Measuring The Impact of Terrorism

Global
Terrorism
Index 2025
Global Trends in Islamic State
The Sahel
Results Terrorism & Affiliates
Quantifying Peace and its Benefits
The Institute for Economics & Peace utilises artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies,
where necessary, to analyse and process data within the Global Terrorism Index. Reference to any
specific country or entity in the report does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation by the
Institute for Economics & Peace.

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated
to shifting the world’s focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being
and progress. IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness;
providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and
prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that
create peace.

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Please cite this report as:

Institute for Economics & Peace. Global Terrorism Index 2025: Measuring The Impact of Terrorism,
Sydney, March 2025. Available from: [Link] (accessed Date Month Year).

The GTI uses Dragonfly’s TerrorismTracker database, which contains detailed and structured event
records of every terrorist incident reported in open sources since January 2007. Dragonfly is a leading risk
intelligence and data company that specialises in global security, geopolitics, crises and instability.

TerrorismTracker is the most comprehensive, current and methodologically robust dedicated open-source
terrorism incidents database available. It is widely used for professional applications in countering terrorism,
by law enforcement, government, military, in the private sector, in academia, and among insurers.

Further information about Dragonfly is available at [Link]

Contents
Executive Summary & Key Findings 2
Key Findings 4
Overall Results Map and Table 6
20 Deadliest Attacks Map and Table 8

1 Results
Terrorism in 2024 11
Global Terrorism Index 2025 Results 12
Increases and Decreases in Terrorism 13
Terrorist Groups 14
Ten Countries Most Impacted by Terrorism 20

2 Trends in Terrorism
Trends in Terrorism 33
Conflict and Terrorism 34
Trends in the West 36
Regional Trends 39
Regional Profiles 40

3 The Sahel
Terrorism in the Sahel 48
Geopolitics in the Sahel 50
Gold Mining: A Mechanism of Local and Global Influence 52

4 Islamic State and Affiliates

Introduction 61
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 64

Expert Contributions
Islamic State Khurasan Province’s International Expansion and Growing Online Activities 77
Lucas Webber, Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst at Tech Against Terrorism
Cat Cadenhead, Junior Research and Project Officer at Tech Against Terrorism

Ten Lessons Terrorists Are Learning from the Russia-Ukraine War 81

Dr. Christina Schori Liang, Head of Counterterrorism and PVE, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and
Faculty Member, PSIA, Sciences Po

Youth Radicalisation: A New Frontier in Terrorism and Security 86

Cecilia Polizzi, Founding President/CEO, Next Wave, The International Center for Children and Global Security

From Vulnerability to Strength: The Growing Role of Strategic Communication in

Preventing Terrorism and Violent Extremism 89
Jodie Wrigley, P/CVE Strategic Communication Specialist Advisor

Appendices 92
GTI Methodology 96
Endnotes 98
Executive Summary ­

Executive
Summary
This is the twelfth edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), which provides a comprehensive
summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism over the last decade.

Terrorism remains a persistent global threat, with 2024 marking In Europe, terrorist incidents doubled to 67, including attacks by IS
another year of shifting patterns and evolving challenges with the and Hamas. The resurgence of attacks was particularly notable in
geographic reach of terrorism spreading. The number of countries seven Western countries - Sweden, Australia, Finland, the
experiencing at least one terrorist incident increased from 58 to 66, Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland, with Germany being the
the most countries affected since 2018. In 2024, more countries
worst ranked nation at 27th on the Index. There are now seven
deteriorated than improved for the first time in seven years, with 45
Western countries ranked amongst the 50 most impacted countries
countries reporting a higher impact from terrorism, while only 34
on the GTI. Meanwhile, in the US, antisemitic and Islamophobic
showed improvement.
hate crimes escalated sharply following the start of the Gaza war,
Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the deadliest terrorist with FBI-recorded incidents targeting the Jewish community rising
organisation in 2024, responsible for 1,805 deaths across 22 by 270 per cent in just two months. Similar patterns emerged in
countries. The four major terrorist organisations, IS, Jamaat Nusrat Europe and Australia, where attacks on synagogues were reported
Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), throughout the year.
and al-Shabaab continued to increase their activity, with deaths
attributed to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 4,204. In Terrorism in the Sahel has increased significantly, with deaths
2023, these groups were active in 29 countries which increased to rising nearly tenfold since 2019. In 2024, the Sahel accounted for
30 countries in 2024. 51 per cent of all terrorism deaths, while overall conflict deaths in
the region exceeded 25,000 for the first time since the inception of
In 2024, 36 per cent of terrorist attacks were not claimed by an the Index. Of these, 3,885 were attributed to terrorism. Terrorism
organisation. IEP has developed a machine learning model to deaths here are now ten times higher than in 2019.
assign these incidents to likely groups. The analysis found that
deaths attributed to IS would have been 58 per cent higher, while The Sahel remains the global epicentre of terrorism, accounting for
those linked to JNIM would have been 176 per cent higher. This over half of all terrorism-related deaths in 2024 with the number of
underscores the challenges in accurately assessing the impact of countries affected increasing. Five of the ten countries most
different terrorist organisations. impacted by terrorism are in this region. Although Burkina Faso
remains the most affected country, both deaths and attacks
In 2024, deaths from terrorism fell to 7,555, representing a 13 per declined, falling by 21 and 57 per cent respectively, however the
cent decline from the previous year. This reduction was entirely due country is still responsible for a fifth of all terrorism deaths globally.
to the large spike in the prior year from the Hamas October 7th Niger highlights how fragile progress in reducing terrorism deaths
attack, otherwise deaths would have been approximately the same. can be. In 2024, the country recorded the largest increase in
The number of terrorist attacks also declined, falling by three per terrorism deaths globally, rising by 94 per cent to a total of 930,
cent to 3,492. The drop in incidents was primarily driven by an 85 reversing previous improvements from 2022 when it had the
per cent decrease in terrorist activity in Myanmar. Excluding second largest improvement. Niger’s example may mean that the
Myanmar, global terrorist attacks would have increased by eight improvements in Burkina Faso are transitory.
per cent.
Geopolitical changes continue to shape security dynamics across
In the West, lone actor terrorism is on the rise with terrorist attacks the Sahel. The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali,
increasing from 32 to 52 in 2024. These attacks are typically Burkina Faso, and Niger, has moved away from the West, instead
carried out by youths, often in their teens, who have no formal ties strengthening ties with Russia and China. This shift, along with the
to terrorist organisations. Instead, they become radicalised through bloc’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, has created opportunities for
online content, constructing personal ideologies that often blend groups such as JNIM to expand their activities into coastal West
conflicting viewpoints influenced via access to fringe forums, Africa. Togo recorded its worst year for terrorism since the inception
gaming environments, encrypted messaging apps and the dark of the Index, reflecting the broader spread of terrorist activity
web. Because there are no affiliations, it means these types of beyond the Sahel’s traditional hotspots.
attacks are difficult for intelligence agencies to track. Social media
algorithms also accentuate biases, pushing disaffected youth Competition over natural resources, especially gold, has also
towards more radicalised content. In Europe, one in five persons played a role in the region’s instability. Niger, the world’s seventh
arrested for terrorism is legally classified as a child. largest uranium producer, has also attracted growing international
interest as global powers seek to secure access to critical

2 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Executive Summary

materials. Russia and China have strengthened their presence in

the region, offering security and economic support with fewer
conditions than Western counterparts. Meanwhile, France has
continued its military withdrawal from West Africa, signalling a
broader shift in influence away from the West.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has had an impact on its operations in

sub-Saharan Africa, with some of its resources being diverted
towards the war. Russia’s growing involvement in the Sahel has
included influence campaigns aimed at reshaping local perceptions
of Western governments, including their counterterrorism efforts.
These campaigns have materially influenced rising anti-French
sentiment in Sahelian countries.

IS continues to function as a global network, maintaining its

presence across multiple regions through affiliated groups. In 2024, In 2024, authorities disrupted 24 publicised plots linked to IS or its
it was active in 22 countries across the Middle East, Africa, Asia, affiliates, including five in Israel, four in the US and others in Iran,
and Europe. Despite counterterrorism efforts, the group’s ability to Türkiye, Germany, France, Sweden and Russia, which included
coordinate, inspire, and execute attacks highlights its resilience and high-profile attempts at the Paris Olympics and a Taylor Swift
evolving operational strategies. concert in Vienna. As intelligence agencies rarely disclose such
plots, the reported numbers likely represent a fraction of the total.
Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo were the countries
most affected by IS activity in 2024. Syria alone accounted for 369 of Over the next decade AI will be embraced by both terrorist
the 559 IS attacks globally and resulted in 708 deaths. The instability organisations and counter-intelligence agencies. These
following the fall of the Assad regime has provided technologies provide new avenues for terrorist
the conditions necessary for terrorist groups to expansion. AI can produce believable deep fake
regroup and expand, with IS capitalising on the The Sahel remains content, provide immersive experiences, better
shifting geopolitical landscape. Since 2020, the global epicentre of intelligence on targets and produce believable
traditional foreign influence in Syria has diminished, terrorism, accounting for tailored propaganda, faster. This presents significant
with Russia, China, and Iran reducing their roles over half of all terrorism- challenges for counter-terrorism efforts. However,
while Türkiye emerges as a dominant regional related deaths in 2024 with the same technologies also offer opportunities for
power. The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces the number of countries intelligence agencies to enhance their operations by
(SDF), once a key partner of the US in the fight affected increasing. improving the detection and removal of malicious
against IS, now face mounting challenges. Türkiye's sites, identifying radicalisation as it occurs in real
opposition to a strengthened SDF, coupled with the time, and crafting targeted counter-narratives to
potential scaling back of US support, has created conditions that IS reach those at risk. The future of terrorism in part will be decided
could exploit to regain strength. The new US administration’s position by AI and its application.
on the SDF is still unclear.
Technology, particularly artificial intelligence, is rapidly changing
In West Africa, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) remains a major the dynamics of how terrorist organisations communicate and
security concern. Although its activity has declined, the group recruit. For example, ISK is producing content that ranges from
remains locked in violent conflict with Boko Haram, leading to high quality online magazines to AI-enhanced video, including
significant casualties and resource losses. In 2024 terrorism deaths news programs. This enables the quick production of high-quality.
attributed to the chapter declined by 46 per cent to 178. ISWA localised propaganda. The wide range of countries within which it is
recorded no deaths in Benin, or Burkina Faso in 2024. These active demonstrates its ability to inspire and recruit from diverse
countries are now dominated by JNIM. nationalities. Encrypted messaging applications have given
extremists secure channels for organising and communicating.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), originally formed to counter Platforms like Telegram and Rocket provide private, invitation-only
the Taliban, has expanded into one of the most active jihadist spaces. At the same time, the dark web provides a hub for illicit
groups worldwide. Since its formation in 2015, ISK has steadily activities and ideological exchanges, further amplifying exposure
extended its reach beyond Afghanistan into Pakistan, Iran, Russia, and radicalisation risks.
and Central Asia. In 2024, ISK was responsible for two of the
Despite a decline in total terrorism deaths, the findings of the GTI
deadliest terrorist attacks, one in Iran and another in Russia. ISK 2025 underscore the shifting nature of global terrorism. As the in-
has intensified its recruitment efforts, producing multilingual tensity of attacks increases, new epicentres emerge, and geopoliti-
propaganda targeting South and Central Asia. ISK linguistic reach cal tensions shape security landscapes, terrorism remains a highly
is particularly notable, with content produced in Pashto, Dari, adaptive and persistent threat.
Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Uzbek, Tajik, English, and more recently,
Russian and Turkish. It also provides remote instruction in tactics,
target selection, and weapons procurement from official ISK
members.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 3

Key Findings ­

Key Findings
1 Results 2 Trends in Terrorism
à Globally, terrorism remains a significant challenge. à Since 2007, deaths from terrorism have fluctuated, peaking
at 10,882 in 2015 and reaching a low of 6,824 in 2022. Over
à The number of countries with a recorded terrorist incident
this period, terrorism dynamics have remained highly fluid,
increased from 58 to 66 countries in 2024.
with its epicentre shifting towards countries with weaker
à Forty-five countries deteriorated, while 34 improved when government institutions.
compared to 2023. à The largest percentage falls in terrorist activity since 2007
à Although 2024 saw reductions in both deaths and attacks, have occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Thailand. Thailand
these improvements were offset by the continued spread fell from 184 deaths in 2012 to 12 in 2024.
of terrorism. à The largest rises in terrorist activity since 2007 have
à Deaths from terrorism fell to 7,555 in 2024, a 13 per cent occurred in Pakistan, Syria, and Mali.
reduction from the prior year. The fall follows the surge à In Iraq, deaths from terrorism have fallen 99 per cent since
in deaths in 2023, driven by Hamas’ October 7 attack in 2007 when 6,249 deaths were recorded to 59 in 2024.
Israel.
à Over the last two decades, the epicentre of terrorism has
à Without the 2023 Hamas attack, deaths in 2024 would shifted from the Middle East and North Africa into the Sahel
have been nearly equal to those recorded in 2023. region of sub-Saharan Africa.
à The number of terrorist attacks fell by three per cent in à The Sahel region now accounts for over half of all deaths
2024 to 3,492 total attacks. This was driven by an 85 per from terrorism globally. Terrorism deaths have increased
cent decrease in terrorist activity in Myanmar. Without the almost tenfold since 2019. In 2007, the Sahel accounted for
reduction in Myanmar, attacks would have increased by only one per cent of global deaths.
eight per cent. à Fatal terrorist attacks have become more concentrated over
à The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in the past decade. The number of countries recording at least
one death from terrorism was 45 in 2024, down from 57 in
2024 were Islamic State (IS), Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal
2015.
Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and al-
Shabaab. Their combined influence continues to increase, à Of the 163 countries in the GTI, only 25 have not recorded a
with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 single terrorist incident since 2007.
per cent to 4,204 deaths. à In the West, terrorist incidents dropped significantly since
à Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remained the world’s their peak in 2017. However, the number of attacks has
deadliest terrorist group in 2024, and is active in 22 increased by 20 to 52 in 2024 when compared to the prior
countries, one more than in 2023. Deaths attributed to year. Attacks in the West peaked in 2017 with 176 attacks
the group and its affiliates declined by ten per cent, from recorded.
1,996 to 1,805 deaths. à There has been a sharp increase in antisemitic violence and
hate crimes across the West, with attacks on synagogues
à The Sahel is the most affected region globally, accounting
recorded in Europe, Australia, and the US. The number of
for over half of all deaths from terrorism in 2024, and 19
antisemitic incidents in the US rose by over 200 per cent
per cent of attacks globally. Five of the ten countries most
in 2024. The number of FBI recorded hate crime incidents
impacted by terrorism are in the Sahel region. targeting the Jewish community rose by 270 per cent in the
à Burkina Faso remains the country most impacted by two months after the start of the Gaza war.
terrorism this year, despite attacks and deaths falling by à The number of terrorist incidents in Europe doubled over the
57 and 21 per cent respectively. A fifth of all terrorism past year, from 34 attacks in 2023 to 67 in 2024, including
deaths globally were in Burkina Faso, followed by Pakistan attacks carried out by IS and Hamas.
and Syria.
à Over the past decade the average impact of terrorism has
à Niger and Pakistan had the largest increases in deaths increased in three regions of the nine regions: Europe, South
from terrorism, with increases of 94 and 45 per cent America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Every other region has
respectively. recorded a decrease in the average impact since 2014.
à Terrorism increased substantially in both Russia and Iran, à Total deaths from terrorism are now considerably higher
highlighting the deteriorating security situation. Russia in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region. Sub-Saharan
recorded 197 terrorism deaths while Iran recorded 163. Africa has recorded the most deaths from terrorism for the
past eight years.
à Of the major terrorist organisations, TTP was responsible
for the largest increase in deaths, which rose by 90 per à Sub-Saharan Africa, The Middle East and North Africa, and
cent to 558 deaths. South Asia have far more deaths from terrorism than other
regions. Collectively they accounted for just under 95 per
à Deaths attributed to JNIM experienced the second largest cent of deaths from terrorism in 2024.
increase, rising by 46 per cent to 1,454 total deaths. Its
attacks also tended to be the deadliest, with an average of à In North America since 2007, there have been 84 politically
motivated attacks compared to 21 religiously motivated
ten deaths per attack.
attacks. Of these attacks, 58 were linked to individuals with
far-right sympathies or connections.

4 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Key Findings

Islamic State and

3 The Sahel 4 Affiliates
à The Sahel accounted for 51 per cent of global terrorism à Islamic State operates as a decentralised network of
deaths in 2024. affiliates, encompassing nine jihadist groups and affiliated
entities. Each group acts independently.
à Conflict deaths in the Sahel reached their highest level
since the inception of the GTI, surpassing 25,000 for the à In 2024, these affiliates were responsible for attacks across
first time. the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe, highlighting the
group's continued transnational reach and operational
à Weak governance, ethnic tensions, and ecological
capacity.
degradation have fuelled terrorism, worsened by
transnational jihadist growth and geopolitical competition. à Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
were the most affected by IS activity in 2024, experiencing
à Terrorist groups such as JNIM continue to expand carrying
the highest number of fatalities. Syria alone accounted for
out attacks in coastal West Africa, with Togo recording its
369 of the 559 IS attacks.
worst year for terrorism in 2024 since the inception of the
GTI. à Since 2020, foreign influence in Syria has shifted, with the
roles of Russia, China, and Iran diminishing and Türkiye
à The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali, Burkina
rising as a key player.
Faso, and Niger, are changing alliances by removing
Western involvement in security and economic sectors à Instability following the fall of the government of the Assad
and withdrawing from ECOWAS. Instead, the alliance has regime could provide fertile ground for IS to regroup and
strengthened ties with Russia and China, which provide rearm, increasing the risk of resurgence.
support with fewer conditions attached.
à While ISWA’s activity has declined, it remains a significant
à In August 2023 the UN panel of experts on Mali declared regional threat, underscored by the recent escalation
that IS-Sahel had doubled the amount of territory they in violence with Boko Haram, which resulted in heavy
controlled in the country, while JNIM had continued to casualties and substantial resource losses.
expand operations.
à ISK has evolved into one of the most active jihadist groups
à Gold is increasingly a critical source of revenue for state globally, expanding its operations beyond Afghanistan
and non-state armed actors alike across the Sahel, into Pakistan, Iran, Russia and Central Asia. It carries out
impacting local and international relations. more deadly attacks outside of Afghanistan than within,
highlighting its growing transnational threat.
à Niger is the 7th largest producer of uranium and can be an
important source for countries such as China who wish to à ISK has extensive multilingual skills and a sophisticated
expand their nuclear power plants. However, terror attacks online presence in Pashto, Dari, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi,
in Niger have reached their highest levels on record. Uzbek, Tajik, English and, more recently, Russian and
Turkish, mainly targeting youth.
à Russia is conducting influence operations across the
continent, particularly in the Sahel, often framing them à ISK's ability to operate and expand in Afghanistan and
around Western failures in counterterrorism. Outside these beyond remains an international concern, prompting
high-profile and visible efforts, China has been steadily heightened security and counterterrorism efforts by the
building economic and political influence. EU, Russia and Central Asian states.
à The wars in Ukraine and Syria have directly influenced à In addition to the attacks that occurred, in 2024, a total of
the conflict in the Sahel. Ukraine has supported rebels 24 publicised plots linked to IS or affiliated groups were
opposing Russian-backed regimes, while the collapse foiled, including a high-profile plot targeting Taylor Swift
of the Assad regime affects Russia's control of a key concerts in Vienna. In view of the rarity of intelligence
logistical hub, potentially increasing the importance of its services disclosing such incidents, it may be that many
influence in Mali and other regions. more such plots were foiled last year.
à Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk prompted Russia to withdraw
military advisors from Burkina Faso, highlighting the
delicate balancing act Moscow faces in its African
operations.
à Russian information campaigns are actively shaping
sentiment across the Sahel, influencing attitudes toward
both Russia and former colonial power France. In Burkina
Faso, the rise in Russian influence has corresponded with
an increase in negative sentiment toward France in media
coverage.
à The collapse of the 2015 Algiers peace agreement has
worsened an already dire security situation in Mali. JNIM
appear to be taking advantage, staging symbolically
damaging attacks on government targets in Bamako in
September 2024.
GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 5
Section 1 | RESULTS­

• terrorist activity. Over 90 per cent of terror attacks in

2023 occurred in conflict zones.

GTI 2025
Overall Results
MEASURING THE IMPACT
OF TERRORISM
THE IMPACT OF TERRORISM
VERY HIGH HIGH MEDIUM LOW VERY LOW NO IMPACT NOT INCLUDED

10 8 6 4 2 0

RANK RANK RANK

RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE

1 Burkina Faso 8.581 Arrows-alt-h 28 Thailand 4.63 long-arrow-alt-up 1 55 Tanzania 1.573 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 11
2 Pakistan 8.374 long-arrow-alt-up 2 29 Egypt 4.416 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 9 56 Ecuador 1.55 long-arrow-alt-up 33
3 Syria 8.006 long-arrow-alt-up 2 30 Indonesia 4.17 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 57 Djibouti 1.461 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 7
4 Mali 7.907 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 31 Burundi 4.043 long-arrow-alt-up 1 58 Côte d'Ivoire 1.454 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 9
5 Niger 7.776 long-arrow-alt-up 5 32 Turkiye 3.968 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 59 Brazil 1.43 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 8
6 Nigeria 7.658 long-arrow-alt-up 2 33 Uganda 3.702 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 60 Netherlands 1.402 long-arrow-alt-up 17
7 Somalia 7.614 Arrows-alt-h United States of 61 Belgium 1.347 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 7
34 3.517 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3
8 Israel 7.463 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 America 62 Switzerland 1.265 long-arrow-alt-up 12
9 Afghanistan 7.262 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 35 Bangladesh 3.03 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 63 Spain 1.256 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 8
10 Cameroon 6.944 long-arrow-alt-up 2 36 Greece 2.928 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 64 Lebanon 1.237 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
11 Myanmar 6.929 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 37 Oman 2.927 long-arrow-alt-up 57 Bosnia and
65 1.218 long-arrow-alt-up 29
Democratic Republic 38 Jordan 2.913 long-arrow-alt-up 40 Herzegovina
12 6.768 long-arrow-alt-up 1
of the Congo 39 Czechia 2.906 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 66 Norway 1.198 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10
13 Iraq 6.582 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 40 France 2.712 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 67 United Arab Emirates 1.178 long-arrow-alt-up 18
14 India 6.411 Arrows-alt-h 41 United Kingdom 2.639 long-arrow-alt-up 2 68 Nepal 1.113 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 20
15 Colombia 6.381 long-arrow-alt-up 1 42 Algeria 2.415 long-arrow-alt-up 4 69 Slovakia 1.023 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1
16 Russia 6.267 long-arrow-alt-up 21 43 Tunisia 2.184 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 70 Tajikistan 0.999 long-arrow-alt-up 1
17 Mozambique 6.251 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 44 Peru 2.062 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 3 Central African
71 0.957 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10
18 Iran 6.056 long-arrow-alt-up 7 45 Ukraine 2.003 long-arrow-alt-up 12 Republic
19 Kenya 5.366 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 46 Australia 1.973 long-arrow-alt-up 13 72 Finland 0.949 long-arrow-alt-up 22
20 Philippines 5.166 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 1 47 Poland 1.962 long-arrow-alt-up 33 72 Japan 0.949 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
21 Chile 5.162 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 48 Canada 1.87 long-arrow-alt-up 5 74 Italy 0.929 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 14
22 Yemen 5.08 long-arrow-alt-up 1 49 China 1.863 long-arrow-alt-up 27 75 Saudi Arabia 0.845 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13
23 Chad 5.032 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 50 Sweden 1.842 long-arrow-alt-up 22 76 Argentina 0.801 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13
24 Togo 5.004 long-arrow-alt-up 2 51 Angola 1.657 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 77 Ethiopia 0.787 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13
25 Palestine 4.93 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 4 52 Malaysia 1.626 long-arrow-alt-up 35 78 Kosovo 0.782 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13
26 Benin 4.802 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 2 53 Libya 1.612 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 11 79 Armenia 0.72 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
27 Germany 4.748 long-arrow-alt-up 13 54 Senegal 1.578 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 7 79 Denmark 0.72 long-arrow-alt-up 15

6 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

RANK RANK RANK

RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE RANK COUNTRY SCORE CHANGE

81 Venezuela 0.71 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 14 100 Equatorial Guinea 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Nicaragua 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
82 Austria 0.582 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 12 100 Eritrea 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 North Korea 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
82 Mexico 0.582 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13 100 Estonia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 North Macedonia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
82 Serbia 0.582 long-arrow-alt-up 12 100 Gabon 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Panama 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
82 South Korea 0.582 long-arrow-alt-up 12 100 Georgia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Papua New Guinea 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
86 Cambodia 0.423 long-arrow-alt-up 8 100 Ghana 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Portugal 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
86 Latvia 0.423 long-arrow-alt-up 8 100 Guatemala 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Qatar 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
86 Lithuania 0.423 long-arrow-alt-up 7 100 Guinea 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 Republic of the
100 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
Congo
89 Cyprus 0.347 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 14 100 Guinea-Bissau 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Romania 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
90 Azerbaijan 0.233 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10 100 Guyana 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Rwanda 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 9
90 Belarus 0.233 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10 100 Haiti 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Sierra Leone 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
90 Ireland 0.233 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 11 100 Honduras 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Singapore 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
90 Uzbekistan 0.233 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10 100 Hungary 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Slovenia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
94 New Zealand 0.217 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 42 100 Jamaica 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 South Africa 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
95 Iceland 0.123 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 10 100 Kazakhstan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 South Sudan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
96 Eswatini 0.087 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 8 100 Kuwait 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Sri Lanka 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 64
97 Paraguay 0.073 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 13 100 Kyrgyz Republic 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Sudan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
98 Bahrain 0.059 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 8 100 Laos 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Taiwan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
98 Uruguay 0.059 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 7 100 Lesotho 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 The Gambia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Albania 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Liberia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Timor-Leste 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Bhutan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Madagascar 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Trinidad and Tobago 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Bolivia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Malawi 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Turkmenistan 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Botswana 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Mauritania 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Vietnam 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Bulgaria 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Mauritius 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Zambia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Costa Rica 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Moldova 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Zimbabwe 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Croatia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Mongolia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Cuba 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Montenegro 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 Dominican Republic 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6 100 Morocco 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6
100 El Salvador 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 66 100 Namibia 0 LONG-ARROW-ALT-DOWN 6

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 7

Section 1 | RESULTS­

Results
20 Deadliest
Attacks
The 20 most fatal terrorist
attacks in 2024
All attacks in 2024 scaled by number of fatalities
Worst attacks in 2024

Description

1 COUNTRY NIGER PROVINCE TAHOUA DEATHS Over 300 assailants killed 237 soldiers in an attack near Tankademi town, Tahoua region, near the
Malian border on 21 July. No group has claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists
JIHADIST operate in the area.
DATE 21/07/2024 GROUP 237
(UNDETERMINED)

2 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO PROVINCE CENTRE-NORD DEATHS Dozens of gunmen killed at least 200 civilians in Barsalogho town, Sanmatenga province, Centre-
Nord region on the morning of 24 August. Reportedly, the attack lasted several hours. Jamaat
DATE 24/08/2024 GROUP JNIM 200 Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.

3 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION SAHEL DEATHS Gunmen killed at least 110 soldiers and 60 civilians and kidnapped an unconfirmed number of
others in an attack on an army base in the Mansila commune, Yagha province, Sahel region on 11
DATE 11/06/2024 GROUP JNIM 170 June. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.

Four gunmen killed at least 144 civilians and wounded at least 551 others at a concert at Crocus
4 COUNTRY RUSSIA PROVINCE MOSCOW CITY DEATHS
City Hall, Krasnogorsk district, Moscow Oblast, Central Federal district on 22 March. The gunmen
also set fire to the venue using flammable liquid, causing the roof to collapse. Russia’s National
Antiterrorism Committee on 23 March said it had arrested 11 alleged suspects linked to the attack,
ISLAMIC STATE - including the four gunmen. The perpetrators were reportedly Tajik nationals. Islamic State-Khorasan
DATE 22/03/2024 GROUP 144
KHORASAN PROVINCE Province (IS-K) claimed responsibility.

5 COUNTRY NIGER PROVINCE TILLABÉRI DEATHS Gunmen killed 91 soldiers and 47 civilians in Chatoumane village, Tera department, Tillaberi region
on 10 December. No group has claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in
JIHADIST the area.
DATE 10/12/2024 GROUP 138
(UNDETERMINED)

6 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION EST DEATHS Assailants killed at least 100 people in an attack on the villages of Kpadiari, Nadiagou and
Tindangou in Kompienga on 16 March. No group had claimed responsibility at the time of writing,
JIHADIST and it is unclear as to whether jihadists, who operate in the area, or security forces were responsible
DATE 16/03/2024 GROUP 100 for the attacks.
(UNDETERMINED)

Around 150 gunmen on motorcycles opened fire on a market and set fire to shops and residences
7 COUNTRY NIGERIA REGION YOBE DEATHS
in an attack on Mafa village, Tarmuwa local government area, Yobe state on 1 September, killing
between 100 and 150 people and wounding an unconfirmed number. The authorities attributed
the attack to Boko Haram, saying that it was in retaliation for the killing of two militants by local
DATE 1/09/2024 GROUP BOKO HARAM 100 vigilantes.

Two bomb explosions killed at least 95 people and wounded at least 284 in Kerman city, Kerman
8 COUNTRY IRAN REGION KERMAN DEATHS
county, Kerman province on 3 January. The incident occurred at the memorial of Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Soleimani during a commemorative
ISLAMIC STATE - ceremony marking his assassination. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-K) claimed responsibility
DATE 3/01/2024 GROUP 95 for the attack.
KHORASAN PROVINCE

9 COUNTRY NIGERIA PROVINCE BORNO DEATHS Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA) attacked Boko Haram members in northeast areas of Lake
Chad, Borno state, on 24 April. Fighting continued intermittently between the two groups until 26
ISLAMIC STATE WEST April. Seventy Boko Haram and 10 ISWA members were reportedly killed in the clashes.
DATE 24/04/2024 GROUP 85
AFRICA (ISWA)

10 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO PROVINCE NORD DEATHS At least 150 assailants attacked several villages, and killed at least 70 civilians in Goubre commune,
Seguenega department, Yatenga province on 22 May. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)
DATE 22/05/2024 GROUP JNIM 70 claimed responsibility for the attack.

8 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

Description

11 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO PROVINCE EST DEATHS A few hundred gunmen attacked a security forces camp in Partiaga, Partiaga department, Tapoa
province, Est region on 30 June, killing at least 70 soldiers. A local media outlet reported that
several dozen assailants were killed in the attack. No group has claimed responsibility at the time of
DATE 30/06/2024 GROUP JIHADIST (UNDETERMINED) 70 writing, but jihadists operate in the area.

12 COUNTRY MALI REGION BAMAKO DEATHS Gunmen killed at least 60 soldiers in an attack on a Gendarmerie school in southern Bamako
city, Bamako Capital district at around 0530hrs on 17 September. This was in conjunction with an
attack on a military air base later that day. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed
DATE 17/09/2024 GROUP JNIM 60 responsibility for the attack.

13 COUNTRY SYRIA REGION HOMS DEATHS Assailants killed 54 regime soldiers near Kaziya in Al-Sukhna area, Homs governorate on 10
December. No group has claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but local sources said Islamic
DATE 10/12/2024 GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS) 54 State (IS) was probably responsible.

14 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION EST DEATHS Gunmen killed 50 civilians as well as kidnapping and wounding an unconfirmed number of others
in Galgnoini village, Tibga commune, Gourma province, Est region on 7 February. No group has
DATE 7/02/2024 GROUP JIHADIST (UNDETERMINED) 50 claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.

15 COUNTRY NIGER CITY TILLABÉRI DEATHS Gunmen killed at least 47 soldiers and wounded at least 18 others in an attack against the military
in the Gotheye area, Tera department, Tillaberi region on 25 June. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal
DATE 25/06/2024 GROUP JNIM 47 Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.

16 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION CENTRE-EST DEATHS Gunmen killed 39 security forces, 7 members of the Volontaires pour la defense de la patrie (VDP)
and wounded an unconfirmed number of others in Kogo village, Koulpelogo province, Centre-est
region at around 1000hrs on 29 May. Repelling forces killed 27 assailants. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam
DATE 29/05/2024 GROUP JNIM 46 wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.

17 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO REGION CENTRE-EST DEATHS

Assailants killed at least 45 police force members in Yourkoudguen town, Koulpelogo province on
23 April. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed responsibility.
DATE 26/06/2024 GROUP JNIM 45

18 COUNTRY BURKINA FASO CITY BOUCLE DU MOUHOUN DEATHS Gunmen killed at least 45 civilians and injured three members of the Volontaires pour la defense de
la patrie (VDP) in Boanekuy village, Djibasso department, Kossi Province on 26 June. No group has
claimed responsibility at the time of writing, but local sources said the Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal
DATE 06/26/2024 GROUP JNIM 45 Muslimeen (JNIM) was probably responsible.
DEMOCRATIC
19 COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF REGION NORD-KIVU DEATHS
Assailants killed at least 42 civilians with melee weapons in Mayikengo village, Lubero territory,
THE CONGO
North Kivu province on the evening of 12 June. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for the
attack.
DATE 12/06/2024 GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS) 42

DEMOCRATIC
20 COUNTRY REPUBLIC OF REGION NORD-KIVU DEATHS
Assailants killed at least 41 civilians in Masala, Mapasana and Mahini village, Beni territory, North
THE CONGO
Kivu province on 7 June. Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility, attributing the attack to its ‘Central
Africa Province’ and saying it targeted Christians.
DATE 7/06/2024 GROUP ISLAMIC STATE (IS) 41

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 9

Section 1 | RESULTS­

Deaths from terrorism fell to 7,555 in

2024, a 13 per cent reduction from the
% prior year. The fall follows the surge in
deaths in 2023, driven by Hamas’ October
7 attack in Israel.

The number of
countries with a
recorded terrorist The number of terrorist attacks fell by
three per cent in 2024, to 3,492 total
incident increased
from 58 to 66 % attacks. This was driven by an 85 per cent
decrease in terrorist activity in Myanmar.
countries in 2024. Without the reduction in Myanmar, attacks
would have increased by eight per cent.

The Sahel is the most affected region

globally, accounting for over half of
all deaths from terrorism, and 19 per
cent of attacks globally, in 2024. Five
of the ten countries most impacted by
terrorism are in the Sahel region.

Burkina Faso Russia Iran Niger Pakistan

1/5 197 163 94% 45%
Burkina Faso remains the country most Terrorism increased substantially Niger and Pakistan had the
impacted by terrorism this year, despite in both Russia and Iran, largest increases in deaths
attacks and deaths falling by 57 and highlighting the deteriorating from terrorism, with increases
21 per cent respectively. A fifth of all security situation. Russia of 94 and 45 per cent
terrorism deaths globally were in Burkina recorded 197 terrorism deaths respectively.
Faso, followed by Pakistan and Syria. while Iran recorded 163.

Terrorist Groups

90%
The four terrorist groups responsible for Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates
the most deaths in 2024 were Islamic State remained the world’s deadliest terrorist
(IS), Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen group in 2024, and is active in 23
(JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), countries, one more than in 2023. Of the major terrorist organisations,
and al-Shabaab. Their combined influence Deaths attributed to the group and its TTP was responsible for the largest
continues to increase, with deaths attributed affiliates declined by ten per cent, from increase in deaths, which rose by
to these groups increasing by 11 per cent to 1,996 to 1,805 deaths. 90 per cent to 558 deaths.
4,204 deaths.

10 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

1 Results
Terrorism in 2024 In the West, attacks increased for the first time since 2017, with
52 attacks recorded in 2024, up from 32 in 2023. However,
deaths were at their lowest in three years, with 15 deaths
recorded in 2024 compared to 23 the year prior. Underscoring
OVERVIEW the spread of terrorism globally, six Western countries that had
previously recorded no terror attacks in the prior five years
Globally, terrorism continues to be a significant challenge. While recorded more than two attacks in 2024 – Sweden, Australia,
2024 saw reductions in both deaths and attacks, these Finland, Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland. Sweden
improvements were offset by the ongoing spread of terrorism recorded eight attacks in 2024, its highest number since 2017; it
and the lingering impact of exceptional events in 2023. The also recorded no attacks in 2023. Australia recorded five attacks,
number of countries that experienced a terrorist attack the most since the inception of the Index, while France recorded
increased from 58 to 66 countries in 2024. While 34 countries nine attacks, its highest in two years.
improved in 2024, 45 deteriorated, the most countries to
deteriorate in a single year since 2018. Additionally, the world’s Although most attacks in the West were carried out by
four deadliest terrorist organisations substantially increased the unidentified groups, target analysis suggests that almost 31 per
number of people they killed, while also slightly expanding the cent of all attacks in the West in 2024 were motivated by
number of countries within which they are active. antisemitic or anti-Israel sentiment. While these attacks did not
result in any deaths, the trends highlight the ongoing spread
Niger, Pakistan, Russia and Iran recorded the largest increases and evolving motivations of terrorism as a threat to the West.
in deaths caused by terrorism in 2024, with all four countries
experiencing more than 100 additional deaths. Both Russia and Sub-Saharan Africa was the deadliest region for the eighth
Iran remain preoccupied with their ongoing wars, resulting in consecutive year, despite a five per cent decrease in deaths
less focus on addressing domestic terrorism. compared to 2023. Although deaths in Burkina Faso fell
substantially in 2024, this was offset by Niger, which recorded
Both deaths from terrorism, and the number of attacks, declined the largest increase in deaths from terrorism globally. Most of
in 2024, though these reductions were primarily driven by the impact of terrorism in the region and globally is
changes in a single country for each category. Deaths from concentrated in the Sahel, contributing to over half of all
terrorism decreased by 13 per cent to 7,555; however, if adjusted terrorism deaths globally, and 19 per cent of attacks worldwide.
for the Hamas October 7 attack, the number of recorded deaths
would have been the highest since 2017. That attack was the The Sahel region hosts five of the ten countries most affected by
largest terrorist attack recorded since the inception of the index terrorism, reflecting the persistent insecurity driven by
in 2007, and the largest since 9/11. extremist groups such as JNIM and IS. Despite ongoing
counterterrorism efforts, the volatile security environment
After adjusting for the 2023 Hamas attack, terrorism deaths continues to challenge state authorities and international
would have remained within a narrow range since 2017, interventions, exacerbating humanitarian crises in countries
fluctuating between 6,824 in 2017 and 7,555 in 2024. This like Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
consistency underscores the persistent and intractable nature of
terrorism. Burkina Faso retained its position as the country most impacted
by terrorism in 2024, recording the most deaths from terrorism
The total number of attacks fell by three per cent to 3,492, the for the third consecutive year. Despite experiencing a 21 per
least number of attacks since 2009. This overall decline was cent reduction in terrorism deaths and a 57 per cent drop in
largely driven by a reduction of 390 attacks in Myanmar. attacks, it had 1,532 total deaths. Terrorism in Burkina Faso has
Without this significant drop in Myanmar, the total number of become significantly more lethal, with an average of almost 14
attacks would have risen by eight per cent. deaths per attack in 2024, compared to just over seven per
attack in 2023. A fifth of all deaths recorded globally occurred
The four major terrorist organisations, Islamic State (IS), within its borders, highlighting the severity of the country’s
Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrik-e-Taliban security crisis.
Pakistan (TTP), and al-Shabaab continue to increase their
activity, with deaths attributed to these groups increasing by 11 Burkina Faso's challenges are tied to the Sahel’s instability, with
per cent to 4,204. In 2023, these groups were active in 29 extremist groups exploiting weak governance, porous borders,
countries, which increased to 30 countries in 2024. and local grievances, to sustain their operations. The country’s

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 11

Section 1 | RESULTS­

ongoing counterterrorism efforts, supported by regional FIGURE 1.1

initiatives like the Alliance of Sahel States, offer a measure of Total terrorism deaths by country, 2023–2024
optimism. As evidenced by Niger, however, deaths can reduce Total terrorism deaths decreased by 13 per cent from 2023
sharply, only to rapidly increase in subsequent years. For to 2024.
example, from 2021 to 2022 in Niger, the number of deaths fell
from 595 to 198, but over the next two years the number of
8,000
deaths rose dramatically, reaching 930 in 2024, the highest
1,935
number ever recorded in the country.

1,532
For the second consecutive year, Afghanistan was not among the
748
five countries most impacted by terrorism, marking its best 6,000
ranking since the Index’s inception. This shift is attributed to 479
1,081

DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

the exclusion of Taliban activities from the Index, following the Burkina Faso
763
group’s ascendance to government in 2021. Similarly, Myanmar Pakistan
saw a significant decline in terror deaths, recording a 93 per 715 930
Niger
cent decrease, marking the first time since 2020 that it was not 4,000
among the ten most-impacted countries. 604 Mali

Syria
744
GTI 2025 RESULTS All other countries

2,000 4,014
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of deaths for the five countries
recording the most terrorism deaths in 2024. Among these 2,664
countries, only Burkina Faso and Mali recorded decreases in
deaths over the past year.
0
Terrorist activity remains highly concentrated in a small 2023 2024
number of countries, as shown in Figure 1.2 1.2. Just ten
Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations
countries accounted for 86 per cent of all terrorism deaths in
2024. This concentration of terrorist activity has intensified
over the past decade, with the proportion of total deaths
occurring in the Sahel region increasing to over half, from 22
per cent a decade ago.

FIGURE 1.2
Distribution of deaths from terrorism by country, 2024
Ten countries accounted for 86 per cent of deaths from terrorism.

