Coordinates: 51°23′23″N 30°05′57″E

Chernobyl disaster
The Chernobyl disaster was a catastrophic nuclear accident that occurred on
Chernobyl disaster
26 April 1986 at the No. 4 nuclear reactor in the Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant, near the city of Pripyat in the north of the Ukrainian SSR.[1]

The accident occurred during a test simulation of an electrical power outage to

develop a safety procedure for keeping reactor cooling water circulating until
the emergency generators could provide power. This gap was about one
minute and had been identified as a potential safety problem which could
cause core overheating. Three such tests had previously been conducted since
1982 but had failed to provide a solution. Unfortunately, on this fourth
occasion the failure to follow the test procedure created unstable operating
conditions which, combined with inherent RBMK reactor design flaws and the
intentional disabling of several emergency safety systems, resulted in an
uncontrolled nuclear chain reaction.[2] The huge amount of energy suddenly
released then vapourised superheated cooling water to rupture the reactor
pressure vessel in a highly destructive steam explosion which was followed by
an open-air reactor core fire.[note 1]
Reactors No. 4 and No. 3
This fire produced considerable updrafts for about nine days[5] before being
Date 26 April 1986
finally contained on 4 May 1986.[6] The lofted plumes of fission products
released into the atmosphere by the fire precipitated onto parts of the USSR Time 01:23:40 MSD
and western Europe. The estimated radioactive inventory that was released (UTC+04:00)
during this very hot fire phase approximately equaled in magnitude the Location Chernobyl Nuclear Power
airborne fission products released in the initial destructive explosion.[7] Plant, Pripyat, Ukrainian
SSR, Soviet Union
The total number of casualties remains a controversial and disputed issue.[8]
Type Nuclear and radiation
During the accident, steam-blast effects caused two deaths within the facility:
accident
one immediately after the explosion, and the other compounded by a lethal
dose of ionizing radiation. Over the coming days and weeks, 134 servicemen Cause Reactor design flaws and
were hospitalized with acute radiation syndrome (ARS), of whom 28 firemen breach of protocol during
and employees died within months.[9] Additionally, approximately 14 simulated power outage
radiation-induced cancer deaths among this group of 134 hospitalized safety test
survivors were to follow within the next 10 years.[10] Among the wider Outcome Chernobyl disaster effects
population, an excess of 15 childhood thyroid cancer deaths were documented
Deaths Chernobyl disaster-related
as of 2011.[11][12] Additional time and research is required to definitively
deaths
determine the elevated relative risk of cancer among the surviving employees,
those that were initially hospitalized with ARS, and the population at large.[13]

The Chernobyl accident is considered the most disastrous nuclear power plant accident in history, both in terms of cost and
casualties. It is one of only two nuclear energy accidents classified as a "level 7 major accident", the maximum classification on
the International Nuclear Event Scale; the other was the 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan.[14] The struggle to safeguard against
scenarios that were perceived as having the potential for greater catastrophe,[15] together with later decontamination efforts of the
surroundings, ultimately involved over 500,000 liquidators, and cost an estimated 18 billion rubles.[16]
The remains of the No. 4 reactor building were soon enclosed in the sarcophagus, a large shelter designed to reduce the spread of
radioactive contamination from the wreckage, and to protect the site from further weathering. This was rapidly built, and was
finished by December 1986, when the reactor was entering the cold shutdown phase. The shelter also provided radiological
protection for the crews of the other undamaged reactors at the power station, with No. 3 continuing to produce electricity until
2000.[17][18] Due to the continued deterioration of the sarcophagus both it and the No. 4 reactor were further enclosed in 2017 by
the Chernobyl New Safe Confinement, a larger, state of the art enclosure, designed and built by an international team. This
structure has the ability to facilitate the removal of both the sarcophagus and the reactor debris, whilst containing the radioactive
contamination.

