S.

Gopal Reddy vs State Of

Andhra Pradesh on 11 July, 1996
Dowry Brief
Technical details
 Author: M.K Mukherjee
 Bench: M.K Mukherjee

 PETITIONER:
S.GOPAL REDDY
 Vs.
 RESPONDENT:
STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH
 DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/07/1996
 BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
BENCH:
ANAND, A.S. (J)
MUKHERJEE M.K. (J)
 CITATION:
1996 SCC (4) 596 JT 1996 (6) 268
1996 SCALE (5)78
Review

 The appellant along with his brother was tried for offences under Section 420 IPC read

with Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The trial Court convicted them both and

sentenced them to undergo 9 months R.I. and to a fine of Rs. 500/- each and in default

to undergo S.I. for four months for the offence under Section 420 IPC and to R.I. for 6

months and a fine of Rs. 1000/- each and in default S.I. for six months for the offence

under Section 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (hereinafter the Act).

Review
 In an appeal against their sentence and conviction, the Additional Metropolitan Sessions

Judge held that no offence under Section 420 IPC was made out and set aside their

conviction and sentence for the said offence while confirming their conviction and

sentence for the offence under Section 4 of the Act. Both the convicts unsuccessfully

invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

This appeal by special leave filed by the appellant is directed against the order of the High

Court of Andhra Pradesh dated 16.10.1990 dismissing the Criminal Revision Petition filed by

the convicts. The brother of the appellant filed SLP (Crl.) 2336 of 1990 against the