14%

3%
3%
6,000 4%
5%
7%
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

8%

4,000 10%

12%

2,000 14%

20%

0
Burkina Pakistan Niger Syria Mali Nigeria Somalia Democratic Cameroon Russia Rest
Faso Republic of of the
the Congo World

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

12 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

INCREASES AND DECREASES IN TERRORISM military. The successful capture of two key IS leaders in January
2025 highlights the importance of ongoing counterterrorism
Figure 1.3 highlights the countries with the largest decreases in efforts in the Sahel region.5
terrorism deaths in 2024. Israel recorded the most substantial
decline, with fatalities dropping from 1,160 to 18, representing a Figure 1.4 highlights the countries with the largest increases in
98 per cent decrease. This is largely because most terrorism terrorism deaths in 2024. Niger recorded the largest increase,
deaths in Israel during 2023 occurred on a single day, as a result with deaths rising from 479 in 2023 to 930 in 2024. This is the
of a series of coordinated attacks by Hamas militants. Most of country’s largest recorded death toll since the inception of the
Israel’s deaths in 2024 occurred when assailants killed seven Index.
civilians in Tel Aviv in October. Hamas later claimed
responsibility for the attack.1 Pakistan recorded the second largest increase, with deaths
rising by 45 per cent to 1,081. Terrorism has increased
Burkina Faso saw the second largest fall in terrorism in 2024, significantly in Pakistan since the Taliban’s rise to power in
despite continuing to be the most impacted country. This Afghanistan, with the number of attacks increasing fivefold
decline came after 200 villagers and soldiers were killed in a since 2021. The most recent surge in terrorism in Pakistan was
JNIM attack in August 2024.2 In response, the Burkinabé primarily driven by increased activity from Tehrik-e-Taliban
government vowed to prioritise counterterrorism in its security Pakistan (TTP), which is aligned with the Afghan Taliban.
policies.3 After this attack, only 27 attacks resulting in 144 deaths Deaths attributed to the group nearly doubled between 2023
were recorded over the next four months, compared to 50 and 2024.
attacks and 777 deaths in the four months prior.
Iran and Russia recorded their highest number of terrorism
Deaths in Myanmar fell from 356 in 2023 to 24 in 2024. As the deaths in a decade, driven by significant attacks carried out by
crisis in Myanmar deepens, the decline in terrorism deaths is Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISK). These attacks are part of
likely linked to the growing strength of rebel groups. With more a broader trend of ISK expanding its operations beyond its
powerful capabilities, these groups appear to rely less on traditional strongholds in Afghanistan, indicating a potential
terror-style attacks, focusing instead on conventional warfare shift in the group’s strategic focus. In Russia, the surge was
against the junta.4 largely due to the Crocus City Hall shooting in Moscow, which
killed 144 people. ISK claimed responsibility for the attack,
Mali recorded the fourth largest decrease this year, with deaths making it the group’s deadliest of 2024 and the fourth deadliest
falling from 763 in 2023 to 604 in 2024, a 21 per cent decrease. attack globally that year. Iran recorded 163 deaths in 2024, an
This improvement was driven by an 88 per cent decrease in the increase from 35 in 2023, with most casualties occurring during
deaths attributed to Islamic State (IS) in Mali, as well as a a memorial for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)
halving in the number of attacks attributed to the group. leader Qasem Soleimani. A bombing at the event killed 95
Despite controlling parts of Mali's territory, IS has carried out people, with ISK also claiming responsibility.
fewer attacks due to intensified operations by the Malian

FIGURE 1.3
Largest decreases in deaths from terrorism, 2023-–2024
Israel experienced the largest decrease in deaths when compared to the previous year.
0
-30 -20
-43 -42
-98 -83
-159

-332
-400
CHANGE IN DEATHS

-403

-800

-1142
-1,200

Israel Burkina Myanmar Mali Cameroon Somalia Kenya Uganda Iraq Benin
Faso
Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 13

Section 1 | RESULTS­

FIGURE 1.4
Terrorist Groups
Largest increases in deaths from terrorism,
2023–2024
Terrorism deaths in Niger rose by over 400 in 2024.
The four terrorist groups responsible for the most deaths in
2024 were Islamic State (IS), Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal
500 Muslimeen (JNIM), Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and
451 al-Shabaab. The trend in deaths for these groups is shown in
Figure 1.5. These four groups were responsible for 4,204
400
terrorism deaths, or 80 per cent of deaths that were attributed
to a specific group. In 2014, these four groups were responsible
CHANGE IN DEATHS

333 for less than 40 per cent of terrorism deaths that were attributed
to a group, highlighting the large global shifts in terrorism over
300
the past decade. In 2014, most deaths were caused by Boko
Haram and the Taliban, with these groups respectively
accounting for 17 and five per cent of the global total.
195
200

In this report, IEP consolidates data on terrorist groups and

128
their affiliated chapters operating under the same organisational
100 name. For instance, Islamic State (IS), also known as Daesh,
55 encompasses both the core group and its affiliated chapters,
41
29 31 32 such as the Khorasan Province chapter (ISK) and Islamic State
23

0
West Africa (ISWA). When referring to a specific affiliate, the
chapter’s name will be explicitly stated.
Chad

Syria

India

Nigeria

Mozambique

Congo
Republic of the
Democratic

Iran

Russia

Pakistan

Niger

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

FIGURE 1.5
Attributed attacks by terrorist groups, 2007–2024
Islamic State were the deadliest terrorist group of 2024.

JNIM Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) Al-Shabaab Islamic State All Other Groups

100

4,000
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

75
3,000
% OF DEATHS

50
2,000

25
1,000

0 0
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

14 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

More terrorist attacks were attributed to a group in 2024 than in including target type, weapon type, incident location and date,
2023. Of the 3,492 terrorist attacks recorded in 2024, 64 per cent and number of people killed in the attack. The model is then
were attributed to a group, an increase of nine per cent from trained on all terrorist incidents where the perpetrator is
2023. The countries with the most attacks not attributed to a known and then applied to the set of incidents where the
group were Pakistan, Mali and India. perpetrator is listed as either ‘unknown’ or ‘unknown jihadists’.

Determining the most active terrorist groups by the deaths and Deaths attributed to IS, Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and JNIM are
attacks they are responsible for can be challenging. Many much lower than the estimated total. Applying the model leads
prominent organisations have affiliate groups or subdivisions to a large increase in the number of deaths attributed to certain
that are still in partnership or partially commanded by a major groups. For example, the total number of deaths attributed to IS
group. In addition to this, it is not uncommon for groups to would increase from just over 26,000 to just over 41,000, an
decline to take responsibility for the attacks they commit, often increase of 58 per cent. The largest percentage increase for any
due to them occurring in areas of high conflict. group would be for AQI, whose estimated deaths would increase
by 239 per cent. Deaths attributed to JNIM would also increase
In conflict environments, attacks resulting in either high or low substantially, by 176 per cent.
numbers of casualties often remain unclaimed. For attacks with
minimal impact, terrorist groups may see little benefit in taking
responsibility, as such incidents could be perceived as failures, Islamic State (IS)
undermining their influence. Conversely, groups responsible for
highly lethal attacks may avoid claiming them to prevent Islamic State (IS) is a Sunni extremist group which formed as
backlash from governments or local populations, which could an Al-Qaeda affiliate in Iraq and Syria in 1999.7 Following the
hinder recruitment efforts and provoke intensified US invasion of Iraq in 2003, IS participated in the Iraqi
counterinsurgency operations against them.6 insurgency. In 2014, the group declared itself a worldwide
caliphate.8 IS primarily adheres to a global jihadist ideology,
The high level of unattributed attacks means that the total following an anti-Western interpretation of Islam and promotes
number of deaths for which certain terrorist groups are violence against those who do not align with its ideology,
responsible is likely to be much higher than the officially including other forms of Islam. In this section, IS comprises
attributed figure. It is possible to try to attribute these unknown Islamic State, Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISK), Islamic
attacks using a machine learning (ML) model. The results of one State Sinai Province (IS-SP), Islamic State of Iraq and the
such model are shown in Figure 1.6, for the seven terrorist Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State West Africa (ISWA).
groups with the highest number of attributed deaths between
2007 and 2024. The model incorporates several factors,

FIGURE 1.6
Estimated deaths from terrorism by group 2007–2024
Deaths attributed to IS, AQI and JNIM are much lower than the estimated total.

Estimated Recorded

45,000

40,000

35,000

30,000

25,000

20,000

15,000

10,000

5,000

0
Islamic State Taliban AQI Boko Haram Al-Shabaab JNIM TTP

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 15

Section 1 | RESULTS­

The original aim of IS was to establish a Salafist-oriented devices, the attackers killed at least 144 civilians and injured at
Islamic state spanning Iraq, Syria and other areas of the least 551 more. ISK claimed responsibility for the attack.13 It is
Levant.9 It then expanded into other parts of the world through also the fourth deadliest attack attributed to any terror group in
affiliate groups to promote their ideology, including ISK in 2024.
Afghanistan and Pakistan and later the Islamic State West
Africa (ISWA), which operates in the Sahel region. IS and its In 2024, IS activity in sub-Saharan Africa declined considerably,
affiliates exploited tensions between Sunni and Shia Muslims in with deaths dropping by 44 per cent, from 1,185 in 2023 to 664
Iraq and Syria, using Sunni disenfranchisement to capture and in 2024. The number of attacks mirrored this trend, falling by
consolidate its control over areas of Iraq and Syria. IS adopted almost a third, from 148 in 2023 to 100 in 2024. Burkina Faso,
similar tactics in the Sahel, taking advantage of political Nigeria and Niger each recorded reductions of over 100 deaths
instability and local grievances as a means of recruiting attributed to IS attacks compared to the previous year. However,
followers. Nigeria and Niger experienced a notable increase in deaths not
attributed to any specific group. Given IS activity in the region,
The overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in it is likely that the group was responsible for at least some of
December 2024, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has these attacks.
resulted in a significant power vacuum in Syria, of which IS has
taken advantage, increasing attacks by almost 50 per cent.10 IS maintained a persistent presence across several regions,
Although HTS actively opposes IS and other terrorist groups, its including Europe, South Asia, Asia-Pacific and MENA, with the
limited alliances with major international powers may hinder number of incidents and deaths in these areas remaining
the implementation of effective counterterrorism measures consistent with the previous year. However, escalating tensions
within Syria.11 The instability has created an opportunity for IS in Syria and the broader Middle East may contribute to
to exploit the crisis, potentially allowing the group to regain increased activity by the group and its affiliates in the near
influence in the region after years of reduced activity. In future.
response, the United States deployed additional temporary
forces to Syria in December 2024 to address this emerging Tactics favoured by Islamic State
threat and prevent IS from re-establishing a foothold.12
The most common target for IS attacks continues to be the
Changes since 2023 military, representing almost half of all IS attacks in 2024.
However, civilians surpassed the military in casualties from the
IS remained the world’s deadliest terrorist group in 2024, group’s attacks, comprising over a third of such deaths. Armed
despite deaths attributed to the group and its affiliates falling by attacks remained IS’s favoured tactic for the sixth consecutive
ten per cent to 1,805. Confirmed attacks by IS and its affiliates year, followed by bombings. In 2024, there were 397 armed
represented 16 per cent of all attacks globally in 2024. However, attacks, resulting in 1,309 people killed, a decline compared to
the actual number is likely to be much higher, as a high the 1,605 deaths from armed attacks in 2023.
percentage of attacks are not attributed to any group and
frequently occur in regions where IS operates. The total number
of confirmed IS attacks increased from 525 in 2023 to 559 in Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen
2024, an increase of six per cent. (JNIM)

IS was active in 22 countries in 2024, one more than in 2023, Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was formed in
with attacks occurring in six of the nine GTI regions: Asia- 2017 in the Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa as a coalition of
Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Salafi-jihadist insurgent groups, including Ansar Dine, the
sub-Saharan Africa, Russia and Eurasia, and South Asia. This Macina Liberation Front, Al-Mourabitoun and the Saharan
marks the highest number of countries affected by IS attacks branch of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.14 Since its
since 2020, when attacks were recorded in 30 countries. emergence, JNIM has expanded across the Central Sahel,
committing acts of violence against civilians, local security
Syria was the country most affected by IS terrorist attacks for forces and counterterrorism operations made up of
the second consecutive year, recording 369 attacks in 2024, an international militaries and UN peacekeepers.15 JNIM claims its
increase of almost 50 per cent from the 250 recorded in 2023. aims are to incite Muslims to oppose oppression, expel
The most deaths from IS attacks also occurred in Syria for the occupying powers from the Sahel region and implement Islamic
third consecutive year, with 708 deaths in 2024, a third higher governance. JNIM’s leaders have declared its enemies to be
than the 534 in 2023. While IS activity remained static in most France and other countries assisting France.16
other regions, the number of attacks fell significantly in Nigeria
and Iraq, falling by 75 and 56 per cent in 2024. IS became Recent counterterrorism efforts have focused on disrupting
slightly less lethal in its attacks, from an average of 3.8 deaths JNIM's growing influence in the Sahel region, particularly in
per attack in 2023 to 3.2 in 2024. Mali and Burkina Faso, where the group remains the dominant
insurgent force. Malian armed forces backed by Africa Corps,
The deadliest attack attributed to IS in 2024, in March, was a formerly the Wagner Group, launched targeted operations
mass shooting of civilians in the Crocus City Hall music venue against a key JNIM stronghold in Tinzaouatene, near the
on the outskirts of Moscow. Using guns, knives and incendiary Algeria-Mali border. JNIM succeeded and took control of the

16 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 RESULTS | Section 1

territory, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the JNIM’s deadliest attack in 2024 occurred in August when
counterterrorism measures currently being undertaken in gunmen attacked a town in Burkina Faso, claiming to target
Mali.17 This operation is part of broader efforts to dismantle militia members affiliated with the army. Both soldiers and
JNIM's infrastructure, which continues to pose significant civilians were attempting to dig trenches, as they had been
challenges to security forces. warned of an impending attack. Various sources reported that
the attack resulted in anywhere from 200 to 600 deaths, many
JNIM maintains considerable territorial control, particularly in of which were reported to be women and children.20
central Mali’s Mopti, Segou and Timbuktu regions, where it
operates with relative impunity. Its ability to embed itself in JNIM’s activity in Burkina Faso surged in 2024, with deaths and
local communities and exploit weak governance has solidified attacks increasing by over 50 per cent compared to the previous
its position as the most prominent insurgent group in the year. Most of JNIM attacks continue to occur in the Centre-Nord
region.18 While IS affiliates maintain a presence, their influence region, which saw 12 attacks resulting in 327 deaths in 2024,
and activity remain limited compared to JNIM. The group’s compared to eight attacks and 161 deaths in 2023. JNIM
strategic use of porous borders and challenging terrain has appears to be expanding its reach both north and south of
allowed it to evade direct confrontations, even as Centre-Nord, with a four- and fivefold increase in deaths in the
counterterrorism forces ramp up operations. neighbouring Sahel and Centre-Est regions, respectively.
Civilians represented 38 per cent of JNIM casualties in Burkina
The persistence of JNIM underscores the complexity of the Faso in 2023, but this figure surged to 67 per cent in 2024.
security environment in the Sahel. Governments face mounting Military were the next most targeted group by JNIM in Burkina
pressure to not only address the group militarily, but also to Faso, with 141 military personnel killed in 16 attacks.
tackle the underlying socio-economic and governance issues
that fuel its recruitment and local support. Continued military JNIM’s activity in Mali was concentrated in the eastern regions
campaigns, along with enhanced regional collaboration and of the country, bordering parts of Burkina Faso and Niger. JNIM
international support, will be crucial to curbing JNIM’s activity in Koulikoro decreased by 75 per cent; however, deaths
influence and securing long-term stability in the region.19 in the region increased by a quarter. Attacks more than doubled
in Mopti, while Segou experienced decreased activity from the
Changes since 2023 group. Bamako, the capital of Mali, experienced the country’s
deadliest attack of 2024, when 60 soldiers were killed in a
JNIM was the second deadliest terrorist group in 2024, with two-stage attack on a military academy, followed by an air base
1,454 deaths from 146 attacks being attributed to it. However, later that same day. JNIM claimed responsibility for the attack,
the group’s actual impact is likely much greater, given the marking the first time the group had attacked the city since its
significant number of unclaimed attacks in the region where it inception.21
operates. Last year marked the first time JNIM was confirmed
to be responsible for more than 1,000 terrorism-related deaths Tactics favoured by JNIM
in a single year.
As JNIM largely operates within existing conflict zones, most of
Deaths from terrorism attributed to JNIM are now at their its attacks are targeted against the military. In 2024, nearly half
highest level since the group’s emergence in 2017, with deaths of all JNIM attacks were directed at the military; however,
increasing by 46 per cent since 2023. The number of JNIM military personnel accounted for less than one-third of deaths.
attacks also increased by more than a quarter. JNIM’s lethality Civilians accounted for the largest share of deaths, comprising
rate is also now at its highest level, with an average of ten over half of all fatalities attributed to JNIM. Civilian deaths
people killed per attack, making it the most lethal terror group more than doubled in a single year, increasing from 343 in 2023
in 2024. to 761 in 2024. Armed assaults remain JNIM’s most lethal tactic,
responsible for 98 per cent of all fatalities and 82 per cent of all
Of the 1,454 deaths attributed to JNIM in 2024, 67 per cent attacks attributed to the group. Deaths from armed assaults
occurred in Burkina Faso and a further 22 per cent occurred in increased by 60 per cent compared to 2023, exceeding 1,000
Mali. Niger experienced a sharp increase in attacks carried out deaths for the first time.
by the group, with 13 incidents in 2024 compared to only two in
the previous year. These 13 attacks killed 109 people, an almost
14-fold increase in JNIM deaths from the eight recorded in Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
Niger in 2023. This is the first year JNIM have killed more than
ten people in Niger. Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani
Taliban, is an Islamist militant group active primarily in
JNIM has also continued its campaign outside of the Sahel, with Pakistan and Afghanistan. Formed in 2007, the group shares a
Benin and Togo experiencing three and four attacks, common ideology with the Afghan Taliban and has assisted the
respectively. The group’s death toll in Togo was the highest on Afghan Taliban several times during the 2001-2021 war.22 The
record, with 41 deaths in 2024, compared to 12 in 2023. This TTP is an umbrella organisation comprising many smaller
underscores the continued spread of JNIM’s influence beyond Islamist armed militant groups that operate along the border of
the Sahel region and into coastal West Africa. Pakistan and Afghanistan.23 The TTP’s main stated objective is
to overthrow the Pakistani government by committing acts of

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 17

Section 1 | RESULTS­

terrorism against the Pakistan armed forces and members of number of bombings increasing almost threefold when
the state. compared to the previous year.

Following the TTP's deadliest attack on record, in which a

school was targeted and 141 people were killed in December Al-Shabaab
2014, the Pakistani government introduced the National Action
Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism and extremism, with a Al-Shabaab is a Salafist militant group active in East Africa. It
particular focus on the TTP.24 This initiative led to the launch of first emerged in a battle over Somalia’s capital in the summer of
Operation Azm-e-Istehkam in June 2024; a counter-insurgency 2006. As an Al-Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia and Kenya,
campaign designed to accelerate the implementation of the al-Shabaab pursues Islamist statehood aspirations in Somalia.
NAP.25 The campaign includes airstrikes aimed at eliminating Al-Shabaab was estimated to have between 15,000 and 18,000
militants and capturing key leaders of insurgent groups. As part fighters as of 2022.29 It gained global recognition following
of these efforts, Pakistan conducted targeted airstrikes in several deadly attacks concentrated around the capital city of
Afghanistan’s Paktika province, focusing on TTP camps. Mogadishu, as well as attacks in the neighbouring states of
However, Taliban forces claimed these strikes resulted in mainly Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda in the 2000s. African Union
civilian casualties comprising of women and children.26 While peacekeeping forces known as the African Union Mission to
the TTP does not hold direct territorial control within Pakistan, Somalia (AMISOM) have been fighting al-Shabaab since 2007,
its influence remains significant in areas such as North and supported by the US and United Nations.
South Waziristan and within the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region.
The group continues to take advantage of the mountainous In 2024, Somalia's offensive against al-Shabaab achieved
terrain in order to facilitate movement and maintain significant gains, including the recapture of El Buur, a major
operational mobility across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.27 militant stronghold.30 However, progress stalled due to
al-Shabaab's counterattacks and internal challenges, such as
Changes since 2023 looting of military convoys by local militias.31 Concerns over a
potential security vacuum led Somalia to request a delay in the
The TTP was the third deadliest terrorist group in 2024, African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS)
responsible for 558 deaths across 482 attacks, the second withdrawal, resulting in a four-month postponement. The year
highest number of attacks by any single group last year. After a ended with the United Nations approving the African Union
period of reduced activity between 2017 and 2021, the group has Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), set to
experienced a resurgence, with attacks more than doubling in begin in 2025, to strengthen counterterrorism efforts and
the past year alongside a 90 per cent increase in deaths. The support stabilisation initiatives.32
number of attacks attributed to the TTP was at its highest ever
on record in 2024, while deaths caused by the group were at Changes since 2023
their highest level since 2011.
Terrorism deaths attributed to al-Shabaab fell from 512 in 2023
The TTP’s activity is confined largely to Pakistan’s northern to 387 in 2024, a decline of almost 25 per cent. The total
border with Afghanistan, with 96 per cent of the TTP’s 2024 number of attacks attributed to al-Shabaab mirrored the trend
attacks occurring in Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, in deaths, falling by over a third to 156 attacks in 2024, the
likely due to its proximity to Afghanistan’s capital. TTP activity fewest since 2014. Of the 387 deaths attributed to the group, 91
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province more than doubled last year, per cent occurred in Somalia and the remaining nine per cent
from 182 attacks resulting in 265 deaths in 2023 to 462 attacks occurred in Kenya. Al-Shabaab was responsible for 33 deaths in
and 545 deaths in 2024. The deadliest TTP attack in 2024 Kenya in 2024, a 57 per cent decrease compared to the year
occurred in the province, where TTP militants killed 16 prior. The decreased al-Shabaab activity within Kenya can be
Pakistani soldiers at an army outpost. The TTP claimed the attributed to enhanced counterterrorism operations,
attack was in retaliation for the killing of senior TTP intelligence gathering, inter-agency collaboration and
commanders.28 Terrorist activity remained relatively low in communications with local communities within the last year.33
other regions, with only 13 of the 558 deaths from terrorism
occurring outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Deaths in Somalia decreased by almost 20 per cent in 2024,
driven by the success of the Somali government and allied
Tactics favoured by TTP forces’ operations. The administrative region of Banaadir, home
to the nation’s capital, Mogadishu, has long been the epicentre
Aligning with its anti-state objectives, the TTP’s most common of terrorist activity by al-Shabaab. While attacks in Banaadir
targets were police and military personnel, accounting for 51 dropped by almost a third, deaths more than doubled from 63
per cent and 16 per cent of attacks, respectively. Civilians were in 2023 to 131 in 2024. Despite experiencing almost the same
the next most targeted group, comprising 16 per cent of attacks number of attacks as the year prior, deaths in the Shabeellaha
and 19 per cent of terrorism-related deaths. Hoose region dropped by over a third. Deaths from terrorism
remained relatively static in most other regions of Somalia.
Armed attacks remain the TTP’s most common tactic in 2024, Al-Shabaab's deadliest attack of the year occurred in Mogadishu,
accounting for almost two-thirds of attacks and 72 per cent of where a suicide bomber and a gunman killed 37 people at a
deaths. Bombing was the second most common tactic, with the beach.34

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 RESULTS | Section 1

Deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in Kenya in 2024 were

concentrated in the Mandera region along the Somali border,
which recorded eight attacks resulting in 23 fatalities. Half of
these deaths were from one attack, where an explosion killed 12
civilians. No group claimed responsibility for the attack, but
local media attributed it to al-Shabaab.35 This was Kenya’s
deadliest attack of 2024.

Tactics favoured by al-Shabaab

The highest proportion of al-Shabaab attacks in 2024 were

targeted towards military, representing almost 40 per cent of
the total, followed by civilians at 28 per cent. However, civilians
made up the majority of casualties, with 132 deaths, a third of
those killed in al-Shabaab attacks in 2024. Al-Shabaab killed an
additional 121 military personnel, accounting for 31 percent of
all the people they killed that year

Al-Shabaab has consistently utilised bombings and armed

assaults as its main modes of attack. Just over half of terrorism
deaths attributed to al-Shabaab in 2024 were the result of
bombings, while armed assaults accounted for almost a third of
deaths.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 19

Section 1 | RESULTS­

10
Ten Countries Most
Impacted by Terrorism

Table 1.1 highlights the ten countries most impacted by wake of the events of October 7, 2023. Cameroon appeared
terrorism in the GTI 2025, and how their ranks have changed among the ten countries most impacted by terrorism for the
since 2011. There has been considerable variation in these first time since 2019, highlighting a notable shift in regional
countries over this period. Only four of the ten countries in dynamics.
2024 were ranked in the ten most affected in 2011.
Niger experienced a sharp deterioration, rising five places to
The GTI is a composite measure that evaluates the impact of fifth position, its first appearance in the worst five and its worst
terrorism through a weighted analysis of incidents, deaths, ranking since the inception of the GTI. Afghanistan dropped
injuries and hostages taken. To provide a nuanced perspective, three places, moving from sixth to ninth, while Somalia
the GTI incorporates a five-year weighted lag, acknowledging remained steady at seventh place. Nigeria’s position shifted
the prolonged effects terrorist activities can have on a nation’s from eighth to sixth, while Syria moved from fifth to third.
social and psychological wellbeing. Detailed information on the Pakistan, Nigeria, Afghanistan and Somalia have consistently
methodology used to calculate the index is available in ranked among the ten most affected countries since 2011,
Appendix C. indicating ongoing challenges in addressing terrorism.

Burkina Faso remains the most affected country for the second The Sahel region has witnessed the most significant
consecutive year, a significant change from its rank of 114th in deterioration in rankings since 2011. Burkina Faso, Mali and
2011. Burkina Faso is followed by Pakistan and Syria in the Niger, which were all ranked outside the top thirty in 2011,
worst three. Pakistan reached its highest position since 2014, continue to be among the most affected by terrorism
moving up to second place after dropping two positions consistently since 2017. This underscores a geographic shift in
compared to last year. Syria rose two places while Mali fell one the epicentre of terrorism away from the Middle East and
place to be third and fourth on the Index, respectively. towards the Sahel, with substantial implications for regional
Furthermore, Israel experienced a marked decline, falling six stability.
positions to eighth place, following the increase last year in the

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 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

TABLE 1.1
Ten countries most impacted by terrorism, GTI rankings 2011–2024
Burkina Faso recorded the highest impact of terrorism for the second consecutive year.

Country 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2022 2024

Burkina Faso 114 113 111 110 52 30 21 15 7 6 4 2 1 1

Pakistan 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 5 5 8 9 7 4 2

Syria 19 4 4 5 6 7 7 8 6 5 6 5 5 3

Mali 40 22 19 21 16 13 10 9 8 7 7 4 3 4

Niger 50 60 45 34 19 19 18 19 14 12 8 10 10 5

Nigeria 8 5 5 3 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 8 8 6

Somalia 5 7 7 7 8 5 3 3 3 3 3 3 7 7

Israel 22 18 22 23 29 31 33 31 34 34 35 26 2 8

Afghanistan 3 3 3 4 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 6 9

Cameroon 49 57 58 19 11 11 12 10 10 11 12 11 12 10

Source: IEP

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 21

Section 1 | TEN COUNTRIES­

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

Burkina GTI RANK GTI SCORE 1,532 DEAD

Faso 1 8.581 206 INJURED

111 INCIDENTS

In 2024, Burkina Faso held its place as the country most 6,982 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
impacted by terrorism for the second consecutive year. Despite
this, deaths fell by a fifth, declining from 1,935 in 2023 to 1,532
in 2024. Terror attacks mirrored this trend, with attacks falling
by 57 per cent from 260 in 2023 to 111 in 2024. This is the third
consecutive year that over a thousand people were killed in 1,500

terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso.

Northern and central-eastern Burkina Faso, near the country’s 1,000

borders with Mali and Niger, experienced the most terror

attacks, accounting for over two-thirds of all attacks in 2024. Of
the country’s 1,532 deaths in 2024, 682 occurred along the Niger 500
border in Centre-Nord and Est, with the former region
recording the highest death toll of the country’s 11 regions.
Centre-Nord was the location of Burkina Faso’s deadliest attack 0
of 2024, when JNIM militants launched a large-scale assault 2007 2024

targeting both soldiers and civilians. The victims were engaged

in digging defensive trenches for the army and the Volunteers
for the Defence of the Homeland (VDP), a civilian armed group
supporting Burkina Faso’s military efforts. Reports estimate the Attack Targets in 2024
death toll to be between 200 and 600 deaths, with hundreds
more injured.36
Civilians
JNIM continues to be the most prominent terrorist group in
Military
Burkina Faso, claiming almost half of the country’s attacks in
2024. JNIM activity has increased in the last year, with both Police
attacks and deaths increasing by over half. After a recent Other
increase in activity, IS operations in Burkina Faso declined in
2024, with the group claiming responsibility for only one attack,
compared to eight in the previous year. The number of deaths
from terrorism also fell by 91 per cent, from 175 in 2023 to 15 in
2024. However, it is likely that the actual number of deaths
Worst Attacks
attributable to both JNIM and IS is significantly higher, as 55
per cent of attacks and 35 per cent of deaths in the country
were attributed to unknown jihadist groups.

Despite Burkina Faso’s improvements, its ranking in the 2025

GTI highlights the significant and ongoing threat of terrorism
in the country. The Alliance of Sahel States, formed by Burkina
Faso, Mali, and Niger, represents a regional effort to combat
terrorism following the withdrawal of French and United CENTRE-NORD
Nations troops. Despite these efforts, the security situation Dozens of gunmen killed at
remains fragile, with reports of human rights abuses by both least 200 civilians in Centre-
Nord province on the morning
insurgents and government forces. The military junta, led by of 24 August. Jamaat Nusrat
Captain Ibrahim Traoré, has extended its rule until 2029, Al-Islam wal Muslimeen
(JNIM) claimed responsibility.
delaying elections and drawing criticism from international
observers concerned that prolonged undemocratic governance
could exacerbate instability and provide opportunities for and prioritising counterterrorism efforts, it is unclear whether
terrorist groups. While the government has taken steps such as the recent decline in terrorism deaths signals lasting progress
freezing the assets of individuals accused of financing terrorism, or a temporary fluctuation.

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 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 1,081 DEAD

Pakistan 2 8.374 1,548 INJURED

1,099 INCIDENTS

The impact of terrorism increased significantly in Pakistan, with 16,532 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
the number of deaths from terrorist attacks rising by 45 per cent
over the past year to 1,081. This is the fifth consecutive year in
which an increase in terrorism deaths has been recorded and 1,600

the largest year-on-year increase in the last decade in the

country. This trend was mirrored by a rise in the number of
terror attacks, which more than doubled from 517 in 2023 to 1,200
1,099 in 2024. This is the first year that attacks have exceeded
1,000 since the inception of the Index.

800
Pakistan has experienced a significant rise in terrorism since the
Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan. Militant groups operating
from Afghanistan have intensified their attacks, particularly
along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. The provinces of 400

Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa remain the most heavily

affected regions, with these western border areas accounting for 2007 2024

over 96 per cent of terrorist attacks and deaths in Pakistan in

2024.
Attack Targets in 2024
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) remains the deadliest terrorist
organisation in Pakistan for the second year. The TTP was
responsible for 52 per cent of deaths in Pakistan in 2024. In
Police
2024, the TTP carried out 482 attacks, resulting in 558 deaths,
an increase of 91 per cent from the 293 deaths in the preceding Military

year. This is the most active that the group has been since 2009. Civilians

Other
The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) was responsible for
Pakistan’s deadliest terror attack of 2024, when a suicide
bomber killed at least 25 civilians and soldiers at Quetta railway
station in Balochistan province.37 Baloch militant groups such as Worst Attacks
the BLA and the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) continue to
take advantage of ongoing instability within Pakistan. Attacks by
BALOCHISTAN
these groups have increased significantly from 116 in 2023 to
A bomb killed at least 25
504 in 2024. Deaths surged over fourfold to 388, from 88 in the civilians and soldiers and injured
previous year. at least 50 others at a railway
station in Balochistan province
on 9 November. The Balochistan
Since the Taliban's return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, TTP Liberation Army claimed
responsibility for the attack.
has capitalised on increased operational freedom and access to
safe havens across the border. This has allowed the group to
plan and execute attacks with greater impunity.38 The TTP has or compensation for the local population. The group has also
continuously targeted security forces and infrastructure to targeted foreign investments, particularly Chinese initiatives
undermine state authority and disrupt military operations.39 In under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which it
response, the Pakistani government has introduced claims marginalise the Baloch people.41 In line with this
counterterrorism initiatives, such as Operation Azm-e- opposition, the BLA has escalated attacks on Chinese nationals
Istehkam.40 and infrastructure, aiming to disrupt these projects and draw
international attention to their cause.42
Additionally, the surge in Baloch militant group activity has
significantly contributed to the heightened levels of terrorism in This dual threat from the TTP and Baloch militant groups
Pakistan in 2024. The BLA has openly opposed the government’s underscores the multifaceted security challenges facing Pakistan
policies on resource extraction, citing the exploitation of in 2024, requiring a combination of military, political, and
Balochistan’s natural resources without equitable development socio-economic measures.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 23

Section 1 | TEN COUNTRIES­

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 744 DEAD

Syria 3 8.006 408 INJURED

430 INCIDENTS

7,587 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007

Terrorism in Syria remains a significant threat, with attacks
rising by 16 per cent to 430 in 2024. Deaths mirrored this trend, 1,000
increasing four per cent to 744 deaths, compared to 715 in 2023.
Increased activity by IS drove the increase, with the group
responsible for 48 per cent more attacks and 33 per cent more 750
deaths when compared to the previous year. The fall of the
Assad regime in December 2024 has sparked fears that IS could
reclaim its lost territory and reestablish its former power, 500
though the long-term impact remains uncertain.43 Hay’at Tahrir
al-Sham (HTS) attacks are excluded from the GTI as they
occurred within the context of the Syrian Civil War. Since 2017, 250
HTS has also acted as a de facto authority in Idlib Governorate,
where most of their attacks were concentrated.
0
The eastern border governorates were the areas most affected 2007 2024

by terrorism in 2024, with 76 per cent of attacks occurring in

Deir ez-Zor and Homs, both of which share a border with Iraq.
Deaths in this area rose by 11 per cent compared to the previous
year, with Homs remaining the governorate with the most Attack Targets in 2024
deaths with 252, followed by Deir ez-Zor with 248 and Al-
Raqqah with 154.
Military
IS remained the deadliest group in Syria in 2024, maintaining
Civilians
this position for over a decade. The group was responsible for
95 per cent of all deaths and 86 per cent of all incidents in the Oil Sector

country. IS also recorded its highest number of attacks and Other

deaths in Syria this year, with 369 attacks causing 708 deaths. A
notable shift in IS strategy has been observed, with a focus on
targeting military personnel, who accounted for 63 per cent of
IS-attributed deaths in 2024.

IS was likely behind Syria’s deadliest attack of the year, which Worst Attacks
killed 54 soldiers in the Homs Governorate. The attack occurred
two days after the fall of the Assad regime on 8 December 2024.
In the 23 days following Assad’s fall, IS launched 23 attacks that
killed 91 people, making December the most lethal month for IS
activity in 2024.

While the future of Syria remains uncertain, the fall of Assad

has coincided with a surge in IS activity, with experts warning
that the regime collapse could trigger a resurgence of IS in
Syria.44 Although it is still too early to determine the full impact,
the United States anticipated this risk and launched strikes on HOMS
IS strongholds immediately after Assad fled in December.45 Assailants killed 54 regime
soldiers in Homs Governorate on
Alternatively, IS may continue to prioritise its operations in 10 December. No group have
sub-Saharan Africa, capitalising on the momentum it has built claimed responsibility at the time
of writing, but local sources say
there rather than refocusing on Syria. Despite the uncertainty Islamic State (IS) was probably
surrounding the group’s intentions, the rise in attacks and responsible.
deaths highlights that IS remains a significant threat in Syria.

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 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 604 DEAD

Mali 4 7.907 158 INJURED

201 INCIDENTS

Terrorism deaths in Mali fell for the second year in 2024, with 4,809 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
the country recording 604 deaths from 201 attacks, a 21 per cent
reduction in both deaths and attacks compared to the previous
year. Despite falling levels of terrorism within the country,
extremist groups continue to exploit the ongoing instability in
750
Mali. The country has yet to restore civilian rule since the 2021
coup, with the deadline set for elections passing in March 2024
and no further date being set.46
500

Mali’s border with Niger and Burkina Faso continues to be the

area most impacted by terrorism, with almost three-quarters of
attacks and deaths occurring in those regions. Terrorism has 250
decreased in most regions of Mali, including Gao, Segou,
Koulikoro and Timbuktu, which saw fewer attacks and
terrorism-related deaths in 2024. However, Mali’s capital, 0
Bamako, experienced terror activity for the first time since 2016, 2007 2024

with three attacks in 2024 resulting in 70 deaths, the most ever

recorded in the city. The country’s deadliest attack in 2024
occurred in Bamako, when 60 people were killed in concurrent
armed attacks on a school and a military air base. JNIM claimed Attack Targets in 2024
responsibility for the attack, its deadliest attack in Mali in
2024.47
Civilians
JNIM remains the most prominent terrorist group in Mali,
Military
recording 77 attacks and 322 deaths in 2024, its second-highest
death toll since the group’s inception in 2017. However, its Police
activity has declined this year, with both deaths and attacks Other
attributed to the group falling by three per cent. IS activity also
declined in Mali, recording an 88 per cent drop in deaths and a
45 per cent drop in attacks compared to the previous year.
However, 58 per cent of Mali’s total attacks and 45 per cent of
total deaths were attributed to undetermined jihadist groups,
which are likely unclaimed attacks by either JNIM or IS Worst Attacks
militants.

The involvement of Africa Corps, formerly the Wagner Group,

within Mali has exacerbated tensions between Mali and its
BAMAKO
international partners. Despite the group’s presence, attacks and
Gunmen killed at least 60
deaths attributed to terrorism have remained prevalent in the soldiers in an attack on a
region. Notably, in July 2024, Africa Corps suffered significant Gendarmerie school in Bamako
Capital district on 17 September.
losses during an ambush by Tuareg rebels near Tinzaouaten, This was in conjunction with an
raising questions about the effectiveness of the group in the attack on a military air base later
that day. Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam
region. Furthermore, the group’s involvement may be driven wal Muslimeen (JNIM) claimed
more by economic interests, such as the extraction of the responsibility for the attack.

region’s rich natural resources, rather than a genuine

commitment to stabilising Mali.48 regime for delaying elections without consultation.49 This move
further consolidated military control and delayed the transition
Tensions within Mali escalated when, in November 2024, Prime to civilian rule. This internal instability, combined with the
Minister Choguel Maïga was dismissed by the junta leader, setbacks faced by Africa Corps, is likely to fuel a further
General Assimi Goïta, after Maïga publicly criticised the military increase in terrorism within the near future.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 25

Section 1 | TEN COUNTRIES­

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 930 DEAD

Niger 5 7.776 158 INJURED

101 INCIDENTS

Terrorism in Niger reached unprecedented levels in 2024, 3,249 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
continuing the sharp rise in activity seen in 2023. The number
of terrorist attacks rose to 101 in 2024, up from 62 the previous
year, while deaths nearly doubled, with 930 recorded in 2024
compared to 479 in 2023. Civilian deaths in Niger increased
750
almost threefold in 2024, while military deaths rose to 499,
from 340 in the previous year, accounting for more than half of
all deaths in the country. Niger now holds the highest military
500
death toll from terrorism of any country in 2024.

Niger’s deadliest attack of 2024 occurred when over 300

gunmen killed 237 soldiers in an attack in the Tahoua region, 250

near the Malian border. No group has claimed responsibility at

the time of writing, but jihadists operate in the area.50 This
attack was also the deadliest globally in 2024. 0
2007 2024

The Tillabéri region remained the area with the highest level of
terrorism. This region is in the unstable tri-border area shared
with Burkina Faso and Mali and has been severely impacted by
the Islamic insurgency in the Central Sahel. Terrorist attacks Attack Targets in 2024
occurred in all eight of Niger’s regions, with Tillabéri recording
63 per cent of the country’s terrorist attacks and 67 per cent of
fatalities. This has spread into neighbouring regions such as Military
Tahoua, with deaths there increasing over fivefold since 2023.
Civilians

JNIM activity in Niger saw a substantial increase in 2024, with Police

the group claiming responsibility for 13 attacks that caused 109 Other
deaths, representing an almost fourteenfold increase in
fatalities and marking the highest number of deaths and attacks
by JNIM in the country to date. IS also remained active, though
attacks remained steady from the previous years and deaths
attributed to the group halved to 108. However, the full extent
of activity by these groups remains unclear, as 75 per cent of Worst Attacks
deaths and 66 per cent of attacks in 2024 were not claimed by
any terrorist group.

The political and security upheaval following the July 2023 coup
has created an environment ripe for exploitation by Islamic
militant groups. Niger’s shift toward partnerships with Russia,
accompanied by a decline in collaboration with Western allies,
has contributed to a sharp rise in terrorist attacks and
fatalities.51 Russian military instructors arrived in April 2024 to
TAHOUA
replace departing Western forces, but their efforts have been
Over 300 assailants killed 237
hindered by limited experience in the Sahel and a focus on soldiers in an attack in Tahoua
supporting the ruling junta.52 The US withdrawal in August region on 21 July. No group has
claimed responsibility at the
2024 further exacerbated the security vacuum, raising concerns time of writing, but jihadists
about militant groups expanding their influence.53 The operate in the area.
disruption of existing counterterrorism operations, combined
with severed ties to Western powers like the US and France, has
provided groups such as JNIM and IS with opportunities to
escalate their activities in the region.

