History of the European Union

Introduction
The history of the European Union (EU) has been marked by periods of rapid change followed by periods of
uncertainty: European integration has been an unpredictable process.

Origins
The European project was an attempt to overcome the nationalist conflicts of the first half of the twentieth
century, especially the rivalry between Germany and France that had contributed to both world wars. After
1945, there was a strong will to ensure that war between Germany and France could never again occur. This
led to a series of schemes that culminated in the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC)
How does
in 1957, which eventually became the EU. aLed
General
in the early Election actuallyRobert
1950s by Frenchmen work? Schuman and Jean
Monnet, the initial plan wasThefor a aEuropean
UK is Coal andThis
liberal democracy. Steel
meansCommunity (ECSC) thatelect
that we democratically would make France,
politicians, who
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium
represent and Luxembourg
our interests. co-operate
It also involves by forcing
that individual them
rights are to share their coal
protected.
and steel resources in the post-war rebuilding of western Europe. This created the organisational model of a
. The type of liberal democracy we have is a constitutional monarchy, where the powers of
Commission, Council and Parliament that was adopted by the EEC.
the monarch are limited by the terms and conditions put down in the constitution.

Founding the EU
The EEC was established under the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Primarily, the EEC aimed to extend the principle
Parliamentary
behind the ECSC to other areas systema customs union. However, it also had more political
of trade by creating
The UK has
ambitions for European integration a parliamentary
– described at thesystem of the
start of democratic governance.
treaty as Unlike
creating ‘an everpresidential
closer unionand
semi-presidential systems, there is an interconnection between the legislative (law-
between the peoples of Europe.’
making) and executive (law-enforcing) branches of government in a parliamentary
system. In the UK, this means that the executive (consisting of the Queen and the
Yet this mixture of economic and political
governments of union was
England, not theWales
Scotland, only option open to
and Northern European
Ireland) countriestointhe
is accountable the
1950s. Britain, Switzerland,legislature
Austria and the Scandinavian
or Parliament countries
(House of Commons, were at this
House timeand
of Lords engaged in the
devolved Assemblies in
European Free Trade Area (EFTA): a looser organisation
Wales and Northern Ireland). based on a zone of free trade without an external
tariff barrier.
Appointed Prime Minister (or chancellor) as Head of Government and a monarch (or
ceremonial president) as Head of State.
The early years of the EEC were principally focused upon developing the customs union. During this period, a
huge economic boom, led by a dynamic West Germany, created much greater prosperity in western Europe
and drove forward the liberalisation of the EEC economy. In 1963, Britain made its first attempt to join but
was rebuffed by the French President Charles De Gaulle. De Gaulle dominated the European Community in
the 1960s, fuelling conflict between those who wanted to push forward a political union and those, like
First-Past-The-Post
himself, who wanted to maintain their
Members of national identities.
Parliament in the House of Commons are elected using the first-past-the-
post electoral system. Each of the 650 voting constituencies in the UK are represented by
By the 1970s, when Britain,an MP. During
Ireland the general
and Denmark and most
finally local
joined theelections,
EEC, thethe candidate
project with most
had slowed of the votes
down
considerably. Although thebecomes
1970s sawthethe
localfirst
representative.
proposals forCandidates
monetary campaign door-to-door,
union, the EEC of ninehold debates
states andit
found
publish than
more difficult to reach agreement manifestos (comparable
the original to shopping list of what they are planning to do once
six had.
they are in power). Eligible voters, about 46m in the UK, receive their polling card once
they register online, or they can vote by post.

Party with most of the votes is invited by the Queen to form a government. If there is no
clear winner, there is a hung Parliament. In this case, a minority or coalition government
can of
© CIVITAS Institute for the Study beCivil
formed. A minority government does not have anAuthor:
Society 2015 overall majority
Wil James, Civitasin03/2006
Parliament. A
More EU factsheets: [Link] Last update: Rachel Maclean,
coalition government means that two or more political parties agree to share power in 10/2015

government. If that does not work out, new elections may be called.
 History of the European Union
Faster Integration
It was not until the mid-1980s - when Spain, Greece and Portugal joined - that the pace of European
integration really picked up again with the agreement of the Single European Act (1986). This laid down a
timetable for the completion of the single market while looking towards creating monetary union and driving
forward the agenda for political union.

The 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany in 1990 provided a huge boost to this
process. In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty transformed the European Community – turning it into the EU,
giving it new roles in the areas of foreign and domestic policy, and setting a timetable for the creation of the
Euro. Subsequently, the treaties
Howof Amsterdam (1997) andElection
does a General Nice (2001) expanded
actuallythese powers.
work?
The UK is a liberal democracy. This means that we democratically elect politicians, who
represent our interests. It also involves that individual rights are protected.

The EU today The type of liberal democracy we have is a constitutional monarchy, where the powers of
A Treaty establishing a Constitution for are
the monarch Europe, drafted
limited by the in 2004,
terms was
and rejectedput
conditions bydown
referendums in France and
in the constitution.
the Netherlands in 2005. The ‘constitutional project’ was then revived in the form of the Lisbon Treaty, which
was signed by the leaders of EU nations in 2007. The treaty was hugely controversial because it was very
similar to the failed constitution. The treaty was rejected by Ireland in a referendum in 2008, however
Parliamentary system
Ireland eventually ratified the treaty following a second referendum in October 2009. The Lisbon Treaty
The UK has a parliamentary system of democratic governance. Unlike presidential and
finally came into force in December 2009.
semi-presidential systems, there is an interconnection between the legislative (law-
making) and executive (law-enforcing) branches of government in a parliamentary
system. In the UK, this means that the executive (consisting of the Queen and the
governments of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) is accountable to the
legislature or Parliament (House of Commons, House of Lords and devolved Assemblies in
“The solidarity between the two countries
Wales established
and Northern by joint production will show that war between France and
Ireland).
Germany becomes not only unthinkable, but materially impossible.”
Robert Schuman,
Appointed Prime Minister 1950 as Head of Government and a monarch (or
(or chancellor)
ceremonial president) as Head of State.
“Our community is not a coal and steel producers association. It is the beginning of Europe."
Jean Monnet, 1970

“Creating a single European State bound by one constitution is the decisive task of our time."
Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister 1998-2005
First-Past-The-Post
Members of Parliament in the House of Commons are elected using the first-past-the-
post electoral system. Each of the 650 voting constituencies in the UK are represented by
Technical Terms
an MP. During the general and most local elections, the candidate with most of the votes
 Customs Union: a groupbecomes the local
of economies representative.
with no Candidates
internal barriers campaign
to trade and a commondoor-to-door,
external [Link] debates and
 Free Trade: international trade when there is no restriction on the import or export of goods.
publish manifestos (comparable to shopping list of what they are planning to do once
Links they are in power). Eligible voters, about 46m in the UK, receive their polling card once
they register online, or they can vote by post.
 [Link]
 [Link]
Party with most of the votes is invited by the Queen to form a government. If there is no
clear winner, there is a hung Parliament. In this case, a minority or coalition government
can of
© CIVITAS Institute for the Study beCivil
formed. A minority government does not have anAuthor:
Society 2015 overall majority
Wil James, Civitasin03/2006
Parliament. A
More EU factsheets: [Link] Last update: Rachel Maclean,
coalition government means that two or more political parties agree to share power in 10/2015

government. If that does not work out, new elections may be called.
 60 YEARS OF THE ROME TREATY AND ITS
ETERNAL LEGACY FOR THE EUROPEAN
PROJECT

“The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the
economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of
economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging to it.”

Article 2, Part 1 titled “Principles” of the Treaty of Rome

The Treaty of Rome was signed in the so-

called Eternal City of Rome exactly sixty years
ago, on 25 March 1957. Together with the
Treaty of Paris of 1951, the Rome Treaty is the
most important legal basis for the modern-day
European Union. This epoch-making document
laid down the key foundations of the greatest
integration of peoples and nations in European
history that made Europe one of the most
peaceful, prosperous, stable and advanced
regions of the world.

The 60th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty is an

important opportunity to remind ourselves of the
Treaty of Rome Ceremony
original goals of European integration and the Source: European Commission
achievements the idea of united Europe has brought
to our continent over the past six decades. The fundamental legacy of the Rome Treaty needs to serve
the EU Member States as a recipe how to resolve the serious crises the EU is facing nowadays and re-
unite all Europeans for a common path towards an “ever closer union”.

A LESSON OF WAR sixty million human lives and devastated

CATASTROPHE AND THE Europe beyond recognition in all aspects. In
FIRST STEPS TOWARDS order to avoid any conflict among European
nations in the future, the leaders of winning
INTEGRATION
Allied powers considered several options for
the post-war structure of Europe. General
misery caused by the war cruelties and
The idea of united Europe was born out of the uncertainties brought up by commencing Cold
ruins of the Second World War. The greatest War between the USA and the Soviet Union
and bloodiest conflict of human history took

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
1
gave a significant unifying impetus to the FROM THE PARIS TREATY TO
European countries. In the late 1940s, the idea THE TREATY OF ROME
of a united Europe finally moved into its actual
implementation at the political level; however,
due to the division of Europe by the so-called
The international tensions that occurred in the
Iron Curtain it concerned the Western European
autumn of 1956 by the Suez Crisis and
countries only. A united Western Europe
Hungarian Revolution convinced the Western
appeared to be the only way how to resist the
European governments to address their
pressure from the USSR, overcome
vulnerability in the economic and energy sector
considerable economic difficulties and maintain
and strengthen the Community. The idea was to
social and political stability in the devastated
create a single economic area of trade in
continent that faced new dangers of the Cold
products and services over and above those
War. Six countries – Belgium, France, Italy,
already covered by the other treaties (ECSC and
Luxembourg, Netherlands and West Germany –
Euratom). This led to the decision to establish
all with various internal problems, needs,
two new communities, one dedicated to the
priorities and goals thus decided to undermine
economic integration and the other focused on
their sovereignty, transfer some of their powers
nuclear cooperation. The historic document
to a common political entity and decide about
known as the Treaty of Rome was actually
important political and economic issues
composed of the two separate treaties – the
together.
Treaty establishing European Economic
Community (EEC) and the Treaty
The Schuman Declaration, which was signed
establishing European Atomic Energy
on 9 May 1950, is considered to be the first
Community (Euratom). Both were signed in
decisive step towards the integration of six
Rome on 25 March 1957 in the Capitoleʼs room
European states. The plan de facto laid down
of the Horaces and the Curiaces. The Treaties
the foundations for a unique European
were ratified by national parliaments over the
supranational organization that was not only
following months and they came into force on 1
aimed to remove the catastrophic causes of the
January 1958. They have been amended on a
Second World War but, more importantly, to
number of occasions and they are still in force
gradually bound together all European nations
(in contrast with the Paris Treaty which expired
in the pursuit of “ever closer union”. To put it
in 2002, exactly 50 years after it came into
concisely, six states opted for cooperation
effect).
instead of past competition, discussions instead
of disputes and integration instead of divisions
that were at the roots of long centuries of the
conflicts among European nations.

On the basis of this declaration, six countries

signed the Paris Treaty and founded the
European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) on 18 April 1951. The ECSC created a
first limited common market for two products –
coal and steel – through which six states kept
strict surveillance and joint control over the
coal and steel industries, two main industries
necessary for armament. The war between them
became not only morally unthinkable but also
materially impossible. Treaty of Rome
Source: European Commission

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
2
The Treaty of Rome was signed by a diverse supposed to improve and simplify the trade
group of visionary leaders who were united in conditions and production of six Member States
the same target – to create a peaceful, united and serve as a step towards political integration.
and prosperous Europe: The Member States decided to gradually align
their economic policies, dismantle all tariff
Kingdom of Belgium barriers and customs duties between them,
Paul-Henri Spaak, Minister for Foreign ensure balanced trade and fair competition,
Affairs reduce economic and social differences
Jean-Charles Snoy et d’Oppuers, Secretary- between their regions, eliminate restrictions on
General of the Ministry of Economic Affairs international trade through a common trade
policy and harmonize tax rules. Due to the
Federal Republic of Germany extensive nature of this Treaty, the common
Konrad Adenauer, Federal Chancellor market was set to be built up gradually over a
Walter Hallstein, State Secretary of the transitional 12-year period – a customs union
Federal Foreign Affairs Office was achieved as the first, already in June 1968.
The free movement of workers began to be
French Republic applied from 1958 and the free movement of
Christian Pineau, Minister for Foreign Affairs capital after 1969. The process of building a
Maurice Faure, Under-Secretary of State for common market was completed in 1992.
Foreign Affairs

Italian Republic
Antonio Segni, President of the Council of
Ministers
Gaetano Martino, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

Joseph Bech, President of the Government and
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Lambert Schaus, Ambassador

Kingdom of Netherlands
Joseph Luns, Minister for Foreign Affair
Johannes Linthorst Homan, Director for Signing the Treaty of Rome
European Integration at the Ministry for Source: European Commission
Economic Affairs
The Treaty establishing EEC also adopted a
common agricultural policy, common trade
The Treaty of Rome aimed to strengthen the policy and transport policy. It also allowed for
foundations of the integration and expand the the creation of other joint policies if the need
fields of cooperation among six states. While arises in the future – this allowed the creation of
the Treaty establishing Euratom extended the joint environmental, regional, social and
trade only to nuclear and fissile commodities industrial policies in the 1970s as well as the
with regards to the risk of nuclear war between establishment of many other common policies
USA and USSR, the EEC established the until today. The important goal was also to pool
comprehensive common market that had no their resources to preserve and strengthen peace
parallel anywhere in the world. In the Treaty, and liberty and search for other European
the signatory countries agreed to lay the countries to join them in their efforts. The
foundations of a common market that was Treaty also established institutions – the

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
3
Council of Ministers, the Commission, the Since the Treaty of Rome, the vision of united
Parliamentary Assembly (today European Europe has captured other twenty-two
Parliament) and the Court of Justice – and European states and essentially Western
decision-making mechanisms which allowed to European entity has been transformed into a
express both national interests and a joint pan-European organization. Three communities
vision. In this way, the signatories stated the – ECSC, EEC and Euratom – were soon
political objective of a progressive political and collectively and legally called the European
economic integration of that day’s and future Communities; later it was simplified to be
Member States. known as the European Community (EC). In
1993, the European Community was
transformed into the organization which we
TREATY’S LEGACY now call the European Union. The basic ideas
of the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome
are projected in the essence of the functioning
The Treaty of Rome has commenced a of the European Union today.
gradualist approach to building the EU based on
the plan to gradually incorporate diverse The Founding Fathers did this significant job in
economic sectors and establish supranational the uncertain and dangerous time of the Cold
institutions with increasingly higher political War that is not far away from the political crisis
competences. The Treaty has also started the we are experiencing nowadays. But now it is
process in which economic integration was our turn to design the future. Today, the
paving the way to the long term objective, the Member States have an obligation to
political union. Hence, the document is demonstrate that the Union is of a real added
considered to be one of the founding treaties of value and all Europeans need to protect and
the European project that significantly enrich the fundamental achievements of
deepened the cooperation between six European European project.
nations.

60 years of European integration: Enlargement or “widening“

Source: European Commission

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
4
THE TREATY OF ROME LED TO THE FOLLOWING
SIGNIFICANT ACHIEVEMENTS OF EUROPEAN PROJECT

GUARANTEE OF PEACE

The Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Rome commenced the longest period
of peace in Europe’s written history. For seventy years there has been no
armed conflict among its members, which is very significant step forward
for the continent marked by the centuries of wars. The European project has
ensured that that military conflict among members is morally unthinkable
and materially unfeasible. Nevertheless, the sacrifice of previous generations
must never be forgotten – today’s peace was hard-earned and must never be
taken for granted.

Source: European Commission

DEMOCRACY AND RULE OF LAW

The European integration has strengthened the democratic regimes and the
rule of law in all Member States. In 1957, only 12 of the present-day EU
Member States were democracies – today, all 28 Member States are
respected and high-advanced democratic states. The EU is thus the largest
union of democracies in the world.

ENSURED HUMAN RIGHTS

The EU ensures the strict defence of human rights as well as civil, political,
economic and social rights for all its citizens without exception. The EU
countries also spread the respect for human rights into the world, especially
in developing countries. Equality between women and men is also one of the
EU’s founding values.

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
5
ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY

Never before did most Europeans live on such high economic level as today.
The EU membership brought an increased prosperity to all its members. The
EU is one of the three largest global players for international trade
(alongside USA and China), it is the world’s largest exporter of
manufactured goods and services, it is a global market leader for high-
quality products and it is the biggest export market for around 80 countries.
The EU is the world’s largest source and destination of foreign direct
investment. Average GDP per capita of the EU has been doubled in past
twenty years and the euro is the second most important global reserve
currency.

SOCIAL WELL-BEING

The EU is one of the most prosperous regions of the world. On key welfare
indicators including poverty, inequality, health and quality of life, the EU
member states are at the top of the world rankings. Without the EU,
economically less advanced European states would not be able to reach so
high economic growth and living standards on their own so quickly and
efficiently. Thanks to the European social model there are the minimum
standards for all citizens of the EU that cannot be lowered by the national
governments.