The accident prompted safety upgrades on all remaining Soviet-designed RBMK reactors, of which 10 continue to power electric
grids as of 2019.[19][20]

Contents
Overview
Accident
Steam turbine tests
Conditions
Experiment and explosion
Radiation levels
Immediate crisis management
Fire containment
Evacuation
Delayed announcement
Steam explosion risk
Debris removal
Causes
INSAG-1 report, 1986
INSAG-7 report, 1992
Analysis
Environmental effects
Spread of radioactive substances
Radioactive release
Environmental residual radioactivity
Human impact
Assessment difficulties
Сancer assessments
Other health disorders
Radiation exposure deaths
Social economic effect
Aftermath
Decommissioning
Confinement
Waste management
Exclusion zone
Forest fire concerns
Recovery projects
Commemoration
 Nuclear debate
See also
References
Notes
Footnotes
Sources
Further reading
External links

Overview
The disaster began during a systems test on 26 April 1986, in reactor No. 4 of the V. I. Lenin Nuclear Power Plant,[21] near
Pripyat and in proximity to the administrative border with Belarus and the Dnieper River.[22] There was a sudden and unexpected
power surge. When operators attempted an emergency shutdown, a much larger spike in power output occurred. This second
spike led to a reactor vessel rupture and a series of steam explosions. These events exposed the graphite moderator of the reactor
to air, causing it to ignite.[22] For the next week, the resulting fire sent long plumes of highly radioactive dust into the atmosphere
which caused radioactive fallout over an extensive geographical area, including Pripyat. The plumes drifted over large parts of the
western Soviet Union and Europe. According to official post-Soviet data,[23][24] about 60% of the fallout landed in Belarus.

Thirty-six hours after the accident, Soviet officials established a 10-kilometre exclusion zone, which resulted in the rapid
evacuation of 49,000 people, primarily from Pripyat, the nearest large population centre.[25]

During the accident the wind changed direction; the fact that the different plumes from the reactor had different ratios of
radioisotopes in them indicates that the relative release rates of different elements from the accident site was changing.[26]

As plumes and subsequent fallout continued to be generated, the evacuation zone was increased from 10 to 30 km about one
week after the accident. A further 68,000 persons were evacuated, including from the town of Chernobyl itself.[25] The surveying
and detection of isolated fallout hotspots outside this zone over the following year eventually resulted in 135,000 long-term
evacuees in total agreeing to be moved.[25] The years between 1986 and 2000 saw the near tripling in the total number of
permanently resettled persons from the most severely contaminated areas to approximately 350,000.[27][28]

The accident raised the already heightened concerns about fission reactors worldwide, and while most concern was focused on
those of the same unusual design, hundreds of disparate nuclear reactor proposals, including those under construction at
Chernobyl, reactors numbers 5 and 6, were eventually cancelled. With ballooning costs as a result of new nuclear reactor safety
system standards and the legal and political costs in dealing with the increasingly hostile/anxious public opinion, there was a
precipitous drop in the rate of new startups after 1986.[29]

The accident also raised concerns about the cavalier safety culture in the Soviet nuclear power industry, slowing industry growth
and forcing the Soviet government to become less secretive about its procedures.[30][a] The government coverup of the Chernobyl
disaster was a catalyst for glasnost, which "paved the way for reforms leading to the Soviet collapse."[31]

Accident
On 26 April 1986, at 01:23:40 (Moscow Summer Time; UTC+04:00), reactor no. 4 suffered a catastrophic power increase,
leading to explosions in its core.[32] As the reactor had not been encased by any kind of hard containment vessel, this dispersed
large quantities of radioactive isotopes into the atmosphere[33]:73 and caused an open-air fire that increased the emission of
radioactive particles carried by the smoke. The accident occurred during an experiment scheduled to test the viability of a
potential safety emergency core cooling system, which required a normal reactor shutdown procedure.
Steam turbine tests
In steady-state operation, a significant fraction (over 6%) of the power from a nuclear reactor is derived not from fission but from
the decay heat of its accumulated fission products. This heating continues for some time after the chain reaction has been stopped
(e.g. following an emergency SCRAM) and active cooling may be required to prevent core meltdown.[34] RBMK reactors like
those at Chernobyl use water as a coolant.[35][36] Reactor 4 at Chernobyl consisted of about 1,600 individual fuel channels, each
of which required coolant flow of 28 metric tons (28,000 litres or 7,400 US gallons) per hour.[33]

