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 Unsayable Music
Six Reflections on Musical Semiotics,
Electroacoustic and Digital Music
 Unsayable Music
Six Reflections on Musical Semiotics,
Electroacoustic and Digital Music

Paulo C. Chagas

LEUVEN UNIVERSITY PRESS

© 2014 Leuven University Press / Presses Universitaires de Louvain / Universitaire
Pers Leuven, Minderbroedersstraat 4, B-3000 Leuven/Louvain (Belgium)

All rights reserved. Except in those cases expressly determined by law, no part of
this publication may be multiplied, saved in an automated data file or made public
in any way whatsoever without the express prior written consent of the publishers.

ISBN 978 90 5867 994 9

D / 2014 / 1869 / 34
NUR: 663

English language revision: Stacia A. Raymond

Cover design: Friedemann Vervoort
 Foreword

The role of the composer in society has gone through many transformations
over the past 1500 years or so. In his De Institutione Musica, the sixth-
century philosopher Boethius perceived three distinctive types of musician,
arranged in descending order of importance: the critic, the composer, and the
performer. But composers have seldom been confined to a single category of
musical activity. Throughout the Middle Ages, they were often responsible
for important breakthroughs in theoretical (i.e., critical) knowledge, e.g.,
Philippe de Vitry’s seminal advances in rhythmic notation, meter, and
isorhythm (talea and color), which laid the foundation for the Ars Nova of
the 1300s. Prominent among later composers who contributed greatly to our
critical understanding of musical practice was the eighteenth-century theorist
Jean-Philippe Rameau.
However, it was in the nineteenth century that composers frequently
undertook to write about the role of music in society, as well as about
themselves. Schumann and Berlioz were renowned as writers about as well
as of music, but most notable—and notorious—in this regard was Wagner,
who racialized musical thinking and projected his imaginings about stylistic
evolution into the future. The phenomenon of the literary composer persisted
into the twentieth century, with writings by Schoenberg, Hindemith,
Messiaen, and Cage, among many others, dealing not only with their approach
to composition but their personal worldview and philosophy as well.
Paulo Chagas is one of those remarkable composers well versed not only
in the methods and means of musical creation but also in theoretical issues
of aesthetics, semiotics, mathematics, and philology. This book displays an
exceptional grasp of a wide range of complex theoretical and philosophical
issues, all of them nonetheless directly connected to the act of composing
music.
Indeed, it is precisely because of his passionate intellectual engagement
that Chagas’s music always exhibits emotional immediacy as well as technical

5
Unsayable Music

sophistication. Both his works and his ideas draw their inspiration from
the wellspring of daily life and its frequently harsh realities. Chagas was a
victim of political violence when, at age 17, he was arrested and tortured by
the military dictatorship in Brazil in 1971 for collaborating with opposition
groups fighting for democracy. He has described to me his ordeal in the
following way:

I was put in the “fridge,” a small room, refrigerated and acoustically

isolated, and completely dark and cold. Various noises and sounds—
howling oscillators, rumbling generators, distorted radio signals,
motorcycles, etc.—shot from loudspeakers hidden behind the walls.
Incessantly, the electronic sounds filled the dark space and overwhelmed
my body for three long days. After a time, I lost consciousness. This
auditory and acoustic torture was then a recent development, partially
replacing traditional methods of physical coercion that killed thousands
in Latin American prisons between the 1960s and 1990s. Such sounds
injure the body without leaving any visible trace of damage. The
immersive space of the torture cell, soundproofed and deprived of light,
resonates in my memory as the perfect environment for experiencing the
power of sound embodiment.

He was freed from prison only after the intervention of a military officer who
was a friend of his parents. His works continue to explore themes of power,
violence, and control, using the latest technology and theoretical approaches.
Thus, Chagas’s music emanates from a place within himself that is not
only highly personal but also something he shares in common with the
rest of us. The human condition and the relationship between music and
society are recurring themes in his music. His philosophical writings are not
arid speculations written in abstruse academies from the lofty heights of an
ivory tower; rather, they exhibit the same immediacy and involvement with
the world of ideas that his compositions do with the world of sound. Thus,
theoreticians, composers, and lovers of music will all benefit from the insights
and wisdom contained within the covers of this book, which is the product of
nearly fifty years of asking questions, seeking answers, and creating expressive
sound.

Walter Aaron Clark

Professor of Musicology
Director, Center for Iberian and Latin American Music
University of California, Riverside

6
 Table of Contents

Introduction 9

1. Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics 13

2. Spectral Semiotics: Sound, Temporality, and Affect in Chopin 43

3. Communication and Meaning: Music as Social System 65

4. The Creativity of Electroacoustic and Digital Music 103

5. The Temple of Electronic Music:

The Electronic Music Studio of Cologne in the 1990s 159

6. Audiovisual and Multimedia Composition:

The Relationship between Medium and Form 203

APPENDIX I
WDR Studio of Electronic Music:
Works produced from 1987 to 2000 251

APPENDIX II
WDR Studio of Electronic Music:
Studio equipment used from 1990 to 2000 257

Bibliography 265

7
 Introduction

This book presents critical reflections on key topics of contemporary music

and aesthetics and represents nearly forty years of study. The six reflections
elaborate a myriad of themes emerging from both my artistic experience as a
composer and my research on musical semiotics, electroacoustic and digital
music, audiovisual and multimedia composition. Different approaches are
offered, including from philosophy, sociology, media, and critical studies.
In this sense, the reflections can be used as a guide for navigating through
today’s complexities and uncertainties while seeking musical understanding.
The first chapter investigates musical understanding through the lens of
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy. What is musical understanding? How can
we communicate that we understand a melody? The chapter provides cultural
background on Wittgenstein, and analyzes his contribution to logic, ethics
and aesthetics. Wittgenstein’s philosophy uses music as a tool for reflecting on
the understanding of language and understanding in general. It places ethics
at the core of the aesthetics and recognizes the role of a culture in shaping
aesthetic understanding. The insight on Wittgenstein’s musical universe
leads to questioning the relevance of applying his philosophical method to
investigating contemporary music.
The second chapter introduces my own theory of spectral semiotics, applying
it to the analysis of Chopin’s Nocturne Op. 27 No. 1. Spectral semiotics
elaborates ideas from Husserl’s phenomenology of time consciousness, Varela’s
theory of neurophenomenology and Tarasti’s existential semiotics. It explores
digital tools such as sonograms for analyzing Chopin’s music, showing how
his composition relates sound to affect by building fractal spectral patterns at
different temporal levels, which are connected to different scales of affection.
Chapter three develops a view of music as a social system of communication
based on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social systems, including his thoughts
on art and media. Central notions such as the distinction between system
and environment, the concept of form as the calling of a distinction (Spencer-

9
Unsayable Music

Brown), the theory of autopoiesis, and the distinction between medium

and form, are discussed. Luhmann’s theory of art as social system provides
conceptual tools for studying meaning in contemporary art and music. The
chapter also presents other views of music and society by Ruwet, Tarasti,
Attali, and Kittler.
The fourth chapter provides a critical account of the creativity of
electroacoustic music and digital music. It examines the emergence of
electroacoustic music from the background of World War II and the aesthetics
of of musique concrète and eketronische Musik, which are associated with the
studios of Paris and Cologne. Themes of the evolution of electroacoustic music
from the 1950s to the present, including timbre composition, acousmatics,
analog modulation, digital sound synthesis, and digital music are among
the topics discussed. Focusing on critical ideas by authors such as Benjamin,
Flusser, McLuhan, and Foerster, we trace the specific creativity that has
emerged with the use of apparatuses, the transition from the analog to the
digital era, and the role of radio in shaping the experimental creativity of the
Electronic Music Studio of Cologne.
The fifth chapter is a critical documentation of the Electronic Music
Studio of Cologne between the years 1990 and 1999, when I worked there as
Klangregisseur (sound director). The studio is presented from both the artistic
and the technical point of view. Electroacoustic works produced during
this era which will be discussed include: Jean-Claude Eloy (France), Denys
Bouliane (Canada), Luc Ferrari (France), Michel Waisvisz (Netherlands),
Jörg Birkenkötter (Germany), Younghi Pagh-Paan (South Korea), York
Höller (Germany), Jonathan Harvey (Great Britain), John McGuire (USA),
Paulo C. Chagas (Brazil), Marco Stroppa (Italy), Mauricio Sotelo (Spain),
and Karlheinz Stockhausen (Germany). A list of the technical equipment and
a list of works produced are provided in the two annexes.
The sixth and final chapter is dedicated to audiovisual and multimedia
composition. On the basis of Luhmann’s theory of medium and form
introduced in Chapter Three, theoretical ideas of audiovisual and multimedia
composition are investigated and connected with my own works. Myriad
forms of audiovisual and multimedia composition are discussed: musical
theater, electronic music for dance and performance, chamber opera with
multimedia, interactive multimedia theater, music video, audiovisual
installation, music laser installation, interactive multimedia composition, and
digital oratorio.
The title Unsayable Music is a reference to Wittgenstein, to whom I owe
the concept of philosophy as a therapeutic activity as well as the philosophical
method of observing music from the point of view of its practical use.

10
 Introduction

Wittgenstein suggests that sound is only the surface of music and that the
musical work conceals something more profound that can hardly be described
by philosophical models or scientific theories. The infinite complexity of
music can only be understood in the context of its use, which includes the
understanding of the cultural and social references that create meaning
beyond what is expressed by sound.
From this perspective, this work relates to the tradition of the 20th
century composers who, in addition to their artistic work, advanced
theoretical reflections on music and composition. I would particularly like
to acknowledge my gratitude to Henri Pousseur (1929-2009), with whom I
studied at the University of Liège, collaborated in many composition projects,
and cultivated a personal friendship. His poetical and insightful writings
captivated my imagination and accompanied me abroad, first from Brazil
to Liège (1980), then from Liège to Cologne (1982), and from Cologne to
California (2004). My gratitude is also due to the University of California,
Riverside (UCR), for providing me with the research environment for this
project.
The development of sound and audio technology with its tools for sound
analysis, synthesis, composition, and performance has created a sort of sound
fetishism that impacts the studies of electroacoustic and digital music. On
the other hand, musicological and musical semiotic studies are generally
devoted to the music of the past, mostly focusing on the heritage of classical
and romantic music, while, at best, touching on works of reference of the
20th century. Therefore, this book aims to bridge the current gap between the
technically oriented approaches of electroacoustic and digital music studies
and the critical approaches of contemporary music informed by musical
semiotics.
In contemporary society, music faces a challenging situation. Never in
the history of humankind have we had so much music available to our ears,
from commercial music to the classical; from the variety of works, genres,
and styles created in different parts of the world to the emerging sounds of
electroacoustic and digital music. However, while in the 19th century the great
musical works were appreciated as artifacts of artistic accomplishment, this is
no longer true today. So-called artistic music suffers from a lack of audience
and visibility. Technology plays an ambivalent role in this process. On the
one hand, it makes music accessible to the masses, opening new possibilities
of musical expression; on the other, it stimulates a different consciousness,
which is related to the specific qualities of the machine, and tends to
eliminate critical thinking, replacing it with automatism and repetition.
In contemporary digital society, the interwoven relationships between arts,

11
Unsayable Music

technology, science, and economics raises many questions about the future of
music and the many ways it will continue to impact our lives.
Therefore, these six reflections aim to address the issue of the changing
status of music in society by providing conceptual tools for a pluralistic
understanding of the diversity of aesthetics related to sound and music. These
reflections aim to relate the traditional categories of musical scholarship to the
new reality of music shaped by technology, which articulates new functions
and domains of artistic and musical creativity. As Wittgenstein says, we have
to penetrate deeper below the appearance of things in order to make visible
the connections that make something meaningful. Following Wittgenstein’s
invitation, we need to understand music by listening to the unsayable.