26 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 565 DEAD

Nigeria 6 7.658 177 INJURED

99 INCIDENTS

While attacks in Nigeria decreased by 37 per cent, deaths from 11,873 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
terrorism continued to rise, increasing by six per cent to 565 in
2024. This marks the highest death toll since 2020, driven by
2,000
ongoing conflict between ISWA and Boko Haram. Together,
fatalities attributed to these groups accounted for nearly 60 per
cent of all terrorism-related deaths in the country.
1,500

Civilians became the most targeted group in 2024, accounting

for 62 per cent of all deaths, a significant increase from 21 per
1,000
cent in 2023. In contrast, terrorists and militants, who
represented 38 per cent of deaths in 2023, accounted for only 15
per cent in 2024.
500

Boko Haram has overtaken Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) as

Nigeria’s deadliest terrorist group for the first time since 2019.
In 2024, the group was responsible for 31 per cent of deaths and 2007 2024

nearly a quarter of all attacks in the country. Despite a decrease

in attacks from 28 in 2023 to 22 in 2024, Boko Haram's death
toll rose by 18 per cent to 175, the highest number since 2020.
On average, the group has become more lethal, with deaths per Attack Targets in 2024
attack increasing from five to eight.

ISWA deaths fell significantly in 2024, with 15 attacks resulting Civilians

in 158 deaths, a sharp decrease from the 64 attacks and 288
Police
deaths recorded in 2023. However, ISWA's attacks became more
lethal, with average deaths per attack rising from five in 2023 to Military
11 in 2024. A single attack targeting Boko Haram accounted for Other
the majority of ISWA deaths in 2024, resulting in 85 deaths.54

Terrorist activity has de-escalated in Borno State, where attacks

halved, and deaths decreased by 23 per cent. Activity appears to
have shifted to neighbouring Yobe State, which recorded 14
attacks and 158 deaths, a threefold increase in deaths compared Worst Attacks
to 2023. This was driven by the deadliest attack of the year
taking place in Yobe State, where assailants killed at least 100
civilians whom they accused of collaborating with the Nigerian
Army. .55

Conflict over territory and internal factional fighting within and

between Boko Haram and ISWA continues to shape Nigeria's
security landscape. The country also faces significant economic YOBE
Around 150 gunmen on
challenges that have fuelled social unrest and weakened motorcycles opened fire on a
governance, conditions that often facilitate terrorist recruitment market and set fire to shops and
residences in an attack on Mafa
and escalate militant activity.56 Regional observers have village, Tarmuwa local government
emphasised the importance of sustained peace initiatives in area, Yobe state at around 1600hrs
on 1 September, killing between
states most affected by terrorism, particularly Borno State. They 100 and 150 people and wounding
have also called for expanded defector rehabilitation programs an unconfirmed number. The
authorities attributed the attack to
and improved access to rural services to weaken recruitment Boko Haram, saying that the attack
efforts and promote stability. was in retaliation for the killing of
two militants by local vigilantes.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 27

Section 1 | TEN COUNTRIES­

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 359 DEAD

Somalia 7 7.614 543 INJURED

144 INCIDENTS

The impact of terrorism in Somalia declined in 2024, 9,867 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
continuing a trend that began six years ago. There were 359
deaths and 144 incidents in 2024, a fall of 19 per cent and 29 1,500
per cent, respectively, compared to the previous year. This
reduction marked the sixth-largest global decrease in deaths
1,250
and Somalia's lowest death toll since 2015, driven by reduced
al-Shabaab activity.
1,000
Al-Shabaab, Somalia's most lethal terrorist group, was
responsible for 96 per cent of recorded terrorist attacks and 99
750
per cent of deaths in 2024. Deaths attributed to al-Shabaab
declined by 19 per cent, driven by successful military campaigns
led by the Somali government, bolstered by collaboration with 500

local militias in the fight against al-Shabaab. Additionally,

support from the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia
(ATMIS) and US military interventions have strengthened 2007 2024

Somali forces, improving their ability to counter al-Shabaab

effectively.57

Terrorism became more concentrated in and around Banaadir, Attack Targets in 2024
the home of Somali’s capital, Mogadishu, in 2024. While
terrorist activity in the region decreased by 36 per cent, deaths
doubled, rising from 63 to 131. The majority of these deaths Military
occurred in a single al-Shabaab attack, a suicide bombing and
Civilians
armed assault on a Mogadishu hotel that killed 37 people,
making it the deadliest attack in Somalia that year.58 Al-Shabaab Police
also expanded its operations into regions bordering Banaadir, Other
with the Bay region experiencing 12 attacks that caused 31
deaths, the highest in four years. In contrast, activity declined
sharply in Hiraan, where incidents fell by 89 per cent and
deaths by 92 per cent.

Significant progress has been made in reclaiming territories Worst Attacks

from al-Shabaab through the combined efforts of the Somali
government, US forces and the African Union. These
coordinated operations have contributed to a sustained decline
in terrorism-related incidents and deaths. However, disputes
between the Somali government and clan militias have further
complicated the country’s security landscape. These internal
conflicts risk undermining counterterrorism initiatives, MOGADISHU
potentially allowing terrorist groups to regroup and regain A suicide bomber detonated his
explosives vest near the Beach View
strength, threatening the hard-won gains in regional stability.59 Hotel located on Liido beach
Mogadishu on 2 August. Several
gunmen then opened fire on civilians
at the beach and in the vicinity of the
hotel. Assailants killed at least 37
people and wounded at least 200
others. After an exchange of fire,
security forces neutralised the
assailants, killing at least three and
capturing one. Al-Shabaab claimed
responsibility for the attack via its
affiliated radio station.

28 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 18 DEAD

Israel 8 7.463 108 INJURED

27 INCIDENTS

In 2024, terrorism-related deaths in Israel dropped significantly, 1,280 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
returning to pre-2023 levels, with 18 deaths compared to 1,160
in 2023, a 98 per cent reduction. This decline is largely
attributed to the October 7 Hamas attacks, which accounted for
most deaths in 2023. Despite the decrease in deaths, the
number of attacks rose slightly, from 21 in 2023, to 27 in 2024. 900

In 2024, the conflict between Hamas and Israel intensified

significantly. Following the October 7 attack, Israel launched 600

airstrikes and a ground offensive targeting key areas in Gaza,

including Gaza City and Khan Younis. By December, Israeli
forces reported the killing of Yahya Sinwar, a senior Hamas 300
leader. The conflict resulted in severe humanitarian
consequences, with over 55,000 Palestinians reported dead and
more than two million displaced.60 International mediators have 0
consistently sought to broker a ceasefire, with a six-week 2007 2024

ceasefire and hostage exchange deal being announced on

January 15, 2025. This conflict further resulted in a wider scale
conflict and the destabilisation of neighbouring countries such
as Lebanon and Syria. Attack Targets in 2024

Israel experienced its highest number of terror attacks since

2019. Although most attacks caused no deaths, nine incidents Civilians
involving Palestinian militants not linked to specific
Military
organisations resulted in one or two deaths. The deadliest
attack of 2024 occurred at a light rail station in Tel Aviv, where Police
gunmen killed seven civilians. Hamas later claimed Other
responsibility for the incident.61

Terrorism in Israel is expected to remain a significant challenge

due to ongoing regional instability, evolving militant tactics,
and unresolved political conflicts. Groups such as Hamas,
Hezbollah, and the Houthis may increasingly target critical Worst Attacks
infrastructure through drones, missiles, and cyberattacks.
Tensions in the occupied West Bank and the broader Israeli-
Palestinian conflict could also fuel localised or lone wolf attacks.
The ceasefire deal reached on January 15, 2025 between Hamas TEL AVIV CITY
and Israel raises questions about the future of regional stability. Assailants armed with a knife
and a gun killed seven civilians
It remains to be seen how this agreement will influence the and injured 16 others in the
broader landscape of insecurity and instability in the region.62 Jaffa part of Tel Aviv City on 1
October. Hamas claimed
responsibility for the attack.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 29

Section 1 | TEN COUNTRIES­

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 113 DEAD

Afghanistan 9 7.262 190 INJURED

87 INCIDENTS

Terrorism remained a persistent threat in Afghanistan in 2024, 18,747 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007
with incidents rising by nearly 20 per cent despite a slight
decrease in deaths. The country recorded 113 deaths, a 12 per 1,600
cent decline, while incidents increased from 73 in 2023 to 87 in
1,400
2024. This year marked Afghanistan’s lowest position on the
GTI since its inception, remaining outside the top five for the 1,200
second consecutive year.
1,000

While terrorist activity in Afghanistan has fallen significantly in 800

recent years, this does not indicate that peace has been restored.
600
The GTI does not account for acts of state repression or violence
committed by state actors. As such, actions carried out by the 400
Taliban are no longer included within the scope of the report.
200
Despite the downward trend in terrorism, widespread reports
persist of repression and violence targeting civilians, the media, 0
human rights officials, and former government officials.63 2007 2024

Afghanistan is considered the world’s most repressive country

for women, who face severe institutionalised gender-based
discrimination, including bans on education and strict
requirements to cover their faces and bodies.64 Attack Targets in 2024

Terrorism in Afghanistan remains concentrated in the northern

provinces, with Kabul and Takhar recording the highest number Government
of attacks in 2024. Kabul saw 27 deaths from 41 attacks, making
Undetermined
it the province with the most terrorism deaths. Despite
remaining the most terrorism-affected province for the 11 th Civilians
consecutive year, Kabul experienced a 48 per cent decrease in Other
deaths even as the number of attacks rose by 78 per cent.

Most attacks in Afghanistan were carried out by anti-Taliban

groups, including the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) and the
National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF). However,
Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISK) remained the deadliest Worst Attacks
group in the country, responsible for 57 per cent of deaths and a
fifth of attacks in 2024. ISK was responsible for Afghanistan’s
deadliest attack of 2024, when a suicide bomber killed 21 people
at a bank branch in Kandahar province.65

Entering their fourth year in power, the Taliban continue to

maintain internal stability while facing resistance from armed
opposition groups such as the AFF and NRF, which challenge
their governance. Relations with Pakistan have also worsened,
highlighted by cross-border tensions and Pakistani airstrikes on KANDAHAR
suspected TTP hideouts in Afghanistan.66 These developments A suicide bomber killed at least
reflect the complexities of Afghanistan’s political landscape as it 21 people and wounded at least
30 others outside a bank branch
grapples with security concerns and internal opposition. in Kandahar province on 21
March. Islamic State - Khorasan
Province claimed responsibility
for the attack.

30 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TEN COUNTRIES | Section 1

10 COUNTRIES MOST IMPACTED BY TERRORISM

GTI RANK GTI SCORE 205 DEAD

Cameroon 10 6.944 200 INJURED

153 INCIDENTS

2,382 Deaths From Terrorism Since 2007

For the first time since 2019, Cameroon is among the ten
countries most affected by terrorism. Following a sharp rise in 300
activity in 2023, Cameroon saw a slight decline in 2024, with
attacks falling by 13 per cent to 153 and deaths dropping by
one-third to 205. Cameroon’s security challenges are primarily
driven by ongoing separatist conflicts and threats posed by 200
Islamic militant groups, particularly Boko Haram.

Boko Haram remained the most active and lethal terrorist

organisation in Cameroon in 2024, responsible for 107 deaths 100
and 69 attacks, or half of the deaths and attacks recorded in the
country. Despite this, the number of attacks and deaths
attributed to the group declined by 28 per cent and 26 per cent,
respectively, compared to the previous year. Furthermore, the 0
ongoing Ambazonia separatist insurgency, also referred to as the 2007 2024

Anglophone crisis, accounted for approximately half of all

terrorist attacks and one-third of deaths within the country
during the same period. The insurgency remains a complex
element of Cameroon’s security landscape, with the Attack Targets in 2024
government’s use of anti-terrorism laws to address the
Anglophone crisis adding further challenges to an already
sensitive situation.67 Civilians

Military
Terrorism declined across all regions of Cameroon in 2024, but
Extrême-Nord remained the most affected region, recording the Police
highest number of attacks and deaths. In this region, 92 per Other
cent of attacks and 98 per cent of deaths were attributed to
Boko Haram. The group’s activity in Extrême-Nord is largely
driven by its ongoing conflict with ISWA, which maintains a
strong presence in neighbouring countries such as Niger and
Nigeria. Cameroon’s deadliest attack in 2024 occurred in
Extrême-Nord, where Boko Haram militants killed 27 fishermen. Worst Attacks
The local fishing community, composed primarily of Nigerian
nationals, may have been targeted due to suspicions of
connections with ISWA.68

Cameroon continues to face significant challenges related to

governance and peace. In the Global Peace Index 2024, the
country ranked 137 th out of 163, highlighting ongoing instability. EXTREME NORD
Two persistent conflicts continue to shape the security Assailants killed at least 27
landscape: the Anglophone separatist crisis and the insurgencies fishermen and abducted at least
three others in Extreme Nord
involving ISWA and Boko Haram. While terrorism declined in region on 11 April. The
2024, tensions remain high. The outlook remains uncertain, as unconfirmed number of victims
were from Nigeria. The assailants
the interplay between separatist pressures and extremist reportedly accused abductees for
insurgencies poses ongoing threats to peace and stability in the being Islamic State’s West Africa
Province (ISWAP) informants. No
years ahead. group has claimed responsibility
at the time of writing, but Boko
Haram operates in the area.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 31

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Over the last two decades, the

2015 2022 epicentre of terrorism has shifted
from the Middle East and North

10,882 6,824 Africa into the Sahel region of

sub-Saharan Africa.

Since 2007, deaths from terrorism have The Sahel region now accounts
fluctuated, peaking at 10,882 in 2015 and for over half of all deaths from
reaching a low of 6,824 in 2022. Over this terrorism globally. Terrorism
period, terrorism dynamics have remained deaths have increased almost
highly fluid, with its epicentre shifting towards tenfold since 2019. In 2007, the
countries with weaker government institutions. Sahel accounted for only one
per cent of global deaths.

In North America since 2007, there have been 84 politically

motivated attacks, compared to 21 religiously motivated
attacks. Of these attacks, 58 were linked to individuals with
far-right sympathies or connections.

Of the 163 countries in

Over the past decade the average
the GTI, only 25 have not impact of terrorism has increased in
recorded a single terrorist three of the nine regions: Europe, South
incident since 2007. America, and sub-Saharan Africa. Every
other region has recorded a decrease in
the average impact since 2014.

2007 2024 2012 2024

6,249 59 184 12
The largest rises in In Iraq, deaths from terrorism The largest percentage Thailand fell from
terrorist activity since have fallen 99 per cent since falls in terrorist activity 184 deaths in 2012,
2007 have occurred in 2007, when 6,249 deaths since 2007 have occurred to 12 in 2024.
Pakistan, Syria and Mali. were recorded, to 59 in 2024. in Iraq, Afghanistan and
Thailand.

Trends in the West

There has been a sharp The number of antisemitic incidents 2023 2024

34 67
increase in antisemitic in the US rose by over 200 per cent
violence and hate crimes in 2024. The number of FBI-recorded
across the West, with attacks hate crime incidents targeting the
on synagogues recorded in Jewish community rose by 270 per The number of terrorist incidents in Europe
Europe, Australia, and the US. cent in the two months after the start doubled over the past year, from 34
of the Gaza war. attacks in 2023 to 67 in 2024, including
attacks carried out by IS and Hamas.

32 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

2 Trends in
Terrorism
Trends in Terrorism 2022 marked the lowest global death toll from terrorism since
2007, but in 2023, deaths surged to levels comparable to those
seen in 2017. This increase, the first since 2020, was primarily
due to the October 7 attack by Hamas on Israel, which resulted
TRENDS SINCE 2007 in over 1,200 fatalities and the capture of more than 200
soldiers and civilians.1 Deaths decreased by 13 per cent in 2024,
Figure 2.1 shows that there have been several distinct phases in primarily due to the surge in deaths caused by the Hamas
terrorist activity since 2007. In 2007 and 2008, most terrorist attack in 2023. However, without this attack, deaths would have
activity was concentrated in Iraq and Afghanistan in response risen slightly in 2024 by half a per cent, reaching their highest
to the US and its allies’ interventions. This impacted Pakistan, level since 2017.
leading to an escalation in terrorist activities from 2008 to 2013.
The Arab Spring and the rise of Islamic State (IS) triggered a The Sahel remains the epicentre of terrorism, despite a decline
surge in terrorism across the Middle East from 2011 to 2013, in deaths in 2024 and renewed violence in MENA. The region
particularly in Syria and Iraq, while the growth of Boko Haram accounted for 51 per cent of total terrorism deaths globally in
led to terrorism increasing in Nigeria. At its peak in 2015, 2024, compared to 48 per cent in 2023 and just one per cent in
almost 11,000 people were killed in terrorist attacks in a single 2007. Niger, Chad and Nigeria saw increases in deaths over the
year. past year, with Niger and Chad recording rises of over 80 per
cent. However, these increases were offset by declines of more
From 2016, deaths from terrorism began to decline. Iraq saw a than 20 per cent in Burkina Faso, Mali, Cameroon, and Senegal,
marked reduction in terrorism starting in 2017, whereas leading to an overall four per cent decline in deaths across the
Afghanistan experienced an increase in terrorism from 2016 to Sahel in 2024. Despite this reduction, 2024 recorded the
2021, followed by a notable decline in 2022 after the Taliban's second-highest death toll in the Sahel since the inception of the
ascension to power. During the same period, the Sahel region Index.
saw a significant rise in terrorist incidents and deaths,
particularly in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Somalia. Since 2009 both
deaths and attacks have risen by roughly tenfold.

FIGURE 2.1
Deaths from terrorism, 2007–2024
Total deaths have decreased 31 per cent from their peak in 2015.

10,000

7,500
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

The West

The Sahel

Pakistan
5,000
Iraq

Afghanistan

All other countries

2,500

0
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 33
Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Globally, deaths from terrorism have declined by almost a third during this period, with deaths increasing 30 times between
since the peak of terrorism in 2015, with Iraq and Nigeria 2007 and 2024. Burkina Faso, Niger and Mali recorded the
recording the largest decreases. Deaths in Nigeria peaked in largest increases, 1,532, 896 and 602 more deaths respectively in
2014 at 2,101, before declining to 392 deaths in 2022, the lowest 2024 than in 2007. Groups such as IS and JNIM continue to
level since 2011. Deaths from terrorism in Nigeria increased in wage a violent campaign in the region, capitalising on political
the two subsequent years, rising by 34 per cent in 2023 to 533 instability and organised crime. Figure 2.2 shows the shift of
and 565 in 2024. The resurgence of violence in Nigeria terrorism away from MENA and towards the Sahel and, more
continues to be driven by intensified conflict between ISWA and specifically, the tri-border region between Mali, Niger and
Boko Haram, with both groups responsible for almost 60 per Burkina Faso.
cent of deaths in 2024 in the country.
Terrorism has become more concentrated over the past few
Deaths from terrorism in Iraq have fallen by 99 per cent since years, as shown in Figure 2.2. Despite total deaths from
their peak in 2007. This is indicative of a broader trend in the terrorism falling by 13 per cent, the number of countries that
MENA region, where terrorist activities have lessened, recorded at least one death from terrorism remained static, from
especially over the last eight years. Contributing factors include 46 in 2023 to 45 in 2024. There are 65 countries with a GTI
the de-escalation of the Syrian civil war, IS’ operational shift score of zero, meaning that they have not experienced a single
from MENA to the Sahel region, and enhanced counterterrorism incident of terrorism in the past five years. By contrast, in 2015
cooperation at both national and international levels. when terrorism was most widespread, there were only 57
countries with a GTI score of zero. Of the 163 countries in the
While attacks and deaths have declined by more than half since GTI, only 25 have not recorded a single terrorist incident since
2007 in the MENA region, the late 2023 resurgence of violence 2007.
in Israel and Palestine has had a ripple effect on conflict in the
region. Israel responded to the October 2023 Hamas attack by CONFLICT AND TERRORISM
invading southern Lebanon, due to Hezbollah’s support for
Hamas. This resurgence in conflict coincided with the fall of the Conflict has been the primary driver of terrorism since 2007.
Assad regime, leaving Syria in a power vacuum. Experts warn There were 153,234 terrorism deaths between 2007 and 2024, of
that the regime’s collapse could lead to a resurgence of IS in which 98 per cent occurred in countries that were involved in a
Syria, prompting the US to launch strikes on IS strongholds conflict at the time of the attacks. In 2024, the 20 countries most
immediately after Assad fled in December.2 impacted by terrorism were all defined as being in conflict.3
Chile is ranked 21 st on the GTI and is the only country in the 25
While a resurgence in IS activity in Syria is anticipated, recent most impacted of the Index that was not classified as being in
trends indicate that IS and its affiliates continue to shift their conflict in 2024.
focus to sub-Saharan Africa and more specifically Sahelian
countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Niger and
Cameroon. The Sahel has become increasingly more violent

FIGURE 2.2
Most significant changes in deaths from terrorism, 2021–2024
Apart from a surge in Israel, Palestine and Syria, terrorism has shifted from MENA to the Sahel within the last three years.

Increasing

Decreasing

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

34 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

FIGURE 2.3
Distribution of deaths by terrorism, 2007–2024
45 countries recorded at least one death from terrorism in 2024.

1000+ 500-999 100-499 25-99 1-24

50

40
NUMBER OF COUNTRIES

30

20

10

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

Figure 2.4 illustrates the trend in deaths from terrorism by Although deaths from terrorism in wars have declined since
conflict type. In 2024, 98 per cent of terrorism deaths occurred their peak in 2017, deaths in minor conflicts have risen, with
in countries experiencing some level of conflict. The almost 2,400 terrorism deaths in minor conflict situations
concentration of terrorism deaths in conflict zones has recorded in 2024. Even with the decline since 2023, terrorism
remained above 95 per cent since 2015. Terror attacks in deaths in minor conflict situations remain high. While deaths in
countries in conflict also tend to be deadlier than those non-conflict countries are well below the peak of 2015, they
committed outside conflict zones, with attacks in conflict have also risen in the last two years, with a 25 per cent increase
countries killing 2.2 people per attack in 2024 compared to 0.9 in the last year alone. The increase was driven by non-conflict
people per attack outside conflict zones. countries bordering the Sahel, with Togo reporting 42 deaths
and Chad 40, their highest death tolls on record. Despite the
increase, terrorism deaths in non-conflict countries remain
below 200.

FIGURE 2.4
Deaths from terrorism by conflict type, 2007–2024
In 2024, 98 per cent of deaths from terrorism occurred in countries currently experiencing conflict.

War Minor Conflict Non-Conflict

10,000 4,000
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

600
7,500 3,000

400
5,000 2,000

2,500 1,000 200

0 0 0
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024

2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024

2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022
2024

Source: Terrorism Tracker; UCDP; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 35

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Countries involved in conflict are more susceptible to terrorism allegiance to IS drove a truck into a crowd in New Orleans,
in part because of the lack of a fully functioning state. killing 15 people.4 It was an attack reminiscent of the wave of IS
Terrorism is also one of many tactics employed by insurgencies inspired terrorism seen in the West in the mid-2010s. There
and paramilitaries in a civil conflict. For example, terrorist have also been fears that the war in Gaza would lead to an
groups like IS and Boko Haram carry out conventional military increase in terrorist activity in Europe. Security services in
attacks in the context of their respective conflicts, as well as Europe foiled several planned terrorist attacks in December
undertaking extensive terrorist activity. 2023. These attacks were linked to Hamas, with some reported
to have been targeting Jewish institutions in Germany.5
TRENDS IN THE WEST
While the predicted increase in terrorism owing to the conflict
In the West, total deaths from terrorism peaked in 2016 when in Gaza did not eventuate, there has been a sharp increase in
194 people died, while attacks peaked a year later when 176 antisemitic violence and hate crimes across the West, with
incidents were recorded. Most of these deaths were caused by attacks on synagogues recorded in Europe, Australia, and the
Islamic jihadists. However, both religious and politically US. The FBI’s hate crime data shows a sharp increase in
motivated terrorism have subsided significantly in the last five antisemitic incidents in the US, with total incidents increasing
years in the West, as shown in Figure 2.5. Between 2017 and by over 270 per cent between September 2023 and November
2024, the total number of yearly attacks in the West fell by 70 2023.
per cent, from 176 to 52. Deaths also fell significantly, with total
deaths over the same period falling from 146 to 15, a 90 per cent Concerns have also been raised about the possibility of a spike
decrease in politically motivated violence and political terrorism, given
the levels of political polarisation and instability that have been
Most terrorist attacks in the West since 2007 have either been seen over the past five years. In recent years, most terrorist
politically motivated or had no clear ideological motivation, attacks have been politically motivated. Figure 2.6 shows trends
with 429 political attacks recorded over the last 18 years. in the US Political Violence database,6 which shows incidents of
However, religiously motivated attacks were more lethal, with political violence that have led to at least one fatality. The data
494 people killed in the West in religiously motivated attacks ranges back to 1780. For almost 200 years, the predominant
over the same period. All the religiously motivated deaths in form of political violence in the US was violent rioting, followed
this period were caused by jihadists groups or individuals with by lynching. However, over the past 40 years, almost all
a jihadist ideology. incidents of fatal politically motivated violence in the US have
been terrorist attacks. From 2020 to 2024, 75 per cent of fatal
Recent events have led to concerns about a resurgence in political violence incidents in the US were terrorist attacks, up
jihadist attacks in the West. The most recent incident occurring from 48 per cent between 1975-1979.
in early January 2025, when an individual who had pledged

FIGURE 2.5
Terrorist attacks and fatalities in the West by ideology, 2007–2024
Both politically and religiously motivated terrorism in the West has fallen since 2017.

Political Religious Nationalist/Religious Nationalist Single Interest Undetermined

150

150
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM
TERRORIST ATTACKS

100
100

50
50

0 0
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

36 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

FIGURE 2.6
Fatal political violence events in the US by 5-year increments, 1780–2024
Terrorism has become the most common form of fatal political violence in the US over the past 40 years.

160

140
EVENTS WITH AT LEAST ONE FATALITY

120

100
Lynching
75%
From 2020 to 2024, 75 per
Other cent of fatal political violence
80
incidents in the US were
Riot terrorist attacks, up from 48
per cent between 1975-1979.
60 Terrorism

40

20

0
1782 1802 1822 1842 1862 1882 1902 1922 1942 1962 1982 2002 2022

Source: USPV

Much of the debate around political terrorism in the West has terrorism in the West occurred in Western European countries.
centred around which political ideologies have been responsible However, far-right terrorism over the same period was more
for the most attacks or most deaths from terrorism. Figure 2.7 lethal, with 292 people being killed in far-right attacks from
looks at incidents of terrorism and deaths from terrorism by 2017 to 2024, with fatal attacks occurring in Europe, North
far-left and far-right groups and individuals. It shows that America, and Asia-Pacific. It should be noted however that
far-left groups were responsible for more terrorist attacks, almost all of these attacks, across both ideologies, were carried
particularly between 2016 and 2022. The vast majority of far-left out by individuals who were not affiliated with a particular
terrorist group.
FIGURE 2.7
Far-left and Far-right terrorism in the West, 2007–2024
While far-left groups have recorded more attacks, far-right groups have recorded more deaths.

Far-Left Far-Right

90

60 80

70
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

60
TERRORIST ATTACKS

40
50

40

30
20
20

10

0 0
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 37

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

The rise in undetermined or unaffiliated terrorism has been a However, in the past few years there has been a noticeable rise
consistent feature of terrorist attacks in the West over the past in the percentage of attacks that cannot be attributed to any
two decades, as shown in Figure 2.8. In 2007, 44 per cent of group at all. In 2024, 65 per cent of attacks could not be tied to
attacks could be attributed to a specific group or organisation. either a specific group or a specific ideology. While part of this
However, this figure has not been higher than 26 per cent in the increase can simply be attributed to a lack of information about
last decade, and in the last year under eight per cent of attacks certain attacks, it may also reflect the rise of ideologically
could be attributed to a specific group. confused or unclear attacks, reflecting the broader political and
social uncertainty.
Between 2014 and 2023 there was a sharp rise in terrorist
attacks carried out by individuals who were affiliated with a Lone-actor terrorists often construct their own ideologies by
specific ideology, but not operating as part of a specific group. piecing together elements from various, and sometimes
These ideologically aligned attacks rose from 20 per cent of contradictory, belief systems. This blending of ideologies isn't
attacks in the West in 2014, to a high of 76 per cent of attacks in about strict allegiance to a single group or cause but rather
2020. Almost all of these attacks were individuals with a broad reflects an attempt to justify violent actions. This approach
jihadist, far-left, or far-right motive. complicates counterterrorism efforts, as it makes these actors
unpredictable and harder to profile.7

FIGURE 2.8
Responsibility for terrorist attacks in the West, 2007–2024
The percentage of attacks that could not be attributed to a group rose from 55 per cent to 92 per cent.

Unknown Ideology Group

180

160

140

120
TERRORIST ATTACKS

100

80

60

40

20

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

38 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

Regional Trends TABLE 2.1

Average GTI score and change by region
South Asia continues to have the highest average impact of
terrorism in 2024, despite an improvement of 15 per cent
Table 1 shows the regions of the world by their average GTI since 2023.
score for 2024, as well as changes in score over the last decade
Average Change Change
and the prior year. The impact of terrorism fell in five of the Region
Score 2014-2024 2023-2024
nine GTI regions in 2024. The largest improvement occurred in
South Asia, with Afghanistan recording its third consecutive South Asia 3.741 -0.627 -0.659
year of declines in deaths and attacks. North America and South MENA 2.895 -1.011 0.175
America followed, recording falls in the number of incidents of
27 per cent and 26 per cent respectively. Sub-Saharan Africa North America 2.694 -0.184 -0.343

recorded its first improvement in GTI score since 2020, driven sub-Saharan Africa 2.205 0.579 -0.102
by decreases in deaths in Mali and Burkina Faso of 21 per cent
South America 1.657 0.065 -0.128
each in the last year.
Asia-Pacific 1.501 -0.051 0.083
South Asia continues to be the most impacted region globally by
Europe 1.07 0.241 0.155
terrorism, a position it has held since 2007. Similarly, Central
America and the Caribbean remained the least impacted region Russia and Eurasia 0.891 -0.8 0.257
for terrorism in 2024 for the 13 th consecutive year. A total of 33 Central America and
0.048 -0.426 -0.039
terrorism deaths have been recorded in the Central America and Caribbean

the Caribbean since 2007, with 24 per cent of those occurring in

2009. The region recorded no attacks in 2024 for the first time In Europe, attacks increased in 2024 for the second time since
in three years. 2016, driven by increases in terrorist activity in Poland, France
and Greece in the last year. However, deaths have remained
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced the most significant regional almost static, recording the lowest terrorism death toll in the
deterioration over the past decade, with attacks and deaths region in three years.
rising by 157 and 73 per cent, respectively, since 2014.
Figure 2.9 shows the total number of attacks and deaths from
By contrast, the trends in MENA and Europe improved over the terrorism since 2007. Between 2007 and 2024, the largest
past decade, with attacks in MENA declining by 77 per cent, and number of deaths from terrorism was recorded in the MENA
fatalities decreasing by 66 per cent. region, at 54,904 deaths. Just over 45,000deaths were recorded
in sub-Saharan Africa, with a further 41,000 in South Asia.
FIGURE 2.9
Attacks and deaths from terrorism by region, 2007–2024
The largest number of deaths were recorded in the MENA region, with almost 55,000 deaths from terrorism since 2007.

MENA

South Asia

sub-Saharan Africa

Asia-Pacific

South America

Europe

Attacks
Russia and Eurasia
Deaths

North America

Central America and the Caribbean

0 20,000 40,000

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 39

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Although MENA has recorded the highest number of terrorism

China 1.863 49 -3.631 1.281
deaths globally since 2007, the region has seen a significant
decline, with decreases in six of the past ten years. MENA is no Malaysia 1.626 52 -0.327 1.434
longer the region with highest number of deaths from terrorism
Japan 0.949 72 0.949 -0.24
and saw a sustained drop between 2016 and 2022. As a result,
sub-Saharan Africa became the region with the most deaths South Korea 0.582 82 0.582 0.582
from terrorism, overtaking MENA and South Asia. Figure 2.10 Cambodia 0.423 86 0.139 0.423
shows the trend in terrorism deaths for these three regions
New Zealand 0.217 94 0.217 -1.73
since 2007. Collectively they accounted for 95 per cent of deaths
from terrorism in 2024. Laos 0 100 0 0

FIGURE 2.10 Mongolia 0 100 0 0

Trend in rerrorism deaths by region, 2007–2024 Papua New
0 100 0 0
Sub-Saharan Africa has had the most deaths of any region Guinea
every year since 2017. North Korea 0 100 0 0

Singapore 0 100 0 0
MENA South Asia sub-Saharan Africa
Timor-Leste 0 100 0 0

Taiwan 0 100 0 0

6,000 Vietnam 0 100 0 0

Regional Average -0.051 0.084

DEATHS FROM TERRORISM

Five countries in Asia-Pacific improved in 2024, while six

deteriorated, resulting in the impact of terrorism rising in the
4,000 region after five years of consistent improvement. A further
eight countries showed no change in score when compared to
the previous year. Despite the deterioration within the last year,
the average impact of terrorism in the region is three per cent
lower than a decade ago.

2,000
Myanmar remained the most impacted country in Asia-Pacific
for the fourth consecutive year, despite recording only 67
attacks and 24 deaths in 2024. This is a decline of 85 per cent in
attacks and 93 per cent in deaths compared to 2023.
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024
The Philippines, Myanmar, Japan, New Zealand and Indonesia
Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations all recorded improvements on the GTI in the past year.
However, the Philippines still has the second highest level of
terrorism in the region, recording 31 deaths from 22 attacks in
2024.

In 2024, Malaysia recorded the largest deterioration in the

Regional Profiles region, with its first terror attack in four years. The attack
occurred when an assailant killed two people at a police station
in May 2024. The assailant reportedly had connections with
Islamic extremist group Jemaah Islamiya (JI).8 Indonesia was
Asia-Pacific the only other country in Asia-Pacific to record more deaths in
2024 than a decade ago, with ten deaths and 20 attacks in 2024,
TABLE 2.2
compared to three deaths and four attacks in 2014.
Asia-Pacific GTI score, rank and change in
score, 2014–2024 Several countries have recorded improvements over the last
Overall Overall Change Change decade, with the Philippines, Thailand, China and Malaysia all
Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024 improving since 2014. China recorded the largest improvement
Myanmar 6.929 11 3.371 -0.614 over the last decade, with deaths falling from 126 in 2015 to only
one in 2024.
Philippines 5.166 20 -1.058 -0.3

Thailand 4.63 28 -2.15 0.372

Indonesia 4.17 30 0.517 -0.118

Australia 1.973 46 0.423 0.498

40 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

Central America and the Caribbean Europe

TABLE 2.3 TABLE 2.4
Central America and Caribbean GTI score, Europe GTI score, rank and change in score,
rank and change in score, 2014–2024 2014–2024
Overall Overall Change Change Overall Overall Change Change
Country Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024 Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024

Mexico 0.582 82 -0.216 -0.458 Germany 4.748 27 3.632 1.933

Costa Rica 0 100 0 0 Türkiye 3.968 32 -1.735 -0.2

Cuba 0 100 0 0 Greece 2.928 36 0.519 -0.151

Dominican Czechia 2.906 39 2.906 -0.671

0 100 0 0
Republic
France 2.712 40 0.126 -0.258
Guatemala 0 100 -1.528 0
United
2.639 41 -0.795 0.217
Honduras 0 100 -0.114 0 Kingdom
Poland 1.962 47 1.962 1.539
Haiti 0 100 0 0
Sweden 1.842 50 1.783 1.107
Jamaica 0 100 0 0
Netherlands 1.402 60 1.402 0.825
Nicaragua 0 100 -2.771 0
Belgium 1.347 61 -0.546 -0.557
Panama 0 100 -0.03 0
Switzerland 1.265 62 1.098 0.638
El Salvador 0 100 -0.446 0
Spain 1.256 63 0.464 -0.553
Trinidad and
0 100 0 0
Tobago Bosnia and
1.218 65 0.759 1.218
Herzegovina
Regional Average -0.425 -0.038
Norway 1.198 66 -2.036 -0.549

The Central America and Caribbean region have remained Slovakia 1.023 69 0.993 -0.069
largely free from terrorism over the last decade. Eleven out of Finland 0.949 72 0.949 0.949
the twelve countries recorded a score of zero on the 2025 GTI.
This signifies that these nations have not encountered a single Italy 0.929 74 0.008 -0.518

terrorist attack in at least the past five years. Mexico is the only Kosovo 0.782 78 -0.863 -0.436
country in the region to have a GTI score above zero. Notably, in
Denmark 0.72 79 0.661 0.72
2024, the country did not record a single terrorist attack. This
marks only the third time since the inception of the index that Austria 0.582 82 0.582 -0.371
Mexico has reported no attacks.
Serbia 0.582 82 -0.153 0.582

Terrorism in Mexico has historically been driven by ideological Lithuania 0.423 86 0.423 0.336
or political motivations. It is important to note that criminal Latvia 0.423 86 0.423 0.423
activity by cartels is not classified as terrorism in this report.
Cyprus 0.347 89 0.288 -0.269
While the level of terrorism in Mexico remains very low, other
forms of violent conflict in the country are reported to be Ireland 0.233 90 -0.938 -0.21
extremely high, particularly against journalists and media
Iceland 0.123 95 0.123 -0.11
workers. Hundreds of these workers have been killed or
disappeared within the last decade, many of which go unsolved.9 Albania 0 100 -0.044 0
Additionally, Mexico continues to report one of the highest Bulgaria 0 100 -1.893 0
homicide rates in the world. Although incidents of terrorism in
Estonia 0 100 -0.241 0
the country have declined, criminal activity driven by cartels
remains prevalent in the crime landscape.10 Croatia 0 100 -0.333 0

Hungary 0 100 -0.423 0

Every country in the region that experienced terrorism in 2014
North
recorded an improvement in the last decade. The largest 0 100 -0.423 0
Macedonia
improvement occurred in Nicaragua, followed by Guatemala
Montenegro 0 100 -0.03 0
and El Salvador, with these countries not recording an attack
since 2014. The decline in terrorism in these countries has been Portugal 0 100 0 0
accompanied by significant reductions in homicide rates. The Romania 0 100 0 0
most notable improvement has been observed in El Salvador,
Slovenia 0 100 0 0
where the homicide rate decreased dramatically from 103 per
100,000 inhabitants to 1.9 in 2024, the lowest in the Western Regional Average 0.24 0.155

Hemisphere.11

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 41

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

Jordan 2.913 38 2.395 2.458

The impact of terrorism in Europe increased in 2024, following
the region’s lowest levels recorded in 2023 since the inception of Algeria 2.415 42 -2.891 0.218
the Index. There were 25 deaths from 67 incidents in 2024, Tunisia 2.184 43 -2.268 -0.73
almost double the attacks when compared to the prior year.
Deaths declined by four per cent to the lowest level in three Libya 1.612 53 -4.335 -0.857

years. Even with the fluctuation, terrorism in Europe remains Lebanon 1.237 64 -4.58 -0.325
far lower than the peak of activity in 2016, when 736 deaths
United Arab
from 362 incidents were recorded. Seven countries recorded a 1.178 67 -0.115 0.945
Emirates
death from terrorism in the past year, and nineteen of the 36
Saudi Arabia 0.845 75 -2.252 -0.521
countries in the region didn’t record a single incident in 2024.
Bahrain 0.059 98 -3.811 -0.064
However, 19 countries experienced a deterioration in score over Kuwait 0 100 -0.123 0
the past decade, with the strongest occurring in Germany and
Morocco 0 100 -1.605 0
Czechia. Germany recorded ten deaths in 2024, the most deaths
in four years. Germany’s deadliest attack was at a Christmas Qatar 0 100 0 0
market in Magdeburg, where an assailant drove a vehicle into
Sudan 0 100 -3.407 0
crowds resulting in the deaths of six people.12 Czechia’s
deterioration was as a result of the shooting at Charles Regional Average -1.011 0.175
University in Prague in 2023 that, where a gunmen killed 14
people with the shooter had also killing a further three people The impact of terrorism deteriorated slightly in the MENA
prior, however, no attacks were recorded in Czechia in 2024.13 region in 2024. However, there was a large level of variance
across countries in the region, with nine countries recording
Türkiye was the second-most impacted country by terrorism in improvements, and seven countries recording deteriorations.
the region, although its score has improved by almost a third in Four countries in the region registered scores of zero, meaning
the last decade. It recorded seven deaths from seven attacks in they had been free of terrorist activity for at least the past five
2024, compared to its peak of 591 deaths from 247 attacks in years. The number of terrorist incidents in the region declined
2016. The largest overall improvement in the last decade marginally from 666 in 2023 to 618 in 2024, whereas the total
occurred in Norway, with the country’s last attack being number of deaths halved from 2,083 in 2023, to 1,058 in 2024.
recorded in 2022 resulting in two deaths.
Two countries in the region, Israel and Syria, were ranked
The number of terrorist incidents in Europe doubled over the among the ten most impacted by terrorism globally. Israel
past year, raising concerns about the potential spillover of experienced a significant improvement in deaths 2024 following
conflict from the Middle East into the region. During major the surge due to the Hamas attacks in 2023. Syria had the
events in Europe in 2024, such as the Euros, Summer Olympics, highest level of terrorism in the region and experienced a surge
and Taylor Swift concerts, several terrorist plots were of terrorist activity in 2024. Total deaths in Syria rose from 372
successfully foiled.14 Attacks carried out by both IS and Hamas to 430, and the level of terrorism has been steadily increasing in
were recorded15, while the majority of foiled plots were the last decade. IS activity has increased substantially in Syria,
attributed to IS-inspired lone-wolf actors. As tensions in the with the group conducting 368 attacks that resulted in 708
Middle East persist into 2025, there remains a possibility of an deaths. The deadliest attack in Syria in 2024 took place in
increase in terrorist activity within Europe. December, when IS militants killed 54 Syrian soldiers who fled
to the desert following the fall of the Assad government.16

Middle East and North Africa The country showing the greatest deterioration in the region
over the past year was Oman, which experienced its first attack
TABLE 2.5
since 2010. During the attack, Islamic State militants opened
Middle East and North Africa GTI score, rank fire on people near a mosque in Muscat, resulting in the death
and change, 2014–2024 of six people and injuring a further 28.17 Jordan recorded the
second-greatest deterioration in the region over the past year,
Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024 with the country experiencing its first attacks since 2019. One of
the attacks was targeting a small US outpost, causing the death
Syria 8.006 3 0.142 0.06
of three US soldiers and injuring 30 others.18
Israel 7.463 8 3.307 -0.656
Over the past decade, Libya recorded the largest improvement
Iraq 6.582 13 -3.087 -0.539
in the region. There were no incidents and no deaths from
Iran 6.056 18 2.077 1.325 terrorism in Libya for the second consecutive year, and just ten
Yemen 5.08 22 -2.397 0.125 deaths have been recorded in the past five years, compared to
463 in the five years prior to 2020.
Palestine 4.93 25 2.003 -0.057

Egypt 4.416 29 -2.175 -0.805 The second largest improvement of the decade occurred in
Egypt, which recorded only one attack resulting in one death in
Oman 2.927 37 2.897 2.927

42 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

2024. Egypt has experienced a significant reduction in terrorism

within the last decade, with its overall GTI score falling for Russia and Eurasia
eight of the last ten years. At the peak of terrorist activity in
TABLE 2.7
2015, 481 people were killed in Egypt from 257 terrorist attacks.
Russia and Eurasia GTI score, rank and
change in score, 2014–2024
North America Overall Overall Change Change
Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024
TABLE 2.6
North America GTI score, rank and change, Russia 6.267 16 -0.009 3.199
2014–2024 Ukraine 2.003 45 -0.311 0.317

Overall Overall Change Change Tajikistan 0.999 70 -0.97 0.128

Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024
Armenia 0.72 79 0.72 0
United States
3.517 34 -0.532 -0.633
of America Azerbaijan 0.233 90 -0.077 -0.19
Canada 1.87 48 0.163 -0.053 Belarus 0.233 90 -1.884 -0.19
Regional Average -0.185 -0.343 Uzbekistan 0.233 90 0.174 -0.19

Georgia 0 100 -1.933 0

The impact of terrorism improved in North America over the
past year, owing to an improvement in score in the US. There Kazakhstan 0 100 -1.544 0
was one death from three attacks in the US in 2024, a large Kyrgyz
0 100 -1.317 0
Republic
improvement from the 16 deaths from eight attacks in 2023,
and the least activity since 2010. The single fatality recorded in Moldova 0 100 0 0
the US in 2024 occurred when a spectator was killed during an Turkmenistan 0 100 -2.457 0
assassination attempt on then former President Donald Trump
Regional Average -0.801 0.256
in Pennsylvania.19

Similarly, Canada experienced an improvement in their GTI Russia and Eurasia experienced the largest deterioration in
score, but to a much smaller extent. Canada recorded five 2024, driven primarily by a significant rise in terrorism in
attacks that resulted in no deaths in 2024 compared to one Russia. Ukraine and Tajikistan also recorded slight declines,
death from three attacks in 2023. This is the first year since while minor improvements were noted in Azerbaijan, Belarus,
2019 that Canada recorded no terrorism deaths. and Uzbekistan. Six countries within the region recorded scores
of zero, meaning they had no incidents of terrorism in the past
Over the last decade, politically motivated attacks have been five years.
more prevalent in North America than religiously motivated
attacks. Since 2014, there have been 77 politically motivated Overall, the region recorded 18 attacks and 199 deaths from
attacks resulting in 114 deaths, compared to 17 attacks and 64 terrorism in 2024, the most deaths since 2010. While the region
deaths driven by religious motivations. In 2024, there were no has experienced a significant decrease in terrorism over the past
recorded religiously motivated attacks, however, 88 per cent of decade, the surge in attacks and deaths in 2024 represents a
the attacks in that year had motivations that could not be concerning reversal of this trend.
determined. Terrorism in North America has predominantly
been carried out by individuals unaffiliated with specific The most significant deterioration in the region occurred in
terrorist organisations. Most perpetrators have been influenced Russia, with the country recording 13 attacks and 197 deaths in
by ideologies but lack formal membership in any recognised 2024, compared to five incidents and two deaths the year prior.
group or party. Of the 172 attacks recorded between 2007 and This is the highest death toll in the country since 2010. The
2024, only 21 were directly linked to known terrorist surge in deaths was due to the IS attack at the Crocus City Hall
organisations. This trend highlights the growing prevalence of in Moscow that killed 144 civilians.20 This attack was the fourth
independent or loosely connected actors in shaping the deadliest terrorist attack globally in 2024.
terrorism landscape in the United States, underscoring the
evolving challenges in identifying, understanding, and The second-most impacted country from terrorism was Ukraine,
countering such threats. experiencing two attacks that resulted in two deaths. Terrorist
activity in Ukraine has gradually decreased since its peak in
2015, where there were 56 attacks that resulted in ten deaths.

Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Uzbekistan were the only countries in

the region to improve, with all three countries recording no
terrorism in 2024. All three countries have not recorded any
deaths from terrorism since 2010.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 43

Section 2 | TRENDS IN TERRORISM

South America South Asia

TABLE 2.8 TABLE 2.9
South America GTI score, rank and change in South Asia GTI score, rank and change in
rank, 2014–2024 score, 2014–2024
Overall Overall Change Change Overall Overall Change Change
Country Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024 Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024

Colombia 6.381 15 -0.098 0.147 Pakistan 8.374 2 -0.292 0.407

Chile 5.162 21 2.341 -0.542 Afghanistan 7.262 9 -1.285 -0.572

Peru 2.062 44 -1.436 -0.68 India 6.411 14 -0.485 0.059

Ecuador 1.55 56 1.317 1.383 Bangladesh 3.03 35 -0.056 -0.381

Brazil 1.43 59 1.371 -0.558 Nepal 1.113 68 -1.642 -1.05

Argentina 0.801 76 -0.087 -0.473 Bhutan 0 100 0 0

Venezuela 0.71 81 -0.053 -0.464 Sri Lanka 0 100 -0.627 -3.072

Paraguay 0.073 97 -2.701 -0.168 Regional Average -0.627 -0.658

Uruguay 0.059 98 0.059 -0.055

Bolivia 0 100 0 0
In 2024, South Asia was the region with the highest average GTI
score, a position it has held throughout the last decade. Despite
Guyana 0 100 0 0 the deterioration this year, which was driven primarily by
Regional Average 0.065 -0.128 Pakistan, terrorism has significantly declined compared to a
decade ago, with all South Asian countries recording an
The impact of terrorism improved in South America over the improvement. This improvement is largely attributed to a
past year, with seven countries improving their score and two decline in terrorist activity in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal,
recording no change. However, Colombia and Ecuador saw their and Sri Lanka. The region is home to two of the ten countries
scores deteriorate between 2023 and 2024. Colombia recorded with the worst GTI scores, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of the
94 deaths, an increase of one from the previous year, while seven countries in South Asia, only Bhutan and Sri Lanka have a
Ecuador recorded its first death in five years. Terrorism has GTI score of zero, indicating that neither country has recorded a
fluctuated in the region over the last decade, with attacks and terrorist attack in the past five years.
deaths falling in five and eight of the last ten years. Although
majority of countries have experienced declines in terrorism in The surge in terrorism in the region was primarily driven by
the last ten years, deteriorations in Chile, Brazil and Ecuador Pakistan, with regional attacks increasing from 726 to 1399 and
have resulted in a minor deterioration in the region’s average deaths rising from 961 to 1,303. Bangladesh and Pakistan were
overall score. In total there have been 2,135 deaths from the only two countries in the region to record a deterioration in
terrorism in South America since 2007, the fourth lowest of any their score in 2024, resulting in Pakistan being the second most
region. impacted country by terrorism globally for the second
consecutive year.
Colombia remains the most impacted country by terrorism in
the region, a position it has held for the past decade, despite a Pakistan experienced the most significant deterioration in the
slight overall improvement over the decade. In 2024, deaths region and remains the most impacted country in South Asia. In
from terrorism increased by one to 94, while the number of 2024, attacks in Pakistan more than doubled, rising from 517
incidents rose from 183 to 221. Of the 94 deaths, 77 were incidents in the previous year to 1,099. This sharp increase was
attributed to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia accompanied by a 45 per cent rise in deaths from terrorism,
(FARC), with the National Liberation Army (ELN) responsible which rose from 748 to 1,081.
for the remaining 17 fatalities. The FARC carried out 161 attacks
during the year, while ELN was responsible for 60. Sri Lanka was the most improved South Asian country in 2024,
with the country recording no terrorist attacks or deaths for the
Chile remains the second most impacted country by terrorism fifth consecutive year since 2019. Nepal followed as the second
in South America. For the second consecutive year, the country most improved country, recording no attacks or deaths for the
recorded no deaths from terrorism, while attacks dropped second consecutive year.
significantly from 188 in 2023 to 52 in 2024. Chile is the highest-
ranked country on the GTI not experiencing active conflict, with
over 63 per cent of attacks attributed to Mapuche militants.

Peru recorded the most significant improvement in South

America in 2024, with no attacks or deaths from terrorism. Over
the past decade, Peru has seen the second largest improvement
in the region, surpassed only by Paraguay.

44 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 TRENDS IN TERRORISM | Section 2

South Africa 0 100 0 0

Sub-Saharan Africa Zambia 0 100 0 0
TABLE 2.10 Zimbabwe 0 100 0 0
Sub-Saharan Africa GTI score, rank and Regional Average 0.579 -0.102
change in score, 2014–2024
The average GTI score improved slightly in sub-Saharan
Overall Overall Change Change Africa in 2024. Only seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa
Country
Score Rank 2014-2024 2023-2024
experienced a deterioration, potentially indicating a positive
Burkina Faso 8.581 1 8.581 0.001 shift. However, six of the ten countries most impacted by
terrorism in 2024 are in sub-Saharan Africa. Notably, 22
Mali 7.907 4 2.759 -0.098
countries in the region have a GTI score of zero, meaning they
Niger 7.776 5 4.462 0.489 have not recorded a single terrorist incident in the past five
Nigeria 7.658 6 -0.922 0.071 years.
Somalia 7.614 7 0.492 -0.21 Total attacks in the region dropped to 947, compared to 1,253
Cameroon 6.944 10 1.564 -0.07 in 2023, a decrease of 25 per cent and the least attacks since
Democratic 2016. Deaths declined by a smaller margin, falling from 5,050
Republic of 6.768 12 2.681 0.243 in 2023 to 4,794 in 2024, indicating an increase in the lethality
the Congo of attacks across the region.
Mozambique 6.251 17 3.817 -0.074
Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),
Kenya 5.366 19 -1.271 -0.299 Mozambique and Nigeria had the largest increases in terrorism
Chad 5.032 23 4.945 0.045 deaths in the past year. Deaths in Niger rose by 94 per cent
Togo 5.004 24 5.004 0.334 from 479 to 930 in 2024, the third-highest terrorism death
toll recorded globally in 2024. Niger recorded the largest
Benin 4.802 26 4.802 -0.096
deterioration in GTI score in the region within the last year,
Burundi 4.043 31 1.741 0.111 experiencing the most deaths and attacks ever recorded in the
Uganda 3.702 33 1.492 -0.692 country. The deadliest attack in Niger occurred in July where
over 300 gunmen killed 237 soldiers near the Malian border.21
Angola 1.657 51 0.742 -0.597
No group claimed responsibility, but jihadists are known to
Senegal 1.578 54 1.464 -0.588 operate in the area. This was also the deadliest terror attack
Tanzania 1.573 55 -1.232 -0.694 globally in 2024.
Djibouti 1.461 57 -0.03 -0.574 Togo experienced the second largest deterioration in GTI
Côte d’Ivoire 1.454 58 -0.766 -0.606 score in the region in 2024, recording 10 attacks that resulted
Central African
in 52 deaths. The country has seen a surge in activity from
0.957 71 -1.972 -0.488 JNIM who carried out 4 attacks that caused 41 deaths. Togo’s
Republic
deadliest attack occurred in October, when armed JNIM
Ethiopia 0.787 77 -2.692 -0.485
militants attacked a group of soldiers near the country’s border
Eswatini 0.087 96 0.087 -0.093 with Burkina Faso, killing nine soldiers and ten civilians.22
Botswana 0 100 0 0
The DRC also recorded a significant deterioration in its score in
Republic of
0 100 0 0 2024, driven by increased attacks from IS. Of the 30 attacks and
the Congo
304 deaths from terrorism recorded in the country, 28 attacks
Eritrea 0 100 -0.85 0
and 299 deaths were attributed to IS.
Gabon 0 100 0 0
Ghana 0 100 0 0 Despite improvements in 2024, Mali continues to be the second
Guinea 0 100 0 0 most impacted country by terrorism in the region. Attacks and
The Gambia 0 100 0 0 deaths within the country both fell by 21 per cent, with 201
Guinea-Bissau 0 100 -0.423 0
incidents and 604 deaths recorded in 2024. Mali faces many of
the same issues as Burkina Faso and Niger, with JNIM being the
Equatorial
0 100 0 0 most prominent terrorist group in the country. However, as
Guinea
evidenced by Niger, terrorism deaths and attacks can fall
Liberia 0 100 0 0
substantially in a singly year, only to rise again shortly
Lesotho 0 100 0 0
afterwards.
Madagascar 0 100 -2.588 0
Mauritania 0 100 -0.856 0 Tanzania was the most improved country in the region for the
Mauritius 0 100 0 0 second consecutive year, with the country recording zero
Malawi 0 100 0 0 incidents for the third year in a row. The Central African
Republic, Ethiopia, and Côte d’Ivoire also recorded no attacks
Namibia 0 100 0 0
for the second year in a row.
Rwanda 0 100 -2.666 -0.114
Sierra Leone 0 100 -0.465 0
South Sudan 0 100 -2.446 0

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 45

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

Weak governance, ethnic

tensions and ecological
degradation have fuelled
The Sahel accounted Conflict deaths in the Sahel terrorism, compounded
reached their highest level by transnational jihadist
for 51 per cent of since the inception of the growth and geopolitical
global terrorism GTI, surpassing 25,000 for competition.
the first time in 2024.
deaths in 2024.

Gold is increasingly a critical source of revenue

for state and non-state armed actors across the
Sahel, impacting local and international relations.

Niger is the 7th largest producer of Uranium

and can be an important source for countries
such as China who wish to expand their
nuclear power plants. However, terror attacks
have reached their highest levels on record.

The Alliance of Sahelian States, comprising Mali,

Burkina Faso and Niger, are changing alliances
by removing Western involvement in security and
economic sectors and withdrawing from ECOWAS.
Instead, the alliance has strengthened ties with
Russia and China, which provide support with fewer
conditions attached.

Russia is conducting influence and

propaganda operations across the continent,
particularly in the Sahel, often framing them
around Western failures in counterterrorism.
Outside these high profile and visible efforts,
China has been steadily building economic
and political influence.

The wars in Ukraine and Syria have directly Ukraine’s invasion of Kursk
influenced the conflict in the Sahel. Ukraine has prompted Russia to withdraw
supported rebels opposing Russian-backed military advisors from Burkina Faso,
regimes, while the collapse of the Assad regime highlighting the delicate balancing
affects Russia’s control of a key logistical hub, act Moscow faces in its African
potentially increasing the importance of its operations.
influence in Mali and other regions.

Terrorism in Sahel
Terrorist groups such as In August 2023, the UN panel The collapse of the 2015 Algiers
JNIM continue to expand by of experts on Mali declared peace agreement has worsened an
carrying out attacks in coastal
West Africa, with Togo in 2024
recording its worst year for
x2 that IS-Sahel had doubled
the amount of territory they
controlled in the country,
already dire security situation in Mali.
JNIM appear to be taking advantage,
staging symbolically damaging attacks
terrorism since the inception while JNIM had continued to on government targets in Bamako in
of the GTI. expand operations. September 2024.

46 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

3 The Sahel
Summary
BOX 3.1
The Sahel
Definitions of the Sahel vary. In this analysis, the Sahel region
The Sahel region of sub-Saharan Africa continues to suffer from
denotes the semi-arid region of western and central northern
the effects of increased political instability, amplified
Africa, which is comprised of parts of ten countries:
geopolitical tensions, and the use of hard counterterrorism
• Burkina Faso
measures to deter and destroy the threat from Salafi-jihadi • Cameroon
groups. While sub-Saharan Africa recorded a five per cent • Chad
decline in terrorism deaths in 2024 to 909 from the prior year, • The Gambia
the Sahel has seen the steepest increases in terrorism deaths • Guinea
globally, with nearly 20,000 deaths since 2019 and 3,885 deaths • Mali
in 2024. • Mauritania
• Niger
The Sahel region faces many converging and complex social, • Nigeria
economic, political and security challenges. These are likely to • Senegal
continue to undermine the development of the conditions
necessary for stability, trapping the Sahel in a cycle of violence
and vulnerability. FIGURE 3.1
Deaths from terrorism in Sahel vs sub-
The region has seen large changes in its conflict dynamics with
Saharan Africa and the rest of the world,
an array of armed state and non-state actors waging war,
2007–2024
controlling large swathes of territory and using resource
Deaths in the Sahel have exceeded both sub-Saharan
extraction and illicit economies to advance their strategic goals.
Africa and rest of the world totals since 2022.
The groups include national armies, state aligned paramilitaries
and self-defence groups, separatist rebels, Salafist jihadist
groups. Added to this, there have been multiple foreign Sahel Rest of sub-Saharan Rest of the World
interventions - from France, the United Nations, the US and Africa
more recently Russia, through state aligned private military
companies, initially the Wagner Group and from 2024 onwards 11,000
known as Africa Corps.
10,000

The conflict is driven by deep divisions within societies and 9,000

conflicts between ethnic groups, between the central
8,000
government and peripheral regions, and global geopolitics.
While ideologies play a part, economics and power are more 7,000

important drivers of conflict, and in both cases the continuation 6,000

of conflict can be lucrative for the interested parties, and as such
5,000
propels the conflict along with little hope of a sustainable
resolution in the near future. 4,000
The inability of several Sahelian governments to provide
3,000
effective security has resulted in terrorist groups controlling
significant amounts of rural territory and making the Sahel 2,000
increasingly violent. Salafi-jihadis and bandits have looked to
1,000
exploit socio-economic, political vacuums as well as grievances.
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024

Terrorist groups IS and JNIM continuing to gain momentum

with their violent campaigns in the region, with the Sahel Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations
accounting 51 per cent of terrorism deaths globally in 2024,
compared with just one per cent in 2007. As Figure 3.1 shows,
the Sahel is increasingly representing more terrorism deaths
than any other region globally.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 47

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

Terrorism in the Sahel FIGURE 3.2

Sahel conflict deaths
The Sahel has seen steadily increasing deaths from conflict
since 2011, with a severe spike from 2017 onwards.
Terrorism usually occurs as a tactic within a conflict setting,
used by groups with asymmetric power capabilities looking to 25,000
bring about political change. The current crisis in the Sahel has
been driven by several factors, including ecological degradation,
poor governance, ethnic polarisation, state security abuses,
pastoral conflict, the growth of transnational Salafi-Islam 20,000
ideology, disputes over natural resource extraction such as gold,
and the involvement of external actors such as France and

CONFLICT DEATHS
Russia.
15,000

The February Revolution in Libya, which led to the overthrow

of Muammar al-Qaddafi in October 2011, precipitated a chain of
events throughout North Africa and the Sahel. Qaddafi’s violent
10,000
removal, after 42 years, empowered the Malian Tuareg
separatist movement. Ethnic Tuareg soldiers who had been part
of the Libyan army returned to Mali. Salafi-jihadis joined them
to play an important role in the 2012 Tuareg uprising in Mali, 5,000
which eventually led this group to capture Timbuktu, Gao and
Kidal. The Salafi-jihadis were ultimately defeated, and the
Tuareg-Salafi Islamic Emirate of Azawad split and lasted about
one year.1 0
1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012 2015 2018 2021 2024
Failure by the Malian government and the international
Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations
community to properly resolve the conflict in Northern Mali, by
addressing its root causes, only increased tensions. It gave rise
to political, social and economic problems that spread from the decisions as to where to operate, how and against whom. They
north, causing intercommunal violence in the Mopti and Ségou exhibit greater willingness to negotiate or shift allegiances.2 The
regions between Dogon and Fulani. This also exacerbated implications for the security environment are substantial, as the
instability in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania and Niger head of a terrorist group may not be theologically wedded to the
increasing intercommunal violence and jihadi activity. transnational jihadi networks. This varied operating context
Transnational Salafi Jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda and raises the prospect of a larger shift in jihadi strategic thinking.
Islamic State, established local affiliates in the region by Historically, jihadis’ commitment to ideological purity weakened
leveraging existing ethnic tensions and resource conflicts. These their ability to build and hold a state, but this pragmatic shift
groups have used their ideology as a tool to mobilise support, raises the prospect of sustained, low-intensity conflict that may
overlaying it onto pre-existing divisions and disputes. facilitate a future takeover.3

Figure 3.2 shows a significant increase in deaths from conflict Weak governance is at the core of the persistent inability by
across the Sahel from 2011 onwards. This is likely driven by the successive Malian governments to resolve differences amicably;
onset and increasing severity of conflicts in Nigeria, Mali, Chad, and gave rise to the emergence of the Dogon, Fulani and
Niger, Cameroon and Burkina Faso. In 2024, conflict deaths in Bambara militia. Communities were compelled to arm
the Sahel exceeded 25,000 for the first time. themselves to ensure their safety, as the government could not
protect them. Similar developments occurred in Burkina Faso,
Groups such as Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Katiba Macina between the Mossi and the Fulani, leading to several clashes.
initially focused on local issues, framing their actions through Increased intercommunal violence has led to further
an ethnic-nationalist-religious lens. However, these groups are recruitment by jihadi groups, particularly IS and JNIM.
no longer active, having been absorbed into transnational
jihadist organisations like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Terrorism continues to affect the periphery regions of bordering
Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was formed states like Togo and Benin, countries that had been previous-
when Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and Macina Liberation Front ly unaffected; although the number of terrorism deaths were
relatively small when compared to neighbouring countries in
merged with the al Qaeda Saharan branch, al Qaeda in the
the Sahel.
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2017. No deaths have been
attributed to al-Qaeda since 2017.
Togo recorded ten attacks and 52 deaths in 2024, the most
With its challenging terrain, distinct local practices and porous attacks and deaths since the inception of the Index. Attacks
borders, local leaders in the Sahel have tremendous autonomy. were largely concentrated along the country’s border with
They operate as political entrepreneurs, making calculated Burkina Faso, with JNIM claiming four of the attacks and likely
responsible for the remaining six.

48 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

FIGURE 3.3
Intensity of deaths from terrorism in the Sahel, 2020–2024
Deaths across the Sahel have increasingly intensified in the tri-border areas of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

This marks the further transnationalisation of terrorism across South American cocaine en route to Europe. The response to
the Sahel. Groups like IS and JNIM are also seeking safe havens drug trafficking has varied across the region, contributing to
and new theatres of operations. Many of these new areas like differing levels of conflict. In Niger, Tuareg rebels returning
northern periphery areas of Togo and Benin are from Libya in 2011 were integrated into state-controlled
demographically, economically and ecologically similar to smuggling networks, maintaining relative stability. In contrast,
regions in Mali, Nigeria, Burkina Faso and elsewhere, from Mali’s government sought to dominate smuggling routes,
which jihadi groups initially emerged over a decade ago. This leading to conflicts with Tuareg groups and contributing to
trend is not uniform however, other Sahelian states such as prolonged instability.6
Mauritania, Senegal and the Gambia continue to experience
little-to-no terrorism. Groups in the Sahel have generated significant revenue from
kidnapping and ransom in the past two decades. Al Qaeda in
Terrorist groups in the Central Sahel rely on a range of illicit the Greater Sahara, the forerunner to JNIM, financed much of
economic activities to sustain their operations. Rather than its operations through kidnapping and ransoming foreign
directly engaging in organised crime, jihadist groups such as nationals in Mali and Algeria. The activity is now at the core of
JNIM typically make money by imposing taxes or providing the economic operations of JNIM, with civilians who have some
security and protection in exchange for payment.4 This model role in business or politics across Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger
not only generates revenue but also helps these groups integrate the most common targets. Kidnapping is also used strategically,
into local communities, strengthening their influence. Cattle with individuals taken for political leverage and intelligence
rustling has become a lucrative illicit economy for terror groups gathering.7 JNIM has been known to escalate its kidnapping
in the Sahel. The theft and trade of livestock have long been a activities when they seek to expand into new territory, then
source of conflict in the region, particularly between semi- reduces them once control is established. For example, in 2023
nomadic pastoralists and farming communities. Armed groups the number of kidnappings increased significantly in the
profit by controlling cattle trade routes and imposing taxes on regions of Burkina Faso where JNIM was clashing with the
herders, using these interactions to deepen their governance pro-government militia group, Volunteers for the Defence of the
structures. By offering protection in exchange for loyalty, Homeland (VDP). In 2024 there was a 94 per cent decline in
terrorist organisations exploit local ethnic tensions, further hostages in Burkina Faso falling from 144 to 8.
entrenching their power in contested areas.5

Drug trafficking represents one of the most financially lucrative

illicit activities linked to terrorism in the Sahel. Although
terrorist groups do not usually control drug production or trade
directly, they provide protection to traffickers and levy taxes on
smuggling operations passing through their territories. Since
the 1990s, the Sahel has served as a major transit route for

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 49

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

Geopolitics in the Sahel Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Additionally, the G5

Sahel Initiative and other unilateral security operations,
including the involvement of private entities, have been
introduced to address insecurity in the region. However, none of
The GTI 2025 examines the complex interaction between local, these efforts have achieved significant success, and negative
regional, and global geopolitical dynamics and their impact on sentiment toward France has grown. The perceived failure of
both terrorism and efforts to counter it. The security crisis in these missions to improve the overall security situation fostered
the Sahel, which began in Mali in 2012 and has since engulfed the belief that France was more focused on protecting its own
neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger, has been shaped by interests than serving the interests of Mali.
domestic political agendas and their interplay with regional and
global geopolitics. Analyses of the Sahel region often present Withdrawal of Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA
overly simplistic narratives, focusing on the dominance of a
single great power, while overlooking the agency of domestic The 2020 and 2021 coups in Mali significantly shifted the
actors and political dynamics, which are often more critical to dynamics of the security relationship. Under Colonel Assimi
understanding the broader situation. The following section Goita, Mali has pursued what it describes as a ‘sovereigntist’
explores how the interaction between domestic and approach to governance, seeking to rid Mali of foreign interests
international politics has shaped the region's security crisis, it believes exploit them. This approach has gained considerable
both historically and in its current state. support from segments of the population, particularly younger
individuals frustrated by the inability of international actors to
The domestic and international politics of the region in most of address the security crisis, and their perceived exploitation of
the post-colonial period has been dominated by France, and a the region's resources.
close relationship between the rulers of the Sahelian states and
Paris. This has generally manifested in close security This is partly due to the model of French interventions, which
cooperation and the domination of French interests in areas like prioritised direct involvement with professional soldiers over
resource management. providing training, tackling corruption in the military or
enhancing the capabilities of local forces. The significant
increase in negative sentiment can be seen in Figure 3.4, which
Mali shows a sharp increase in the proportion of media articles in
Mali expressing negative views about France following the first
In the security realm, Mali is critical for understanding this coup in 2020. IEP has produced the following analysis using
dynamic. Since 2012, several French- backed security operations machine learning, with source data supplied by ICEWS to show
have taken place in the Sahel. These include an EU Training the changing sentiment between Mali and France. ICEWS was
Mission, French-led counterterrorism operations (such as discontinued in 2023, a similar dataset POLECAT shows similar
Operation Serval, Operation Barkhane and the Takuba trends continuing in 2024.
Initiative), and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated

FIGURE 3.4
Tensions between Mali and France, 1995–2023
Negative sentiment between Mali and France has risen precipitously since 2018, negative sentiment in Mali about France
spiking from the first coup in 2020.
Mali towards France France towards Mali

1.00
Proportion of Negative Events Reported

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
2011
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Source: ICEWS; IEP Calculations

50 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

The 2022 withdrawal of French forces under Operation northern Mali, may create further opportunities for jihadist
Barkhane significantly impacted regional security. The groups to expand their influence and consolidate control in the
responsibility for providing security transitioned from French to region. JNIM’s attack on the military academy and air force
Malian Armed Forces, supported by pro-government militias base in Bamako in September 2024 showed a high level of
and the Russian Wagner Group, now Africa Corps. Although frailty within the military regime’s internal security.10 Although
Barkhane's overall effectiveness in securing Mali was limited, it large-scale attacks in urban areas have yet to materialise, a
did manage to maintain control around key urban centres, in security vacuum in densely populated urban centres could
collaboration with UN MINUSMA peacekeepers. Many of these further exacerbate the country's security crisis.
areas are now under siege from JNIM and IS-Sahel.
Russian involvement in the Sahel has significantly increased,
In June 2023, the UN Security Council terminated MINUSMA's with the region becoming an important theatre for their
mission in Mali after the Malian government withdrew its competition with the West. The Russian government, through
support. Established in 2013, MINUSMA struggled with security their private military contractor Africa Corps, formerly the
provision outside its base areas, burdened by a massive Wagner Group, deployed to Mali in December 2021 and operate
operational area and infrastructural challenges. The phased alongside Malian forces in counterterrorism operations. Russian
withdrawal of peacekeepers, completed in December 2023, PMC troops are also potentially involved in operations against
directly escalated violent conflict in areas previously under UN jihadist groups in Burkina Faso. The record of Russia and Africa
control. Corp as security partners in the region is on a par with prior
missions.
Figure 3.5 shows the location of MINUSMA bases, as well as all
conflict events in Mali since the withdrawal of UN forces. Fierce The Wagner Group, now Africa Corps, has been less effective in
battles for control of former UN bases emerged, involving providing security and has been involved in mining and the
Malian forces, Africa Corps mercenaries, Tuareg rebels, and extractive industry. Africa Corps’ approach appears to be more
JNIM. The violence in Kidal in November 2023 marked some of appealing to the military regime than UN or French models,
the most severe active conflict between government and rebel which focused on population-centred protection of civilians.
forces since the 2015 peace deal. The agreement fully collapsed Reportedly, the brutal counterinsurgency approach employed by
in January 2024, leading to escalating conflict in northern Mali. Wagner, now Africa Corps, has brought significant approval
from Malian troops and parts of the population, who were
Security threats persist, from jihadists who have become disillusioned by the failures of Western interventions.11
entrenched across the country and a resurgent rebel conflict in
the north.8 In August 2023, the UN panel of experts on Mali Following the failed uprising and the death of former Wagner
declared that IS-Sahel had doubled the amount of territory they leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russian PMCs have transitioned to
controlled in the country, while JNIM had continued to expand the Africa Corps brand. While their operations in the region
operations.9 The collapse of the Algiers peace agreement and continue, they have been significantly impacted by Russia’s
the surge in violence, particularly in urban areas of central and invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Opinion polling of Malian

FIGURE 3.5
MINUSMA bases and conflict events, 2024
Conflict has intensified in areas around UN bases.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 51

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

citizens in January 2024 was overall highly positive of both the Artisanal gold mining has rapidly expanded across the region in
junta’s approach to security and relations with Russia, the latter the decade since, especially in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.
with 82 per cent approval.12 It is unclear whether this positive Gold is central to the conflict dynamics in some of these areas,
sentiment has continued. In July 2024 at least 84 Russian troops which often lack significant state presence or control. The
were killed after being ambushed by Tuareg rebels on the revenue raised is potentially critical to funding group activities;
Mali-Algeria border. Offensives in Northern Mali have largely however, control of the territories where gold is mined and
failed to improve the security situation and reports suggest transported is perhaps more crucial, as this territorial control
many Russian troops are becoming less willing to participate in increases the scale of their operations and provides the financial
high-risk missions, and are increasingly withdrawing to the resources, security and power projection to influence the local
areas around their bases.13 There are only around 1,000 Africa population.14 From 2018 onwards, attacks in Burkina Faso have
corps troops believed to be actively deployed in Mali, down from increasingly targeted artisanal gold mines and areas around the
2,000 and substantially less than the combined 13,000 UN mines.
peacekeepers and French troops that were deployed prior to the
withdrawal of both missions. Most of the time, terrorist groups in the Central Sahel don't
directly extract, trade, or smuggle gold themselves. Instead, they
control the areas where artisanal gold mining happens and
collect taxes from miners. These illegal economies have often
Gold Mining: A Mechanism of existed for a long time in places with weak governance. Both

Local and Global Influence state and non-state groups have benefited from, and even
coordinated, these activities.

Illegal activities need to be kept secret, so they depend on people

Terrorism and some of the broader intercommunal violence in within the state to protect them. In countries with weak
the region can also be linked to natural resource exploitation, governments, smuggling networks lead to competition among
specifically gold. A rich vein of gold spanning much of the Sahel those who can offer protection and make money from these
was discovered in 2012 in Sudan. Two main forms of gold activities. This competition can cause violence as different
mining exist in the region: large scale industrial mining, groups fight to control the territory, and the profits. This
generally the purview of multi-national companies; and state struggle for control can then lead to instability in the state.15
entities and artisanal gold mining, local level operations that are
largely not regulated and are a source of revenues for local Figure 1.5 shows the rates of terrorism deaths in the Sahel and
governments, militias, terror groups, criminal organisations and locations of established gold mines. Concentrations of terrorism
other non-state armed actors like private military companies. deaths in northern Burkina Faso correspond with the locations

FIGURE 3.6
Terrorism deaths and gold mines
Terrorism deaths in the Sahel are more likely in areas with established gold mines.

52 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

of gold mines as JNIM, paramilitaries like the VDP and the share of revenues from international miners.19 To date, however,
army of Burkina Faso fight for control over these areas. Many the full picture of Russian involvement in the mining sector in
artisanal gold mines are informal and not included in available Mali and beyond is piecemeal. While Russia may strike deals for
data. future concessions, at least publicly such deals are yet to be
announced. Given the sanctions imposed over Ukraine, it is
Gold is ideal for illicit smuggling, as it is difficult to trace and highly likely that the full extent of its operations will not be
highly valuable. From mines in Mali and Burkina Faso, gold can known.
be smuggled into Togo before being exported. With its value
potentially in the billions, even a small amount of gold could be A less discussed but perhaps more significant part of this story
highly lucrative to jihadi groups.16 The junta in Burkina Faso is the growing influence of China, which commands far less
announced the closure of artisanal gold sites in July 2022, attention but is, according to reports, more significant in the
partly to restrict jihadist groups’ access to funds. It is unclear mining sector. Chinese influence in the gold mining sector has
what effect this may have on access to gold mining. Similar reportedly surged since the 2021 coup and in December a
attempts in the past have been counterproductive, as jihadist Chinese owned lithium production plant opened, with the
groups have used closures to gain popular support from local Chinese ambassador in attendance alongside the junta leader
communities that depend on the mines.17 It is also highly likely Colonel Assimi Goita, who described Chinese ties with Mali as “a
that most of these mines continue to operate in areas where the strategic and sincere partnership.”20 The development of lithium
state no longer has control over territory. The government in mining in Mali is potentially significant, as lithium is a
Burkina Faso has control over between 50 and 60 per cent of component of electric batteries and a critical mineral for the
territory in the country, meaning that much of the gold rich green energy transition. The more subtle and quieter influence-
region in the north of the country is outside the regime’s building approach in Mali appears to mirror Chinese strategy
control. elsewhere on the African continent, where it has built significant
influence in 27 countries.21
FIGURE 3.7
Incidents involving gold mines in the Sahel, Russian operations in Mali have influenced and are being
2012–2024 influenced by its involvement in conflicts elsewhere. While the
As a result of the strategic importance of this territory, there invasion of Ukraine has incentivised Russian involvement in the
has been a large increase in attacks against gold mining Sahel to procure sanction-proof revenue, it has also drawn
operations in the past three years.
Ukraine into the conflict. Cooperation on intelligence sharing
between Tuareg rebels and Ukraine was confirmed by its
intelligence chief following the deadly attack on Africa Corp
40
troops in July. It has also been reported, though denied by Kyiv,
that Ukraine has supplied drones to the rebels, in what is
Gold Incidents

30 potentially developing as a proxy war emanating from the war

in Ukraine. 22

20
Events elsewhere are also likely to affect Russian operations.
The collapse of the Assad regime in Syria has placed Russian
10 military assets on the Syrian coast under threat. Russian bases
in Syria had been the staging point for operations into Africa.
While such operations could continue from Russian bases in
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 Syria, the lack of certainty on the new Syrian government’s
Source: ACLED; IEP Calculations position remains an open question and complicates Russian
operations in Africa. The partial withdrawal and uncertainty
Russian operations in Mali reflect a broader pattern seen in over the future of operations can be seen in Russia sending over
Sudan and the Central African Republic, where the acquisition 100 military vehicles to Mali, in January 2025, believed to have
of resources such as gold and diamonds, along with the been moved from bases in Syria.23 The potential loss, or
acquisition of mining concessions, forms part of Russia’s lessening of, influence in Syria may also push Russia to double
approach in Africa. This strategy involves providing security, down on its influence operations in Africa. Russia continues to
military assistance and other aid for access to valuable build a base in Bamako around the military airbase that was
resources, which, in part, helps Russia circumvent sanctions attacked by JNIM in September 2024.24
imposed following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
Africa Corps have maintained their presence in Libya, which
The full extent of such operations is difficult to uncover. Wagner could become strategically more critical to its operations if they
troops were reported to have taken over artisanal mine sites in lose their only current Mediterranean base in Tartous, Syria. In
the past and Russia has agreed deals to build a gold refinery in addition to military assistance, Russia has also agreed a deal
Bamako.18 Mali’s largest international mining operations, run by with Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to provide telecoms and
Barrick Gold, ceased operations in January 2025 when the satellites for the three Sahelian states.
Malian government seized $245 million worth of gold, and have
blocked Barrick’s access to its mines, with the government
seeking to enforce recently passed laws mandating a larger

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 53

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

FIGURE 3.8
Influence in Mali, 2011–2022
There is very high competition for influence in Mali between four powerful states, with Russia having made significant gains in
the past decade.

0.14

0.12

France
0.10
Russia
United States
0.08
China
FBIC

0.06

0.04

0.02

0.00
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022

Source: FBIC; IEP Calculations

The overall influence in Mali remains highly competitive. While

BOX 3.2
Russia's growing influence, as indicated by FBIC data, has been
the most prominent, it is neither the sole nor the most Foreign Bilateral Influence Capability
dominant actor. China, France, and the United States also Measure (FBIC)
maintain significant influence in the country. What should not The Foreign Bilateral Influence Capability (FBIC) dataset, from
be lost in these events is the ready participation and the Pardee Institute for International Futures at University of
engagement of Malian authorities. Russian partnership has Denver is designed to measure the extent of one country's
become symbolic of the rejection of unpopular Western influence over another in bilateral relationships. It focuses on
assistance missions, garnering significant popularity with capturing economic, political, and military dimensions of
influence.26
sections of the population.
The scores in the FBIC dataset are constructed using a
Between 2019 and 2022, US influence in Mali also increased combination of quantitative indicators, such as trade flows,
paradoxically while European influence declined. This was due foreign direct investment, military agreements, and diplomatic
to sustained economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security engagements. These indicators are weighted and aggregated
cooperation. Despite Mali’s political instability, the US remained to create an influence score for each country pair, reflecting
the ability of one nation to shape the decisions or behaviour of
a key donor, with bilateral foreign assistance rising from $132
the other. In addition to measuring absolute levels of an
million in 2019 to over $156 million in 2020, reinforcing
indicator FBIC also creates a measure of dependency by
economic ties and dependence. Politically, the US maintained
quantifying the extent to which one country relies on another
diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability for economic, political, or security needs. It incorporates
following the 2020 coup, ensuring continued engagement.25 indicators such as trade volume, foreign direct investment
Although security assistance was limited after the coup, the US inflows, and development aid to reflect economic dependency.
backed international efforts like MINUSMA prior to the Political dependency is assessed through factors like voting
mission's withdrawal. alignment in international organisations and the frequency of
diplomatic interactions. Security dependency is captured
through metrics such as military assistance, defence
agreements, and arms transfers. Data is only available to 2022
so changes to 2024 are not captured though in most cases
influence capability is relatively slow moving, so the trends
indicated in this report are expected to have continued.

