Chapter Eight

FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND DYNAMICS OF NORTH AFRICAN STATES BEFORE AND BEYOND THE
ARAB SPRING

Casmir Chukwuka Mbaegbu

Introduction

North Africa links the world's three continents of Africa, Europe, and Asia to one another. It includes the
countries of Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia. The importance of North Africa as a geopolitical
region stems in large measure from its geographic location as a crossroads between North Africa,
European countries of the Mediterranean Basin, West and Central Asia and, historically, sub-Saharan
nations as well. Several countries of the region are especially important as sources of oil on which
nations worldwide depend as the basic source of their energy for commercial and domestic use. Almost
75% of the North Africa's region consists of deserts, semi-arid land, or small oases. Evidence suggests
that about 130,000 years ago, much of the land mass that is now North Africa was filled with forests,
lakes, rivers, and oases. The vast amount of ancient foliage of the region's distant past are, today, the
source of its equally vast quantities of petroleum found deep underground in the region's oil exporting
countries (Tiliouine & Estes, 2016). In North Africa, Islam is the dominant religion and has been
influenced by many diverse cultures. The Berbers are the original inhabitants of North Africa (a region
also called the Maghrib in Arabic), and they interacted with the Arabs over time (Brett & Fentress 1995).

Foreign policy analyses are generally governed, influenced and shaped by a whole of events of which the
attitudinal disposition and idiosyncrasies of analysts stand out conspicuously. The North Africa's foreign
policy has gone through many phases of policy making over the years. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA). Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Defense are involved in the formulation of a country's
foreign policy. They play vital roles of overseeing the foreign policy-making, and representation of a
country's interests, goals and aspirations which are to be externally projected. This function has been
relevant in the precolonial era and in the contemporary independence era, throughout North Africa.
Thus, foreign policy decision-making is mostly coordinated by top government officials of the MFA. The
evolution of North African MFA during the contemporary independence era, began with Libya's
independence in 1951. The other North African countries followed suit in 1956 (Morocco and Tunisia)
and 1962 (Algeria), with each country establishing its own embassy networks abroad, independent of
the former colonial power (Italy in the case of Libya, and France in the case of Algeria, Morocco, and
Tunisia). Egypt, which gained independence from the United Kingdom in 1922, was unique, as one of the
three African countries to enjoy independence prior to the 1950s (the other two countries were Liberia,
which gained independence in 1847, and Ethiopia, which was never subjected to European colonial
rule). It is a fact that all five North African countries find themselves in the top 25 percent of the largest
African diplomatic networks (Schraeder, 2018).

The Arab Spring was an unprecedented event in the Middle East and North Africa which brought hope of
political change and pro-democratic movement in the Maghreb and Mashreq region. It involved waves
of protests, uprisings, and unrest that spread across Arabic-speaking countries in North Africa and the
Middle East. The Pro-democratic protests, which spread rapidly due to social media, ended up toppling
the governments of Tunisia. Egypt, Libya and Yemen. The Arab Spring began in Tehran, the capital city of
Iran. The protests following the corrupt elections in June, 2009, braved the way for the Arab protests by
pioneering the use of social networking and IT technology and grounding actions in the principles of
non-violence. With respect to North Africa, the Arab Spring began with the first protests that occurred in
Tunisia on 18 December 2010 in Sidi Bouzid, following Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation in protest of
police corruption and ill-treatment. Bouazizi's self-immolation is regarded as the direct cause of the Arab
Spring in the whole Maghreb and Mashreq region (Zdanowski, 2011).

Each of the North African states involved in the Arab Spring had its own.dynamics and how the Arab
Spring affected national interests, counterterrorism strategies, and foreign policy implementation at the
international arena. The Arab Spring had shown the limits of American power in the Middle East. No
longer does the US have the prestige and resources to dominate Middle East affairs to the degree it has
since the British withdrew from east of Suez in 1971. Neither the US nor Europe has the great financial
resources needed to shape prospects in the Arab Spring countries other than marginally; significant
investment will also have to come from elsewhere, particularly the Gulf states and China countries that
do not share to the same extent the Western interest in reinforcement of democratic values. On
terrorism, the Arab Spring uprisings underscored the bankruptcy of Islamic extremist philosophy
sanctioning violence as the only way to attain societal changes. In fact, the Arab Spring movements were
oriented towards universal values and rooted in the demand for jobs, justice, and dignity - not far in
spirit from life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.

Prior to the Arab Spring, foreign policies of the North African states, occupied a peripheral and subaltern
position within the global system. These ranged from the global (Tunisia's financial predicaments and
foreign debt negotiations) through the (sub)regional (Egypt's relationship of necessity with Saudi Arabia,
Algeria's half-hearted policies towards the conflicts in Libya and Mali) to the domestic sphere (Morocco's
power balance between the monarchy and the Islamist-led government, Libya's extreme state weakness
and internal competition among proliferating actors), reaching also the deeper non-state societal level
in the case of Mauritania. North African foreign policies matter to the ruling authorities of each state, to
the rest of its domestic political, economic, and social actors, and to its population as a whole, as well as
to neighbouring countries, to regional systems of variable geometry on different overlapping scales and
sometimes even to other parts of the world that are far afield (Fernández-Molina, Feliu & Hernando de
Larramendi, 2019).

