Velasco, Sharmaine J.

– BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law

Case Digest

Makati Stock Exchange, Inc. vs. Securities and Exchange

Commission

G.R. No. L-23004, 30 June 1965

Facts:

The Makati Stock Exchange sought permission from the

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to operate a stock
exchange. Under the Securities Act, no stock exchange may
operate in the Philippines without prior registration with the
SEC, which has the authority to grant or deny such registration.
However, in its resolution, the SEC imposed a condition that the
Makati Stock Exchange could not list securities already listed on
the Manila Stock Exchange to prevent double listing. This
condition, known as the SEC’s rule against double listing,
prohibits a security already listed on one exchange from being
listed on another.

The Makati Stock Exchange objected to this requirement,

contending that the SEC had no power to impose it and that it
was illegal, discriminatory, and unjust. Furthermore, they argued
that the SEC’s order would make it practically impossible for the
stock exchange to operate, adding that its so-called “permission”
amounted to a “prohibition.” The SEC, on the other hand,
maintained that the rule was in the public interest and necessary
to protect investors. It also argued that allowing double listing
could divide buyers and sellers, undermining the efficiency of the
stock exchange as a centralized market.

Issue:

Does the Securities and Exchange Commission have the

authority to promulgate the rule in question?

Ruling:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

No. An administrative officer or body has only the powers

expressly granted by law and those necessarily implied
therefrom. The Securities Act does not grant the SEC the
authority to prohibit double listing or restrict the establishment
of new stock exchanges. This means that its general power to
“regulate” does not include the power to “prohibit.”

The SEC’s rule also violated the constitutional rights of the

Makati Stock Exchange, including the right to equality before the
law, the right to pursue lawful employment, and the right to free
enterprise. Hence, the license of the Makati Stock Exchange was
approved without the condition against double listing
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Board of

Communications

G.R. No. L-43653, 29 November 1977

Facts:

Diego Morales claimed that his daughter sent him a

telegram via Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc.
(RCPI) from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of his wife’s death.
However, he never received it. As a result, he had to be informed
in person and rushed to catch a flight to Isabela for the burial.
RCPI argued that when the telegram reached its message center
in Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent, making the copy
received in Sta. Cruz, Manila, unreadable.

Similarly, Pacifico Inocencio's case involved a telegram sent

by Lourdes Inocencio from Paniqui, Tarlac, informing him of
their father’s death. The message, also sent through RCPI, never
reached him, and the sender was not notified of the non-delivery.
Months later, when he visited his hometown, he was shocked to
learn about his father’s passing. He claimed to have suffered
mental anguish and personal inconvenience.

Due to these failures, Morales and Inocencio sought

damages. The Board of Communications ruled that RCPI’s
service was unsatisfactory and imposed a disciplinary fine of
P200. However, RCPI argued that the board had no jurisdiction
to handle complaints related to breaches of contractual
obligations.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Issue:

Does the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over

cases involving complaints for injury caused by failure of RCPI to
transmit telegrams and impose fines for such failures?

Ruling:

No. The Board of Communications, as a regulatory body and

not a court, can only exercise powers expressly granted by law. It
does not have the authority to adjudicate claims for damages
arising from contractual breaches or negligence. Therefore, such
claims should be filed in the courts, not before the Board of
Communications.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Matienzo vs. Abellera

G.R. No. L-45839, 1 June 1988

Facts:

The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized

taxicab operators in Manila. However, the respondents
admittedly operate “colorum” or “kabit” taxicab units. In the
second week of February 1977, the private respondents filed a
petition with the Board of Transportation (BOT) seeking the
legalization of their unauthorized “excess” taxicab units. They
cited Presidential Decree (PD) 101, promulgated on January 17,
1973 with the purpose to eradicate unlawful clandestine
operations by allowing unauthorized operators to become
legitimate and responsible. The BOT then granted them
provisional authority to operate their excess taxicab units.

The petitioners, as authorized taxicab operators, opposed

the application, arguing that the BOT acted without jurisdiction
in legalizing and awarding special permits to the private
respondents. They contended that the Board had no authority to
act beyond the six-month period prescribed in Section 4 of PD
101, following the decree’s promulgation, as it had already
served its purpose.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Issue:

Does the Board of Transportation have the power, at the

time the petitions were filed, to legitimize clandestine operations
under the Decree?

Ruling:

Yes. Section 1, PD 101, grants the Board of Transportation

(BOT) the authority to issue provisional permits as a step toward
the legalizing colorum taxicab operations, without the alleged
time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, as cited by the
petitioners, suggests the expiration of such powers six (6)
months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides that after this period, the State withdraws its waiver of
the right to punish colorum operators for their illegal acts.