revisional order of the High Court but that S.L.P. was dismissed by this Court on 15.2.1991.
Prosecution Case
 The appellant - the first accused - the younger brother of the petitioner (hereinafter
the second accused) in S.L.P. (Crl.) No.2336 of 1990, which as already noticed was
dismissed on 15.2.1991 by this Court. The first accused had been selected for Indian
Police Service and was undergoing training in the year 1985 and on completion of the
training was posted as an Assistant Superintendent of Police in Jammu & Kashmir
Police force. His brother, the second accused, was at the relevant time working with
the Osmania University at Hyderabad. P.W.1, Shri G.Narayana Reddy, the complainant,
was practising as a lawyer at Hyderabad. PW1 has four daughters. Ms.Vani is the eldest
among the four daughters. She was working as a cashier with the State Bank of India at
Hyderabad. PW 1 was looking for marriage alliance for his daughter Ms. Vani. A
proposal to get Ms.Vani married to the first accused was made by P.W.2, Shri Lakshma
Reddy, a common friend of the appellant and PW1.
..continued
 Later on P.W.2 introduced the second accused to P.W.1, who later on also met Ms Vani
and approved of the match. After some time, the first accused also met Ms.Vani at the
Institute of Public Enterprises and both of them approved each other for marriage. It is
alleged that on 6.5.1985, the second accused accompanied by P.W.2 and some others
went to the house of P.W.1 to pursue the talks regarding marriage. There were some
talks regarding giving of dowry and the terms were finally agreed between them on
7.5.1985 at the house of the second accused. The first accused was not present either
on 6.5.1985 or on 7.5.1985. It is alleged that as per the terms settled between the
parties, P.W.1 agreed to give to his daughter (1) house at Hyderabad (2) jewels, cash
and clothes worth about at rupees one lakh and (3) a sum of Rs 50,000/- in cash for
purchase of a car.
…continued
 The date of marriage, however, was to be fixed after consulting the first accused PW1, however,
later on insisted on having an engagement ceremony and contacted the first accused but the
first accused persuaded P.W.1 not to rush through the same as it was not possible for him to
intimate the date to his friends at a short notice. The first accused came to Hyderabad from
Dehradun, where he was undergoing training, on 6.8.1985 and stayed at Hyderabad till
15.8.1985. The first accused attended the birthday party of the youngest sister of Ms.Vani on
15.8.1985 and later on sent a bank draft of Rs.100/- as the birthday gift for her to Ms.Vani.
In the letter Ex.P1 which accompanied the bank draft, some reference was allegedly made
regarding the settlement of dowry. It is alleged that the first accused later on wrote several
letters including exhibits P6,P7,P9 and P10 to Ms. Vani It is the prosecution case that the second
accused, on being approached by PW1 for fixing the date of marriage, demanded Rs. 1 lakh
instead of Rs. 50,000/- for purchase of car. The second accused also insisted that the said
amount should be paid before marriage. The ‘dowry’ talks between the second accused and
PW1, however, remained inconclusive.
…continued
 Later on the date of marriage was fixed as 2.11.1985. On 1.10.1985, the first accused allegedly
wrote a letter, exhibit P6, to Ms.Vani asking her to cancel the date of marriage or to fulfil the
demands made by his elders. The first accused came to Hyderabad on 20.10.1985 when P.W.1
told him about the demand of additional payment of Rs.50,000/- made by the second accused
for the purchase of car. The first accused told P.W.1 that he would consult his brother and
inform him about it and left for his native place. lt is alleged that on his return from the village,
the first accused asked P.W.1 to give Rs.75,000/- instead of Rs.50,000/- as agreed upon earlier
instead of Rs. 1 lakh as demanded by the second accused. According to the prosecution case this
talk took place in the presence of Shri Narasinga Rao (not examined) The first accused suggested
that P.W.1 should give Rs.50,000/- immediately towards the purchase of the car and the balance
of Rs.25,000/- should be paid within one year after the marriage but PW1 did not accept the
suggestion.
…continued
 According to the prosecution case `Varapuja’ was performed by PW1 and his other relatives
at the house of the second accused on 31.10.1985 At that time P.W.1 allegedly handed over
to the first accused, a document Exhabit P-13 dated 12.10.1985, purporting to settle a
house in the name of his daughter Ms.Vani alongwith a bank pass book, Exhibit P-12
showing a cash balance of Rs.50,881/- in the name of Ms.Vani. The first accused is reported
to have, after examining the document Exhibit P-13, flared up saying that the settlement
was for a Double Storeyed House and the document Exhibit P-13 purporting to settle the
house in the name of Ms.Vanl was only a single storey building. He threatened to get the
marriage cancelled if P.W.1 failed to comply with the settlement as arrived at on the
earlier occasions. The efforts of P.W.1 to persuade the first accused not to cancel the
marriage did not yield any results and ultimately the marriage did not take place. The first
accused then returned all the articles that had been given to him at the time of
`Varapuja’.
…continued
 Aggrieved, by the failure of the marriage negotiations, P.W.1 on 22.1.1986 sent a complaint to the
Director of National Police Academy where the first accused was undergoing training Subsequently,
PW1 also went to the Academy to meet the Director when he learnt from the personal assistant to the
Director of the Academy that the first accused was getting married to another girl on 30th of March,
1986 at Bolaram and showed to him the wedding invitation card. P.W.1, thereupon, gave another
complaint to the director on 26.3.1986, who, however, advised him to approach the concerned police
for necessary action. P.W.1 filed a report Ex.P20 at Chikkadapalli Police Station on 28.3.1986. The
Inspector of Police P.W.7, registered the complaint as Crime Case No.109/1986 and took up the
investigation. During the investigation, various letters purported to have been written by the first
accused to Ms.Vani were sent to the handwriting expert P.W.3, who gave his opinion regarding the
existence of similarities between the specimen writings of the first accused and the disputed writings.
Both the first accused and his brother, the second accused, were thereafter chargesheeted and tried
for offences punishable under section 420 I.P.C. read with an offence punishable under section 4 of
the Act and convicted and sentenced as noticed above.
Arguments
 Mr. P.P.Rao the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the courts below
had committed an error in not correctly interpreting the ambit and scope of section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 read with the definition of `dowry’ under section 2 of the said Act. According to
the learned counsel, for “demand” of dowry to become an offence under Section 4 of the Act, it must
be made at the time of marriage and not during the negotiations for marriage. Reliance in this behalf
is placed on the use of the expressions `bride’ and `bridegroom’ in Section 4 to emphasise that at the
stage of pre-marriage negotiations, the boy and the girl are not `bridegroom’ and `bride’ and
therefore the `demand’ made at that stage cannot be construed as a `demand’ of dowry punishable
under Section 4 of the Act. On merits, counsel argued that reliance placed by the trial court as well as
the appellate and the revisional court on various letters purporting to have been written by the first
accused was erroneous since the appellant had denied their authorship and there was no satisfactory
evidence on the record to connect the appellant with those letters except the “inconclusive” and
uncorroborated evidence of the handwriting expert.
Arguments
 Mr.Rao further argued that in the present case there was no unimpeachable evidence
available on the record to bring home the guilt of the appellant and the failure of the
prosecution to examine Ms.Vani and Shri Narsinga Rao was a serious lacuna in the
prosecution case. Argued Mr. Rao that the evidence of PW1, the complainant had not
received any corroboration at all and since the evidence of PW1 was not wholly
reliable, conviction of the appellant without any corroboration of the evidence of PW1
was not justified. Mr. Rao urged that the complainant had exaggerated the case and
roped in the appellant, whose elder brother alone had made the demand for dowry,
out of anger and frustration and that let alone `demanding dowry’, the first accused
was not even a privy to the demand of dowry as made by the second accused, his elder
brother.
Arguments
 Learned counsel Mr. Prabhakar, for the respondent-State, however, supported the judgment of the