North Africa's foreign policy has been fashioned to meet the requirement for political stability and
development, specifically in the region and generally in Africa. With the exception of Egypt, the study of
the foreign policies of North African states is underrepresented in most works that analyse international
relations in the Middle East and North Africa providing comparative insights (Hinnebusch & Ehteshami,
2014; Ismail & Perry, 2014; Fürtig, 2014; Fawcet, 2016). However, the aftermath of the Arab Spring
made North African leaders to respond to the growing levels of violence by violent non-state actors by
making the pursuit of national security their primary foreign policy goal. This, according to Schumacher
& Schraeder (2018), had led to the marginalization of other expected benefits of the Arab Spring,
including socio-economic development, human rights reforms, and democratization. North African
leaders-old and new alike have instead coordinated with regional and international partners to promote
common national security-oriented foreign policy objectives, most notably counterterrorism.

According to Fernández-Molina, Feliu & Hernando de Larramendi (2019), in the realm of foreign policy,
the decolonisation experience influenced the adoption of distinct orientations in international and
regional relations. Egypt during the Nasserite period, Algeria under Houari Boumediene and Qaddafi's
Libya all held revisionist positions with regard to the international system. By contrast, the ruling elites
of Morocco and Tunisia opted to respect the international status quo, accepting a subordinate position
which did not, however, completely limit their capacity for leverage. Morocco, for example, made use of
mediation and good offices to reinforce its image as a stabilizing force in the Mediterranean region and
especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. It also aligned itself with Western interests in sub-Saharan Africa
during the Cold War to win the backing of Washington and Paris in the Western Sahara conflict. North
African labour organisations have entered the foreign policy realm in numerous ways. They have
coordinated together in the pursuit of common goals. For example, Egyptian and Tunisian trade
unionists shared information both implicitly and tacitly throughout their transitions (Hartshorn,
2016:354). North African workers had also sought to create regional labour organisations designed to
provide national unions with greater political clout, in both domestic and foreign policy (Dobbs &
Schraeder, 2018).

Most analysts in foreign policy see foreign policy as a plan of action, principles, strategies, and tactics in
external relations for the actualization of objectives and goals in foreign relations. However, how do we
analyze or determine the foreign policy of a state? Do we look at the budget, end-means
pronouncement of actors, statesmen, Ambassadors, prime ministers? The chapter analyzed new
convergences of foreign policies of selected North African states before and beyond the Arab Spring. We
examined the social economic dynamics of the states, sub-regional security and domestic regime
security, the strengthening and improvement of relations between these North African states.

Conceptual and Theoretical Orientation of Foreign Policy Foreign policy analysis is a subfield of
international relations, which applies theories and methods from an array of disciplines, which include
but not limited to, political science, public administration, economics, psychology, sociology. To
understand how states make foreign policies, and how these policies translate into geopolitical
outcomes. Foreign policy analysis allows us to better understand how political actors make policy
decisions and how they relate to other foreign government and non-government entities. In a nutshell,
states must have a foreign policy in order to be a global player in the international arena.

Holsti's (1995:83) conceives foreign policy as "ideas or actions designed by policy makers to solve a
problem or promote some changes in the policies, attitudes or actions of other states or states, in non-
state actors (e.g. terrorist groups), in the international economy or in the physical environment of the
world". The place of a state in the international system and its material power capabilities tend to
inform its foreign policies. Conventionally, foreign policy aims at achieving a specific objective or a set of
objectives consistent with the interest of the state undertaking the foreign policy mission. For Akinboye
& Ottoh (2007:115), foreign policy is "a type of policy that transcends the boundary of a given state" For
them, it is a set of principles that define the objectives a given state pursues in the international arena in
the process of its interactions with other international actors.

Foreign policy is the relations between sovereign actors in the international system. Thus, foreign policy
objectives can be understood as a range of intended actions as well as a set of strategies adopted by
some sovereign actors with the express purpose of influencing the behavior of other sovereign actors
within the international system (Ogwu, 2005:6). The import of the above definition is that states in the
global stage project their foreign policies with the motive of achieving their national interests in an
environment characterized by permanent interests and sometimes friendly allies or enemies. Okolie
(2009:8) defines foreign policy as "a decision-making contextualized within the ambit of the state
structure and directed at enunciating policies to guide relations with other states at the global level".
Going further, he averred that foreign policy refers to specific decision-making aimed at protecting,
maximizing, and promoting the prescribed national interest of the given state.

For us, foreign policy goes beyond the domestic conditions of a country to include the interplay of
domestic and external forces in the pursuit of varying national interests. It is first and foremost, home-
grown and derives from shared common goods, goals and values specific to a given nation-state. Thus,
domestic politics is typically a crucial part of the explanation for states' foreign policies. Foreign policy
serves as an important tool and field of action that follow the evolving fate of the spheres of power.
More importantly, it is a complex discipline wherem numerous actors work within structures both inside
and outside the state to have an impact on the decision-making process.

The analysis is anchored on rational actor model. It is the most widely cited foreign policy analysis and
propounded or developed by foreign policy analyst and scholar, Graham Allison. This framework
assumes that the main actor in foreign policy is a rational individual who can be relied on to make
informed decisions that maximize value and perceived benefits to the state. The rational- actor model
relies on individual state-level interactions between nations and government behavior as units of
analysis; it assumes the availability of complete information to policymakers for optimized decision-
making, and that actions taken throughout time are both consistent and coherent. There are four main
steps in the rational actor's decision-making process: identify the problem, define desired outcomes,
evaluate the consequences of potential policy choices and finally, make the most rational decision to
maximize beneficial outcomes.

