BENJAMIN V.

LADESMA

1. Can Legislature enact laws regulating the practice of law?

Absolutely, the Philippine legislature has the power to create laws that
oversee how the legal profession operates. You see, in the Philippines,
it’s mainly the laws passed by this legislature that dictate how lawyers
and legal practices are regulated. Plus, it’s the Supreme Court that
usually steps in to uphold these rules and standards. So, it’s a bit of a
system where the lawmakers set the rules, and the highest court
makes sure everyone is playing by them.
2. In re: Cunanan, Resolution, (18 March 1954), 94 Phil 534-597

FACTS: In this case, unsuccessful candidates from 1946 to 1953 filed a

petition to be admitted to the bar to take advantage of Republic Act
No. 972, popularly referred to as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." The
law allowed candidates with lower passing averages to be admitted to
the bar by fixing the passing scores for the 1946–1955 bar exams. The
petitioners contended that their post-war years were marred by a lack
of reading materials and poor preparation. The job of deciding whether
the law was constitutional fell to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does Republic Act No. 972, which establishes the passing
scores for the 1946–1955 bar exam, constitutional? Does the law go
against the Constitution's equal protection clause? Does the Supreme
Court's authority to admit, suspend, disbar, and reinstate attorneys-at-
law get usurped by the law?

RULING: The Supreme Court declared Republic Act No. 972

unconstitutional. According to the Court, admitting attorneys-at-law is
a judicial function that necessitates applying accepted norms and
principles to specific facts affecting specific people. The Court cannot
neglect its duty to guarantee that only eligible persons are permitted
to practice law. The Court also underlined that the public interest
requires the legal profession to be adequately prepared and efficient,
and that allowing people who are not adequately prepared to practice
law would pose a major social risk. Furthermore, because the law lacks
a rational foundation for categorizing failed bar candidates over the
years, the Court determined that it is class legislation.
3. Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos. 230642, 242954 & A.M.
No. 20-03-04-SC (Resolution), (09 November 2021)

FACTS: The case centers on whether the Philippine Law School

Admission Test (Phil SAT) is constitutional and whether the Legal
Education Board (LEB) has the authority to control legal education.
Established by Republic Act No. 7662, the LEB is responsible for
overseeing and accrediting law schools, establishing minimum
requirements for admission to the legal profession, and establishing
qualifications for faculty members. The LEB implemented the Phil SAT,
a required aptitude test, to guarantee the caliber of law students. The
petitioners and intervenors contended that the LEB's and the PhiL
SAT's authority violates due process and the academic freedom of law
schools.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court's authority to control the practice

of law and the LEB's authority to restrict law schools' academic
freedom.

HELD: The majority of the Court declared the PhiLSAT unconstitutional

for violating academic freedom and due process. According to the
Court, educational institutions are protected by the constitution's
guarantee of academic freedom, which includes the authority to
choose who can teach, what can be taught, how it can be taught, and
who can be admitted studying. This right is violated by the PhiLSAT, a
required aptitude test that dictates law schools' admissions
procedures. Because the PhiLSAT lacks a scientific foundation and is
arbitrary and unreasonable, the Court also determined that it does not
meet the due process requirement. The Court stressed that while the
regulation of the legal profession is a different issue, the regulation of
law as an academic discipline should always be evaluated considering
academic freedom standards.

4. Cite Civil Code provisions that govern practice of law.

 The Lawyers' Oath (taken upon passing the Bar exam),
 Republic Act No. 7662 (The Legal Education Act of 1993),
 The Code of Professional Responsibility
5. Zalamea v. De Guzman, Jr., A.C. No. 7387, (07 November 2016)
 FACTS: Manuel Enrique L. Zalamea and Manuel Jose L. Zalamea, the
petitioners, filed a disbarment petition against their attorney, Atty.
Rodolfo P. de Guzman, Jr., for allegedly breaking the Lawyer's Oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility by obtaining their property
through their attorney-client relationship. De Guzman was consulted by
the Zalamea brothers regarding the management of their mother's
estate, which included a home in Scout Limbaga, Quezon City. De
Guzman became a business partner in their lechon company, EMZEE
FOODS, INC. (EMZEE), after assisting them in forming a corporation to
manage the estate. The Zalameas sought to reclaim a property in
Speaker Perez St. that was foreclosed by Banco de Oro (BDO) after the
corporation of their aunts and uncles, Elarfoods, Inc., failed to repay a
loan to the bank. After haggling with BDO, De Guzman negotiated a
P20 million deal, with his wife, Angel, paying the P2 million down
payment. Subsequently, the Zalameas asserted that De Guzman had
violated his professional ethics by purchasing their property.

