Stereo HCJDA-38

Judgment Sheet
IN THE LAHORE HIGH COURT, LAHORE
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

CRL.A. NO.1937/05
( KHIZAR HAYAT VS. THE STATE )

MR NO.796/05

JUDGMENT

DATE OF HEARING: 10.11.2010

APPELLANT BY: MR.BASHIR ABBAS KHAN, ADVOCATE.
STATE BY: CH.MUHAMMAD MUSTAFA, DPG.

MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK, J.-- This judgment shall dispose

of Criminal Appeal No.1937/05 (Khizyar Hayat vs. The State) and Murder

Reference No.796/05, sent by the learned trial Court, for confirmation or

otherwise, of the sentence of death awarded to the appellant, as both these

matters have arisen out of the same judgment dated 25.11.2005 passed by the

learned Additional Sessions Judge-I, Bhakkar, whereby, appellant was

convicted under section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to death as Tazir with a

further direction to pay a compensation of Rs.50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand

only) to the legal heirs of the deceased as provided under section 544-A

Cr.P.C. in default whereof to further undergo SI for six months. However,

benefit of doubt was extended to two co-accused of the appellant, namely,

Shah Jahan and Javaid Iqbal and they were acquitted from the charge.
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 2

2. Brief facts of the case, as given by PW9 Abdul Rehman (complainant)

in the FIR(Exh.PD/1) are that on the night of 22.5.2005, when the complainant

returned home after offering Isha prayer, his son Nasrullah was sleeping on a

cot in the courtyard of the Baithak. The complainant went to the house to sleep.

On the morning of 22.5.2005, the complainant went to Mosque to say Fajar

prayer. On his return from the mosque, he found his said son missing from the

cot. According to the complainant, he was informed by Lumberdar of the

village through Chowkidar that the dead body of his son Nasrullah(deceased)

was lying near the house of Shah Jahan within the area of Rakh Goharwala.

Upon receipt of the said information, the complainant started weeping which

attracted Muhammad Ramzan and Imam Bakhsh, who are residents of the

same village. They apprised the complainant that on the preceding night at

about 10.00 p.m., they were going towards Rakh Goharwala to guard their herd

of sheeps/goats and when they crossed the house of Shah Jahan, they heard the

voice “Bachao” “Bachao”. When they stepped forward, they saw that Shah

Jahan, Javaid Iqbal and Khizyar Hayat(appellant), alongwith an unknown

accused, were giving beating after laying him on the ground while Shah Jahan

was raising Lalkara that he be not spared and killed. According to them they

did not go near due to fear and came to know in the morning that the person,

who was being given beating by the above mentioned accused persons, was

Nasrullah(deceased). After getting information from them, the complainant

went to the said place alongwith them and found dead body of his son

Nasrullah in a naked condition who was only wearing a Bunyan at that time.

The motive stated by the complainant in the FIR was that there was a dispute
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 3

between his son and Shah Jahan etc. due to which they killed him. As per

complainant, the deceased was having a sum of Rs.10,000/- with him at that

time which, in his view, were taken away by the accused persons.

3. After completion of investigation, challan was prepared and submitted

before the learned trial Court, copies were distributed to the appellant and his

co-accused as required under section 265-C of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

charge was framed, to which, they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution produced as many as 12

witnesses during the trial. The appellant, alongwith his co-accused, were

examined under section 342 Cr.P.C.. In answer to question “why this case

against you and why the PWs have deposed against you”, the appellant stated

as under:-

“The case against me and my co-accused is false. So far as the PWs are
concerned, they are not only related to the deceased but are chance
witnesses also. Occurrence did not take place as mentioned by the
prosecution. Actually deceased was not enjoying the good reputation. On
the fateful night he entered in any house of the vicinity with bad
intention due to that reason he was murdered. During those days, some
“Wardat” of dacoity took place in that area. According to the prosecution
story Rs.10,000/- were with the deceased possibility can not be ruled out
that some dacoits tried to snatch the above said rupees from the deceased
and he tried to resist in the meanwhile he was murdered. In 1991 a case
of sodomy was registered against Abdul Rehman complainant of this
case. Because Abdul Rehman complainant abducted Khuda Bakhsh s/o
Beera Ghown by caste of village Kapahi and committed sodomy with
him. In the above said mentioned case, I and my co-accused were deadly
supporter of above said Khuda Bakhsh and compromise was not effected
due to my intervention as well as intervention of my co-accused. Due to
this reason, the complainant had a grudge against me and my co-
accused. When the actual culprits were not traced out, Abdul Rehman
complainant booked me and my co-accused in this blind murder case
due to above said enmity”.
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 4

