Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 49549 August 30, 1990

EVELYN CHUA-QUA, petitioner, vs.

HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant, and TAY TUNG HIGH
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

William C. Gunitang and Jaime Opinion for petitioner.

Laogan Law Offices for private respondent.

REGALADO, J.:

This would have been just another illegal dismissal case were it not for the controversial and unique situation
that the marriage of herein petitioner, then a classroom teacher, to her student who was fourteen (14) years
her junior, was considered by the school authorities as sufficient basis for terminating her services.

Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is an educational institution in Bacolod City. Petitioner had
been employed therein as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 when this dispute arose, was the class adviser in
the sixth grade where one Bobby Qua was enrolled. Since it was the policy of the school to extend remedial
instructions to its students, Bobby Qua was imparted such instructions in school by petitioner. 1 In the course
thereof, the couple fell in love and on December 24, 1975, they got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in
Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo.2 Petitioner was then thirty (30) years of age but
Bobby Qua being sixteen (16) years old, consent and advice to the marriage was given by his mother, Mrs.
Concepcion Ong.3 Their marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding
solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City on January 10, 1976. 4

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub-regional office of the Department of Labor at
Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground:
"For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued
employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school." 5

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976. 6 Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y.
Aguirre, Jr. of the National Labor Relations Commission, Bacolod City, to whom the case was certified for
resolution, required the parties to submit their position papers and supporting evidence. Affidavits 7 were
submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, "defying all standards of decency,
recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section
and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation." 8 More specifically, private respondent raised issues on the
fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone
home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing,
rendered an "Award" in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate
the employment of petitioner. It was held therein that —

The affidavits . . . although self-serving but were never disputed by the respondent pointed out
that before the marriage of respondent to Bobby Qua, fourteen (14) years her junior and during
her employment with petitioner, an amorous relationship existed between them. In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, the undisputed written testimonies of several witnesses
convincingly picture the circumstances
 under which such amorous relationship was manifested within the premises of the school,
inside the classroom, and within the sight of some employees. While no direct evidences have
been introduced to show that immoral acts were committed during these times, it is however
enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place
during these times. . . . 9

10
Petitioner, however, denied having received any copy of the affidavits referred to.

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission claiming denial of due
process for not having been furnished copies of the aforesaid affidavits relied on by the labor arbiter. She
further contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a
dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student. 11

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter's
decision and ordered petitioner's reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a
classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chin are of the same tenor. No statements
whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

Even if we have to strain our sense of moral values to accommodate the conclusion of the Arbiter, we could
not deduce anything immoral or scandalous about a girl and a boy talking inside a room after classes with
lights on and with the door open.

Petitioner-appellee naively insisted that the clearance application was precipitated by immoral acts which did
not lend dignity to the position of appellant. Aside from such gratuitous assertions of immoral acts or conduct
by herein appellant, no evidence to support such claims was introduced by petitioner-appellee. We reviewed
the the sequence of events from the beginning of the relationship between appellant Evelyn Chua and Bobby
Qua up to the date of the filing of the present application for clearance in search of evidence that could have
proved detrimental to the image and dignity of the school but none has come to our attention. .

The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who, on March 30, 1977, reversed the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months
salary as financial assistance. 13

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the
Philippines. 14 After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential
Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private
respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual
reinstatement. 15

Having run the gamut of three prior adjudications of the case with alternating reversals, one would think that
this decision of public respondent wrote finis to petitioner's calvary. However, in a resolution dated December
6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration 16 of herein private respondent and despite
opposition thereto, 17 reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the
application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but
giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary. 18

In thus reconsidering his earlier decision, public respondent reasoned out in his manifestation/comment filed
on August 14, 1979 in this Court in the present case:

That this Office did not limit itself to the legal issues involved in the case, but went further to view the matter
from the standpoint of policy which involves the delicate task of rearing and educating of children whose
interest must be held paramount in the school community, and on this basis, this Office deemed it wise to
uphold the judgment and action of the school authorities in terminating the services of a teacher whose
actuations and behavior, in the belief of the school authorities, had spawned ugly rumors that had cast serious
doubts on her integrity, a situation which was considered by them as not healthy for a school campus,
believing that a school teacher should at all times act with utmost circumspection and conduct herself beyond
reproach and above suspicion; 19

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner relies on the following grounds for the reversal of the aforesaid resolution
of public respondent, viz.:

1. The dismissal or termination of petitioner's employment, despite Tay Tung's claim to the contrary, was
actually based on her marriage with her pupil and is, therefore, illegal.