12
 Chapter 1

Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein,

Ethics, and Aesthetics

It is impossible for me to say in my book one word

about all that music has meant in my life. How then
can I hope to be understood? (Rhees 1981, 94)

1. Wittgenstein, Philosophy, and Music

I was first introduced to the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951)

as a graduate student at the University of São Paulo, Brazil, in the late 1970’s.
Reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was a formative and life-changing
experience; not only because of the challenging nature of the work, which
requires sophisticated logical-mathematical reasoning, but more so because of
the way the book eradicates any certitude a reader may have about themselves
and the world. As a young man, the main lesson of this study was that if one
has something to say, that it should be said clearly, otherwise it is better for it
to pass over in silence. For someone intending to become a composer, this was
and remains a prompting to look deeply into oneself and inquire about the
real motivation of composing music, to ask what can be said through music,
and to investigate how it can be done. There were no obvious answers to these
questions, but the seed of curiosity had been planted.
Over the years, my interest in Wittgenstein has intensified. I have studied
his writings fervently and continue to attempt to connect his ideas with my
research on musical meaning. The more insight I have developed, the more
fascinated I’ve become by the originality of his thinking and the passionate
tone of his writing. The following reflections aim to share this passion by
focusing on some issues that represent but one personal interpretation of the
countless points of view one might develop by reading him. I am engaged in
a process of continuous self-inquiry guided by Wittgenstein’s voice. This text
includes a significant amount of quotations, as I believe it is important to
acquaint oneself with his unconventional style and relentless search for logical
clarity. His ideas on music reveal a kind of conservative attitude that seems at
odds with his progressive attempt to remove the veils of confusion caused by
the limitations of language. How are we to understand this attitude toward
music? Can we interpret his musical world beyond the original context to

13
Unsayable Music

project them into a contemporary analysis of music? I undertake no attempt

to draw easy conclusions, but rather, extend an invitation such as the one I
received upon first reading Wittgenstein, to revisit applying his method in
order to learn something new.
Wittgenstein is an “intellectual myth” of the 20th century and certainly
one of the most original thinkers that Western culture has ever produced.1
His philosophy reflects on issues of logic, mathematics, language, psychology,
ethics, aesthetics, and religion. While his method combines the rejection of
metaphysics and the scientific spirit with clarity and a simple, colloquial-like
language, it is pushed to such a level of logical precision that it stretches
the limits of thinking. The unorthodoxy of Wittgenstein emerges as much
in his life as in his thought; his writing is almost incomprehensible and his
unusual assumptions, views, and inquiries cause surprise, confusion, and
discomfort. The growing bibliography on Wittgenstein bears witness to
the fascination unleashed by his work and life inside and outside academic
circles.2 The archives of his work—an enormous body of manuscripts, diaries,
correspondence, notes, drafts, and aphorisms, which only recently became
available, turned out to be a treasure chest for scholarship.3 We can expect
that the fascination will continue and a profusion of new approaches will
appear, seeking to illuminate his legacy through multiple perspectives by way
of the connections between his life and philosophy.
Wittgenstein characterized his philosophy as a therapeutic activity. He
dismissed the idea that philosophy can serve as a theory to explain the world;
he had great antipathy to academic life, which he considered an obstacle
to promoting philosophy as a serious and productive activity. No honest
philosopher, he said, could treat philosophy as a profession. He encouraged
his best students to leave academia and pursue careers such as that of a
physician, schoolteacher, or gardener. Above all, he abhorred a worldview
grounded in science. For him, science and technology have nothing to do with
the fundamental problems of the world because “there is no great essential
problem in the scientific sense” (CV 10; 20).4 Criticizing the devastating

1
Sloterdijk suggested this mythological view of Wittgenstein taking in account both the
still-lasting magic of Wittgenstein’s work—the fascination it causes among readers and
scholars—and the kind of mystical aura surrounding his monastic way of life (Sloterdijk
2009, 125-29).
2
A review of the bibliography on Wittgenstein is beyond the scope of this essay.
3
For an overview of the efforts to make available the sources on Wittgenstein, see The
Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen (WAB), [Link] [accessed
on August 1, 2013].
4
The works by Wittgenstein are cited according to the usual abbreviations; for Culture and
Value (CV ) I include the pages of both the first and the second English edition (1980,

14
 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

effect that the scientific method and the cult of science exert on culture as a
whole, he took the view that science would have a “theory for everything”
and this characterizes for him the decline of civilization in the 20th century:
“The whole modern conception of the world is based on the illusion that the
so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena” (TLP
6.371). Scientific principles are not appropriate for elucidating, for example,
aesthetics and religion; rather they generate distortion, superficiality, and
confusion.
The intensity of his temperament reflects in the way he struggled with
the problems of philosophy as well in his personal relationships. Several
biographies reveal his strong personality and constant restlessness. He
cultivated an attitude of severe criticism towards the values of society and
the individual, which led to a kind of self-isolation, both personally and
philosophically. Taking refuge from civilization, he often opted for solitude,
living in remote places like the Alps of Austria or the fjords of Norway,
seeking peace, tranquility, and energy to overcome his own suffering. But
the attempt to escape the world resulted often in greater isolation, more
sorrow and suffering, thus creating a vicious circle from which he almost
never escaped (cf. Monk 1990). Sloterdijk (2009) interprets the isolation as
the conscious choice of an eremitic life in order to distance himself from the
world in an era when philosophy was dominated by politics and war illusions.
What is embodied here is the return of a monastic moment in the moral
center of bourgeois culture: “Like no other he witnessed the moral secession
of an intellectual elite from the totality of mediocre conditions” (Sloterdijk
2009, 125). In Wittgenstein’s cult of the artistic and philosophical genius that
engages the duty of self-transcendence as a minimum condition of existence,
Sloterdijk sees a bourgeois version of Nietzsche’s Übermensch (superman). In
other words, Wittgenstein is the bourgeois depiction of Zarathustra, operating
with logical and philosophical precision, the creator of new values, raising
himself above the ambivalence and mediocrity of the world. Carnap observed
in 1927 the impact he caused when he visited the positivist philosophers of
the Vienna Circle:

When he started to formulate his view on some specific philosophical

problem, we often felt the internal struggle that occurred in him at that

1998). For the citations from Wittgenstein I use basically the English translations, which
I changed—sometimes significantly—when I considered that the translation didn’t
convey correctly the meaning of Wittgenstein’s German text. All emphases are in the
original.

15
Unsayable Music

very moment, a struggle by which he tried to penetrate from darkness to

light under an intense and painful strain, which was even visible on his
most expressive face. When finally, sometimes after a prolonged arduous
effort, his answer came forth, his statement stood before us like a newly
created piece of art or a divine revelation. Not that he asserted his views
dogmatically […] But the impression he made on us was as if insight
came to him as through a divine inspiration, so that we could not help
feeling that any sober rational comment or analysis of it would be a
profanation. (Monk 1990, 244)

Wittgenstein had a profound interest in music. He grew up in a family of

amateur musicians, who were active patrons of Vienna’s musical circles.
Ludwig’s father, Karl, was a businessman who amassed one of the largest
fortunes in the iron and steel industry in imperial Austria and also played the
violin. His mother was Leopoldine Kalmus, an accomplished pianist who had
extraordinary sight-reading ability. Ludwig was the youngest of the family.
Of their eight children, two dedicated themselves to music: his brother Hans,
the eldest son, was a child prodigy who began composing at age four and had
intended to follow a career in music, before committing suicide. His brother
Paul pursued a career as a concert pianist; he had his right arm amputated
during the First World War but managed to continue performing only with
his left hand. It was for him that Ravel wrote his Piano Concerto in D Major,
the concerto for the left hand.
A number of famous artists performed in the salons of the Wittgenstein
mansion in Vienna in the beginning of the 20th century, such as the young
Pablo Casals, Bruno Walter, Gustav Mahler, and the famous violinist Joseph
Joachim with his string quartet. Joachim introduced Johannes Brahms to
the family; Brahms gave piano lessons to their two daughters and regularly
attended concerts in the house. One of the major works of Brahms’s last
years, the Clarinet Quintet with op. 115, was premiered at the mansion.
Growing up among so many musical talents, the young Ludwig became a
great admirer of the repertoire of musical classicism and romanticism. He
only learned to play the clarinet when he was thirty years old, while pursuing
training as a schoolteacher. He had perfect pitch and showed an exemplary
ability to explain music. He was also known for his exceptional talent in
whistling; he used to whistle Lieder by Franz Schubert, his favorite composer,
accompanied by the piano.
Despite his great interest in music, he did not develop any theory or
musical aesthetics. However, the references to music, especially the analogies
between music and language, pervade his philosophy. A significant body of

16
 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

thoughts on music and musical life appears in Culture and Value [Vermischte
Bemerkungen], a collection of notes, aphorisms, and fragments covering the
period between 1914 and his death in 1951, which was first published in
1977. This work addresses themes of philosophy, art, science, culture, and
religion. Some parts are autobiographical and reveal personal beliefs and
traits of his personality: artistic preferences, identification with certain
traditions, and the continuous struggle with the problems of philosophy
and man. The observations of Culture and Value give clear evidence of
Wittgenstein’s musical taste and attachment to the music of the 19th century,
particularly to the German composers and the Viennese tradition: Bach,
Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms, Mendelssohn, Mahler, and Wagner.
There are also many references to Josef Labor (1842-1924), a Czech composer,
pianist, and organist who became blind at a young age and whose career was
sponsored by Wittgenstein’s family. Ludwig greatly appreciated his style of
virtuosic interpretation.

2. Saying and Showing

The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP) was the first and only book
Wittgenstein published in his lifetime. It covers a period of seven years: from
1911, when he was a Russell protégé in Cambridge, to 1918, when he was
serving as an officer in the Austrian army during World War I. Published
in German in 1921 and in English in 1922, the Tractatus reflects on the
philosophy of logic and language, metaphysics, and ethics. The text is
organized under seven major aphorisms, which are each followed by a
hierarchy of propositions that give the impression of being increasingly
detailed elucidations [Erläuterungen], but actually function as self-descriptive
commentaries [Bemerkungen]. The writing is dense and poetic without traps
or provocations, without fear of itself appearing incomplete and fragmented.
He does not try to seduce the reader with the illusion of an easy solution or a
final interpretation.
Contrary to what the title suggests, the Tractatus is far from being a work
of logical perfection. In the last two paragraphs, he expresses the surprising
paradox of his whole philosophy:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who

understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has
used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak,
throw away the ladder after climbing up it.)

17
Unsayable Music

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world
aright. (TLP 6.54)
What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. (TLP 7)

What does it mean here to “throw away the ladder”? What is the subliminal
message of a text that cancels itself? The reader, who is urged in the beginning
to climb the arduous rungs of a treatise on dogmatic metaphysics, discovers
at the end that he must discard everything he has learned so far in order to
continue. The exhortation to throw away the ladder is a challenge to transcend
the boundaries of logic and rational thought. Wittgenstein addresses his
readers almost like a Zen master that speaks to his disciples by means of
paradoxes. The master leaves us perplexed, hurls us into the abyss of doubt,
takes the ground from under our feet, and invites us to swirl inside the vortex of
the uncertainties of the world. Narrow and winding is the path of knowledge
moving upwards from the illusion of metaphysical clarity to the mystical
ineffability of existence. He rejects the thesis and philosophical doctrines:
“Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work
consists essentially of elucidations” (TLP 4.112).
The central and revolutionary idea of the Tractatus is that any attempt to
say something philosophical results in nonsense. The task of philosophy is
thus to trace the boundaries between what can be said and what cannot be
said but only shown. The relation between saying and showing is not a dualism;
they are incompatible, mutually exclusive categories: “What can be shown
cannot be said” (TLP 4.1212). The saying is what can be expressed through
logical-scientific language using an objective terminology. The showing is
what cannot be said within the positivist discourse, what is excluded from the
objectivity consistent with logical systems. He is concerned with protecting
the positivist discourse against metaphysical absurdity. When he refers to
the limits of language, he is not evoking ordinary everyday language but
the language of science and philosophy. Towards the end of the Tractatus he
affirms: “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical”
(TLP 6.522).
For Wittgenstein, the propositions of logic express only imperfectly the
aspects of reality. “Logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of
the world. Logic is transcendental” (TLP 6.13). We can logically understand
even a proposition that makes no sense because it is not consistent with
the reality of the world. Such propositions are, for example, the tautology

18
 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

and the contradiction:5 “A tautology has no truth-conditions, since it is

unconditionally true: and a contradiction is true on no condition. Tautologies
and contradictions lack sense” (TLP 4.461). Tautologies and contradictions
are the limit of language and thought and therefore the limit of the world.
The tautology and the contradiction do not say anything, because they are not
located in the space between the true and the false: “A tautology leaves open
to reality the whole—the infinite whole—of logical space: a contradiction
fills the whole of logical space leaving no point of it for reality. Thus neither
of them can determine reality in any way” (TLP 4.463).
Wittgenstein considered the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to be primarily
a book of ethics. But his conception of ethics is unique. Ethics is a discourse
of human existence that transcends the factual world. The principles of ethics
cannot be defined or analyzed by external characteristics. The main function
of ethics in his view, is to give sense to the world: “The sense of the world
must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything
happens as it happens, in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have
no value” (TLP 6.41). Just as with logic, ethics does not allow itself to be
expressed: “Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the
same.)” (TLP 6.421). But, in opposition to logic, ethics does not show the
structure of the world. The propositions of ethics and aesthetics, as well as
of logic, are pseudo-propositions that say nothing of what they want to say,
but show something that is not what they give the impression of saying. And
unlike logic, ethics and aesthetics are not a “mirror-image” of the world. They
do not describe facts, but simply show. Ethics and aesthetics are predicates of
the thinking subject and not properties of the world.
This conception of ethics is influenced by Schopenhauer’s philosophy in
the sense that man, in knowing himself as a thinking subject, is conscious
of his will. However, while for Schopenhauer “the thinking subject is in the
world which is the manifestation of will”, for Wittgenstein, “the thinking
subject is not a part of the world, but its limit: it is now as metaphysical, as
real or unreal as the will” (Griffiths 1974, 103; emphasis in the original). This
gives a different view of ethics and aesthetics. For Wittgenstein, aesthetics
and ethics can be one in a way that was not possible for Schopenhauer: “To
view the world sub specie aeternitatis is to view it as a whole—a limited whole.

5
A tautology occurs when the same thing is said twice in different words, a kind of
redundancy that is generally considered a figure of rhetoric or the expression of a certain
style. Wittgenstein was the first to apply the concept of tautology to the redundancies of
propositional logic.