The rational-actor theoretical approach can be useful to understanding the goals and intentions behind
a foreign policy action. However, critics of this model believe it does not account for instances when
complete information may not be available, as well as the relatively subjective concept of rationality or
factors that might inhibit rational decision-making. The appeal of rational choice theory is widespread
precisely because it offers social scientists a general tool with broad applicability to human endeavors in
arguably every ambit of existence.

The processes behind foreign policy-making in North Africa finds justification on

the rational actor model. The starting point is the observation that rational actor

model can be identified in the economic, social, and political relations of North

African states. The main characteristics of the systemic dependence of countries

in the region are defined in the social, economic, political, and security dynamics
of their foreign policies. For example, Egypt's economic dependency and

weakness have restricted the foreign policy leeway for the successive

governments after the fall of Mubarak globally, regionally, and domestically, the

dron in oil prices threatened the viability of the Algerian rentier state model

supporting the social contract that has guaranteed the country's political stability. and Tunisia cannot
survive financially without interacting with Europe. The theoretical framework of rational actor model
illuminated the dynamics of foreign policy in North Africa and explained how North African states
conduct their foreign policy and diplomatic endeavors externally.

Case Studies of Selected North African States

1. Algeria Foreign Policy Analysis

It is a fact that domestic factors such as internal and political structures shaped the foreign policies of
nations. With respect to Algeria, we identify the idiosyncratic factors of personality. This led to different
forms of radicalism, caution, restraints, and incrementalism in the orientation of its foreign policy.
Absolutist conceptions of sovereignty and inflexible opposition to interventionism even in cases of
severe humanitarian crises lead to a possible banalization of the guiding principles of Algerian foreign
policy.

Arising from the1992 military intervention in the Algerian electoral process to usher in democratic
dispensation, Algeria entered a period of international isolation from which it has begun to emerge only
recently. Suspicion towards the regime, both domestically and internationally, was widespread. Algeria's
notorious lack of international communication generated persistent and sometimes far-fetched
speculation about the reality of the country's internal affairs. Not surprisingly, outside powers were ill-
informed about Algerian affairs. Given the existence of multiple centres of power within the central
government, Algerian diplomats themselves were uncertain about their country's foreign policy (Zoubir.
2004). Algeria's rivals in the region, particularly Morocco and Egypt, exploited Algeria's weakened
international position to undercut its prominent role in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. In March 1998,
the Moroccan government, headed by Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi, declared its intent to
reintegrate the OAU, but only on the condition that the SADR be excluded from membership. Though it
failed, this manoeuvre was aimed at weakening Algeria's traditional regional position (Zoubir, 2004).

From early independence, Ben Bella and Boumediene had been committed to an activist foreign policy,
because they believed that Algeria had something to teach other developing states. They based foreign
policy on the notion that diplomatic activism would enhance the stature of the new state. In a similar
manner, Bouteflika used diplomacy as an instrument to refurbish the reputation of the state, in the
process enhancing his own institutional position within the political system. Bouteflika came to the
presidency in 1999 with a mandate to restore Algeria's international reputation sorely blemished by the
tribulations of the 'black decade". His supremacy over foreign policy was never questioned. There is
existence of special partnership between Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa, which developed since 1999.
With these great African powers, Algeria facilitated conflict resolution and represented Africa's voice on
economic, political, and cultural issues in international fora (Quazani, 2000).

Mortimer (2015) noted that the most incisive observation to be made about Algerian foreign policy from
1999 to 2004 is that it served as the instrument of Bouteflika's consolidation of his power as president.
The army selected Bouteflika for leadership in 1999, because the generals believed that he was capable
of restoring Algeria's international reputation. As Bouteflika moved tirelessly across the international
stage not only in New York, Paris, Washington, and Brussels, but also in Japan, India, Canada, Germany,
Russia, China, Vietnam, Nigeria, Mali, Cameroon, Zambia, Abu Dhabi, Bahrein among other ports-of-call-
he built not only visibility and credibility for Algeria, but, also prestige for himself. During the early part
of his first term, political scientist, Lahouari Addi, argued that Bouteflika was less a president than a
'super-minister of foreign affairs" (Addi, 1999). The above point was well taken at the time, but
underestimated Bouteflika's capacity to utilise foreign policy to strengthen the political power of the
office of president. At the end, Bouteflika was a much-diminished President and there were scarce new
initiatives as he struggled to cope with his disability (Mortimer, 2015).

Algeria is a regional power in the era of the Global War on terrorism. As Bouteflika's second term began,
the issues facing Algerian foreign policy were largely defined by the ongoing context of the USA's 'Global
War on Terror (GWOT) into which the Maghreb was irresistibly drawn. The American wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq not only failed to crush Al Qaida, but spawned terrorist affiliates in Yemen, the
Horn of Africa, and trans-Saharan Africa, notably Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an emanation
of the Salafist Group for Predication and Combat (GSPC). In this new strategic environment, Algeria had
a regional role to play. It sought to exploit its geopolitical position in relation to the Sabel while resisting
total incorporation into the US counterterrorism orbit. As the USA was not a reliable partner for Algeria
with regard to the Western Sahara issue, which remained a paramount interest for Algiers, Bouteflika
tried to thread the needle of Algerian national interest in the emergent regional and global
configuration. Reverberations of the 'Arab Spring' also provided challenges to the Algerian foreign
policy. Throughout this period, Algeria hewed more and more closely to the classic foreign policy
objective of defense of its territorial integrity (Mortimer, 2015).