Since cooling pumps still require electricity to cool a reactor and run for some time after an emergency shutdown of a nuclear
reactor or SCRAM, to maintain cooling in the event of a power grid failure each of Chernobyl's reactors had three backup diesel
generators; these could start up in 15 seconds, but took 60–75 seconds to attain full speed[33]:15 and generate the 5.5‑megawatt
(MW) output required to run one main pump.[33]:30

To maintain cooling during this one-minute power gap—considered an unacceptable safety risk—it had been theorized that
rotational energy from the steam turbine (as it wound down under residual steam pressure) could be used to generate the required
electrical power. Analysis indicated that this residual momentum and steam pressure might be sufficient to run the coolant pumps
for 45 seconds,[33]:16 bridging the gap between an external power failure and the full availability of the emergency generators.[37]

This capability still needed to be confirmed experimentally, and previous tests had ended unsuccessfully. An initial test carried
out in 1982 indicated that the excitation voltage of the turbine-generator was insufficient; it did not maintain the desired magnetic
field after the turbine trip. The system was modified, and the test was repeated in 1984 but again proved unsuccessful. In 1985, a
test was conducted a third time but also yielded negative results. The test procedure was to be run again in 1986, and scheduled to
take place during a maintenance shutdown of Reactor 4.[37]

The test focused on the switching sequences of the electrical supplies for the reactor. The test procedure was expected to begin
with an automatic emergency shutdown. No detrimental effect on the safety of the reactor was anticipated, so the test programme
was not formally coordinated with either the chief designer of the reactor (NIKIET) or the scientific manager. Instead, it was
approved only by the director of the plant (and even this approval was not consistent with established procedures).[38]

According to the test parameters, the thermal output of the reactor should have been no lower than 700 MW at the start of the
experiment. If test conditions had been maintained as prescribed, the procedure would almost certainly have been carried out
safely; the eventual disaster resulted from attempts to boost the reactor output once the experiment had been started and an
operational misstep had let the output fall too low, inconsistent with approved procedure.[38]

The Chernobyl power plant had been in operation for two years without the capability to ride through the first 60–75 seconds of a
total loss of electric power, and thus lacked an important safety feature. The station managers presumably wished to correct this at
the first opportunity, which may explain why they continued the test even when serious problems arose, and why the requisite
approval for the test had not been sought from the Soviet nuclear oversight regulator (even though there was a representative at
the complex of four reactors).[b]

The experimental procedure was intended to run as follows:

1. The reactor was to be running at a low power level, between 700 MW and 800 MW
2. The steam-turbine generator was to be run up to full speed
3. When these conditions were achieved, the steam supply for the turbine generator was to be closed off
4. Turbine generator performance was to be recorded to determine whether it could provide the bridging power for
coolant pumps until the emergency diesel generators were sequenced to start and provide power to the cooling
pumps automatically
5. After the emergency generators reached normal operating speed and voltage, the turbine generator would be
allowed to continue to freewheel down
Conditions
The conditions to run the test were established before the day shift of 25
April 1986. The day-shift workers had been instructed in advance and were
familiar with the established procedures. A special team of electrical
engineers was present to test the new voltage regulating system.[39] As
planned, a gradual reduction in the output of the power unit began at 01:06
a.m. on 25 April, and the power level had reached 50% of its nominal
3,200 MW thermal level by the beginning of the day shift.
Schematic diagram of the reactor
At this point, another regional power station unexpectedly went offline, and
the Kiev electrical grid controller requested that the further reduction of
Chernobyl's output be postponed, as power was needed to satisfy the peak evening demand. The Chernobyl plant director agreed,
and postponed the test. Despite this delay, preparations for the test not affecting the reactor's power were carried out, including
the disabling of the emergency core cooling system or ECCS, a passive/active system of core cooling intended to provide water to
the core in a loss-of-coolant accident. Given the other events that unfolded, the system would have been of limited use, but its
disabling as a "routine" step of the test is indicative of the lack of attention to safety in the test.[40] In addition, had the reactor
been shut down for the day as planned, it is possible that more preparation would have been taken in advance of the test.