54 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

The use of private military actors, in particular, is believed by amplified through a vast network of hundreds of Russian-
the government to be crucial to maintaining sovereignty, associated accounts and pages, achieving significant reach.28
providing it with critical security assistance while avoiding
conditions or handing over decision making or sovereignty to Burkina Faso has seen at least eight Russian-backed influence
external actors. Though they are seeking to reclaim their campaigns, matching the activity recorded in Mali and the
sovereignty, there is a risk they will simply swap one external Central African Republic, both of which host significant Russian
security dependency for another. Without improving relations presence. Africa Corp has been the Kremlin’s central tool for
with regional neighbours and other parts of the international orchestrating influence efforts in Africa, linked to nearly half of
community, it could become isolated and instead dependent on all Russian operations on the continent. Since the death of
outside patronage. The Malian model is, however, clearly being Yevgeny Prigozhin, in 2023, Russia's disinformation activities
followed by its two main neighbours, Burkina Faso and Niger. are transitioning to new entities, including the Russian Africa
Corps and the Africa Initiative News Agency.29

Burkina Faso Russia has built its own media infrastructure with online, TV
and radio channels capable of controlling and articulating its
In 2024, Burkina Faso remained the country most affected by core narratives. Russian embassies have reportedly facilitated
terrorism for the second year in a row. This year also marked the creation of African grassroots organisations to produce and
the third consecutive year with over 1,000 fatalities from disseminate disinformation.30 Figure 3.9 shows the success of
terrorism in the country. The northern and central eastern Russia’s strategy to build influence in the region, beginning in
regions, near the borders with Mali and Niger, experienced over 2017 and steadily increasing in scope. The start and increase of
two-thirds of all attacks. Centre-Nord recorded the highest death Russian influence correlates significantly with the increase of
toll, including the deadliest attack of 2024, where JNIM negative sentiment Burkina Faso towards France, seen in Figure
militants killed between 200 and 600 individuals in an assault 3.10.
on soldiers and civilians digging defensive trenches.
US influence also increased during this period due to sustained
JNIM remained the dominant terror group, responsible for economic aid, diplomatic engagement, and security cooperation.
nearly half of Burkina Faso's attacks, with their activities and Despite political instability, including the January 2022 coup
fatalities rising by over 50 per cent. In contrast, IS operations d'état, the US remained a key partner, providing significant
declined significantly, with only one attack in 2024 compared to development assistance and supporting efforts to counter
eight in 2023, and terrorism deaths attributed to IS dropped by extremism in the Sahel region. Politically, the US maintained
91 per cent, from 175 to 15. Despite these improvements, over diplomatic relations and supported efforts to restore stability
half of the attacks and a third of the deaths were attributed to following the coup, ensuring continued engagement.31 Military
unknown jihadist groups, likely to be JNIM or IS Sahel. and other forms of assistance were frozen following the coup so
it is likely that US influence may be reduced in future.
Burkina Faso had substantially less direct intervention and
FIGURE 3.9
involvement by foreign powers prior to 2023, other than the
French troops who were stationed in the country since 2009.
Influence in Burkina Faso, 2011–2022
Following the second coup in September 2022, Captain Ibrahim
Russian influence has risen from almost none in 2017 to
the second most influential state in 2022.
Traore began strengthening ties with Russia around military
assistance and, in January 2023, called for a withdrawal of
0.14
French troops and its ambassador. In January 2024, Russian
private military troops began arriving in Ouagadougou, with the
peak troop presence around 300. There has been little 0.12

improvement in the security situation in the country, however.

In July 2024, at least 100 of the ‘Bear Brigade’ military advisors 0.10

left Burkina Faso to support Russian military responses to France

Ukraine’s capture of the Kursk region.27 Given the severity of the 0.08
FBIC

security crisis in Burkina Faso, the impact of Russian troops

remains uncertain. Reports suggest that their primary role has 0.06
Russia
been to provide direct protection for junta leaders rather than
United States
actively engaging in combat missions. 0.04
China

Beyond direct military support Russian influence models have 0.02

been successful in advancing their geostrategic goals by shaping
narratives supportive of the military and countering western
0.00
and UN influence. Russian social media and traditional media
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022

campaigns have been active for over a decade across Africa, with
attention focused in recent years on the Sahel. These efforts are
Source: FBIC; IEP Calculations
extensive, with two Russian-linked influencers collectively
reaching over 28 million social media followers. Their content is

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 55

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

The picture of influence, like that in Mali, remains complex. Tillaberi remained the most affected region, located in the
China has steadily increased its influence, having achieved its tri-border area with Burkina Faso and Mali. It accounted for 63
goal of Burkina Faso ending its cooperation with Taiwan in per cent of attacks and 67 per cent of fatalities in Niger, with
2019. China has gained gold, copper and nickel exploration violence spilling into neighbouring regions like Tahoua, where
licenses and has also built strong relations with the new deaths increased fivefold. JNIM activity surged, with 13 attacks
government. Whilst Chinese interests dominate along economic causing 109 deaths, a fourteenfold rise in fatalities and the
lines, there is a growing commitment to protect its interests group’s highest numbers in Niger to date. IS attacks remained
against security threats. China has pledged 1 billion Yuan (US steady, though deaths attributed to them dropped by half to 108.
$136 million) in military assistance to train 6,000 military
personnel and 1,000 law enforcement members across Africa. In July 2023, Niger experienced a military coup, with the
This pledge, part of China’s Global Security Initiative includes presidential guard overthrowing President Mohamed Bazoum
support for an African standby force to carry out peacekeeping and General Adourahmane Tchiani assuming power. The
and counterinsurgency.32 Such a development is not unexpected justification centred around Bazoum's inability to counter
where China seeks to protect its influence, especially in regions jihadist threats, although this reasoning was seen as a pretext,
where non-state armed actors imperil its investments. The especially considering the low terror attack frequency prior to
actual direct implications for security dynamics, especially in a the coup. The coup led to a diplomatic crisis, with regional
country like Burkina Faso are unclear. powers threatening intervention and risking an interstate
conflict.

Niger By the end of 2023, Niger distanced itself from Western allies,
ending security cooperation with the EU and began exploring
Terrorism in Niger escalated to record levels in 2024, following ties with Russia. The government ended military ties with both
the sharp rise in 2023. Attacks increased to 101, up from 62 in France and the US. France withdrew its 1,500 troops in
2023, while deaths nearly doubled to 930. Civilian deaths December 2023.33 In May 2024, the US were told to withdraw
tripled, and military deaths rose to 499, making up over half of their troops from the country, including handing over their
all fatalities and marking the highest military death toll caused $100 million dollar Airbase 101 in Niamey and Airbase 201 in
by terrorism globally in 2024. The deadliest attack occurred in Agadez in northern Niger that had become AFRICOM’s main
the Tahoua region, near the Malian border, where over 300 base for counterterrorism and drone operations in the region.
gunmen killed 237 soldiers. No group has claimed responsibility, The withdrawal was completed in September 2024, marking the
though jihadists are active in the area. This was also the end of either US or French presence in any of the three states.34
deadliest global attack of 2024.

FIGURE 3.10
Tensions between Burkina Faso and France, 1995–2023
Negative sentiment between Burkina Faso and France have risen precipitously since 2017, corresponding with increases in
Russian influence.

Burkina Faso towards France France towards Burkina Faso

1.00
PROPORTION OF NEGATIVE EVENTS REPORTED

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
2011
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Source: ICEWS; IEP Calculations

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 THE SAHEL | Section 3

Niger and Burkina Faso also withdrew from the G5 Sahel Russia, both major consumers of uranium, have been actively
following Mali's departure, significantly weakening the alliance. securing deals in Niger as French companies like Orano and
Russian influence campaigns became more prominent in the Canada’s GoviEx have had their operating licences revoked,
lead up to the coup and have continued since the coup. This was losing access to their mines.36
a major shift for a country that had not until recently had
diplomatic relations with Russia and, unlike Mali and Burkina Meanwhile, a majority Chinese owned uranium mining
Faso, had no history of engagement with the Soviet Union. In company is set to resume operations after ten years of
the period following the coup, Russia has mounted a concerted inactivity. This is as projections estimate China will require a
influence campaign sending military instructors and military roughly four-fold increase in uranium between 2023 and 2040.37
equipment to the government, including aircraft.
FIGURE 3.12

As shown in Figure 3.11, following the withdrawal of both US

Influence in Niger, 2011–2022
and French forces, Niger has experienced the most terrorist
Influence in Niger is shifting with Russia and the US
growing at the expense of France.
attacks since the inception of the GTI.
0.18

The post-Niger withdrawal period has seen a reformulation of

0.16 United States
US counterterrorism strategy in the region. It appears unlikely
that they will seek to re-establish a base akin to those in Niger, 0.14
at least in the short term. Cooperation and hosting of US forces
0.12
in Côte d'Ivoire and Benin has significantly increased since the France
coup in Niger, whilst US special forces, who had been asked to 0.10 China

FBIC
leave Chad, have been invited to return.
0.08
The influence landscape in Niger, as shown in Figure 3.12, is
0.06
complex. Data up to 2022 indicates that the United States
remains the most influential state, while France's influence is 0.04 Russia
declining, and Russia and China are expanding their presence.
This dynamic is expected to continue in the post-coup 0.02

environment, though with the exit of US troops, their influence

0.00
is likely to decline. Niger is the seventh largest producer of
uranium in the world. Prior to the coup, it produced 25 per cent
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
of Europe’s uranium, the second largest source.35 China and
Source: FBIC; IEP Calculations

FIGURE 3.11
Terror attacks in Niger, 2020–2024
Attacks rose to their highest level ever following the withdrawal of US Counterterrorism Forces.

18
Withdrawal of US

15
Number of Terror Attacks

12

0
Apr 2020

Apr 2021

Apr 2022

Apr 2023

Apr 2024

Oct 2024
Jul 2024
Oct 2020

Jul 2021

Oct 2021

Jul 2023

Oct 2023
Jan 2020

Jan 2021

Jan 2022

Jan 2024
Jul 2020

Jul 2022

Oct 2022

Jan 2023

Source: TerrorismTracker, IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 57

Section 3 | THE SAHEL ­

According to Gallup polling sentiment towards major powers cent. Support for the US has also grown in many countries,
has shifted across the Sahel. Support for both Russia and the US though it has declined in Burkina Faso and Mali by 9 per cent
has increased in much of the region, as shown in Figure 3.13. and 15 per cent, respectively.9 The only country where support
Positive sentiment towards Russia has risen by 33 per cent in for both has dropped is The Gambia, where support for Russia
Burkina Faso since 2019, with smaller but notable increases has dropped by 16 per cent and support for the US has dropped
across the Sahel, except in Guinea, where it dropped by six per 10 per cent.

FIGURE 3.13
Changes in the approval of the US and Russia in the Sahel 2019-2024
Changes in approval rates of Russia and the US have significantly improved overall since 2019.

40%

30%

33%
20%
PERCENTAGE CHANGE

Russia
10% Positive sentiment towards
USA Russia has risen by 33 per
cent in Burkina Faso since
2019, with smaller but notable
0% increases across the Sahel,
except in Guinea, where it
dropped by six per cent.
-10%

-20%
Burkina
Faso

Mali

Chad

Mauritania

Guinea

Senegal

Nigeria

Cameroon

Niger

Gambia

Source: Gallup; IEP Calculations

FIGURE 3.14
Tensions between central West African countries and France, 1995-2023
Central West African countries, excluding Burkina Faso and Mali
Central West Africa towards France France towards Central West Africa

1.00
Proportion of Negative Events Reported

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
2011
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023

Source: ICEWS; IEP Calculations

58 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 THE SAHEL | Section 3

FIGURE 3.15
Tensions between the Sahel and France, 1995-2023
Negative sentiment from Mali and Burkina Faso drives up overall regional proportions of negative sentiment

The Sahel towards France France towards The Sahel

1.00
Proportion of Negative Events Reported

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00

2011
1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

2021

2022

2023
Source: ICEWS; IEP Calculations

Meanwhile, France is growing in unpopularity across many of Given the extraterritorial nature of the counterterrorism
its former colonies in the Sahel, with 59 per cent of Malians challenge, effective operations require collaboration and
holding negative views about France. The most extreme changes cooperation beyond the Alliance of Sahelian States, to include
in negative sentiment can be seen in Mali and Burkina Faso, North Africa, other Sahel states, and Coastal West Africa. It is
when combined with the other former French colonies: Guinea, also important for the US and EU countries to remain actively
Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo, Senegal and Mauritania Figure 3.15 involved. This is essential to disrupt the flow of illicit financing
shows a clear increase in negative sentiment. Without Mali and and arms that sustain these organisations. Powerful regional
Burkina Faso, however, the levels of negative sentiment are states like Nigeria will dominate efforts, and cooperation
significantly lower. A new wave of anti-colonial populism has between the alliance and other neighbours like Algeria and
surged in West Africa and has been utilised by military leaders Libya will likely also prove pivotal. While Russia and China are
of the governments in both Mali and Burkina Faso.38 These ascendant in the region, the European Union and US are
trends may persist beyond the Central Sahel states and are unlikely to seek to abandon their interests. With rising conflict
certainly an area to watch into the future. within the region and growing external competition for
influence, the security outlook for the Central Sahel appears
The geopolitical shifts and evolving dynamics in the Sahel have increasingly bleak.
created uncertainty regarding their impact on terrorism.
Counterterrorism cooperation between the Alliance of Sahelian
States and neighbouring countries is now shaped by divisions
between states aligned with Russia, the United States, or France.
In January 2025, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger announced a
5,000 strong joint military force to conduct counterterrorism
operations in the area where groups operate across borders.39

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 59

Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

Since 2020, foreign

Syria and the Democratic Republic of influence in Syria has
the Congo (DRC) were the most affected shifted, with the roles of
by IS activity in 2024, experiencing the Russia, China and Iran
highest number of fatalities. Syria alone diminishing and Türkiye
rising as a key player.
accounted for 369 of the 559 IS attacks.

Islamic State operates as a

decentralised network of affiliates,
encompassing nine jihadist groups
and affiliated entities. Each group
acts independently.

In 2024, these affiliates were responsible

for attacks across the Middle East, Africa,
Asia and Europe, highlighting the group’s
continued transnational reach and
operational capacity.

In addition to the attacks that

Instability following the occurred, in 2024, a total of 24
fall of the government publicised plots linked to IS or
of the Assad regime affiliated groups were foiled,
could provide fertile including a high-profile plot targeting
Taylor Swift concerts in Vienna.
ground for IS to In view of the rarity of intelligence
regroup and rearm, services disclosing such incidents,
increasing the risk of it may be that many more such plots
resurgence. were foiled last year.

ISK’s ability to operate and expand in Afghanistan

ISK has extensive multilingual and beyond remains an international concern,
skills and a sophisticated prompting heightened security and counterterrorism
efforts by the EU, Russia and Central Asian states.
online presence in Pashto,
Dari, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, ISK has evolved into one of the most active jihadist
Uzbek, Tajik, English and, groups globally, expanding its operations beyond
Afghanistan into Pakistan, Iran, Russia and Central
more recently, Russian and Asia. It carries out more deadly attacks outside of
Turkish, mainly targeting youth. Afghanistan than within, highlighting its growing
transnational threat.

60 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

4 Islamic State
and Affiliates
Introduction IS continues to pose a significant security threat to the West,
with both organised cells and lone-wolf individuals pledging
allegiance to IS attempting mass-casualty attacks. In 2024,
authorities foiled IS plots targeting the Paris Summer Olympics
Since 2015, Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates have remained and Taylor Swift’s concerts in Vienna, among several others,
the world's deadliest terrorist group. The total number of IS highlighting the group’s ongoing global reach.1
attacks rose globally until 2022, but the number and overall
intensity of attacks have declined in recent years, leading to a Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in
slight reduction in fatalities. While some chapters have December 2024, after more than 13 years of civil war, concerns
declined, others, such as Khorasan chapter, have increased their over a potential power vacuum in the region have intensified.
activities substantially. IS has continued to expand its presence Alongside the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021,
in the Middle East, Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. these shifts have added new layers of complexity to the
geopolitical landscape in both the Middle East and South Asia.
IS is no longer as centrally organised as it was at its peak in Additionally, the ongoing war in Gaza risks serving as a catalyst
2015, when it controlled territory in Iraq and Syria roughly the for radicalisation and recruitment, much like the conflicts in
size of France. The destruction of its so-called caliphate by 2019 Iraq and Afghanistan did in the past.
led to decentralisation and a shift towards low-cost, high-
impact attacks. These tactics have allowed IS to sustain its This section provides an analysis of IS and affiliates, and its
operations despite military and territorial losses, demonstrating impact on global security, examining the current ecosystem of
its adaptability. IS. It also explores the group’s rise and fall in Syria and Iraq, the
influence of its major regional affiliates, and the growing role of
Today, IS operates through regional affiliates, each pursuing ISK, which has emerged as IS’s most internationally active
distinct goals tailored to local contexts, reflecting a broader branch. The evolving nature of IS marks a phase of terrorism
trend towards networked jihadism. This decentralised model that is increasingly resistant to traditional military strategies.
makes IS more difficult to contain, as it combines territorial Effectively countering this threat requires a comprehensive and
control, ideological influence, opportunistic attacks and a adaptable approach, capable of addressing the group’s
strategy adapted for the locality. For example, Islamic State decentralised structure and rapidly shifting tactics.
Sahel (IS-S) has focused on territorial expansion in border areas
of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, while Islamic State-Khorasan
Province (ISK) has pursued a more transnational agenda.
Islamic State affiliates are active in multiple states and regions
including Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Somalia, Egypt, Cameroon and Nigeria.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 61

Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

Summary

FIGURE 4.1
Islamic State affiliate locations and attacks, 2024
In 2024, Islamic State affiliates were active across Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa.

ISK ISIL ISS ISWA IS Sinai

IS Libya IS Somalia IS Mozambique IS Central Africa

Source: IEP Calculations

Definitions of Islamic State (IS) vary. In this report, IS is defined Roughly 48 per cent of terrorism deaths in 2024 have not been
as a global jihadist organisation that operates as a decentralised attributed to any group. IEP has developed a machine learning
network of affiliates. However, not all IS chapters are model which apportions these deaths to various groups.2 Based
categorised in the Terrorism Tracker. The attribution of attacks on these findings IS is likely to be responsible for an additional
and deaths to Islamic State and its affiliates can be challenging 15,000 deaths between 2007 and 2024.
to determine, due to the shifting nature of affiliations and the
evolving dynamics of the group's regional branches. As IS IS and its affiliates were responsible for over 4,000 deaths in
originally rose to prominence in Iraq and Syria, the group tends 2016, the peak of its deadly operations. Over the next three
to be most associated with – and sometimes treated as years, the number of deaths dropped substantially, reaching as
synonymous with – Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). low as 1,666 in 2019, and deaths have not exceeded 2,500 since
But in the Terrorism Tracker, “Islamic State” is also used to then. Iraq has been the most affected country by IS attacks, with
denote events ascribed to the network that have been carried a total of 9,088 deaths since 2007, followed by Syria with 3,636
out outside of Iraq and Syria. The attacks replicate IS tactics; fatalities, and Afghanistan with 2,686 deaths. In 2024, deaths
however, they cannot be linked to any one affiliate group. In from IS attacks fell to their lowest level since 2019, dropping by
2024, for example, there were a total 22 countries around the 12 percent compared to the previous year. Syria recorded the
world with incidents attributed to “Islamic State”. As shown in most IS attributed deaths in 2024, with 708 deaths, followed by
Figure 4.1, this section provides an overview of affiliate branches the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) with 299 deaths,
of IS: Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISK), Islamic State in Nigeria with 159 and Russia with 148 deaths.
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), IS Sahel Province (ISS), IS West
Africa (ISWA), IS Sinai, IS Libya, IS Somalia (ISS), IS While the number of IS deaths peaked in 2016, the number of
Mozambique (ISM) and IS Central Africa (ISCA). attacks attributed to IS and its affiliates reached its highest level

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

in 2021. Between 2007 and 2014, attacks were relatively limited, The ongoing transnational threat posed by IS remains a serious
with 21 incidents in 2007. However, 2015 marked a sharp concern across various regions, including in the West. This is
increase, with 390 attacks recorded. Attacks rose to 815 in 2018 evident not only from successful attacks but also from
and remained elevated over the next several years, eventually numerous plots that have been foiled by security services in
peaking at 867 attacks in 2021. Attacks increased for the first different countries. Figure 4.3 shows the foiled plots attributed
time since the peak in 2024, when 559 IS attacks were recorded, to IS in 2024. While foiled plots and terror suspect arrests occur
six per cent more than the prior year. regularly, intelligence agencies rarely disclose them to the
media. As a result, only publicly reported cases can be analysed,
The rise in attacks despite declining deaths suggests a shift while many more thwarted attacks remain undisclosed.
toward smaller, less coordinated operations, often relying on
local sympathisers rather than centralised command. In 2024, there were 24 publicised plots linked to IS or affiliated
groups. The most were recorded in Israel, with five plots,
For instance, Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) recorded its including one where four alleged members of IS were arrested
highest number of attacks in 2020, with 90 incidents, before with hundreds of explosives.3 The US followed with four plots,
declining in subsequent years. ISK saw a significant surge in with one notably being planned by a former CIA security guard
activity, peaking in 2021 with 189 attacks. Islamic State Sinai in Afghanistan who had planned to carry out a mass shooting
Province (IS-SP), although relatively less active, remained a on election day. The suspect told the FBI that he was
persistent threat, with notable activity in 2016 and 2018. communicating with individuals associated with ISK.4 In
Germany, arrests occurred throughout 2024, including in
Figure 4.2 shows the total deaths associated with IS and its Cologne, and in March 2024, following a threat to the Swedish
affiliates by country and regional groupings over the past two Parliament.5 Similarly, Russian authorities apprehended
decades. The groupings are broadly associated with the main suspects linked to a planned attack on a Moscow synagogue in
branches: March 2024.6

• Iraq and Syria (ISIL dominated) In addition to foiled plots, there have also been recent high-
• Central and South Asia, including Iran and Russia (ISK profile arrests of IS affiliated individuals in every part of the
dominated) world. In mid-2024, several suspects were detained in Iran.
• Sahel: Chad, Cameroon and Nigeria (ISWA dominated), Between June 2023 and March 2024, 2,733 suspects were
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger (ISS Dominated) detained in Türkiye, with 692 formally arrested for suspected
links to IS.7

FIGURE 4.2
Deaths attributed to the Islamic State, by country and regional groupings, 2007–2024
Of the IS affiliate groups, ISIL, ISWA and ISK have been the deadliest in the past decade.

The Sahel (ISWA/ISS Dominated) Iraq and Syria (ISIL Dominated)

Central and South Asia (ISK Dominated) Rest of sub-Saharan Africa Rest of the World

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000
TOTAL DEATHS

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

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Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

FIGURE 4.3
IS foiled plots, 2024
Attacks by IS were foiled across the West and in parts of Russia and Eurasia.

Source: IEP Calculations

In Central Asia, there has been an increase in ISK-related arrests Facing backlash from the community and increased pressure
and incidents, reflecting both the group’s focus on the region from US and Iraqi forces, the group weakened until 2011, when
and heightened counterterrorism efforts by governments. For its involvement in the Syrian Civil War sparked a period of
instance, in December 2023, two teenagers were arrested for renewed growth. In 2013, under Baghdadi’s leadership, the
plotting attacks in Jalal-Abad, Kyrgyzstan. A few months later, group rebranded itself as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
an ISK-linked car bomb exploded in Tajikistan's Kulob region. In (ISIL). In 2014, it formally broke ties with Al-Qaeda.11
June 2024, 15 individuals were arrested in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan,
for posting videos related to ISK weapons and explosive tactics.8 ISIL exploited the power vacuum in Syria to expand its influence
into neighbouring areas, engaging in conflicts with tribal groups
and militias in Iraq, and against Kurdish forces and various
rebel factions in Syria. Strengthened by an influx of fighters
from across the region, the group rapidly evolved, marking the
Islamic State of Iraq early stages of its transformation into a global extremist
and the Levant organisation.

In June 2014, ISIL captured Mosul and again changed its name
to Islamic State (IS), declaring a caliphate and naming its leader,
The emergence of Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the “Caliph”.12 This declaration marked a
also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) can be significant turning point for the group, as it now claimed
traced back to the mid-2000s, when the group initially formed religious and political authority. The caliphate’s territory
as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). AQI was established by Abu Musab spanned parts of Iraq and Syria, totalling an area roughly the
al-Zarqawi in 2004, shortly after the US invasion of Iraq.9 The size of France at its peak. IS sought to implement a strict
group capitalised on the instability and sectarian violence in interpretation of Islamic law in the areas it controlled.
Iraq, positioning itself as a major player in the insurgency.
In September 2014, the United States and a coalition of allies
By 2006, the group expanded its operations and changed its launched airstrikes against IS positions, while local forces,
name to the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), signalling its growing including the Iraqi military and Kurdish fighters, mounted a
ambition to create an Islamic state. The group’s leadership, resistance against the group’s expansion.13 Despite the setbacks,
under Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi after Zarqawi's death in 2006, IS continued to hold significant territory and maintained its
focused on establishing a territorial base in northern Iraq. Over control over large swathes of land in both Iraq and Syria for
the next few years, ISI claimed many terrorist attacks inside much of 2014 and 2015. In 2015, the group established a
Iraq, including the attacks in Baghdad in August, October and presence in Libya.14
December 2009, which, combined, killed over 480 people.10
However, ISI faced significant challenges due to limited
resources and internal conflicts, while the Iraqi government and
US forces mounted a strong resistance against its advances.

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FIGURE 4.4
IS territorial control, 2015
IS controlled large swarths of Syria and Iraq at its peak in 2015.

ISIS Control

Controlled by Others

Unpopulated Desert

Source: CNN; IHS Conflict Monitor

Terrorism deaths attributed to IS peaked in 2016 at 4,240 most IS deaths were concentrated in Syria and Iraq. However,
reported fatalities. While the death toll has fluctuated over the since then, fatalities in other regions have increased,
years, it has generally declined since its peak, reaching 1,805 in highlighting the expanding reach and influence of IS affiliates
2024. Despite this reduction, IS remains a significant threat, as across different parts of the world.
ongoing casualties in recent years demonstrate. Up until 2016,

FIGURE 4.5
Deaths attributed to Islamic State, 2007–2024
Since 2017, the majority of deaths caused by IS have occurred outside Iraq and Syria.

4,000

3,000

Other Countries
Total Deaths

2,000 Syria

Iraq

1,000

0
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 65

Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

The decline of IS began in 2016 as military efforts to reestablish In response to the escalating threat, the US has conducted a
Syrian and Iraqi governmental control of the countries’ series of airstrikes targeting IS positions in Syria. Between
territories gained momentum. In Iraq, the Iraqi military, December 2024 and January 2025, US Central Command
supported by a US-led coalition, launched a series of offensives reported multiple operations aimed at degrading IS capabilities
to retake key cities, culminating in the reclaiming of Mosul in and preventing the group from exploiting the current security
2017, a decisive turning point in the fight against IS.15 Similarly, vacuum.20
in Syria, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), supported by the US,
made significant advances, gradually pushing IS out of its IS is also leveraging the disarray among groups that formerly
strongholds, including Raqqa, which fell in 2017.16 By 2019, IS opposed the Assad regime to re-establish its foothold in Syria.
had lost most of its territory, and the group’s self-declared The rapid overthrow of the government has led to internal
caliphate was effectively dismantled. discord within Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), creating
opportunities for IS to infiltrate and destabilise these factions.21
Despite losing its territorial holdings, IS remained a significant IS deaths in Syria surged to over 700 in 2024, with nearly 100
threat through its insurgency activities, continuing to carry out occurring in attacks following the fall of Assad.
attacks in Iraq, Syria and beyond. The group’s leadership
adapted by going underground or fleeing to other regions, The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), instrumental
including parts of Africa and Southeast Asia. The decline of IS’s in the territorial defeat of IS in 2019, now face challenges from
geographical caliphate did not mark its end; instead, the group Turkish-backed groups and other insurgents. In early 2025, the
transitioned to a more decentralised model, relying on cells and leader of the SDF expressed concerns about IS militants
affiliates to sustain its violent campaign and spread its ideology. regrouping in eastern Syria, taking advantage of the diminished
centralised authority.22
IS maintains a presence in northeastern Syria and parts of Iraq,
while its regional affiliates, including IS-Sahel, ISWA and ISK, The instability has exacerbated conditions in detention camps
have gained increasing prominence. Since the end of IS’s such as al-Hol and al-Roj in northern Syria, which house at least
territorial holdings in Iraq and Syria, attacks previously 40,000 IS fighters and their families. Reports indicate that these
attributed to ISIL are now attributed to IS.17 The other regional camps have become breeding grounds for the next generation of
branches of IS, such as ISWA, have seen a rise in activity in IS extremists, with children as young as eight displaying violent
recent years, with the number of attacks increasing from two behaviour and being indoctrinated by radicalised family
increases, with their attack numbers rising from a few incidents members. Camp administrators have raised alarms about
in 2015 to larger spikes in recent years, such as 189 attacks in deteriorating conditions and the potential for IS to exploit these
2021. This underscores both the persistence of the IS network environments for recruitment and radicalisation.23 The future of
and the shifting geography of its operations. these camps is uncertain as they are dependent on US funding
for Kurdish security forces who guard and maintain them.
Different IS provinces have adapted their strategies to suit their Changes to foreign assistance under the new US administration
local contexts. IS-Sahel, for example, has focused on capturing and a more isolationist position make the presence of US troops
and holding territory, while ISK has pursued a more in Syria and their involvement in guarding the camps uncertain.
transnational agenda. The internal dynamics of these provinces, Prison break attacks have occurred in the past, such as at the
along with the conflict environments in which they operate, Hasakah prison in 2022, where over 300 people died during an
have shaped their divergent approaches, making IS difficult to assault on the prison and hundreds of IS fighters escaped.24
define.
The current transitional phase in Syria presents a precarious
IS AND THE END OF WAR IN SYRIA environment where IS can potentially reassert itself. The group’s
recent activities suggest a strategic effort to regroup and exploit
The fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December of security gaps. Addressing this threat necessitates a coordinated
2024 has precipitated a period of significant instability in Syria, international response focused on stabilising the region,
creating a power vacuum that IS is actively seeking to exploit. supporting effective governance structures, and preventing IS
Historically, IS has demonstrated a capacity to capitalise on from capitalising on the current turmoil.
political turmoil to expand its influence, and current
developments suggest a potential resurgence of the group within Türkiye has emerged as a significant power broker in post-Assad
the region. Syria, expressing readiness to assist the new Syrian
administration in managing IS camps and prisons. Turkish
Following the collapse of Assad’s government, IS militants have Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reaffirmed Türkiye’s commitment
intensified their operations in Syria. The group has reportedly to supporting Syria in combating terrorism during a meeting
gained access to new weapon supplies left behind by former with his Syrian counterpart Asaad Hassan al-Shibani.25 As
government troops, bolstering IS’s operational capacity.18 This shown in Figure 4.6, Türkiye’s influence in Syria as of 2022 was
rearmament has coincided with an increase in attacks globally, already at a level comparable to Russia’s, which was declining
including a notable incident on New Year’s Day in 2025 in New well before the fall of Assad. Similarly, China and Iran have seen
Orleans, where an assailant, inspired by IS, killed 14 people with declines, with their influence remaining below that of Russia
a pickup truck.19 and Türkiye.

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

FIGURE 4.6 as a UN humanitarian facility and a police station, resulting in

Geopolitical influence in Syria, 2000–2022 the death of tens of people.30
As captured by the measures of the Formal Bilateral
Influence Capacity (FBIC), the influence of Russia, China By late 2019, ISWA had become an integral part of the IS’s global
and Iran has declined in Syria since 2020. network, with the group being one of the most active IS affiliates
outside the Middle East.31 The group has attempted to expand
operations into neighbouring countries, aiming to exploit weak
0.30 governance and regional instability. Despite this, ISWA has faced
challenges in expanding its influence due to consistent
opposition from regional military forces and rival groups.32 The
0.25 group’s recorded activity has gradually decreased, and in 2024
was at its lowest levels since 2018.

0.20
In 2021, Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau died after
Russia
Türkiye detonating an explosive device to avoid capture during an ISWA
attack. Following his death, there were expectations that Boko
FBIC

0.15
Haram fighters might join ISWA. However, reports indicate that
Boko Haram, under new leadership, has continued its
0.10 operations independently.33
Lebanon

In late 2024, the conflict between Boko Haram and ISWA

China
0.05 Iran intensified. In December, Boko Haram forces launched
coordinated attacks on ISWA strongholds, targeting critical
camps and supply centres. The assaults resulted in substantial
0.00
ISWA casualties and the seizure of valuable assets, including
2000
2002
2004
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016
2018
2020
2022

vehicles, weapons, and other resources. These actions compelled

ISWA to withdraw from several strategic locations, causing
considerable disruption to its regional operations.34
Source: FBIC; IEP Calculations

In 2024, Nigeria recorded 40 attacks attributed to ISWA,

resulting in 158 deaths. This marks a decline from 288 deaths in
ISLAMIC STATE WEST AFRICA 2023. The peak of ISWA activity in Nigeria occurred in 2020,
when the country recorded 482 deaths. ISWA's activity in
Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) was formed in 2015 with an Burkina Faso led to deaths between 2019 and 2021, but there
alliance between Nigeria-based terrorists and those in have been no attacks in the country since then. Niger recorded
surrounding countries and regions, including the southern Lake 20 deaths in 2024, a decline from 31 in 2023. In 2024, no deaths
Chad group, Boko Haram. ISWA operates in Nigeria and the from ISWA were reported in the DRC, Benin, Burkina Faso or
southern Lake Chad Basin.26 In 2016, IS leadership publicly Cameroon.
replaced ISWA leader Abubakar Shekau with Abu Musab
al-Barnawi, leading to a split in the group. The faction loyal to
al-Barnawi continued as ISWA, while Shekau's faction remained Türkiye’s influence in Syria
as Boko Haram.27
as of 2022 was already
Unlike Boko Haram, ISWA focuses on targeting state and at a level comparable
military assets while attempting to win local support by to Russia’s, which was
providing limited services, such as distributing food and declining well before the
protecting local populations. Additionally, ISWA collects taxes
from locals which are used to fund the group, but also to
fall of Assad. Similarly,
provide health services and implement its own jihadist-based China and Iran have seen
education system. However, ISWA is known to kill those who declines, with their influence
refuse to pay taxes and for targeting agencies providing remaining below that of
humanitarian aid, depriving locals of necessities in government-
held areas. The group has also massacred civilians who
Russia and Türkiye.
collaborate with local governments or disobey ISWA orders, as
well as persecuting the Christian minority in its territory.28

The group has conducted several significant attacks, including

the January 2020 attack on a Niger military base which left 89
soldiers dead.29 Later that year, ISWA fighters also attacked the
town of Monguno in Nigeria, destroying many buildings, such

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Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

FIGURE 4.7 Despite facing opposition from regional military forces and rival
Attacks and deaths by Islamic State West groups, IS-Sahel has demonstrated resilience and adaptability.
Africa, 2017–2024 Its ability to capture and hold territory has allowed itself to
Deaths from ISWA's activity peaked in 2020, after which embed within the local populations. The focused recruitment of
they declined markedly. child soldiers is further designed to provide a long-term source
of fighters and leaders. Its tactics have morphed from mass
violence to siege-like tactics, controlling logistical routes and
Attacks Deaths
placing embargoes on towns they want to exert control over.
800
Within its zones of control, the group has established
governance infrastructure, including court systems which
700 adhere to strict Salafist interpretations of Sharia law.36

600 IS-Sahel remains a formidable force in the region, with its

operations posing a significant threat to the stability of Burkina
500 Faso, Mali and Niger.
Terror Activity

400 ISLAMIC STATE CENTRAL AFRICA PROVINCE

300 Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) emerged in 2017

and initially comprised two branches: one based in northern
200
Mozambique and the other in eastern DRC.

The Congolese wing of ISCAP originated from the Ugandan

100
Islamist group known as the Uganda Muslim Freedom Fighters
and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in the 1990s. Over time,
0
the ADF shifted its focus to the DRC due to military pressure
2018 2020 2022 2024 and internal challenges. By 2017, the group pledged allegiance to
IS, securing financial support and recruitment from across East
Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations
Africa. In 2019, IS officially recognised the ADF as its Central
Africa Province, enabling the group to expand its operations
while maintaining allegiance to successive IS leaders despite
ISLAMIC STATE - SAHEL significant leadership losses.37

Islamic State in the Sahel (IS-Sahel) emerged in 2015 under the Initially focused on Uganda’s government, the IS-affiliated
banner of the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). faction in Congo shifted its attention to local economic
Initially operating independently, ISGS was integrated into activities, including mining and timber. Since aligning with IS, it
Islamic State West Africa (ISWA) in 2019. By 2022, the group has escalated attacks against both Congolese forces and
restructured and established itself as the autonomous ‘Sahel civilians.
Province’ of IS, focusing on consolidating territorial control.
Despite ongoing military efforts, the group remains a significant
IS-Sahel is primarily active in the tri-border area of Burkina threat. In June 2024, an attack in Mayikengo resulted in at least
Faso, Mali and Niger, known as Liptako-Gourma, but has also 42 deaths, with perpetrators using firearms and machetes.38 The
engaged in sporadic activity in Algeria, Benin and Nigeria. It has conflict in the DRC has worsened, with armed groups like the
faced an ongoing inter-Jihadist conflict with JNIM for control of IS-linked ADF driving significant displacement. By mid-2024,
territory. In 2024, IS carried out 16 attacks in Nigeria, 12 in over 2.4 million people had been displaced due to escalating
Niger, six in Mali and one attack in Burkina Faso. violence between armed groups and government forces, with an
estimated 200,000 internal displacement caused by the IS
IS-Sahel is known for its mass, indiscriminate violence against Congo conflict.39
civilians. The group has carried out numerous attacks, including
the March 2021 massacres in Niger's Tahoua Region, where over ISLAMIC STATE MOZAMBIQUE
140 civilians were killed. Since 2023, IS-Sahel has sought to shift
away from its purely mass violence-based approach to one of The Mozambique IS wing (ISM), locally known as Al-Shabaab
territorial expansion and governance in the areas it controls, in though not related to the Somali group, emerged in October
part contributing to lower numbers of attacks in its areas of 2017 from a long-standing Salafist sect. Heavily armed fighters
operations. By August 2023, IS-Sahel had reportedly doubled the launched attacks on security forces in Cabo Delgado’s northern
amount of territory it controlled in Mali.35 province, driven by growing tensions with local leaders. The
group was designated a separate ‘province’ from ISCAP in
In 2024, IS-Sahel appeared to prioritise territorial consolidation. 2022.40
Its control over vast areas along the Mali-Niger border has
provided an operational safe haven, presenting a significant
challenge for state forces attempting to counter its presence.

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

ISM’s primary area of operation is the northern province of The group orchestrated several high-profile attacks, including
Cabo Delgado, though other provinces, such as Balama, Chiure the January 2015 assault on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli,
and Macomia, also saw group development. It also conducts resulting in nine deaths.50 In February 2015, IS-LP claimed
cross-border attacks in southern Tanzania.41 responsibility for bombings in the eastern town of al-Qubbah,
which killed at least 40 people.51 Additionally, the group
ISM's early years were characterised by violent activities, with conducted mass executions, notably the killing of 21 Egyptian
frequent attacks on civilians. Between 2017 and 2019, the group Christians near Sirte in Early 2015.52
was involved in 66 incidents, mostly targeting civilians in
districts like Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Palma. IS-LP’s presence in Libya attracted international concern,
prompting military interventions. By late 2016, a coalition of
In 2019, IS officially recognised ISM as part of ISCAP, Libyan forces, supported by US airstrikes, expelled the group
strengthening the group’s resources and strategic focus. ISM from Sirte.53 In January 2017, US airstrikes on an IS-LP base
increased its operations, targeting urban centres and key southwest of Sirte reportedly killed over 90 militants.54
infrastructure, including a liquefied natural gas (LNG) project Furthermore, in September 2019, US Africa Command
near Palma. By 2020, the group had taken control of Mocímboa (AFRICOM) claimed airstrikes carried out against the group
da Praia and disrupted major transportation routes, pushing resulted in the death of 43 IS-LP militants. Despite these
the state to respond with counterinsurgency efforts.42 setbacks, the group persisted, adapting its tactics to operate as a
dispersed insurgency, particularly in Libya’s southern regions.55
Since 2021, international interventions by Rwandan security As of 2020, IS-LP has mostly operated as a moving insurgency,
forces and the Southern African Development Community instead of holding territory that risks being subjected to raids
Mission in Mozambique have significantly disrupted ISM’s and attacks.56
activities. Although the group initially resisted these offensives,
its capacity for political violence has steadily declined since late In recent years, the IS-LP has experienced significant setbacks,
2022. ISM’s focus shifted from targeting civilians to state including the loss of key leaders and a marked reduction in its
institutions and LNG sites. ISM also became distinct from operational capacity. Notably, there have been no recorded
ISCAP in 2022.43,44 terrorist attacks attributed to IS-LP within Libya since 2022.
While the group no longer holds control over territory in the
By the end of 2023 and into 2024, ISM escalated its operations country or carries out numerous attacks, the continued
across northern and southern Mozambique, including in presence and activity of IS on an international scale present a
previously untouched areas like Chiure and Mecúfi districts in potential risk of IS-LP's resurgence.
southern Cabo Delgado. In the first six months of 2024, the
group carried out deadly attacks, including kidnappings and ISLAMIC STATE – SOMALIA PROVINCE
massacres, displacing over 200,000 people.45 Despite
international efforts to reclaim territory, ISM exploited the Islamic State – Somalia Province (ISS) emerged in late 2015,
region’s weak governance to regain strength. The group remains when Abdul Qadir Mumin, a former al-Shabaab cleric, pledged
focused on capturing and controlling territory, following the allegiance to IS along with approximately 20 other fighters.
same strategies used by other IS branches in Iraq, Syria, and Operating primarily in the Galgala mountains of Puntland, ISS
Libya.46 In 2024, these branches carried out a total of 28 sought to expand its influence in the region.57
terrorist attacks in the DRC and 33 in Mozambique.
After being inactive for a year, ISS captured the port town of
ISLAMIC STATE – LIBYA PROVINCE Qandala in 2016, marking its first significant territorial gain.
The group held the town for over a month before being expelled
The Islamic State – Libya Province (IS-LP) was established in by Puntland Security Forces in December of 2016.58 Despite its
2014. It was formed mainly by Libyan fighters who had relatively small size compared to rivals al-Shabaab, ISS has
participated in conflicts in Syria and Iraq as members of IS. conducted several notable attacks. In May 2017, the group
These fighters took advantage of Libya's instability following the claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Bosaso,
2011 civil war to consolidate its influence. The group was Puntland's commercial capital, which resulted in multiple
initially organised as the Islamic Youth Shura Council and later casualties.59
pledged allegiance to IS, officially becoming IS-LP.47 The group
secured a stronghold in the city of Derna, which has a By late 2019, ISS was considered a significant part of the IS’s
longstanding history of jihadist activity. global network. Despite this status, the group struggled to
expand its influence, facing consistent opposition from
IS-LP swiftly expanded its influence, with IS leadership al-Shabaab, the Somali Armed Forces, and US military
recognising three provinces in country: Cyrenaica in the East, operations. In an attempt to broaden its reach, ISS directed its
Fezzan in the South, and Tripolitania in the West.48 By early efforts toward Ethiopia, seeking to infiltrate the country and
2015, IS-LP had seized control of Sirte, Muammar Gaddafi’s recruit additional fighters. These initiatives were consistently
hometown, implementing strict Sharia Law and using the city thwarted by Ethiopian security forces, who dismantled ISS
as a strategic base for operations.49 Additionally, the operations and apprehended numerous militants, preventing
neighbouring towns of Nofaliya and Harawa were taken over by the group from establishing a meaningful presence beyond
the group. Somalia’s borders.60

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Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

In May 2024, a US airstrike in northern Somalia targeted Abdul IS-SP members, offering immunity in exchange for their
Qadir Mumin, who was allegedly acting as IS’s global leader at surrender.69
the time. Although reports suggested he survived, the incident
underscores ISS’s growing significance within the broader IS ISLAMIC STATE KHORASAN PROVINCE
network.61
Islamic State - Khorasan Province (ISK), also known as ISKP, is
In late December 2024, ISS launched a coordinated suicide a regional affiliate of IS operating primarily in Afghanistan,
attack on a Puntland military base near Dharjaale in the Bari Pakistan, Iran and parts of Central Asia. Formed in 2015, ISK
region. The assault involved 12 militants and two explosive- pledged allegiance to IS's central leadership and aims to
laden vehicles, resulting in the deaths of at least 22 Puntland establish an Islamic caliphate in the historical region of
soldiers. Puntland forces repelled the attack, killing several ISS Khorasan, which includes parts of modern-day Iran,
fighters.62 Afghanistan and Central Asia.