A major consequence of the GWOT was the redefinition of the very geopolitical

environment in which Algeria found itself. In effect, the Maghreb became a

component of a newly conceptualized space denoted as trans-Saharan Africa. This

process of re-conceptualisation began when the USA launched what was called

the Pan-Sahel Initiative in December 2002 as an instrument to combat terrorism.

The original members of this programme were Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Chad,

four former French colonies incorporating vast expanses of the Sahara Desert and

the Sahel. Two years later, the Initiative was expanded to embrace five other North

and West African states, including Algeria, thus becoming the Trans-Saharan

Counter-Terrorism Initiative, later rebaptised as 'Partnership' (or TSCTP).

According to Mortimer (2015), the physical decline of the Algerian leader seems
almost a metaphor for the evolution of Algerian foreign policy towards a

conventional conception of national interest as physical security of the homeland.

The president's inability to accept an honourable exit from office after three terms

and a debilitating stroke was more a sign of a domestic crisis of governance than

a failure of foreign policy.

Algeria's relations with the outside world have witnessed considerable change after Arab Spring and
years of isolation in the international stage. This change has been more noticeable since the election of
Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April 1999. The aggressive foreign policy that Algeria has pursued in recent years
helped dissipate those suspicions and effectively ended Algeria's isolation. In a rather unexpected way,
domestic contradictions between the military and the presidency have spilled over into the realm of
foreign policy, where the president continues to seek support for 'National Reconciliation which seems
to imply a restoration of the FIS while the military wishes to obtain unambiguous support for the
eradication of terrorism and its potential roots. 2. Egypt's Foreign Policy Analysis

Egypt as a middle-income country maintains foreign relations based on pragmatism and flexibility. Egypt
is a semi-rentier economy, though it has natural resources such as oil and gas. It has a dependent
foreign energy, and exports agriculture and manufactured goods, foreign investment- mainly from the
United States and Arab Gulf countries and above all tourism. She holds strategic importance to the
United States and to the stability of the North African region. It is the largest Arab country in the region
and its geography is significant. According to Hernando de Larramendi & Fernández-Molina (2016),
Egypt's economic situation was quite directly affected by the global economic and financial crisis in
2007. Her revolution in 2011 was seen by many as a major step forward in delivering democratic rule to
the country in search of first free democratic presidential election and leadership. Most studies on
Egypt's foreign policy have been observed through a US, Israeli, and Saudi lens, utilizing the Mubarak
regime as a historical basis. Historically, the foreign policy of Egypt has been developed and designed by
the state's ruling elites (Fazzur, 2016).
It is a fact that Egypt's political polarization between the Army and the Muslim Brotherhood did not
result in a fundamental change in the country's external political and economic relations. It resulted in a
situation of not such different political actors, but rather two ideologically conservative groups that
opted for neoliberal economic policies, and were both financially dependent on foreign groups and
countries. Both of them had authoritarian tendencies in the exercise of power. Thus, Mohamed Morsi's
accession to power did not result in a radical reorientation of foreign policy as might have been
expected of an Islamist president, but it did relatively change regional alliances, with Qatar and Turkey
becoming Egypt's new preferred partners in the Middle East (Azaola, 2018). Thus, Shama (2014) argued
that Egyptian foreign policy like those majority of Arab states is in part the product of its internal
fragility, external vulnerability, and economic dependency on foreign states.

Egypt depicts the continuance of centralization and opacity in foreign policy decision-making processes
by successive governments and the cohabitation period in the exercise of power between apparently
very different political forces. From Gamal Abdel Nasser to Anwar Sadat and then under Mubarak,
Egyptian foreign policy has traditionally been a prerogative of the president and his closest
collaborators; all three leaders centralized and personalized the process of formulating foreign policy
(Hillal Dessouki, 2008). Thus, the foreign policies were based on personal preferences of the leaders.
Any consultations the president might had made regarding foreign policy with the country's elites or
professionals in the field were a matter of personal choice, and any influence these consultants might
had depended on their personal relationship with the president (Hinnebusch & Shama, 2014)

According to El-Labbad (2014: 82), since Egypt was readmitted into the Arab League in 1989, its regional
policies had focused on preventing the emergence of a regional challenge based on four pillars:

i. a strong alliance with the United States;

11. Egypt's role as a mediator between the Israelis and Palestinians;

m. the promotion of Arab nationalism as a way to weaken the regional influence of Turkey and Iran;

iv. and maintaining a special relationship with Saudi Arabia to help Egypt with its financial difficulties.
These four pillars remained in place during the post-revolutionary period under the Supreme Council of
the Armed Forces (SCAF). In foreign policy, then, the Mubarak era carried on, with some minor changes
in form and content.