They neither produced any evidence in defence nor opted to depose on Oath as
required under section 340(2) Cr.P.C. However, after conclusion of the trial,
the learned trial Court convicted and sentenced the appellant as mentioned
above.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this appeal,

contends that admittedly it was a night time occurrence which was not

witnessed by any body; that the complainant of the case has based his

complaint on the statements of PW10 Muhammad Ramzan and PW11 Imam

Bakhsh, as such, he is not the witness of occurrence; that statements of both

these witnesses are not worthy of credence which are even otherwise

improbable; that PW10 Muhammad Ramzan is the first cousin of the deceased

and Bhanja of the complainant while PW11 Imam Bakhsh is father-in-law of

the deceased and both of them have stated that they saw the appellant and his

acquitted co-accused while beating a person but they did not go near because of

fear and this version of both these witnesses, according to the learned counsel,

is not believable; that even they kept mum till the next morning and their

statements were recorded after registration of the FIR which conduct, on their

part, is un-natural; that even there is no mention in the statements of both these

witnesses that Nasrullah deceased was being given beating by the appellant and

his acquitted accused although the deceased was not only known but closely

related to them; that the recovery of “Parna” (P2), which was taken into

possession through memo Exh.PB, is of no avail to the prosecution because

there is no evidence on the record that any body saw the appellant or his

acquitted co-accused while strangulating the deceased Nasrullah with the said
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 5

“Parna”; that the motive has not been proved by the prosecution and even the

learned trial Court has not believed the same; that as per statements of PW10

Muhammad Ramzan and PW11 Imam Bakhsh, the appellant and his two

acquitted co-accused, namely, Shah Jahan and Javaid Iqbal were causing

injuries to the deceased but both the said co-accused were acquitted by the

learned trial Court and no appeal against their acquittal has either been filed by

the State or the complainant; that on the same evidence, the appellant cannot be

convicted unless there is a strong corroboration which is not available in this

case; that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellant

beyond any shadow of doubt and that the appellant is entitled to acquittal.

6. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Prosecutor General for the

State, while vehemently opposing this appeal, contends that the appellant is

named in the FIR; that he has been fully implicated in the case by PW10 and

Muhammad Ramzan PW11 Imam Bakhsh; that the PWs had no enmity with

the appellant to falsely depose against him during the trial; that the ocular

account in this case is supported by the medical evidence and the evidence of

recovery of “Parna”(P2); that, even otherwise, in such like cases substitution is

a rare phenomenon; that the prosecution has proved its case against the

appellant beyond any shadow of doubt and that the appeal filed by the

appellant against his conviction and sentence be dismissed.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length, have given
anxious consideration to their arguments and have also scanned the
evidence on record with their able assistance.
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 6

8. Occurrence in this case took place between the night of 22/23.5.2005,

the matter was reported to the police by PW9 Abdul Rehman (complainant) at

about 6.30 a.m. on 23.5.2005, the formal FIR(Exh.PD/1) was registered on

23.5.2005 while the distance between the place of occurrence and the Police

Station was about 55 kilometers.

9. PW9 Abdul Rehman is the real father of Nasrullah(deceased) and is also

the complainant of the case. Although he is author of the FIR but is not an eye-

witness of the occurrence. He has based his complaint on the information

provided to him by PW10 Muhammad Ramzan and PW11 Imam Bakhsh. The

motive given in the complaint(Exh.PD) has not been believed by the learned

trial Court and even otherwise there is no convincing evidence on the record as

for as motive is concerned, so, there is no need to dilate upon the statement of

PW9 Abdul Rehman (complainant) which is of no avail to the prosecution.