In response to ISS escalating activities, Puntland authorities ISK has become one of the most active jihadist groups
initiated a major offensive in January 2025, targeting ISS internationally in recent years. Since its formation, it has
hideouts in the Cal Miskaad mountains. The operation led to the carried out numerous attacks beyond its bases in Afghanistan.
seizure of eight jihadist outposts and the deaths of several ISS In 2024, the group was responsible for two of the year’s
fighters.63 deadliest terrorist incidents: the January attack in Kerman,
Iran, which killed at least 95 people, and the March attack in
As of January 2025, ISS continues to pose a security threat in Moscow, Russia, which resulted in at least 144 deaths.70
Somalia, particularly in Puntland's mountainous regions. The
group's resilience and integration into IS's global network Since its inception, ISK has been linked to 634 attacks and 3,212
highlight the ongoing challenges in countering militant Islamist deaths. Recent activity has targeted the Russia and Eurasia
factions in the Horn of Africa. region, with incidents rising from 11 in 2023 to 18 in 2024.
Although the number of attacks remains lower than in sub-
ISLAMIC STATE – SINAI PROVINCE Saharan Africa, deaths attributed to the group increased from
four to 199 during the same period.
Islamic State – Sinai Province (IS-SP), originally known as Ansar
Bait al-Maqdis (ABM), emerged as a prominent militant group The threat of jihadism in Afghanistan and surrounding
in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula following the 2011 Egyptian countries has been limited until recently. Since the various
Revolution. Initially focusing on attacks against Israel and the political and military upheavals that have impacted the region
Arab Gas Pipeline to Jordan, ABM shifted its operations towards in the years since 2021, radical jihadism had persisted as a
Egyptian security forces after the 2013 ousting of President security concern until then but had remained a marginal issue,
Mohamed Morsi. In 2014, ABM pledged allegiance to IS, affecting only a small segment of the socio-political landscape.71
rebranding itself as IS-SP.64
The departure of Bashar al-Assad from Syria in December 2024,
IS-SP has been responsible for numerous high-profile attacks coupled with the change of power in Afghanistan in 2021, has
between 2013 and 2023. In October 2014, the group conducted a reshaped the regional security landscape. At the same time, a
coordinated assault on Egyptian military checkpoints near surge in international attacks and foiled plots linked to ISK has
El-Arish, resulting in the death of at least 26 soldiers.65 One year underscored the group’s growing transnational threat. This
later, IS-SP claimed responsibility for the bombing of Metrojet subsection examines ISK’s expanding influence and reassesses
Flight 9268, a Russian passenger plane which departed from the broader jihadist threat both in the region and globally.
Sharm El Sheikh, leading to the deaths of all 224 individuals on
board the plane.66 From Inception to Formative Years (2015-2021)

The group continued its insurgency with significant incidents, Foundation

such as the October 2016 attack on an Egyptian army checkpoint
in Bir al-Abed, which resulted in the deaths of 12 soldiers. In Jihadism in the Khorasan region has multiple sources and
July 2020, IS-SP militants launched an assault on the village of influences. The ideology gained prominence after the US-led
Rabaa, temporarily seizing control of several nearby villages operation that overthrew the Taliban in 2001, which led to
before being repelled by Egyptian forces three months later, increased jihadist activity in Afghanistan. The draw-down of
killing 77 IS-SP operatives.67 The following month, Egyptian and Western combat forces in 2014 did not end the Afghan jihad but
Bedouin forces killed Salim Salma Said Mahmoud al-Hamadin, a instead fuelled ongoing instability driven by internal conflicts
prominent IS-SP leader, during clashes just south of Rafah.68 and factional disputes.72

IS-SP was at its most active and most deadly in 2017, carrying At the end of 2014, the first IS representatives arrived in
out 156 attacks that resulted in 501 fatalities. By 2024, its activity Pakistan, distributing leaflets in Pashto and Dari. These leaflets
had significantly decreased, largely due to sustained military called on local Muslims to pledge allegiance to al-Baghdadi and
campaigns by the Egyptian Army in coordination with the Sinai join IS's global jihad.73 Later that year, six senior members of
Tribes Union. Additionally, reports suggest that Egyptian Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) also pledged allegiance to
authorities have reached amnesty agreements with suspected al-Baghdadi.74, 75

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

By January 26, 2015, the formation of "Wilayat Khorasan" has had seven emirs to date. As shown in Figure 4.8, under the
(Khorasan Province) was officially announced by IS leadership of ISK’s first emir, Saeed Khan, just one attack
spokesperson Abu Muhammed al-Adnani.76 This followed six resulting in 83 deaths was attributed to the group. Abu Sayed
months of negotiations between IS leadership in Syria and Iraq took over as leader in April 2017, but his tenure was short-lived
and militant factions in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Among these after he was killed in a US drone strike in July 2017. ISK became
groups were former TTP members, led by Hafiz Saeed Orakzai, more active under the leadership of Saad Orakzai, a former TTP
who became ISK’s first emir.7778 At the time, IS had already commander, who was killed in an airstrike in Afghanistan in
captured the Iraqi city of Mosul and the Syrian city of Raqqa, 2018. The next ISK emir, al-Khorasani, was appointed by the
declared the establishment of a global caliphate, and received local ISK leadership council but was demoted by IS in Iraq and
pledges of allegiance from other radical jihadist groups in Syria due to poor performance.89 Deaths from ISK attacks
various countries, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria. declined during his leadership from 814 in 2018 to 225 in 2019.

ISK was initially thought to have few connections with IS. Since 2020, ISK has been led by Shahab al-Muhajir, who was
However, by 2016, it was confirmed that the group had allegedly a commander in the Haqqani network, an Islamist
financial, strategic, and communication links with IS leadership insurgent group in Afghanistan.90 Since al-Muhajir took power,
in Iraq and Syria.79 ISK initially consisted of several thousand ISK has organised several high-profile attacks, including the
individuals opposing the government. The group was mainly 2021 Kabul airport attack. Due to the ongoing conflict with the
composed of Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Taliban, over 500 deaths were attributed to ISK in both 2021 and
Afghanistan.80 According to the Afghanistan Analysts Network 2022. The lethality of the group’s activities declined in 2023, but
(AAN), ISK's core also included members of Pakistani Islamist deaths rose again in 2024, primarily due to international
groups who had fled military operations in northern Pakistan attacks, such as at the Crocus City Hall in Moscow.
between 2010 and 2011. These individuals referred to
FIGURE 4.8
themselves as ‘muhajerin’, meaning refugees or migrants. By the
end of 2015, AAN reported that around 1,000 Pakistani migrants
Number of deaths caused by ISK under
were members of ISK in Afghanistan's Nangarhar province.81 different leaders, 2016–2024
While ISK deaths peaked during al-Korasani’s leadership,
One of ISK's early strategic regional alliances was with the
they experienced a second surge after al-Muhajir took
power in 2020.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist group
formed in 1998, primarily composed of Uzbeks and originally
based in the mountains of eastern Tajikistan. Historically, the
IMU has allied with both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The group’s 800

goal has been to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish

an Islamic state in Uzbekistan, governed by the application of 700
Sharia law.82 In August 2015, IMU leader Usman Ghazi pledged
allegiance to IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in a video,83 600
thereby establishing a close relationship with ISK.
Hasib

Sayed/Orakzai

al-Khorasani

Farooqi

al-Muhajir

500
Terrorism Deaths

ISK shares core ideological elements with IS, including the goal
of establishing a global caliphate governed by a strict
400
interpretation of Islamic law. One of the components of their
ideology is takfirism, the practice of declaring other Muslims
300
who reject sharia law as infidels or kafirs, which they use to
justify violence against Muslims.84
200

Key Activities and Operations

100

In its early stages, ISK focused on establishing a foothold in

Afghanistan for future expansion. The group initially avoided 0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
conflict with the Taliban and other groups in the region,
refrained from local taxation, and limited confrontations with
regional military authorities.85 Recruitment remained limited, Source: Australian Government; TerrorismTracker
with several hundred active fighters and a larger number of
sympathisers. Initially, ISK received funding from IS in Syria
and Iraq. However, as IS in Syria and Iraq struggled to
consolidate control in Middle East, this support declined, and
ISK began to rely more on other funding.86 The affiliates of IS in
Central Asia were divided between those linked directly to IS
leadership in Iraq and Syria (Tajikistan) and those aligned with
ISK in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.87

ISK maintains a hierarchical leadership structure.88 The group

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 71

Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

US forces in Afghanistan began targeting ISK fighters at the end system is deemed rebellion and corruption.97 Consequently, the
of 2015. In 2016, a joint US and Afghan counterterrorism Taliban considers ISK's actions illegal and against national
operation killed ISK’s first leader Hafiz Sayyid Khan and several interests. Therefore, assisting ISK or maintaining ties with the
fighters, further diminishing the group’s territory. Taliban group in Afghanistan is prohibited.98 However, despite the
attacks also contributed to this decline. In 2017, the US dropped declared hostility between ISK and the Taliban, their
a powerful bomb on ISK positions in Nangarhar province.91 By relationship is complex. Researchers suggest that it is
mid-2017, the group’s territorial control was limited to just three influenced not only by ideological differences but also by
districts in Nangarhar province, with ISK deaths later peaking competition for influence within the same ideological space
in 2018.92 and, ultimately, the struggle for power.99

Evolution after Taliban’s Takeover in 2021 A few months after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, ISK
expanded its influence across nearly all provinces.100 The group
Regionalisation and Internationalisation continues to use suicide bombers, ambushes, and targeted
killings. These attacks often focus on civilians and religious or
In 2021, the power dynamics in Afghanistan shifted when the ethnic minorities. Human Rights Watch reported that in the
Taliban regained control of the country, following the year following the Taliban's takeover, ISK killed or injured 700
withdrawal of US and NATO forces after nearly two decades of members of religious minorities in Afghanistan.101
military presence.
Since 2022, ISK has primarily focused its attacks in
During the US withdrawal, ISK conducted an attack on the northeastern and southern Afghanistan, continuing to target
Kabul Airport. The bombing killed at least 175 people, including key locations and infrastructure. The group remains active,
13 US service members, and left hundreds more injured. The engaging in violent activities as it attempts to regain influence
attack is believed to have been orchestrated under the and challenge local authorities in these regions, which border
leadership of the current emir, Shahab al-Muhajir.93 Al-Muhajir Pakistan and Tajikistan on the north.
was reported killed by Taliban in 2023,94 but he survived with
injuries and continues to lead the group.95 Operating on the north-eastern border area of Afghanistan, ISK
targets neighbouring Pakistan. In 2018, total ISK-related deaths
ISK rejects the Taliban's legitimacy as an Islamic group and in Pakistan peaked, with 236 fatalities. The impact of ISK
denies its rule over Afghanistan.96 According to a resolution activity in Pakistan has declined since, with 75 deaths in 2023
passed by the Taliban in 2022, Afghanistan operates under an and 15 in 2024. Total IS attributed attacks in the country in
Islamic system of governance, and any armed opposition to this 2024 stood at 25, similar to the 24 attacks reported the previous
year.

FIGURE 4.9
ISK attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan, post 2021
Since the Taliban took power in 2021, ISK has concentrated its attacks primarily along the country’s border with Pakistan.

Kabul
Afghanistan
Islamabad

Pakistan

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

In recent years, ISK has shifted its operational focus, with a across the region, understanding the shifting dynamics of
decline in the number of attacks claimed or attributed to the foreign influence in Afghanistan is essential. These changes not
group globally but an expansion of its geographical reach. This only shape Afghanistan's internal stability but also impact the
shift may be an attempt to highlight the Taliban’s limited control broader regional and global security landscape.
over border security and attract new recruits from the region. It
could also be driven by the Taliban’s efforts to suppress ISK Since 2021, ISK has caused more deaths outside Afghanistan
following the group’s takeover of Afghanistan or a broader than within it, indicating a shift in focus toward high-impact
strategic adjustment within ISK.102 ISK’s propaganda magazine external operations rather than internal control. This trend
Khorasan Ghag (Voice of Khorasan) reported in late 2023 that suggests an expansion of the group’s global ambitions, as it
the decline in attacks since 2021 was part of a ‘strategic silence seeks to target foreign interests, inspire attacks abroad, and
policy’ aimed at reducing the group’s visibility within extend its influence beyond Afghanistan. The relative decline in
Afghanistan.103 deaths within Afghanistan also reflects ISK’s struggle to
maintain territorial control or consolidate power locally.
Figure 4.10 shows the proportion of ISK attacks within and
outside Afghanistan since 2016. Prior to 2022, ISK attacks were ISK has carried out several large-scale attacks in recent years,
primarily confined to Afghanistan. However, since 2022, attacks drawing significant media and policy attention. One of its most
within the country have declined, while those outside its borders significant attacks in Iran took place in late 2023 during a
have risen to a comparable level. This shift may reflect a ceremony commemorating General Qasem Soleimani, who was
strategic adjustment by ISK, possibly as a survival tactic in killed by a US drone strike in January 2020. Multiple explosions
response to being increasingly suppressed in Afghanistan. Faced targeted the memorial event in Kerman, killing more than 100
with diminishing territorial and operational opportunities, the people.
group might be redirecting its activities to regions where it
encounters less resistance or can more easily rebuild its In 2024, deaths from ISK attacks increased. On March 22,
networks. gunmen stormed Crocus City Hall near Moscow, opening fire on
civilians and detonating explosives. The attack caused a roof
The Threat of ISK collapse and fire, killing 133 and injuring 140. ISK later claimed
responsibility for the attack. Russian authorities arrested 11
ISK's influence and activities unfold within a complex web of suspects, including the main perpetrators.
regional and global circumstances. With the group's growing
international attacks and increased efforts to mobilise support

FIGURE 4.10
ISK attacks in Afghanistan and the rest of the world, 2016–2024
In the past two years, the number of ISK attacks in Afghanistan has been on par with those outside the country.

200

150
Number of Attacks

Since 2021, ISK has

Rest of the World
caused more deaths
100
Afghanistan outside Afghanistan than
within it, indicating a shift
in focus toward high-impact
external operations rather
than internal control.
50

0
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 73

Section 4 | ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES

FIGURE 4.11 Since the Taliban's takeover of Afghanistan, ISK has expanded
ISK deaths in Afghanistan and the rest of the its propaganda efforts, focusing on outreach, recruitment and
world, 2016–2024 fundraising across South and Central Asia.104 As shown in Figure
The percentage of deaths from ISK has increased outside 4.12, the number of propaganda pieces released by ISK has
Afghanistan since 2021. increased since 2022, with a notable rise in content produced in
Tajik and Uzbek. While comprehensive data on propaganda in
different languages remains limited, Figure 4.12 suggests that
Afghanistan Rest of the World ISK has intensified its efforts to gain sympathisers and boost
recruitment in Central Asia.
100%

ISK relies on financial networks to sustain its operations, with

an estimated $2.5 million in funding accessed through
blockchain transactions in 2023.105 In 2024, the group’s
75%
membership in the region was estimated to be between one and
Percentage of Total Deaths

six thousand, with a strong presence near Tajikistan’s southern

border provinces, including Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar.106
ISK continues to attract returning fighters from Syria and Iraq,
50%
with recruitment efforts bolstered by the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan. ISK‘s multilingual media strategy uses Pashto, Dari,
Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, Uzbek, Tajik, English, and more recently,
25%
Russian and Turkish, to target youth and marginalised groups
through platforms such as Telegram and Al-Azaim.107

0% As shown in Figure 4.13, foreign influence in Afghanistan has

2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 declined since the Taliban regained power in 2021. This trend is
evident for the four major powers who had the most influence
Source: TerrorismTracker; IEP Calculations
in the country since 1999: the US, India, Russia and Pakistan.
The only exception is Uzbekistan, which has maintained its
influence, though its overall impact on Afghanistan remains
limited compared to the declining influence of the US or
Russia.108 This shift may weaken the ability of traditional powers
to counteract ISK’s activities. With the Taliban’s focus on
consolidating internal control, the potential space for other
actors, such as ISK, to expand their influence may increase,

FIGURE 4.12
ISK propaganda by language, 2022–2024
In the past two years, there has been a notable increase in reported ISK propaganda pieces.
Arabic Pashto Russian Turkish Uzbek

English Persian Tajik Urdu

300
NUMBER OF PROPAGANDA PIECES

200

100

2022 2023 2024

Source: Centre for Information Resilience

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 ISLAMIC STATE AND AFFILIATES | Section 4

especially in regions with limited state authority. Additionally, Regional discussions continue on countering these threats,
the reduction in foreign presence means that ISK may face less alongside shifting Russian policies toward the Taliban. ISK’s
direct military opposition from external powers, allowing them attacks in Russia may be in part a response to growing Russian
to operate more freely and potentially target foreign interests engagement with the Taliban. The growing strength of ISK in
more aggressively beyond the country. Afghanistan, driven in part by weaknesses in Taliban
governance, poses a challenge for Russia and its Central Asian
Concerns over the stability of the Afghan border have existed partners. As a result, there is increasing pressure to develop
for many years, particularly among neighbouring countries like strategies to counter this threat.117 Simultaneously, between
Tajikistan, which view it as a critical security challenge in terms January and August 2024, Russian law enforcement thwarted
of radicalisation and organised crime.109 In this context, regional 110 terrorist attacks and detained 1,050 people.118 This coincided
organisations have repeatedly emphasised the importance of with a significant increase in expulsions from Russia, after the
reinforcing border security. For instance, in November 2024, the ISK attack near Moscow, with over 80,000 migrants expelled in
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) announced the 2024, nearly doubling the 44,200 expulsions from the previous
adoption of a Targeted Intergovernmental Program aimed at year.119 Additionally, in December 2024, President Putin signed a
strengthening the Tajik-Afghan border, later supported by law that could potentially remove the Taliban from Russia's list
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.110 of banned organisations.120 Meanwhile, members of the CSTO
However, local media in Tajikistan highlighted that similar convened in Moscow to discuss the military-political situation
promises of assistance were made by the CSTO as early as 2017, in Afghanistan and the extremist threat posed by ISK.121
with little to no significant actions undertaken to reinforce the
border since then.111 The situation in Afghanistan remains crucial for the future
trajectory of ISK and its threat to other countries, including
In 2024, the Taliban claimed that Afghanistan is safe and that neighbouring states and major global powers. As the Taliban
there is no need for a security belt around the country, while consolidates its control, the ability of ISK to operate and expand
also stating that drugs have been completely banned.112 Despite both within Afghanistan and beyond is a key point of
the ban, reports suggest that opium poppy cultivation in international concern. Governments have expressed significant
Afghanistan increased by 19 per cent between 2023 and 2024, concern over the growing external threat posed by ISK,
with production shifting from the southwest to the northeast.113 particularly in countries like the UK, where it is considered the
most serious overseas Islamist threat.122 The European Union,
Tajikistan faces significant threats from ISK, which has Russia and Central Asian countries are strengthening security
intensified recruitment, expanded training facilities, and and counterterrorism efforts.123 Whether ISK expands its reach
increased attacks near the country’s border with Afghanistan.114 or is contained will be a key factor in shaping its ongoing
Tajiks were implicated in several major attacks and arrests in international threat, keeping it at the forefront of global
2024.115 Domestic policies restricting religious practices, such as counterterrorism priorities.
hijab bans, may inadvertently fuel radicalisation.116

FIGURE 4.13
Foreign influence in Afghanistan, five countries with greatest influence, 2000–2022
As captured by the measures of the Formal Bilateral Influence Capacity (FBIC), the influence of the US, Russia, India and
Pakistan has declined in Afghanistan in the past three years.

0.6

0.4

United States
FBIC

0.2

India
Russia
Pakistan
Uzbekistan
0.0

2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022

Source: FBIC; IEP Calculations

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 75

Expert
Contributions
 Expert Contributions

EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

Islamic State Khurasan Province’s

International Expansion and
Growing Online Activities
Tech Against Terrorism Analysis

Lucas Webber, Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst,

Tech Against Terrorism
Cat Cadenhead, Junior Research and Project Officer,
Tech Against Terrorism

Introduction Media Production has become an integral instrument

for expanding the group's influence, shaping regional
Islamic State’s (IS) external operations threat have
1
perceptions of its strength, and maintaining its strategic
undergone a fundamental shift, evolving from a relevance.5 This digital strategy has enabled ISKP to
predominantly centrally-directed enterprise into a mobilise, coordinate, and conduct attacks against
dynamic, multi-vector network of regional branches foreign nationals across the region. The second half of
across Asia and Africa. These branches have not only this paper will focus on ISKP's transformation into an IS
demonstrated the intent but also the growing capability branch with significant international capabilities. It will
to orchestrate international terrorist attacks in the West, examine how the group has expanded its propaganda
reshaping the global security landscape. Among them, dissemination to reach previously inaccessible
Islamic State Khurasan Province (ISKP), IS’ Afghanistan- audiences through targeted messaging and increasingly
Pakistan branch2, has emerged as the organisation’s multilingual production. Ultimately, this paper will argue
most active external affiliate. The group is unusual that the group’s successful incitement of violence
in that it does not control significant territory, and its and the growth in its supporter base highlights the
militant attacks within the region have declined, but it effectiveness—and danger—of its sustained digital
has nonetheless dramatically expanded3 its external strategy.
operations capacity and developed a sophisticated
online apparatus. ISKP has been able to turn its
territorial weakness into a strength by becoming more The implications are clear: ISKP’s sophisticated online
difficult to locate and launch attacks against, adopting strategy directly enables its militant and external
a more flexible and elusive operational model based on operations, resulting in more attacks across a wider
guerilla tactics and urban terrorism. By scaling back its geographical area. Given the group’s dispersed and
insurgent focus, it has increasingly prioritized its focus highly covert nature, traditional military measures alone
on the digital battlefield. Crucially, much of its external are insufficient to neutralise the threat. Consequently,
plotting activity has been hybrid in nature, whereby it is paramount that governments, organisations, tech
followers were not trained and deployed by ISKP directly platforms, financial institutions, and other private
but were instead remotely guided in tactics, target industry entities develop and implement a coordinated
selection, and weapons procurement by official ISKP approach to countering and degrading ISKP’s online
members through communication on online platforms4. infrastructure and operational capacity. Tech Against
This increasing exploitation of digital infrastructure raises Terrorism urges tech platforms to increase efforts to
pressing questions: How and why is ISKP leveraging the monitor and remove terrorist content, with regulators
internet so effectively, and what implications does this needing stronger powers to enforce accountability.6
have for counterterrorism efforts? Action taken to remove and suppress ISKP’s online
content is just as important as kinetic military action.
This paper will examine how ISKP has strategically
exploited digital platforms to expand its influence,
recruit members, fundraise, and mobilise followers Use of the Internet to Project Power at a
to violence. Tech Against Terrorism assesses that Regional Level
the group's regional and international ambitions are ISKP has leveraged the internet as a primary instrument
fundamentally dependent on its ability to harness for amplifying the projection of power beyond its
digital infrastructure, thereby demonstrating that ISKP's territorial area of operations and shaping regional
growing operational success is directly tied to its online perceptions of its strength and influence.7 Since the
capabilities. This paper will explore how, at the level Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021, the
of regional operations, the Al-Azaim Foundation for group has increasingly relied on its online presence

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 77

Expert Contributions

to maintain strategic relevance while facing intensified targeting serves multiple strategic objectives. A primary
counterterrorism raids. Through sophisticated objective of attacks on foreign nationals is to undermine
media operations and digital propaganda, ISKP has the Taliban’s authority by demonstrating their inability to
exaggerated its apparent operational capabilities and provide security for foreign investments and diplomatic
created a discrepancy between its perceived and personnel in Afghanistan. A second objective is to
actual strength. This digital strategy serves multiple provoke international reactions that could destabilize
purposes: it helps to attract potential recruits, maintains diplomatic and economic relationships across the
psychological pressure on adversaries, and advances region. A third objective is to capitalise on existing
the group's broader goal of regional expansion. ISKP regional tensions for the purpose of creating conditions
also uses dedicated propaganda channels, including of instability that ISKP believes could facilitate territorial
magazines and encrypted messaging channels, to expansion.
maintain active crowdfunding campaigns using Monero,
a privacy-based cryptocurrency and money transfers via ISKP appears to have been successful in advancing
TRC20 tokens.8 these strategic objectives. Since the withdrawal of
NATO forces from Afghanistan in July 2021, ISKP has
Central to this outreach effort is the Al-Azaim Foundation steadily escalated its campaign of violence against
for Media Production, which emerged from an foreign nationals. Significantly, in August 2021, a suicide
ecosystem of competing but aligned pro-IS propaganda bombing at the Kabul airport’s Abbey Gate killed
outlets to become the chief media organ used by American soldiers and scores of other bystanders.12
ISKP. While initially focused narrowly on religious The same day, two Pakistani nationals possessing an
discourse, Al-Azaim has evolved in parallel with ISKP's explosive device were detained in the vicinity of the
growing regional ambitions to become a sophisticated Turkmenistan embassy. In September 2022, the Al-
multimedia platform addressing religious, political, Azaim Foundation issued threats of further attacks on
social, and military issues at both regional and global diplomatic targets in Afghanistan, specifically naming
levels. ISKP’s outreach and propaganda campaigns those from China, Iran, and India. On January 11,
exploit the dynamics of regional conflict and militant 2023, these threats materialsed with a suicide bombing
infrastructures by fusing local grievances with its global targeting a Chinese diplomatic delegation at the Afghan
agenda. Al-Azaim's linguistic reach is particularly Foreign Ministry in Kabul.13 Most recently, on January
notable, with content produced in a lengthening list of 22, 2025, ISKP fatally shot a Chinese national and
languages, including Pashto, Dari, Arabic, Urdu, Farsi, mine worker in Afghanistan’s Takhar province, near the
Uzbek, Tajik, English, and more recently, Russian and border with Tajikistan.14 These attacks have undermined
Turkish. This versatility enables ISKP to craft culturally the Taliban’s ability to attract foreign direct investment
resonant messages for diverse audiences across and economic development projects. The Chinese
South Asia, Central Asia, and beyond.9 Tech Against government, for instance, has increased pressure on
Terrorism has observed that, in recent campaigns, the Taliban to better secure its citizens and interests
Al-Azaim and aligned outlets have intensified regional in Afghanistan.15 The cumulative effect has been a
outreach, producing content that ranges from high deterioration of regional stability, with affected nations
quality online magazines to AI generated video content. adopting increasingly aggressive security postures while
Notable examples include a pro-ISKP AI video news reducing diplomatic and economic engagement with
program in Pashto called "Khurasan TV" and the flagship Afghanistan. This has created precisely the conditions of
English language Voice of Khurasan magazine. This isolation and instability that ISKP seeks to exploit, while
high volume of propaganda output in local and regional also serving to make the group appear successful and
languages, with customised messaging and narratives more dangerous.
to appeal to specifically identified ethnolinguistic
target audience segments, has resulted in a growth of Use of the Internet to Project Power at an
influence and support throughout South and Central International Level
Asia.10 By maintaining consistent messaging across
multiple platforms and languages, Al-Azaim has In the past four years, ISKP has transformed from a
enabled ISKP to project an image of organisational militant group with a regional focus into an organisation
strength and operational capability that often exceeds with expansive international capabilities, largely driven
its true extent. These communication networks, which by its sophisticated exploitation of digital platforms.16
imply an extensive organisation thereafter, supply the A pivotal factor in this transformation is Al-Azaim's
infrastructure for achieving strategic objectives which multilingual propaganda campaign, which strategically
typically require substantial territorial control or military targets the growing Afghan and Central Asian diasporas
capability. in Europe and North America. By extending its reach
beyond Asia, ISKP strengthens its sphere of influence,
The success of this strategy manifests most importantly widening its support base far beyond its regional
in ISKP’s ability to inspire, coordinate, and conduct origins.
attacks against foreign nationals across the region.
ISKP propaganda explicitly advocates targeted attacks A milestone in Al-Azaim’s expansion was the launch
against Chinese, Russian, and Central Asian nationals of its English-language magazine, Voice of Khurasan,
as retaliation for the perceived anti-Muslim policies in January 2022. This publication has attracted
enacted by such nationals’ home countries.11 Issues contributors from diverse backgrounds, including those
such as China’s treatment of Uyghurs and Russia’s from Canada, Australia, Italy, and Tajikistan, reflecting
actions in the Caucasus are frequently emphasised by ISKP’s successful extraterritorial expansion of its
way of justification. This selective but comprehensive ideological appeal. Al-Azaim has further strengthened

78 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Expert Contributions

its media presence through strategic partnerships with campaign mostly focused on large sporting events.20
other pro-IS media entities. A significant development This particular escalation in ISKP's event-driven
was its collaboration with Fursan al-Tarjuma, an umbrella incitement campaign is marked by increasingly specific
organisation established in March 2023 that coordinates tactical guidance and target selection. Furthermore,
at least 14 pro-IS media groups. Additionally, Al-Azaim it represents an evolution in the group's approach
has partnered with the I'lam Foundation archive, which to inspiring attacks abroad and demonstrates the
serves as a key source of translated official IS content increasing sophistication of its ability to exploit global
for supporter networks both within and outside the events and mobilise violence against both traditional
EU, available on the surface and dark web. These and emerging target sets.
strategic media partnerships significantly amplify ISKP’s
ISKP has poured considerable resources into building
reach by increasing the accessibility and visibility of
up its external operations and guided plot capabilities.
its propaganda. By making content easier to find and
This increased resourcing is evident in the rise in
available in multiple languages, Al-Azaim enhances
international plots in 2024 when compared to the
ISKP’s potential to radicalise supporters across multiple
previous year. Notably, many of these plots were hybrid
continents, further solidifying its global influence.
operations, whereby followers were not directly trained
ISKP has also considerably intensified the online and deployed by ISKP but instead received remote
incitement of its supporters to carry out violence abroad. instruction in tactics, target selection, and weapons
The first escalation in this incitement campaign was procurement from official ISKP members by means of
prompted by events that took place in Stockholm, online platforms.21 This is a clear practical application
Sweden, on January 21, 2023, when Rasmus Paludan, of the system that the group has developed whereby
the leader of the far-right Danish party “Hard Line”, selected “officials” of ISKP provide online advice and
stood in front of the Turkish embassy and burnt a copy support to followers willing to carry out attacks abroad.
of the Quran on video. By way of response, ISKP, This support involves the provision of DIY manuals on
in its Pashto language Khurasan Ghag magazine, making IEDs, detonators, craft-made suppressors,
devoted several pages to issuing threats and calling and drone-use. ISKP instructors are readily available
for attacks against targets in Sweden and, in general, to answer the plotters’ questions and coach them on
against European citizens wherever they could be operational security practices and more.
found.17 This campaign of incitement intensified further
These developments highlight how ISKP has effectively
following the October 7, 2023, Hamas attack on Israel:
leveraged online platforms to transform its ability to
ISKP moved quickly and aggressively to capitalise on
project power internationally. The group's sophisticated
hostile sentiments stirred up throughout the Muslim
use of digital infrastructure has enabled it to spread its
world as a result of the ensuing protracted conflict
propaganda beyond Asia, radicalising and mobilising
in Gaza. ISKP created a high volume of propaganda
new communities across diverse geographical regions.
criticising, threatening, and urging attacks against
This expansion has affected a striking collateral shift
Israeli targets as well as against Western states that
in ISKP's operational methodology, as the group can
support Israel. In its Voice of Khurasan magazine,
now establish and coordinate operational cells across
for instance, ISKP published an English translation of
multiple continents simultaneously and remotely by
an editorial from IS’s official al-Naba newsletter that
providing online guidance. The shift to enhance digital
urged its supporters to participate in its post-October
operations serves as a significant force multiplier,
7 propaganda campaign.18 In addition, it encouraged
enabling ISKP to reach previously inaccessible
supporters to carry out attacks against Jewish
audiences with targeted messaging while providing
neighbourhoods in America and Europe and on Israeli
operational guidance without physical presence.
and Western embassies, synagogues, and Israeli
economic interests globally. In the same issue, Al-Azaim A testament to the effectiveness of this approach is
included instructions in a full-page infographic titled the marked diversification in the backgrounds of those
“Practical Ways to Confront the Jews” which called upon implicated in ISKP-related activities abroad. Historically,
supporters to kill Jews wherever they could be found, international plots were primarily associated with Central
participate in IS’ anti-Jewish propaganda campaign and Asians and predominantly Tajiks.22 This resulted from
conduct cyberattacks on websites affiliated with Jews.19 an intentional decision by ISKP to appeal to a wider
ISKP suggested that supporters choose weapons such Central Asian audience in order to expand its influence
as Molotov cocktails, crossbows, guns acquired on and recruitment within and beyond Afghanistan’s
the black market, pipe guns, nail guns, vehicles, and borders. However, in the latter half of 2023, this
knives. diversification accelerated, with the national and
ethnic backgrounds of those involved in ISKP-related
ISKP and aligned pro-IS outlets launched a similarly
operations broadening noticeably. The group’s success
intense incitement campaign after the Crocus City
in increasing their appeal to a broader range of Central
Hall raid in Moscow, Russia on 22 March 2024. This
Asian backgrounds was illustrated in July 2023, when
campaign emphasised specific countries and targets
coordinated law enforcement operations in Germany
which should be attacked and additionally provided
and the Netherlands resulted in the arrest of individuals
tactical advice and options for relevant weaponry. In
from Tajik, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz backgrounds.23
an issue of Voice of Khurasan magazine, it featured a
Arrests which took place in early 2024 showed a yet
full-page image of an ISKP jihadist wearing camouflage
wider range of nationalities involved in ISKP plots. In
with a rifle and box of explosives on a train with a sign
January 2024, Austrian authorities disrupted an ISKP
behind him saying “Welcome to Europe” accompanied
cell in Vienna comprising individuals of Chechen
by the text “Last call before exit.” The post-Moscow

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and Bosnian descent, suggesting a successful traditional military measures alone are insufficient to
expansion of the group’s influence into the Caucasus counter its evolving threat. A more comprehensive
and Balkan regions.24 Similarly, February 2024 saw approach is essential - one that prioritizes enhanced
Turkish authorities dismantle a network comprising online counterterrorism efforts, disruption of ISKP's
Russian, Uzbek, Kyrgyz, Azerbaijani, and Sudanese digital ecosystem, and targeted counter-radicalisation
nationals and in March 2024, German police arrested messaging to undermine its ideological appeal.28 The
two ISKP-linked Afghan nationals accused of plotting mere existence of ISKP's propaganda online represents
an attack on the Swedish parliament.25,26 These arrests a strategic victory given the digitalisation of militant
underscore the group's expanding global appeal and warfare. Tech Against Terrorism continues to stress that
the effectiveness of its growing propaganda efforts. information warfare is just as important as traditional
military means in combating ISKP.29 Accordingly, it is
The implications of this evolution are significant for
paramount that governments, organizations, and the
counterterrorism efforts. ISKP's sophisticated digital
private sector work together to remove and suppress
infrastructure enables it to provide detailed operational
ISKP’s online content. Only through such a multifaceted
guidance while bypassing traditional counterterrorism
strategy can the international community effectively
measures focused on physical movement and training
mitigate ISKP's growing influence and prevent future
camps. The group's demonstrated ability to recruit
attacks.
across diverse nationalities, incite violence, and
establish operational networks from Central Asia to
North America underscores how online platforms have
fundamentally transformed the nature of the threat
landscape.27

Conclusion
ISKP’s strategic exploitation of digital platforms,
including social media, messaging, file-sharing
platforms, and archiving sites, has enabled it to
overcome traditional limitations of territorial control and
physical presence, creating a dynamic, multi-vector
threat with expanding international capabilities. The
group's distinctive multilingual propaganda strategy,
spearheaded by the Al-Azaim Foundation, represents
a form of "digital caliphate" that in some aspects rivals
IS's multilingual online presence during the height of
the caliphate era and has enabled it to simultaneously
pursue regional destabilisation and global operational
reach in ways that set it apart from other IS branches.
Tech Against Terrorism's analysis shows this dual-track
approach has yielded significant results. Regionally,
ISKP has successfully executed high-profile attacks
against foreign interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan
while using targeted propaganda in local languages
to exploit regional grievances. Globally, the group has
demonstrated its expanded reach through devastating
attacks in Iran, Türkiye, and Russia in 2024 while
establishing operational networks extending into North
America and Europe. Its propaganda now provides
increasingly specific tactical guidance, transforming
online platforms into operational planning tools. By
remotely guiding operatives, ISKP can now coordinate
attacks across multiple continents without physical
training infrastructure. The group’s capacity is likely to
increase as it grows its influence to reach a broader
range of ethno-linguistic elements from Afghanistan,
Central Asia, the Caucasus, and elsewhere situated in
the West, providing ISKP with additional opportunities
for recruitment and operational planning. This threat is
increasingly difficult for intelligence and law enforcement
agencies to detect, monitor, and disrupt. However, this
also creates an opportunity to place greater focus on
the online communications space where much of this
activity is concentrated and planned. Given ISKP's
strategic de-emphasizing of territorial conquest, its
sophisticated digital strategy, and demonstrated
ability to inspire and coordinate attacks globally,

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EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

Ten Lessons from the

Russia-Ukraine War
Dr. Christina Schori Liang, Head of Counterterrorism
and PVE, Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and
Faculty Member, PSIA, Sciences Po