The Egyptian foreign policy bureaucracy may not have had legislators, but the country's Foreign Service
has had a long tradition of excellence and enjoys a good reputation among Arab countries. Career
diplomats were recruited after passing competitive exams and were prepared at the Egyptian Diplomatic
Institute (Hinnebusch & Shama, 2014). The foreign affairs ministers in recent decades have largely come
from the diplomatic corps instead of the political elite, which has professionalised the Foreign Service,
and its ministers and the holders of high posts like minister of foreign affairs have been given positions
of responsibility in international institutions, most notably in the Arab League. Boutros Boutros- Ghali,
for instance, was Secretary-General of the UN from 1992 to 1996, while Amr Moussa served as
Secretary-General of the Arab League from 2001 to 2011 (Bahi, 2016). The first foreign affairs minister
from the post-Mubarak period, the diplomat Nabil Elaraby, was appointed Secretary-General of the Arab
League from 2011 to 2016, followed by Ahmed Aboul Gheit, the last minister of foreign affairs proposed
by Mubarak, who took Elaraby's position in July 2016. After Mubarak's ouster, there was a so-called
transition period, which witnessed what has been termed a 'cohabitation' in the exercise of power
between the Armed Forces and the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The connection between the army
and Egyptian foreign policy is undeniable. In Egypt, the army has historically been privileged as the only
institution capable of safeguarding the security of the country (Bahi, 2016). For decades, its officials have
participated in designing both foreign policy and defence, using the nationalist argument that cites
Egyptian military support in the wars against Israel in 1948, 1956 and 1967 and during what was
considered the victorious 1973 war. After Amr Moussa stepped down as minister of foreign affairs in
2001 to become Secretary-General of the Arab League, the ministry was pushed into the background
and the General Intelligence Service took over the leading role in the key foreign policy matters of
security and the fight against terrorism (Hernando de Larramendi & Fernández-Molina, 2016). Its
director, General Omar Suleiman, was widely seen as President Mubarak's most important advisor
indeed, he was appointed to the vice presidency ten days before Mubarak's fall and the main contact in
Cairo for foreign governments (Grimm & Roll, 2012).

Despite the unquestionable influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, foreign policy under Morsi was not so
much Islamist beyond some symbolic gestures. In reality, there were few substantial changes with
respect to the Mubarak period due fundamentally to economic factors. Just as under Mubarak during
his final years, the ministry of foreign affairs did not occupy a central position in the decision- making
process and Morsi was front and centre in the attempt to promote Egypt as a regional leader on the
international stage. The military intelligence services continued to play a key role in dialogue with Israel,
while Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood leaders talked with Hamas. This division of labour made it
possible to reinforce the country's international image and allay the fears of the American and Israeli
administrations. In this respect, the role played by Morsi in negotiating the Gaza crisis in November 2012
when he sent his prime minister, Hisham Qandil, to Gaza in an historical gesture was decisive (Hernando
de Larramendi & Fernández-Molina, 2016; Monier & Ranko, 2014; Shama 2014).

After Morsi's fall in July, 2013 and the accession of military officer Abdul Fattah al-Sisi to power, Abdel
Fattah al-Sisi was elected President of the republic almost without opposition, winning 98% of the votes,
which reinforced the centralisation of the decision-making process in foreign relations, security and
defence. The constitution approved in January, 2014 maintained the central role of the army in the
Egyptian political system (Azaola, 2018). Egypt's foreign policy continues to move in opposite directions:
one adheres to the idea of independence from foreign powers, presented as a question of national
dignity, while the second submerges the country in a web of economic dependency from which it
cannot escape (Bahi, 2016). Egypt appears to manipulate regional affairs to detract both domestic and
foreign attention from its security, political, economic, and social problems, and adopting an active
foreign policy to obtain regional power amidst such terrible domestic conditions does not seem prudent
(Sayigh, 2015). Not even the presidency of Islamist Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 produced a radical
realignment or change at either regional or international level. From the outset, both the president
himself and the leaders of his party indicated that they were committed to the international treaties
signed by Egypt, including those with Israel, Indeed, in a speech by President Morsi to the UN General
Assembly in September, 2012, he made it clear that there would be no fundamental changes in Egypt's
foreign policy (Hernando de Larramendi & Fernández-Molina, 2016).