2. Petitioner's right to due process under the Constitution was violated when the hearsay affidavits of
Laddy Maselliones, Eleuterio Despi, Pina D. Chiu, and Ong Lee Bing, were admitted and considered in
evidence without presenting the affiants as witnesses and affording the petitioner the right to confront and
cross-examine them.

3. No sufficient proofs were adduced to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached
the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283
(Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment. 20

We first dispose of petitioner's claim that her right to due process was violated. We do not agree. There is no
denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to present his side. Also, the procedure by
which issues are resolved based on position papers, affidavits and other documentary evidence is recognized
as not violative of such right. Moreover, petitioner could have insisted on a hearing to confront and cross-
examine the affiants but she did not do so, obviously because she was convinced that the case involves a
question of law. Besides, said affidavits were also cited and discussed by her in the proceedings before the
Ministry of Labor.

Now, on the merits. Citing its upright intention to preserve the respect of the community toward the teachers
and to strengthen the educational system, private respondent submits that petitioner's actuations as a teacher
constitute serious misconduct, if not an immoral act, a breach of trust and confidence reposed upon her and,
thus, a valid and just ground to terminate her services. It argues that as a school teacher who exercises
substitute parental authority over her pupils inside the school campus, petitioner had moral ascendancy over
Bobby Qua and, therefore, she must not abuse such authority and respect extended to her. Furthermore, it
charged petitioner with having allegedly violated the Code of Ethics for teachers the pertinent provision of
which states that a "school official or teacher should never take advantage of his/her position to court a pupil or
student." 21

On the other hand, petitioner maintains that there was no ground to terminate her services as there is nothing
wrong with a teacher falling in love with her pupil and, subsequently, contracting a lawful marriage with him.
She argued that she was dismissed because of her marriage with Bobby Qua This contention was sustained in
the aforesaid decision of the National Labor Relations Commission thus:

. . . One thing, however, has not escaped our observation: That the application for clearance was filed only
after more than one month elapsed from the date of appellant's marriage to Bobby Qua Certainly, such belated
application for clearance weakens instead of strengthening the cause of petitioner-appellee. The alleged
immoral acts transpired before the marriage and if it is these alleged undignified conduct that triggered the
intended separation, then why was the present application for clearance not filed at that time when the alleged
demoralizing effect was still fresh and abrasive?22

After a painstaking perusal of the records, we are of the considered view that the determination of the legality
of the dismissal hinges on the issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to prove that the
antecedent facts which culminated in the marriage between petitioner and her student constitute immorality
and/or grave misconduct. To constitute immorality, the circumstances of each particular case must be
holistically considered and evaluated in the light of prevailing norms of conduct and the applicable law.
Contrary to what petitioner had insisted on from the very start, what is before us is a factual question, the
resolution of which is better left to the trier of facts.

Considering that there was no formal hearing conducted, we are constrained to review the factual conclusions
arrived at by public respondent, and to nullify his decision through the extraordinary writ of certiorari if the
same is tainted by absence or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The findings of fact must be
supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, this Court is not bound thereby.23

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion. As vividly and forcefully observed by him
in his original decision:

Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor (actually the records referred to are the
affidavits attached as Annexes "A" to "D" of the position paper dated August 10, 1976 filed by appellee at the
arbitration proceedings) in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit, leaving many
question unanswered by a rational mind. For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off
school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But
the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and
the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete
absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student. For another, and very
important at that, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but
the disciplinenary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the
affidavits were executed only in August, 1976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its
counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after-thought. . . . The action
pursued by appellee in dismissing appellant over one month after her marriage, allegedly based on immoral
acts committed even much earlier, is open to basis of the action sought seriously doubted; on the question.
The basis of the action sought is seriously doubted; on the contrary, we are more inclined to believe that
appellee had certain selfish, ulterior and undisclosed motives known only to itself. 24