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Unsayable Music

Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical” (TLP 6.45).6
He uses the term sub specie aeternitatis as synonymous with transcendental.
It emphasizes the two different ways of accessing reality: the saying and the
showing. The form of showing is the sub specie aeternitatis (transcendental)
observation, which has the world as its backdrop. It is the domain of ethics
and aesthetics:

The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis, and the good life
is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between
art and ethics.
The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst
of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside. (TB 7.10.16)

The aesthetic attitude, as well as ethical experience, belongs to the sphere of

transcendental showing. The aesthetic experience is the observation of the
world as a limited whole from the “outside” by means of a complete single
object: the artwork. To understand the artwork we must first separate it
from its environment. Whoever listens to music in a concert hall, at home,
or using a digital mobile device must first isolate the music from the ambient
noise. After that, the world becomes the world of music, the ambient noise
disappears, and the music takes up all the space. The music becomes the
world. It is this ability of artwork to see the world as a whole through a
limited space of facts—the artwork—that creates the experience of surprise.
The artwork is true regardless of its relation to the world. It conveys, at the
same time, an experience of logic, ethics, and aesthetics. In his Lecture on
Ethics (LE), Wittgenstein links ethics to the existential experience of surprise.
This same observation appears in the Notebooks:

Aesthetically, the miracle is that the art world exists. That there is what
there is.
Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at
the world with a happy eye? (NB 4.11.16)

The key to understanding the “mysticism” of this philosophy lies in the

attitude toward the world: “Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it
is” (TLP 6.44). Aesthetic contemplation can serve as a logical interpretation of
the world—i.e., can help you see the world correctly and can simultaneously

6
For an account of Wittgenstein’s conception of ethics in relation to Schopenhauer, see
Griffiths (1974).

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

evoke a mystical experience. It helps us to be happy, to live in harmony with

the world. But it is also clear that there is unhappiness in the world and that
is why art can serve as a remedy, as a therapy to find a good and happy life.
When life itself becomes art, then humans live happily. A happy life is the
purpose of existence according to this philosophy, and is expressed through
artwork. Art is an expression and artwork is the complete expression. The
artwork both says about itself and shows itself: “The work of art does not seek
to convey something else, just itself” (CV 58; 67). Art has a “mystical” mission,
especially music. It has to express what ordinary language cannot express, i.e.,
the unsayable, according to the last paragraph of the Tractatus.

3. Logic and Representation: Sound and Melody as States of Affairs

Early in the Tractatus, an example from sound is introduced to illustrate

the properties of the objects that constitute a state of affairs [Sachverhalt]:
“Notes must have some pitch” (TLP 2.0131). Things do not exist as isolated
entities: “It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of
states of affairs” (TLP 2.011). The objects are combined to constitute a state of
affairs and the internal properties of the objects constitute all the possibilities
of combining into states of things; the possibility of its occurring in states
of affairs is the form of an object (TLP 2.0123; 2.01231; 2.014-2.0141).
Anything that exists in the world can only exist in a space that determines
the possibilities of all its internal properties.
The statement that “notes must have some pitch” is an analogy. What
makes a sound a musical sound is its logical space, i.e., the possibilities of
establishing a state of affairs. Pitch is an internal property of the sound, a
logical condition of its existence. The sound needs to be heard, i.e., it has
to be distinguished from the sounds of the world, needs to have a “pitch”,
which sets it apart from other sounds. The pitch, which is determined by the
frequency of the sound vibrations, is an external property that distinguishes,
for example, the sound of a flute from the sound of a contrabass. The musical
scale consists of tones of different pitches—the musical notes. The musical tone
with a pitch—the musical note— is therefore a state of affairs. But, besides
the pitch, the musical tone has other properties such as timbre, intensity, and
duration. The sounds of each instrument have different timbres and the same
instrument can produce tones with varying timbres and intensities.
The sine wave oscillator can generate “pure” electronic sounds with
precise frequencies (pitches). The sinusoidal sound is a logical abstraction that
serves to isolate specific properties of sound vibrations. The musical tones

21
Unsayable Music

are complex phenomena, formed by the sum of vibrating constituents called

partials (or overtones), which determines the quality of the sound spectrum.
An instrumental or vocal sound can be interpreted as a sum of partials
evolving in time. The sound spectrum can be analyzed or synthesized through
mathematical operations and also visually represented. The mathematical
calculations that allow us to analyze or synthesize sounds, as well as the systems
of visual representation (e.g., sonogram), are analogies of sound, which serve
to display states of affairs. Even when it comes to a “pure” sinusoidal sound
generated electronically, it exists within a given logical space.
A musical tone never exists alone. We always listen to various sounds,
a simultaneity of sounds. In music, successive sounds make up the melody
and the simultaneous sounds that constitute chords. A melody or chord is
a complex state of affairs, which can be resolved (analyzed) into a statement
about their constituents (TLP 2.0201). For instance, the melody can be seen
as a sequence of pitches, intervals, movements, etc.; a chord can be analyzed
according to the intervals of its notes, the relation of the root-tone to a scale
degree, the harmonic functionality etc. The individual tones that constitute a
melody or a chord are “independent in so far as they can occur in all possible
situations, but this form of independence is a form of connection with states
of affairs, a form of dependence” (TLP 2.0122). These forms of dependence
and independence, the possibility of occurring in states of affairs, are the
form of a sound object (TLP 2.0141). This form is logical and internal. It
cannot be expressed, it shows itself. The pitch, timbre, and intensity are not
external to the sound, but they are essential characteristics of sound.
Electroacoustic music can be composed of sounds with specific properties
that cannot be translated into the traditional parameters of sound—pitch,
timbre, and intensity. For example, it can be made of “noise” recorded from
the acoustic environment and electronically processed until the original
source becomes unrecognizable; but it can also be made of “noise” generated
by electronic processes of sound synthesis. The noise may have different
characteristics of which the electronic music composition takes advantage.
In this case, the noises constitute the sound objects of the music and the
musical logic is the result of the connections of these objects in their possible
states of affairs. From an external point of view, the noise can be described as
a sound that is much more complex than any instrumental or vocal sound,
and therefore much more difficult to put into words that are commonly used
to describe musical notes. The concept of pitch may not apply because one of
the characteristics of noise is to be formed of non-periodic sound vibrations
that do not have a clear pitch. However, the spectral complexity of noise is an
external property; what matters is to know its internal properties, the possible

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

states of affairs that determine its form. The logic of these states of affairs can
be related to different types of knowledge and practices, for example, to the
knowledge of the apparatuses and programs for creating and manipulating
electronic sounds; the space of the states of affairs may reflect the mode of
operation of these devices, as Flusser shows (cf. Flusser 2000; 2011).
A concern of the Tractatus is the relationship of a representation to what
is represented. This relationship is investigated through the concept of image
[Bild]. The image consists of several elements and has in common with reality
the logical form, which is the form of the reality. Wittgenstein makes an
analogy to music to explain the relationship between image and reality:

A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, sound-waves,

all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that
holds between language and the world.
They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern. (TLP
4.014)

The expressions “musical idea”, “musical thought”, and “musical theme” are
synonymous for melody. They share the same logical construction of musical
notation, which, in turn, has in common the same logical construction of
the gramophone, of the record’s grooves, and of the digital representation of
sound. All these forms of representation share an internal relationship that
is similar to the relationship between language and the world. There is a
logical rule that allows us to reconstruct the symphony from the score or
from the grooves of the vinyl record or from the numerical combinations of
the computer. It is precisely this rule that makes for the similarity of these
internal settings that seem to be so different in nature. This rule, according to
Wittgenstein, is the “law of projection”, which relates to the translation of an
idea or a thought, from one context to another.
“In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by
the senses” (TLP 3.1). In analogy to that, we can say that in a melody, a
thought is expressed in a way perceptible to the senses. And for Wittgenstein,
just as it is clear that a phrase is not a blend of words, the theme in music is
not a blend of notes (TLP 3.141). What constitutes a phrase or melody is that
its elements (the words or the notes) stand in a determinate relation to one
another. Both the phrase and the melody are “articulated”. Whoever does
not understand the meaning of a melody does not understand the music.
However, the melody is not a meaningful proposition; it says nothing: “A
melody is a kind of tautology, it is complete in itself; it satisfies itself” (NB
4.3.15). The only thing one can perceive in the melody is its logical structure.

23
Unsayable Music

A melody is just a melody as music is just music. The melody—and thus the
music—shows what cannot be said. That is why the melody is a privileged
instrument to capture reality in its structure, as different melodies point to
the diversity of what cannot be said.

4. Philosophy as Therapy: Understanding the Melody

The second philosophy presented in Philosophical Investigations is a collection of

fragments, notes, aphorisms, and reflections that covers the period 1930-1948.
The focus of these reflections makes the shift from logic to grammar and is an
incomplete book, aiming to show the impossibility of giving a description of
the world as a whole. This work is in a style very different from the Tractatus;
no more logical propositions but a disconnected discourse focused on ordinary
language and operating with comparisons and analogies. Wittgenstein explores
the complex nature of the mind, the restlessness of simultaneous thoughts
that characterizes our experience. He proposes a therapeutic exercise of
reflection for releasing us from the compulsivity of language; he points to the
obsessions and traps of our language, as if language would conspire against us:
“Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means
of our language” (PI §109). Language produces illusions that are deeply rooted
in us because of the limitations of our language. He wants to point to these
illusions, which are the source of our misunderstanding. “Philosophy simply
puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since
everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden,
for example, is of no interest to us” (PI §126).
For him, “The problems of life are insoluble on the surface and can only
be solved in depth.” (CV 74; 84). Music shows that we have to dive into the
depths, beyond the surface of the sounds, to understand its complexity:

Music, with its few notes and rhythms, seems to some people a primitive
art. But only its surface is simple, while the body which makes possible the
interpretation of this manifest content has all the infinite complexity that
is suggested in the external forms of other arts and which music conceals.
In a certain sense it is the most sophisticated art of all. (CV 8; 11)

Music is the most refined of all art because it hides its complexity in a simple
surface. The surface of music gives access to a complexity that we try to
understand by using language. Wittgenstein’s ideas on music influence the
way he reflects on language, exploring the connections that may exist between

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

the linguistic phrase and the musical phrase. What does it mean to understand
a spoken phrase? What does it mean to understand a melody? He articulates
these thoughts in the Brown Book, a series of lectures dictated in 1934-35,
which is considered a preparatory work for Philosophical Investigations.
Observing the strange illusion that possesses us when “repeating a melody to
ourselves and letting it make its full impression on us, we say ‘This melody
says something’, and it is as though I had to find what it says” (BrB II §17),
he claims that the melody doesn’t say anything that we can express in words
or pictures. And if we recognize that, we should say that, “It just expresses
a musical thought.” In other words, he emphasizes the idea of melody as a
tautology, a phrase that expresses itself and nothing more. Everything that is
said, is said by the melody itself, and not by something outside it. How does,
in such a view of music, individual perception and subjectivity come into play?
Wittgenstein is not concerned with providing a subjective explanation of
music. Rather, he puts himself in the position of a musician, reflecting on
the different ways to play a melody: “But surely when you play it you don’t
play it anyhow, you play it in this particular way, making a crescendo here,
a diminuendo there, a caesura in this place, etc.” (BrB II §17). How do we
justify playing the melody in this manner and not differently? He says that we
can explain the specific performance by comparing the melody to a phrase:
“At this point of the theme, there is, as it were, a colon” (BrB II §17). He
considers the “right” tempo of the melody. As we know, playing a melody in
a different tempo can create a completely new meaning. He asks:

“What it is like to know the tempo in which a piece of music should

be played?” And the idea suggests itself that there must be a paradigm
somewhere in our mind, and that we have adjusted the tempo to conform
to that paradigm. But in most cases if someone asks me, “How do you
think this melody should be played?”, I will, as an answer, just whistle it
in a particular way, and nothing will have been present to my mind but
the tune actually whistled (not an image of that). (BrB II §17)

There are two interesting things to observe here in Wittgenstein’s rhetoric:

First, the idea that it should be a paradigm in our mind telling us how to play
the melody, what the correct tempo is, the dynamics, the punctuations, etc.
Secondly, the view that the melody can be represented through something;
for example, I can whistle the melody to show someone the correct tempo of
the melody. But both assumptions turn out to be wrong, as he explains: What
is present in my mind is the whistled melody and nothing else. Wittgenstein
does not deny that understanding a musical theme may consist in finding a

25
Unsayable Music

form of verbal expression that is thought of as equivalent to the theme. The

same applies for the understanding of a facial expression: We can say, “Now
I understand the expression of this face” (BrB II §17), and what happened is
that we found a word that conveys the expression. However—and this is the
crucial point—the verbal expression we associate with the musical theme or
the words we use to describe the face are not the understanding itself.
“Consider also this expression: ‘Tell yourself that it’s a waltz, and you
will play it correctly’” (BrB II §17). Here, the word correct indicates that
the musician knows what a waltz is, because he has learned the rules for a
successful performance and the verbal image of the word waltz triggers this
implicit knowledge. He invokes the understanding of a musical phrase as an
analogy of understanding language because he wants to say that, in music,
understanding comes from within, from doing the performance, and not
from a reference to something outside projected onto it:

What we call “understanding a sentence” has, in many cases, a much

greater similarity to understanding a musical theme than we are inclined
to think. But I don’t mean that understanding a musical theme is more
like the picture one tends to make oneself of understanding a sentence;
but rather that this picture is wrong, and that understanding a sentence
is much more like what really happens when we understand a melody
than at first sight appears. For understanding a sentence, we say, point
to a reality outside the sentence. Whereas one might say “Understanding
a sentence means getting hold of its content; and the content of the
sentence is in the sentence”. (BrB II §17)

The concept of philosophy as a therapy (PI §254) conveys the idea that our
concern with building models of elucidation is an obstacle to our progress,
something that binds us and prevents us from developing our thinking. The
goal is not to produce new stable conclusions, but lead us to change our way of
thinking and approaching problems. McGuinn suggests that Wittgenstein’s
philosophy, “aims to engage the reader in an active process of working on
himself; it also underlines the fact that the reader’s acknowledgment of
Wittgenstein’s diagnoses of philosophical error is a vital part of his method”
(McGuinn 1996, 22). This therapeutic approach is essentially a slow process:
“My sentences are all to be read slowly” (CV 57; 65); the patient is gradually
led to a new understanding of the nature of the problems that were disturbing
him; this understanding allows him to recognize that he was seeking pleasure
in the wrong way, and this should bring him peace.