The most conservative governments in the Middle East, led by Saudi Arabia, provided the Egyptian
military regime with not only political, but also financial support. In the first months of al-Sisi's tenure,
two elements characterised the country's short-term foreign policy: the fight against the Muslim
Brotherhood and extremist groups based in the Sinai and an almost exclusive economic dependence on
Saudi Arabia (Dunne, 2014). President al-Sisi needed the financial support of these monarchies to revive
the Egyptian economy and reinforce his own position against the Muslim Brotherhood, while Saudi
Arabia and its allies needed al-Sisi to defeat and prevent the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
region. Egypt's foreign policy behaviour appeared to have been based on a combination of pragmatism
and prudence. Between 2011 and 2016, the Egyptian foreign policy included a series of adaptive moves
in the Arab region in parallel to political transformations at the domestic front. Horesh (2016) posited
that China and Russia emerged in the international context of North African foreign policies between
2011 and 2016. Chinese construction companies decided in 2016 to invest nearly 45 billion dollars in the
megaproject for a new administrative and financial capital (Osborne, 2016). Russia, in turn, took
advantage of the temporary freeze of United States' military aid after al-Sisi took power to offer itself as
a financial ally, particularly with regard to the military. In 2014, the two countries signed an arms
agreement for 3.5 billion dollars in addition to a plan to train Egyptian soldiers in Russian academies and
carry out joint exercises in the Mediterranean (Bender & Kelley, 2015). Both Vladimir Putin and al-Sisi
visited Cairo and Moscow respectively and repeatedly between 2014 and 2016.
When the Islamists came into power, priorities changed and there was a relative reshaping of strategic
alliances with regional partners. Qatar and Turkey, which had not hitherto played a particularly
important role in Egypt's foreign policy, came to the fore as staunch defenders of the Islamist
government, providing both financial and ideological supports. When Morsi was overthrown one year
later, relations with these two countries deteriorated severely, while traditional alliances with countries
that strongly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait re-emerged
(Azaola, 2018). At sub-regional level, Egypt's foreign policy has continued to focus on security questions
as its priority. It has followed a securitisation approach in emphasising a rhetoric of existential threats
coming from the country's borders or nearby areas (Bahi, 2016). The security focus reveals a traditional
way of understanding security as a priority in domestic and foreign policies, which also promotes a top-
down military strategy that prioritises the army as the only institution capable of safeguarding security
against, in this case, the threat of Islamism (Bahi 2016). Hosni Mubarak designed Egypt's regional
leadership on the basis of guaranteeing regional stability against the Islamist threat and al-Sisi had also
exploited this as a way to solidify Egypt's foreign policy. This discourse revolving around the will to
establish an independent foreign policy and reinforce Egypt's role in the region had been the one used
by Egyptian security forces backed by the army (Monier & Ranko 2014). al-Sisi recovered this traditional
Egypt's foreign policy doctrine and adapted it to the regional challenges of the time (Bahi, 2016).

Security and intelligence cooperation between Egypt and Israel did not decrease under the Islamist
government, which indirectly reassured the US. For Tawil (2014), the triangular relationship with Israel
and the US that had formed the basis of Egypt's foreign policy since the Camp David Accords were
signed was maintained. The limitations resulting from Egypt's economic dependency and weakness had
restricted the foreign policy margin of action for the successive governments after the fall of Mubarak
internationally, regionally, and internally. With respect to President Mubarak, he was first to take the
reins of establishing a foreign policy over the Egypt-Gaza Strip territory or border. This initial foreign
policy was aimed at maintaining the peace with Israel, assuming the role of mediator between Hamas
and Israel, and sustaining security in the region. By maintaining the peace treaty with Israel, Mubarak
would ensure that the United States continued to provide its annual foreign aid to Egypt. In addition,
upholding the peace treaty reaffirmed Egypt and Israel's shared common interest of containing Hamas
(Aran & Rami, 2014). Secondly, with Egypt assuming the role of mediator between Hamas and Israel not
only gives Mubarak international support and praise, but it prevents a third-party state, such as Turkey,
from assuming a role at the negotiating table. Finally, Mubarak's foreign policy sustained regional
security by controlling the Gaza Strip borders. Mubarak's foreign policy towards the Gaza Strip balanced
itself between the US-Israeli alliance and fulfilling national interests with the goal of maintaining Egypt's
stability.
The foreign policy of President Mohamed Morsi came after Egypt's political revolution in 2011, which
ended Mubarak's three-decade rule. After Mubarak's ouster, Egypt did not have a constitution or a
functioning parliament (Shama, 2014). Essentially, Morsi inherited a state that lacked political stability,
following the revolution in 2011. After assuming office, Morsi took drastic changes to purge Mubarak's
security and political institutions and to regain his legislative powers. Morsi dismissed a number of
senior military leaders, issued a new constitution which gave him full legislative authority, and
reinstated the parliament (Shama, 2014). Like Mubarak, President Morsi strived to maintain positive
relations with the United States and Israel. This could be attributed to ensuring that economic and
military aids continued to flow into Egypt. Again, as President Morsi succeeded Mubarak, he found
himself bound to the Camp David agreements established by Mubarak's predecessor, President Sadat
(Meringolo, 2015). With the backing of the Muslim Brotherhood party, President Morsi initially adopted
a different foreign policy from Mubarak's towards the Gaza Strip and Hamas. Though Morsi never
supported Hamas openly, he took actions to ensure that his relationship with the organization was
positive. It is evidently clear that Morsi's policy on the Gaza Strip was not much different than Mubarak.
Consequently, Morsi in conjunction with the Muslim Brotherhood party were unable to fundamentally
alter Egypt's foreign policy toward the Gaza Strip from the

Mubarak era.

General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Morsi's Defense Minister, came into power following a military coup in
2013. General al-Sisi inherited the implications of the Gaza Strip and its foreign policy. He was faced with
the Gaza Strip smuggling dilemma and border security, Hamas's objectives, the Muslim Brotherhood's
support, national interests, and the role and importance of its US-Israeli alliance. Like the previous two
presidencies, al-Sisi had to be mindful of his foreign policy and its impact on national public sympathy
concerning the Palestinian cause. Furthermore, al-Sisi continued Egypt's role as the mediator of peace
between Israeli and Hamas. These are all lessons learned from the Mubarak and Morsi presidencies. Like
his predecessors, President al-Sisi's Gaza Strip foreign policy had had to balance the realities and
complexities of the Gaza Strip. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi shared Israel's objective of containing
Hamas and destroying Islamists in the region. However, he understood the Palestinian cause and how
turmoil and unrest in Gaza impacted broad domestic public sympathy, international relations, and
Egypt's security. The analysis so far revealed that President al-Sisi took into account both regime and
national interests within his foreign policy decision-making.

