and, (d) proportionality. It is contended that ROOS has not complied
with any of the said principles.
a. Distinction : As per this principle, it is the obligation of parties to an armed
conflict to distinguish between, (a) civilians and combatants, and, (b) civilian
objects and military objectives.96 Therefore, under this principle, attack can be
made only on combatants and military objectives. Art. 48 of the Additional
Protocol I, recognizes the principle of distinction and states that operations of
states be directed only against military objectives. 97 Further, Art. 13.1 of
Additional Protocol II, too recognizes this principle by providing protection to
civilians during military operations.
[¶54.] Therefore, the principle of distinction forms a part of the customary law.
Further, under no circumstance, military necessity justifies the encroachment of
human rights of civilians.98 In the instant case, ROOS did not distinguish civilians
from military targets. Therefore, its military operation that resulted in the destruction
of various cities and civilian population, amounts to a breach of customary law and
IHL.

95
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art.26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
96
Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I: OUP,
3, (2005).
97
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 48 ¶ 5, June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
98
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 254, (2010).

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b. Military Necessity: Military necessity is defined as those measures that are

necessarily to be carried out in order to meet the ends of war and are thus lawful. 99 It
is recognized by Art. 25 of ILC100, Art. 23(g) of the Hague Regulation IV101, and the
Statute of ICC.102 It has been recognized as a peremptory norm in the international
sphere.103
[¶55.] However, military necessity can’t be invoked as per whims and fancies. The
Caroline test, lays down conditions wherein military necessity can be invoked.
Namely, when the situation is instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and
no moment of deliberation.104 Further, military necessity permits only lawful measures
as per the customs of war.105In the instant case, the military action of ROOS, neither
satisfies the test nor was necessary to meet the ends of war.

c. Unnecessary Suffering: This principle is enshrined in Art. 35.2 of Additional

Protocol I which prohibits employing weapons of such nature and methods of warfare
as to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. 106 Article 23 of the Hague
Regulation107 further states this principle. This court has defined unnecessary suffering
as, “harm greater than that avoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.”108
[¶56.] It is contended that the actions of ROOS are in contravention of this principle
coupled with the principle of military necessity. ROOS through its military operation
and air strikes has caused unnecessary suffering in URAINE’s territory and is
violative of IHL.

99
4 U.S. War Department, General Orders No. 100, 24 Apr. 1863. Hereafter, “Lieber Code.
100
Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 21, (2001), . Draft articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, art. 25, (2001).
101
Hague Convention IV, art. 23(g), (1907).
102
International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute, art. 8(2) (b) (xiii), (1998).
103
GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, 258, (2010).
104
Caroline Case, 29 British and Foreign State Papers (1841), 1137-1138 (28 May 2019),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th-century/br-1842d.asp; Theodora Christodoulidou & Kalliopi Chainoglou, The
Principle of Proportionality in Self-Defence and Humanitarian Intervention, 20 JILPAC 79 (2007).
105
5 Knut Dormann, ¨ Elements of War Crimes Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(Cambridge: ICRC/Cambridge University Press, 2003), 81.
106
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 35.2 ¶ 5, June 8 1977, 1125 UNTS 609.
107
Hague Convention IV, art. 23, (1907).
108
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra, note 114, at para. 78

16 | P a g e
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d. Proportionality: This principle is enshrined in Art. 51.5(b) and Art. 57.2(b) of the
Additional Protocol I. Whereby, the former describes the principle and the latter states
the precautions necessary in attack of military objectives. Thus, this principle
prohibits attacks that are “excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated”.
[¶57.] Proportionality may be assessed on the following factors; a. selection of target,
b. means and methods of attack, c. conduct of the attack must not be negligent
involving unnecessary civilian casualties.109 In contravention of both the articles,
ROOS neither implied a proportional force nor took precautionary measures
necessary in attack of military objectives.

ISSUE IV: The actions of ROOS make it liable to provide relief on humanitarian
grounds to URAINE

It is humbly submitted that the actions of ROOS make it liable to provide relief to URAINE
on humanitarian grounds. The applicant would be establishing its case on the following
grounds: First, ROOS violated territorial integrity of URAINE; Second ROOS is bound to
provide economic reparations to URAINE; Third, ROOS is bound to provide humanitarian
support to URAINE; Fourth, security guarantee.