trial court and the High Court and argued that the case against the appellant had been established

beyond a reasonable doubt and that this court need not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 136 (Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court. (1) Notwithstanding anything in this

Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment,

decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or

tribunal in the territory of India) of the Constitution of India with findings of fact arrived at after

appreciation of evidence by the courts below. According to Mr. Prabhakar, the interpretation sought to

be placed by Mr. Rao on Section 4 of the Act would defeat the very object of the Act, which was

enacted to curb the practice of “demand” or acceptance and receipt of dowry” and that the

definition of `dowry’ as contained in Section 2 of the Act included the demand of dowry `at or before

or after the marriage’.

Relevant provisions of the dowry prohibition
act,1961.
 “Section 2- `dowry’ means any property or valuable security given or
agreed to be given either directly or indirectly-
(a) by one party to a marriage to the other party to the marriage; or
(b) by the parents of either party to a marriage or by any other person,
to either party to the marriage or to any other person;
at or before or after the marriage as consideration for the marriage of
the said parties, but does not include dower or mahr in case of person
to whom the Muslim Personal law (Shariat) applies.
 The definition of the expression ‘dowry’ contained in Section 2 of the
Act cannot be confined merely to the ‘demand’ of money, property or
valuable security ‘made at or after the performance of marriage’ as is
urged by Mr. Rao
Section 2- `dowry’ definition, meaning & relevant
arguments
 Mr. P.P.Rao, learned senior counsel referred to various dictionaries for the meaning of ‘dowry’, ‘bride’
and ‘bridegroom’ and on the basis of those meanings submitted that ‘dowry’ must be construed only
as such property, goods or valuable security which is given to a husband by and on behalf of the wife
at marriage and any demand made prior to marriage would not amount to dowry.

 The definition given in the statute is the determinative- factor. The Act is a piece of social legislation
which aims to check the growing menace of the social evil of dowry and it makes punishable not only
the actual receiving of dowry but also the very demand of dowry made before or at the time or after
the marriage where such demand is referable to the consideration of marriage. Dowry as a quid pro
for marriage is prohibited and not the giving of traditional presents to the bride or the bride groom by
friends and relatives. Thus, voluntary presents given at or before or after the marriage to the bride or
the bridegroom, as the case may be, of a traditional nature, which are given not as a consideration
for marriage but out of love, affection on regard, would not fall within the mischief of the expression
‘dowry’ mare punishable under the Act.
Section 2- `dowry’ definition, meaning & relevant arguments
 Interpretation = Textual meaning+contextual meaning+object of the legislation
 Raised by Mr. Rao, regarding the use of the expressions ‘bride’and ‘bridegroom’ occurring in Section 4
of the Act was to urge that “demand” of property or valuable security would not be “dowry” if it is
made during the negotiations for marriage until the boy and the girl acquire the status of
‘bridegroom’ and ‘bride’, at or immediately after the marriage, was raised and repelled by this court
in L.V. Jadhav’s case (supra).