FREEDOM AND OPENNESS

Freedom is one of the core values of the EU that provides citizens with
freedom of thought, religion, assembly, expression and information. In
addition, Europeans enjoy four freedoms of free movement of goods, capital,
service and people – thanks to them, EU citizens can live, study, work and
retire anywhere within the EU. Travelling is also less bureaucratic and
cheaper, roaming will be soon abolished and young Europeans can study and
live in another country within the European exchange programs. As a result,
Europe is the freest continent in the world.

EQUALITY AND SOLIDARITY

The EU has significantly helped to spread the ideas of solidarity, equality

and cohabitation within all Member States within the Community. The
European institutions’ operation is also based on equality and solidarity. The
EU has adopted a number of legislative initiatives on improving social,
environmental and regional policies to reduce the disparities between richer
and poorer states and regions. In ten EU Member States, EU funding
accounts for more than 40 percent of total public investment.

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
6
 EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

The EU enables the exchange of best practices, know-how and innovations

in education, technologies, research and science among the EU member
states. The EU also launches various programmes for research and invests
millions euro to make our lives better, easier and happier. The EU is a world
leader in research and innovation. Scientists, economists and authors from
the EU have won the greatest number of Nobel Prizes in history for their
contribution to general human advancement. In the fight against climate
change, the EU has implemented a variety of projects for sustainable
development and smart mobility.

GLOBAL INFLUENCE

The European states have stronger and much more decisive influence over
the global affairs precisely thanks to the EU. Europe as a whole has much
more decisive political voice and economic negotiating power vis-à-vis the
USA, China or Russia. Without the EU, individual European states would
not have necessary political influence, diplomatic capacity, economic
mechanisms and industrial resources on the global stage.

60 years of European integration: Institutional integration or “deepening”

Source: European Commission

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
7
 THE ROME TREATY – ADDRESSING THE CRISIS OF THE EU

The European project has changed European continent for the better. Today, Europe looks as never
before and Europeans enjoy the highest living standards ever. Together we are just not only stronger,
more stable and decisive, but also more productive and prosperous than if we were divided.
Despite all these achievements and benefits of the united Europe, the survival of the European project
is at stake nowadays. A number of severe problems such as terrorist threats, rise of populism, Brexit,
massive migration and social and economic insecurity caused that the European project is currently
experiencing the most serious crisis of legitimacy in its existence.
Hence, all pro-European and pro-democratic political forces in the EU need to use the fundamental
legacy of the Rome Treaty for addressing the critical issues the EU is facing. In particular, the
following steps are necessary:

I. EU has to respond to populism and political extremism

resolutely
With populist movements arising throughout Europe, the EU has to return the trust
of its citizens in EUʼs capacity to solve the current issues and to strengthen
Europeans’ trust in integration itself. Populist calls for the end of the EU are based
on false claims and their political proposals are not the real solutions how to
resolve the actual problems. The EU has to use all its mechanisms to explain
Europeans that nation-states cannot face today’s challenges, such as terrorism,
migration or the negative impact of globalization, on their own. The EU has to
respond to populism and political extremism much more decisively because
populist political parties represent a very serious risk to peace, stability and
prosperity of our continent.

II. EU has to take the result of the British referendum as a chance

for democratic refoundation
For the first time, one of the Member States decided to leave the common project
and this fact naturally brings many questions and uncertainties. The Britain’s
decision to leave the EU has to be a wake-up call and the opportunity for deeper
integration of the EU-27. Although the UK will stay a close EU partner, the EU-27
needs to reach the best possible deal for the EU during the Brexit negotiations in
order to prove the undeniable benefits of the European project to its citizens.

III. EU has to reinforce its security and defence system

The EU has to be able to guarantee safety for all its citizens. The Member States
need to realize that they can be more secure if they create common institutions to
guard the external borders and reinforce the existing framework for internal
security. The EU needs to take steps towards full control of the external borders,
better cooperation of intelligence agencies and fully operational Frontex. Europe
also has to do more in defence cooperation and proceed towards deeper defence
integration.

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
8
 IV. EU has to provide more effective management of migration and
refugee flows
With regards to continuing massive migration flows into the EU, the Member
States have to reach a far-reaching new agreement towards effective migration
management that will be designed upon each state’s financial resources and
absorptive potential. There is also a desperate need for the mechanism for better
integration of migrants into the national systems of the EU member states as long
as economic disenfranchisement is considered a chief ingredient of radicalization.

V. EU has to address social and economic insecurity and

unemployment
Facing high unemployment rates and differences in living standards among
European regions, the EU has to demonstrably guarantee economic and social
prosperity for its citizens. It has to take steps for an active trade policy, investment
support, re-industrialization and implementation of the European social model that
secures the minimum social standards and observes social protection and social
justice for all EU citizens.

VI. EU Institutions have to re-gain citizens’ trust

EU Institutions have to work in more transparent, democratic and accountable way
so they can solve problems much more effectively, re-engage with the citizens and
regain general public’s trust in European project. At the same time, the Institutions
need to specifically clarify where they want to move the EU in the future.

VII. EU has to react to climate and environmental changes

Although the majority of Europeans still do not realize it, the climate change is one
of the most serious and critical issues that endangers our world nowadays. The
Member States need to pay more attention to the climate changes so we can secure
safe and healthy environment for us and future European generations.

All Europeans need to bear in mind that the EU will be able to overcome these serious issues only in
case of unity, peaceful coexistence and common approach of all Member States. The stakes are
critically high and more than ever before Europeans need to stay united and faithful to its democratic
principles. The EU is the only guarantee of peace, security, political stability and economic prosperity
in Europe nowadays. The EU is simply the only option for our future and therefore we need to defend
it and prevent populist politicians to destroy the values and pillars the European project has been built
upon. The current EUʼs political representatives need to find courage of the Founding Fathers and
move the EU-27 towards a kind of extensive and fruitful cooperation that has not been known before –
as the Founding Fathers did on 25 March 1957. This is the essence of the eternal message of the Rome
Treaty for the present and future of our continent.

Author: Adriana Ciefova (IED, March 2017)

The sole liability of this publication rests with the author
and the European Parliament is not responsible for any use
that may be made of the information contained therein.

IED - INSTITUTE OF EUROPEAN DEMOCRATS

ASBL - BRUSSELS
9
 FACTSHEETS

THE FIRST TREATIES

The disastrous effects of the Second World War and the constant threat of an East-
West confrontation meant that Franco-German reconciliation had become a top
priority. The decision to pool the coal and steel industries of six European countries,
brought into force by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, marked the first step towards
European integration. The Treaties of Rome of 1957 strengthened the foundations
of this integration, as well as the notion of a common future for the six European
countries involved.

LEGAL BASIS
— The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), or
Treaty of Paris, was signed on 18 April 1951 and came into force on 23 July 1952.
For the first time, six European States agreed to work towards integration. This
Treaty laid the foundations of the Community by setting up an executive known as
the ‘High Authority’, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Court of
Justice and a Consultative Committee. The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002
at the end of the 50-year validity period laid down in Article 97. In accordance
with the Protocol (No 37) annexed to the Treaties (the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the net worth of the
ECSC’s assets at the time of its dissolution was assigned to the Research Fund
for Coal and Steel to finance research by Member States in sectors relating to the
coal and steel industry.
— The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, otherwise known as ‘Euratom’), or
the Treaties of Rome, were signed on 25 March 1957 and came into force on
1 January 1958. Unlike the ECSC Treaty, the Treaties of Rome were concluded ‘for
an unlimited period’ (Article 240 of the EEC Treaty and Article 208 of the EAEC
Treaty), which conferred quasi-constitutional status on them.
— The six founding countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands.

OBJECTIVES
— The founders of the ECSC were clear about their intentions for the Treaty, namely
that it was merely the first step towards a ‘European Federation’. The common
coal and steel market was to be an experiment which could gradually be extended
to other economic spheres, culminating in a political Europe.
— The aim of the European Economic Community was to establish a common
market based on the four freedoms of movement (goods, persons, capital and
services).

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2025

[Link]/factsheets/en
1
 FACTSHEETS

— The aim of Euratom was to coordinate the supply of fissile materials and the
research programmes initiated or being prepared by Member States on the
peaceful use of nuclear energy.
— The preambles to the three Treaties reveal a unity of purpose behind the creation
of the Communities, namely the conviction that the States of Europe must work
together to build a common future as this alone will enable them to control their
destiny.

MAIN PRINCIPLES
The European Communities (the ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were born of the desire for
a united Europe, an idea which gradually took shape as a direct response to the events
that had shattered the continent. In the wake of the Second World War, the strategic
industries, in particular the steel industry, needed reorganising. The future of Europe,
threatened by East-West confrontation, lay in Franco-German reconciliation.
The appeal made by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, on 9 May 1950
can be regarded as the starting point for European integration. At that time, the
choice of coal and steel was highly symbolic: in the early 1950s, coal and steel were
vital industries and the basis of a country’s power. In addition to the clear economic
benefits, the pooling of French and German resources was intended to mark the end
of the rivalry between the two countries. On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman declared:
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ It was on the
basis of that principle that France, Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries (Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Paris, which concentrated
predominantly on ensuring:
— Free movement of goods and free access to sources of production;
— Permanent monitoring of the market to avoid distortions which could lead to the
introduction of production quotas;
— Compliance with the rules of competition and the principle of price transparency;
— Support for modernisation and conversion of the coal and steel sectors.
Following the signing of the Treaty of Paris, and despite France being opposed to
the re-establishment of a German national military force, René Pleven was giving
thought to the formation of a European army. The European Defence Community
(EDC), negotiated in 1952, was to have been accompanied by a Political Community
(EPC). Both plans were shelved following the French National Assembly’s refusal to
ratify the treaty on 30 August 1954.
Efforts to get the process of European integration under way again following the
failure of the EDC took the form of specific proposals at the Messina Conference (in
June 1955) on a customs union and atomic energy. They culminated in the signing of
the EEC and EAEC Treaties.
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC
Treaty, the Treaty of Rome) included:
— The elimination of customs duties between Member States;

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2025

[Link]/factsheets/en
2
 FACTSHEETS

— The establishment of an external Common Customs Tariff;

— The introduction of common policies for agriculture and transport;
— The creation of a European Social Fund;
— The establishment of a European Investment Bank;
— The development of closer relations between the Member States.
To achieve these objectives the EEC Treaty laid down guiding principles and set the
framework for the legislative activities of the Community institutions. These involved
common policies: the common agricultural policy (Articles 38 to 43), transport policy
(Articles 74 and 75) and a common commercial policy (Articles 110 to 113).
The common market is intended to guarantee the free movement of goods and the
mobility of factors of production (the free movement of workers and enterprises, the
freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital).
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (The Euratom
Treaty) had originally set highly ambitious objectives, including the ‘speedy
establishment and growth of nuclear industries’. However, owing to the complex
and sensitive nature of the nuclear sector, which touched on the vital interests of
the Member States (defence and national independence), those ambitions had to be
scaled back.
The Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities, which
was signed and entered into force at the same time as the Treaties of Rome, stipulated
that the Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice would be common institutions.
This Convention lapsed on 1 May 1999. All that remained was for the ‘Executives’ to be
merged, so the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
European Communities of 8 April 1965, known as the ‘Merger Treaty’, duly completed
the process of unifying the institutions.
From then on, the EEC held sway over the sectoral communities, the ECSC, and the
EAEC. This amounted to a victory for the general EEC system over the coexistence
of organisations with sectoral competence, and an establishment of its institutions.
This fact sheet was prepared by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for
Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs.

Mariusz Maciejewski / Rudolfs Verdins

04/2024

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 2025

[Link]/factsheets/en
3
 AT A GLANCE
European Union History Series

Schuman Declaration: 70 years on

Aiming to secure peace in Europe after the horrors of the Second World War, the Schuman Declaration proposed
cooperation among European countries in two key economic areas central to rearmament and warfare: coal and
steel. As an institutional framework for this cooperation, the Schuman Declaration proposed the creation of the
first supranational organisation in Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Established in 1952,
the ECSC laid the foundations for today's European Union (EU). The Schuman Declaration is therefore seen as
the EU’s founding act. Presented by the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, on 9 May 1950, this year marks
the 70th anniversary of the Schuman Declaration.

Europe in the mid-20th century

In the middle of the last century, coal and steel played a significant political and economic role in Europe.
As essential elements in national defence industries, in the potential to wage war, and in economic growth,
they were seen as indicators of state power. After the Second World War, however, coal, one of the most
important energy sources for steel production, was a scarce resource. American and British intentions to lift
production limits for the German steel industry from mid-May 1950 therefore put pressure on France to find
a swift solution to the 'German issue'. In other words, France had to define a strategy to safeguard itself
against potential German aggression and to make sure to benefit in political and economic terms from the
German economic resurgence. From the end of the war, France had followed a policy aimed at preventing
Germany from getting back on its feet, through territorial fragmentation and disarmament. From 1949 on,
however, French foreign policy on the 'German issue' became increasingly shaped by moves towards
Western European integration. Similarly, in Germany, plans for Western European integration were also
discussed, as a way to abolish the Occupation Statute and to obtain sovereignty for the Federal Republic
founded in 1949. The Schuman Declaration provided a simple but convincing answer as to how to secure
peace in Europe by combining the difficult 'German issue' with thinking on the new political architecture
of post-war Europe.

Schuman Declaration: Monnet's supranational innovation

Jean Monnet, guiding light of the
Schuman Declaration and first President
of the ECSC High Authority, alerted
Schuman and French Prime Minister
George Bidault to the possible
consequences for the French economy
of an unimpeded German economic
recovery, in an urgent appeal in early
May 1950. At that time, Monnet was
Head of the French Planning Committee
and familiar with contemporary
thinking on transnational cooperation
in the coal and steel sectors. He worked
from mid-April 1950 on the text which
later became the Schuman Declaration.
There are a total of nine recognised
versions of the text. Its main objectives
were to ensure: peace, security,
European unification, modernisation of
Robert Schuman speaks in the Salon de l'Horloge, Quai d'Orsay, 1950. the French economy, and improvement
© European Communities, 1950; Source: EC - Audiovisual Service. of industrial production conditions,

EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service

Author: Christian Salm, On-site and Online Library Services Unit
PE 649.420 – May 2020
EN
EPRS Schuman Declaration: 70 years on
especially for steel production. This was to be achieved by the establishment of a common market for coal
and steel, and equivalent production conditions for France and Germany. The really innovative element of
the Schuman Declaration, however, was the institutional creation of a new European political organisation.
This encompassed a supranational design in the form of the High Authority (today's European Commission),
equipped with real competence and independent of any direct influence from the participating Member
States.
Monnet could not convince Bidault to agree to his plan. Schuman, in contrast, saw it as an opportunity for
French foreign policy. Having obtained agreement in principle from German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer,
Schuman presented the Declaration in a press conference at the Quai d'Orsay on 9 May 1950. As the text,
marking a turning point in European history, was read out by Schuman, it was thereafter known as the
Schuman Declaration.
Objective: Peace in Europe
To find a way to secure peace in Europe in the post-war era was a difficult task. Nevertheless, it was precisely
this task to which the Schuman Declaration attempted to find an answer. The Declaration's first two
sentences made this absolutely clear. They read: 'World peace cannot be safeguarded without the making
of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it. The contribution which an organised and
living Europe can bring to civilisation is indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations.' It is thus
safe to say that the Schuman Declaration was, in essence, a peace project. This was furthermore underlined
by the day chosen to present the Declaration, 9 May 1950, exactly one day after the fifth anniversary of the
capitulation of Nazi Germany. Without the establishment of a common market for coal and steel, the
creation of a strong supranational institution and the possibility for mutual monitoring, it is possible that
the European countries might have sleepwalked into another war. The 1951 Paris Treaty founding the ECSC
adopted the essence of the Schuman Declaration, putting securing peace in Europe first and foremost.
Negotiating the European Coal and Steel Community
On 3 June 1950, the six participating countries – Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands – announced the launch of an intergovernmental conference to flesh out the Schuman
Declaration. The countries' agreement to start negotiations was due to both political and economic reasons.
Politically, no country wanted to remain outside the newly developing Europe represented by the ECSC.
Economically, Italy and the Benelux countries especially, sought solutions to energy issues due to the lack
of coal and emerging globalisation, which put European energy sectors under pressure from cheaper
energy sources coming from non-European countries.
Intensive negotiations started on June 1950 in Paris and took almost one year. For example, various changes
to the ECSC's institutional form were made during the negotiations. While Monnet had designed the High
Authority as a small, completely independent and highly powerful body, the Benelux countries in particular
demanded the creation of various control bodies. Therefore, further entities were added to the institutional
set-up, including the Court of Justice, a special Council of Ministers (equivalent to today's Council of the
European Union), and the ECSC Common Assembly, the forerunner of the European Parliament. The High
Authority's competences softened, the Paris Treaty establishing the ECSC is not therefore identical to the
institutional framework envisaged by Monnet when preparing the Schuman Declaration. Signed on 18 April
1951, the Paris Treaty entered into force after ratification on 23 July 1952. (Concluded for a fixed period of
50 years, the Treaty expired in July 2002, although its provisions had by then largely been subsumed into
the EU Treaties.)