As earlier stated, from the outset even the labor arbiter conceded that there was no direct evidence to show
that immoral acts were committed. Nonetheless, indulging in a patently unfair conjecture, he concluded that "it
is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired during those times."
25
In reversing his decision, the National Labor Relations Commission observed that the assertions of immoral
acts or conducts are gratuitous and that there is no direct evidence to support such claim, 26 a finding which
herein public respondent himself shared. We are, therefore, at a loss as to how public respondent could adopt
the volte-face in the questioned
resolution, which we hereby reject, despite his prior trenchant observations hereinbefore quoted. What is
revealing however, is that the reversal of his original decision is inexplicably based on unsubstantiated
surmises and non sequiturs which he incorporated in his assailed resolution in this wise:

. . . While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the
classroom it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the
solitude of the classroom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the
best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those
times of the day. . . . 27

With the finding that there is no substantial evidence of the imputed immoral acts, it follows that the alleged
violation of the Code of Ethics governing school teachers would have no basis. Private respondent utterly
failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in
love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the
heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal
emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage
from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

It would seem quite obvious that the avowed policy of the school in rearing and educating children is being
unnecessarily bannered to justify the dismissal of petitioner. This policy, however, is not at odds with and
should not be capitalized on to defeat the security of tenure granted by the
Constitution to labor. In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an
employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and
illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been
inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any
prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated
December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc.
is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or
qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras and Padilla, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

A.M. No. RTJ-04-1868 August 13, 2004

RE: REQUEST OF JUDGE TITO G. GUSTILO THAT THE SECOND 25% GRANT OF THE
SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR JUDGES BE INCLUDED IN THE COMPUTATION OF HIS RETIREMENT
BENEFITS

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

In his Letter dated May 26, 2004 addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., Judge Tito G.
Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23, avers that he is due to retire at the age of 70
(compulsory retirement) on September 29, 2004. By then, he would have served the Judiciary for 21 years; 7
years and 11-and-1/2 months of which as Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City. Judge Gustilo requests
that, considering his retirement is "barely one month from November 2004," the second tranche of the Special
Allowance granted to judges under Republic Act No. 92271 be included in the computation of his retirement
benefits.

To recall, Rep. Act No. 9227, which took effect on November 11, 2003,2 granted additional compensation in the
form of Special Allowance to justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of
justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court. Section 2 thereof reads:

Sec. 2. Grant of Special Allowances. – All justices, judges and all other positions in the
Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as
authorized under existing laws shall be granted special allowances equivalent to one hundred percent (100%)
of the basic monthly salary specified for their respective salary grades under Republic Act No. 6758, as
amended, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, to be implemented for a period of four (4)
years.

The grant of special allowances shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent to twenty-
five percent (25%) of the basic salaries of the positions covered hereof. Subsequent implementation shall be in
such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by the funding source specified in
Section 3 hereof.

Further, Section 5 of the same law provides:

Sec. 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. – For purposes of retirement, only the
allowances actually received and the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented
and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included in the computation of their
respective retirement benefits.

On March 9, 2004, in A.M. No. 03-12-04-SC (Re: Possible Means to Implement the Special Allowance under
R.A. 9227 and to Increase the Judiciary Development Fund), the Court promulgated the GUIDELINES ON
THE GRANT OF ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION IN THE FORM OF SPECIAL ALLOWANCE FOR
JUSTICES AND JUDGES IN THE JUDICIARY AND ALL OTHER
OFFICIALS WITH THE EQUIVALENT RANK OF JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND JUDGES
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. The Guidelines provide for the manner of the implementation in this wise:

4.1 The Special Allowance shall be implemented uniformly in such sums or amounts equivalent to
twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual basic monthly salaries for the positions covered starting 11
November 2003 until the one hundred percent (100%) special allowance is fully implemented.

If the source of fund is insufficient to cover the twenty-five percent (25%) special allowance for any
year, it shall be granted in such sums and amounts and up to the extent only that can be supported by
 the funding source specified in Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 9227; provided that annually the special
allowance shall always be twenty-five percent (25%) of the actual "basic monthly salary."

The Guidelines, likewise, reiterate that:

4.2 For purposes of computing the retirement benefits, only the special allowance actually received and
that which has accrued at the time of retirement shall be included.

Paragraph 7.0 thereof states that cases not covered thereby shall be referred to the Chief Justice for
resolution.

Judge Gustilo claims that pursuant to OCA Circular No. 48-2004 dated March 3, 2004, the first tranche of the
Special Allowance equivalent to 25% was implemented starting November 11, 2003. The next 25% (second
tranche) will be implemented on November 11, 2004. In this connection, Judge Gustilo appeals to the Chief
Justice that, in the computation of his retirement benefits, the second tranche of the Special Allowance be
included since his retirement is only one (1) month and twelve (12) days before its implementation on
November 11, 2004.