 According to Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1962 edn. bride means a woman who has just been
married or is about to be married, and bridegroom means a man who has just been married or is
about to be married. If we give this meaning of a bride or a bridegroom to the word bride or
bridegroom used in Section 4 of the Act, property or valuable security demanded and consented to be
given prior to the time when the woman had become a bride or the man had become a bridegroom,
may not be “dowry” within the meaning of the Act.
Section 2- `dowry’ definition, meaning & relevant arguments

 The object of Section 4 of the Act is to discourage the very demand for property or valuable security

as consideration for a marriage between the parties thereto. Section 4 prohibits the demand for

‘giving’ property or valuable security which demand, if satisfied, would constitute an offence under

Section 3 read with Section 2 of the Act.

There is no warrant for taking the view that the initial demand for giving of property or valuable

security would not constitute an offence……… ”

Therefore, interpreting the expression ‘dowry and ‘demand’ in the context of the scheme of the Act,

any ‘demand of ‘dowry’ made before at or after the marriage, where such demand is made as a

consideration for marriage would attract the provisions of Section 4 of the Act.
Section 4- `dowry’ definition, punishment & relevant arguments
 The merits of the present case.

 This Court, generally speaking, does not interfere with the findings recorded on appreciation of

evidence by the courts below except where there appears to have occurred gross miscarriage of

justice or there exist sufficient reasons which justify the examination of some of the relevant

evidence by this court itself.

 There is no dispute that the marriage of the appellant was settled with Ms. Vani, daughter of PW1 and

ultimately it did not take place and broke down. According to PW1, the reason for the brake down of

the marriage was his refusal and inability to comply with the “demand” for enhancing the ‘dowry’ as

made by the appellant and his brother, the second accused. The High Court considered the evidence

on the record and observed.