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

Wittgenstein’s writing style is complex and distinctive. He shapes the

philosophical process as an internal dialog using the voice of an interlocutor.
The voice is introduced either indirectly through observations or directly
through the use of quotations marks. The dialog presents the situation in
which someone succumbs to the traps of language while the therapeutic
voice examines concrete examples of how to seek clarity and understanding.
Due to these multiple voices, his style has often been compared to music
and particularly to polyphony. We can say that the different voices with
their specific timbres play individual roles in the thematic development; they
appear and disappear, join other voices in new contexts and connections.
Wittgenstein introduces the concept of Übersicht, which is translated
in English as “perspicuity”, to define a philosophical attitude that seeks to
understand things by making visible their connections. This is a significant
difference from an understanding produced by a theory of explanation, which
is the common case in metaphysics and science. An Übersicht is the kind of
understanding produced, for instance, by a work of music, a poem, or other
work of art. Our language lacks Übersicht, because of the grammar, which
obscures our capacity to see the connections between things:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command

a clear view of the use of our words. Our grammar is lacking in this
sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that
understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Here the
importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.
The concept of a perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance
for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at
things. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?). (PI §122)7

Polyphony is but one of many musical metaphors that have been proposed
for interpreting Wittgenstein. Eggers, for example, analyzes this method
as a “musical” elaboration of material that can be viewed in different ways.
Wittgenstein operates with figures emerging from an unspeakable background;
he develops a technique of changing points of view [Blickwechsel], moving
from one figure to another or detaching figures from a noisy, unutterable
background (cf. Egger 2011, 232). This unspeakable background is what

7
“Weltanschauung” It is a fundamental concept of German 19th century philosophy.
It indicates a comprehensive conception of the world of an individual or a particular
community inside geographic borders or sharing values such as linguistic, political,
cultural, etc.

27
Unsayable Music

allows music to develop audible meanings. When we listen to a musical

work, we are necessarily recognizing figures that are formed on a background,
which, at the same time, is not openly manifest. In a musical work one
cannot simultaneously realize all layers of expression. There is no fixed point
functioning as a stable state of affairs for interpreting music. In the field
of music there are states of affairs, but these are intentional, i.e., they are
objectifications of subjects. The listener is an integral part of the process of
musical meaning.
For Wittgenstein, there is no prototype of understanding. We apply the
word understand according to each situation. The aesthetic understanding,
especially the musical understanding, is a paradigm of the hermeneutic
understanding of language. With this the musical analogy, he guides us
through the labyrinths of understanding: “Language is a labyrinth of paths.
You approach from one side and know your way about; you approach the
same place from another side and no longer know your way about” (PI §203).
Music has a more transparent grammar and therefore can help to elucidate
the grammar of language, which is more opaque.
Nevertheless, he does not transform the musical phrase into a paradigm
of understanding; he is not concerned with developing a general model of
comprehension based on musical understanding. For Chauviré (1986),
Wittgenstein uses the analogy between the melody and the phrase in order
to achieve an Übersicht [overview] of the different applications the word
understanding can have. He uses the analogy as a bilateral tool, going back
and forth between music, language, and other kinds of representation such
as pictures, faces, gestures, etc. The analogy creates a reciprocal relationship
that serves to illuminate both terms of the comparison. He doesn’t want us
to think that music is the model of understanding; he suggests exploring
some internal similarities that may exist between relative cases. The analogy
points to the similarities but also to the differences between different cases of
understanding. Instead of paradigms to explain everything, his philosophy
has to operate with partial models that are instruments of making analogies.
These instruments are called objects of comparison [Vergleichsobjekte].
According to Chauviré, Wittgenstein rejects the dogmatic—even perverse—
use of paradigms in all research including philosophy, psychoanalysis (Freud),
ethnology, physics, and mathematics (cf. Chauviré 1986, 1161).

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

5. Language Games: Musical Understanding

Wittgenstein’s theory of language games became one of the most powerful

arguments of modern and postmodern pluralism (Sloterdijk 2011, 128). What
is a language game? It is an object of comparison for exploring similarities
and differences that help to clarify some aspects of the language:

Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for
a future regimentation of language—as it were first approximations,
ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set
up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of
our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.
(PI §130)

The analogy between the melody and the sentence is an example of a language
game. Chauviré distinguishes some strategic functions of this specific
language game: (1) there is a similarity of family between the musical phrase
and the verbal phrase; (2) there is no prototype of understanding; (3) musical
understanding emphasizes important aspects of understanding. What is the
understanding of a musical theme? How can we say that we understand a
melody? Similarly, as he wrote in the Brown Book, he asks himself:

Understanding a sentence is much more akin to understanding a theme

in music than one may think. What I mean is that understanding a
sentence lies nearer than one thinks to what is ordinarily called
understanding a musical theme. Why is just this the pattern of variation
in loudness and tempo: One would like to say “Because I know what it’s
all about.” But what is it all about? I should not be able to say. In order to
‘explain’ I could only compare it with something else which has the same
rhythm (I mean the same pattern). (One says “Don’t you see, this is as
if a conclusion were being drawn” or “This is as if it were a parenthesis”,
etc. How does one justify such comparisons?—There are very different
kinds of justification here.) (PI §527)

By saying that music conveys nothing but itself, Wittgenstein rejects the causal
approach according to which music has the essential function of producing
affects and emotions, the meaning of which is intentionally incorporated into
musical signs. The belief that music expresses nothing but itself is in line with
the idea of musical autonomy.

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Unsayable Music

It has sometimes being said that what music conveys to us are feelings
of joyfulness, melancholy, triumph, etc. etc. and what repels us in this
account is that it seems to say that music is an instrument for producing
in us sequences of feelings. And from this one might gather that any other
means of producing such feeling would do for us instead of music.—To
such an account we are tempted to reply “Music conveys to us itself !”
(BrB II §22)

This notion of musical autonomy can be easily mistaken for self-sufficiency,

as if music had the capability to speak about itself. The crucial idea is that
the understanding of music cannot be explained causally. Although, if there
could be something through which we could express our understanding
of music—such as a word we utter, or a facial expression or gesture, these
expressions can demonstrate understanding, they say nothing about the
essence of the understanding. The understanding is embedded in music, in
a melody, a phrase, a theme, etc. Wittgenstein asks how one can recognize
that another person understands a musical thought. He makes an analogy
between someone listening to music, drawing a face, or playing an instrument
with understanding; he asks how this understanding is to be communicated:

What does it consist in: following a musical phrase with understanding?

Observing a face with a feeling for its expression? Drinking in the
expression on the face?

Think of the demeanor of someone who draws the face with understanding
for its expression. Think of the sketcher’s face, his movements;—what
shows that every stroke he makes is dictated by the face, that nothing in
his sketch is arbitrary, that he is a delicate instrument?
It is really an experience? I mean: can we say that this expresses an
experience?

Once again: what does it consist in, following a musical phrase with
understanding, or, playing it with understanding? Don’t look inside
yourself. Ask yourself rather, what makes you say that’s what someone else
is doing. And what prompts you to say that he has a particular experience?
Indeed, do we ever actually say that? Wouldn’t I be more likely to say of
someone else that he’s having a whole host of experiences?
I would perhaps say, “He is experiencing the theme intensely”; but ask
yourself, what is the expression of this? (CV 51; 58)

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

What emerges here is the issue of internal experience, which is recurrent in

Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Understanding is not caused by an external factor,
but is internal. The understanding of a musical phrase (or a work of music)
is like the sudden emergence of an acoustic configuration for which we give
an interpretation. We understand music like we recognize the expression of
a face or a drawing. Understanding arises out of an impulse; it happens like
a “click” in our mind (Chauviré 1986, 1165), an explosion of meaning that
leads us to connect things and through which we experience the unity: “I
want to remember a melody and it escapes me; suddenly I say ‘Now I know
it’ and I sing it. What was it like to suddenly know it? Surely it can’t have
occurred to me in its entirety in that moment!” (PI §184)
Wittgenstein refers frequently to gesticulations [Gebärde] and gestures
[Geste] to illustrate the problem of understanding. The metaphor of gestures
is a recurrent one in Culture and Value and Philosophical Investigations:

This musical phrase is a gesture for me. It creeps into my life. I make it
my own (CV 73; 83).

I should like to say: “These notes say something glorious, but I do not
know what.” “These notes are a powerful gesture, but I cannot put
anything side by side with it that will serve as an explanation.” (PI §610)

What is being emphasized here is the notion that musical understanding does
not consist in the gestures and movements you can make while listening to
music. Gesture is only a reaction in line with the sensations we may have,
the movement we may make, or even the words that can accompany our
understanding. Wittgenstein disassociates everything exterior that points to
the understanding from the understanding itself:

Understanding and explaining a musical phrase. – The simplest

explanation is sometimes a gesture; another might be a dance step, or
words describing a dance.—But isn’t our understanding of the phrase
an experience we have while hearing it? And what function, in that case,
has the explanation? Are we supposed to think of it while we hear the
music? Are we supposed to imagine the dance, or whatever it may be, as
we listen? And supposing we do,—why should that be called hearing the
music with understanding?? If seeing the dance is what matters, it would
be better that, rather than the music, were performed. But that is all a
misunderstanding. (CV 69; 79)

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Unsayable Music

Understanding of music is expressed in a certain way, both in the

course of hearing and playing and at other times too. This expression
sometimes includes movements, but sometimes only the way the one
who understands plays, or hums, occasionally too parallels he draws and
images, which, at it were, illustrate the music. Someone who understands
music will listen differently (with a different facial expression, e.g.), play
differently, hum differently, talk differently about the piece that someone
who does not understand. His appreciation of a theme will not however
be shown only in phenomena that accompany the hearing of playing of
the theme, but also in an understanding of music in general. (CV 70; 80)

Gestures and gesticulations appear as primitive language games with aesthetic

value. Although gestures are not articulated like language, they say more than
a thousand words compared to traditional aesthetic discourse. The gesture as
the first and last image of a silent understanding appears as a primitive and
ultimate manifestation of an aesthetic appreciation, which it is impossible to
formulate orally with accuracy. The gesture may be considered an external
index pointing to a specific understanding, but understanding itself is
internal. If it were external there would be a rule whereby a certain gesture
would be correlated with a certain understanding. Gestures do not belong
to listening with understanding, but are part of the music in the same way
that music can trigger emotions and emotions can be associated with the way
we listen to music. For Wittgenstein, the gesture realizes the impossibility of
describing what we feel and therefore the inadequacy of logical and scientific
theories for clarifying music.

6. Rules and Forms of Life

If music expresses nothing but itself, how do we make aesthetic judgments?

How can we set standards to compare works of art? How can we communicate
about art using language? Wittgenstein repeatedly emphasizes that words
such as “beautiful” and the like can be used as interjections, but play no real
role in discussions of art. In the notes of his lectures in Cambridge taken by
his students, he says:

It is remarkable that in real life, when aesthetic judgments are made,

aesthetic adjectives as ‘beautiful’, ‘fine’, etc., play hardly any role at all.
Are aesthetic adjectives used in a musical criticism? You say: “Look at
this transition”, or “The passage is incoherent”. Or you say, in a poetical

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

criticism: “His use of images is precise”. The words you use are more akin
to ‘right’ and ‘correct’ (as these words you use are ordinary speech) than
to ‘beautiful’ and ‘lovely’. (L&C §8)

This seems exaggerated, since it is common sense to use such adjectives to

qualify our feelings towards works of art. However, Wittgenstein is not
concerned about ordinary conversations. He reflects on the use of language
when it comes to discussions between experts—such as scholars—about the
rightness or wrongness of works of art, in the sense that it can be debated,
accepted, or denied. As Schulte claims, the idea of aesthetic standards to
judge the value of works of art seems to be in contradiction with the “more
common view that aesthetic judgments ultimately depend on personal
taste, on education and culture” (Schulte 1990, 77). It seems that we learn
to appreciate art by following rules, or we are drilled to learn rules—“as
in music you are drilled in harmony and counterpoint” (L&C §15)—and
artistic judgments are made according to rules, including those of the artists
themselves:

The rules of harmony, you can say, expressed the way people wanted
chords to follow—their wishes crystallized in these rules (the word
‘wishes’ is much too vague.) All the greatest composers wrote in
accordance with them. (You can say that every composer changed the
rules, but the variation was very slight; not all the rules were changed.
The music was still good by a great many of the old rules.—This thought
shouldn’t come in here.) (L&C § 16)

The issue of rules seems, however, not to apply to extraordinary works of art,
the so-called “masterpieces”.

When we talk of a Symphony of Beethoven we don’t talk of correctness.

Entirely different things enter. One wouldn’t talk of appreciating the
tremendous things in Arts. In certain styles in Architecture a door is
correct, and the thing is you appreciate it. But in the case of a Gothic
Cathedral what we do is not at all to find it correct—it plays an entirely
different role with us. The entire game is different. It is as different as to
judge a human being and on the one hand to say ‘He behaves well’ and
on the other hand ‘He made a great impression on me’. (L&C §23)

The problem here is that the concept of rule as a standard for judging the
correctness of a work of art has both a positive and a negative value. On the

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Unsayable Music

one hand, there are the “normal” works that are supposed to follow the rules
(of harmony, or of counterpoint); if they break the rules they are considered
flawed or imperfect. On the other hand, there are the “masterpieces”, where,
if they break the rules, this can be considered as an intentional act that gives
the work a special meaning. However, as Schulte notes, if a masterpiece sets its
own standards, as in the case of Beethoven’s symphony, how can we consider
that it breaks rules? And when we exclude the possibility that a correct work
breaks rules, then it doesn’t make sense to talk about “correctness” (cf. Schulte
1990, 80). Pointing to the same problem, Gmür asks if there is a rule that
determines when the rules must be broken in order to indicate that a work
of art has to be considered a masterpiece. For him the answer is no (Gmür
2000, 167).
Mozart’s overture to Le nozze di Figaro is an example of how rules are
broken and the composition still seems “correct”.