Historical significance
By creating the ECSC, for the first time in European history, participating states voluntarily gave up part of
their sovereignty to an organisation at European level. The Schuman Declaration thereby allowed the
establishment of the present-day EU by preparing its historical institutional framework. This included, as
one of the most important Schuman Declaration achievements, the breakthrough in Franco-German
reconciliation. Clearly its most important legacy, however, is that the supranational institutions for which
the Declaration paved the way have contributed a great deal to guaranteeing the peaceful co-existence of
European Union Member States over the last 70 years. It is therefore fitting to call the Schuman Declaration
an innovative and visionary peace treaty.

This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their
parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to
represent an official position of the Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is
acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy. © European Union, 2020.
eprs@[Link] (contact) [Link] (intranet) [Link] (internet) [Link] (blog)
 Foundations of EU Law- Tutorial

Syllabus:

Topic 3: (i) Theoretical Perspectives of European Integration including Theoretical and conceptual
approaches to understand the European Integration Process.
a.​ Neo-functionalism – spill over—Functional and Political
b.​ Inter-governmentalism
c.​ Multi-governance
d.​ Realism
e.​ Pluralism
(ii) Historical Developments paving the way for possibility of European integration. – World War,
Hiroshima Nagasaki, Reasons for each country to indulge in WWII
(iii) Marshall Plan, 1948, Schuman Declaration, 1950, Paris Treaty, 1951, Messina Conference, 1955,
Rome Treaty, 1957, Merger Treaty, 1965, Single European Act, 1986.

X-X

1.​ Neofunctionalism

This lack of a substantial account of the dynamics of integration was bridged by neo- functionalist
scholars (e.g. Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963). The basic neofunctionalist assumptions can be summarized as
follows: (1) integration is understood as a process. Implicit in the notion of process is the assumption that
integration processes evolve over time and take on their own dynamic. (2) Regional integration is
characterised by multiple, diverse and changing actors, especially supranational ones, who also build
coalitions across governments/bureaucracies (Haas 1964: 68ff). (3) Decisions are taken by rational and
self-interested actors, who have the capacity to learn from their experiences in co-operative
decision-making and also change their preferences (Haas 1958: 291; Haas 1970: 627). (4) Incremental
decision-making is given primacy over grand designs where seemingly marginal adjustments are often
driven by the unintended consequences of previous decisions.

The neofunctionalist conception of change is succinctly encapsulated in the notion of ‘spillover’. Three
types of spillover have generally been identified: functional, political and cultivated spillover
(Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Functional spillover pressures come about when an original objective can
be assured only by taking further integrative actions (Lindberg 1963: 10). The basis for the development
of these pressures is the interdependence of policy sectors and issue areas. Individual sectors and issues
tend to be so interdependent in modern polities and economies that it is difficult to isolate them from the
rest (Haas 1958: 297, 383). Functional pressures thus encompass the various endogenous
interdependencies, i.e. the tensions and contradictions arising from within, or which are closely related to,
the European integration project, and its policies, politics and polity, which induce policy- makers to take
additional integrative steps in order to achieve their original goals. Political spillover encapsulates the
process whereby (national) elites come to perceive that problems of substantial interest cannot be
effectively addressed at the domestic level. This should lead to a gradual learning process whereby elites
shift their expectations, political activities and – according to Haas – even loyalties to a new European
centre. Consequently, national elites would come to promote further integration, thus adding a political
stimulus to the process. Haas (1958: chs 8 and 9) in particular focused on the pressures exerted by
non-governmental elites. Lindberg (1963 chs. I and IV), for his part, attributed greater significance to the
role of governmental elites and socialisation processes, which tended to foster consensus formation
among member governments. This would eventually lead to more integrative outcomes. Cultivated
spillover concerns the role of supranational institutions that, concerned with increasing their own powers,
become agents of integration, because they are likely to benefit from the progression of this process. Once
established, they tend to take on a life of their own and are difficult to control by those who created them.
Supranational institutions may foster the integration process by various means: for example by acting as
policy entrepreneurs, or through promotional brokerage lifting agreements beyond the lowest common
denominator (e.g. Haas 1961, 1964).

The neofunctionalists themselves focused rather little on integration in the foreign policy domain. Haas
(1958: 297-299) did talk about the need for cooperation among the member states in international
economic institutions, such as the GATT and the OEEC. He identified spillover pressures stemming from
the customs union, internal (ESCE and EC) integration more generally as well as specific rules/norms of
the international institutions in question. Haas was more skeptical when it came to integration spilling
over to military and defence questions, which ‘have not displayed a close affinity to integration unless the
issue involves the related question of saving and allocating resources for welfare measures’ (Haas 1961:
368). Later Schmitter formulated a more general neofunctionalist rationale for external policy cooperation
among member states. Once a regional integration project has got under way and developed common
policies ‘participants’ will find themselves compelled – regardless of their original intentions – to adopt
common policies vis-à-vis non-participant third parties. Members will be forced to hammer out a
collective external position (and in the process are likely to rely increasingly on the new central
institutions to do it)’ (Schmitter 1969: 165). Schmitter points to the incentive of forging common
positions and policies to increase the collective bargaining power of the Community vis-à-vis the outside
world as well as involuntary motives such as the demands of the extra- Community environment reacting
to successful developments within the regional integration project. Schmitter’s externalization hypothesis
was taken further and expanded by Niemann (2006: ch. 1) and termed ‘exogenous spillover’.

In the subsequent literature neofunctionalism has not been used extensively in order to conceptualise
and/or explain European foreign policy. Often neofunctionalism was drawn upon or recognized (as
providing useful theoretical underpinnings) rather implicitly in the literature. This can be seen, for
instance, in the early literature on European Political Cooperation (EPC). A substantial part of the EPC
literature seems to iterate neofunctionalist insights in terms of socialization and ‘engrenage’. Authors
noted for example ‘complex inter-bureaucratic networks’ (Wessels 1982: 13), ‘talking incessantly’
(Nuttall 1992: 12), a strong esprit de corps among the Political Directors (Nuttall 1992: 16), ‘habits of
cooperation’ (Wessels 1980: 23), a ‘coordination reflex’ as a phenomenon that quickly became a
substantial factor in the definition of national positions and in the search for common European positions
(von der Gablentz 1979; Tonra 2001), resulting in deliberations ‘beyond the lowest common
denominator’ (von der Gablentz 1979: 691; Nuttall 1992). The particular neofunctionalist insight into
such phenomena has rarely been acknowledged (but see: Soetendorp 1994; Øhrgaard 1997).
Similarly, a number of studies have indicated the importance of supranational agency in EU foreign
policy without, however, making the link to cultivated spillover or neofunctionalist theory more generally
(e.g. Krause 2003; Mayer 2008; Davies 2011). They show that supranational agents, especially the
Commission, may be able to contribute significantly in shaping EU policy. In addition, some authors also
did relate supranational entrepreneurship to neofunctionalism (Tessem 2008; Niemann 1998).

The concept of functional spillover has been picked up explicitly by a number of authors who argued that
EU foreign policy is more and more intertwined with other policy areas, as a result of which integration in
traditional policy fields may require further integration in the Union’s external policies. For example, the
customs union has been directly linked to trade policy and development policy as access to the
Community’s market could only be decided commonly (Peters and Wagner 2005: 236; Niemann 2012).
Similar (functional) linkages have been identified between development policy and democracy
promotion, or between the internal dimension of technology and environmental policy and their foreign
and security policy dimension (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008: 332-333).

Political spillover in terms of non-governmental elites has been largely ignored as a factor in European
foreign policy, which seems to be indicative of its relevance in this broader policy area. The lesser
involvement of interest groups, which have spurred the European integration process in the (internal)
economic fields, in the policy- making process of EU foreign policy has been taken as one explanation for
why foreign policy integration has generally been lagging behind the process of integration in other policy
fields (cf. Wagner and Hellmann 2003: 584).

Few authors have applied, illustrated or probed neofunctionalism as an entire theory to (certain fields of)
European foreign policy. Pre-accession, enlargement and neighbourhood policy has been the area where
neofunctionalism has been employed most frequently (Niemann 1998, Özen 1998; Renner 2009;
Macmillan 2009). In addition, neofunctionalism has found isolated application to trade policy (Niemann
2012) and defense policy (Collester 2000). Some of these accounts have treated the neofunctionalist
approach rather ‘heuristically’ (Özen 1998; Collester 2000). The applicability of neofunctionalist theory
to these policy areas has generally been viewed rather optimistically (but see Özen 1998), even if in some
instances a somewhat revised neofunctionalist framework has been probed (Niemann 2006, 2012).

2.​ Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalists hypothesise that the development of European integration is determined by states’

interests and the outcomes of EU bargaining. Integration only takes place if there is a permanent excess of
gains and losses for nation-states. It is thus viewed as strengthening the nation-state since it takes place
according to its ‘rules’ (Hoffmann 1966, 1982; Milward 1992). While for intergovernmentalists
governments are the paramount actors, the role of supranational institutions is downplayed. Governments
only transfer sovereignty to institutions where potential joint gains are large, but efforts to secure
compliance by other governments through decentralised means are likely to be ineffective (Moravcsik
1998: 9). Supranational institutions are denied any significant independent entrepreneurship and are
subject to amendment by member governments. In his liberal intergovernmentalist account
(LI), Moravcsik (1993, 1998) has developed the intergovernmentalist approach. He departed from
‘classic’ intergovernmentalism which sees national interests arising in the context of the state’s perception
of its relative position in the states system. Instead, Moravcsik views national preferences arising in the
context provided by the domestic politics of the state. Preferences emerge from dynamic political
processes in the domestic polity. However, the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the
states themselves and the relative power each brings to the bargaining table. Hence, further integration is
possible, when (the most powerful) member states see their interest best served through such undertaking.

In terms of European foreign policy, ‘classic’ intergovernmentalists have been very sceptical concerning
the prospect of integration because this policy area was considered ‘high politics’, i.e. close to the heart of
national sovereignty (Hoffmann 1966: 882). ‘When the functions are concerned with the ineffable and
intangible issues of Grosspolitik, when grandeur and prestige, rank and security, domination and
dependence are at stake, we are fully within the realm of traditional interstate politics’ (Hoffmann 1964:
88; cited in Koenig-Archibugi 2004: 139). Effective cooperation depends on the convergence of national
interests, but in the area of foreign policy such convergence was seen as rather unlikely, as states tend to
have very different interests in this policy area (e.g. stemming from diverging geopolitical and systemic
embeddedness), as a result of which Hoffmann sees a ‘logic of diversity’ at play in the domain of
European foreign policy4. During the Cold War the member states of the Community pursued different
foreign policy interests with regard to European security and defence. While de Gaulle sought to
challenge American tutelage, the other member states were not prepared to test US hegemony and thus
risk losing its protective power (Hoffmann 1966: 890). This situation changed after the iron curtain was
lifted and the demand for US protection substantially weakened. As a result, the fundamental security and
defence policy preferences among the member states, including those of Britain, Germany and France,
substantially converged, thus making somewhat closer cooperation in this domain possible (Hoffmann
2000).

Liberal intergovernmentalism suggests that sector-specific welfare interests of dominant interest groups
determine member governments’ utility function in terms of cooperation/integration. In terms of foreign
policy, this utility function is difficult to ascertain given the lesser involvement of influential (economic)
interest groups (Moravcsik 1998: 28-30). As a result, the original LI thesis has been somewhat modified.
Subsequently, it has been argued that in areas where economic/welfare interests are not substantially
affected, member governments tend to favour further integration when they do not have (credible)
unilateral alternatives for action (Moravcsik 1998; Moravcsik and Nicolaidis 1999). Moravcisk and
Nicolaidis (1999)

4 In a similar vein, French political scientist Raymond Aron (1966) argues that integration in the
economic domain will not necessarily lead to integrative steps in the foreign policy field due to a diversity
of political history and national interest: ‘the system of obligations created by the institutions of Europe
(...) will not create a common will among French, Germans, Italians to be henceforth autonomous as
Europeans and no longer as members of historical nations’ (Aron 1966: 748).

thus argue that, during the intergovernmental conferences leading to the Treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam, Britain and France were the strongest opponents of a supranational CFSP because they
possessed other (unilateral) foreign and security policy alternatives, while Germany lacked such
alternatives and thus favoured a more supranational CFSP.
In terms of enlargement, Moravcsik (1998) only analysed the issue of British membership in the 1960s.
LI explained that the British bargaining position was weak because Britain was more dependent on the
EC than the other way round. France managed to extract substantial concessions (especially with regard
to the CAP) in return for giving up its veto since it had little economic interest in UK membership (1998:
219-224). Moravcsik and Vachudova (2002) apply LI to Eastern enlargement and argue in a similar
manner. The bargaining power of EU member states was significantly greater than that of the applicant
countries given the latter’s dependence on Western European investment and market access. As a result,
the candidate countries decided to accept the EU membership conditions rather than being excluded from
the Union.

Koenig-Archibugi (2004) has argued – based on his LI informed account – that member governments
cooperate in European foreign policy because a realisation of their preferences at EU level provides them
with support vis-à-vis national opposition and societal groups, and because economic interdependencies
between states gradually increase, as a result of which particular economic interests can only be realised
through enhanced cooperation at European level. Also based on LI, some authors have expanded
Moravcsik’s two-level approach to three-level or multi-level bargaining accounts (e.g. Patterson 1997;
Collinson 1999; Knodt and Princen: 2003 4).

Apart from these rather explicit applications of classical and liberal intergovernmentalism to European
foreign policy, many authors seem to have viewed EFP, and especially the CFSP/ESDP, from an
intergovernmentalist perspective, at least implicitly. Notions of the ‘lowest common denominator’, the
importance of ‘national interests’, ‘member state control’, and the ‘intergovernmental design’ of large
parts of European foreign policy have, for a long time, perhaps been the mainstream account in this policy
area. Intergovernmentalism has been used very heuristically and rather descriptively – i.e. without
probing or applying the basic intergovernmentalist tenets/theses explicitly or systematically – by many
authors (e.g. Gillespie 2011). In addition, ‘intergovernmentalism’ has been the semantic, if not
conceptual, point of departure for the coining of a multitude of hybrid terms and concepts, such as
‘Brussels-based intergovernmentalism’ (Allen 1998), ‘supranational intergovernmentalism’ (Horworth
2010), ‘deliberative intergovernmentalism’ (Puetter 2003; cf. Sjursen 2011), ‘democratic
intergovernmentalism’ (Sjursen 2011), or ‘rationalised intergovernmentalism’

3.​ Pluralism

In recent years, challenges have arisen on several fronts. This includes most prominently the suppression
of societal pluralism in Hungary and the violation of judicial independence in Poland but also the
challenge to EU legal supremacy by Germany’s highest court, the conditionality of support to Greece
during the euro crisis and the (unsuccessful) recourse to differentiated integration in the single market to
prevent Brexit. While such issues are often studied separately, we argue that they are connected by a
common thread: the EU’s attempt to address a plurality of interests, values, and views – including those
related to its very own nature – in a democratic manner.

In general, the relation between democracy and pluralism is complex. On the one hand, the very idea of
modern democracy is premised on what Rawls called the ‘fact of reasonable pluralism’: a democratic
order aims to produce commonly binding norms that can be reasonably accepted by all citizens despite
their competing interests and values. On the other hand, democracy can only be sustained if there is some
minimal consensus on the basic norms that govern the ways collective matters are settled. Hence,
democracy finds its limits in accommodating pluralism where that pluralism turns against democracy
itself; that is, when it encounters positions that are themselves unwilling to recognize the validity of
competing values and interests. Short of those extremes, a democratic polity continuously has to look for
ways to accommodate the diversity of interests and values that it encounters.

In the EU, pluralism is taken to a next level, as it is composed of a heterogeneous set of member states
that each face pluralism internally. What is more, these pluralisms themselves are related to a plurality of
views of what the EU is and ought to be. As a consequence, the EU regularly has to navigate the tension
between democracy and pluralism when member states raise deviant demands, or when its
decision-making rules are being challenged.