 Evidence Analysis
 “From the evidence of PW1 it is clear that it is only the 2nd petitioner that initially
demanded the dowry in connection with the marriage of his younger brother, the first
petitioner. He alone was present when PW1 agreed to give a cash of Rs. 50,000/- for
purchase of car, a house, jewels, clothing and cash valued at rupees one lakh. This took
place in the month of June, 1985 when PW1 approached the second petitioner for fixation of
date for marriage some time in the month of September, 1985. According to PW1, the second
petitioner demanded rupees one lakh for purchase of car. But, however, PW1 persuaded the
second petitioner to fix the date leaving that matter open to be decided in consultation with
the first petitioner. When the first petitioner came to Hyderabad in October, 1985 PW1
complained to him about the demand for additional dowry and that the first petitioner
would appear to have told PW1 that he would discuss with his brother and inform him. Then
the first petitioner went to his native place and return to Hyderabad and asked PW1 to give
Rs. 75,000/- for purchase of car.
Evidence Analysis
 The demand for dowry either initially or at later emanated only from the second petitioner, the elder
brother for the first petitioner. From the evidence it would appear that the petitioners come from a
lower middle class family and fortunately the first petitioner was selected for I.P.S. and from the tone
of letters written by the first petitioner to Kum. Vani particularly from Ex. P-6 letter it would appear
that he was more interested in acting according to the wishes respondent who he probably felt was
responsible for his coming up in life. The recitals in Ex.P-6 would show that he did not like to hurt the
feelings of the second petitioner and probably for that reason he could not say anything when his elder
brother demanded for more dowry. We cannot say how the first petitioner would have acted if only he
had freedom to act according to his wishes. But the first petitioner was obliged to act according to the
wishes of his elder brother in asking for more dowry. However, I feel that this cannot be a
circumstances to exonerate him from his liability from demand of dowry under Section 4 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act.
Evidence Analysis
 It appears that the High Court felt that the appellant was perhaps acting as “His Master’s Voice” of his
elder brother. The High Court accepted the evidence of PW1 to hold that the appellant had demanded
enhanced dowry of Rs 75000/ for purchase of car on his return from the native village and had
repeated his demand at the him; of “Varapuja” and later on did not marry Ms Vani as PW1 was unable
to meet the demands as projected by the appellant and his elder brother. The High Court appears to
have too readily accepted the version of PW1 without properly analysing and appreciating the same.
Since, PW1 is the sole witness, we have considered it proper to examine his evidence with caution.
Since, PW1 is the sole witness, the court considered it proper to examine his evidence with caution.
From the critical analysis of the evidence of PW1,it emerges that at the time of initial demand of
dowry as a consideration for marriage of the appellant it was only the brother of the appellant, the
second accused, who was present and it was the second accused alone with whom the negotiations
took place in presence of PW2.
 Evidence Analysis
 According to PW1, the brother of the appellant later on demanded rupees one lakh for the purchase of car as
against the initial agreement of rupees fifty thousand or the said purpose. Admittedly, the first accused was not
present at either of the two occasions. According to PW1 when the appellant came to Hyderabad in October,
1985 he (PW1) complained to him about the demand for a additional dowry made by his brother and the
appellant told him that he would discuss the matter with his brother and inform him. It was, thereafter.
According to PW1 that then the appellant returned to Hyderabad from his native place that he asked the
complainant (PW1) to give Rs.75,000/- for purchase of the car. Shri Narsingh Rao is stated to have been present
at that time, but he has not been examined at the trial. The above statement of PW1 has, however, surfaced
for the first time at the trial only. These is no mention of it in the first information report, Ex.P-20 or even in
the two complaints which had been sent by PW1 to the Director, National Police Academy prior to the lodging of
Ex. P-20. PW1 admitted in his evidence “I have not stated in Ex. P-20 and in my 161 statement that A-1 on
return from his native place demanded rupees seventy five thousand instead of rupees one lakh for purchase of
car and that I said that what was the agreed for purchase of car was only Rs. 50,000/- and not Rs. 75,000/- .