10. The prosecution, in order to prove the ocular account against the

appellant and his two acquitted co-accused, has produced PW10 Muhammad

Ramzan and PW11 Imam Bakhsh. The examination-in-chief by PW10 reads

as under:-

“On 22.05.2005 at about 10.00 PM I alongwith Imam Bakhsh PW after

taking meal were gong to guard sheep and goats. When we cross the
house of Shah Jahan accused we heard the noise ‘Bachao’ ‘Bachao’. We
went forward to the side and saw Shah Jahan, Javaid Iqbal, Khizar Hayat
accused person present in the court and one unknown person who had
fallen the one person on the ground and were beating him. Shah Jahan
raised Lalkara to not spare him and murdered him. We did not go near
them due to our own fear. In the morning we came to know that Shah
Jahan and other had murdered Nasar Ullah deceased. I and Imam Bakhsh
told the incident witnessed by us to Abdul Rehman complainant. The
motive for the occurrence was that there was dispute of money between
the accused and the deceased”.
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 7

In his examination-in-chief, PW11 Imam Bakhsh, has stated as under:-

“On 22.5.2005, I alongwith Muhammad Ramzan PW after taking meals

were going towards sheep and goats at about 10.00 PM when we crossed
the house of Shah Jahan accused. We heard noise Bachao, Bachao. We
went towards that side and saw Shah Jahan, Javaid Iqbal and Khizar
Hayat accused persons present in the court and one unknown person had
fallen a person on the ground and were beating him, Shah Jahan raised
Lalkara that he should not spare and done to death. We due to our own
fear did not go near them. Early in the morning we went to our home and
came to know that Nasar Ullah deceased was murdered by Shah Jahan
and others. I and Muhammad Ramzan told the incident to Abdul
Rehman complainant”.

11. It is on the record that these two witnesses are closely related to the

deceased because PW10 Muhammad Ramzan is the first cousin of the

deceased and Bhanja of the complainant while PW11 Imam Bakhsh is father-

in-law of the deceased Nasarullah. Both have stated that they saw an unknown

person who was being given beating by the appellant and his two co-accused,

namely, Shah Jahan and Javaid Iqbal. It is really astonishing that they correctly

identified the appellant and his two acquitted co-accused but could not identify

the person (Nasrullah deceased) who was being beaten by the appellants and

his co-accused though the deceased Nasrullah was their close relative.

Surprisingly, they did not report the matter to any body and kept mum till the

next morning. This conduct of both these witnesses, in our view, is highly un-

natural.

12. The medical evidence in this case was furnished by PW8 Dr.Mehmood

Akhtar Tanveer who conducted postmortem examination on the body of

Nasrullah deceased on 23.5.2005 at about 11.30 a.m.. He noted following

injuries on his person:-

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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 8

“1. Abrasion with bruise of 02x3 cm at middle part of left chest was
on its lateral part.

2. Bruise of 02x3 cm at lower part of left chest wall on its posterior

part.

3. Abrasion of 04x03 cm lumber region.

4. Cut with lacerated margins on left side of lacer lip measuring 01

cm x 01 cm.

5. Abrasion of 08 x 02 cm over the left hip bone of lateral side.

6. Bruise with abrasion at top of left shoulder measuring 05 cm x 08

cm.

7. Bruise of 03 cm x 02 cm in the middle and upper most part of

chest on posterior surface just below the neck.

8. Upper part of neck especially right side massively bruised all

around.