ISSUE: Did Atty. By purchasing the Speaker Perez property, which had
belonged to his clients, the Zalamea brothers, did Rodolfo P. de
Guzman, Jr. transgress his ethical obligations as a lawyer?

HELD: The Court denied Atty.'s request to be disbarred. de Guzman, Jr.

Rodolfo P. for lack of merit. Because the Speaker Perez property was
not at issue in the litigation, the Court decided that Article 1491 of the
Civil Code, which forbids a lawyer from acquiring his client's property
or interest in litigation, does not apply in this case. The Court
determined that De Guzman's purchase of the property was a
legitimate outcome of a business transaction and did not contravene
his professional ethics. The Court further stated that there was no proof
of undue influence, dishonesty, or misrepresentation in the transaction
and that De Guzman and the Zalamea brothers were business partners
rather than attorneys and clients.

6. Tingco v. Pabinguit, G.R. No. 10439, (17 October 1916), 35 Phil 81-89)

FACTS: The case centres on a disagreement over who owns six land
parcels in Jimalalud, Oriental Negros. Gan Tingco purchased the lands
from their original owner, Candida Acabo, on June 12, 1911, for P500.
Silvino Pabinguit, however, asserted that he had acquired the lands
from Faustino Abad, who had acquired them from a justice of the peace
 named Henry Gardner. A writ of execution issued by the justice of the
peace court of Guijulngan had resulted in Gardner purchasing the lands
for P555 at a public auction on March 20, 1907.

ISSUE: Is the sale of the lands to Silvino Pabinguit legal, and did Henry
Gardner, the justice of the peace, break the law by buying them at
public auction?

HELD: The Supreme Court decided in Gan Tingco's favour, stating that
he was the rightful owner of the lands and directing Silvino Pabinguit to
return them to Tingco. The court's ruling was founded on the idea that,
even in cases where the property is up for public auction, a judge
cannot purchase it while it is being litigated in his court. The purpose of
this prohibition is to stop a judge from improperly interfering with or
showing interest in something that is levied upon and sold under his
order. Since Gardner bought the land himself and was the justice of the
peace who issued the writ of execution, the court determined that the
sale of the land to him was null and void. The court also pointed out
that Pabinguit's seller, Faustino Abad, was unable to sell because he
was a minor at the time. As a result, the court upheld the trial court's
decision, naming Gan Tingco as the landowner and directing Silvino
Pabinguit to return the land to Tingco.
7. Valencia v. Cabanting, A.C. No. 1302, 1391, 1543, (26 April 1991), 273
Phil 534-546

FACTS: The estate of Remedios Mejia Vda is at issue in the case of

Heirs of Fran v. Salas. real estate and personal belongings left by de
Tiosejo, who died on July 10, 1972. Her final will and testament, which
was signed on April 23, 1972, named Rosario Tan or, after her passing,
Jesus Fran as executor and left all her assets to her collateral relatives.
Jesus Fran submitted a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will
and testament to the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 15, 1972.
After initially opposing the probate, the deceased's sisters, Concepcion
Mejia Espina and Maria Mejia Gandiongco, the private respondents,
filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate of the
Will" on September 18, 1972, stating that they had no issues with the
will's allowance. On November 13, 1972, the probate court issued a
ruling designating Jesus Fran as executor and admitting the will to
probate. Although the required notice to creditors was given, the
estate was not the subject of any claims. The proceedings came to an
 end on September 10, 1973, when the court approved the executor's
Project of Partition.

ISSUE: Six years after the probate judgement, can the private
respondents—who had previously withdrawn their opposition to the
will's probate—file an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, claiming
that the will is a forgery, that they were not given a copy of it, and that
the Clerk of Court's evidence reception was invalid?