The powers granted to administrative bodies like the BOT

should be liberally construed in light of the purposes for which it
was created. In this case, the BOT’s authority to legalize
clandestine operations under PD 101 was essential in fulfilling
the Decree’s goal of eradicating illegal taxicab operators.

Therefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Vda. De Herrera vs. Bernardo

G.R. No. 170251, 1 June 2011

Facts:

The respondents, heirs of Crisanto S. Bernardo, represented

by Emelita Bernardo, filed a complaint against Alfredo Herrera
before the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP), an administrative body established by virtue of
Executive Order 561. They accused him of interference,
disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment, and trespassing on a
portion of a parcel of land located in Barangay Dalig, Cardona,
Rizal, with an area of 7,993 square meters. The respondents
claimed that the land was originally owned by their predecessor-
in-interest, Crisanto Bernardo, and was later acquired by
Crisanto S. Bernardo.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

The COSLAP ruled in favor of the respondents, affirming

their rightful claim over the property. Alfredo Herrera then filed
a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Following this,
Celia S. Vda. De Herrera, the surviving spouse of Alfredo, filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). However,
the CA dismissed the petition and upheld the COSLAP’s
resolution. The appellate court ruled that COSLAP had exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. Moreover, even if it were assumed
that COSLAP lacked jurisdiction over the land dispute, the
petitioner was already estopped from raising the issue. This was
because Alfredo Herrera had failed to challenge the jurisdiction
before COSLAP and had actively participated in the proceedings.

ISSUE:

Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction to decide the question

of ownership between the parties?

RULING:

No. Administrative agencies like the COSLAP have limited

jurisdiction and can only exercise powers specifically granted by
the law that created them. Under Executive Order (EO) No. 561,
COSLAP was established to provide mechanisms for the
expeditious settlement of land disputes among small settlers,
landowners, and members of cultural minorities to prevent social
unrest.

Furthermore, Section 3 of EO No. 561 enumerates the

instances in which COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory
functions. The present case does not fall under any of these
instances. Specifically, the dispute not critical and explosive in
nature, and it does not involve large number of parties. As a
result, it does not meet the criteria for COSLAP’s jurisdiction.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Therefore, COSLAP has no authority to decide the question

of ownership. The petition is granted, and the decision of
COSLAP is declared null and void.

Ruperto vs. Torres

G.R. No. L-8785, 25 February 1957

Fact:

A complaint was filed against Cornelito S. Ruperto, an

Assistant Fiscal of the City of Manila, before the Integrity Board,
chaired by Hon. Luis P. Torres. The complaint charged Ruperto
with: (1) disloyalty to service, (2) partiality, (3) favoritism, (4)
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

violation of his oath of office, and (5) acquisition of substantial

real estate beyond his government salary.

After conducting a hearing, the Board found sufficient

evidence to support the charges, concluding that Ruperto had
used his public office to favor his friends and prosecute their
enemies, rather than maintaining impartiality in his official
duties. Consequently, the Board recommended that Ruperto be
reprimanded and warned that any future misconduct would be
dealt with more severely.

The Integrity Board was established under Executive Order

No. 318 on May 25, 1950, with the mandate to investigate graft,
corruption, dereliction of duty, or other irregularities in office
and to submit its findings and recommendations to the President.
On December 30, 1953, the Integrity Board was replaced by the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, which had the
same powers, duties, and functions. Ruperto argued that
certiorari does not apply to the Integrity Board, as it only
exercises investigatory and advisory powers.

Issue:

Was the defunct Integrity Board or its successor,

Presidential Complaints and Action Commission, a board
exercising judicial functions?

Ruling:

No. The Board does not exercise judicial functions. Its role
is limited to conducting investigations and making factual
findings. It does not adjudicate rights, interests, or duties of
parties, as the authority to pass final judgment on the matters it
investigates rests with the President.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

While the Board exercises some degree of judicial discretion

in evaluating evidence and determining facts, this discretion is
solely for investigative purposes. The test of a judicial function is
not merely the exercise of judgment or discretion but the power
to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of parties. Since the
Board lacks the authority to make final pronouncements affecting
the parties, certiorari is not applicable in this case.