3. Tunisia's Foreign Policy Analysis Tunisia became independence on 20 March 1956, and also a
recognized member of the United Nations (UN) on 12 November 1956. She has consistently
demonstrated a strong presence in both regional as well as international organisations, continuously
underlining the necessity to strengthen the role of such institutions. Tunisia consistently sought bi- or
multilateral solutions to conflicts, advocating international or regional cooperation and favouring
dialogue over intervention. Tunisia became not only a member of the UN, but also joined the Arab
League, the Organisation of African Unity (later the African Union), and the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), etc. The polity and politics of Tunisia provides the framework for its foreign policy, with
particular emphasis on its past and present constitutions; bilateral relations (old ones which have been
revived and new ones which were close to non-existent before); as well as its activism in international
organizations (McLarren, Stahl, Krüger, Abderrahim, & Besbes, 2017). Tunisia before January 2011 was
an autocratic regime. The self- immolation of Bouazizi could be regarded as the opening of Tunisia's
transition process. It was followed by unrest and protests which large parts of the population joined
throughout the country, as well as a process of political liberalisation. Dictator Ben Ali's escape on 14
January, 2011 and the collapse of the regime led to a break-through of the transition phase (McLarren,
Stahl, Krüger, Abderrahim, & Besbes, 2017).Tunisia provided the first test-case that the most resilient
autocratic regimes could be overthrown and challenged the notion of "Arab resilience" to
democratization (Schäfer, 2015:7). Despite the shaky economic situation directly after the fall of Ben Ali,
Tunisians showed acts of solidarity and generosity by hosting Libyan and other refugees fleeing the crisis
in Libya. This not only promoted Tunisia's image as a refugee-friendly country, but also increased
cooperation with international organisations such as the UNHCR, WHO, UNDP, UNICEF, and Médecins
sans frontiers (UNHCR 2012). Tunisia's post-independence foreign policy favoured neutrality and
pragmatism. According to Murphy (2014:234-248), Tunisia's foreign policy under the autocratic leaders,
Bourguiba and Ben Ali, could be characterized by the following patterns:

1. An anti-colonial positioning, in particular vis-à-vis France in the wake of the war in Algeria

2. Ambiguous relationship to other Arab leaders and the 'Israel question"

3. Preference for UN, but also supporting Maghreb and African Union and

Arab League 4. Pragmatism and vacilating between different positions (e.g. Second Gulf War)

5. Neoliberal external trade policy

6. Ally in the fight against jihadist terrorism

7. Supportive of Barcelona process

Tunisia's contribution to international relations involves strengthening international institutions, and
providing a mechanism to help implement and endorse the (democratic) ideals set out in the charters
and declarations. It has continued to pursue a foreign policy which strongly supports cooperation within
institutions and at the same time rejects interventions. Furthermore, it has been contributing to
international organisations far more actively and prominently than before the revolution. The
involvement of a state in international organisations and the degree to which it values the significance
of institutionalised cooperation can be indicative of its foreign policy as a whole. Tunisia consistently
actively sought international support and cooperation and was mainly in favour of non- intervention, it
rarely proposed own solutions or concepts. In the case of the Arab League, Tunisia's behaviour was,
therefore, labelled as occasionally rebellious, however, with little influence, for example, when
boycotting sessions, rather than offering own solutions. Regarding its behaviour in the UN, by contrast,
Tunisiawas continuously supportive of cooperation and always sought international support, in
particular for its foreign political priorities of de-colonization, peaceful conflict settlement and non-
intervention. Overall, its contributions to both organizations complemented each other, for
strengthening the regional voice would fulfil the original goal of at the same time strengthening the UN
(McLarren, Stahl, Krüger, Abderrahim, & Besbes, 2017).

Moreover, Tunisia sought support elsewhere be it by becoming a member of the Non-Aligned

Movement, or for example, consulting the African Union in order to bolster cohesion within the UN. In
other words, Tunisia consistently drew upon the legal framework of international institutions to act
locally and think globally, which was continued and expanded following the revolution. From the very
beginning of the 'Arab Spring', Tunisia was not only focused on the developments in its own country, but
supported the other countries in their endeavours to also attain democratic systems. This led to Tunisia
being partly torn on whether or not to sway from its traditional non-interventionist policies and
consistent call for peaceful negotiations with all involved parties. Tunisia once again became host to
such talks or the headquarters for coordinating activities. On the one hand, Tunisia can, therefore, be
said to have continued its enabling contributions to international organisations. Yet the contributions
have become more active. Its own democratisation process had developed to an imperative to act
internationally to ensure similar (sustainable) developments in the region and beyond (a process
comparable to its active support of other countries seeking independence after its own independence
from France).