9. Nose was deshaped and depressed”.

Although the doctor has conducted postmortem examination on the body of

deceased and found the above mentioned nine injuries on his person but the

said doctor has not mentioned the kind of weapon with which those injuries

were caused. Rather, the doctor has admitted in the cross-examination that “the

injuries mentioned in the postmortem report i.e. bruises abrasion generally to

any person could be the result of dragging”, but, we have noted that there is no

allegation against the appellant that the deceased was dragged by the appellant

or his two acquitted co-accused and then tortured, which factor goes against the

prosecution. It is settled law that the medical evidence may confirm the ocular

evidence with regard to seat of injury and its duration, nature of injury and kind

of weapon used in occurrence but it cannot connect the accused with the

commission of the crime, therefore, this piece of evidence is of no avail to the

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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 9

prosecution. In this regard reference is invited to the case GHULAM

MUSTAFA and another vs. STATE (PLJ 2010 SC 522), wherein, at page

527, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, has been pleased to observe as

under:-

“………..However, it is settled law that the medical evidence can

only establish the type of weapon used, the seat of injury and the
time elapsed between receipt of injury and the medical
examination. It can never be a primary source of evidence for the
crime itself but is only corroborative of the same……”.

13. As far as recovery of “Parna” (P2), which was taken into possession

vide memo Exh.PB, is concerned, it is not the case of the prosecution that any

witness saw the appellant and his acquitted co-accused while strangulating the

deceased with the said “Parna”. It is an ordinary “Chadar”. Muhammad Khan

Niazi SI/SHO, who was Investigating Officer of the case at the relevant time,

appeared before the learned trial Court as PW12 and admitted that the cloth in

question(“Parna” P2) was not blood stained and was of casual type. Therefore,

the recovery of piece of cloth(P2) is of no avail to the prosecution because such

like “Parnas” are easily available in the market, so, its plantation on the

appellant cannot be ruled out. So far as other articles i.e. Shalwar(P3),

Qameez(P4), Watch(P5), Chain(P6), Wallet(P7), Hunter(P8), two pairs of

Chappal(P9/1-2) and P10/1-2), which were taken into possession from the spot

by the said Investigating Officer vide memo Exh.PJ, are concerned, these are of

no avail to the prosecution because those were not taken into possession either

from the appellant or at his instance.

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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 10

14. Apart from above, two co-accused of the appellant, namely, Shah Jahan

and Javaid Iqbal, against whom allegations were that they, alongwith the

appellant, gave beating to Nasrullah deceased after putting him on the ground

while Shah Jahan was also raising Lalkara not to spare the deceased, have

already been acquitted by the learned trial Court. No appeal either by the State

or the complainant has been filed against their said acquittal. In the

circumstances when the evidence to the extent of two acquitted co-accused has

been disbelieved by the learned trial Court it cannot be believed against the

appellant until and unless the same is not supported by any other independent

corroborative piece of evidence which is very much lacking in this case as we

have not been able to find out any such evidence on the record. In this regard

reliance is placed on GHULAM SIKANDAR AND ANOTHER VS.

MAMRAZ KHAN AND OTHERS (PLD 1985 SC 11), wherein, at page 23,

the learned Apex Court has been pleased to hold as under:-

“It is often said that the principle falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not
applicable in Pakistan. The same principle has been described in some
cases, slightly differently; namely, that the testimony of an eye-witness
should not be treated as indivisible although there is no consensus with
regard to the later view. A contrary view has also been held. Expressed
in a more direct manner a similar rule in the administration of criminal
justice which is hall-mark of Islamic Jurisprudence, that when a witness
has been found false with regard to the implication of one accused about
whose participation he had deposed on oath the credibility of such
witness regarding involvement of the other accused in the same
occurrence would be irretrievably shaken. However, as a matter of
convenience a rule has been developed in Pakistan since the famous case
of Ghulam Muhammad v. Crown (1) propounded by late Chief Justice
Muhammad Munir that where it is found that a witness has falsely
implicated one accused person, ordinarily he would not be relied upon
with regard to the other accused in the same occurrence. But if the
testimony of such a witness is corroborated by very strong and
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 11

independent circumstances regarding other the reliance might then be

placed on the witness for convicting the other accused………….”

In IFTIKHAR HUSSAIN VS. THE STATE (PLJ 2004 SC 552), at page 562,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, has been pleased to hold as under:-

“……..It is true that principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is no

more applicable as on following this principle, the evidence of a witness
is to be accepted or discarded as a whole for the purpose of convicting or
acquitting an accused person, therefore, keeping in view prevailing
circumstances, the Courts for safe administration of justice follow the
principle of appraisal of evidence i.e. sifting of grain out of chaff i.e. if an
ocular testimony of a witness is to be disbelieved against a particular set
of accused and is to be believed against another set of the accused facing
the same trial, then the Court must search for independent corroboration
on material particulars as has been held in number of cases decided by
the Superior Courts. Reference may be made readily to the case of
Sarfraz alias Sappi and 2 others versus The State (2000 SCMR
1758)……”.