Carmelo vs. Ramos

Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

G.R. No. L-17778, 30 November 1962

Facts:

An executive order was issued by the Mayor of Manila

establishing a committee to investigate the anomalies involving
license inspectors and personnel from the License Inspection
Division of the Office of the City Treasurer, as well as the License
and Permits Division of the Office of the Mayor. He named Mr.
Jesus L. Carmelo as chairman of said committee.

In a statement to the Mayor's office, Armando Ramos, a

bookkeeper at Casa de Alba, admitted to misappropriating funds
intended for the company’s taxes from 1956 to 1959. His
practice of entertaining employees from the City Treasurer's
office at Casa de Alba helped conceal his misconduct. The
committee issued subpoenas requiring Ramos to appear before it
on June 3, 8, 9, 15, 16, and August 4 and 11, 1960, in connection
with an administrative case against Crisanto Estanislao.
However, Ramos refused to appear.

Claiming that Ramos' refusal impeded, obstructed, or

degraded the administrative proceedings, Carmelo, as chairman
of the probe committee, filed a petition in the Court of First
Instance of Manila to have Ramos declared in contempt. The trial
court dismissed the petition, ruling that no law grants
committees created by municipal mayors the authority to issue
subpoenas or compel witnesses to testify under oath. The court
also held that forcing Ramos to testify would violate his right
against self-incrimination.

Issue:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Does the committee have the power to subpoena witnesses

to appear before it and to ask their punishment in case of
refusal?

Ruling:

No. The committee has no authority to cite witnesses or

seek their punishment for refusal to appear. The executive order
creating the committee does not grant such power.

The Mayor’s delegated power to investigate does not imply

the authority to compel testimony or gather evidence from
witnesses through subpoenas. Any power the committee claims
can only be traced to the Mayor’s authority to investigate, which
is derived from his power to suspend or remove city employees.
There is no statutory provision granting the committee the power
to conduct investigations.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Evangelista vs. Jarencio

G.R. No. L-29274, 27 November 1975

Facts:

Executive Order No. 4, issued on January 7, 1966,

established the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO). The President of the Philippines granted
the agency all the powers of an investigating committee,
including the authority to summon witnesses through a subpoena
duces tecum, administer oaths, and take testimony or evidence
relevant to an investigation.

The respondents in this case are Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, the

Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
Fernando Manalastas, the then Acting City Public Service Officer
of Manila. Pursuant to the agency’s vested powers, petitioner
Quirico Evangelista, serving as Undersecretary of PARGO, issued
a subpoena ad testificandum to Manalastas, commanding him to
appear as a witness at the PARGO office. However, instead of
complying, Manalastas filed an amended petition for prohibition,
challenging the legality of the subpoena and the investigation.

Issue:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Whether the Agency, acting through its officials, enjoys the

authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations?

Ruling:

Yes, an administrative agency, acting through its officials,

has the authority to issue subpoenas when conducting fact-
finding investigations.

Administrative agencies may be authorized to conduct

investigations not only in legislative or judicial proceedings but
also in purely investigatory proceedings aimed at gathering
information. This information may serve as the basis for future
legislative or judicial actions, and agencies may require the
attendance of witnesses as part of this process. The purpose of a
subpoena is to gather evidence, not to prove a pending charge,
but to determine whether a charge should be made based on the
discovered evidence.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Catura vs. Court of Industrial Relations

G.R. No. L-27392, 30 January 1971

Facts:

Pablo Catura and Luz Salvador, President and Treasurer of

the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees
Association, were accused of unauthorized disbursement of union
funds under Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act. The
complaint filed by the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) and led
by Celestino Tabaniag and other employees, representing over
10% of the union's membership, demanded transparency in the
union’s financial transactions.

The complainants requested a full financial report and

access to the union’s books and records, but the petitioners
refused. In response, the union's executive board called for a
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

general membership meeting to address the issue, but Catura

canceled it. A second meeting was scheduled but was also
ignored. The members then brought the matter to the
Department of Labor, which issued subpoenas for the financial
records—again, without compliance.

Having exhausted all internal remedies, the complainants

sought to have the petitioners declared guilty of unfair labor
practice and requested a court order to prevent further
violations. They also demanded full financial disclosure and
access to the union’s records.

The respondents sought an injunction to stop Catura, who

had been re-elected as President, from taking office. However,
Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador issued an order requiring
the petitioners to submit financial documents at the hearing
instead of granting the injunction. The petitioners later filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing they had not been given a
chance to be heard before the order was issued. The court
denied their motion, leading them to file a petition for review of
the CIR resolution.