EU is not a state with a well-entrenched constitutional structure. Instead, all EU member states bring their
own, often long-established conceptions of democracy and constitutionalism into the Union and accede
with diverging motivations and ideas about what the EU is and how it should evolve. Hence, in this
article, we ask how we can understand controversies between the EU and its member states in light of
alternative conceptions of the EU and its democratic and pluralistic character. In response to this question,
we argue that the pluralism of conceptions of what the EU is, and what it should be, has exacerbated the
controversies mentioned. What is more, the absence of a shared understanding of the nature of the polity
and the constitutional rules that govern it fundamentally challenges the ability to resolve these
controversies in a democratic way. Hence, we argue for a greater recognition and awareness of the
pluralism of EU conceptions in the Union, its member states, and among its citizens, because conflicts
between them are bound to resurface time and again. This requires the recognition of EU politics as an
arena in which not only different interests and values but also distinct EU conceptions conflict with each
other.
European Union and its member states. In that particularly challenging context, the plurality of views,
values, and interests of persons and groups comes to be related to two other ‘subjects’ of pluralism:
constitutional pluralism and a pluralism of EU conceptions. To add these subjects of pluralism is
necessary, we argue, because of the intense – and indeed contested – relations the EU maintains with its
member states. Also within the EU the issue of societal pluralism remains first and foremost an issue for
nation states. Each of the EU member states continues to be the primary arena in which societal pluralism
is played out and addressed within the confines of its respective constitutional structure. However, these
constitutional structures vary from member state to member state. Nations have travelled different paths,
in which they have made different constitutional choices, in more or less democratic ways, about what
national democracy demands and how it should be institutionalized. For that reason, EU member states
display a remarkable constitutional richness, which they – according to their own proclamation in the
Treaty on European Union – want the Union to ‘respect’ (Art. 4.2 TEU). Hence, given the range of
conceptions of national democracy, we find within the EU not only societal pluralism (a pluralism of
social interests and comprehensive doctrines) but also constitutional pluralism (a pluralism of national
institutional responses to societal pluralism). With the latter term we refer not to the ‘vertical’ conflict
between the national legal order and the EU legal order as commonly problematized in EU legal theory.
This constitutional pluralism creates a problem for the EU depending on the particular view one holds of
the nature of European integration. Here we discern a third subject of pluralism: a pluralism of
conceptions of what the EU is. For example: as long as the EU is regarded as a form of international
cooperation only, erected for the sole benefit of each of its member states, constitutional pluralism need
not be a pressing EU problem. In this view, a nation’s democratic practice is primarily that nation’s
business and not that of another state or of a union of freely cooperating nation states. In contrast, if the
EU is seen as an autonomous political and legal order, shaped by its own principles of democracy and rule
of law, then it is not unreasonable that EU institutions critically examine each member state’s form of
democracy as incorporated in its constitutional structure. In conceptualizing pluralism in the context of
the EU, we thus highlight a pluralism of EU conceptions, which comes on top of a domestic pluralism of
worldviews among societal groups and a pluralism of constitutional arrangements across member states.
In the rest of this article, we argue that distinguishing and recognizing these different kinds of pluralism in
the EU is essential to properly grasp the dynamics of recent EU crises and to appreciate the difficulties to
resolve them in a democratic way. The focus on pluralism also allows us to indicate how the crises
resemble each other and how they are different.

Two positions that are particularly distinctive about ways to conceive of the EU and, in particular, about
the relations that it establishes between its component parts, the member state democracies. The first
conception underlines the intergovernmental character of the EU and emphasizes its primary focus on
establishing order and peace. It sees the member state democracies as essentially self-centred and, on that
basis, developing instrumental relations with each other. The other conception rather sees the EU as
engaging its member states in a cooperative union with a cosmopolitan orientation. That is, it sees the
member states and their citizens, in the domains in which they are cooperating (particularly the single
market), as opening up to each other and committing to rules and norms that transcend national interests
and identities.

4.​ Realism

Traditionally, it has been difficult to combine realism with European integration in general, since IR and
EU scholars often view realism as a theory of non-integration. The various realist approaches see EU
foreign and security policy as nothing more than the combined effort of member states’ foreign and
security policies, which can only deliver common denominator-based policies. However, as the realist
block has branched off in different directions, the gap between European integration and realism has (at
least partially) been bridged, and the usefulness of the theory to the study of the EU has been
acknowledged (Reichwein, 2015). From the perspective of neo-realism, the behaviour of states is a result
of their relative power and position in the international anarchical system. Consequently, the
transformation of Europe into a rule-based interstate system has confounded neo-realists (Hyde-Price,
2018). However, revisions made to neo-realist theory during the 1990s and 2000s made neo-realism better
suited to explain the European situation, as it tried to explain the high degree of cooperation that resulted
in the creation of the CFSP. Based on Kenneth N. Waltz’s theory on the balance of power (Waltz, 1979),
the creation of the CFSP has been linked to member states’ desire to act as a counterbalance to the US, as
well as an attempt to balance out one another (Reichwein, 2015).
However, the revised neo-realist focus on European integration was short-lived and, as a consequence, the
EU remains under-theorised in neo-realist thought. Assumptions made by neo-realists predict that, as
states operate in an anarchical order, the EU as we know it will eventually break down—even though
cooperation is necessary to balance against the US (Mearsheimer, 2014; Walt, 2004). However, collapse
has thus far been averted, and the EU has muddled through several crises that ought to have led to its
downfall (Riddervold et al., 2021). This shows that realist theories lack predictive capability when it
comes to EU security policy. Thus, the main focus of realism has remained the nation state and the
cooperation (or lack thereof) between sovereign actors, neglecting the values and interests of the EU has a
whole. As a result, when it comes to analysing the multi-actor character of the EU and of EU foreign and
security policy, realism falls short.

X-X

Historical Developments paving the way for possibility of European integration. – World
War, Hiroshima Nagasaki, Reasons for each country to indulge in WWII

European integration refers to the process of pooling national sovereignty among European nation-states
to create the European Union (EU). It is a unique and successful experiment in international cooperation,
characterized by its own system of law, supranational institutions, and currency. European integration has
faced challenges due to tensions between national interests and shared economic interdependence.

European integration is the product of the selective pooling of national sovereignty, or ultimate
jurisdiction over a body politic, by postwar European nation-states. It has yielded the European Union
(EU), the most successful experiment in international cooperation in modern history. European
integration poses daunting challenges to political science as a discipline. The EU defies traditional
conceptions of states as atomized, self-sufficient units that engage in alliances strictly on an ad hoc basis.
Only the EU amongst all international organizations has its own system of law, supranational institutions,
and currency. It has evolved into a polity in its own right, although an extraordinarily complex and
protean one, which sustains more than it supersedes the nation-state in Europe. European integration has
been subject to frequent stops and starts. It rarely has shaken free of tensions between distinct national
interests and shared economic interdependence. Even after the EU succeeded in creating a single
currency, it faced a crisis of purpose amidst pressures to admit Central and Eastern European states that
were far less modern or wealthy than its existing members.

However, with the global economic crises in the early 1970s, it became clear that the experiments in
regional integration outside Europe were not as deeply entrenched as the process within Western Europe.
Ernst Haas, the founding father of ‘regional integration theory,’ consequently proclaimed that the
generalizable study of regional integration was now ‘obsolete’ (Haas 1976). From the launch of European
integration in the 1950s to the relaunch in the mid-1980s, there have been two dominant explanations of
European integration.

3.1 Neofunctionalism
Neofunctionalism was first proposed by Haas (1958) to explain the establishment of the ECSC Treaty,
and was developed by his disciples to explain subsequent integration steps. The basic argument of
neofunctionalism is that European integration is a deterministic process, whereby ‘a given action, related
to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further
actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more, and so forth’ (Lindberg 1963, p. 9).
This ‘spillover’ process is promoted by two sets of actors. First, at the domestic level, societal and
sectional interests promote integration of different policy sectors to achieve political advantage over their
opponents or secure benefits already accrued by the integration of other policy sectors. For example, in
the 1980s, multinational business interests lobbied for the establishment of a European-wide single
market, to secure greater economies of scale and lower transactions costs in cross-border trade. Second, at
the European level, the supranational institutions promoted further integration to increase their ability to
shape policy outcomes. For example, in the 1960s the European Court of Justice consciously made rulings
and established doctrines to promote legal integration in Europe, and in the mid-1980s the European
Commission was instrumental in persuading governments to adopt the program for completing the single
market.

3.2 Intergovernmentalism
Neofunctionalism's failure to explain the slowdown of European integration in the 1970s, and the
subsequent strengthening of the ‘intergovernmental’ elements of the European Communities, led to the
emergence of a starkly opposing theory of European integration, known as intergovernmentalism. In
direct contrast with neofunctionalism's emphasis on nonstate interests at the domestic and supranational
levels, intergovernmentalism argues that European integration is driven by the interests and actions of the
European nation-states. In this interpretation, the main aim of nation-states is to protect their geopolitical
interests, such as national security and ‘sovereignty.’ Also, interstate bargaining is a zero-sum game,
where ‘losses are not compensated by gains on other issues: nobody wants to be fooled’ (Hoffmann 1966,
p. 882). Consequently, against the neo-functionalist ‘logic of integration,’ intergovernmentalists see a
‘logic of diversity [which] suggests that, in areas of key importance to the national interest, nations prefer
the certainty, or the self-controlled uncertainty, of national self-reliance, to the uncontrolled uncertainty of
the untested blunder’ (Hoffmann 1966, p. 88). From the intergovernmentalist perspective, then, European
integration was relaunched in the mid-1980s because the governments in the large member states shared
the same policy preference for a single market and the governments in the periphery states were bought
off through ‘side payments,’ such as regional transfers

Historical events in the European integration process (1945–2009)

1945–1949 The pioneering phase

At the end of the Second World War, Europe was totally drained of vitality and exhausted. Age-old trade links had
been cut off, and any heavy industry or vital manufacturing sector that had not been destroyed was operating below
capacity in a Europe that lay bloodied and ill-prepared to deal with the millions of people made homeless both during
and after the war. The continent was now relegated to playing second fiddle on the international stage owing to the
increased might of the United States and the Soviet Union and the growing rivalry between those two countries. In
this context, a divided Western Europe quickly realised that the path to its survival lay in pooling its economic
resources and establishing effective, common institutions, where necessary with US financial, technical and military
support. They were times of great political instability accompanied by heightened social tensions, and innovative
diplomatic solutions were urgently needed, even at regional level. The debate on the status of Germany, where, from
1961, the division of Berlin was the symbol in Europe of the Cold War between the two Great Powers, together with
the inexorable demise of colonial rule made the continent’s dependence on external aid all the more striking. It was at
this point that pro-European movements and supporters of federalism moved into action and vigorously promoted the
idea of European unification. Closely associated with financial circles and demonstrating allegiance to a particular
political tendency or, on the contrary, seeking to mobilise the general public, these movements, some of which
originated in the Resistance, established in 1947 an International Committee of the Movements for European Unity. In
May 1948, they also convened the Hague Congress, from which emerged the European Movement (EM), founded in
Brussels on 25 October 1948.

WWII- Europe was in ruins and reduced to total confusion: factories and transport links destroyed, traditional trade
dislocated, livestock wiped out and shortages in raw materials and foodstuffs prevalent. The war was being prolonged
by purges and the settling of old scores, which were once again tearing apart the liberated countries. Reconciliation
seemed extremely difficult. It was impossible to imagine that, one day, yesterday’s enemies might join together to
form a common organisation. There were three basic questions for the peoples of Europe exhausted by the conflict.
The first was economic: how could material damage be repaired and economic activity revived on the old continent?
The second was political: how could the return of a conflict which had set Europe and the whole world ablaze be
prevented? The third was cultural: how could the survival and renaissance of European civilisation be ensured in the
face of the increasing threats, which seemed to be embodied in the ideological schism and confrontation between the
victorious American and Soviet blocs?

Cold War- The end of the Second World War did not signal a return to normality. On the contrary, it resulted in a new
conflict, less bloody, but longer and more insidious: the Cold War. The Allied Powers could not agree on a Peace
Treaty with a Germany which was defeated and divided into four occupied zones.
The conflicts of interest between the new world powers multiplied, and a climate of fear and suspicion reigned. The
result was a long period of international tension, interspersed with dramatic crises which, from time to time, led to
localised armed conflicts without actually causing a full-scale war between the United States and the USSR. From
1947 to the end of the Cold War, Europe, divided in two blocs, was at the heart of the struggle between the two
superpowers. The Cold War first reached a climax with the Soviet blockade of Berlin. The explosion of the first Soviet
atomic bomb in the summer of 1949 reinforced the USSR in its role as a world power.

X-X

TREATIES:

1.​ Messina Conference

The Messina Conference of 1955 was a meeting of the six member states of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). The conference assessed the progress of the ECSC and, deciding that it was working
well, proposed further European integration. This initiative led to the creation in 1957 of the European
Economic Community and Euratom. the meeting included consideration of the action programme to
relaunch European integration. In August 1954 the plans had collapsed to create a European Political
Community and a common defence force, the European Defence Community, as a substitute for the
national armies of Germany, France, Italy, and the three Beneluxcountries, when France refused to ratify
the treaty.[1] The six ECSC countries then turned their attention to the idea of a customs union, which was
elaborated at Messina. The final resolution of the conference, largely reflecting the point of view of the
three Benelux countries, formed the basis for further work to relaunch European integration. The Benelux
countries in their BeNeLux memorandum proposed a revival of European integration on the basis of a
common market and integration in the transport and atomic energy sectors. Paul-Henri Spaak, who was
entrusted, on 18 June, with the production of a report at an Intergovernmental Committee in order to
evaluate the option of a sectoral integration or the step-by-step establishment of a European common
market. The Spaak Report of the Spaak Committee and the subsequent Intergovernmental Conference on
the Common Market and Euratom which was held at the Château of Val-Duchesse would lead to the
Treaties of Rome in 1957 and the formation of the European Economic Community and Euratom in 1958.

In Messina the Foreign Ministers expressed their wish to start negotiations at both levels at once: while forms of new,
partial integration — especially in the areas of transport, conventional energy and nuclear energy — needed to be
examined, another objective was the creation of a common market.

The discussions mainly focused on the memorandum submitted by the Benelux countries, which summarised the
various proposals and ideas. The ministers of the Six agreed to look into the possibility of extending European
integration to all sectors of the economy.

There were rather differing and conflicting concepts of Europe at Messina: for or against supranational institutions, for
or against giving the ECSC wider powers, giving priority to political or economic aspects, and so forth. Despite these
differences, agreement was reached at dawn on 3 June 1955.

The Six adopted a resolution in which they stated their determination to make ‘further progress […] towards the
setting up of a united Europe by the development of common institutions, the gradual merging of national economies,
the creation of a common market and the harmonisation of their social policies’.

Determined to ensure that Europe maintained its position in the world and to restore its influence, they also set
themselves the objective of progressively raising the standard of living of its population.

The six ministers recognised the importance of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. They therefore
considered it essential to look into creating a common organisation which would have the responsibility and the
facilities for ensuring the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

The Messina Conference signalled the start of the European revival.

2.​ Merger Treaty

The Merger Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Brussels,[1] was a European treaty which unified the
executive institutions of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy
Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The treaty was signed in Brussels
on 8 April 1965 and came into force on 1 July 1967. It set out that the Commission of the European
Communities should replace the High Authority of the ECSC, the Commission of the EEC and the
Commission of Euratom, and that the Council of the European Communities should replace the Special
Council of Ministers of the ECSC, the Council of the EEC and the Council of Euratom.[2] Although each
Community remained legally independent, they shared common institutions (prior to this treaty, they
already shared a Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice) and were together known as the European
Communities. This treaty is regarded by some as the real beginning of the modern European Union. This
treaty was abrogated by the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997.

Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (Merger
Treaty)
The Merger Treaty of 1965 merged the executives. The European Communities was established as a
result of the merger of the institutions set up by the ECSC, the EEC and the Euratom.

- Signed in: Brussels (Belgium) 8 April 1965

- Entry into force: 1st July 1967

Treaty of Brussels (Merger Treaty)
What was the aim of the Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European
Communities?

The Brussels Treaty establishing a single Council and single Commission of the European Communities
(known as the ‘Merger Treaty’) was signed with the explicit intention of unifying the 3 then-existing
European Communities (EC) — the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or more commonly
known as ‘Euratom’). While keeping the 3 communities legally independent, the Merger Treaty
rationalised their institutions by merging their then still independent executive bodies — thus bringing to
5 the number of common European institutions — and amended the 3 community treaties accordingly.
FACT SHEETS ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

The historical development

of European integration
PE 618.969

1. The First Treaties.....................................................................................................3

2. Developments up to the Single European Act.........................................................6
3. The Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties...............................................................10
4. The Treaty of Nice and the Convention on the Future of Europe.......................... 14
5. The Treaty of Lisbon..............................................................................................18

EN - 18/06/2018
ABOUT THE PUBLICATION

This leaflet contains a compilation of Fact Sheets provided by Parliament’s Policy

Departments and Economic Governance Support Unit on the relevant policy area.

The Fact Sheets are updated regularly and published on the website of the European
Parliament: [Link]

ABOUT THE PUBLISHER

Author of the publication: European Parliament

Department responsible: Unit for Coordination of Editorial and Communication

Activities
E-mail: editorial-secretariat@[Link]

Manuscript completed in June, 2018

© European Union, 2018

DISCLAIMER

The opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and
do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided

the source is acknowledged and the publisher is given prior notice and sent a copy.
 1 - THE FIRST TREATIES - [1.1.1.]

The disastrous effects of the Second World War and the constant threat of an East-
West confrontation meant that the Franco-German reconciliation had become a top
priority. The decision to pool the coal and steel industries of six European countries,
brought into force by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, marked the first step towards
European integration. The Treaties of Rome of 1957 strengthened the foundations
of this integration and the notion of a common future for the six European countries
involved.