The Ukrainian military has gained respect for holding a piece, they were later strapped with 2-3 pound
out against its numerically and technologically superior explosives in order immobilize armored vehicles and kill
enemy through innovative tactics and technology. These artillery brigade operators. The war also introduced the
adaptations, often finding cheaper and asymmetrical large Drone Hunter F700, a six-rotor drone equipped with
solutions to countering a stronger adversary, have also radar-supported autonomous technology that can launch
provided potential blueprints for terrorists to adopt. This webs to capture smaller enemy drones.
analysis aims to focus on the twenty-first-century war
Drones allow combatants to conduct operations
tactics being employed in the Russia-Ukraine war to gain
remotely, reducing their exposure to direct combat risks.
fresh insights into what types of strategies terrorists will
Drones are extremely economical. Recent advancements
employ and how countries will need to counter them.
in commercially available drones have equipped them
Wars are not merely battles of weapons and resolve; they with high-level sensors, user-friendly controls, and first-
are testing grounds for the future and unique laboratories person view capabilities at a lower cost than military-
for technological and strategic advancements. The grade systems. These drones, while less durable and
Russia-Ukraine war has been depicted as the first less protected than their military grade counterparts,
commercial space war, the first full-scale drone war, the allow forces to absorb losses more easily.
first 3D printing war and the first Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Drones are challenging Western dominance in battlefield
war. At the same time, the war is stealthily ushering in a
economics. The cost implications are substantial if
new age of Lethal Autonomous Weapons (LAWS) that
a $500 drone can take out a tank, or if neutralizing a
are reinventing air, land and naval warfare.
$25,000 drone requires a $250,000 missile. This can
War tactics and strategies are open source. With round- impact the balance of power and has heralded greater
the-clock international news and social media coverage, asymmetry in war.3
terrorists worldwide can monitor the unfolding war in real
time by accessing encrypted messaging apps, social Ukraine launched an ambitious “Million Drone Army”
media platforms, image boards, video-sharing platforms, program to leverage the power of unmanned aerial
and the dark web. vehicles and AI-enabled drones. The programme has
significantly bolstered its military capabilities against
Both sides in the conflict have integrated drones into Russian forces. By 2024, the Ukrainian Defense Ministry
every aspect of fighting, from precision fire and strike had supplied approximately 1.2 million unmanned
coordination to intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance aerial vehicles (UAVs) to its army, encompassing
(ISR) and psychological operations. Kyiv has earned the reconnaissance UAVs, strike drones, and FPV kamikaze
nickname “Mil-Tech Valley”, making Ukraine arguably a systems.4
leader in military robotics. Drones have become the eyes
of the battlefield.1 A special reconnaissance drone team This large-scale deployment has enabled Ukraine
to conduct deep strikes on Russian logistics hubs,
called “ochi” effectively give eyes to their artillery helping
ammunition warehouses, and other strategic targets,
them to identify targets. The drones are linked to Starlink
thereby alleviating pressure on Ukrainian frontlines.5
satellites of the American company SpaceX which
The program's success is further underscored by the
supplies high-speed internet connection so everything
establishment of the Unmanned Systems Forces in June
the drone sees can be streamed to nearby brigades.
2024, aiming to field 10,000 drone specialists by the end
Drones have become the definitive weapons fielded of 2025.6 Financially, Ukraine has committed substantial
in the Russia-Ukraine war. Large surveillance drones resources to this endeavor, allocating $60 million monthly
patrol high above while smaller drones (first-person view for new drones to support combat units.7
drones or FPVs), including the small Mavic quadcopter,
In December 2024, Ukraine deployed an all-robot assault
are used for surveillance and to drop small munitions
on a Russian position for the first time. It utilized dozens
(grenades, mortar shells, bottles of petrol). The Ukrainian
of remote-controlled vehicles mounted with machine
MOD bought these in bulk – 8,200 DJI drones for only
guns and unmanned kamikaze drones, indicating
$3,650 each.2 Already in 2023, Ukrainian high-school
Ukraine's growing reliance on technology to mitigate its
students built drones by welding Chinese-supplied
manpower shortages.
components on to carbon-fibre frames costing $350

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The Ukrainian military has begun integrating cutting- and act cohesively. Employed as a system to attack
edge advancement by deploying vehicles with robotic a system, militaries can multiply the effects a swarm
machine guns, mine layers and electronic warfare weapon by exploiting synergetic effects to gain a larger
systems. This involves modifying drone bodies by operational advantage.
replacing traditional radio-electronic components with
fiber-optic systems, significantly improving control over Over the past year Ukraine has been deploying swarms
long distances. Fiber-optic drones are immune to terrain- of 3 to 10 drones.8 In December 2024, the Ukrainian
related signal degradation and operate at low altitudes national guard brigade orchestrated an all-robot
(20 to 50 meters), making them harder to detect. combined-arms operation, mixing crawling and flying
Additionally, they evade electronic reconnaissance by drones for an assault on Russian positions in Kharkiv
emitting no radio signals, enhancing Ukraine’s stealth Oblast in northern Ukraine. The Ukrainian operation
and operational effectiveness on the battlefield. involved remote-controlled flying surveillance and
minelaying drones, one-way explosive robots on the
Russia is responding in kind with its new Shahed-136 ground and in the air as well as gun-armed ground
suicide drones that use GPS technology to navigate. robots. 9
Packed with 4G data modems and Ukrainian SIM cards,
they can travel using Ukrainian cell-phone towers and Crowdsourcing Corporates and Volunteer Civilian
Chinese satellite navigation antennas, helping them Forces
to dodge Ukrainian electronic warfare (EW) defenses. The Russia-Ukraine war has also been depicted as
Russia hopes to launch autonomous drone salvos in the the first commercial space war. Corporates are using
future. Ukraine as a hotbed to testbed their military technology
More recently, AI has been introduced to boost such and latest AI tech. SpaceX has helped ensure
weapons. AI can process massive data and leveraging Ukraine’s access to high-speed internet providing the
algorithms to identify and prioritize potential targets. backbone of Ukraine’s military communications, and,
Drones are equipped with various sensors, including according to Mykhailo Federov,10 “the blood of our entire
high-resolution cameras, infrared sensors, radar, and communications infrastructure.”11
LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging). AI systems Ukrainian intelligence analysts use Palantir's
are being trained to recognize objects (vehicles, MetaConstellation tool to quickly access commercial
buildings, or people) with deep learning models to get satellite data through AI-assisted searches, providing
a comprehensive view of the environment in real-time to crucial information when and where it’s needed. It
deliver munitions with high precision. utilizes Palantir's AI software to analyze open-source
Many remote-controlled machines produced by Ukraine, data, satellite imagery, and drone footage, creating
ranging from long-range aircraft and attack boats to reports from the ground that present military options to
inexpensive FPV kamikaze drones, are early versions of commanders.12
weapons that can eventually operate autonomously with Ukrainian forces have also reinforced their daily
AI. Depending on the level of autonomy programmed intelligence work with the help of civilians with cyber
into the drone, the AI can either autonomously decide to expertise who report Russian movements creating
strike or assist human operators by suggesting targets. an extensive network. Deep State Map, initiated by
Autonomous systems operate within predefined rules Ukrainian volunteers provides real-time updates on
of engagement, while human operators typically make front-line changes, military unit locations, and liberated
the final decision. In most cases humans are asked territories. A crucial resource for both citizens and
to confirm selected targets and information is sent to military personnel, it demonstrates the power of open-
Ukrainian battle management systems. This has enabled source intelligence. An IT army of international and
the time of detection of a target to its destruction to be Ukrainian volunteer hackers also work with the defense
reduced to approximately 30 seconds. Sometimes AI ministry to conduct offensive cyberwarfare operations
can operate with a high degree of autonomy, making that target Russian infrastructure and websites. The IT
split-second decisions based on complex data analysis. army is organized through a Telegram channel where
While highly effective in modern warfare, it raises new Russian targets are listed for volunteers to attack.
significant ethical and legal concerns.
Supported by the Ukrainian government, drones are
Drone Swarms crowd-sourced worldwide through a UNITED24 platform
The Ukraine conflict has underscored the advantages of "Army of Drones" initiative that focuses on fundraising
deploying multiple drones simultaneously for operational for the procurement, delivery, and maintenance of
advantage. Napoleon Bonapart employed the tactic professional drones for aerial reconnaissance and
of deploying his forces at multiple points of enemy training pilots.
weakness, allowing him to defeat armies larger than his New technology is openly sourced. Ukrainian
own. He attacked the enemy as a cohesive system and entrepreneurs, engineers and military units are using
created synergetic effects. code found online and components from hobbyist
Transitioning to a theory of warfare for swarm weapons, computers like Raspberry Pi that can be purchased from
going beyond just mass, a swarm of drones can hardware stores or Best Buy.
exploit this same principle of maneuver to attack the Naval Drones to Attack Ships
enemy system at hundreds of dispersed weak points
simultaneously. The effectiveness of swarming tactics Ukraine's use of unmanned surface vehicles (USV)
relies on the drones' ability to communicate, coordinate, has given the world a genuine view of what large-scale

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future naval warfare might look like and how naval 3D printing can also create futuristic new weapons: gun
drones can impact naval security. Autonomous drones turrets with autonomous targeting that can reach targets
present a significant threat to naval fleets. Ukraine has up to 1,000 meters away with A.I.-trained software, guns
demonstrated this by repelling large-scale Russian that can shoot targets using a video game controller
mechanized attacks and crippling Russia's Black as well as bombs strapped to racing drones with night
Sea Fleet. It will be more challenging to defend port vision that hunt in the dark.
infrastructure and ships in harbour – the targets are
PSYOPS
obvious and a weaker power without a navy can pose a
serious asymmetric threat. Ukrainians have employed psychological operations
(PSYOPs) effectively in the ongoing conflict with Russia
Ukraine has used remote-controlled boat drones
to influence enemy forces, they bolster domestic morale,
packed with explosive to attack Russia’s fleet located
and sway international opinion. Ukrainians use social
off the coast of Sevastopol. According to unofficial
media, and propaganda to highlight Russian military
reports, an amphibious Russian landing ship, the $70
failures, high casualty rates, and logistical problems.
million Ivanovets, sank after it was targeted with sea
Messages are crafted to sow doubt among Russian
drones, each carrying approximately 300 kilograms of
troops about their mission and leadership.
explosives.13 According to multiple news agencies, at
least 20 medium to large Russian naval vessels have Ukraine launched surrender campaigns encouraging
been sunk in the Black Sea.14 (Carey, Kostenko and Russian soldiers to surrender safely. Ukrainian media
Pennington, 2024). and social media platforms mock Russian military
leaders with memes, videos, and viral posts to amplify
According to Chinese analysts, USVs have five
their narratives. Heartwarming or tragic stories of
advantages in combat: effective concealment, low
civilians resisting occupation are widely shared to garner
cost to manufacture and use, strong destructive ability,
international sympathy and keep global attention on
intelligent modes of control, and potential to operate
the conflict to help galvanize international support for
autonomously with diversified attack modes. USVs
sanctions and military aid. Figures like the "Ghost of Kyiv"
have greater explosive power than air strikes and can
(a supposed ace fighter pilot) or the defiant defenders
“harness wolf group tactics” for greater destructive
of Snake Island became symbols of resistance. Ukraine
power.15
has also used misinformation and disinformation to
In January 2025, NATO launched its new mission “Baltic mislead Russian forces about the timing and location
Sentry”, which provides enhanced surveillance in the of offensives, such as the Kherson and Kharkiv
Baltic Sea against acts of sabotage, where at least 11 counteroffensives in 2022.
undersea cables have been damaged since October
While Ukrainian PSYOPs have been highly innovative,
2023.16 More than 95% of internet traffic is carried via
they face challenges. Russia also conducts extensive
undersea cables, with some 1.3 million kilometers
propaganda and censorship to suppress Ukrainian
of such cabling securing an estimated $10 trillion
narratives and saturate the information space making
dollars of international trade daily.17 The success of
the global information space so crowded that it is
USVs on the Baltic Sea Fleet and the most recent acts
difficult to sustain attention on Ukrainian messages.
of sabotage of sea cables might inspire new terrorist
Nonetheless, Ukraine’s PSYOPs have been widely
tactics. Houthi rebels have proven capability of hijacking
regarded as a critical element of its asymmetric strategy,
ships in the Red Sea.18 Ukraine has proven that a nation
complementing military operations and securing crucial
without a navy can pose a serious asymmetric threat
international support.
and Russia has revealed the vulnerability of undersea
cables. The Ukraine conflict continues to be marked by rapid
tactical and technological developments on both sides
Printing War Tools
These same tactics can also be used to by violent
Ukraine is the new laboratory for 3D printing aided non-state actors to pursue asymmetrical warfare. What
by multiple states, companies and organizations. potential lessons can terrorists learn from this conflict
Tech Against Tanks connects 3D printing support and how can we prepare to counter them?
efforts, producing items such as window barricades,
Lesson One: Software is Transforming Modern
tourniquets, and diversionary mines. Ukraine receives
Warfare.
essential lifesaving gadgets at cost from WildBees
Poland, which is part of a global network of 20 countries Today’s modern soldier is deeply embedded in a
with “BeeHives” that produce items using 3D printers. web of software that supports logistics, intelligence,
The US donated Warp SPEE3D metal 3D printers that communications, and weapon guidance. Starlink
allow engineers to quickly manufacture metal parts ensures Ukraine maintains internet connectivity, allowing
needed for repairing damaged machines in real-time in troops to remotely control drones and stream encrypted
combat zones. video for intelligence purposes. The Ukrainian military’s
Delta System consolidates data from various sources,
Since Ukraine is greatly underequipped compared to
such as drones, satellite imagery, and intelligence from
Russian military forces and armor, 3D printing is an
partner countries to enhance situational awareness and
important strategic enabler allowing Ukraine to print
battlefield management. Additionally, Estonian company
crucial munitions including artillery shells. Grenades,
SensusQ has created an AI-powered "Crystal Ball"
once obsolete, are now being dropped directly onto
system that can predict potential attacks ahead of time.
targets, equipped with 3D-printed stabilizing fins for
accuracy.

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Cyberwarfare allows combatants to hack into enemy in the potential for these less expensive systems to be
networks to disable critical infrastructure, disrupt designed and developed by terrorists globally with little
communication, and gather intelligence. These can effort.
paralyze military operations without a single shot being
Lesson Four: PSYOPs and Cognitive Warfare are a
fired.
Powerful Weapon
Terrorists can exploit software in various ways, including
The war has featured significant cyberattacks and
reverse-engineering open-source military programs
information campaigns. Some of the lessons that
to study tactics and defenses. Additionally, leaked
were learned is that social media and disinformation
battlefield applications, drone control software, and AI
campaigns can shape public opinion and destabilize
targeting systems can be repurposed.
societies not only among the war combatants but across
Lesson Two: Drones and UAWs are Reinventing the globe.
Military Opus Operandi
Deepfakes and propaganda can influence public
Drones have significantly impacted how wars will be perception and sow discord. PSYOPs can also be used
fought in the future. We are already witnessing the to mislead the timing and location of offensives and
emergence of advanced "deep-strike" drones, such thus lead to significant operational successes. PSYOPs
as Iranian Shahed drones used by Russia and long- can be widely used as a critical element of asymmetric
range drones developed by Ukrainian startups. In large strategy.
numbers, these drones can surpass even sophisticated
Lesson Five: Non-State Actors Worldwide are Sharing
air defenses. Unlike traditional large standing armies,
Expertise
reserve drones require minimal space, no sustenance,
and no salaries. Drones are also becoming easy to Drones are increasingly used by non-state actors around
acquire and if needed, upgraded, repurposed and if the world, with videos of drone attacks and group chats
broken, rebuilt. facilitating knowledge sharing. According to the Centre
for Information Resilience, fighters in Myanmar have
Drones are not a new phenomenon for terrorists; a
documented 1,400 online videos of drone flights from
variety of non-state actors, including the Taliban, Boko
October 2021 to June 2023. Drone operators are turning
Haram, Houthi rebels, and ISIL have utilized drones in
to chat apps like Discord and Telegram to access 3D
combat. Drone innovations by the Houthis have shown
printing blueprints for fixed-wing drones, get information
that drone attacks can be highly precise and effective at
on tactics and tips on pilot training and learn how
long distances. A Houthi drone was able to fly for some
to bypass default software on commercial drones to
16 hours from Yemen over a distance of more than 2,600
conceal their locations.19
kilometers to strike Tel Aviv in July 2024.
What is new in this war is that drones are being deployed Lesson Six: David and Goliath- New Asymmetry in
with AI capabilities; innovation has transformed even Wars
cheap drones into effective guided missiles, both Wars are no longer solely determined by the number
human-operated and AI-guided. of jets, ships, or tanks a country can deploy. Instead,
AI will further enhance the effectiveness of drones and the focus will shift to those who are equipped to defend
autonomous weapons for Intelligence, Surveillance and against the new and less expensive surge of new dual-
Reconnaissance, targeting, and kamikaze missions. AI use weapons ranging from smartphones to drones.
has been instrumental in analyzing satellite imagery, Terrorists will never achieve the air superiority of a state,
identifying troop movements, and predicting enemy given that most nations possess advanced defense
actions. systems like Patriot anti-air and anti-missile systems,
In the future, low-cost drones will be even more effective and MIG aircraft. However, terrorists can still access
in swarms designed to overwhelm enemy defences. MANPADS and drones, as seen in the past. The war in
Ukraine has demonstrated the significant advantages
Lesson Three: ‘Do-it-Yourself’ Weapons these drones offer for ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance).
The war has introduced the concept of ‘do-it-yourself’
weapons. The widespread availability of easily designed Especially cheap drones have shifted the dynamics for
software, off-the-shelf devices and 3D printing has terrorists. The conflict has highlighted the importance
accelerated the ability for innovative minds to build of open-source technology, unmanned systems, and
their own weapons. 3D printing means non-state actors AI. The spread of these technologies among non-
can print whatever they need, wherever they need it. state actors introduces a new asymmetry in warfare.
The widespread availability of off-the-shelf devices, This pattern has been evident in past conflicts in Iraq,
user-friendly software, specialized AI microchips, and Afghanistan, and Syria, where IEDs emerged as a
powerful automation algorithms are now within reach of highly lethal, low-cost threat to military personnel.
anyone with a few thousand dollars and some technical This new AI, 3D, drone and robotic war is heralding in
skills. greater asymmetry in war. Success will now depend on
“innovation power,” the capacity to invent, adapt, and
People around the world now have access to the tools
deploy new technologies more swiftly than adversaries.
necessary to create lethal robots. Although these
systems may not match the sophistication of military- Lesson Seven: Companies are Expanding AI
grade technologies from major powers the concern lies
Technology is transforming the nature of warfare. The

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shift toward increasingly autonomous weapons systems Lesson Nine: The Importance of Regulation of Lethal
has been developing over decades. Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)
The growing demand for combat tools that integrate Drone swarms are the perfect weapon for asymmetrical
human and machine intelligence has led to substantial wars and Generative AI will have an enormous impact
investments in companies and government agencies on global security generating new weapons and modus
that promise to enhance the efficiency, cost- operandi to malicious actors worldwide. The heightened
effectiveness, and speed of warfare. This demand for focus on LAWS and AI over the past year has given
advanced AI and autonomy has been a boon for tech regulation advocates some optimism that political
and defense companies, resulting in large contracts pressure for international treaties might increase.
for developing a range of weaponry, including lethal Despite differing global visions on governance, both
autonomous drones, unmanned fighter jets, and the U.S. and China share a concern about preventing
underwater vehicles. These companies will have a terrorists from acquiring autonomous weapons.
difficult time to keep the technologies under wraps. As
Lesson Ten: The World is Becoming Increasingly
DeepSeek has recently revealed, AI companies are
Transparent.
openly sharing their expertise to the global community
allowing anyone to further develop their technologies. The world is becoming more transparent due to
AI has further democratized access to dual-use advancements in technology. Satellite imagery is able
technological innovations. to document mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing.
Nanosatellites track vessels engaged in illegal fishing
Lesson Eight The Oppenheimer Moment: The AI
through their identification systems. Amateur sleuths can
Military Race
assist Europol in investigating child sexual exploitation.
The rise of AI-enabled warfare and autonomous As the world becomes more transparent, terrorists and
weapons systems is being likened to the "Oppenheimer insurgents will have fewer places to hide both in the real
moment," drawing parallels to the creation of the atomic and virtual worlds.
bomb. This comparison represents a pivotal point that
Conclusion
could either mark the beginning of a new era of great
power dominance or serve as a warning of potential Marc Andreessen's famous declaration that "software
catastrophic consequences. As investment in AI rapidly is eating the world" has never been more relevant,
increases, experts caution that these technologies could especially in the context of modern warfare. 20 Software
profoundly change society's relationship with war and is increasingly central to shaping military strategies
technology, potentially leading to greater reliance on and determining the outcomes of conflicts. As defense
machines for critical decision-making. The prospect systems are challenged and data is becoming the
of autonomous weapons raises fears of a dystopian new oil, the power of intelligence and information,
future reminiscent of apocalyptic fiction. The substantial traditionally controlled by global superpowers and large
investments being made in autonomous weapons and corporations, may eventually be harnessed by weaker,
AI targeting systems are increasing global threats. At less-resourced groups like insurgents and terrorists.
the same time, AI may be the saving grace of humanity, While the titans still hold the keys to the castle, terrorists
making people smarter and more resilient. are constantly finding new ways to breach the moat.

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Youth Radicalization: A
New Frontier in Terrorism
and Security
Cecilia Polizzi, Founding President/CEO, Next Wave,
The International Center for Children and Global Security

In September 2021, Cressida Dick, the then-Metropolitan societies. The extremist environment has fragmented
Police Commissioner, issued a cautionary statement: a into an increasingly complex and ideologically diverse
new wave of extremists was emerging among children network of interplaying groups, movements, subcultures,
in the United Kingdom.1 This remark was prompted by and hate-fueled belief systems. At the same time,
data from the Home Office indicating a significant rise new, more radical groups are emerging from internal
in the number of underage arrests for terror-related divisions within extremist factions, with the hierarchical
offenses, marking the highest figures on record.2 By structures of conventional movements no longer being
2023, this trend reached a new apex with forty-two followed. While both, the extreme far-right and Salafi-
arrests for offenses ranging from the dissemination jihadism continue to pose significant challenges,
of terrorist propaganda to the encouragement and extremist and conspiratorial narratives morph and
planning of violent attacks. With a year-on-year metastasize, affecting broad segments of the youth
increase, one in every five terrorist suspects in Britain population.9 Ideological fluidity blurs the boundaries
is now legally classified as a child.3 The surge in youth between belief systems, posing significant challenges
radicalization is not confined to the United Kingdom; it is to the effectiveness of prevention and intervention
gaining global attention and increasingly being framed strategies. Youth radicalization, shaped by this dynamic
as an epidemic in major headlines, with nearly two- environment, is inherently cross-ideological, manifesting
thirds of ISIS-linked arrests in Europe in 2024 involving as a consistent pattern across diverse, hybrid
teenagers.4 In Austria, authorities uncovered a foiled worldviews. Actors not only blend ideologically but also
terrorist attack intended to kill ´tens of thousands´ at a cross-pollinate in terms of tactics, reflecting the current
concert venue in Vienna and arrested three suspects, manifestations of the youth threat ecosystem and further
aged 17 to 19.5 On the margins of the Olympics, French complicating efforts to detect and monitor it. In addition,
prosecutors charged an 18-year-old with 'terrorist the shift of extremist movements from hierarchical
criminal association' and uncovered several separate structures to a leaderless resistance model implied
plots for conspiring terrorist attacks with explosive belts. that the incitement of violent acts no longer required
The minors allegedly aspired to become ISIS martyrs.6 formal command, training, or operational support.10
Australian counter-terrorism operations exposed a By decentralizing control, extremists turned ordinary
network of youth who shared a 'religiously motivated individuals into autonomous agents of violence, driven
violent extremist ideology' and were planning an attack. by ideology rather than direct orders. Narratives that
Investigators alleged that the teenagers were connected promote violent action as a universal duty and lionize
to the same movement as a 16-year-old boy who had mass casualty find resonance with young, aspiring
previously been charged with a terror offense related to militants within online forums, leading to a rise in self-
the stabbing of Assyrian Bishop Mar Mari Emmanuel.7 radicalization and lone-wolf terrorism among young
In response to these incidents, Australia elevated its people.11
terror threat level from 'possible' to 'probable,' citing
The increasingly central role of digital communications
a heightened vulnerability in its security environment
in extremist strategies, with actors using a broad range
due to emerging threats. These incidents highlight
of mainstream and fringe digital platforms to organize,
a disquieting truth: the face of extremism is growing
communicate, and plan has further exacerbated this
younger, more unpredictable, and harder to contain.
issue. Technological innovation has in fact not only
The involvement of young people with extremism is supported the decentralization of terror groups but
embedded in a dynamic, evolving and diversifying allowed them also to operate in complete anonymity
threat landscape. One key characteristic of youth and in a truly transational way across a plethora of
radicalization is that extremism threats are becoming mainstream social media platforms, fringe forums,
more ideologically multifaceted and increasingly difficult gaming environments, encrypted messaging apps
to categorize along well-established ideological lines. and the dark web.12 Children and young people are
A mix of political grievances, conspiracy theories, immersed in online cultures and comprise a large
and overlapping ideologies has given rise to bespoke portion of internet and social media users. In fact, 80%
belief systems used to justify violence.8 Organizations of the world's children and youth13 may be exposed daily
like the Islamic State and al-Qaeda, once defining to violent propaganda campaigns and the risk of online
actors in the ecosystem of global extremism, no longer radicalization by extremist actors across the spectrum.
represent the predominant threats facing Western This does not necessarily imply that the entirety of these

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 Expert Contributions

demographics will ultimately fall into hardcore extremist investment – a sort of insurance policy23 that allows to
forums, radicalize, join an extremist organization, or endure territorial losses, outlast counter-terror efforts,
perpetrate acts of violence. However, the widespread and perpetuate extremism across generations.
availability of extremist content online, social media
The risks posed by radicalized youth extend far beyond
algorithms, and the use of persuasive tactics by these
immediate acts of violence. Their engagement with
so-called ´bad actors´ have fundamentally altered
violent extremism exacerbates polarization, undermines
the modus operandi of violent extremism and youth
social cohesion, perpetuates cycles of violence and
radicalization processes.14 Unlike in the past, when
complicates efforts to counter-terrorism and extremism.
recruitment or mobilization was largely dependent on
Threats involving minors are harder to detect, monitor,
physical proximity or community networks, radicalization
and disrupt than those posed by adults or individuals
nowadays takes place in an unrestricted digital
with a known history of violent extremism. Adolescents
environment. Extremists exploit the virtual domain to
often lack a criminal record or prior engagement
project narratives that resonate with youth, including
with authorities and are generally afforded greater
themes of heroism, belonging, justice, and equality,
privacy protections under the law. In many countries,
while also glamorizing violence through the so-called
stricter rules govern the collection of data on minors,
'jihadi cool,' which portrays extremist lifestyles as alluring
including online activity, communications, and personal
and desirable.15 Technology has not only amplified the
information, which hinders authorities' awareness of
reach of extremist messaging but has also innovated
potential risks. Additionally, early signs of radicalization,
the methods by which radicalization occurs. Algorithms
such as increased isolation, secrecy, or rebelliousness,
designed to maximize user engagement inadvertently
can overlap with typical behavioral changes associated
fuel radicalization by creating echo chambers and
with the youth developmental stage of identity formation.
reinforcing ideological content. Social media platforms,
Adolescence is a period of self-discovery, often marked
in particular, use recommendation engines that funnel
by a search for independence, which may involve
users toward increasingly extreme material, embedding
challenging authority, questioning societal norms, or
radical perspectives as part of the digital norm over
withdrawing from social interactions. These behaviors
time.16 Violent ideologies and behaviors become
and attitudes can be misinterpreted as part of normal
normalized, influencing young people's interactions
development, making it difficult to distinguish between
online and shaping their offline actions, often fostering
typical adolescent behavior and potential signs of
an interest in targeted violence. Encrypted messaging
radicalization. The online ecosystem further complicates
applications have given extremists secure channels for
effective prevention and risk mitigation. It not only
organizing and communicating. Platforms like Telegram
serves as an echo chamber for extremist views and
and [Link] provide private, invitation-only spaces
fosters self-reinforcing bubbles but also accelerates
where recruiters can groom potential adherents without
the radicalization process. Data shows that in 2002, the
fear of surveillance.17 At the same time, the dark web
average radicalization period was sixteen months, but it
provides a hub for illicit activities and ideological
shortened by over 40% by 2015,24 due to the increased
exchanges, further amplifying ideological exposure and
accessibility and reach of violent extremist digital
radicalization risks.
content. Today, it may take place in just a few weeks.25
The increasing involvement of minors in homegrown
A scenario that began as a strategic response by
terrorism, sheds light on the evolving nature of
terrorist groups under duress has evolved into a
extremism and the heightened risks posed by younger
rapidly evolving core component of terrorist tactics and
demographics. Radicalized youth can pose the same
strategy, posing a real and present danger to young
credible threats as adults18 - able to produce and
people and global security. The key trends defining the
disseminate violent content, organize and lead networks,
current youth threat ecosystem, such as ideological
recruit and radicalize others, carry out attacks - and, in
fragmentation and the exploitation of digital technology
some cases, may even do so more efficiently. But why?
for terrorism purposes, are set to drive significant shifts
The traits that make children and adolescents appealing in the dynamics of youth radicalization. While traditional
to extremist groups such as their vulnerability to extremist ideologies like white supremacy and Salafi-
influence, versatility, presumed inherent non-violence, jihadism maintain their appeal, a much broader set
and ability to operate with a lower the level of scrutiny of extremist and extremist-adjacent movements is
19
- are the same qualities that make them more effective emerging to compete for young followers.26 Extremist
as executing operatives in carrying out terrorism- groups will continue to leverage technology to expand
related activities. Therefore, children and young people their influence and operational capabilities. Artificial
become, paradoxically, both the target and an asset intelligence, virtual reality, and the metaverse will create
driving the operational efficacy of extremist groups new, expansive digital spaces to spread narratives,
and their ability to inflict damage. The influence of recruit and radicalize. As extremists magnify their reach
children and young people within extremist contexts to young people across an ever-growing array of online
is therefore substantial. However, the scenario is even platforms, the concept of an identifiable epicenter of
more concerning. Extremists recognize a value in these radical activity will become progressively obsolete.
demographic cohorts that goes beyond short-term
Future scenarios may also evolve in fragile and conflict-
tactical and strategic value.20,21,22 Terror and extremist
affected states, where conditions such as instability,
movements therefore intentionally develop radicalization
insecurity, protracted violence, and the erosion of
frameworks systematically targeting children and youth
governmental institutions create fertile ground for youth
as a core element of a transgenerational strategy. These
recruitment and radicalization. In these environments,
actors understand youth radicalization as a long-term

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 87

Expert Contributions

the sustained presence and systematic focus of

groups such as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and their affiliates on
indoctrinating the next generation is likely to produce
newer threats. Shaped by years of psychological
manipulation and in the absence of proactive and
effective counteractions, the future cohort of fighters will
likely exhibit aggression, violence, and remorselessness
on a scale beyond what has been so far encountered.27
Ultimately, appealing to young people is arguably
among an extremist group’s most important priorities –
as evidenced by the long-term strategic planning and
systematicity, and the tactical and strategic advantages
of exploiting youth are simply too significant to be
abandoned. Observation on the issue has begun,
which is a positive development, but counter-extremism
strategies have not evolved at the same pace as the
challenge. The next wave of terrorism is already taking
shape, and the recruitment and radicalization of youth
needs to be recognized as key dimension of extremism
and treated as an integral part of international security
policy moving forward to end the terrorist cycle.

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EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS

From Vulnerability to Strength:

The Growing Role of Strategic
Communication in Preventing
Terrorism and Violent
Extremism
Jodie Wrigley, P/CVE Strategic Communication Specialist Advisor

Terrorism remains an ongoing global threat—one that Conversely, strategic communication is also central
is constantly evolving and adapting to suit its purpose to terrorism. In fact, without communication, terrorism
in the current context. Ideological motivations are as we know it would not exist. It has been described
expanding and, in many cases, becoming increasingly as a form of violent communication designed to instil
blurred. Advances in technology and the interconnected fear, create uncertainty and erode trust.2 Historically,
nature of the digital world provide new and easier ways by publicising attacks through traditional media,
for malign actors to reach their intended audiences. terrorists have sought to capture public and government
attention, amplifying their message. The broader and
Compounding this, the conditions conducive to
more sustained the media coverage, the more effective
terrorism and violent extremism are also increasing. The
the act becomes. The greater the fear it generates, the
COVID-19 pandemic led to a sharp decline in trust in
more influence it has over its intended audiences.
governments and institutions. Economic pressures are
bringing underlying grievances to the surface. Climate Strategic communication in relation to terrorism and
events—both sudden and long-term—are displacing violent extremism is no longer just about publicity. It is
populations and disrupting lives and livelihoods. now a tool for recruitment, radicalisation and the erosion
of institutional trust. Extremists use it to build credibility
Strategic communication has long been a powerful tool
and legitimacy, seed chaos and divide societies to
to help prevent and counter the violent extremism and
further their own objectives.
terrorism threat. Targeted prevention efforts, including
counter-narratives, diversion, and disengagement The internet and social media have exponentially
strategies, remain critical in addressing this evolving increased opportunities for messages to be heard.
challenge. However, in an increasingly connected No longer having to solely rely on newspapers and
world—where misinformation and disinformation are on broadcast media, nor the third-party interpretation of
the rise and societal grievances deepen—the need for a journalists, terrorist and violent extremists now directly
whole-of-society approach to prevention has never been target and reach their audiences with the messages
more urgent. they want, at any time, in any part of the world. The
advent of generative AI means content can be created,
Why Strategic Communication translated, tailored and adapted more rapidly than ever
before. This includes, among other things, designing
In 2019, They are us was voted New Zealand’s convincing disinformation to trick audiences, creating
Massey University Quote of the Year.1 Why? As part of chatbots to radicalise and recruit or to rapidly subvert
former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s content moderation.3
press conference and following speeches in the
aftermath of the Christchurch attack, three simple Not only are the tools changing but so are both
words captured the feelings of a nation on one of its the communication environment and audiences.
‘darkest days’. Simply conveyed, and repeated often, Communities are being challenged by compounding
it perfectly matched the public sentiment at the time shocks and stresses such as the rising cost of living,
and gave people something to unite around at a time sustained global conflicts and increasing frequency
of unprecedented horror. It sparked a social movement and intensity of climate events. This makes it harder for
both in New Zealand and across the world. One of governments and institutions to reach them, build trust,
solidarity, unity and a rejection of violent extremism in and support the resilience, cohesion and togetherness
all its forms. Her communication throughout this time required to help protect communities and prevent the
didn’t just inform people with the facts alone, it helped appeal of violent extremist narratives.
promote togetherness and belonging, strengthening As such, terrorists and violent extremists continue
connections and cohesion. to rapidly evolve their communication approach to
As this demonstrates, when done well, strategic leverage these emerging technologies and changing
communication ensures that information is delivered environments.
in a way that fosters trust, engagement, and has a
meaningful impact among diverse audiences.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 89

Expert Contributions

While communication responses must continue to focus someone who joined Boko Haram as a result.7
on tactics like diversion initiatives and counter narratives,
In Somalia, consecutive droughts and floods have
the broadening of grievances and vulnerabilities
displaced millions and left many struggling for food.
means there needs to be a greater focus on rebuilding
Displaced individuals, lacking security and support, are
protective elements such as resilience, cohesion and
more vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Groups like
togetherness across the whole of society. The role that
al-Shabaab have capitalised on this, running food aid
strategic communication can play in this is becoming
publicity campaigns to gain legitimacy and trust. Their
more crucial.
aid distributions are made to look like humanitarian
efforts by mimicking elements like the packaging or
Why is a Whole of Society Approach Needed – labelling. The aid is then promoted not only to the
A Focus on Climate Events community receiving it but through media outlets with
Climate-related disasters and extreme events are the aim to expose real or perceived gaps in government
increasing in frequency and intensity due to rising responses and further enhance their influence.
global temperatures.4 They negatively impact health, In 2018, al-Shabaab expanded their legitimacy and
livelihoods, and social cohesion. Floods, heatwaves, ‘reputation-building’ efforts by supporting the global
droughts, storms and wildfires disrupt access to food movement to ban single-use plastic bags, framing them
and water, affecting mental well-being, and weakening as a “serious threat to humans and animals.” This stance
community resilience. These challenges are not limited seemingly aligned them with efforts by corporations
to developing regions but also include high-GDP championing environmental issues through corporate
economies which also face significant risks.5 social responsibility programs. Al-Shabaab capitalised
Like COVID-19, extreme climate events have global on local environmental concerns of farmers and herders
implications, exacerbated by mis- and disinformation, while publicising its move more widely to enhance and
which undermine trust in authorities and hinder effective legitimatise its image.8
responses. A study of 167 countries (1970–2007)6 found Similarly, violent extremist groups use strategic
that a rise in disaster-related deaths correlates with communication to exploit resource shortages and
increased terrorist attacks and casualties. While the link gain influence. In Iraq, water scarcity, worsened by
between climate events and violent extremism is still decreasing rainfall, upstream damming and inadequate
being explored, these crises deepen existing conflicts, irrigation, has become a tool for coercion. Extremists
fuel anti-democracy sentiment and erode institutional have historically controlled dams, using threats
trust. Though disasters may initially unite communities, of scarcity, flooding and poisoning to manipulate
prolonged hardship often leads to disillusionment, communities. They also offer aid through food, water and
compounding vulnerabilities and impeding recovery. financial support, in exchange for loyalty.
Extreme climate events often spark an airing of Increasingly, groups like Daesh, craft tailored climate-
grievances in traditional and online public spheres, and related narratives to recruit and radicalise, blaming
it is at this point that trust in governments and institutions government neglect and promising empowerment.
can be gained or lost. Responses, or the lack thereof, They leverage various community grievances such as
can fuel anti-government sentiment. Hostile actors are inflaming tribal tensions by spreading misinformation
quick to exploit this, not just during crises but pre- about stolen water supplies or using religious rhetoric
emptively in order to sow distrust and polarisation. to link climate disasters to divine punishment. These
As extreme climate events become more frequent, narratives, once shared face-to-face, are amplified via
understanding how violent extremists leverage these Facebook and TikTok, making water scarcity a potent
crises is crucial. driver of division and recruitment.9

While climate events may not directly drive violent These examples present communication challenges at a
extremism, they act as risk multipliers by exacerbating micro, local and national level.
resource competition, livelihood insecurity and
displacement. These factors increase vulnerability, Exploiting Short-Term Climate Disasters
erode trust in governments and strengthen the
While short-term disasters often spark a momentary
environment for extremist recruitment efforts.
peak in togetherness, once the public safety threat
is over, communities experience a period of shock,
Climate Events as Recruitment, Legitimacy and disbelief and disillusionment. Multiple or subsequent
Control Tools events that impede the reconstruction trajectory, risk
compounding this community impact.
Countries most affected by long term severe climate
events often face high risks of violent extremism, There is growing evidence showing that conspiracy
particularly in Africa and the Middle East. Climate- theories are being used to rapidly spread misinformation
induced resource scarcity worsens survival challenges. and fuel grievances during the ‘disillusionment period’
This was seen in the Lake Chad region, where drought when communities are at their most vulnerable.
has reduced crop yields and fish stocks, forcing many
into economic desperation. Boko Haram exploited this Conspiracy theories often frame a world controlled
hardship, recruiting young men by promising security by shadowy elites, corrupt governments or external
and prosperity. A 2021 survey found that 41% of those threats. This "us vs. them" mentality can push individuals
experiencing climate-related livelihood struggles knew toward radical ideologies, particularly when they feel

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 Expert Contributions

disenfranchised or powerless. Many terrorist movements In these situations, the communication challenge is
use conspiracy theories to justify violence. two-fold. The immediate impacts on public safety and
diversion of resources presents a significant challenge
Conspiracy theories, such as QAnon, The Great
for disaster and emergency response communication.
Replacement and The Great Reset, have shown the
In addition, the longer-term impacts of the ongoing
ability to radicalise individuals, undermine trust or justify
legitimisation of these conspiracy theories and erosion of
violence.10
trust should be a focus for violent extremism prevention
As an example, Great Replacement Theory, which efforts.
falsely claims that elites are orchestrating demographic
changes to replace white populations, inspired the mass An Opportunity for Whole of Society Strategic
shootings in Christchurch, El Paso, and Buffalo. QAnon, Communication
which falsely claims a secret global cabal of elites is
engaging in child trafficking and satanic rituals in efforts Whether it’s climate events, widespread economic
to control the work, is reported to have fuelled the hardship, COVID-19, or global conflicts, any situation
January 6 Capital Riot.11 that tests social cohesion makes communities more
vulnerable. This, combined with declining trust and
Events such as the 2023 heatwaves resulting in power the pervasive influence of social media, creates fertile
outages in Europe and the U.S., the wildfires in Maui and ground for those with violent, extreme views to recruit
more recently Los Angeles and the floods in Spain, all and radicalize others and spread fear and hate.
have become focal points for mis- and disinformation,
further eroding trust in governments, institutions and During these times it is critically important to rapidly
impeded emergency responses. strengthen protective factors such as connection,
cohesion, trust, and resilience at a whole-of-society
The 2023 Maui wildfires claimed over 100 lives and level. From governments to individuals, everyone has a
burned 2,500 acres. While historically rare in the region, role to play in making communities stronger and more
climate change is contributing to an increase in these cohesive. Building trust, fostering belonging, respecting
more extreme events. As the community grappled with differences and diverse perspectives, and reinforcing
loss and sought accountability, misinformation and our shared humanity are all essential protective
conspiracy theories flooded social media, prompting measures.
news outlets like Reuters and CNN to debunk false
claims. As demonstrated by Prime Minister Ardern’s approach,
strategic communication plays a vital role in this effort.
Four main conspiracy themes emerged, drawing from However, it cannot be activated only in times of crisis—it
existing theories such as QAnon, the New World Order, is far more difficult to implement when communities are
the Great Reset, and the Great Replacement. These already fractured or lack strong social fabric.
theories were often amplified by bots and linked to
extreme content on alternative platforms. Therefore, alongside traditional targeted initiatives such
as counter-narratives and diversion interventions, whole-
A news report on children being evacuated was twisted of-society strategic communication must be an everyday
into claims that they had vanished, fuelling baseless focus to make communities stronger and more resilient
theories of a cover-up for human trafficking. to these efforts.
A single home left standing in a burned-out
neighbourhood sparked theories that the fire was Three urgent priorities are clear: (1) creating a strong
deliberately caused by the government using energy alternative narrative centred on community and
weapons. Scientific reports linking the wildfire to climate common humanity, (2) preparing communities for and
change were dismissed as a hoax to push government protecting them from misinformation, disinformation,
control.12 and conspiracy theories, and (3) fostering strong
connections—between individuals, their families and
These conspiracy theories spread fear and division at friends, their broader communities, and all levels of
a time of crisis, undermining trust in emergency efforts. government.
It was reported that some residents ignored official
instructions, to stay in evacuation centres due to fears Through this we can help build the protective measures
around direct energy weapons. Some also refused to needed to prevent the impacts of violent extremism and
wait to return to their property because they believed the terrorism in our communities.
government would seize control of their houses. There
were also rumours of a military takeover.
Similar claims of direct energy weapons, DEWS, or
government controlling water supplies, resurfaced
again in the 2025 California wildfires hampering the
emergency response.13 Instead of managing the crisis,
authorities had to allocate time and resources towards
debunking false claims and conspiracy theories.14
Similar patterns of disinformation were seen following the
2024 floods in Valencia, a region of Spain, surrounding
weather control or the intentional removal of dams.15