This story, therefore, appears to be an after thought, made with a view to implicate the appellant with the
commission of an offence under Section 4 of the Act.
Evidence Analysis
 Had this been the state of affairs, the court sees no reason as to why the fact would not have found mention
at least in the complaints made to ‘the Director of the Academy where the appellant was under-going
training. PW1, being a lawyer, must be presumed to be aware of the importance and relevance of the
statement attributed to the appellant to incorporate it in the complaints and the FIR. We find this part of
the evidence of PW1 rather difficult to accept without any independent corroboration. There is no
corroboration available on the record as even Shri Narsingh Rao has not been examined.
According to PW1, the demand of dowry was repeated by the appellant at the time of “Varapuja” which was
performed on 31.10.1985 at the house of the second accused also. PW1 stated that he handed over the
documents pertaining to the house, rupees fifty thousand in cash and pass book showing the deposit of
about rupees fifty thousand in the bank in the name of Ms.Vani to the appellant alongwith other articles of
‘varapuje’and on seeing the documents the appellant flared up and said that since the settlement was for a
two storeyed house and not a single storey house, as reflected in Ex.P13, he would cancel the marriage
unless the ‘demands’ as made earlier were fulfilled.
Evidence Analysis
 The story of “varapuja” which has been too readily accepted by the courts below, again appears to us
to be of a doubtful nature and does not inspire confidence. The following admission of PW1 in his
evidence, in the context of “varapuja” allegedly held on 31.10.1985 has significance :
“It is not true that Varapuja is puja of brideroom according to my understanding. I did not take any
prohit for Varapuja. I did not take any photograph on that occasion. I did get any Lagna Patrika
prepared for the marriage. It is not true that I am deposing falsely that there was Varapuja and that
offered money on that occasion.
I started marriage preparation probably in the month of September, or October, I cannot say on what
date I booked hall for the marriage. Ex. P.8 is only cancellation receipt of the marriage hall. I have not
got invitation cards printed. I did not write any letters to anybody informing them of the marriage or
inviting them to the marriage as I received letter from A-1 to cancel the marriage in the month of
October,itself cancellation of the date of marriage was prior to Varapuja.
Evidence Analysis
 This admission creates a lot of doubt about the performance of ‘varapuja.’ According to PW1, he had
received a letter from the appellant to the marriage in the month of October itself. Therefore, if the
marriage had been it does not stand to reason as to why ‘varpuja’ should have take? place at all. The
holding of ‘Varapuja’ appears to be highly improbable. No corroboration of any nature to support this
part of the evidence of PW1 is forthcoming on the record.
That the marriage between the parties did not take place is not in dispute but these is no satisfactory
evidence on the record to show that the appellant cancelled the marriage on account of non-fulfilment
of dowry demand allegedly made by him. The letter which PW1 claims to have himself received from the
appellant regarding cancellation of marriage prior to ‘varapuja’ ceremony has not been produced.
Reliance instead has been placed by the prosecution on letter Ex P-6 allegedly written by the appellant
to Ms.Vani cancelling the date of marriage. We shall refer to the documentary evidence in the latter
part of the judgment. The failure of PW1 to produce the letter allegedly received by him from the first
accused invites an adverse presumption against him that had he produced the letter, the same would
have belied his evidence.
Evidence Analysis
 The evidence of PW1, who is the sole witness, suffers from serious inconsistencies and exaggerations.
He admittedly is the most interested person to establish his case. He is the complainant an the case. It
was he who had made two complaints to the Director of National Police Academy against the appellant
before lodging the FIR, Ex.P20. He is a lawyer by profession. He would be presumed to know the
importance of the ‘demand made by the appellant on the two occasions. He, however, has offered no
explanation as to why those facts are conspicuous by their absence from the FIR and the two
complaints made to the Director of the Academy. PW1, does not appear to us to be a wholly reliable
witness. He has made conscious improvements at the trial to implicate the appellant by indulging in
exaggerations and that detracts materially from his reliability. Prudence, therefore, requires that the
Court should look for corroboration of his evidence in material particulars before accepting the same.