The ‘necessity’ with which the second idea succeeds the first. (Overture to
Figaro). Nothing could be more idiotic than to say it’s ‘pleasing’ to hear the
second after the first!—But the paradigm according to which everything
there is right is certainly obscure. “It is the natural development.” You
gesture with your hand, would like to say: “of course!”—You could too
compare the transition to a transition (the entry of a new character) in
a story, e.g. or a poem. That is how this piece fits into the world of our
thoughts and feelings. (CV 57; 65)

The paradigm of “correctness” here would be explicit if a second idea

would follow the first one. But Mozart gives only a hint at the paradigm;
he indirectly calls for the rule and, at the same time, causes surprise by not
following it. The rule functions as an object of comparison [Vergleichsobjekt]:
Following the rule would be a logical consequence, a musical construction in
the domain of “saying”. Breaking the rule unfolds a meaning that cannot be
explained through crystalline logic, pointing to something that is external
and cannot be expressed, only indicated; it is the domain of “showing”. As
Schulte claims, only when one develops a “feeling” for the rules and learns to
“indicate” it, is one able to interpret the rules in a broad sense, determining
cases that are left open by the rules.
Wittgenstein’s philosophical method is not focused on building new and
astonishing theories or elucidations, but on the examination of language. Since
he considers the problems of philosophy to be rooted in the “misunderstanding
of the logic of language” (PI §93), the remedy he presents asks us to look closely
at the structure of the practice of our language, to study specific cases. We

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

are always in a rush to build models that seem appropriate but, when applied
to concrete examples, reveal themselves as useless. Wittgenstein’s therapeutic
method leads us to investigate individual cases in order to see clearly what
is at stake; we begin to recognize not only the emptiness of our models, but
also that all we need to understand how a given language functions is already
there before our eyes.
The concept of understanding is not related to the idea of something
“going on in our minds”, but suggests the ideas of readiness, willingness, and
ability. Understanding is therefore linked, in a complex and multifaceted way,
to our participation in a particular form of life. So the answer to Wittgenstein’s
question, “What is musical understanding?”, can only be given by means of
an investigation of the concrete practices of music in society, the language
games that connect music with culture and life. Musical understanding
implies not only understanding what music is in general, but also the variety
of its uses—activities, expressions, gestures, images—that imply knowledge
of other aspects of culture:

Understanding music is a manifestation of human life. How could it

be described to someone? Well, above all I suppose we should have to
describe music. Then we could describe how human beings react to it.
But is that all that is necessary, or is it also part of the process to teach
him to understand it for himself? Now, teaching him to understand
would be teaching him what understanding is in another sense than a
theory that does not do this. And again, teaching him to understand
poetry or painting can be part of an explanation of what understanding
music is. (CV 70; 80-81)

Music is part of our very particular form of life and we recognize in it

the same repertoire of gestures through which we understand each other.
Therefore we can consider that music is a language. Understanding music
and understanding language is embedded in a network of language games.
Understanding is not possible without a musical environment; outside it
music does not have game partners and loses its meaning. If a work of music
ceases to be performed, it loses its meaning as a game; if it comes to be played
again, it acquires a new meaning related to the new era. An example of this
is the rediscovery of Bach’s music in the 19th century; another example is
the “authentic Baroque music” played on historical instruments in the 20th
century. If we fail to listen to a work of music, it is because we think that it no
longer works for our form of life. It was not the music that changed, but our
culture. Music is rooted in the practice of life.

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Unsayable Music

7. Musical Melancholy

“Schubert is irreligious and melancholy.” (CV 47; 53)

Melody is the primary focus of Wittgenstein’s reflections on music. There

is also a focus on theme, reinforcing the analogy between a musical theme
and a phrase in language. He says: “The theme interacts with the language”
(CV 52; 60).
Wittgenstein formulated thoughts on many composers: Bach, Mozart,
Beethoven, Mendelssohn, Schubert, Wagner, Brahms, Mahler, and also
Joseph Labor (1842-1924). He discusses things he likes and dislikes in both
a given composer’s music and life. He appreciated the music of the first half
of the 19th century; Beethoven, Schubert, and Brahms were his favorite
composers. Labor’s performance impressed him; in 1947 he wrote on Labor’s
playing: “He is speaking. How curious!” (CV 62; 71). Wittgenstein reflects
on the relationship between music and language when he analyses Labor’s
performance: “What was it about this playing that was so reminiscent of
speaking?” (CV 62; 71). He argues that the similarity between music and
language is not a secondary thing but something “important” and “big”.
There is some music that describes itself as language; however, there are other
ones that don’t want to become a language at all. He notes that the differences
he sees in music should not be taken as a “judgment of value” (CV 62; 71).
In other words: there is no paradigm for defining what music is, we can have
different understandings of music.
Wittgenstein appreciates Schubert’s melody deeply. Gmür suggests that
Schubert was his favorite composer, mainly because of his identification
with Austrian culture (Gmür 2000, 186). Wittgenstein believes Schubert’s
melody to be full of moments that he calls Pointen (cf. CV 47; 53). The
French word pointe, which conveys ideas such as “head”, “tip”, “peak”, etc.,
has been imported into the German language (Pointe) with the meaning of
“punch line”. He uses also another German word from ordinary language
in connection with Schubert’s melody: Witz. This word means short story
in German, or a smart and creative language game. But Witz can also mean
a joke, something told for the purpose of causing a laugh. Witz is thus a
synthesis of many meanings, a word that opens up an ambivalent analogy.
He is not suggesting that Schubert’s music functions like a joke, yet he is
suggesting that there are moments of climax—Pointen—that transform our
expectations like the punch lines of jokes. The Pointen are “thoughts” he
admires, along with Schubert’s capacity for transforming conventions into

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

some deeper expression.8 He briefly analyzes the last two bars of Schubert’s
song Der Tod und das Mädchen [Death and the Maiden]: we first listen to a
figure that seems conventional and ordinary until we understand that “here
the ordinary is filled with significance” (CV 52; 60).
Wittgenstein makes many critical remarks on Mendelssohn, characterizing
the essence of his music by saying that “there is perhaps no music by
Mendelssohn that is hard to understand” (CV 23; 27). He calls Mendelssohn
a “reproductive” artist (CV 38; 43) and asks: “What does Mendelssohn’s music
lack? A ‘courageous’ melody?” (CV 35; 40). Wittgenstein uses the analogy of
surface/depth once again, this time, referring to the music as primitive on the
surface and meaningful in its depth—to criticize Mendelssohn:

Within all great art there is a WILD animal: tamed.

Not, e.g. in Mendelssohn. All great art has primitive human instincts as
its ground bass. They are not the melody (as they are, perhaps, in Wagner),
but they are what gives the melody depth and power. (CV 37-38; 43)9

In contrast, Wittgenstein admires the “strength of the musical thinking in

Brahms” (CV 23; 27), and “Brahms’s overwhelming skills” (CV 25; 29). He
saw a kinship between Brahms and Mendelssohn; they composed similar
music but the difference is that “Brahms does with complete rigor what
Mendelssohn did half-rigorously. Or: Brahms is often Mendelssohn without
the flaws” (CV 21; 18). Brahms is a boundary for Wittgenstein’s thoughts on
music. In 1930 he said to his friend Drury: “Music came to a full stop with
Brahms; and even in Brahms I can begin to hear the sound of machinery”
(Rhees 1981, 127). In other words, he thinks that music comes to an end
when the sound of machinery starts to shape musical creativity. What would
he had said about electroacoustic music?
Wittgenstein’s conception of music, like his conception of language, is
contextual. The understanding of music is determined by the culture. The
work of art must be understood and judged in the cultural context in which
it is created. Music refers to itself, and to the specific culture—the time and
space in which it emerges. It includes the totality of “forms of life”—all
manifestations of culture of that time, including architecture, film, religion,

8
Hatten’s analysis of Schubert, focused on gestures, brings also this idea that Schubert’s
music operates with a synthetic element that articulates simultaneously different
meanings; this synthesis is accomplished by gestures (cf. Hatten 2004).
9
The word “depth” is here used to express the “complexity” that lies below the surface of
music, to which the melody is associated (See Wittgenstein’s definition of music (CV 8;
11) quoted above.

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Unsayable Music

etc. For him, art has an intimate relationship with ethics because it is both a
commitment to a happy life and the revelation that makes happy life visible.
Artists have something to teach the world both through their work and life.
The artist and his work are one.
Beethoven was an ideal figure to Wittgenstein. Beethoven “talked and
wrestled” with problems that “no philosopher has ever confronted”, and
“perhaps they are lost”. Beethoven experienced and described the development
of Western culture as an “epic”, and he did it with precision (CV 9; 12).
What is the epic of a culture? For Wittgenstein, the epic of a whole culture
is to be sought in the works of its greatest figures, and in a time when these
works foresee the end of this culture, “for later there is no one there any
more to describe it” (CV 9; 12). As pointed out by Gmür (2001), Beethoven
embodies the qualities of passion, willpower, dedication, and persistence in a
time of adversity, which impressed Wittgenstein. Beethoven showed through
his art that one can overcome suffering and adversity; he shaped his artistic
creativity and production in the perspective of the eternal and transcendental
that achieves the unity of work and life.

8. Summary

Wittgenstein’s philosophy doesn’t provide any musical theory or aesthetics.

Rather, music is a tool for reflecting on the understanding of language
and understanding in general. He uses the analogy between music and
language as an object of comparison for illuminating different aspects of the
investigation. There is no prototype of understanding. There is a similarity
between understanding language and music but music has a more transparent
“grammar” than language and therefore can make things that are hidden
by language appear more clearly. However, he proposed no philosophy of
understanding. Any attempt to develop a comprehensive account of musical
understanding based on Wittgenstein’s ideas would lead to nothing but a
fallacious misunderstanding.
Wittgenstein formulated with intensity and precision a close relationship
between ethics and aesthetics—“(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)”
(TLP 6.421). Both are part of the ineffable; the ethical and aesthetical attitude
towards the world is the one that shows the “good life”. The artist’s attitudes
and decisions are a matter of both ethics and aesthetics. It doesn’t matter how
the world is, how much misery there is in the world, the work of art has to
show the possibility of seeing the world as it is, as something transcendental.
The idea that we are not able to explain the world in a logical sense, together

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 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

with the attitude of acceptance, leads to a “mystical” view: “There are, indeed,
things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are
what is mystical” (PI §6.53).
Wittgenstein emphasizes the autonomy of music: music doesn’t say anything
but itself. On the other hand, he recognizes that aesthetic understanding
is only possible within a culture through the contextual references to the
“forms of life”. To describe an ensemble of aesthetic rules means to describe a
specific culture. Musical understanding cannot be reduced to the mechanical
application of explicit rules; the expressive game of musical rules obeys a
tradition that is mostly implicit, which determines the choices. The rules
allow us to recognize the full expression of music.
His reflection on music is focused on the music of the 19th century that
belonged to his particular Austrian cultural context. He gave no thoughts to
the music of his own time, for example the atonal and serial music of Arnold
Schoenberg, with whom he shares similar points of view.10 This leads us to
question whether Wittgenstein’s ideas on music apply only to the music he
reflects on or to other kinds of music. Are his thoughts useful but limited to
the music of the past? Or can he help us understand music no longer rooted in
the European tradition or music that seeks formal models outside melodic and
harmonic structures of tonality, such as atonal music, electroacoustic music,
or digital music? On the other hand, should we consider the possibility that a
shift has occurred in which music became a different kind of language with
a different grammar? Or even that music itself lost the ability to articulate a
language that can be understood by a large community?
In opposition to the narrow focus of his musical universe, Wittgenstein’s
philosophical method opens new perspectives for understanding music in
a broad sense, including listening, composing, performing, analyzing, and
teaching. He develops a concept of “grammar” that is not focused on language
considered as a system of signs, but on the practice of using language. This
concept invokes the idea that language is a spatial and temporal phenomenon
(PI §108) that has to be understood as a language-in-use with its distinctive
patterns of use that constitute what he calls the “grammar of our concepts”
(cf. McGinn 1996, 13). His therapeutic voice tells us to look carefully into the
detailed structure of our practice of using language in order to cure ourselves
of the temptations of misunderstanding.
For Wittgenstein, understanding is not a process of going inwards but
of looking at the complexity of patterns that characterize our form of life.
Music—similar to language—is not an abstract system of signs conveying

10
For a comparison between Wittgenstein and Schoenberg, see Eggers (2011).

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Unsayable Music

some kind of meaning, but a particular form of life that displays structures
that are constituted by the activity of making music. He invites us to look
at the way we determine musical concepts, how in our musical practice we
constitute regular patterns by following rules, how we choose to follow some
rules and dismiss others and how we apply words like “correct” or “incorrect”
to make aesthetic judgments about music.
Understanding music cannot be reduced to the mechanical decoding of a
system of signs. For instance, although we learn to play a musical instrument
through “ostensive teaching”—by establishing an association between names,
gestures and repeated movements performed with the instrument—, this
kind of ostensive training can lead to quite different understanding of music.
In the same way, while listening to music we can use some words or make
gestures that accompany or manifest our feelings, but they don’t constitute
the musical understanding itself. For Wittgenstein, aesthetic appreciation
consists of assessing the significance of an artwork or performance without
comparing it to a pre-existent model or reality. The aesthetic pleasure emerges
from the sense of “correctness”, similar when a musician finds the correct
expression for performing a certain work of music; for instance, the correct
expression of a particular raga in Indian classical music, or the appropriate
interpretation of a piano sonata by Beethoven.
Music is autonomous in the sense that it doesn’t need to express anything
external. Music is complete in itself. Everything that can be said is said
through the music. This idea of artistic autonomy can help us to understand
meaning in the ordinary language as an internal process—the particular way
signs are being used to say something. For Wittgenstein art, and especially
music, is capable of expressing what ordinary language cannot convey with
words. Art can place us outside the world and give us the opportunity to
observe the world from the exterior, the experience of transcendence. This is
the mystical mission of art.
The relevant message of Wittgenstein’s philosophy is a double-sided
one. On the one hand, he sparks intellectual passions by pushing us to
investigate the limits of what can be logically explained. On the other hand,
by placing ethics at the core of the aesthetic experience, he urges us to work
on ourselves and for humanity. The ethical attitude is at the same time a
way of action and knowledge, an encouragement to dispel ignorance through
clarity, transparence, and profound commitment. The mystical mission of art
emerges through these ethical values. It requires, at the same time, a struggle
with the roots of our confusion—which lies in the “misunderstanding of the
logic of language” (PI § 93), in order to establish the clarity and transparence,

40
 Musical Understanding: Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics

and a pragmatic approach to creativity in order to make visible what language

passes over in silence—the unsayable.