LEGAL BASIS
— The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), or
Treaty of Paris, was signed on 18 April 1951 and came into force on 25 July 1952.
For the first time, six European States agreed to work towards integration. This
Treaty laid the foundations of the Community by setting up an executive known as
the ‘High Authority’, a Parliamentary Assembly, a Council of Ministers, a Court of
Justice and a Consultative Committee. The ECSC Treaty expired on 23 July 2002
at the end of the 50-year validity period laid down in its Article 97. In accordance
with the Protocol (No 37) annexed to the Treaties (the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), the net worth of the
ECSC’s assets at the time of its dissolution was assigned to the Research Fund
for Coal and Steel to finance research by Member States in sectors relating to the
coal and steel industry.
— The Treaties establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the
European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, otherwise known as ‘Euratom’), or
the Treaties of Rome, were signed on 25 March 1957 and came into force on
1 January 1958. Unlike the ECSC Treaty, the Treaties of Rome were concluded
‘for an unlimited period’ (Article 240 of the EEC Treaty and Article 208 of the EAEC
Treaty), which conferred quasi-constitutional status on them.
— The six founding countries were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg
and the Netherlands.

OBJECTIVES
— The founders of the ECSC were clear about their intentions for the Treaty, namely
that it was merely the first step towards a ‘European Federation’. The common
coal and steel market was to be an experiment which could gradually be extended
to other economic spheres, culminating in a political Europe.
— The aim of the European Economic Community was to establish a common market
based on the four freedoms of movement (goods, persons, capital and services).
— The aim of Euratom was to coordinate the supply of fissile materials and the
research programmes initiated or being prepared by Member States on the
peaceful use of nuclear energy.
— The preambles to the three Treaties reveal a unity of purpose behind the creation
of the Communities, namely the conviction that the States of Europe must work

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 3

 together to build a common future as this alone will enable them to control their
destiny.

MAIN PRINCIPLES
The European Communities (the ECSC, EEC and Euratom) were born of the desire for
a united Europe, an idea which gradually took shape as a direct response to the events
that had shattered the continent. In the wake of the Second World War the strategic
industries, in particular the steel industry, needed reorganising. The future of Europe,
threatened by East-West confrontation, lay in Franco-German reconciliation.
1. The appeal made by Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, on 9 May
1950 can be regarded as the starting point for European integration. At that time,
the choice of coal and steel was highly symbolic: in the early 1950s coal and steel
were vital industries, the basis of a country’s power. In addition to the clear economic
benefits, the pooling of French and German resources was intended to mark the end
of the rivalry between the two countries. On 9 May 1950 Robert Schuman declared:
‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built
through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.' It was on the
basis of that principle that France, Italy, Germany and the Benelux countries (Belgium,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Treaty of Paris, which concentrated
predominantly on ensuring:
— free movement of goods and free access to sources of production;
— permanent monitoring of the market to avoid distortions which could lead to the
introduction of production quotas;
— compliance with the rules of competition and the principle of price transparency;
— support for modernisation and conversion of the coal and steel sectors.
2. Following the signing of the Treaty, and despite France being opposed to the
reestablishment of a German national military force, René Pleven was giving thought
to the formation of a European army. The European Defence Community (EDC),
negotiated in 1952, was to have been accompanied by a Political Community (EPC).
Both plans were shelved following the French National Assembly’s refusal to ratify the
treaty on 30 August 1954.
3. Efforts to get the process of European integration under way again following the
failure of the EDC took the form of specific proposals at the Messina Conference (in
June 1955) on a customs union and atomic energy. They culminated in the signing of
the EEC and EAEC Treaties.
a. The EEC Treaty’s provisions included:
— the elimination of customs duties between Member States;
— the establishment of an external Common Customs Tariff;
— the introduction of common policies for agriculture and transport;
— the creation of a European Social Fund;
— the establishment of a European Investment Bank;
— the development of closer relations between the Member States.

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 4

To achieve these objectives the EEC Treaty laid down guiding principles and set the
framework for the legislative activities of the Community institutions. These involved
common policies: the common agricultural policy (Articles 38 to 43), transport policy
(Articles 74 and 75) and a common commercial policy (Articles 110 to 113).
The common market is intended to guarantee the free movement of goods and the
mobility of factors of production (the free movement of workers and enterprises, the
freedom to provide services and the free movement of capital).
b. The Euratom Treaty had originally set highly ambitious objectives, including
the ‘speedy establishment and growth of nuclear industries’. However, owing to the
complex and sensitive nature of the nuclear sector, which touched on the vital interests
of the Member States (defence and national independence), those ambitions had to
be scaled back.
4. The Convention on certain institutions common to the European Communities,
which was signed and entered into force at the same time as the Treaties of Rome,
stipulated that the Parliamentary Assembly and Court of Justice would be common
institutions. All that remained was for the ‘Executives’ to be merged; the Treaty
establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities
of 8 April 1965, known as the ‘Merger Treaty’, duly completed the process of unifying
the institutions.
From then on, the EEC held sway over the sectoral communities, the ECSC and the
EAEC. This amounted to a victory for the general EEC system over the coexistence of
organisations with sectoral competence, and a victory for its institutions.
Petr Novak
05/2018

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 5

 2 - DEVELOPMENTS UP TO THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT - [1.1.2.]

The main developments of the early Treaties are related to the creation of Community
own resources, the reinforcement of the budgetary powers of Parliament, election
of MEPs by direct universal suffrage and the setting-up of the European Monetary
System. The entry into force of the Single European Act in 1986, substantially altering
the Treaty of Rome, bolstered the notion of integration by creating a large internal
market.

MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS IN THE FIRST STAGE OF INTEGRATION

Article 8 of the Treaty of Rome provided for the completion of a common market over a
transitional period of 12 years, in three stages, ending on 31 December 1969. Its first
aim, the customs union, was completed more quickly than expected. The transitional
period for enlarging quotas and phasing out internal customs ended as early as 1 July
1968. Even so, at the end of the transitional period there were still major obstacles to
freedom of movement. By then, Europe had adopted a common external tariff for trade
with third countries.
Creating a ‘Green Europe’ was another major project for European integration. The first
regulations on the common agricultural policy (CAP) were adopted and the European
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) was set up in 1962.

FIRST TREATY AMENDMENTS

A. Improvements to the institutions
The first institutional change came about with the Merger Treaty of 8 April 1965, which
merged the executive bodies. This took effect in 1967, setting up a single Council
and Commission of the European Communities (the ECSC, EEC and EAEC) and
introducing the principle of a single budget.
B. Own resources and budgetary powers
The Council decision of 21 April 1970 set up a system of Community own resources,
replacing financial contributions by the Member States (1.4.1).
— The Treaty of Luxembourg of 22 April 1970 granted Parliament certain budgetary
powers (1.3.1).
— The Treaty of Brussels of 22 July 1975 gave Parliament the right to reject the
budget and to grant the Commission a discharge for implementing the budget. The
same Treaty set up the Court of Auditors, a body responsible for scrutinising the
Community’s accounts and financial management (1.3.12).
C. Elections
The Act of 20 September 1976 gave Parliament new legitimacy and authority by
introducing election by direct universal suffrage (1.3.4). The Act was revised in 2002,
introducing the general principle of proportional representation and other framework
provisions for national legislation on the European elections.

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 6

D. Enlargement
The UK joined on 1 January 1973, together with Denmark and Ireland; the Norwegian
people had voted against accession in a referendum. Greece became a member in
1981; Portugal and Spain joined in 1986.
E. EU budget
After the first round of enlargement there were calls for greater budgetary rigour
and reform of the CAP. The 1979 European Council reached agreement on a
series of complementary measures. The 1984 Fontainebleau agreements produced a
sustainable solution based on the principle that adjustments could be made to assist
any Member State with a financial burden that was excessive in terms of its relative
prosperity.

PLANS FOR FURTHER INTEGRATION

Building on the initial successes of the economic community, the aim of also creating
political unity for the Member States resurfaced in the early 1960s, despite the failure
of the European Defence Community (EDC) in August 1954.
A. Failure of an attempt to achieve political union
At the 1961 Bonn summit, the Heads of State or Government of the six founding
Member States of the European Community asked an intergovernmental committee,
chaired by French ambassador Christian Fouchet, to put forward proposals on the
political status of a union of European peoples. The study committee tried in vain, on
two occasions between 1960 and 1962, to present the Member States with a draft treaty
that was acceptable to all, even though Fouchet based his plan on strict respect for the
identity of the Member States, thus rejecting the federal option.
In the absence of a political community, its substitute took the form of European Political
Cooperation, or EPC. At the summit conference in The Hague in December 1969, the
Heads of State or Government decided to look into the best way of making progress in
the field of political unification. The Davignon report, adopted by the Foreign Ministers
in October 1970 and subsequently enlarged upon by further reports, formed the basis
of EPC until the Single Act entered into force.
B. The 1966 crisis
A serious crisis arose when, at the third stage of the transition period, voting procedures
in the Council were to change from the unanimity rule to qualified majority voting in a
number of areas. France opposed a range of Commission proposals, which included
measures for financing the CAP, and stopped attending the main Community meetings
(the ‘empty chair’ policy). Eventually, agreement was reached on the Luxembourg
Compromise (1.3.7), which stated that, when vital interests of one or more countries
were at stake, members of the Council would endeavour to reach solutions that could
be adopted by all while respecting their mutual interests.
C. The increasing importance of European ‘summits’
Though remaining outside the Community institutional context, the conferences of
Heads of State or Government of the Member States started to provide political
guidance and to settle the problems that the Council of Ministers could not handle.
After early meetings in 1961 and 1967, the conferences took on increasing significance
with the summit at The Hague on 1 and 2 December 1969, which allowed negotiations

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 7

to begin on enlarging the Community and saw agreement on the Community finance
system, and with the Fontainebleau summit (in December 1974), at which major
political decisions were taken on the direct election of the European Parliament and
the decision-taking procedure within the Council. At that summit, the Heads of State
or Government also decided to meet three times a year as the ‘European Council’ to
discuss Community affairs and political cooperation (1.3.6).
D. Institutional reform and monetary policy
Towards the end of the 1970s there were various initiatives in the Member States to
bring their economic and fiscal policies into line with each other. To solve the problem of
monetary instability and its adverse effects on the CAP and cohesion between Member
States, the Bremen and Brussels European Councils in 1978 set up the European
Monetary System (EMS). Established on a voluntary and differentiated basis — the UK
decided not to participate in the exchange-rate mechanism — the EMS was based on
a common accounting unit, the ECU.
At the London European Council in 1981 the Foreign Ministers of Germany and Italy,
Mr Genscher and Mr Colombo, put forward a proposal for a ‘European Act’ covering a
range of subjects: political cooperation, culture, fundamental rights, harmonisation of
the law outside the fields covered by the Community Treaties, and ways of dealing with
violence, terrorism and crime. It was not adopted in its original form, but some parts
of it resurfaced in the ‘Solemn declaration on European Union’ adopted in Stuttgart on
19 June 1983.
E. The Spinelli project
A few months after its first direct election in 1979, Parliament’s relations with the
Council were thrown into a serious crisis by the budget for 1980. At the instigation
of Altiero Spinelli, MEP, founder of the European Federalist Movement and a former
Commissioner, a group of nine MEPs met in July 1980 to discuss ways of revitalising
the operation of the institutions. In July 1981 Parliament set up an institutional affairs
committee, with Spinelli as its coordinating rapporteur, to draw up a plan for amendment
of the existing Treaties. The committee decided to formulate plans for what was to
become the constitution of the European Union. The draft Treaty was adopted by a
large majority on 14 February 1984. Legislative power would come under a bicameral
system akin to that of a federal state. The system aimed to strike a balance between
Parliament and the Council, but it was not acceptable to the Member States.

THE SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT

Having settled the Community budget dispute of the early 1980s, the European Council
decided at its Fontainebleau meeting in June 1984 to set up an ad hoc committee
of the personal representatives of the Heads of State or Government, named the
Dooge Committee after its chairman. The committee was asked to make proposals
for improving the functioning of the Community system and of political cooperation.
The June 1985 Milan European Council decided by a majority (7 votes to 3), in an
exceptional procedure for that body, to convene an intergovernmental conference to
consider the powers of the institutions, the extension of Community activities to new
areas and the establishment of a ‘genuine’ internal market.
On 17 February 1986 nine Member States signed the Single European Act (SEA),
followed later, on 28 February 1986, by Denmark (after a referendum vote in favour),

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 8

Italy and Greece. The Act was ratified by Member States’ parliaments in 1986, but,
because a private citizen had appealed to the Irish courts, its entry into force was
delayed for six months until 1 July 1987. The SEA was the first substantial change to
the Treaty of Rome. Its principal provisions were as follows:
A. Extension of the Union’s powers
1. Through the creation of a large internal market
A fully operational internal market was to be completed by 1 January 1993, taking up
and broadening the objective of the common market introduced in 1958 (2.1.1).
2. Through the establishment of new powers as regards:
— monetary policy,
— social policy,
— economic and social cohesion,
— research and technological development,
— the environment,
— cooperation in the field of foreign policy.
B. Improvement in the decision-making capacity of the Council of Ministers
Qualified majority voting replaced unanimity in four of the Community’s existing areas of
responsibility (amendment of the common customs tariff, freedom to provide services,
the free movement of capital and the common sea and air transport policy). Qualified
majority voting was also introduced for several new areas of responsibility, such
as the internal market, social policy, economic and social cohesion, research and
technological development, and environmental policy. Finally, qualified majority voting
was the subject of an amendment to the Council’s internal rules of procedure, so as
to comply with a previous Presidency declaration that in future the Council could be
called upon to vote not only on the initiative of its President, but also at the request
of the Commission or a Member State if a simple majority of the Council’s members
were in favour.
C. Growth of the role of the European Parliament
Parliament’s powers were strengthened by:
— making Community agreements on enlargement and association agreements
subject to Parliament’s assent;
— introducing a procedure for cooperation with the Council (1.2.3) which gave
Parliament real, albeit limited, legislative powers; it applied to about a dozen legal
bases at the time and marked a watershed in turning Parliament into a genuine
co-legislator.
Petr Novak
05/2018

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 9

 3 - THE MAASTRICHT AND
AMSTERDAM TREATIES - [1.1.3.]

The Maastricht Treaty altered the former European treaties and created a European
Union based on three pillars: the European Communities, the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the field of justice and home
affairs (JHI). With a view to the enlargement of the Union, the Amsterdam Treaty
made the adjustments needed to enable the Union to function more efficiently and
democratically.

I. THE MAASTRICHT TREATY

The Treaty on European Union, signed in Maastricht on 7 February 1992, entered into
force on 1 November 1993.
A. The Union’s structures
By instituting a European Union, the Maastricht Treaty marked a new step in the
process of creating an ‘ever-closer union among the peoples of Europe’. The Union
was based on the European Communities (1.1.1 and 1.1.2) and supported by policies
and forms of cooperation provided for in the Treaty on European Union. It had a single
institutional structure, consisting of the Council, the European Parliament, the European
Commission, the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors which (being at the time
strictly speaking the only EU institutions) exercised their powers in accordance with the
Treaties. The Treaty established an Economic and Social Committee and a Committee
of the Regions, which both had advisory powers. A European System of Central Banks
and a European Central Bank were set up under the provisions of the Treaty in addition
to the existing financial institutions in the EIB group, namely the European Investment
Bank and the European Investment Fund.
B. The Union’s powers
The Union created by the Maastricht Treaty was given certain powers by the Treaty,
which were classified into three groups and were commonly referred to as ‘pillars’:
The first ‘pillar’ consisted of the European Communities, providing a framework within
which the powers for which sovereignty had been transferred by the Member States in
the areas governed by the Treaty were exercised by the Community institutions. The
second ‘pillar’ was the common foreign and security policy laid down in Title V of the
Treaty. The third ‘pillar’ was cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs laid
down in Title VI of the Treaty. Titles V and VI provided for intergovernmental cooperation
using the common institutions, with certain supranational features such as involving
the Commission and consulting Parliament.
1. The European Community (first pillar)
The Community’s task was to make the single market work and to promote, among
other things, a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic
activities, a high level of employment and of social protection and equality between
men and women. The Community pursued these objectives, acting within the limits of
its powers, by establishing a common market and related measures set out in Article 3
of the EC Treaty and by initiating the economic and single monetary policy referred

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 10

to in Article 4. Community activities had to respect the principle of proportionality and,
in areas that did not fall within its exclusive competence, the principle of subsidiarity
(Article 5 of the EC Treaty).
2. The common foreign and security policy (CFSP) (second pillar)
The Union had the task of defining and implementing, by intergovernmental methods,
a common foreign and security policy (5.1.1). The Member States were to support this
policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. Its objectives
were: to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter; to
strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; to promote international cooperation; to
develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.
3. Cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs (third pillar)
The Union’s objective was to develop common action in these areas by
intergovernmental methods (4.2.1) to provide citizens with a high level of safety within
an area of freedom, security and justice. It covered the following areas:
— rules and the exercise of controls on crossing the Community’s external borders;
— combating terrorism, serious crime, drug trafficking and international fraud;
— judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters;
— creation of a European Police Office (Europol) with a system for exchanging
information between national police forces;
— controlling illegal immigration;
— common asylum policy.