 Neither Ms Vani nor Shri Narsingh Rao in whose presence the appellant is said to have demanded dowry
have been examined as Witnesses. The failure to examine them is a serious lacuna in the prosecution
case.
 Evidence Analysis
 It was Ms. Vani who could have deposed about the circumstances which led to the breakdown of the matrimonial
negotiations, before its maturity. Various letter which PW1 produced at the trial were allegedly written by the
appellant to the handwriting expert prosecution has sought to corroborate the evidence of PW1 regarding the
authorship of those letters. The opinion of PW3,the Assistant Director in the State Forensic & Science Laboratory,
Hyderabad, in our view can not be said to be of inching type to attribute the authorship of those letters to the
appellant. PW3 during his statement deposed : “In my opinion (1) there are similarities indicating common authorship
between the red enclosed writings marked as S-12 to S-23 and the red enclosed writings marked as Q.4 to Q.7. But
definite present standards.(2) No opinion can be given on the authorship of the red enclosed signatures and writings
marked as Q-1 to Q-3 and Q-8 to Q-15 on the basis of present standards.
(emphasis supplied) The expert further opined :
“When all the writing characteristics are considered collectively, they led to the conclusion that there are similarities
indicating common authorship between the standard writings marked S-12 to S-25 and the questioned writings marked
Q-4 to Q-7. But no definite opinion can be given on the basis of the present standards Extensive admitted writings are
required for offering definite opinion.
Evidence Analysis
During his cross-examination PW3 admitted :
“Q. From the available standards you cannot say that the signatures of Exs. P.7 and P.9 is the same person who
wrote Exs. P.7 and P.9.
Ans: we can compare truly like live, signatures with signatures and writings with writings and not a signature with
a writing.”
Thus, the evidence of PW3, is not definite and cannot be said to be of a clinching nature to connect the appellant
with the disputed letters. The evidence of an expert is rather weak type of evidence and the courts do not
generally consider it as offering ‘conclusive’ proof and therefore safe to rely upon the same without seeking,
independent and reliable corroboration. In Magan Bihari Lal Vs. State of Punjab (AIR 1977 SC 1091), while dealing
with evidence of a handwriting expert, this Court opined: “We think it would be extremely hazardous to condemn
the appellant merely on the strength of opinion evidence of a handwriting expert. It is now well settled that
expert opinion must always be received with great caution and perhaps none so with mare caution than the
opinion of a handwriting expert. There is a profusion of precedential authority which holds that it is unsafe to
base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This rule has been universally acted
upon and it has almost become a rule of law. It was held by this Court in Ram Chandra Vs. State of U.P. AIR 1957
SC 381 that it is unsafe to treat expert handwriting opinion as sufficient basis for conviction, but it may be relied
upon when supported by other items of internal and external evidence.
Evidence Analysis
 This Court again pointed out in Ishwari Prasad Vs. Md. Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 that expert evidence of handwriting
can never be conclusive because it is, after all, opinion evidence, and this view was reiterated in Shashi Kumar Vs.
Subodh Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 529 where it was pointed out by this Court that expert’s evidence as to handwriting
being opinion evidence can rarely, if ever, take the place of substantive evidence and before acting on such
evidence, it would be desirable to consider whether it is corroborated either by clear direct evidence or by
circumstantial evidence. This Court had again occasion to consider the evidentiary value of expert opinion in
regard to handwriting in Fakhruddin Vs. State of M.P. AIR 1967 SC 1326 and it uttered a note of caution pointing
out that it would be risky to found a conviction solely on the evidence of a handwriting expert before acting upon
such evidence, the court must always try to see whether it is corroborated by other evidence, direct or
circumstantial.”
We are unable to agree, in the established facts and circumstanced of this case, with the view expressed by the
courts below that PW1 is a competent witness to speak about the handwriting of the appellant and that the
opinion of PW3 has received corroboration from the evidence of PW1. PW1 admittedly did not receive any of those
letters. He had no occasion to be familiar with the handwriting of the appellant. He is not a handwriting expert.
The bald assertion of PW1 that he was “familiar” with the handwriting of the appellant and fully “acquainted”
with the contents of the letters, admittedly not addressed to him, without disclosing how he was familiar with the
handwriting of the appellant, is difficult to accept. Section 67 of the Evidence Act enjoins that before a document
can be looked into, it has to be proved. Section 67, of course, does not prescribe any particular mode of proof.
Section 47 of the Evidence Act which occurs in the chapter relating to ‘relevancy of facts’ provides that the
opinion of a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of a particular person is a relevant fact. Similarly,
opinion of a handwriting expert is also a relevant fact for identifying any handwriting. The ordinary method of
proving a document is by calling as a witness the person who had executed the document or saw it being executed
or signed or is otherwise qualified and competent to express his opinion as to the handwriting.
Evidence Analysis
 There are some other modes of proof of documents also as by comparison of the handwriting as envisaged
under Section 73 of the Evidence Act or through the evidence of a handwriting expert under Section 45 of
the Act, besides by the admission of the person against whom the document is intended to be used. The
receiver of the document, on establishing his acquaintance with the handwriting of the person and
competence to identify the writing with which he is familiar, may also prove a document. These modes are
legitimate methods of proving documents but before they can be accepted they must bear sufficient
strength to carry conviction. Keeping in view the in-conclusive and indefinite nature of the evidence of the
handwriting expert PW3 and the lack of competence on the part of PW1 to be familiar with the handwriting
of the appellant, the approach adopted by the courts below to arrive at the conclusion that the disputed
letters were written by the appellant to Ms.Vani on the basis of the evidence of PW1 and PW3 was not
proper. The doubtful evidence of PW1 could neither offer any corroboration to the inconclusive and
indefinite opinion of the handwriting expert PW3 nor could it receive any corroboration from the opinion of
PW3. We are not satisfied, in the established facts and circumstances of this case, that the prosecution has
established either the genuineness or the authorship of the disputed letters allegedly written by the
appellant from the evidence of PW1 or PW3. The courts below appear to have taken a rather superficial
view of the matter while relying upon the evidence of PW1 and PW3 to hold the appellant guilty. We find it
unsafe to base the conviction of the appellant on the basis of the evidence of PW1 or PW3 in the absence of
substantial independent corroboration, internally or externally, of their evidence, which in this case is
totally wanting.
Final Judgment
 To us it appears that the demand of dowry in connection with and as consideration for the marriage of the
appellant with Ms.Vani was made by the second accused the elder brother of the appellant and that no such
demand is established to have been directly made by the appellant. The High Court rightly found the second
accused, guilty of an offence under Section 4 of the Act against which S.L.P. (Criminal) No.2336 of 1990, as
earlier noticed stands dismissed by this court on 15.2.1991. The evidence on the record does not establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that any demand of dowry within the meaning of Section 2 read with Section 4 of
the Act was made by the appellant. May be the appellant was in agreement with his elder brother regarding
‘demand’ of ‘dowry’ but convictions cannot be based on such assumptions without the offence being proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. The courts below appear to have allowed emotions and sentiments, rather than
legally admissible and trustworthy evidence, to influence their judgment. The evidence on the record does
not establish the case against the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt. He is, therefore, entitled to the
benefit of doubt. This appeal, thus,succeeds and is allowed. The conviction and sentence of the appellant is
hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds shall stand discharged.