At 23:04, the Kiev grid controller allowed the reactor shutdown to resume. This delay had some serious consequences: the day
shift had long since departed, the evening shift was also preparing to leave, and the night shift would not take over until midnight,
well into the job. According to plan, the test should have been finished during the day shift, and the night shift would only have
had to maintain decay heat cooling systems in an otherwise shut-down plant.[33]:36–38

The night shift had very limited time to prepare for and carry out the experiment. A further rapid decrease in the power level from
50% was executed during the shift change-over. Anatoly Dyatlov, deputy chief-engineer of the entire Chernobyl Nuclear Power
Plant, was present to supervise and direct the experiment; as he out-ranked all other supervisory personnel present, his orders and
instructions overrode any objections of other senior personnel present during the test and its preparation. (In 1987, Dyatlov would
be found guilty "of criminal mismanagement of potentially explosive enterprises" and sentenced to ten years imprisonment—of
which he would serve five—for the role that his oversight of the experiment played in the ensuing accident.) Serving under
Dyatlov, Alexander Akimov was chief of the night shift, and Leonid Toptunov was the operator responsible for the reactor's
operational regimen, including the movement of the control rods. Toptunov was a young engineer who had worked independently
as a senior engineer for approximately three months.[33]:36–38

The test plan called for a gradual decrease in power output from reactor 4 to a thermal level of 700–1000 MW.[41] An output of
700 MW was reached at 00:05 on 26 April. Due to the reactor's production of a fission byproduct, xenon-135, which is a
reaction-inhibiting neutron absorber, core power continued to decrease in the absence of further operator action—a process
known as reactor poisoning. In steady-state operation this is avoided because xenon-135 is "burned off" as quickly as it is created
from decaying iodine-135 by the absorption of neutrons from the ongoing chain reaction, becoming highly stable xenon-136.
With the reactor power reduced, previously produced high quantities of iodine-135 were decaying into the neutron-absorbing
xenon-135 faster than the now reduced neutron flux could burn it off. As the reactor power output dropped further, to
approximately 500 MW, the power suddenly fell into an unintended near-shutdown state, with a power output of 30 MW thermal
or less. The exact circumstances that caused the power fall are unknown because Akimov died in hospital on 10 May and
Toptunov on 14 May; early reports attributed it to Toptunov mistakenly inserting the control rods too far into the core, but it has
also been suggested it was due to an equipment failure.[38]:11

The reactor was now producing 5 percent of the minimum initial power level prescribed for the test.[38]:73 Control-room
personnel decided to raise power by withdrawing most of the reactor control rods from the control of the automatic control rod
regulation system and manually extracting the majority of rods to their upper limits.[42] Several minutes elapsed between their
extraction and the point at which the power output began to increase and subsequently stabilize at 160–200 MW (thermal), a
much lower level than the prescribed 700 MW. The rapid reduction in the power during the initial shutdown, and the subsequent
operation at a level of less than 200 MW led to increased poisoning of the reactor core by the accumulation of xenon-135.[c] This
prevented the rise of reactor power, and made it necessary to extract additional control rods from the reactor core in order to
counteract the poisoning.