Issue:

Whether the CIR, in the exercise of its power of

investigation to assure compliance with the internal labor
organization procedures under Section 17 of the Industrial
Peace Act, can require a labor organization’s “books of accounts,
bank accounts, passbooks, Union funds, receipts, vouchers and
other documents related to [its] finances” be delivered and
deposited with it at the hearing to conduct such investigation in
accordance with a complaint duly filed without the officials of
such labor organization?
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent court has the
authority to ensure compliance with internal labor organization
procedures and investigate alleged violations under Section
17(b), (h), and (1) of the Industrial Peace Act. The complaint
before the CIR involved unauthorized use of union funds and
failure to provide a detailed financial report. Given the
seriousness of these allegations, the court’s investigative power
was necessary to uphold union members' rights. The challenged
order simply required petitioners to submit relevant documents,
which falls within the court’s legal authority. Investigating
violations naturally involves examining existing facts and
conditions.

The Supreme Court upheld the authority of the CIR to

investigate alleged violations of union regulations, specifically
unauthorized disbursement of union funds and failure to provide
a full and detailed report of financial transactions. The CIR's
order requiring the petitioners to submit relevant documents was
within its statutory power. The Court also stated that denying the
CIR this authority would render its investigative functions
ineffective. Thus, the ruling affirmed that the power to
investigate includes the ability to require evidence to
substantiate alleged violations, ensuring that the rights and
conditions of union membership are protected. The petition for
review was hereby denied.

Lupangco vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 77372, 29 April 1988

Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Facts:

As the respondent, the Professional Regulation Commission

(PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its "Additional
Instructions to Examinees" for the accountancy licensure
examinations. This resolution prohibited examinees from
attending review classes, briefings, conferences, or similar
activities and receiving handouts, materials, or tips from any
review centers, schools, or universities during the three days
before the exam, including the exam day. It also imposed
sanctions on violators based on Sec. 8, Art. III of the PRC Rules
and Regulations.

The petitioners, reviewees preparing for the licensure exam,

filed a complaint for injunction with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila. They sought a writ of preliminary injunction to
prevent the enforcement of the resolution and to have it declared
unconstitutional.

In response, the PRC filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that

the RTC lacked jurisdiction to review and enjoin the enforcement
of its resolution. However, on the same day, the RTC ruled that it
had jurisdiction and issued an order preventing the PRC from
enforcing Resolution No. 105, declaring it unconstitutional. The
PRC then challenged this decision by filing a petition with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA granted the petition, ruling that
the RTC’s order was null and void because the PRC and RTC
were co-equal bodies, and one could not exercise control over
the other’s actions.

Issue:

Is the questioned resolution valid?

Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Ruling:

No. The resolution is unreasonable and arbitrary as it

violates the examinees' constitutional right to liberty and
infringes upon the academic freedom of the institutions involved.

While its purpose is to safeguard the integrity of licensure

examinations, its enforcement does not guarantee the
elimination or reduction of alleged leakages. Instead, it unfairly
restricts examinees from engaging in legitimate review activities
essential for their preparation. Rather than imposing such a
broad restriction, the respondent should focus on identifying and
addressing the actual source of the leakages. Therefore, the
resolution is null and void, and has no effect for being
unconstitutional.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

Olsen and Co., Inc. vs. Aldanese

G.R. No. L-18740, 28 April 1922

Facts:

The case involves Act No. 2613, which was designed to

enhance tobacco production, improve quality standards, and
develop the export trade by establishing specific regulatory
measures. Provisions of the act grant the Collector of Internal
Revenue the authority to formulate rules governing the
classification, marking, and packaging of tobacco, as well as to
enforce mandatory inspection requirements before exportation.

Under Clause B of Section 6, the Tobacco Inspection

Regulations (Administrative Order No. 35) were issued, requiring
cigars exported to the United States to be made under sanitary
conditions, using properly cured long-filler tobacco exclusively
from Cagayan, Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The regulation also
designates the Collector of Internal Revenue as a stamp agent
for the U.S. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, whose inspection
or certification allows the Insular Collector of Customs to issue
the necessary certificate of origin for exporting cigars duty-free
to the United States.

Walter E. Olsen & Co., Inc., a licensed domestic corporation

engaged in manufacturing and exporting cigars made from
Philippine-grown tobacco, applied for a certificate of origin for a
consignment of 10,000 cigars intended for export to the United
States, despite using short-filler tobacco, and not exclusively
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

from any of the three specified provinces. The Collector of

Internal Revenue denied the certificate, citing non-compliance
with the long-filler tobacco requirement. As a result, the Insular
Collector of Customs also refused to issue the certificate,
preventing exportation.