HELD: When the respondent judge granted the Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and overturned the November 13, 1972, probate
judgement, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, finding
that the judge had engaged in a serious abuse of discretion that
amounted to lack of jurisdiction. The Court determined that the private
respondents' signing of the Project of Partition and submission of
certifications constituted unquestionable evidence of their prior actual
knowledge of the decision, and that they had waived their claim of lack
of notice.
8. Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68838, (11 March
1991), 272 Phil 628-639

FACTS: A service agreement between Florencio Fabillo, his wife, Josefa

Tana, and their attorney Alfredo M. Murillo is at issue in the case of
Fabillo v. Intermediate Appellate Court. On August 22, 1964, Murillo
signed a contract committing him to represent the Fabillos in a lawsuit
to reclaim a home and land in San Salvador Street, Palo, Leyte that his
sister Justina Fabillo had left for Florencio. According to the terms of the
contract, Murillo's contingent fee would be 40% of the property’s value.
On October 29, 1964, the court ruled that Florencio Fabillo was the
legitimate owner of the property, thereby ending the case. But the
parties couldn't agree on how to carry out the service agreement,
especially when it came to Murillo's portion of the properties.

ISSUE: Did the Fabillos and Murillo contract of services violate Article
1491 of the Civil Code, which forbids attorneys from purchasing
properties and rights that are the subject of litigation in which they
may be involved by virtue of their profession, even at a public or
judicial auction?
 HELD: The Supreme Court decided that Article 1491 of the Civil Code
was not violated by the service agreement. According to the Court, the
ban only applies if the property is sold or assigned while the client's
property is the subject of an ongoing legal dispute. The prohibition did
not apply to the contingent fee because it was paid after the case's
verdict was issued. The Court also decided that the contract's
contingent fee was reasonable and enforceable, but it made it clear
that Murillo was only entitled to 40% of the property’s value, not 40%
of the actual properties. Murillo was awarded P3,000 as a contingent
fee by the court, along with legal interest starting on October 29, 1964,
from Fabillos.

9. Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan, A.C. No. 11494, (24 July 2017), 814 Phil 1-
16

FACTS: The case concerns the administrative complaint that Juan De

Dios E. Carlos's heirs (Juan) filed against Atty. For alleged
transgressions of his attorney's oath, Jaime S. Linsangan (Atty.
Linsangan). Attorney. In a number of cases involving the recovery of a
piece of land in Alabang, Muntinlupa City, Linsangan represented Juan
as his attorney. Juan's brother, Teofilo, sold the land to Pedro Balbanero
after it had belonged to Juan's parents. Juan contacted Atty. Teofilo and
Pedro will give the property back to Linsangan. Attorney. Linsangan
filed several lawsuits, including one against Pedro and another against
Felicidad, Teofilo's alleged wife. In the end, the cases were resolved,
and the parties divided the property.

ISSUE: Whether Atty. Linsangan is guilty of violating his lawyer's oath

by colluding with Juan's estranged mother, evading income taxes, and
appropriating funds without consent.

HELD: The Court finds Atty. Linsangan is liable for violating his
lawyer's oath, Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code, Rule 9.02, Canon 9
and Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
suspended from practicing law for six months. Atty. Linsangan's
Contract for Professional Services with Juan, which included a
contingent fee equal to 50% of the property's value, violated Civil Code
Article 1491 (5), which prohibits lawyers from acquiring an interest in
the subject matter of a lawsuit. This provision is unambiguous and
categorical, and Attorney. Linsangan's actions clearly contradicted it.
 10. What are the two concepts of Attorney’s Fees?

In the case of Alva vs High-Capacity Security Force, the two concepts

of Attorney’s Fees are ordinary and extraordinary fees.

11. Cite provisions in Revised Penal Code which provide for specific
acts of lawyers that may result in criminal liability.

Article 183 - False Testimony in Civil Cases: Lawyers who

knowingly allow their clients to file false testimony in civil
cases may be held liable under false testimony provisions in the RPC.
They may be liable under criminal law for conspiring to deceive the
court using false information.

12. Cite the four-fold duty of a lawyer. Discuss each.

13. How would you characterize the relationship between the judge and a
lawyer?

14. Samson v. Caballero, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2138 (Resolution), (05 August

2009), 612 Phil 737-753

15. Campos v. Campos, A.M. No. MTJ-10-1761, (08 February 2012), 681 Phil
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