In AKHTAR ALI AND OTHERS VS. THE STATE (PLJ 2008 SC 269), at
page 275 of the judgment, the following principles have been highlighted by the
learned Apex Court:-

“……….It is a settled law that eye-witnesses found to have falsely

implicated five out of eight accused then conviction of remaining accused
on the basis of same evidence cannot be relied upon without independent
corroboration. See Ghulam Muhammad’s case(PLJ 1976 SC 29), Sheral
alias Sher Muhammad’s case (1999 SCMR 697) and Ata Muhammad’s
case(1995 SCMR 599). It is also a settled law that credibility of the
ocular evidence is not divisible. See Faiz Bakhsh’s case (PLD 1959 PC
24), Nadia’s case(42 Cr.L.J. 53), Muhammad’s case (PLD 1954 FC 84),
Sher Bahadar’s case (1972 SCMR 651) and Muhammad Afsar’s case
(PLD 1954 FC 171). It is also a settled maxim when a witness improves
his version to strengthen the prosecution case, his improved statement
subsequently made cannot be relied upon as the witness had improved his
statement dishonestly, therefore, his credibility becomes doubtful on the
well known principle of criminal jurisdiction that improvements once
found deliberate and dishonest cast serious doubt on the veracity of such
witnesses. See Hadi Bakhsh’s case (PLD 1963 Kar 805)…..”.
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 12

In this regard further guidance is sought from the case of GHULAM

MUSTAFA and another vs. STATE (PLJ 2010 SC 522), wherein, at page
529, the learned Apex Court of the country, has been pleased to hold as under:-

“……..In our jurisdiction it is by now well established that the legal

maxim falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is not a universal principle to be
applied in all criminal cases. However, according to settled case law
there are exceptions and if evidence on the record warrants a doubt in the
credibility of such witnesses than indeed their testimony regarding
another set of co-accused is to be considered with caution and cannot be
accepted without strict corroboration from other independent and
credible sources. In this connection reference can be made to the case of
Muhammad Nawaz v. State (1969 SCMR 132), Shafoo v. State (1968
SCMR 719) and Allah Ditta v. State (NLR 2002 Criminal 1 SC)…….”.

The rule of corroboration came up for consideration in yet another case

reported as ROHTAS KHAN VS. THE STATE (2010 SCMR 566), wherein,
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, at page 570, has been pleased to
observe as under:-

“……..We are conscious of the fact that the rule of corroboration in case
of interested witnesses is not an inflexible rule as held in the cases of
Niaz v. State (PLD 1960 SC 387), Nazir v. State (PLD 1962 SC 269),
Muhammad Ismail v. Khushi Muhammamd (PLD 1974 SC 37), Abdul
Rashid v. Umid Ali (PLD 1975 SC 227) and Muhammad Ali v. State
(1985 SCMR 230). However, in appropriate cases such rule can be
dispensed with. In order to bring the case out of the scope of general rule
the evidence of interested witness is to be scrutinized very carefully.
Firstly, it is to be seen whether the witness is truthful and tested on the
touchstone of inherit merit of his statement. Secondly, in the
circumstances of case the statement is reasonable, probable or plausible
and could be relied upon. If a statement satisfies the above requirements,
then the statement of a worst enemy of the accused can be accepted and
relied upon without corroboration. Reference is invited to Haroon v.
State (1995 SCMR 1627) and Muhammad Rafique v. State (1977 SCMR
457)”.