41
 Chapter 2

Spectral Semiotics: Sound, Temporality,

and Affect in Chopin

1. Spectrum as Existential Metaphor

The concept of spectrum emerges as an existential metaphor of sound and

music in the digital era. A simple definition of spectrum is the representation
of sound energy as a function of frequency. The conversion of acoustic
vibrations into digital signals (Digital Signal Processing) allows the direct
numerical calculation of the frequency content of sound. For that, the most
widely used algorithm is the Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT). It emerges
from the scientific knowledge of waveforms in general, specifically periodic
vibrations. Any sound, no matter as complex it seems, can be described as a
system of periodic vibrations that are multiple of a fundamental frequency.
The FFT algorithm, proposed by the French mathematician Joseph Fourier
in the late 18th century has been successfully implemented in computers as
Discrete Fourier Transformation (DFT), a digital signal processing algorithm
allowing very fast calculations of samples of digital signals.1
Digital signals may be processed in either the time domain or the frequency
domain. DFT can convert signals from the time domain to the frequency
domain and vice-versa. This allows different representations of sound: the
waveform representation is interesting for visualizing time and the spectral
representation for frequency content. A waveform can then be transformed
into a corresponding spectrum and vice-versa. The sonogram (or spectrogram)
is a spectral representation of the sound. Figure 1 shows the sonogram of a
female voice saying the phrase: “My father works in a mysterious place”. On
the top, we see the waveform, on the bottom the sonogram. On the sonogram

1
For a short overview of digital audio processing see Rossing et al. (2002, 634-51); for
an introduction to the digital signal processing and applications in computer music see
Moore (1990), Steiglitz (1995), and Loy (2007); the articles on Strawn (1985) provide a
useful introduction to the development of musical signal processing with computers.

43
Unsayable Music

the horizontal axis represents time and the vertical axis the frequencies;
there is a third dimension given by the variation of the black color, which
represents the amplitudes. The more intense the color, the stronger sounds
the frequency. For example, the black lines on the bottom indicate the voice’s
frequency energy is concentrated in the lower register of the spectrum. The
sonogram provides a clear visualization of how the sound evolves in time in
terms of frequency and amplitude.

Figure 1: Sonogram of the phrase: “My father works in a mysterious place”

One of the great advantages of digital spectral representation is that it reveals

the micro-structure of sound. In Figure 2, the sonogram displays the beginning
of the previous phrase, the word “my”, which has a very short duration of only
270 milliseconds. We can visualize its spectrum in a window of the same size
as the one representing the phrase. By comparing the two sonograms, we
recognize two different forms of sound. In the first sonogram we see that the
sequence of events, corresponding to the individual words of the phrase, form
a certain rhythm. In the second sonogram we see a single event stretched over
the whole duration of the window, displaying the spectral micro-structure of
the word “my”. If, instead of speech, these two sonograms were representing
music, we would have two different musical forms, the first one consisting of
a sequence of segments and the second one of a single segment. However, as
we see here, the formal distinctions we can make on a spectrum depend on
the temporal level we choose to represent it. With the sonogram we are able
to visualize sound at different scales of time, which gives us the opportunity
to analyze music from different temporal perspectives.

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 Spectral Semiotics: Sound, Temporality, and Affect in Chopin

Figure 2: Sonogram of the word “My”

Spectral representation has become a tool for analysis, synthesis and

manipulation of musical sounds. It provides an understanding of the sound
material that benefits not only electroacoustic and digital music composition,
but also musical analysis and semiotics. My theory of spectral semiotics
(Chagas 2010) proposes a phenomenological approach to investigate sound
and music using sonograms and other digital tools. The research on spectral
semiotics, which is informed by the compositional practice with digital
tools, aims to develop analysis techniques that can be applied to any kind
of music, as well as to experiences related to sound and music ranging from
consciousness, perception, thought, memory, imagination, emotion, affect,
and performance, to the level of meaningful social and cultural interactions.
As an interdisciplinary field of studies, spectral semiotics interfaces with
disciplines such as composition, music theory, musical analysis/synthesis,
musicology, acoustics, psychoacoustics, computer science, cognitive science,
semiotics, and cultural studies. My investigation on spectral semiotics focuses
on the relation between sound, music and temporality. Husserl’s theory of
time-consciousness (Husserl 1966; 1990) and Varela’s neurophenomenology
of time-consciousness (Varela 1991) provides the theoretical framework for
associating time-consciousness to sound-and-music-consciousness. I am
particularly interested in studying the role of affect in the constitution of
temporality in sound and music. Listening to music is not a passive experience,
but an active process of perception and action that creates both meaning and
affect. How does sound relate to affect? What kind of emotions does music
trigger in us? How do we understand the different kinds of affect? These are
but a few of the questions that have instigated my research.

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Unsayable Music

In the following, I propose an application of the spectral semiotics

approach to the analysis of Chopins’ Nocturne Op. 27 No. 1. By focusing
on the constitutive role of temporality and affection in the sound and music
composition, I intend to demonstrate how spectral analysis can expand the
understanding of Chopin’s music. The references to existential semiotics
emphasize the convergence between spectral analysis and musical semiotics
in the investigation of musical meaning and affect.

2. Polyphony and Transcendence in Chopin

The radical inventiveness of Chopin’s compositions represents a striking

paradox to the romantic stereotypes that characterize the wide reception of
his music. Chopin’s significant body of work, mostly written for the piano,
contains a broad palette of musical innovations that makes it a paradigm
for scholarship and composition studies, while it is at the same time highly
accessible to a wide range of listeners. My hypothesis is that Chopin’s music
unfolds a sound poetics of affects that resonates at the most basic level of
human experience and consequently achieves in the listeners the readiness for
accepting the high level of complexity and inventiveness of his music. Charles
Rosen, in his brilliant study on the music of the Romantic generation (Rosen
1990), demonstrates how the poetic force of Chopin is related to his ability
to create a consistent and diversified polyphony that integrates compositional
features by articulating meaning at different levels of temporality and
signification. Chopin’s music achieves the “transformation of the vulgar into
something aristocratic. Its power depends in part on our unconscious sense of
how commonplace the material originally was before it reappears in an aura
of iridescent sonority” (Rosen 1990, 395).
Chopin’s polyphonic language embraces contradictory elements such
as salon music and the operatic bel canto, conventional ternary forms
(ABA) and unconventional narratives, periodic phrasings and shifts of
phases, harmonic commonplaces as well as radical variations of texture and
sonority. According to Tarasti, Chopin lived at the center of the literary-
musical culture of Romanticism, “in an age that perceived the narrative
content as an essential level of signification” (Tarasti 1994, 138).2 One of his

2
Tarasti proposes an analysis of musical narrative articulated as categories of temporality
(temporal organization), spatiality (organization of tonal space), and actoriality (thematic
or actorial elements). For a semiotic investigation of narrativity in Chopin see Tarasti
(1994, 138-80), particularly the extensive analysis of Chopin’s Ballade in G minor
Op. 23.

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 Spectral Semiotics: Sound, Temporality, and Affect in Chopin

most remarkable achievements is the reinvention of counterpoint. Chopin

transforms the baroque and classical melodic line into a vector of narrativity.
The long sustained melody—a major characteristic of his music—is,
according to Rosen, an influence of Bellini’s opera that Chopin translated
for the piano. Chopin’s writing for this instrument is charged with the
affect of the human voice. The dramatic gestures of the music express the
transformation of the vocal apparatus into the mechanical medium of the
piano as if the piano could embody the ego and bring human existence to a
level of transcendence. In terms of Tarasti’s existential theory, the music of
Chopin accomplishes the semiotic operations of negation and affirmation
through which transcendence is realized (Tarasti 2000, 21). The piano first
negates the biological foundation of the human self by transforming the
body into machine, but the composition transmutes the machine into a kind
of living system and reaffirms the organism.
Chopin’s musical approach intentionally assigns an existence to
commonplace objects and transcends it by subjectively changing them.
For example, he introduces melodies that seem conventional, devoid of
any freshness or originality, but that reveal an inexhaustible potential of
imagination, musical creativity and emotional fullness. The composition
achieves musical transcendence using both traditional techniques and radical
innovations. It transforms banality into sublimity by deploying a network
of motives that rhythmically change their appearance and constantly shift
between voice lines. Chopin’s polyphony makes transparent the dynamic
of permanence/change that connects the embodied ego aware of emotional
change (Varela 1999, 304). The creation of individual lines in the inner parts
(Rosen 1990, 302) is an example of change within permanence. It transforms
the virtual, abstract structure of polyphonic lines into an “exquisite spacing”
of “vibrant inner voices” filled with subtle shifts of phase and “astonishing
experiments in harmony” (Rosen 1990, 471). Chopin’s music unfolds both the
permanence of the self-identified ego and the stream of change characterizing
the dimension of the living present in the sense of Husserl’s phenomenology
(Held 2003, 47).
Tarasti analyzes transcendence as a dynamic shift between two Daseins3
that appear as transference of signs. The transcendental transfer is a six-
step process oscillating between affirmation and negation. It starts with the

3
The concept of Dasein refers to the human experience of being. It is a core concept
of Heidegger’s existential philosophy, which inspired Tarasti’s theory of existential
semiotics. See discussion of existential semiotics in “Communication and Meaning:
Music as Social System”, pp. 65-102 herein.

47
Unsayable Music

negation of the original Dasein followed by the affirmation of Nothingness,

to the negation of Nothingness, to the partial affirmation of Dasein, to the
negation toward affirmation, and then finally to the return from negation,
which constitutes at the same time a new affirmation that possibly creates
a new Dasein (Tarasti 1990, 31). The transfer can also been seen as an
interaction between pre-signs, act-signs, and post-signs. In Chopin for example,
we may consider as pre-signs popular and classical music genres such as
waltzes, polonaises, preludes, études, nocturnes, ballades, sonatas, and
fantasies; as act-signs the semiotic processes activated by the composition;
and as post-signs the new meanings achieved through the metamorphose of
these signs. In the third Ballade, for instance, the sonata style and the ternary
form function as pre-signs of conformity and stability (permanence), which
are transformed “not by harmonic events or by thematic contrast but by
fluctuations of sentiment, by variations of intensity” (Rosen 1990, 322). Such
changes belong to the domain of post-signs (interpretants) and are activated
by ambiguities and disruptions in the narrative flow that accomplish the
remarkable concretization of pre-signs into act-signs in Chopin’s music.

3. Time Consciousness and Affect

Husserl considered temporality a fundamental substrate of the pheno-

menological research. Time accounts for the way we experience things in
the world and build consciousness. The structures of consciousness are what
make it possible to perceive the unity of any object as a manifestation of
time consciousness. In Husserl’s Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness
(Husserl 1991), time is a proto-level of perception, the emergent process
that occurs when we become aware of the sensations and feelings that
create the experience of the living present. Time provides consciousness with
formal continuity at the most fundamental level.4 Inner time-consciousness
constitutes an ultimate “substrate of consciousness where no further reduction
can be accomplished” (Varela 1999, 268). Time-consciousness is a process
of individuation emerging from the unity of the ego and is equal to self-
consciousness. The temporal experience is a paradox oscillating between the
present as unity and as flow of consciousness. They are mediated through acts
of consciousness or what Husserl calls “experiences” [Erlebnisse]. Therefore,
phenomenology distinguishes three levels of the constitution of temporality:

4
Cf. Held (2003) for an account of Husserl’s time-consciousness as a phenomenology of
living experience.

48
 Spectral Semiotics: Sound, Temporality, and Affect in Chopin

1. The first level of temporal objects—the perceived unities of the consciousness.

2. The second level of immanent acts of the consciousness.
3. The third level of the absolute self-constituting and time-constituting flow
of consciousness.

With this tripartite definition, the phenomenological method acknowledges

that inner-consciousness shares the same temporal features as physical objects;
that the perception of time cannot be disassociated from the mental acts;
and also that it occurs in an extended horizon including the past, present
and future. Husserl explains inner-time-consciousness through a significant
number of musical metaphors. Listening to a melody is a recurrent one. He
correlates the tones of a melody with the first level of temporal objects. “The
tone in its durations” is a temporal object (Husserl 1991, 24). Further, the
melody is an example of how the present is experienced as an extended frame
of simultaneity. When a melody sounds, says Husserl, the individual tones do
not disappear without leaving a trace. They reverberate in the flux of inner-
time consciousness. The objective time flows as a straight line in which every
point is a now, an extended present surrounded by past and future nows.
Listening to a melody is an example of how time-consciousness refers to
distant intentional experience that occurs both in the past and in the future.
Past and future are part of the intentional stream of consciousness through
retention (memory) and protention (expectation). One hears every tone of a
melody as a now and hears the whole melody as a now. “At any given time
I hear only the actually present phase of the tone, and the objectivity of the
whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is part memory,
in smallest punctual part perception, and in further part expectation”
(Husserl 1991, 25).
Husserl’s melody metaphor emerges from the notion that music is a temporal
experience. Spectral semiotics distinguishes music-sound temporality at
different levels, from sound-objects, to intentional music-objects, to the absolute
musical flow. Since time does not detach from temporal objects-events, sound
does not detach from temporal sound objects-events and music does not
detach from temporal music objects-events. According to Husserl, temporal
objects-events have a double aspect: duration, which correlates to intentional
direction, and unity, which correlates to individuality. Translating these ideas
in terms of sound and music objects-events we can say:
• The duration of sound and music objects-events depends on intentional
directions such as an envelope, a crescendo or a diminuendo, an ascending
or descending scale, the profile of a melody, or musical structure.