In support thereof, Judge Gustilo points out that "in the past, Judges who retire in October are included in the
grant of the December 13th month pay." He, thus, invokes the "liberal policy" of the Court "in granting benefits
to the underpaid Trial Court Judges."

In the Memorandum dated June 18, 2004 for the Chief Justice, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) 3
recommends that the request of Judge Gustilo be granted. The OCA cites Judge Gustilo’s service record in the
Judiciary, which started on January 18, 1983, including his exemplary record of disposing cases at an average
of 2.25 cases each month. It also mentions that Judge Gustilo, as Executive Judge, introduced several
innovations in the Iloilo City courts and was able to manage well the 17 judges under his administrative
supervision. Further, Judge Gustilo was the recipient of several "awards and recognitions."4 Considering the
foregoing, the OCA concludes that "it is but just and fair that the second additional Special Allowance of 25%
be granted to him and included in the computation of his retirement benefits." 5

In compliance with the Court’s Resolution dated July 6, 2004, referring Judge Gustilo’s letter and the OCA’s
memorandum to her for study and recommendation, Chief Attorney Edna E. Diño submitted her Report dated
July 15, 2004. The Chief Attorney recommends that Judge Gustilo’s request be denied for not being in accord
with Rep. Act No. 9227 and the Guidelines promulgated by the Court.

After a careful evaluation of Judge Gustilo’s letter, the OCA’s memorandum and the Chief Attorney’s report,
the Court, regrettably, cannot grant the request of Judge Gustilo.

It is axiomatic that when the law is clear, the function of the courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.6 With respect to the manner of computation of the retirement benefits in light of the Special
Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227, Section 5 thereof, quoted anew below, could not be any clearer:

Sec. 5. Inclusion in the Computation of Retirement Benefits. – For purposes of retirement, only the
allowances actually received and the tranche or tranches of the special allowance already implemented
and received pursuant to this Act by the justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the
equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized
under existing laws shall, at the date of their retirement, be included in the computation of their
respective retirement benefits.

A plain reading of the above provision shows that, for purposes of retirement, only the allowances
"actually received" and the tranche or tranches "already received and implemented," upon the date of
retirement, shall be included in the computation of the retirement benefits. Otherwise put, before the Special
Allowance could be considered in the computation of retirement benefits, it should have been "actually
received" and the tranche or tranches thereof should have been "already implemented and received" at the
date of retirement.

Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is clear and unambiguous. There is no room for its interpretation. Further, the
foregoing exchange among the members of the Bicameral Conference Committee7 on the Disagreeing
Provisions of Senate Bill (SB) No. 2018 and House Bill (HB) No. 51788 is particularly instructive:

...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Accepted.

Section 4. No questions? (Silence)

Section 5. (Silence)

Just again for purposes of record and clarification, Section 5, lines 3 and 4, "For purposes of retirement, only
the allowances actually received…," and so forth and so on, I just like to make it clear that the computation of
retirement would include the salary already being received, plus the special allowance.

THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Yes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Because this seems to suggest that you compute, rather the
computation of retirement will be on the basis only of the special allowance. So, at least, let’s make that on
record.

THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Yes. On record, yes.

And I think that first word in the title of Section 5, "Inclusion" also explains that.

REP. LIBANAN. Mr. Chairman.

THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Congressman Libanan.

REP. LIBANAN. For the sake of further clarification, would it mean that if, for example, a judge retires on the
second year of the implementation, so his retirement benefits would be only computed….

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). On the basis of what he is already receiving.

REP. LIBANAN. … on the basis of [what] he is receiving, not on the 100 percent.

THE CO-CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Actually receiving. That is correct.

REP. LIBANAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

...

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Can we now go back to Section 5?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Section 5, Mr. Chairman, just a suggestion but in the House panel

SEN. ARROYO. Kasi kung mandatory, doon sa voluntary, hindi naman dapat iyon.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). I’ll be constrained to withdraw my proposal.
SEN. ARROYO. But your idea is very attractive.

SEN. VILLAR. In fact, it’s too attractive. In the first place, iyong allowance is already part of the retirement
benefit. Iyon, malaking bagay na iyon, eh.

Mr. Chairman, may add-on pa. Medyo sobra naman yata na iyon.