A. Territorial Integrity

[¶58.] The applicant asserts the defendant's obligation to respect sovereignty and
territorial integrity, including the withdrawal of troops from the applicant's territory.
The applicant also asserts its right to sovereignty and territorial integrity under the
Article 2(4)110.The applicant asserts its sovereign right to territorial integrity, violated
by Roos by way of illegal annexation of KREMA and support for separatist
movements in eastern Uraine. This is humbly submitted that the ICJ may direct the
defendant to remove its forces from Urainian territory and ensuring respect for
Uraine's borders. Additionally, humanitarian relief is imperative to alleviate the
suffering of civilians affected by the conflict, guaranteeing access to essential services

109
Judith Gail Gardam, “Proportionality and Force in International Law,” 87–3 AJIL (July 1993), 391.
110
UN Charter: General Principles

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and aid in accordance with international humanitarian principles upheld in the case of
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda.111
[¶59.] In Nicaragua v. United States 112 the ICJ condemned US for violating the
sovereignty of Nicaragua. The principle of non-intervention113 and respect for
territorial integrity was also established or laid down in this case. the same is
applicable in the present case and the applicant here requests the court to ask Roos
respect the sovereignty of applicant.
[¶60.] The presence of defendant’s troops in URAIN contributes to the
destabilization of the region, exacerbating tensions and increasing the risk of further
conflict. This threatens regional security and undermines efforts to achieve a peaceful
resolution to the crisis the court here may direct the defendant to stop the air strikes.
[¶61.] The court may direct non- interference of defendant in the territory of
applicant to protect the interest of the applicant and its right of sovereignty which will
improve the situation of both the states.

B. Economic Aid

[¶62.] The applicant seeks economic support as a means of addressing the underlying
issues and facilitating resolution, citing provisions of the United Nations Economic
and Social Council and relevant bilateral agreements between the parties.

C. Humanitarian Aid

[¶63.] The ongoing conflict between the two states has led to humanitarian crises,
including displacement of civilians, loss of life, and damage to infrastructure. The
applicant here asserts its right to humanitarian aid from defendant to address the dire
needs of civilians affected by the conflict in eastern Urane. Upholding principles of
humanity and international humanitarian law, Ukraine emphasizes defendants legal
obligation to provide assistance to applicant as per Article 25 UDHR guarantee of a
standard of living adequate for health and well-being themselves and their families,
including food, clothing, housing, and medical care regardless of political differences
or conflicts between states.

111
Congo v. Uganda, ICJ GL No 116 (Official Case No) [2005] ICJ Rep 168
112
Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 ICJ Reports.
113
UN Charter, art. 2.4

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[¶64.] The International Humanitarian law lays duty to care for wounded and sick
persons (Geneva Conventions) and the prohibition against targeting
civilians(Additional Protocol I) underscore the legal obligations of states to provide
assistance to civilians affected by conflict, regardless of political considerations.
[¶65.] In the case of Georgia v. Russia114 the court emphasize Russia's legal
obligation to provide aid in accordance with international humanitarian law.
Additionally, invoking principles of customary international law and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, particularly Article 25, 115 Ukraine underscores the
universal duty to ensure the well-being of civilians affected by armed conflict
[¶66.] Additionally, applicant calls on defendant to fulfill its legal and moral
obligation to provide humanitarian aid to civilians in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, in
accordance with the standards set forth in the Cyprus v. Turkey case and international
humanitarian law116.

D. Security Guarantee

[¶67.] The applicant seeks assurances of security to safeguard against further

escalation and ensure stability in the region, referencing relevant security guarantees
provided in Budapest Memorandum defendant should not use force or the threat of
force against applicant, and immediately stop the air strikes comprising of military
action and Nuclear weapons.
[¶68.] The defendant must follow the provisions of the Minsk agreement to
withdraw the heavy weapons from the territory of the applicant (Article 2) Minsk
agreement and the applicant further request court to instruct the defendant to grant
back the control over the borders to the defendant as per the Article 9 of the
agreement .

114
European court of human rights, preamble
115
UN Charter, preamble
116
Supra note 14.

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MEMORIAL FOR DEFENDANT

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the facts stated, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the State of URAINE requests the Hon’ble Court to opine that:

1. The Hon’ble Court have Jurisdiction to render advisory opinion.

2. ROOS violated sovereignty of URAINE.
3. ROOS violated International obligations.
4. ROOS is liable to provide relief to URAINE on humanitarian grounds.
5. Any other relief as the Court deems fit.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

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