49
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Title: A Prose English Translation of Harivamsha

Translator: Manmatha Nath Dutt

Release date: April 25, 2020 [eBook #61937]

Language: English

Credits: Produced by James Simmons

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A PROSE

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF HARIVAMSHA ***
 Transcriber's Note

This book was transcribed from a scan of the original found at

Google Books. Words in italics in this etext were italicized in the
original book. I have corrected obvious misspellings but I've left
variant spellings alone.
 A
PROSE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF
HARIVAMSHA.

(TRANSLATED LITERALLY INTO ENGLISH PROSE.)

EDITED AND PUBLISHED BY

MANMATHA NATH DUTT, M.A., M.R.A.S.,

RECTOR, KESHUB ACADEMY;
Author of the English Translations of Ramayana,
Mahabharata,
Srimadbhagavatam, Vishnupuran, Markandeyapuran,
Bhagavat-Gita and many other works.

CALCUTTA
PRINTED BY H. C. DASS,
Elysium Press, 6.5/2 Beadon Street.
1897
A PROSE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF HARIVAMSHA
HARIVAMSHA
THE PRELUDE.
CHAPTER I. AN ACCOUNT OF THE PRIMEVAL CREATION
CHAPTER II. THE ORIGIN OF MEN: THE BIRTH OF DAKSHA.
CHAPTER III. AN ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS FAMILIES; DAKSHA'S
OFFSPRING.
CHAPTER IV. A QUERY REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF THE
ARTICLES OF FOOD.
CHAPTER V. AN ACCOUNT OF VENA AND PRITHU.
CHAPTER VI. THE ORIGIN OF THE EARTH.
CHAPTER VII. AN ACCOUNT OF MANWANTARAS.
CHAPTER VIII. DIVISION OF TIME.
CHAPTER IX. ACCOUNT OF THE SUN'S OFFSPRING.
CHAPTER X. VAIVASWATA MANU'S OFFSPRING.
CHAPTER XI. ACCOUNT OF RAIVATA AND HIS SONS.
CHAPTER. XII. THE STORY OF SATYAVRATA.
CHAPTER XIII. THE SAME STORY CONTINUED.
CHAPTER XIV. AN ACCOUNT OF SAGARA.
CHAPTER XV. THE SAME STORY CONTINUED.
CHAPTER XVI. THE ORIGIN OF PITRIS AND FRUITS OF
SRADDHAS.
CHAPTER XVII. THE SAME STORY CONTINUED.
CHAPTER XVIII. AN ACCOUNT OF PITRIS.
CHAPTER XIX. BHARADWAJA's FAMILY.
CHAPTER XX. ACCOUNT OF BRAHMADATTA AND THE STRANGE
BIRD.
CHAPTER XXI. AN ACCOUNT OF THE SEVEN BRAHMANAS.
CHAPTER XXII. THE CURSE OF THE BIRDS.
CHAPTER XXIII. THE STORY OF THE BIRDS—CONTINUED.
CHAPTER XXIV. BRAHMADATTA RETIRES FROM THE WORLD.
CHAPTER XXV. AN ACCOUNT OF THE BIRTH OF THE MOON.
CHAPTER XXVI. AN ACCOUNT OF PURURAVA.
CHAPTER XXVII. AN ACCOUNT OF ILA'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXVIII. AN ACCOUNT OF RAJI AND HIS SONS.
CHAPTER XXIX. AN ACCOUNT OF KASHI KINGS.
CHAPTER XXX. ACCOUNT OF THE KING YAYATI.
CHAPTER XXXI. AN ACCOUNT OF PURU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXII. AN ACCOUNT OF RICHEYU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXIII. AN ACCOUNT OF HAIHAYAS AND KARTAVIRYA.
CHAPTER XXXIV. KROUSTHU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXV. VASUDEVA'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXVI. KROUSHTHU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXVII. AN ACCOUNT OF VABHRU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. AN ACCOUNT OF SWYAMANTAKA JEWEL.
CHAPTER XXXIX. AN ACCOUNT OF AKRURA.
CHAPTER XL. A DESCRIPTION OF VISHNU.
CHAPTER XLI. THE INCARNATIONS OF VISHNU.
CHAPTER XLII. VISHNU'S APPEARANCE.
CHAPTER XLIII. THE PREPARATION OF THE DANAVAS FOR THE
BATTLE.
CHAPTER XLIV. ARRANGEMENT OF THE CELESTIAL ARMY.
CHAPTER XLV. THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE GODS AND DEMONS.
CHAPTER XLVI. THE BATTLE OF THE GODS.
CHAPTER XLVII. THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF DANAVAS.
CHAPTER XLVIII. KALANEMI GOES TO VISHNU.
CHAPTER XLIX. ATTRIBUTES OF NARAYANA
CHAPTER L. AN ACCOUNT OF NARAYANASHRAMA.
CHAPTER LI. THE PROPOSAL OF RELIEVING THE EARTH OF HER
BURDEN.
CHAPTER LII. THE ASSEMBLY OF THE GODS.
CHAPTER LIII. AN ACCOUNT OF SANTANU'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER LIV. THE BIRTH OF THE DAITYAS.
CHAPTER L.V. VISHNU'S REPLY.
CHAPTER LVI. KANSA IS INFORMED OF HIS DEATH BY NARADA.
CHAPTER LVII. AN ACCOUNT OF THE BIRTH OF DEMONS
CHAPTER LVIII. ATTRIBUTES OF THE GODDESS.
CHAPTER LIX. BIRTH OF KRISHNA AND BALADEVA.
CHAPTER LX. A DESCRIPTION OF VILLAGE VRAJA
CHAPTER LXI. SUPERHUMAN DEEDS OF KRISHNA. HE UPSETS A
CARRIAGE AND KILLS PUTANA.
CHAPTER LXII. THE CHILDISH FREAKS OF KRISHNA.
CHAPTER LVIII. KRISHNA WISHES TO GO TO VRINDAVANA AND
PRODUCES WOLVES.
CHAPTER LXIV. THEIR DEPARTURE FOR VRINDAVANA.
CHAPTER LXV. AN ACCOUNT OF THE RAINY SEASON.
CHAPTER LXVI. AN ACCOUNT OF KALYA.
CHAPTER LXVII. KRISHNA SUBDUES KALYA.
CHAPTER LXIII. THE DESTRUCTION OF KHARA AND DHENUKA.
CHAPTER LXIV. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE DEMON PRALAMVA
CHAPTER LXX. AN ACCOUNT OF INDRA-YAJNA.
CHAPTER LXXI. KRISHNA PROTESTS AGAINST INDRA-YAJNA: AN
ACCOUNT OF AUTUMN.
CHAPTER LXXII. THE REPLY OF THE GOPAS.
CHAPTER LXXIII. INDRA SENDS DOWN PUNISHMENT.
CHAPTER LXXIV. INDRA COMES AND EULOGISES KRISHNA.
CHAPTER LXXV. RASA DANCE.
CHAPTER LXXVI. DEATH OF ARISTHA.
CHAPTER LXXVII. KANSA INVITES KRISHNA AND SENDS
AKRURA TO BRING HIM.
CHAPTER LXXVIII. ANDHAKA'S ADVICE TO KANSA.
CHAPTER LXXIX. THE DESTRUCTION OF KESHI.
CHAPTER LXXX. AKRURA GOES TO VRAJA
CHAPTER LXXXI. AKRURA DESCRIBES TO HIM THE MISERIES OF
HIS PARENTS.
CHAPTER LXXXII. KRISHNA'S ARRIVAL.
CHAPTER LXXXIII. ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MATCH.
CHAPTER LXXXIV. A DESCRIPTION OF THE ARENA.
CHAPTER LXXXV. TRIAL OF ARMS.
CHAPTER LXXXVI. LAMENTATIONS OF KANSA'S WIVES.
CHAPTER LXXXVII. KRISHNA'S REPLY TO UGRASENA.
CHAPTER LXXXVIII. KRISHNA BRINGS BACK HIS PRECEPTOR'S
SON FROM THE OCEAN.
CHAPTER LXXXIX. JARASANDHA PREPARES TO ATTACK
MATHURA.
CHAPTER XC. JARASANDHA'S ARMY.
CHAPTER XCII. THE BATTLE BETWEEN KRISHNA AND
JARASHANDHA.
CHAPTER XCIII. AN ACCOUNT OF HARYASHWA.
CHAPTER XCIV. THE SONS OF YADU AND THEIR CONQUESTS.
CHAPTER XCV. KRISHNA MEETS WITH PARASURAMA.
CHAPTER XCVI. A DESCRIPTION OF THE MOUNT GOMANTA.
CHAPTER XCVII. BALARAMA GETS DRUNK.
CHAPTER XCVIII. JARASANDHA'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE
KINGS.
CHAPTER XCIX. KRISHNA MEETS HIS ENEMY.
CHAPTER C. BATTLE WITH SHRIGALA.
CHAPTER CI. KRISHNA'S ARRIVAL AT MATHURA.
CHAPTER CII. BALADEVA VISITS VRAJA.
CHAPTER CIII. RUKSHMINI'S SWAYAMVARA
CHAPTER CIV. THE MEETING OF KRISHNA AND GARUDA.
CHAPTER CV. JARASANDHA'S ADRESS TO THE KINGS.
CHAPTER CVI. DANTAVAKRAS SPEECH.
CHAPTER CVII. KAISHIKA WORSHIPS KRISHNA.
CHAPTER CVIII. CONVERSATION BETWEEN KRISHNA AND
BHISHMAKA.
CHAPTER CIX. JARASANDHA'S PROPOSAL TO INVITE
KALAYAVANA.
CHAPTER CX. SHALYA MEETS KALAYAVANA.
CHAPTER CXI. KALAYAVANA AGREES TO KILL KRISHNA.
CHAPTER CXII. UGRASENA RECEIVES KRISHNA.
CHAPTER CXIII. KRISHNA'S PROPOSAL TO GO TO DWARAKA.
CHAPTER CXIV. ACCOUNT OF KALAYAVANA.
CHAPTER CXV. THE LAYING OUT OF DWARKA.
CHAPTER CXVVI. AN ACCOUNT OF RUKSHMI: KRISHNA TAKES
AWAY RUKSHMINI.
CHAPTER CXIVII. RUKSHMI ATTACKS KRISHNA AND IS
DEFEATED.
CHAPTER CXVIII. MARRIAGE OF RUKSHMAVATI.
CHAPTER CXIX. BALADEVA'S GLORIOUS DEEDS DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER CXX. THE DEFEAT OF THE ASURA NARAKA.
CHAPTER CXXI. KRISHNA VISIT WITH ADITI.
CHAPTER CXXII. THE PRESENT OF THE PARIJATA BY KRISHNA
TO RUKSHMINI.
CHAPTER CXXIII. SATYABHAMA'S RESENTMENT AND KESHAVA'S
CONSOLATION TO HER.
CHAPTER CXXIV. SATYABHAMA'S GRIEF.
CHAPTER CXXV. THE HISTORY OF THE PARIJATA TREE THE
COLOQUY BETWEEN KRISHNA AND NARADA.
CHAPTER CXXVI. THE COLLOQUY BETWEEN NARADA AND
INDRA REGARDING THE TRANSPLANTATION OF THE PARIJATA.
CHAPTER CXXVII. NARADA'S ADVICE AND INDRA'S ANSWERS.
CHAPTER CCXVIII. NARADA'S ADVICE.
CHAPTER CCXIX. ATTRIBUTES OF HARI.
CHAPTER CCXX. THE FIGHT BETWEEN KRISHNA AND INDRA.
CHAPTER CCXXI. THE FIGHT BETWEEN GARUDA AND AIRAVATA
CHAPTER CCXXII. INDRA FIGHTS WITH KRISHNA
CHAPTER CCXXIII. SATYA PERFORM THE RITE.
CHAPTER CCXXIV. THE HISTORY OF THE PUNYAKA RITE.
CHAPTER CCXXV. PUNYAKA DESCRIBED BY UMA.
CHAPTER CCXXVI. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
CHAPTER CCXXVII. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
CHAPTER CCXXVIII. NARADA GIVES A HISTORY OF VRATAS
PERFORMED BY OTHER LADIES.
CHAPTER CCXXIX. AN ACCOUNT OF THE CITY OF ASURAS.
CHAPTER CCXXX. THE ASURAS OBSTRUCTING A YAJNA.
CHAPTER CCXXXI. WAR BETWEEN KRISHNA AND ASURAS.
CHAPTER CCXXXII. DEFEAT OF THE ASURAS: THEY FIGHT
AGAIN.
CHAPTER CCXXXIII. THE HISTORY OF THE ASURA ANDHAKA.
CHAPTER CCXXXIV. ANDMAKA GOES TO THE MOUNT MANDARA.
CHAPTER CCXXXV. THE YADAVAS SPORT IN THE OCEAN.
CHAPTER CCXXXVI. THE SPORT OF THE YADUS CONTINUED.
CHAPTER CCXXXVII. NIKUMBHA CARRIES AWAY BHANUMATI.
CHAPTER CCXXXVIII. THE DESTRUCTION OF VAJRANABHA: AN
ACCOUNT OF PRABHAVATI.
CHAPTER CCXXXIX. THE CELESTIAL SWANS GO TO THE CITY OF
VAJRA
CHAPTER CCXL. THE YADAVAS ARRIVE AT THE CITY OF ASURAS
AS ACTORS.
CHAPTER CCXLI. PRADYUMNA APPEARS BEFORE PRABHAVATI
AND MARRIES HER.
CHAPTER CCXLII. A DESCRIPTION OF THE RAINY SEASON.
CHAPTER CCXLIII. VAJRANABHA WANTS TO CONQUER THE
CELESTIAL REGION.
CHAPTER CCXLIV. THE DESTRUCTION OF VAJRANABHA
CHAPTER CCXLV. THE CELESTIAL ARCHITECT BUILDS DWARAKA
CHAPTER CCXLVI. KRISHNA'S ENTRANCE INTO DWARAKA AND
RECEPTION.
CHAPTER CCXLVII. KRISHNA INVITES A MEETING OF HIS
KINSMEN.
CHAPTER CCXLVIII. NARADA DESCRIBES THE FEAT OF
KRISHNA.
CHAPTER CCXLIX. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
CHAPTER CCL. KRISHNA'S CHILDREN.
CHAPTER CCLI. AN ACCOUNT OF PRADYUMNA.
CHAPTER CCLII. BATTLE BETWEEN PRADYUMNA AND
SHAMVARA'S SONS.
CHAPTER CCLIII. SHAMVARA COMES TO THE BATTLE-FIELD.
CHAPTER CCLIV. SHAMVARA'S DEATH.
CHAPTER CCLV. PRADYUMNA GOES TO DWARAKA AND HIS
PARENTS RECOGNIZE HIM.
CHAPTER CCLVI. BALADEVA'S MANTRA FOR PROTECTING
PRADYUMNA.
CHAPTER CCLVII. NARADA PUTS QUESTIONS: AND THE
MYSTERY IS EXPLAINED.
CHAPTER CCLVIII. ARJUNA DESCRIBES ANOTHER WONDERFUL
WORK.
CHAPTER CCLIX. ARJUNA GOES TO RESCUE THE BRAHMANA
AND BECOMES UNSUCCESSFUL.
CHAPTER CCLX. KRISHNA RESCUES THE BRAHMANA'S SONS.
CHAPTER CCLXI. KRISHNA EXPLAINS THE MYSTERY.
CHAPTER CCLXII. KRISHNA'S FEATS DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER CCLXIII. VANA—THE GREAT ASURA.
CHAPTER CCLXIV. BHAVA'S SPORT AND VANA'S DAUGHTER
OBTAINS A BOON.
CHAPTER CCLXV. USHA MEETS HER LOVER WHILE ASLEEP AND
EXHORTS HER FRIENDS TO BRING HIM.
CHAPTER CCLXVI. CHITRALEKHA UNITES ANIRUDDHA WITH
USHA: ANIRUDDHA'S FIGHT WITH VANA'S SOLDIERS.
CHAPTER CCLXVII. THE GODDESS CONSOLES ANIRUDDHA.
CHAPTER CCLXVIII. ANXIETY OF THE YADAVAS FOR
ANIRUDDHA.
 CHAPTER CCLXIV. KRISHNA GOES TO SONITPURA AND FIGHTS
WITH RUDRA'S FOLLOWERS ON THE WAY.
CHAPTER CCLXX. KRISHNA'S BATTLE WITH JVARA (FEVER).
CHAPTER CCLXXI. KRISHNA'S BOON TO JVARA.
CHAPTER CCLXXII. THE FIGHT BETWEEN KRISHNA AND
SHANKARA.
CHAPTER CCLXXIII. THE EARTH GOES TO BRAHMA:
MARKANDEYA EXPLAINS HOW BRAHMA, VISHNU, SIVA ARE
ONE.
CHAPTER CCLXXIV. KARTIKEYA GOES TO THE BATTLE-FIELD.
CHAPTER CCLXXV. THE BATTLE BETWEEN VANA AND KRISHNA.
CHAPTER CCLXXVI. KRISHNA FINDS ANIRUDDHA: GIVES THE
KINGDOM TO KUMBHANDA AND FIGHTS WITH VARUNA FOR
COWS.
CHAPTER CCLXXVII. ANIRUDDHA'S WEDDING AND RECEPTION.
BHAVISHYA PARVA OR THE BOOK OF FUTURE.
CHAPTER I. AN ACCOUNT OF JANAMEJAYA'S FAMILY.
CHAPTER II. VYASA'S PRESENCE AT JANAMEJAYA'S SACRIFICE.
CHAPTER III. AN ACCOUNT OF KALI-YUGA.
CHAPTER IV. KALI-YUGA DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER V. INDRA RAVISHES VAPUSTHAMA: VISHWAVASU
PACIFIES JANAMEJAYA'S WRATH.
CHAPTER VI. JANAMEJAYA LIVES HAPPILY: EFFECT OF THE
RISHI'S WORDS.
CHAPTER VII. THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.
CHAPTER VIII. THE DURATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF
YOGA.
CHAPTER IX. THE WORK OF DISSOLUTION DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER X. THE GOD AFTER DISSOLUTION.
CHAPTER XI. THE CREATION OF A LOTUS AFTER DISSOLUTION.
CHAPTER XII. A DESCRIPTION OF THE EARTH.
CHAPTER XIII. THE WORLD OF CREATION BEGINS: THE BIRTH
OF MADHU AND KAITABHA.
CHAPTER XIV. BRAHMA'S CREATION.
CHAPTER XV. JANAMEJAVA's QUERY.
CHAPTER XVI. THE GREAT BRAHMAN DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER XVII. THE CREATION OF RIVERS.
CHAPTER XVIII. THE CREATION OF GANDHARVAS ETC.
CHAPTER XIX. KSHATRA YUGA DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER XX. THE FRUITS OF YOGA.
CHAPTER XXI. THE PROCESS OF PRANAYAMA.
CHAPTER XXII. KURUKSHETRA AND THE DUTY OF THE
BRAHMANAS.
CHAPTER XXIII. THE BEGINNING OF FIGHT BETWEEN DEVAS
AND DAITYAS.
CHAPTER XXIV. THE FIGHT BETWEEN MADHU AND VISHNU.
CHAPTER XXV. VISHNU KILLS MADHU.
CHAPTER XXVI. AN ACCOUNT OF PIRTHU AND THE CHURNING
OF THE OCEAN.
CHAPTER XXVII. THE DESTRUCTION OF BALI.
CHAPTER XXVIII. SIVA OBSTRUCTS DAKSHA'S SACRIFICE AND
HARI FIGHTS WITH HIM.
CHAPTER XXIX. THE BOAR INCARNATION OF VISHNU.
CHAPTER XXX. THE WORK OF CREATION AND UPRAISING OF
THE EARTH.
CHAPTER XXXI. THE CREATION OF MOUNTAINS AND RIVERS.
CHAPTER XXXII. THE CREATION OF THE VEDAS.
CHAPTER XXXIII. VARIOUS KINGS ARE APPOINTED BY BRAHMA.
CHAPTER XXXIV. THE MOUNTAINS SET ASURAS FIGHTING WITH
THE GODS.
CHAPTER XXXV. THE LORD COMES OUT AS A BOAR.
CHAPTER XXXVI. RELEASE OF THE CELESTIALS.
CHAPTER XXXVII. THE MAN-LION INCARNATION OF VISHNU
HIRANYAKASHIPU'S PRAYER TO BRAHMA.
CHAPTER XXXVIII. THE ASURAS ARE FILLED WITH SURPRISE AT
SEEING THE MAN-LION FORM.
CHAPTER XXXIX VISHNU KILLS HIRANYAKASHIPU.
CHAPTER XL. THE BEGINNING OF THE DWARF INCARNATION:
BALI BECOMES KING.
CHAPTER XLI. BALI'S PROSPERITY.
CHAPTER XLII. THE GODS GO TO KASHYAPA FOR FINDING OUT
MEANS FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF BALI.
CHAPTER XLII. BRAHMA INSTRUCTS THE DEVAS TO GO TO
VISHNU.
CHAPTER XLIII. VISHNU PROMISES HELP TO THE GODS.
CHAPTER XLIV. VISHNU'S BIRTH AS A DWARF.
CHAPTER XLV. BALI PROMISES TO GIVE LANDS TO THE DWARF.
CHAPTER XLVI. THE DANAVAS DESCRIBED.
CHAPTER XLVII. THE FRUITS OF THE RECITATION OF THE
BHARATA.
CHAPTER XLVIII. THE FRUITS OF THE RECITATION OF
HARIVAMSHA.
 A PROSE ENGLISH TRANSLATION
OF HARIVAMSHA