SEN. ARROYO. No, because by the accident of birth, when they retire, they retire on the second year,
halimbawa, 68 sila ngayon. Pagkatapos, mandatorily they have to retire at the age of 70, di iyong benefits nila
is …

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). For those born in 1934 up to 1937.

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). But the fact here remains, the allowances they have been receiving so far
which is over and above, kasama na talaga sa retirement. I mean, sobra-sobra na, eh. Lahat na lang ng
allowance na puwedeng gawin, nandoon na, eh. At saka nagre-retire pa sila sa 70, ibig sabihin talagang
marami na iyan.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). Okay?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). So, as is?

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. ANDAYA). Nandoon na, eh.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. PANGILINAN). So, whether they retire at 60 or 70, whether they opt for early
retirement or mandatory retirement, they will receive the actual. Would it not be a good idea to encourage them
to stay on …9

Thus, the congressional records as well as the text itself of Rep. Act No. 9227 reveal the unequivocal intention
of the lawmakers that only the Special Allowance actually received at the date of retirement shall be included
in the computation of the retirement benefits.

The Guidelines promulgated by this Court pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9227 is even more definite as it used the
term "accrued" in this wise: "only the special allowance actually received and that which has accrued at the
time of retirement shall be included." As correctly reasoned by the Chief Attorney:

Notably, the phrase "has accrued at the time of retirement" is used in the Guidelines instead of "the tranche or
tranches of the special allowance already implemented and received" which is used in Section 5 of Rep. Act
No. 9227. Nevertheless, the same meaning is conveyed. The word "accrue" means "to come into existence as
an enforceable claim: vest as a right" or "to come by way of increase or addition: arise as a growth or result" or
"to be periodically accumulated in the process of time whether as an increase or a decrease." Hence, a
Special Allowance that has not yet come into existence as an enforceable claim or has not yet vested on the
recipient judge as a matter of right cannot be considered in the computation of retirement benefits. 10

Indeed, "accrue" in its past tense is "in sense of due and demandable; vested."11 In the case of Judge Gustilo,
on the date of his retirement, the second tranche of the Special Allowance has not accrued as yet; hence, it
cannot be said that the same is due and demandable or that it has vested insofar as he is concerned.

The Chief Attorney, likewise, correctly posits that the strict application of Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is
called for by the fact that, under Section 3 thereof,12 the source for the Special Allowance is the Judiciary
Development Fund (JDF), established under Presidential Decree No. 1949, which basically comes from the
docket fees paid by litigants:
... As such, the JDF as a fund source is not constant or fixed in amount, as its amount depends on the amount
collected by the courts and the amount of increase in docket fees that the Court would impose. The fact of the
JDF becoming insufficient has been foreseen by the Court and is reflected in the second paragraph of 4.1 of
the Guidelines quoted above. It is worth noting that until now, the first tranche of the Special Allowance has
been received only for the months of 11 November 2003 until February 2004. The delay in receipt thereof may
continue if courts nationwide do not timely transmit the reports of collections to the OCA, as the JDF should be
disbursed only if the reports of collections and the deposits under the JDF account for the Special Allowance
tally in accordance with accounting and auditing rules.13

While this Court had, in certain cases,14 adopted a liberal stance in interpreting retirement laws in favor of the
retiree, it cannot do so in this case because, as earlier stated, Section 5 of Rep. Act No. 9227 is quite clear and
unambiguous. In other words, there is no room for interpretation but only simple application of the law.

ACCORDINGLY, the request of Judge Tito G. Gustilo that the second 25% or second tranche of the Special
Allowance granted under Rep. Act No. 9227 be included in the computation of his retirement benefits is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1
An Act Granting Additional Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices, Judges
and all Other Positions in the Judiciary with the Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals
and Judges of the Regional Trial Court, and For Other Purposes.

2
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9227 provides that it "shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its
publication in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation." It was published in Today
on October 25, 2003 and the Times on October 27, 2003.

3
Signed by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. and Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepaño.

4
These awards are: (1) National Awardee of the 3rd PNP Anniversary on January 29, 1994 at Camp
Crame, Quezon City; (2) Plaque of Recognition for his services as Executive Judge given on March
4, 1991; (3) Plaque of Appreciation given by the IBP, Iloilo Chapter, on April 4, 1997; (4) Certificate
of Appreciation given at the Forum with Educators, Media and other Concerned Sectors on
Enhancing Communication Between the Judiciary and the Citizenry, given at the Days Hotel, Iloilo
City, on September 11, 1998; and (5) Certificate of Recognition for his assistance to the Supreme
Court Centenary Celebrations Executive Committee, given on June 11, 2001.