II. THE AMSTERDAM TREATY

The Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, signed in Amsterdam
on 2 October 1997, entered into force on 1 May 1999.
A. Increased powers for the Union
1. European Community
With regard to objectives, special prominence was given to balanced and sustainable
development and a high level of employment. A mechanism was set up to coordinate
Member States’ policies on employment, and there was a possibility of some
Community measures in this area. The Agreement on Social Policy was incorporated
into the EC Treaty with some improvements (removal of the opt-out). The Community
method now applied to some major areas which had hitherto come under the ‘third pillar’
such as asylum, immigration, crossing external borders, combating fraud, customs
cooperation and judicial cooperation in civil matters, in addition to some of the
cooperation under the Schengen Agreement, which the EU and Communities endorsed
in full.
2. European Union
Intergovernmental cooperation in the areas of police and judicial cooperation was
strengthened by defining objectives and precise tasks and creating a new legal

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 11

instrument similar to a directive. The instruments of the common foreign and security
policy were developed later, in particular by creating a new instrument, the common
strategy, a new office, the ‘Secretary-General of the Council responsible for the CFSP’,
and a new structure, the ‘Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’.
B. A stronger position for Parliament
1. Legislative power
Under the codecision procedure, which was extended to existing 15 legal bases under
the EC Treaty, Parliament and the Council became co-legislators on a practically equal
footing. Excepting only agriculture and competition policy, the codecision procedure
applied to all the areas where the Council was permitted to take decisions by qualified
majority. In four cases (Articles 18, 42 and 47 and Article 151 on cultural policy, which
remained unchanged) the codecision procedure was combined with a requirement for
a unanimous decision in the Council. The other legislative areas where unanimity was
required were not subject to codecision.
2. Power of control
As well as voting to approve the Commission as a body, Parliament also had a vote
to approve in advance the person nominated as President of the future Commission
(Article 214).
3. Election and statute of Members
With regard to the procedure for elections to Parliament by direct universal suffrage
(Article 190 of the EC Treaty), the Community’s power to adopt common principles
was added to the existing power to adopt a uniform procedure. A legal basis making it
possible to adopt a single statute for MEPs was included in the same article. However,
there was still no provision allowing measures to develop political parties at European
level (cf. Article 191).
C. Closer cooperation
For the first time, the Treaties contained general provisions allowing some Member
States under certain conditions to take advantage of common institutions to organise
closer cooperation between themselves. This option was in addition to the closer
cooperation covered by specific provisions, such as economic and monetary union,
creation of the area of freedom, security and justice and incorporating the Schengen
provisions. The areas where closer cooperation was possible were the third pillar and,
under particularly restrictive conditions, matters subject to non-exclusive Community
competence. The conditions which any closer cooperation had to fulfil and the planned
decision-making procedures had been drawn up in such a way as to ensure that this
new factor in the process of integration would remain exceptional and, at all events,
could only be used to move further towards integration and not to take retrograde steps.
D. Simplification
The Amsterdam Treaty removed from the European Treaties all provisions which the
passage of time had rendered void or obsolete, while ensuring that this did not affect the
legal effects which derived from them in the past. It also renumbered the Treaty articles.
For legal and political reasons the Treaty was signed and submitted for ratification in
the form of amendments to the existing Treaties.

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 12

E. Institutional reforms with a view to enlargement
a. The Amsterdam Treaty set the maximum number of Members of the European
Parliament, in line with Parliament’s request, at 700 (Article 189).
b. The composition of the Commission and the question of weighted votes were
covered by a ‘Protocol on the Institutions’ attached to the Treaty. This provided that, in
a Union of up to 20 Member States, the Commission would comprise one national of
each Member State, provided that by that date, weighting of the votes in the Council had
been modified. At all events, at least a year before the 21st Member State joined, a new
IGC would have to comprehensively review the Treaties’ provisions on the institutions.
c. There was provision for the Council to use qualified majority voting in a number of
the legal bases newly established by the Amsterdam Treaty. However, of the existing
Community policies, only research policy had new provisions on qualified majority
voting, with other policies still requiring unanimity.
F. Other matters
A protocol covered Community procedures for implementing the principle of
subsidiarity. New provisions on access to documents (Article 255) and greater
openness in the Council’s legislative work (Article 207(3)) improved transparency.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament was consulted before an intergovernmental conference was
called. Parliament was also involved in the intergovernmental conferences according
to ad hoc formulas; during the last three it was represented, depending on the case,
by its President or by two of its members.
Petr Novak
05/2018

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 13

 4 - THE TREATY OF NICE AND THE CONVENTION
ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE - [1.1.4.]

The Treaty of Nice prepared the European Union only partially for the important
enlargements to the east and south on 1 May 2004 and 1 January 2007. Hence,
following up on the questions raised in the Laeken Declaration, the European
Convention made an effort to produce a new legal base for the Union in the form of
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Following ‘no’ votes in referendums
in two Member States, that treaty was not ratified.

TREATY OF NICE
The Treaty was signed on 26 February 2001 and entered into force on 1 February 2003.
A. Objectives
The conclusions of the 1999 Helsinki European Council required the EU to be able, by
the end of 2002, to welcome as new Member States those applicant countries which
were ready for accession. Since only two of the applicant countries were more populous
than the Member State average at the time, the political weight of countries with a
smaller population was due to increase considerably. The Treaty of Nice was therefore
meant to make the EU institutions more efficient and legitimate and to prepare the EU
for its next major enlargement.
B. Background
A number of institutional issues (which became known as the ‘Amsterdam leftovers’)
had been addressed by the Maastricht and Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conferences
(IGCs) (1.1.3) but not satisfactorily resolved: size and composition of the Commission,
weighting of votes in the Council, and extension of qualified majority voting. On the
basis of a report by the Finnish Presidency, the Helsinki European Council decided in
late 1999 that an IGC should deal with the leftovers and all other changes required in
preparation for enlargement.
C. Content
The IGC opened on 14 February 2000 and completed its work in Nice on
10 December 2000, reaching agreement on the institutional questions and on a range
of other points, namely a new distribution of seats in the European Parliament, more
flexible arrangements for enhanced cooperation, the monitoring of fundamental rights
and values in the EU, and a strengthening of the EU judicial system.
1. Weighting of votes in the Council
Taking together the system of voting in the Council, the composition of the Commission
and, to some extent, the distribution of seats in the European Parliament, the IGC
realised that the main imperative was to change the relative weight of the Member
States, a subject that had been addressed by no other IGC since the Treaty of Rome.
Two methods of defining a qualified majority were considered: a new system of
weighting (modifying the existing one) or application of a dual majority (of votes and of
population), the latter solution having been proposed by the Commission and endorsed
by Parliament. The IGC chose the first option. The number of votes was increased

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 14

for all Member States, but the share accounted for by the most populous Member
States decreased: previously 55% of votes, it fell to 45% when the 10 new members
joined and to 44.5% on 1 January 2007. This was why the demographic ‘safety net’
was introduced: a Member State may request verification that the qualified majority
represents at least 62% of the total population of the Union. If it does not, the decision
concerned will not be adopted.
2. The Commission
a. Composition
Since 2005 the Commission has comprised one Commissioner per Member State. The
Council has the power to decide, acting unanimously, on the number of Commissioners
and on arrangements for a rotation system, provided that each Commission reflects
the demographic and geographical range of the Member States.
b. Internal organisation
The Treaty of Nice provides the President of the Commission with the power to allocate
responsibilities to the Commissioners and to reassign them during his or her term of
office, as well as to select, and determine the number of, Vice-Presidents.
3. The European Parliament
a. Composition
The Treaty of Amsterdam had set the maximum number of MEPs at 700. At Nice
the European Council thought it necessary, with an eye to enlargement, to revise the
number of MEPs for each Member State. The new composition of Parliament was also
used to counterbalance the altered weighting of votes in the Council. The maximum
number of MEPs was therefore set at 732.
b. Powers
Parliament was enabled, like the Council, the Commission and the Member States,
to bring a legal challenge to acts of the Council, the Commission or the European
Central Bank on grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural
requirement, infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application,
or misuse of powers.
Further to a proposal by the Commission, Article 191 was turned into an operational
legal basis for the adoption, under the co-decision procedure, of regulations governing
political parties at EU level and rules on their funding.
Parliament’s legislative powers were increased through a slight broadening of the
scope of the co-decision procedure and by requiring Parliament’s assent for the
establishment of enhanced cooperation in areas covered by co-decision. Parliament
must also be asked for its opinion should the Council adopt a position on the risk of a
serious breach of fundamental rights in a Member State.
4. Reform of the judicial system
a. The Court of Justice of the European Union
The Court of Justice was empowered to sit in a number of different ways: in chambers
(where it consists of three or five judges), in a Grand Chamber (eleven judges) or as the
full Court. The Council, acting unanimously, may increase the number of Advocates-
General. The Court of Justice of the EU retained jurisdiction over questions referred

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 15

for a preliminary ruling, but it may, under its Statute, refer to the Court of First Instance
types of matters other than those listed in Article 225 of the EC Treaty.
b. Court of First Instance
The powers of the Court of First Instance were increased to include certain categories of
preliminary ruling, with the possibility of judicial panels being established by unanimous
decision of the Council. All these operating provisions, notably on the powers of the
Court of First Instance, were thenceforth set out in the Treaty itself.
5. Legislative procedures
Although a considerable number of new policies and measures (27) now required
qualified majority voting in the Council, co-decision was extended only to a few minor
areas (covered by former Articles 13, 62, 63, 65, 157, 159 and 191 of the EC Treaty);
for matters covered by former Article 161 assent was now required.
6. Enhanced cooperation
Like the Amsterdam Treaty, the Treaty of Nice contained general provisions applying
to all areas of enhanced cooperation and provisions specific to the pillar concerned.
Whereas the Amsterdam Treaty provided for enhanced cooperation under the first and
third pillars only, the Treaty of Nice encompassed all three pillars.
The Treaty of Nice made further changes: referral to the European Council ceased to
be an option, the concept of ‘a reasonable period of time’ was clarified, and the assent
of Parliament was now required in all areas where enhanced cooperation related to a
question covered by the co-decision procedure.
7. Protection of fundamental rights
A paragraph was added to Article 7 TEU to cover cases where a patent breach of
fundamental rights has not actually occurred but where there is a ‘clear risk’ that it
may occur. The Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members and after
obtaining the assent of Parliament, determines the existence of the risk and addresses
appropriate recommendations to the Member State in question. A non-binding Charter
of Fundamental Rights was proclaimed (4.1.2).
D. Role of the European Parliament
As with earlier intergovernmental conferences, Parliament was actively involved in
preparations for the 2000 IGC, giving its views on the conference agenda and its
progress and objectives. Parliament also expressed its opinion on the substance and
judicial implications of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (4.1.2). Parliament insisted
that the next IGC should be a transparent process, involving European and national
parliamentarians and the Commission, as well as input from ordinary people, and that
what it produced should be a constitution-type document.

CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

A. Basis and objectives
In accordance with Declaration No 23 annexed to the Treaty of Nice, the Laeken
European Council of 14 and 15 December 2001 decided to organise a Convention
bringing together the main parties concerned for a debate on the future of the European
Union. The objectives were to prepare for the next IGC as transparently as possible and
to address the four main issues concerning the further development of the EU: a better

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 16

division of competences; simplification of the EU’s instruments for action; increased
democracy, transparency and efficiency; and the drafting of a constitution for Europe’s
citizens.
B. Organisation
The Convention comprised a chair (Valéry Giscard D’Estaing), two vice-chairs (Guiliano
Amato and Jean-Luc Dehaene), 15 representatives of the Member States’ heads of
state or government, 30 members of the national parliaments (two per Member State),
16 members of the European Parliament and two members of the Commission. The
countries that had applied to join the Union also took part in the debate on an equal
footing, but could not block any consensus which might emerge among the Member
States. The Convention thus had a total of 105 members.
In addition to the chair and vice-chairs, the Praesidium comprised nine members of
the Convention and an invited representative chosen by the applicant countries. The
Praesidium had the role of lending impetus to the Convention and providing it with a
basis on which to work.
C. Outcome
The work of the Convention comprised: a ‘listening phase’, in which it sought to identify
the expectations and needs of Member States and Europe’s citizens, a phase in which
the ideas expressed were studied, and a phase in which recommendations based on
the essence of the debate were drafted. At the end of 2002, eleven working groups
presented their findings to the Convention. During the first half of 2003, the Convention
drew up and debated a text which became the draft Treaty establishing a Constitution
for Europe.
Part I of the Treaty (principles and institutions; 59 articles) and Part II (Charter of
Fundamental Rights; 54 articles) were laid before the Thessaloniki European Council
on 20 June 2003. Part III (policies; 338 articles) and Part IV (final provisions; 10 articles)
were presented to the Italian Presidency on 18 July 2003. A subsequent IGC adopted
this text on 18 June 2004, retaining the basic structure of the Convention’s draft, albeit
with a considerable number of amendments. However, as a result of two ‘no’ votes in
referendums in France and the Netherlands, the ratification procedure for the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe was not completed (1.1.5).
D. Role of the European Parliament
The impact of MEPs during the work of the European Convention was seen by
most observers as decisive. Thanks to several factors, including their experience
of negotiating in an international environment and the fact that the Convention was
meeting on Parliament’s premises, MEPs were able to leave a strong imprint on the
debates and on the outcome of the Convention. They were also instrumental in the
formation of political families comprising MEPs and national MPs. Parliament thus
achieved a considerable number of its original aims, and most of that achievement is
now safeguarded in the Treaty of Lisbon.
Petr Novak
05/2018

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 17

 5 - THE TREATY OF LISBON - [1.1.5.]

This fact sheet presents the background and essential provisions of the Treaty of
Lisbon. The objective is to provide a historical context for the emergence of this latest
fundamental EU text from the ones which came before it. The specific provisions
(with article references) and their effects on European Union policies are explained
in more detail in the fact sheets dealing with particular policies and issues.

LEGAL BASIS
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
establishing the European Community (OJ C 306, 17.12.2007); entry into force on
1 December 2009.

HISTORY
The Lisbon Treaty started as a constitutional project at the end of 2001 (European
Council declaration on the future of the European Union, or Laeken declaration), and
was followed up in 2002 and 2003 by the European Convention which drafted the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (Constitutional Treaty) (1.1.4). The process
leading to the Lisbon Treaty is a result of the negative outcome of two referenda on
the Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005, in response to which the European
Council decided to have a two-year ‘period of reflection’. Finally, on the basis of the
Berlin declaration of March 2007, the European Council of 21 to 23 June 2007 adopted
a detailed mandate for a subsequent Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), under the
Portuguese presidency. The IGC concluded its work in October 2007. The Treaty was
signed at the European Council of Lisbon on 13 December 2007 and has been ratified
by all Member States.

CONTENT
A. Objectives and legal principles
The Treaty establishing the European Community is renamed the ‘Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union’ and the term ‘Community’ is replaced by ‘Union’
throughout the text. The Union takes the place of the Community and is its legal
successor. The Lisbon Treaty does not create state-like Union symbols like a flag or
an anthem. Although the new text is hence no longer a constitutional treaty by name,
it preserves most of the substantial achievements.
No additional exclusive competences are transferred to the Union by the Lisbon
Treaty. However, it changes the way the Union exercises its existing powers and some
new (shared) powers, by enhancing citizens’ participation and protection, creating a
new institutional set-up and modifying the decision-making processes for increased
efficiency and transparency. A higher level of parliamentary scrutiny and democratic
accountability is therefore attained.
Unlike the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty contains no article formally
enshrining the supremacy of Union law over national legislation, but a declaration was

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 18

attached to the Treaty to this effect (Declaration No 17), referring to an opinion of the
Council’s Legal Service which reiterates consistent case-law of the Court.
The Lisbon Treaty for the first time clarifies the powers of the Union. It distinguishes
three types of competences: exclusive competence, where the Union alone can
legislate, and Member States only implement; shared competence, where the Member
States can legislate and adopt legally binding measures if the Union has not done so;
and supporting competence, where the EU adopts measures to support or complement
Member States’ policies. Union competences can now be handed back to the Member
States in the course of a treaty revision.
The Lisbon Treaty gives the EU full legal personality. Therefore, the Union obtains
the ability to sign international treaties in the areas of its attributed powers or join an
international organisation. Member States may only sign international agreements that
are compatible with EU law.
The Treaty for the first time provides for a formal procedure to be followed by
Member States wishing to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with their
constitutional requirements, namely Article 50 TEU.
The Treaty of Lisbon completes the absorption of the remaining third pillar aspects
of the area of freedom, security and justice (FSJ), i.e. police and judicial cooperation
in criminal matters, into the first pillar. The former intergovernmental structure ceases
to exist, as the acts adopted in this area are now made subject to the ordinary
legislative procedure (qualified majority and codecision), using the legal instruments
of the Community method (regulations, directives and decisions) unless otherwise
specified.
With the Treaty of Lisbon in force, the European Parliament is able to propose
amendments to the Treaties, as was already the case for the Council, a Member
State government or the Commission. Normally, such an amendment would require
the convocation of a Convention which would recommend amendments to an IGC (the
European Council could, however, decide not to convene such a Convention, subject
to Parliament’s consent (Article 48(3) TEU, second paragraph)). An IGC could then be
convened to determine amendments to the Treaties by common accord. It is, however,
also possible to revise the Treaties without convening an IGC and through simplified
revision procedures, where the revision concerns the internal policies and actions of the
Union (Article 48(6) and 48(7) TEU). The revision would then be adopted as a decision
of the European Council, but might remain subject to national ratification rules.
B. Enhanced democracy and better protection of fundamental rights
The Treaty of Lisbon expresses the three fundamental principles of democratic equality,
representative democracy and participatory democracy. Participatory democracy takes
the new form of a citizens’ initiative (4.1.5).
The Charter of Fundamental Rights is not incorporated directly into the Lisbon Treaty,
but acquires a legally binding character through Article 6(1) TEU, which gives the
Charter the same legal value as the Treaties (4.1.2).
The process of the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) was opened when the 14th protocol to the ECHR entered into force on
1 June 2010. This allows not only states but also an international organisation, i.e.
the European Union, to become signatories of the ECHR. Accession still requires
ratification by all states that are parties to the ECHR, as well as by the EU itself.