INTRODUCTION.

Harivamsha or the family of Hari (Srikrishna) is properly speaking a

sequel of the great Epic Mahabharata. The work opens with a
request made by Sounaka to Souti for an account of the two great
clans namely, Vrishnis and Andhakas. He says:—"O son of
Lomaharshana, while describing the birth and history of the Kurus
you forgot to narrate the history of Vrishnis and Andhakas. It
becomes you to relate their history." Chapter I, Sloka 9. The work in
which an account of the Kurus is given is undoubtedly the
Mahabharata though we meet with a little confusion in the text,
when it is mentioned as a Purana. This passage clearly shows that
the object of the author is evidently to give a detailed account of the
family of Krishna which is not to be found in Mahabharata.
It is very difficult to ascertain the true nature of this work—
whether it is to be called a Purana or an epic poem. It is not
mentioned in the list of Puranas or Upapuranas, though in style,
form and character it resembles the Puranas. As in the Puranas and
more particularly in Vishnu Purana so in Harivamsha we find an
account of creation, the dimension of the earth, the division of the
time and the history of the patriarchal and regal dynasties. They so
much resemble each other that sometimes it appears, that one is
the paraphrase of the other. The account of Krishna's early life and
some of his miracles are merely the counterparts of the same in
Vishnupuran. Thus it is evident that though this work is not included
in the list of Puranas it is in reality one of them written with the
same object and in the same style. It is called a sequel of the
Mahabharata only because it gives a profuse account of what has
been left off in that work. The greatest interest however lies in the
fact that it gives an elaborate account of the life of Srikrishna and as
such it is always regarded as an authority.
It is almost impossible to ascertain the date of the composition
of this work as it is of other ancient Sanskrit works. We have no
regular history of our literatures and there are so many contradictory
statements in various works that we cannot safely rely on internal
evidence for the solution of the question of date. The popular belief
is that Mahabharata Ramayna and Puranas were written long after
the Vedas. But we have references to these works even in the Vedic
literature.
In the Atharva Veda we have the names of Itihasa, Purana and
Gatha. We meet with another passage in Satpata Brāhmana wherein
Itihasas and Puranas have been mentioned. The text is:
"The Rig Veda, Sama Veda, Atharva Veda, Itihasis, Purana,
Upanishads, Sutras, Slokas, etc."
 There are many other similar passages which clearly prove that
the class of literature passing under the appelation of Puranas and
Itihasas were in existence even in the Vedic period. From these
statements it is very difficult to arrive at a conclusion when these
works were really written. The various episodes of these works
passed orally from one generation to another for many centuries
before they were committed to writing. And even after this many
interpelations had been added by various writers in the shape of
references to contemporaneous events. The ancient Hindu writers
were so very modest that they never liked the idea of making their
names known as authors. Many works written by those unknown
writers passed in the names of their Gurus or spiritual guides. Thus
from internal evidence it is not safe to make any attempt for the
determination of date or authorship. The only safe course is to give
an approximate date based upon the development of thought that is
to be seen in various works, making use of the internal evidence as
a test for the accuracy of our conclusions. Taking a survey of the
various departments of Hindu literature we find that the theory of
incarnation and sectarial worship were absolutely unknown to the
Vedic writers and took a very meagre proportion even when the
Ramayana and the Mahabharata were written. In the Puranas
however we see that the entire theology is based on the doctrine of
incarnation-the various sects have their rituals and ceremonies
definitely laid down and the caste rules introduced with all their
severity and force. Besides we also find the doctrines of Vedanta and
Sankya explained popularly in the shape of episodes. This clearly
proves that whatever may be the actual date of the composition of
these works they are long posterior to the Mahabharata and the
Ramayana. From the evidence of style, the treatment of subject
matter, the account of Creation and Patriarchal families it is clear,
that Harivamsha, although it is a sequel to the Mahabharata, was
written long after that great work. If it was not written in the same
period when the Puranas were composed it was not at least written
earlier.
I have said before that Harivamsha consists of the life and
miracles of Srikrishna together with an account of his family. I think,
I should say a few words whether the central hero of this great work
as well as of many other works is a historical person or a myth.
Foreigners who have no access to the literature of the Hindus
consider him as a creation of imagination, an ideal of lust. Several
poetical works and Brahma Vaivarta Purana in the list of Puranas are
responsible for this opinion. Any impartial student, of Mahabharata
and other authentic writings regarding his life, will admit that he was
a real historical personage—a man of wonderful power and
superhuman intellect. He was a great politician and a great prophet.
Such a combination is rare in the history of men. If the battle of
Kurukshetra is a historical incident which many inscriptions prove we
fail to see why the central figure should not be a historical character.
Srikrisna is a grand figure in the history of the Aryans—his life teems
with lofty moral precepts which have been still shedding lustre upon
the greatness of our forefathers; his teachings have been not only
swaying over the vast millions of India but have arrested the
admiration and veneration of the people of the West. Writers like
Messrs Dupuis and Volney have even gone the length of arguing in
their respective works that the history of life and miracles of Christ
have been borrowed from those of Indian Krishna. If then for many
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