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 91

Appendices

A
GTI Ranks & Scores, 2024
Change Change
GTI 2024 GTI Score in Score GTI 2024 GTI Score in Score
Country Country
Rank (out of 10) Rank (out of 10)
(2023–2024) (2023–2024)
1 Burkina Faso 8.581 0.001 36 Greece 2.928 -0.151

2 Pakistan 8.374 0.407 37 Oman 2.927 2.927

3 Syria 8.006 0.06 38 Jordan 2.913 2.458

4 Mali 7.907 -0.098 39 Czechia 2.906 -0.671

5 Niger 7.776 0.489 40 France 2.712 -0.258

6 Nigeria 7.658 0.071 41 United Kingdom 2.639 0.217

7 Somalia 7.614 -0.21 42 Algeria 2.415 0.218

8 Israel 7.463 -0.656 43 Tunisia 2.184 -0.73

9 Afghanistan 7.262 -0.572 44 Peru 2.062 -0.68

10 Cameroon 6.944 -0.07 45 Ukraine 2.003 0.317

11 Myanmar 6.929 -0.614 46 Australia 1.973 0.498

Democratic Republic of 47 Poland 1.962 1.539

12 6.768 0.243
the Congo
48 Canada 1.87 -0.053
13 Iraq 6.582 -0.539
49 China 1.863 1.281
14 India 6.41 0.059
50 Sweden 1.842 1.107
15 Colombia 6.381 0.147
51 Angola 1.657 -0.597
16 Russia 6.267 3.199
52 Malaysia 1.626 1.434
17 Mozambique 6.251 -0.074
53 Libya 1.612 -0.857
18 Iran 6.056 1.325
54 Senegal 1.578 -0.588
19 Kenya 5.366 -0.299
55 Tanzania 1.573 -0.694
20 Philippines 5.166 -0.3
56 Ecuador 1.55 1.383
21 Chile 5.162 -0.542
57 Djibouti 1.461 -0.574
22 Yemen 5.08 0.125
58 Côte d'Ivoire 1.454 -0.606
23 Chad 5.032 0.045
59 Brazil 1.43 -0.558
24 Togo 5.004 0.334
60 Netherlands 1.402 0.825
25 Palestine 4.93 -0.057
61 Belgium 1.347 -0.557
26 Benin 4.802 -0.096
62 Switzerland 1.265 0.638
27 Germany 4.748 1.933
63 Spain 1.256 -0.553
28 Thailand 4.63 0.372
64 Lebanon 1.237 -0.325
29 Egypt 4.416 -0.805
65 Bosnia and Herzegovina 1.218 1.218
30 Indonesia 4.17 -0.118
66 Norway 1.198 -0.549
31 Burundi 4.043 0.111
67 United Arab Emirates 1.178 0.945
32 Turkiye 3.968 -0.2
68 Nepal 1.113 -1.05
33 Uganda 3.702 -0.692
69 Slovakia 1.023 -0.069
United States of
34 3.517 -0.633 70 Tajikistan 0.999 0.128
America

35 Bangladesh 3.03 -0.381 71 Central African Republic 0.957 -0.488

92 |­ GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Appendices

Change Change
GTI 2024 GTI Score in Score GTI 2024 GTI Score in Score
Country Country
Rank (out of 10) Rank (out of 10)
(2023–2024) (2023–2024)
72 Finland 0.949 0.949 100 Croatia 0 0

72 Japan 0.949 -0.24 100 Haiti 0 0

74 Italy 0.929 -0.518 100 Hungary 0 0

75 Saudi Arabia 0.845 -0.521 100 Jamaica 0 0

76 Argentina 0.801 -0.473 100 Kazakhstan 0 0

77 Ethiopia 0.787 -0.485 100 Kyrgyz Republic 0 0

78 Kosovo 0.782 -0.436 100 Kuwait 0 0

79 Armenia 0.72 0 100 Laos 0 0

79 Denmark 0.72 0.72 100 Liberia 0 0

81 Venezuela 0.71 -0.464 100 Sri Lanka 0 -3.072

82 Austria 0.582 -0.371 100 Lesotho 0 0

82 South Korea 0.582 0.582 100 Morocco 0 0

82 Mexico 0.582 -0.458 100 Moldova 0 0

82 Serbia 0.582 0.582 100 Madagascar 0 0

86 Cambodia 0.423 0.423 100 North Macedonia 0 0

86 Lithuania 0.423 0.336 100 Montenegro 0 0

86 Latvia 0.423 0.423 100 Mongolia 0 0

89 Cyprus 0.347 -0.269 100 Mauritania 0 0

90 Azerbaijan 0.233 -0.19 100 Mauritius 0 0

90 Belarus 0.233 -0.19 100 Malawi 0 0

90 Ireland 0.233 -0.21 100 Namibia 0 0

90 Uzbekistan 0.233 -0.19 100 Nicaragua 0 0

94 New Zealand 0.217 -1.73 100 Panama 0 0

95 Iceland 0.123 -0.11 100 Papua New Guinea 0 0

96 Eswatini 0.087 -0.093 100 North Korea 0 0

97 Paraguay 0.073 -0.168 100 Portugal 0 0

98 Bahrain 0.059 -0.064 100 Qatar 0 0

98 Uruguay 0.059 -0.055 100 Romania 0 0

100 Albania 0 0 100 Rwanda 0 -0.114

100 Bulgaria 0 0 100 Sudan 0 0

100 Bolivia 0 0 100 Singapore 0 0

100 Bhutan 0 0 100 Sierra Leone 0 0

100 Botswana 0 0 100 El Salvador 0 0

100 Republic of the Congo 0 0 100 South Sudan 0 0

100 Costa Rica 0 0 100 Slovenia 0 0

100 Cuba 0 0 100 Turkmenistan 0 0

100 Dominican Republic 0 0 100 Timor-Leste 0 0

100 Eritrea 0 0 100 Trinidad and Tobago 0 0

100 Estonia 0 0 100 Taiwan 0 0

100 Gabon 0 0 100 Vietnam 0 0

100 Georgia 0 0 100 South Africa 0 0

100 Ghana 0 0 100 Zambia 0 0

100 Guinea 0 0 100 Zimbabwe 0 0

100 The Gambia 0 0

100 Guinea-Bissau 0 0

100 Equatorial Guinea 0 0

100 Guatemala 0 0

100 Guyana 0 0

100 Honduras 0 0

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 93

Appendices

B
50 Worst Terrorist
Attacks in 2024
Rank Country Date State/Province Organisation Fatalities Attack type

1 Niger 21/7/2024 Tahoua Jihadist (undetermined) 237 Armed attack

2 Burkina Faso 24/8/2024 Centre-Nord JNIM 200 Armed attack

3 Burkina Faso 11/6/2024 Sahel JNIM 170 Armed attack

Islamic State - Khorasan

4 Russia 22/3/2024 Moscow City 144 Armed attack
Province

5 Niger 10/12/2024 Tillabéri Jihadist (undetermined) 138 Armed attack

6 Burkina Faso 16/3/2024 Est Jihadist (undetermined) 100 Armed attack

7 Nigeria 1/9/2024 Yobe Boko Haram 100 Armed attack

Islamic State - Khorasan

8 Iran 3/1/2024 Kerman 95 Bombing
Province
Islamic State West Africa
9 Nigeria 24/4/2024 Borno 85 Armed attack
(ISWA)

10 Burkina Faso 22/5/2024 Nord JNIM 70 Armed attack

11 Burkina Faso 30/6/2024 Est Jihadist (undetermined) 70 Armed attack

12 Mali 17/9/2024 Bamako JNIM 60 Armed attack

13 Syria 10/12/2024 Hims Islamic State (IS) 54 Undetermined

14 Burkina Faso 7/2/2024 Est Jihadist (undetermined) 50 Armed attack

15 Niger 25/6/2024 Tillabéri JNIM 47 Armed attack

16 Burkina Faso 29/5/2024 Centre-Est JNIM 46 Armed attack

17 Burkina Faso 23/4/2024 Centre-Est JNIM 45 Armed attack

18 Burkina Faso 26/6/2024 Boucle du Mouhoun JNIM 45 Armed attack

Democratic Republic
19 12/6/2024 Nord-Kivu Islamic State (IS) 42 Armed attack
of the Congo
Democratic Republic
20 7/6/2024 Nord-Kivu Islamic State (IS) 41 Armed attack
of the Congo

21 Burkina Faso 24/2/2024 Sahel Jihadist (undetermined) 40 Armed attack

22 Chad 27/10/2024 Lac Boko Haram 40 Armed attack

23 Somalia 2/8/2024 Banaadir Al-Shabaab 37 Bombing

Islamic State West Africa

24 Nigeria 1/9/2024 Yobe 37 Armed attack
(ISWA)
Democratic Republic
25 23/7/2024 Nord-Kivu Islamic State (IS) 35 Armed attack
of the Congo

94 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Appendices

Rank Country Date State/Province Organisation Fatalities Attack type

26 Niger 20/7/2024 Tillabéri Islamic State (IS) 34 Armed attack

27 Mali 27/1/2024 Mopti Jihadist (undetermined) 30 Armed attack

28 Mali 28/2/2024 Koulikoro JNIM 30 Armed attack

29 Burkina Faso 23/4/2024 Nord JNIM 30 Armed attack

30 Nigeria 26/5/2024 Borno Jihadist (undetermined) 30 Armed attack

31 Burkina Faso 1/6/2024 Est JNIM 30 Armed attack

32 Burkina Faso 27/6/2024 Centre-Nord JNIM 30 Armed attack

33 Nigeria 29/6/2024 Borno Jihadist (undetermined) 30 Bombing

34 Burkina Faso 9/3/2024 Centre-Est JNIM 27 Armed attack

35 Cameroon 11/4/2024 Extreme-Nord Boko Haram 27 Armed attack

36 Burkina Faso 29/6/2024 Centre-Nord JNIM 27 Armed attack

37 Niger 15/9/2024 Tillabéri JNIM 27 Armed attack

38 Mali 21/7/2024 Mopti Jihadist (undetermined) 26 Armed attack

39 Burkina Faso 25/8/2024 Boucle du Mouhoun Jihadist (undetermined) 26 Armed attack

40 Mali 20/12/2024 Mopti JNIM 26 Armed attack

41 Niger 22/7/2024 Tillabéri Jihadist (undetermined) 25 Armed attack

Balochistan Liberation Army

42 Pakistan 9/11/2024 Balochistan 25 Bombing
(BLA)

43 Burkina Faso 29/6/2024 Centre-Est Jihadist (undetermined) 24 Armed attack

44 Niger 20/3/2024 Tillabéri Islamic State (IS) 23 Armed attack

Balochistan Liberation Army

45 Pakistan 26/8/2024 Balochistan 23 Armed attack
(BLA)

46 Niger 28/1/2024 Tillabéri Jihadist (undetermined) 22 Armed attack

47 Syria 18/4/2024 Hims Islamic State (IS) 22 Armed attack

48 Niger 20/5/2024 Tillabéri Islamic State (IS) 22 Armed attack

49 Russia 23/6/2024 Dagestan Jihadist (undetermined) 22 Armed attack

50 Russia 23/6/2024 Dagestan Jihadist (undetermined) 22 Armed attack

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 95

Methodology

C
GTI Methodology
The GTI ranks 163 countries based on four indicators weighted TABLE C.2
over five years. A country’s annual GTI score is based on a Hypothetical country terrorist attacks in a
unique scoring system to account for the relative impact of
incidents in the year. The four factors counted in each country’s given year
yearly score are: Number of incidents Calculated
Dimension Weight
for the given year raw score
• total number of terrorist incidents in a given year
Total number of
• total number of fatalities caused by terrorists in a given year 1 21 21
incidents
• total number of injuries caused by terrorists in a given year Total number of
3 36 108
fatalities
• total number of hostages caused by terrorists in a given year
Total number of
0.5 53 26.5
injuries
Each of the factors is weighted between zero and three, and
a five-year weighted average is applied in a bid to reflect Total number of
0.5 20 10
injuries
the latent psychological effect of terrorist acts over time.
The weightings shown in Table C.1 were determined by Total raw score 166.5
consultation with the GPI Expert Panel.
Given these indicator values, this hypothetical country for that
The greatest weighting is attributed to a fatality.
year would be assessed as having an impact of terrorism of

HYPOTHETICAL EXAMPLE OF A COUNTRY’S GTI (1×21) + (3×36) + (0.5×53) + (0.5×20) = 166.5.

SCORE
To assign a score to a country, each incident is rated
according to the four measures. The measures are then FIVE-YEAR WEIGHTED AVERAGE
multiplied by their weighting factor and aggregated. This is
done for all incidents and then all incidents for each country To account for the aftereffects of trauma that terrorist attacks
are aggregated to give the country score. To illustrate, Table have on a society, the GTI takes into consideration the events
C.2 depicts a hypothetical country’s record for a given year. of previous years as having a bearing on a country’s current
score. For instance, the scale of the 2011 terrorist attacks
TABLE C.1 in Norway continued to have a psychological impact on the
Indicator weights used in the Global Terrorism population for many years after the event. To account for the
lingering effects of terrorism, the prior four years are also
Index included in the scoring with a decreasing weight each year.
Dimension Weight
Table C.3 highlights the weights used for each year.

TABLE C.3
Total number of incidents 1
Time weighting of historical scores
Total number of fatalities 3
Year Weight % of Score
Total number of injuries 0.5
Current year 16 52
Total number of hostages 0.5
Previous year 8 26

Two years ago 4 13

Three years ago 2 6

Four years ago 1 3

96 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Methodology

LOGARITHMIC BANDING SCORES ON A SCALE OF 1-10 3. Subtract the Minimum from the Maximum GTI scores and
calculate 'r' by:
The impact of terrorism is not evenly distributed throughout the
world. There are a handful of countries with very high levels of 4. a. root = 2 X (Highest GTI Banded Score – Lowest GTI
terrorism compared to most countries which experience only Banded Score) = 2 X (10–0) =20
very small amounts of terrorism, if any. Hence, the GTI uses a
5. b. Range = 2 X (Highest Recorded GTI Raw Score –
base 10 logarithmic banding system between 0 and 10 at 0.5
Lowest Recorded GTI Raw Score)
intervals.
6. c. r = root range -1 for all values of root between 1 to 21
As shown in Table C.4,C.4 this mapping method yields a total
number of 21 bands. This maps all values to a band of size 0.5 This method produces the set of bands used in the GTI listed
within the scale of 0-10. To band these scores, the following in Table C.4.
method is used:
1. Define the Minimum GTI Score across all countries as
having a banded score of 0.
2. Define the Maximum GTI Score across all countries as
having a banded score 10.

TABLE C.4
Bands used in the GTI
Band number Bands Band cut off values Band number Bands Band cut off values

1 0 0 12 5.5 578.19

2 0.5 1.78 13 6 1030.79

3 1 3.18 14 6.5 1837.66

4 1.5 5.67 15 7 3276.14

5 2 10.1 16 7.5 5840.64

6 2.5 18.01 17 8 10412.57

7 3 32.11 18 8.5 18563.3

8 3.5 57.24 19 9 33094.25

9 4 102.04 20 9.5 58999.71

10 4.5 181.92 21 10 105183.4

11 5 324.32

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 97

Endnotes

ENDNOTES

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98 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Endnotes

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na Varghese. "How Wagner's Ruthless Image Crumbled in 2. Lister, Charles. “Opinion | With Al-Assad Gone, the Risk of an
Mali." The New York Times, November 1, 2024. [Link] ISIS Resurgence Grows.” The New York Times, December
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54. Chris Ewokor and Kathryn Armstrong. “Russian Troops 3. Defined as having more than 25 battle-deaths in a year -
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tes-pullout-from-niger. 6. The USPV is compiled by the Seshat Database. It should
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56. TerrorismTracker USPV encompasses a slightly broader range of ideologies
57. TerrorismTracker, Monguno, Shettima Lawan. “Mass Burial and attacks than used by IEP in the Global Terrorism Index.
for Victims of Mafa Massacre.” Radio Ndarason International, 7. Pascarelli, Paige. “Ideology à La Carte: Why Lone Actor
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al-for-victims-of-mafa-massacre/. 18, 2023. [Link]
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Mess,” February 27, 2024. [Link] ideologies.
world-africa-68402662. 8. TerrorismTracker

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 99

Endnotes

ENDNOTES

9. Mioli, Teresa. “Mexico and Venezuela Top Lists of Murders 7. Raineri, Luca, and Francesco Strazzari. “Drug Smuggling
and Detentions of Journalists in 2024.” LatAm Journalism and the Stability of Fragile States: The Diverging Tra-
Review by the Knight Center, December 18, 2024. https:// jectories of Mali and Niger.” Journal of Intervention and
[Link]/articles/mexico-and-venezue- Statebuilding 16, no. 2 (2022): 222–39. [Link]
la-top-list-of-violence-and-detentions-of-journalists-in-2024/. 80/17502977.2021.1896207.
10. Resendiz, Julian. “Mexican Cartel Violence Likely to Increase 8. Al Jazeera, “ISIL doubled territory it controls in Mali in less
in 2024, Experts Say.” BorderReport, February 7, 2024. than a year: UN”
[Link] 9. International Crisis Group, “The 17 September Jihadist
violence-likely-to-increase-in-2024-experts-say/. Attack in Bamako: Has Mali’s Security Strategy Failed?”
11. “El Salvador’s Homicide Rate Reaches Historic Low in September 24, 2024, [Link]
2024,” 1735850535. [Link] sahel/mali/attaque-jihadiste-du-17-septembre-bamako-lech-
el-salvador-s-homicide-rate-reaches-historic-low-in-2024/ ec-du-tout-securitaire-au-mali
ar-AA1wS9Jb?ocid=BingNewsSerp. 10. Giustozzi, Antonio, Joana de Deus Pereira, and David
12. Wiseman, Lewis. “The ‘anti-Islam’ Saudi Doctor Suspected Lewis. Did Wagner Succeed in the Eyes of its African and
of the Magdeburg Christmas Market Attack.” ABC News, Middle Eastern Clients? London: Royal United Services
December 22, 2024. [Link] Institute (RUSI), 2025. [Link]
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13. Rob Cameron and James Gregory. “Czech Mass Shoot- eyes-its-african-and-middle-eastern-clients.
ing: Gunman Confessed to Shooting Baby in Woods,” 11. Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 2024. Mali-Mètre 2024: What Do
December 28, 2023. [Link] Malians Think? Bamako, Mali: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
rope-67830858. 12. Faulkner, Christopher, Marcel Plichta, and Raphael Parens.
14. RFI. “France Foiled Three Terror Plots Targeting 2024 Paris "Africa Corps: Has Russia Hit a Ceiling in Africa?" CTC
Olympics.” September 11, 2024, sec. france. [Link] Sentinel 17, no. 11 (December 2024). [Link]
fr/en/france/20240911-france-foils-three-terror-plots-target- edu/africa-corps-has-russia-hit-a-ceiling-in-africa/.
ing-2024-paris-olympics.; Ortega, Maria, and Mark Whiley. 13. Hunter, Marcena, Gold, Conflict, and Criminality in West
“Euro 2024 Terror Attack Plot Linked to ISIS Stopped in Africa. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised
Nick of Time.” The Mirror, June 18, 2024, sec. News. https:// Crime. [Link]
[Link]/sport/football/news/isis-terror-plot-eu- nality-west-africa/.
ro-2024-33055614.; Tom Winter, Andy Eckardt, Minyvonne
Burke and Rebecca Cohen. “Taylor Swift Concerts in Vienna 14. Ibid.
Canceled after Austrian Police Say Foiled Terrorist Plot 15. Piling, David. Financial Times. “Instability in the Sahel: How
Targeted Shows.” NBC News, August 8, 2024. [Link] a Jihadi Gold Rush Is Fuelling Violence in Africa.” June 27,
[Link]/news/world/taylor-swift-concert-terror-plot-aus- 2021.
tria-foiled-2-men-arrested-shows-w-rcna165591. 16. Ruiz Benitez de Lugo, Lucia, Marcena Hunter ENACT
15. TerrorismTracker Africa. “Will Burkina Faso’s Closure of Artisanal Gold Mines
16. TerrorismTracker Work This Time?” ENACT Africa, October 28, 2022. https://
[Link]/enact-observer/will-burkina-fasos-closure-of-
17. David Gritten & Jaroslav Lukiv. “Islamic State Group Claims artisanal-gold-mines-work-this-time.
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na Pushes Its Agenda in Sahel Mines.” January 5, 2025.
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5. Beevor, Eleanor, “JNIM in Burkina Faso: A Strategic Criminal
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li-war-economy/.

100 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Endnotes

ENDNOTES

26. Moyer, Jonathan D., Collin J. Meisel, Austin S. Matthews, plotting-attack-moscow-synagogue-2024-03-07/.

David K. Bohl, and Mathew J. Burrows. “China-US Compe- 7. Shahbazov, Fuad. "What Does a Recent ISIS-K Terror
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Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures at the [Link]
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org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/China-US-Competition-Re- 8. CRSS. "Возрастающая активность Исламского
[Link]. государства в провинции Хорасан угрожает Центральной
Азии" [“Increasing Activity of the Islamic State in the Khoras-
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com/news/articles/cg4yg0k976lo. [Link]/2024/07/18/vozrosshaya-aktivnost-islamskogo-go-
28. Africa Center for Strategic Studies. “Mapping a Surge of sudarstva-v-provincii-xorasan-ugrozhaet-centralnoj-azii/.
Disinformation in Africa.” [Link] 9. Stanford University. "Al-Qaida in Iraq." Mapping Militant
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31. Nyabiage, Jevans, South China Morning Post. “Why China qaida-in-iraq.
May Step Up African Security Efforts after Wang Yi’s Close 11. Stanford University. "Al-Qaida in Iraq." Mapping Militant Or-
Call in Chad.” [Link] ganizations. April 1, 2021. [Link]
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after-wang-yis-close-call-chad. 12. Chulov, Martin. "Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of
32. Asadu, Chinedu, AP News. “Niger-France Sahel Mosul." The Guardian, June 10, 2014. [Link]
Security Troop Withdrawal.” [Link] [Link]/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-mil-
article/niger-france-sahel-coup-troops-security-ma- itants-seize-control-mosul.
cron-97c8ccfe880169832965c33e96d7befe. 13. Barnard, Anne. "Opposition in Syria Is Skeptical of U.S. Air-
33. AFRICOM. “US Withdrawal from Niger Completed.” https:// strikes on ISIS." The New York Times, September 29, 2014.
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34. Statista. “Share of Uranium Delivered to EU Utilities.” https:// 14. Robins-Early, Nick. "What We Know About ISIS in Lib-
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35. Reuters. “Canada’s GoviEx Uranium Stripped of Niger Min- 56b369e2e4b08069c7a6352f.
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commodities/canadas-goviex-uraniums-stripped-niger-min- [Link]
ing-rights-2024-07-05/?utm. 16. U.S. Department of Defence. "Syrian Democratic Forces
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37. Collins, Tom, Quartz. “New Wave of Anti-Colonial Pop- gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/1349213/syrian-dem-
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[Link]/africa/2173650/new-wave-of-anti-colonial-popu- 17. Terrorism Tracker.
lism-sweeps-francophone-africa/. 18. Guerin, Olga. "New Orleans Truck Attack Updates." BBC
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SECTION 4: ISLAMIC STATE 20. Roggio, Bill. "U.S. Continues to Target the Islamic State’s
Network in Iraq and Syria." Long War Journal. January 7,
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swift-concert-plot-2024-08-08/.
21. Hani, Salem. "Islamic State’s Threats Persist in Syria and
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people killed in the attack, and more. The model is then
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known and then applied to the set of incidents where the of Islamic State. December 24, 2024. [Link]
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ists’. fears-return-of-islamic-state-xq778rs0b.
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ficials-say-rcna175566. 25. Reuters. "Turkey Ready to Support Syria in Managing Islam-
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rests-two-afghan-people-allegedly-planning-attack-swe- 26. Australian Government. "Islamic State West Africa Prov-
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[Link]/world/europe/russia-says-it-neutralized-isis-cell- ic-state-west-africa-province.

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 101

Endnotes

ENDNOTES

27. Australian National Security. "Islamic State West Africa bique." The Soufan Center, March 21, 2024. [Link]
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30. Al Jazeera. "20 Soldiers, 40 Civilians Killed in Attacks in 50. BBC News. "What Next for Islamic State in Libya After Sirte?"
Nigeria’s Borno State," June 14, 2020. [Link] August 26, 2016. [Link]
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tacks-nigerias-borno-state.
51. BBC News. "Libya Violence: Islamic State Attack ‘Kills 40’ in
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33. Zenn, Jacob. "Three Years After Death of Shekau, Boko Har- in-libya.
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ra/.
54. Reuters. "Libyan Forces Say They Found 90 Bodies at Site of U.S.
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55. Alarabiya. "ISIS Re-emerges in Southern Libya, Vows to Target
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36. ACLED. "Newly Restructured: The Islamic State in the Sahel Aims 56. Trauthig, Inga. "Islamic State in Libya: From Force to Farce."In-
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37. O'Farrell, Ryan, Caleb Weiss, Tara Candland, and Laren Poole. 57. Weiss, Caleb, Webber Lucas. "Islamic State-Somalia: A Growing
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58. Weiss, Caleb. "Islamic State Fighters Withdraw from Cap-
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40. Whittaker, David J. "Terrorism," Oxford Bibliographies. July 7, 60. Africanews. "Ethiopian Authorities Say Al-Shabaab, Islamic
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46. Soufan Center. "IntelBrief: Islamic State Resurging in Mozam- middle-east-29763144.

102 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Endnotes

ENDNOTES

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GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 103

Endnotes

ENDNOTES

Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolu- go-gosudarstva.

tions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) concerning 116. Library of Congress. "Tajikistan: New Law Bans Muslim
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117. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. "Россия на пороге новой эпохи."
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Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolu- [Link]
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associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities для нападения на московскую синагогу," ТАСС, 8 января
addressed to the President of the Security Council ". Feb- 2025 [“Russia's Investigative Committee Identifies Terrorist
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110. Asia 24. "ОДКБ усилит южные рубежи, программу по EXPERT CONTRIBUTIONS:
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Program to Reinforce Tajik-Afghan Border to Be Adopted in Expansion and Growing Online Activities
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"Таджикистан поднимет вопрос о нарушении границы с [Link]
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[Link] ning.
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an-but-watch-border-warily. Escalating Online Threat in Response to MI5 Director Gen-
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at-o-tadzhikah-gotovyatshih-terakti-po-zadaniyu-islamsko- ing Online Propaganda Targeting Russia and Central Asia |

104 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

 Endnotes

ENDNOTES

Eurasianet.” [Link] 26. Denis Leven. “Germany Arrests 2 Afghans over Swedish
fying-online-propaganda-targeting-russia-and-central-asia. Parliament Attack Plot.” POLITICO, March 19, 2024. https://
9. Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle. “Islamic State Khorasan’s [Link]/article/germany-arrests-two-afghan-peo-
Expanded Vision in South and Central Asia.” [Link] ple-allegedly-planning-attack-sweden-parliament/.
[Link]/2022/08/islamic-state-khorasans-expanded-vision- 27. Lucas Webber and Peter Smith. “IS Khurasan’s Multipolar
in-south-and-central-asia/. War: Propaganda and Operations Against the Great Powers
10. Lucas Webber, Louise Meloy. “Perspectives: ISKP Intensify- | Hudson Institute,” January 23, 2025. [Link]
ing Online Propaganda Targeting Russia and Central Asia | org/foreign-policy/khurasans-multipolar-war-propaganda-op-
Eurasianet.” [Link] erations-against-great-powers-peter-smith-lucas-webber.
fying-online-propaganda-targeting-russia-and-central-asia. 28. Adam Headly. “We Need to Move Beyond Bombs and
11. Lucas Webber. “ISKP’s China Threats Surge, Become More Bullets to Counter Terrorism,” February 11, 2025. [Link]
Nuanced | Eurasianet.” [Link] org[Link]
threats-surge-become-more-nuanced. 29. “Press Release: Tech Against Terrorism Highlights ISKP’s
12. “Kabul Airport Attack: What Do We Know?” August 26, 2021. Escalating Online Threat in Response to MI5 Director Gen-
[Link] eral’s Warning.” [Link]
against-terrorism-highlights-iskps-escalating-online-threat-in-
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14. Gul, Ayaz. “Islamic State Claims Killing of Chinese National Ten Lessons Terrorists Are Learning from the Russia-
in Afghanistan.” Voice of America, January 22, 2025. https:// Ukraine War
[Link]/a/islamic-state-claims-killing-of-chi-
nese-national-in-afghanistan/[Link]. 1. The initial months of the war were shaped by Russia's Or-
lan-10 and Ukraine's Bayraktar TB-2 drones.
15. Jennifer Murtazashvili. “China’s Activities and Influence
in South and Central Asia.” [Link] 2. Haye Kesteloo, “Ukraine's Defense Ministry Buys Over $27
[Link]/posts/2022/05/chinas-activities-and-influ- Million in DJI Drones,” DroneXL, May 29, 2024, [Link]
ence-in-south-and-central-asia?lang=en. [Link]/2024/05/29/ukraines-buys-27-million-dji-drones/.
16. Stockhammer, Nicolas, and Colin Clarke. “Learning from 3. “The Age of Drone Warfare Is Disrupting the Defense Indus-
Islamic State-Khorasan Province’s Recent Plots.” Lawfare, try,” Financial Times, July 7, 2024.
August 11, 2024. [Link] 4. Giulia Bernacchi, “Ukrainian Military Reports Acquisition of
ing-from-islamic-state-khorasan-province-s-recent-plots. Over 1 Million Drones in 2024,” The Defense Post, Decem-
17. The Khorasan Diary [@khorasandiary]. “TKD MONITORING: ber 13, 2024, [Link]
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azine Khorasan Ghag - Published by Al-Azaim - Features 5. Vladyslav Smilianets and Sergiy Karazy, “Inside the Ukraini-
Major Articles on Burning of the Quran in Sweden & the an Drone Unit Conducting Deep Strikes on Russia,” Reuters,
Netherlands, Threatening Retaliation in Europe and against January 25, 2025, [Link]
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Twitter, January 28, 2023. [Link] sia-2025-01-24/.
tus/1619428887288766465.
6. Haye Kesteloo, “Ukraine’s Million Dollar Drone Army: How
18. Clarke, Lucas Webber, Colin P. “How the Islamic State Prop- Consumer Tech Revolutionized Modern Warfare,” DroneXL,
aganda Machine Is Exploiting the Israel-Hamas Conflict,” January 2, 2025, [Link]
November 21, 2023. [Link] lion-drone-army-revolutionized-warfare/.
how-the-islamic-state-propaganda-machine-is-exploit-
7. Rudy Ruitenberg, “Ukraine to Hand Combat Units $60
ing-the-israel-hamas-conflict/.
Million Monthly for New Drones,” Defense News, Jan-
19. Webber, Lucas. “Islamic State Ramps Up Campaign uary 22, 2025, [Link]
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and Propaganda.” [Link] monthly-for-new-drones/.
ic-state-ramps-up-campaign-targeting.
8. Vikram Mittal, “Swarming Drones Will Be on the Rus-
20. Lucas Webber. “Islamic State Increasingly Targeted and sian-Ukrainian Battlefield in 2025,” Forbes, January 2,
Threatened Western Sporting Events in Advance of the Paris 2025, [Link]
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increasingly-targeted-and-threatened-western-sporting- in-2025/.
events-in-advance-of-the-paris-olympics/.
9. David Axe, “Ukraine’s First All-Robot Assault Force Just Won
21. Dass, Rueben. “Islamic State-Khorasan Province’s Virtual Its First Battle,” Forbes, December 21, 2024, [Link]
Planning.” Lawfare, May 19, 2024. [Link] [Link]/sites/davidaxe/2024/12/21/ukraines-first-all-ro-
[Link]/article/islamic-state-khorasan-province-s-virtual-plan- bot-assault-force-just-won-its-first-battle/.
ning.
10. Vice Prime Minister for Innovations, Development of Educa-
22. Laith Alkhouri, Lucas Webber. “Islamic State Launches New tion, Science & Technologies — Minister of Digital Transfor-
Tajik Propaganda Network | Eurasianet.” [Link] mation of Ukraine.
org/islamic-state-launches-new-tajik-propaganda-network.
11. Katie Hawkinson, “Starlink Has Become the 'Blood' of
23. Lucas Webber and Riccardo Valle. “The Islamic State’s Ukraine's Communication Infrastructure, but Officials Are Re-
Central Asian Contingents and Their International Threat | portedly Growing Concerned About Relying on Elon Musk's
Hudson Institute,” January 23, 2025. [Link] Tech,” Yahoo News, Business Insider, July 29, 2023, https://
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gents-their-international-threat. [Link].
24. Stockhammer, Nicolas, and Colin Clarke. “Learning from 12. V. Bergengruen, “How Ukraine Is Pioneering Ways to Pros-
Islamic State-Khorasan Province’s Recent Plots.” Lawfare, ecute War Crimes,” Time, November 6, 2023, [Link]
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ing-from-islamic-state-khorasan-province-s-recent-plots.
13. Illia Novikov, “Ukraine Claims Its Sea Drones Sank a Rus-
25. Peter Smith , Levent Kemal, and Lucas Webber. “Islamic sian Warship, Moscow Says Patriot Missiles Downed Its
State Khorasan’s Westward Network Expansion Into Iran, Plane,” Associated Press, February 2, 2024, [Link]
Turkey, and Europe.” [Link] com/article/russia-ukraine-war-c713c425574e943029271c-
islamic-state-khorasans-westward-network-expansion-in- 117f9a16a8.
to-iran-turkey-and-europe/.
14. Andrew Carey, Maria Kostenko, and Josh Pennington,

GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025 |­ 105

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ENDNOTES

“Ukraine Says It Hit Two Russian Naval Vessels in Major Recruitment Tactics: Somalia and Minnesota (May 2020;
Attack on Crimea,” CNN, March 24, 2024, [Link] Next Wave, The International Center for Children and Global
com/2024/03/24/europe/ukraine-strikes-russian-naval-ves- Security), [Link]
sels-sevastopol-intl/[Link]. tremism-propaganda-and-child-recruitment-tactics-soma-
15. Lyle Goldstein and Nathan Waechter, China’s Naval Strat- lia-and-minnesota.
egists Dissect Ukraine’s USV Strike on Russia’s Black Sea 11. Ibid at 8.
Fleet Base, the Diplomat, 23 March 2023, accessed at https:// 12. Ibid.
[Link]/2023/03/chinas-naval-strategists-dissect-
ukraines-usv-strike-on-russias-black-sea-fleet-base/ 13. UNICEF, "80 Per Cent of Youth in the World Recognize
That Internet Can Be a Danger," press release, February
16. John Leicester and Emma Burrows, “11 Baltic Cables Dam- 7, 2017, [Link]
aged in 15 Months, Pushing NATO to Boost Security,” Asso- unicef-80-cent-youth-world-recognize-internet-can-be-dan-
ciated Press, January 28, 2025, [Link] ger#:~:text=%E2%80%9CToday%2C%20globally%201%20
com/global/europe/2025/01/28/11-baltic-cables-damaged-in- in%203,information%2C%20educational%20resources%20
15-months-pushing-nato-to-boost-security/. and%20more.; International Telecommunication Union (ITU),
17. “NATO Defense Baltic Undersea Cables,” CNN, January 27, Facts and Figures 2023: Youth Internet Use, Almost 80 Per
2025, [Link] Cent of People Aged Between 15 and 24 Use the Internet,
fense-baltic-undersea-cables-intl-cmd/[Link]#:~:tex- October 10, 2023, [Link]
t=According%20to%20Rutte%2C%20more%20than,can%20 tics/2023/10/10/ff23-youth-internet-use/.
take%20months%20to%20fix. 14. Cecilia Polizzi, Children Affected by the Foreign Fighter
18. Notably, on November 19, 2023, the Houthis attacked the Phenomenon: Guidelines on the Prevention of Radicalization
Galaxy Leader, a Bahamas-flagged cargo ship en route from on Social Media and the Internet in This Digital Era, vol. I
Turkey to India. (2023; Next Wave, The International Center for Children and
19. Myanmar Witness, “Four Years from Myanmar Coup, open- Global Security).
source monitoring remains crucial”, CIR Centre for Informa- 15. Caroline Joan S. Picart, "“Jihad Cool/Jihad Chic”: The Roles
tion Resilience, 2024, accessed at [Link] of the Internet and Imagined Relations in the Self-Radical-
myanmar-witness/articles/four-years-on-from-myanmar-coup/ ization of Colleen LaRose (Jihad Jane)," Societies 5, no. 2
20. Marc Andreessen, "Why Software Is Eating the World," The (April 2015): 1-30.
Wall Street Journal, 20 August 2011. 16. Ibid.; Kateira Aryaeinejad and Thomas Leo Scherer, Ph.D.,
The Role of the Internet and Social Media on Radicalization:
What Research Sponsored by the National Institute of Jus-
Youth Radicalisation: A New Frontier in Terrorism and tice Tells Us (U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
Security Programs, National Institute of Justice, April 2024).
17. Ibid.
1. Lizzie Dearden, "Children forming ‘new generation of ex-
tremists’ in UK as terror threat shifts, Cressida Dick warns," 18. "Young People and Violent Extremism: A Call for Collective
Independent, September 13, 2021, accessed at [Link] Action," Five Eyes Insights, October 2024.
[Link]/news/uk/home- news/terror-threat-uk-chil- 19. Cecilia Polizzi, Inside Salafi-Jihadism: The Rationale Driving
[Link]. the Recruitment and Use of Children, lecture, National
2. Home Office, Individuals Referred to and Supported Through Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Ter-
the Prevent Programme Statistics, last updated December rorism (START), 2021, [Link]
5, 2024, [Link] 7H8dsUZ1lo&t=1797s.
uals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-pro- 20. Cecilia Polizzi, "Fourth Generation Warfare: An Analysis of
gramme-statistics. Child Recruitment and Use as a Salafi-Jihadi Doctrine of
3. Ibid. War," Small Wars Journal, April 29, 2022, [Link]
[Link]/2022/04/29/fourth-generation-warfare-analy-
4. Paton Walsh, Nick, Muhammad Darwish, Saskya Vandoorne, sis-child-recruitment-and-use-salafi-jihadi-doctrine-war/.
and Benjamin Brown. “ISIS-K’s Online Recruitment Poses
Security Threat to West Ahead of Olympic Games.” CNN, 21. Ibid.
July 25, 2024. [Link] 22. Cecilia Polizzi, "The Crime of Terrorism: An Analysis of
isis-k-online-recruitment-security-threat-olympics-intl-cmd/ Criminal Justice Processes and Accountability of Minors Re-
[Link]. cruited by the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham," U.C. Davis
5. Euronews with AP. "CIA Says Foiled Plot to Attack Taylor Journal of International Law & Policy 24 (2018): [Link]
Swift Shows in Vienna Aimed to Kill 'Tens of Thousands'." [Link]/sites/g/files/dgvnsk15346/files/media/docu-
Euronews. August 29, 2024. [Link] ments/[Link].
com/2024/08/29/cia-says-foiled-plot-to-attack-taylor-swift- 23. Colleen McCue, Joseph T. Massengill, Dorothy Milbrandt,
shows-in-vienna-aimed-to-kill-tens-of-thousand. John Gaughan, and Meghan Cumpston, "The Islamic State
6. Petter Nesser and Wassim Nasr, "The Threat Matrix Long Game: A Tripartite Analysis of Youth Radicalization
Facing the Paris Olympics," CTC Sentinel 17, no. 6 (June and Indoctrination," CTC Sentinel, September 2017, Vol. 10,
2024): 1.; "France Arrests Teen for Olympics Terror At- Issue 8.
tack Plot," Deutsche Welle, May 31, 2024, [Link] 24. Global Terrorism Database (GTD). "Data on Terrorist
[Link]/en/france-arrests-teen-for-olympics-terror-attack- Events." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and
plot/a-69238329. Responses to Terrorism (START), 2020. [Link]
7. Hannah Ritchie and Simon Atkinson, "Seven Teens with [Link]/data-tools/GTD (Accessed January 14, 2025).;
Alleged 'Extremist Ideology' Arrested in Sydney Raids," BBC National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Re-
News, April 24, 2024, [Link] sponses to Terrorism (START). "The Use of Social Media by
tralia-68887448.; Christian Edwards, Paul Devitt, and Xiaofei U.S. Extremists: An Analysis of Radicalization." Research
Xu. "Stabbing of Bishop at Sydney Church a ‘Terrorist Brief, July 2018.[Link]
Act,’ Police Say." CNN, April 16, 2024. [Link] RUS_UseOfSocialMediaByUSExtremists_ResearchBrief_
com/2024/04/15/australia/sydney-australia-stabbing-wake- [Link] (Accessed January 14, 2025).
ley-intl/[Link]. 25. Christopher Wray, "FBI Director Christopher Wray: The 60
8. Jones, Isabel, Jakob Guhl, Jacob Davey, and Moustafa Ayad. Minutes Interview," 60 Minutes, YouTube, posted September
Young Guns: Understanding a New Generation of Extremist 13, 2020, [Link]
Radicalization in the United States. Institute for Strategic 26. Ibid at 8.
Dialogue, 2023. 27. Ibid at 23.
9. Ibid.
10. Cecilia Polizzi, Violent Extremism, Propaganda and Child
From Vulnerability to Strength: The Growing Role of

106 ­| GLOBAL TERRORISM INDEX 2025

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