5
Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator, p. 2.

6
AB Leasing and Finance Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 405 SCRA 380 (2003).

7
The Senate Conferees were Senators Francis Pangilinan, Manuel Villar, Jr., Joker Arroyo, Edgardo
Angara and John Osmeña.

The House of Representatives Conferees were Representatives Rolando Andaya, Jr., Marcelino
Libanan, Rodolfo Albano, Jr., Danton Bueser, Rolex Suplico, Gilbert Remulla and Bellaflor Angara-
Castillo.

8
SB No. 2018 and HB No. 5178 became Rep. Act No. 9227.
 9
Deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of SB No. 2018
and HB No. 5178, September 3, 2003, pp. 17-32.

10
Report of the Chief Attorney dated July 15, 2004, p. 5.

11
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed., p. 19.

12
The said provision states:

Sec. 3. Funding Source. – The amount necessary to implement the additional compensation in the form of
special allowances granted under this Act shall be sourced from, and charged against, the legal fees
originally prescribed, imposed and collected under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court prior to the promulgation of
the amendments under Presidential Decree No. 1949, dated July 18, 1984, and from the increases in current
fees and new fees which may be imposed by the Supreme Court of the Philippines after the effectivity of this
Act.

In the event that the said amounts are insufficient to cover the grant of allowances on the last year of
implementation of this Act, the National Government shall subsidize the special allowance granted for
justices, judges and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of
Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial Court as authorized under existing laws in an amount not exceeding
One hundred sixty-five million pesos (Php165,000,000.00) per annum.

If the collections from any increase in current fees and any new fees imposed after the effectivity of this Act
exceed the amount needed to fund the special allowances granted to justices, judges and all other positions
in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of the Regional Trial
Court as authorized under existing laws, the surplus may be used by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
to grant additional allowances exclusively to other court personnel not covered by the benefits granted under
this Act.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT Manila

EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant, vs.

ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M.
Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced
respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with
whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I
miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of
the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second
occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the
venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its
face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding
to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for
you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal
pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for
the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to
love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the
life in me is gone and until we are together again.
 Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always
remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL
ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still
later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert,
she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP
as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001,
the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega
Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila
Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed
together; their picture was captioned:
"Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics
and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship"
supplied), respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and that
Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary
Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his
apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making
him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of
marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are
together again," as now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding his
adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to
 keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as
in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling
the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his abovequoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was
merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution
regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer,
has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked
the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits
adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being
that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile
special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to
grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of
the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father
of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10,
2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached
to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case
filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery against
respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct (Underscoring supplied), and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
 Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:

RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-
entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of
the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-
quoted 33-word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published
in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is
carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on
record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made
the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that]
their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their respective
families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special"
relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the
Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H1") sufficiently prove that
there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene which resulted in the birth of
the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that
complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child.
Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to
believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It
 should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he is the father of
Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman
who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of
her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What
respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile and known only
to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not
squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a
negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an
implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the
substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or modifying language
and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been held that the
qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha
Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent – a "lawyer," 38 years
old – as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE
AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the certificate 28 with her
signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the same person. Notatu
dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the
child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of
Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer. 31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more
than clearly preponderant evidence – that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and
credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other 32 – which is the quantum
of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence"
is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. ─ A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied), under scandalous
circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods.

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding
circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who
is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant,
albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarried adults
is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of
the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of
the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been
carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely
low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders him
regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his license confers upon
him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear
that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey
the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the
courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by
the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of
Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for
nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based
on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the Department of
Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition
for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are
inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which
provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has
been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The
acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent
should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and void, and despite
respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state
that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had
already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ
Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department,
sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early
on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this
she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her.
Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent
Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was
married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant
had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both
respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11 th Street,
New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's
were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts
that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said
address appears to be a residential house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation
from complainant. It was both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there
bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl,
Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful and
damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed illegal procurement of
the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied,
in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the
DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and
Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same
would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings.
The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original), this Court in Gatchalian
Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath
of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the
Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.