Challenging this decision, the petitioner questioned the

constitutionality of certain provisions in Act No. 2613 and
Administrative Order No. 35, arguing that the restrictions
violated its rights under the Tariff Act and Jones Law. The
company claimed that the Collector's refusal was unjustified and
wrongfully prevented its cigars from being exported.

Issue:

Is Administrative Order No. 35 in excess of the authority

granted by Act No. 2613?

Ruling:

No, Administrative Order No. 35 is not in excess of the

authority granted by Act No. 2613. The purpose of Act No. 2613
was to establish a proper standard for tobacco quality to ensure
equal rights and opportunities for all tobacco producers who
meet the same standard. It was not intended to create a standard
that would unfairly restrict the export of cigars to certain
provinces or impose different standards on tobacco from
different provinces, as that would constitute discrimination.

While Act No. 2613 does not provide specific details on how
tobacco quality standards should be set, it grants the Secretary
of the Treasury the authority to establish uniform standards for
tobacco's purity, quality, and fitness for export. Administrative
Order No. 35, also known as the Tobacco Inspection Regulations,
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

was created in line with this authority to ensure consistent

quality checks for tobacco being exported, particularly to the
USA.

Thus, Administrative Order No. 35 is consistent with the

intent of Act No. 2613 and does not exceed the authority granted
by the Act. It ensures that tobacco quality is uniformly
maintained across provinces, offering equal opportunities to all
producers who comply with the same standards.

Sy Man vs. Fabros

G.R. No. L-5612, 31 October 1953

Facts:

On January 2, 1951, the Collector of Customs for the Port of

Manila ordered the seizure of two shipments of textiles and
several sewing machines consigned to petitioner Sy Man,
operating under the name “United China Import Trading,” due to
alleged customs violations. On June 4, 1951, following a hearing,
the Collector issued a decision allowing the release of the textiles
upon payment of customs duties, sales tax, fines, and other
charges, but declared the sewing machines forfeited to the
government. The seized goods were to be sold at public auction
or destroyed if unsellable. The petitioner received the decision
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

on June 27, 1951, and on July 12, 1951, requested its execution,
claiming the decision had become final after the 15-day appeal
period had elapsed. On August 21, 1951, the petitioner reiterated
the request, urging the release of the textiles, which had not
been found to be in violation of the law. However, the Collector
informed the petitioner on August 24, 1951, that his
communications had been referred to the Commissioner of
Customs for review, and no response had been received from the
Commissioner’s office.

The petitioner then filed a petition seeking to invalidate a

portion of a 1947 memorandum order that allowed the
Commissioner to review decisions of the Collector and to compel
the release of the goods. The Court of First Instance of Manila
ruled in favor of the petitioner, granting a writ of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus, ordering the Commissioner and
Collector to execute the June 4, 1951 decision, on the grounds
that it had become final.

Issue:

Does the Commissioner have the power to review, reverse,

or modify an un-appealed decision of the Collector in seizure
cases as provided in the memorandum order in question?

Ruling:

No. The Memorandum Order does not specify a period of

time within which the Commissioner must act on an un-appealed
seizure case. As a result, the Commissioner may withhold action
indefinitely on such cases, potentially for months or even years,
particularly when there are numerous cases to review or other
matters requiring priority. This lack of a defined period is
unsatisfactory, unjust, and potentially oppressive to the importer.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

The Supreme Court also held that under the current law
governing the Bureau of Customs, a decision made by the
Collector of Customs in a seizure case, if not protested and
appealed within the proper time frame, becomes final not only as
to the importer but also against the government. Neither the
Commissioner nor the Department Head has the authority to
review, revise, or modify an un-appealed decision.

Additionally, the court found that the Memorandum Order

issued by the Insular Collector of Customs on August 18, 1947, is
void and of no effect. This is due to the fact that the order was
not duly approved by the Department Head or published as
required by Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
because it is inconsistent with the law.

Philippine Lawyers’ Association vs. Agrava

G.R. No. L-12426, 16 Feb 1959

Facts:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

On May 27, 1957, Celedonio Agrava, the Director of the

Philippine Patent Office, issued a circular announcing an
examination scheduled for June 27, 1957, to determine who was
qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippine
Patent Office. The examination was to cover patent law,
jurisprudence, and the rules of practice before the office. The
circular specified that members of the Philippine Bar, engineers,
and other individuals with sufficient scientific and technical
training were qualified to take the examination. While similar
examinations had been held by the respondent Director in the
past, the new development raised concerns, particularly for
lawyers already admitted to the bar.