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 19

Negotiations between Council of Europe and EU representatives led to the finalisation
of a draft agreement in April 2013, which, however, was deemed incompatible with
Article 6 TEU by the Court of Justice of the European Union in its Opinion 2/2013.
Further negotiations will be necessary before accession can take place.
C. A new institutional set-up
1. The European Parliament
Pursuant to Article 14(2) TEU, the EP is now ‘composed of representatives of the
Union’s citizens’, not of representatives of ‘the peoples of the States’ (Article 189 TEC).
The EP’s legislative powers have been increased through the ‘ordinary legislative
procedure’, which replaces the former codecision procedure. This procedure now
applies to more than 40 new policy areas, raising the total number to 73. The assent
procedure continues to exist as ‘consent’, and the consultation procedure remains
unchanged. The new budgetary procedure creates full parity between Parliament and
the Council for approval of the annual budget. The multiannual financial framework has
to be agreed by Parliament (consent).
The EP now elects the President of the Commission by a majority of its members on a
proposal from the European Council, which is obliged to select a candidate by qualified
majority, taking into account the outcome of the European elections. The EP continues
to approve the Commission as a college.
The maximum number of MEPs has been set at 751. The maximum number of seats
per Member State is reduced to 96; the minimum number is increased to 6. Germany
kept its 99 MEPs until the 2014 elections.
2. The European Council
The Lisbon Treaty formally recognises the European Council as an EU institution,
responsible for providing the Union with the ‘impetus necessary for its development’
and for defining its ‘general political directions and priorities’. The European Council
has no legislative functions. A long-term presidency replaces the previous system of
six-month rotation. The President is elected by a qualified majority of the European
Council for a renewable term of 30 months. This should improve the continuity and
coherence of the European Council’s work. The President also represents the Union
externally, without prejudice to the duties of the High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (see below).
3. The Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR)
The VP/HR is appointed by a qualified majority of the European Council with the
agreement of the President of the Commission and is responsible for the EU’s common
foreign and security policy, with the right to put forward proposals. Besides chairing
the Foreign Affairs Council, the VP/HR also has the role of Vice-President of the
Commission. The VP/HR is assisted by the European External Action Service, which
comprises staff from the Council, the Commission and national diplomatic services.
4. The Council
Lisbon maintains the principle of double majority voting (citizens and Member States).
However, the previous arrangements remained in place until November 2014; since
1 November 2014, the new rules apply. The use of previous voting weights could still
be requested by any Member State until 31 March 2017.

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 20

A qualified majority is reached when 55% of members of the Council, comprising at
least 65% of the population, support a proposal (Article 16(4) TEU). When the Council
is not acting on a proposal from the Commission or the VP/HR, the necessary majority
of Member States increases to 72% (Article 238(2) TFEU). To block legislation, at least
four Member States have to vote against a proposal. A new scheme inspired by the
‘Ioannina compromise’ will allow 55% (75% until 1 April 2017) of the Member States
necessary for the blocking minority to ask for reconsideration of a proposal during a
‘reasonable time period’ (Declaration 7).
The Council meets in public when it deliberates and votes on a draft legislative act.
To this end, each Council meeting is divided into two parts, dealing respectively
with legislative acts and non-legislative activities. The Council Presidency continues
to rotate on a six-month basis, but there are 18-month group presidencies of three
Member States in order to ensure better continuity of work. As an exception, the Foreign
Affairs Council is continuously chaired by the VP/HR.
5. The Commission
Since the President of the Commission is now chosen and elected taking into
account the outcome of the European elections, the political legitimacy of the office
is increased. The President is responsible for the internal organisation of the college
(appointment of commissioners, distribution of portfolios, request to resign under
particular circumstances).
6. The Court of Justice of the European Union
The jurisdiction of the Court is extended to all activities of the Union with the exception
of the CFSP. The number of Advocates-General can be increased from eight to eleven.
Specialised courts can be set up with the consent of Parliament. Access to the Court
is facilitated for individuals. A European Public Prosecutor’s Office should be set up
in order to investigate, prosecute and bring to judgment offences against the Union’s
financial interests.
D. More efficient and democratic policy-making with new policies and new
competencies
Several so-called ‘passerelle clauses’ allow a change from unanimous decision-
making to qualified majority voting and from the consultation procedure to codecision
(Article 31(3) TEU, Articles 81, 153, 192, 312 and 333 TFEU, plus some passerelle-
type procedures concerning judicial cooperation in criminal matters) (1.2.4). In areas
where the Union has no exclusive powers, at least nine Member States can establish
enhanced cooperation among themselves. Authorisation for its use must be granted by
the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. On CFSP matters,
unanimity applies.
The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthens the principle of subsidiarity by involving the
national parliaments in the decision-making process (1.3.5). A certain number of new
or extended policies have been introduced in environment policy, which now includes
the fight against climate change, and energy policy, which makes new references to
solidarity and the security and interconnectivity of supply. Furthermore, intellectual
property rights, sport, space, tourism, civil protection and administrative cooperation
are now possible subjects of EU law-making.
On the common security and defence policy (CSDP) (5.1.2), the Lisbon Treaty
introduces a mutual defence clause which provides that all Member States are obliged

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 21

to provide help to a Member State under attack. A solidarity clause provides that
the Union and each of its Member States have to provide assistance by all possible
means to a Member State affected by a human or natural catastrophe or by a terrorist
attack. A ‘permanent structured cooperation’ is open to all Member States which commit
themselves to taking part in European military equipment programmes and to providing
combat units that are available for immediate action. To establish such cooperation, it
is necessary to obtain a qualified majority in Council after consultation with the VP/HR.

ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

See 1.1.4 for Parliament’s contributions to the European Convention and its implication
in previous IGCs. With respect to the 2007 IGC, leading to the signature of the Treaty
of Lisbon, Parliament for the first time sent three representatives to the conference
under the Portuguese presidency. In February 2017, Parliament approved two major
resolutions aimed at reviewing the constitutional framework set out by the Lisbon
Treaty: one on improving the functioning of the European Union by building on
the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, and the other on the possible evolution of and
adjustments to the current institutional set-up of the European Union.
Roberta Panizza
05/2018

Fact Sheets on the European Union - 18/06/2018 22

 THE EUROPEAN UNION AT A GLANCE

The aim of the Fact Sheets is to provide an overview of European

integration and of the European Parliament’s contribution to that
process.

Created in 1979 for Parliament’s first direct elections, the Fact Sheets are
designed to provide non-specialists with a straightforward, concise and
accurate overview of the European Union’s institutions and policies, and the
role that the European Parliament plays in their development.

The Fact Sheets are grouped into five chapters.

• How the European Union works addresses the EU’s historical

development and the successive treaties, its legal system, decision-
making procedures, institutions and bodies, and financing.
• Economy, science and quality of life explains the principles of the
internal market and consumer protection and public health, describes a
number of EU policies such as social, employment, industrial, research,
energy and environment policies, outlines the context of the economic
and monetary union (EMU) and explains how competition, taxation and
economic policies are coordinated and scrutinised.
• Cohesion, growth and jobs explains how the EU addresses its
various internal policies: regional and cohesion policy, agriculture and
fisheries, transport and tourism, and culture, education and sport.
• Citizens: fundamental rights, security and justice describes
individual and collective rights, including the Charter of Fundamental
Rights, and freedom, security and justice, including immigration and
asylum, and judicial cooperation.
• The EU’s external relations covers foreign policy, security and
defence policies, external trade relations, and development policy;
the promotion of human rights and democracy; the enlargement and
relations beyond the EU’s neighbourhood.

Drafted by the policy departments and the Economic Governance Support

Unit, the Fact Sheets are available in 23 languages. The online version is
reviewed and updated at regular intervals throughout the year, as soon as
Parliament adopts any important positions or policies.

Fact Sheets on the European Union

[Link]/factsheets
The Marshall Plan and the establishment of the OEEC

Source: CVCE. European NAvigator. Étienne Deschamps.

Copyright: (c) [Link] by [Link]
All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via
Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries.
Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site.
URL:
[Link]
[Link]
Last updated: 11/05/2021

1/3
The Marshall Plan and the establishment of the OEEC

At the end of the war, the United Nations (UN), whose founding Charter was signed in
San Francisco in June 1945, provided aid in various ways to the European countries
ruined by the war. Europe was faced with serious food shortages and had to maintain
various rationing schemes. It was also short of dollars and therefore had to limit
imports of civil and military equipment. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation
Agency (UNRRA), founded in November 1943, brought emergency individual aid
packages to the European countries, especially humanitarian aid.

But this programme was haphazard and would not have much impact on the economy
of the entire region. Intra-European trade was hindered by a lack of foreign exchange
and required an international authority capable of efectively organising trade
worldwide. The United States, whose interests lay in promoting such trade in order to
increase its own exports, decided to help the European economy via a large-scale
structural recovery programme. The United States wanted to protect American
prosperity and stave of the threat of national overproduction. But the United States’
desire to give Europe massive economic aid was also politically motivated. The fear of
Communist expansion in Western Europe during the Cold War was undoubtedly a
decisive factor, as important as the conquest of new markets. The Americans
therefore decided to ight poverty and hunger in Europe, factors which, they felt,
encouraged the spread of Communism. The Marshall Plan formed part of the US policy
of containment — as outlined by US President Truman in his speech to the United
States Congress on 12 March 1947 — of the real or imaginary spread of Communism
in Europe.

In a speech made on 5 June 1947 at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts,

the US Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, proposed the granting of economic and
inancial assistance to all the countries of Europe, subject to closer European
cooperation. This was the Marshall Plan or the European Recovery Program (ERP).
France and Great Britain were very keen and, three weeks later in Paris, convened a
conference, to which they also invited the USSR, in order to elaborate a common
programme in response to General Marshall’s ofer. But Vyacheslav Molotov, the
Soviet Foreign Minister, categorically refused to countenance any international control
and opposed economic aid for Germany. The Soviet Union rejected the Marshall Plan
and persuaded its satellite countries and neighbouring Finland to refuse US aid. This
rejection deepened the split between Eastern and Western Europe. In January 1949, in
response to the Marshall Plan, the USSR created a programme of economic
cooperation between Soviet bloc countries, called the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA or Comecon).

Ultimately, 16 countries signed up to the Marshall Plan: Austria, Belgium, Denmark

(with the Faroe Islands and Greenland), France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy (and San
Marino), Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal (with Madeira and the
Azores), Sweden, Switzerland (with Liechtenstein), Turkey and the United Kingdom.
They immediately set up a Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEEC)
which drew up a report establishing the priorities for the European economy. But the
Americans insisted these countries should control the management and distribution of
the funds themselves. The CEEC therefore set up a permanent agency for this
purpose. On 16 April 1948, in Paris, the 16 countries signed a Convention to establish
the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). West Germany and the
territory of Trieste joined in 1949. The colonies and overseas territories of the OEEC
countries were represented by their parent state, and the United States and Canada,
even though they did not belong to the Organisation, were also involved in its work.

2/3
The OEEC was therefore a de facto worldwide organisation. In 1960, when the United
States and Canada joined, it became the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), which later expanded even further.

In April 1948, the United States passed a law covering foreign aid and created the
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) to manage the Marshall Plan. They
decided to send a Permanent Representative to Europe and to set up a special agency
in each of the countries involved. Bilateral agreements were concluded between the
United States and each country.

The programme for European recovery was divided into subsidies and loans
amounting to a total of about 13 billion dollars distributed between April 1948 and
June 1951. Apart from being invested in modernisation schemes, US aid was primarily
used to purchase items indispensable to the European economies: food and
agricultural products, raw materials, tools and industrial equipment. The United States
also allocated money to the development of the production of strategic goods in
European colonies where the Americans wanted to stop the spread of Communism. In
October 1948, the OEEC set up a Committee for Overseas Territories (COT) which,
through a special fund, encouraged European countries to cooperate with the United
States in the development of Africa.

The political importance of the Marshall Plan cannot be overestimated. Through this
aid, the US President Harry Truman wanted to help the free nations of Europe solve
their economic problems. But it was also a question of stopping Communism, which
was a threat in countries such as France and Italy. This policy paid of. In the April
1948 elections, the Christian Democrat Party defeated the hitherto so inluential
Communist Party in Italy. Intense propaganda campaigns also formed part of the
Marshall Plan. For example, a ‘train for Europe’, illed with food supplies and staple
goods, travelled through the recipient countries to publicise the work in progress and
the results already obtained. The press, radio and television were also called in to
help. The programme for recovery in Europe was undoubtedly a weapon in the Cold
War.

But the Marshall Plan marked the entry of Western Europe into the consumer age,
symbolised, for example, by Coca-Cola and Hollywood ilms. In 1948, the OEEC
negotiated a multilateral agreement on intra-European payments. That was followed,
in 1949, by a trade liberalisation scheme. From July 1950 to December 1958, a
European Payments Union (EPU) restored the convertibility of European currencies
and removed quantitative trade restrictions. The OEEC also promoted economic
productivity in Europe via the European Agency for Productivity that it set up in 1953
to study and disseminate technical advances in the industrial sector. As an initial
umbrella organisation for European democratic countries with a free market economy,
the OEEC was in fact an important forerunner of a united Europe. It remained,
however, an organisation for intergovernmental cooperation that was unable to create
a customs union.

3/3
The European revival and the Rome Treaties (1955–1957) — historical
context

Source: CVCE. Christian Lekl.

Copyright: (c) [Link] by [Link]
All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via
Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries.
Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site.
URL:
[Link]
istorical_context-[Link]
Last updated: 08/07/2016

1/3
Historical context

With the failure of the European Defence Community in August 1954, efforts to achieve European
integration on the political and military fronts temporarily ground to a halt. It seemed from the successes
achieved by the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) that the economic domain and atomic energy
offered the best chances of reviving the process of European unification.

Responding to an initiative from the governments of the Benelux countries, the Foreign Ministers of the six
ECSC Member States met in Messina from 1 to 3 June 1955 to consider how best to pursue efforts towards
European integration.

The resolution adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Messina provided the decisive impulse for a
resumption of the European integration process. The Ministers instructed a group of experts to assess the
scope for economic integration, with particular regard to the development of common institutions, the
creation of a common market, the progressive harmonisation of social policies and the establishment of an
organisation for the peaceful use of atomic energy. This intergovernmental committee met in Brussels from
July 1955 under the chairmanship of Paul-Henri Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, its remit being to find
ways of achieving these aims. Proposals submitted by the national delegations were studied and discussed in
four technical committees and subcommittees.

The United Kingdom withdrew from the negotiations during the discussion process, the British Government
being interested neither in a customs union nor in an atomic energy community. Following tough and
protracted negotiations, drafting of the report to the Foreign Ministers began in February 1956 on the basis
of the working papers drawn up by the various committees. What came to be known as the ‘Spaak report’
was finally approved by the Heads of Delegation on 21 April 1956; it foresaw the creation of a Common
Market and the founding of an Atomic Energy Community.

Guy Mollet, the French Prime Minister, proposed that negotiations on the European Atomic Energy
Community should constitute the first step. Mollet could not count on securing a parliamentary majority in
France in favour of the Common Market and hoped that success on the atomic energy issue would provide
the desired impetus for the subsequent negotiations. The French proposal did, however, meet with great
resistance, especially on the part of the German Federal Government which feared that, following a
successful conclusion to the atomic energy negotiations, the French Government would not throw all its
weight behind the founding of a Common Market. This was why the Federal Government under Konrad
Adenauer insisted on the previously agreed package which included both projects.

The French Government eventually bowed to pressure from the negotiating partners and, at the Conference
of Foreign Ministers of the Six held in Venice on 29 and 30 May 1956, approved the Spaak Report as the
basis for Treaty negotiations in respect of an Economic and an Atomic Energy Community. The
intergovernmental conference began work on 26 June 1956 at the Château de Val Duchesse near Brussels.
Once again, the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was asked to chair the proceedings.

The Conference set up two committees, one for the Common Market, the other for a European Atomic
Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom). As with the previous year’s discussions in the intergovernmental
committee, progress in the negotiations was slow. Some of the main contentious issues were inclusion of the
Overseas Territories in the Common Market, harmonisation of welfare provisions and Euratom’s monopoly
on the supply of fissile material.