Tunisia's proposal of creating an International Constitutional Court within the frameworks of the United
Nations are a clear indicator that its newly formed democratic identity has also had an impact on its
foreign policy, at least in regard to its involvement in international organisations, which goes beyond the
UN and the Arab League. The foreign policy under the autocratic rulers, Bourguiba and Ben Ali, are a
good example of autocratic peace: non-binding, wavering, pragmatic, and pro-UN. Thus, the cooperative
moments in Tunisia's foreign policy became slightly stronger (in the UN) and more nuanced and spread
(in the Maghreb and African Union), enabling and promoting dialogue. Hence, Tunisia's "rebellious"
moments in its foreign policy were not uncontested domestically.Foreign Policy beyond the Arab Spring:
Challenges and Prospects The Arab Spring provides an opportune moment to reappraise foreign policy
in

North African states. It is clear that if future foreign policies are to promote genuine political and
economic development in the region they need to be decoupled from the past tendency to dictatorship
and support for terrorist organizations regardless of their past support and opposition to regime change
brought about by the Arab Spring. One of the results of the Arab Spring anti- regime uprisings both in
Tunisia and in other countries of the region is the growth in popularity of Islamist groups among the
Arab people, while the socio-economic development and welfare of the masses remained poor. Despite
the support of Tunisia's transition to democracy and prevention of the Islamisation of the socio- political
sphere, the stability and secularity of the country after the wave of the Arab Spring could still be
questioned. The international community was openly concerned about the outcome of the first
parliamentary election.

North African states, especially Tunisia, provided the largest number of volunteers to Syria and Iraq to
fight in the name of the principles enunciated by the founders of the so-called Islamic State. Tunisian
authorities estimated that in 2011-2014 the so-called Islamic State had attracted about 2,400 potential
jihadists from Tunisia. Therefore, the radical Islamists are currently the greatest threat to the stability,
and socio-economic and political development of the region. From the point of view of maintaining
Tunisia's stability and security, both internal and external, the support the terrorist groups received from
other countries in the region was also dangerous. Furthermore, Tunisia has extensive government
bureaucracy, which does not help in fighting against the pathology of power.

The problem is whether this new freedom can be sustained through the creation of liberal institutions
and economic problem-solving. In the near term, prospects are for instability as Arab Spring states sort
out their governance and economic problems and recalibrate their relations with neighbors and others;
rising influence for countries which have the resources to back up their policies; and the continuation of
a preponderant, but attenuated role for the United States. In the long term, a more democratic,
prosperous, and accountable North Africa and Middle East offers the promise of a region with better
governance and less abusive of human rights, and thus a net positive outcome for U.S. interests. Also
worrisome is the internal situation in the countries of the region. The difficulteconomic situation is
aggravated by the unemployment rate of up to 17% (even up to 35% among young people).
The foreign policy after the Arab Spring had not contributed much to tackling the internal social,
economic, security and political challenges as the region continues to face pressing socio-economic
problems, particularly high levels of unemployment and widening inequalities. The overall economic
picture today in North Africa is still grim, as the economies of all the countries are in no better shape,
and in some cases much worse shape, than they were before the Arab Spring in 2010. North African
economies, particularly Tunisia and Egypt, have been hit by high inflation, unemployment, loss of
tourism revenues, declining exports and foreign investment, and declining growth in the aftermath of
the political uprisings. There is need for the foreign policies of North African states to support the
democratization process, generate pro-poor growth, support social safety nets, and address the pressing
issues of widening inequalities and unemployment in the North African region. There is need for the
foreign policies of North African states to help foster the development of genuine democracy, press
freedom, and accountability in the region.

Algeria's attitude to the Arab uprisings was largely shaped by domestic considerations, security policy,
and geostrategic imperatives. Algerian leaders were concerned about the potential disintegrative effects
of the breakdown phase of authoritarian structures in neighboring countries on Algeria's internal
stability as well as on its status in the regional balance of power. The foreign policies by the
governments of North African states must show consistent behavioral patterns in external relations. The
end-means pronouncement by the actors must be consistent so as to simultaneously undertake
openings and reforms in the political arena and affect far-reaching economic reforms. The experiences
of these North African countries over the past eleven years demonstrate that the postponement of
economic reforms has the ability to threaten or even retard progress made on the political front.

Conclusion

The study has revealed how centralization and opacity have been constants in the foreign policy
decision-making process under some selected North African states, and analyzed the cohabitation
period in the exercise of power between apparently very different political forces in the North African
countries. North Africa'sforeign policy has shown both continuities and discontinuities before and after
the Arab Spring. Among the continuities are the North Africa's unity, regional security network, and
economic development. However, there have been clear contending issues, challenges or
inconsistencies in North Africa's implementation of their national interests within the African milieu as a
result of despotic tendencies and poor democratic ideals and dynamics of anti-democratic policies.
Progress in democratization and socio-economic development are intrinsically linked to increased
international leadership roles and responsibilities, requiring a conducive domestic environment for
foreign policy-making, implementation and analysis.
The global environment is in a flux and concerns for sovereignty, survival and economic development
remain primary preoccupations of nation states. In this light, North Africa's present foreign policy
demands a new approach to move from despotism to diplomacy in order to engender social, economic,
cultural, and political development under democratic rule in the pursuit of good governance, African
unity, and global peace and security. Finally, attention must be paid to enduring democratic reforms in
the North African region and economy in order to bring about enduring institutions and sustainable
development as a desideratum for the states in the region to play their role at the global stage. The
immediate political changes and benefits of the aftermath of the Arab Spring have been fragile and
diminished, but the little successes must be sustained and consolidated in order to set a firm foundation
for emancipation of the masses, respect for due process and human rights, transparency and
accountability, security provisioning, and a concomitant virile foreign policy.

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