The Philippine Lawyers' Association, the petitioner,

contended that anyone who has passed the bar examination, is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law, and is in good
standing is already duly qualified to practice before the
Philippine Patent Office. Therefore, they argued that the
requirement for members of the Philippine Bar to take and pass
an additional examination administered by the Patent Office, as a
condition to practice before the office, was an excess of
jurisdiction and in violation of the law.

Issue:

Is the Director of Patents authorized by law to require

persons desiring to practice or do business before him to submit
an examination, even if they are already members of the Bar?

Ruling:

No. Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code grants

every chief of bureau the authority to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders, provided they are not inconsistent
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

with law, to ensure the harmonious and efficient administration

of the bureau’s services and to fully implement the laws within
its jurisdiction. Similarly, Section 608 of Republic Act 1937,
known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, allows
the Commissioner of Customs, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, to make all necessary rules and regulations
for enforcing the code.

Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code

empowers the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, to promulgate rules and
regulations for enforcing the code’s provisions.

Rules and regulations have been established for various

government bureaus, including Customs and Internal Revenue,
to govern transactions and enforce laws. However, in the
absence of a clear legal provision, the requirement for lawyers to
pass an examination before practicing before the Patent Office is
unjustified. If such a condition were allowed, other bureaus, like
Internal Revenue and Customs, could also require lawyers to
pass an exam before practicing before them, which would be
inconsistent with existing legal frameworks.

The court held that under current law, members of the

Philippine Bar, authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law
and in good standing, may practice their profession before the
Patent Office. Much of the work in the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of Patent Law and other relevant
laws, as well as the presentation of evidence. Additionally, the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial,
with appeals from his orders and decisions being taken to the
Supreme Court. Therefore, the imposition of such an examination
by the Patent Office is not authorized.
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

People vs. Maceren

G.R. No. L-32155, 18 October 1977

Facts:

Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,

Nazario Aquino, and Carlito del Rosario were charged in the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, for engaging in electro
fishing. It was alleged that the accused used a motor banca, a
generator with an attached dynamo, and an electrocution device
or "senso" to shock and catch fish using an electric current,
thereby causing harm to aquatic life.

They violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 which

prohibited electro fishing in all Philippine waters. This regulation
was later amended by Order No. 84-1, restricting the ban to
freshwater fisheries such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, and
irrigation canals.

Fisheries Law itself only expressly penalized the use of

"obnoxious or poisonous substances" with penalties as outlined
in sections 11 and 76 and did not specifically mention electro
fishing. The lower court held that, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments
cannot consider it unlawful.

Issue:

Is the order in question valid?

Ruling:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

No. Power to declare what acts should constitute criminal

offense cannot be delegated. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded
their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84
and 84-1. The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electrofishing. Since electrofishing is not banned under the law,
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries have no authority to penalize it. In
other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, which
penalize electrofishing, lack a legal basis.

U.S vs Panlilio

G.R. No. L-9876, 8 December 1914

Facts:

The defendant was charged for violating Act No. 1760,

which pertains to the quarantining of animals suffering from
dangerous communicable or contagious diseases. The Act
stipulates penalties for the violation of any of its provisions. It
appears that all the carabaos owned by the defendant had been
exposed to rinderpest, a disease commonly known to affect
livestock. As a result, these carabaos were placed under
quarantine and ordered to be kept in a corral until released by
the Director of Agriculture.

However, despite being aware of the quarantine order, the

defendant removed the carabaos from the corral, moved them
around his hacienda, and used them as work animals, as if they
were not under quarantine. The Act does not explicitly prohibit
the violation of orders issued by the Bureau of Agriculture, nor
does it provide any punishment for disobeying such orders.

Issue:
Velasco, Sharmaine J. – BA Pol Sci 3A POL SCI 108 Administrative Law
Case Digest

May the accused be convicted for violation of the

quarantine order issued by the Director of Agriculture, assuming
there was the violation?

Ruling:

No. While the orders issued by the Bureau of Agriculture

may be considered to have the force of law, they are not statutes,
and particularly not penal statutes. A violation of these orders
does not constitute a penal offense unless the statute itself
specifically makes such a violation unlawful and provides a
penalty for it.

Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is the violation of the Bureau of

Agriculture’s orders explicitly classified as a penal offense, nor is
it punished in any way within the Act. The Act only penalizes the
violation of its own provisions and does not include penalties for
the violation of any rules or regulations issued under it.