15. So far as motive part of the prosecution case is concerned, the learned

trial Court has not believed the motive alleged by the prosecution. We have also

not found any evidence in support of the said motive, therefore, the same is not

proved. In this regard, reference is given to the case of NOOR MUHAMMAD

MR.NO.796/05
CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 13

VS. THE STATE AND ANOTHER (2010 SCMR 97), wherein, at page 101,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, has been pleased to observe as under:-

“…….Thus the prosecution has failed to prove the motive. It has been
held in the case of Muhammad Sadiq vs. Muhammad Sarwar (1979
SCMR 214) that when motive is alleged but not proved then the ocular
evidence required to be scrutinized with great caution. In the case of
Hakim Ali vs. The State (1971 SCMR 432) it has been held that the
prosecution though not called upon to establish motive in every case, yet
once it has set up a motive and failed to establish it, the prosecution must
suffer consequence and not the defence. In the case of Ameenullah vs.
State (PLD 1976 SC 629), it has been held that where motive is an
important constituent and is found by the Court to be untrue, the Court
should be on guard to accept prosecution story”.

16. After having looked the prosecution case from all angles we have noted

that the case to the extent of the appellant is of doubtful nature and the

conviction and sentence of the appellant on the basis of such type of shaky and

unreliable evidence, cannot be maintained.

17. It is settled by the Apex Court of the country that in case of doubt, its

benefit must go to the accused not as a matter of grace but of right. The same

proposition came up for consideration in the case reported as MUHAMMAD

AKRAM VS. THE STATE (2009 SCMR 230), wherein, at page 236, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, held as under:-

“13. The nutshell of the whole discussion is that the

prosecution case is not free from doubt. It is an axiomatic
principle of law that in case of doubt, the benefit thereof must
accrue in favour of the accused as matter of right and not of
grace. It was observed by this Court in the case of Tariq Pervez v.
The State (1995 SCMR 1345) that for giving the benefit of doubt,
it was not necessary that there should be many circumstances
creating doubts. If there is circumstance which created reasonable
doubt in a prudent mind about the guilt of the accused, then the
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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 14

accused would be entitled to the benefit of doubt not as a matter of

grace and concession but as a matter of right”. (emphasis supplied)

In AYUB MASIH VS. THE STATE (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 1048), at
page 1056, while quoting a saying of the Holy Prophet (PBUH) that ‘mistake
of Qazi(Judge) in releasing a criminal is better than his mistake in punishing
an innocent”, and making reference to the maxim, that ‘it is better that ten
guilty persons be acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted’,
the learned Apex Court has been pleased to observe as under:-

“……It is hardly necessary to reiterate that the prosecution is

obliged to prove its case against the accused beyond any reasonable
doubt and if it fails to do so the accused is entitled to the benefit of
doubt as of right. It is also firmly settled that if there is an element
of doubt as to the guilt of the accused the benefit of that doubt must
be extended to him. The doubt of course must be reasonable and not
imaginary or artificial. The rule of benefit of doubt, which is
described as the golden rule, is essentially a rule of prudence which
cannot be ignored while dispensing justice in accordance with law.
It is based on the maxim, ‘it is better that ten guilty persons be
acquitted rather than one innocent person be convicted’. In simple
words it means that utmost care should be taken by the Court in
convicting an accused. It was held in The State vs. Mushtaq Ahmad
(PLD 1973 SC 418) that this rule is antithesis of haphazard
approach or reaching a fitful decision in a case. It will not be out of
place to mention here that this rule occupies a pivotal place in the
Islamic Law and is enforced rigorously in view of the saying of the
Holy Prophet (PBUH) that the ‘mistake of Qazi(Judge) in
releasing a criminal is better than his mistake in punishing an
innocent”.(emphasis supplied)

After considering all the circumstances, this Court is of the considered

view that the prosecution has failed to prove its case against the appellants

beyond any shadow of doubt, therefore, this appeal is allowed, the impugned

judgment is set-aside and the appellant is acquitted from the charge. He is

behind the bars and shall be released forthwith if not required to be detained in

any other case.

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CRL.APPEAL NO.1937/05 15

Murder Reference is answered in the NEGATIVE and sentence of

death is NOT CONFIRMED.

APPROVED FOR REPORTING

(MUHAMMAD ANWAARUL HAQ) (MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK)

JUDGE JUDGE
*MIAN ASHFAQ*