The delegations’ positions appeared irreconcilable. And when even the Foreign Ministers failed to achieve
any significant result at the Paris Conference on 20 and 21 October 1956, the entire project seemed on the
brink of collapse. What is more, the British Government chose this time to put forward its proposal for a
European free trade area. This was again a boost, in the various countries, to the opponents of the quest for
political integration.

Two factors were instrumental in pulling the negotiations back from the brink: these were the international

2/3
situation and bilateral discussions between the French and German Governments. The escalation of the Suez
crisis, on the one hand, and the signing in late October 1956 of the Luxembourg Treaties, which allowed the
Saar to become part of the Federal Republic, brought the negotiating partners closer together again. At the
intergovernmental meeting between Guy Mollet and Konrad Adenauer in early November, a compromise
was finally secured which allowed the Treaty negotiations to resume and to proceed to a successful
conclusion. Work in the individual committees accelerated, and they were able to complete their tasks by
March 1957, shortly before the Treaties were signed.

The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) provides for the progressive
establishment of a common market on the basis of a customs union. The market created in this way aims to
achieve a common transport policy and also encompasses agriculture. It was, however, agreed that the
matter of a common agricultural policy would be settled later at an intergovernmental conference. Other key
features of the Treaty are the creation of a European Investment Bank and of a European Social Fund, the
idea being to improve employment opportunities for workers and raise their standard of living.

At the meeting of the Heads of Government on 19 and 20 February 1957 in Paris, it proved possible also to
reach agreement on the Overseas Territories. The Overseas Countries and Territories were to be associated
with the Common Market and, through the creation of an investment fund, supported for a period of five
years.

Compared with the progress being made on the Common Market front, progress with the Atomic Energy
Community was slow, not least because of a failure to reach agreement on a number of important issues, for
example, the construction of a European isotope-separation plant; the Atomic Energy Community thus lost
some of its importance. Euratom’s fundamental objectives were to foster research into and utilisation of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within the Six and the development of relations with other countries.

The Rome Treaties were formally signed on 25 March 1957. The Interim Committee for the Common
Market and Euratom was established on the same day with the task of clarifying, in the time that remained
before the Treaties came into force, those issues that were still outstanding. Since it had not proved possible
to settle on a single seat for the Community bodies, it was agreed that the work would proceed in Brussels
on a provisional basis.

The Rome Treaties went forward to ratification by the parliaments of the six Member States without any
major difficulty — thanks, in no small measure, to the persuasive efforts of the Action Committee for the
United States of Europe, established in 1955 at the instigation of Jean Monnet. Finally, on 1 January 1958,
the Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community
entered into force.

3/3
The main reforms prior to the Single European Act

Source: CVCE. European NAvigator. Fabio Pappalardo.

Copyright: (c) [Link] by [Link]
All rights of reproduction, of public communication, of adaptation, of distribution or of dissemination via
Internet, internal network or any other means are strictly reserved in all countries.
Consult the legal notice and the terms and conditions of use regarding this site.
URL:
[Link]
[Link]
Last updated: 08/07/2016

1/4
The main reforms prior to the Single European Act

The first reforms of the Communities

The first reforms of the Communities took place gradually as a result of isolated amendments relating to
specific aspects of European integration. These were scattered changes of diverse origins, some arising as
scheduled events laid down in the founding Treaties, others introduced by follow-on Treaties, others again
originating in acts of a different kind.

From the establishment of the Communities until the first comprehensive reform embodied in the Single
European Act, a number of legal acts had a major impact on their development.

The Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities,
signed in Brussels on 8 April 1965 (the ‘Merger Treaty’), merged the executive bodies of the three
Communities. Consisting of 39 articles, it is divided into five chapters relating, in particular, to the Council
of the European Communities, the Commission of the European Communities, financial provisions, and
officials and other servants of the European Communities. It came into force on 1 July 1967.

The signing of the Merger Treaty took place two weeks after the Commission submitted a proposal for a
plan to finance the agricultural policy, which necessitated the reform of the financial and budgetary
framework of the Communities and the powers of the various institutions involved in it. This draft was not
adopted but became a casus belli in response to which France, fearing an increase in the supranational scope
of the Communities, unleashed an institutional crisis. The French Government decided to cease all
participation in the activities of the Communities. This constituted the ‘empty chair’ crisis, which was
resolved only after seven months of Community inertia. The signing of an agreement concluded on
30 January 1966, the Luxembourg Compromise, enabled the Council to resume its regular operations.

The EEC Treaty provided for the gradual establishment of a common market and laid down the successive
stages for its completion. Following transition to the third stage on 1 January 1966, several matters which
had, hitherto, been subject to a unanimous decision in the Council could now be determined by qualified
majority.

The Council Decision of 21 April 1970 provided for the Community budget to be augmented by the
Communities’ own resources.

The Treaty of Luxembourg of 22 April 1970 amending Certain Budgetary Provisions of the Treaties
establishing the European Communities and of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single
Commission of the European Communities provided for an increase in the budgetary powers of the
Assembly following the replacement of financial contributions from the Member States by the
Communities’ own resources. Consisting of 13 articles, it was divided into five chapters concerning,
respectively, provisions amending the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty, the EAEC Treaty and the Merger
Treaty and final provisions. It came into force on 1 January 1971.

The Paris Summit held on 9 and 10 December 1974 provided for regular meetings of the European
Council.

The Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission of 4 March 1975
concerning the institution of a conciliation procedure provided for a legislative procedure which took
account of the new budgetary powers of Parliament. This was the first of the procedures by which the
European Parliament became a co-legislator.

The Treaty of Brussels of 22 July 1975 amending Certain Financial Provisions increased the budgetary
powers of Parliament and established a Court of Auditors responsible for carrying out external audits of the
Community’s finances. The Treaty of Brussels, consisting of 31 articles, was divided into five chapters
concerning, respectively, provisions amending the ECSC Treaty, the EEC Treaty, the EAEC Treaty and the

2/4
Merger Treaty and final provisions. It came into force on 1 June 1977.

The Act of the Council of the Communities of 20 September 1976 (‘Act of 1976’), laying down procedures
for direct elections to the European Parliament by universal suffrage, increased the democratic legitimacy of
the Communities.

The accession to the Communities of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in
1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986, and the Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties
establishing the European Communities, signed in 1985, brought about amendments to the founding
Treaties. The most important changes related to the composition of the various institutions (which had to be
adjusted as the enlargements progressed), the financial framework of the Communities (following the
contribution of the new Member States) and the territorial scope of the Treaties.

The institutional framework

The Merger Treaty of 1965 simplified the Community’s institutional framework, providing for the existence
of a single Commission and a single Council for the three Communities. Thus, nine years after the
unification of the Assembly and the Court, all the institutions were common to the three Communities with
the exception of the ECSC Consultative Committee, which did not merge with the Economic and Social
Committee, its equivalent for the other two Communities. The Treaty also provided for the establishment of
common Staff Regulations for all three Communities.

The Council Presidency, which had had a term of three months in the ECSC and six months in the EEC and
Euratom, was held in turn by each Member of the Council for a period of six months.

The Luxembourg Compromise of 1966 provided that, in the event of decisions which could be taken by a
majority vote on a proposal from the Commission, when the key interests of one or more partners were at
stake, the Members of the Council would endeavour, within a reasonable time limit, to arrive at solutions
which could be adopted safeguarding both their mutual interests and those of the Community. In addition,
the Financial Regulation applicable to agriculture and other decisions on agricultural matters had to be taken
by common accord.

Parliament acquired new powers in the financial area. It also became more involved in the legislative
procedure and acquired greater democratic legitimacy.

Sine 1975, Parliament has adopted the budget, and its President has declared that it had become final and
operational.

In addition, Parliament was given greater involvement in the legislative procedure. The Joint Declaration of
1975 instituted a new legislative procedure; when Community acts which were general in scope but had
significant financial implications were to be adopted, Parliament could request the application of this
procedure, the purpose of which was to seek agreement between Parliament and the Council.

The direct elections for which the 1976 Act made provision were held in June 1979 and gave Parliament
new legitimacy.

A new body, the Court of Auditors, was established by the 1975 Treaty of Brussels, and began its
operations in 1977. It consisted of nine Members offering every guarantee of independence and belonging to
or having belonged to external auditing institutions or having special qualifications for the task.

The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government and the President of the
Commission, was established by the Paris Summit of December 1974. It meets at least three times per year.

The financial framework

3/4
In accordance with the Merger Treaty, a single budget was put in place for the administrative expenditure of
the three Communities, but special budgets continued to be drawn up for expenditure on the activities of the
EAEC and ECSC. Following the Council Decision of 21 April 1970, which made provision for the
Community budget to be funded by its own resources, and the 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg and the 1975
Treaty of Brussels, the budgetary powers of the European Parliament were increased. Henceforth,
Parliament and the Council shared those powers. The draft budget was adopted by the Council by qualified
majority and forwarded to Parliament at the latest by 5 October each year, but it was for Parliament to adopt
it finally. The President of Parliament declared that the budget was final and operational. Previously, in
connection with the EEC and EAEC, power of scrutiny was exercised by the national parliaments when they
voted on the amount of the national contributions to the budget of the Communities. No such power of
scrutiny had been provided in the case of the ECSC, which was, from the onset, financed by its own
resources.

The 1970 Treaty of Luxembourg completed the unification of the Community budgets by incorporating
expenditure on the activities of the EAEC into a single budget. Only the operational expenditure of the
ECSC and the expenditure of financially autonomous establishments with their own legal personality were
not covered by the single budget.

In addition, the 1975 Treaty of Brussels provided for the establishment of a Court of Auditors whose task
was to act as external auditor with respect to the Community’s finances.

Territorial scope

The accession to the Communities of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1973, Greece in 1981,
and Spain and Portugal in 1986 altered the territorial scope of the Treaties. Certain territories enjoyed
special status. For example, the Treaties did not apply to the Faroe Islands or to the British sovereign bases
in Cyprus. Special provisions were drawn up for the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. In addition,
Greenland, which had become an integral part of Community territory in 1973, decided by referendum to
leave the Communities and become an associated territory of the Communities from 1 February 1985. It was
the first time that any territory had left the European Communities.

4/4
 Single European Act
Introduction
The Single European Act (SEA) was the first major attempt made by member states to amend the arrangements made
in the Treaty of Rome (1957). Although the European Community had been in operation for nearly thirty years, it had
not achieved its aim of establishing a genuine common market. The SEA’s main purpose was to set a deadline for the
creation of a full single market by 1992. It also created deeper integration by making it easier to pass laws,
strengthening the EU Parliament and laying the basis for a European foreign policy. In these ways it took the process of
European integration to a new level, laying the groundwork for the rapid changes of the 1990s and 2000s.

History
By the mid-1980s the European Community had grown to twelve members: France, West Germany, Italy, the
How does a General Election actually work?
Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Although it had
produced a large number of directives
The UK isand
a liberal
regulations,
democracy.
it wasThis
having
meansproblems
that weindemocratically
implementingelect
thempoliticians,
because the who
need for consensus made it difficult
represent
to move
our interests.
forward with
It also
the
involves
single market
that individual
[Link] are protected.

In 1985, British
. CommissionerThe
Arthur
typeCockfield
of liberalproduced
democracya report making
we have 300 recommendations
is a constitutional monarchy,on how the single
where powers of
market could be brought into the
being. Theseare
monarch recommendations led toand
limited by the terms theconditions
signing of the
put Single
down inEuropean Act in February
the constitution.
1986, which became effective in July 1987.

Parliamentary
What did the Single European Act do?system
The SEA swept away restrictive The UK has in
practices a parliamentary
a range of areassystem of democratic
of private enterprisegovernance. Unlike
and the public presidential
sector, and
in order to
reach the target of a full singlesemi-presidential
market by 1992. systems,
It soughtthere is an interconnection
to improve between the legislative
democracy by strengthening the power(law-
of the
making) and executive (law-enforcing) branches of government in a parliamentary
Parliament to discuss new laws, and it gave the Parliament the power to veto the admission of new member states.
The SEA made it easier for laws system. In the UK,
to be passed thisCouncil
by the means that the executive
of Ministers (consisting
by increasing the of the Queen
number andcovered
of areas the by
governments of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) is accountable
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV). The Treaty also officially included the comitology procedure. Finally, it laid the to the
tentative groundwork for the legislature
creation ofor Parliament
common (HouseForeign,
European of Commons,
Justice House of Lords
and Home andpolicies,
Affairs devolved Assemblies
which would in
emerge in the Maastricht Treaty Wales and Northern Ireland).
(1992).

Appointed
Opinion has been divided on the Primeon
SEA’s impact Minister (or chancellor)
the direction as Head project.
of the European of Government
The SEAand a monarch
embodied (or of a
a vision
ceremonialwas
European Community where integration president) ascovered
real and Head ofaState.
large number of areas. It also made it easier to pass
EU legislation by loosening the voting rules in the Council of Ministers, which suggests a vision of ever deeper union.
However, it also emphasised the role of the European Parliament, and represented a push for deregulation, led by
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Commissioner Arthur Cockfield. This latter emphasis suggested the EU
might have shifted focus to creating a freer, more open market.
First-Past-The-Post
Facts and figures Members of Parliament in the House of Commons are elected using the first-past-the-
post electoral system. Each of the 650 voting constituencies in the UK are represented by
 The Cockfield Report identified
an MP. Duringthree types ofand
the general barrier
mostto creating
local a common
elections, market: with
the candidate physical
most(border
of the votes
controls), technical (rules and regulations) and fiscal (different tax rates). The SEA used this framework
becomes the local representative. Candidates campaign door-to-door, hold debates and
when it set out itspublish
approach to establishing
manifestos the single
(comparable market. list of what they are planning to do once
to shopping
they are in power). Eligible voters, about 46m in the UK, receive their polling card once
they register online, or they can vote by post.

Party with most of the votes is invited by the Queen to form a government. If there is no
clear winner, there is a hung Parliament. In this case, a minority or coalition government
can of
© CIVITAS Institute for the Study beCivil
formed. A minority government does not have an
Society 2015 overall
Author: majority
Wil James, Civitas,in11/2005
Parliament. A
More EU factsheets: [Link] Last update: Rachel Maclean, 07/2015
coalition government means that two or more political parties agree to share power in
government. If that does not work out, new elections may be called.
 Single European Act
Arguments about enlargement
For

 A wider EU will mean greater security and wealth for everyone and will help prevent another European war.
 The membership process encourages countries to become more democratic and respect the rule of law.
 Western Europe needs cheap labour from the new member states to fill gaps in the job market.

Against

 Enlargement works to the detriment of existing member states: EU development aid will flow to the poorer
accession countries and lower taxes in these countries could mean that businesses re-locate there.
 Migration from Eastern Europe to the EU-15 will take jobs from citizens of these countries.
How does a General Election actually work?
 Letting a Muslim country like Turkey or Bosnia into the EU could undermine Europe’s culture.
Thebeen
 No referendum has ever UK iscalled
a liberal
on democracy. This means that we democratically elect politicians, who
enlargement.
represent our interests. It also involves that individual rights are protected.

The type of liberalSingle European

democracy we have Act
is a constitutional monarchy, where the powers of
the monarch are limited by the terms and conditions put down in the constitution.

Parliamentary system
The UK has a parliamentary system of democratic governance. Unlike presidential and
semi-presidential systems, there is an interconnection between the legislative (law-
making) and executive (law-enforcing) branches of government in a parliamentary
system. In the UK, this means that the executive (consisting of the Queen and the
governments of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) is accountable to the
“In ten years, 80% of the laws on the economy and social policy will be passed at a European not the national level.”
legislature or Parliament (House of Commons, House of Lords and devolved Assemblies in
Jacques Delors, European Commission President
Wales and Northern Ireland).
“The Community is now launching itself on a course for the 1990s, a course which must make it possible for Europe to
Appointed Prime Minister (or chancellor) as Head of Government and a monarch (or
compete on equal terms with the United States and Japan…. What we need are strengths which we can only find
ceremonial president) as Head of State.
together. We must be stronger in new technologies. We must have the full benefit of a single large market."
Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister

“We want a European Union, we want the United States of Europe."

Helmut Kohl, German Chancellor
First-Past-The-Post
Members of Parliament in the House of Commons are elected using the first-past-the-
post electoral system. Each of the 650 voting constituencies in the UK are represented by
Technical Terms an MP. During the general and most local elections, the candidate with most of the votes
becomes the local representative. Candidates campaign door-to-door, hold debates and
 Deeper integration: the processes whereby member states develop co-operation on more areas of policy.
 Comitology: committees,publish
formedmanifestos
of national (comparable to shopping
experts, that work with the list of what to
Commission they are planning
implement to do once
EU law.
they are in power). Eligible voters, about 46m in the UK, receive their polling card once
Links they register online, or they can vote by post.
 [Link]
Party with most of the votes is invited by the Queen to form a government. If there is no
 [Link]
clear winner, there is a hung Parliament. In this case, a minority or coalition government
can of
© CIVITAS Institute for the Study beCivil
formed. A minority government does not have an
Society 2015 overall
Author: majority
Wil James, Civitas,in11/2005
Parliament. A
More EU factsheets: [Link] Last update: Rachel Maclean, 07/2015
coalition government means that two or more political parties agree to share power in
government. If that does not work out, new elections may be called.