The operation of the reactor at the low power level (and high poisoning level) was accompanied by unstable core temperatures
and coolant flow, and possibly by instability of neutron flux, which triggered alarms. The control room received repeated
emergency signals regarding the levels in the steam/water separator drums, and large excursions or variations in the flow rate of
feed water, as well as from relief valves opened to relieve excess steam into a turbine condenser, and from the neutron power
controller. Between 00:35 and 00:45, emergency alarm signals concerning thermal-hydraulic parameters were ignored, apparently
to preserve the reactor power level.[44]

When a power level of 200 MW was reattained, preparation for the experiment continued. As part of the test plan, extra water
pumps were activated at 01:05 on 26 April, increasing the water flow. The increased coolant flow rate through the reactor
produced an increase in the inlet coolant temperature of the reactor core (the coolant no longer having sufficient time to release
its heat in the turbine and cooling towers), which now more closely approached the nucleate boiling temperature of water,
reducing the safety margin.

The flow exceeded the allowed limit at 01:19, triggering an alarm of low steam pressure in the steam separators. At the same
time, the extra water flow lowered the overall core temperature and reduced the existing steam voids in the core and the steam
separators.[d] Since water weakly absorbs neutrons (and the higher density of liquid water makes it a better absorber than steam),
the activation of the additional pumps decreased the reactor power. The crew responded by turning off two of the circulation
pumps to reduce feedwater flow, in an effort to increase steam pressure, and by removing more manual control rods to maintain
power.[40][45]

The combined effect of these various actions was an extremely unstable reactor configuration. Nearly all of the 211 control rods
had been extracted manually, including all but 18 of the "fail-safe" manually operated rods of the minimum 28 that were
supposed to remain fully inserted to control the reactor even in the event of a loss of coolant.[46] While the emergency scram
system that would insert all control rods to shut down the reactor could still be activated manually (through the "AZ-5" button),
the automated system that would ordinarily do the same had been mostly disabled to maintain the power level, and many other
automated and even passive safety features of the reactor had been bypassed. The reduction of reactor coolant pumping left little
safety margin; any power excursion could produce boiling, thereby reducing neutron absorption by the water. The reactor
configuration was outside the safe operating envelope prescribed by the designers. If anything pushed it into supercriticality, it
would be unable to recover automatically.

Experiment and explosion

At 1:23:04 a.m., the test began. Four of the main circulating pumps (MCP) were active (of the eight total, six are normally active
under regular operation). The steam to the turbines was shut off, beginning a run-down of the turbine generator. The diesel
generators started and sequentially picked up loads; the generators were to have completely picked up the MCPs' power needs by
01:23:43. In the interim, the power for the MCPs was to be supplied by the turbine generator as it coasted down. As the
momentum of the turbine generator decreased, so did the power it produced for the pumps. The water flow rate decreased,
leading to increased formation of steam voids (bubbles) in the core.

Unlike western light-water reactors, the RBMK had a positive void coefficient of reactivity at low power levels, meaning that
when water began to boil and produce voids in the coolant, the nuclear chain reaction increased instead of decreasing. Given this
characteristic, the No. 4 RBMK reactor operation was now at risk of spiraling into a positive feedback loop, in which the
formation of steam voids would reduce the ability of the liquid water coolant to absorb neutrons, increasing the reactor's power
output, causing yet more water to flash into steam, and yielding a further power increase. Throughout most of the experiment the
automatic control system successfully counteracted this positive feedback, inserting
control rods into the reactor core to limit the power rise. However, this system had control
of only 12 rods, as nearly all the others had been manually retracted.

At 1:23:40, as recorded by the SKALA centralized control system, a SCRAM (emergency

shutdown) of the reactor was initiated. The SCRAM was started when the EPS-5 button
(also known as the AZ-5 button) of the reactor emergency protection system was pressed:
this engaged the drive mechanism on all control rods to fully insert them, including the
manual control rods that had been withdrawn earlier. The reason why the EPS-5 button
was pressed is not known, whether it was done as an emergency measure in response to
rising temperatures, or simply as a routine method of shutting down the reactor upon
completion of the experiment.
Radioactive steam plumes
One view is that the SCRAM may have been ordered as a response to the unexpected continued to be generated
rapid power increase, although there is no recorded data showing this. Some have days after the initial
suggested that the button was not manually pressed, that the SCRAM signal was explosion, as evidenced
automatically produced by the emergency protection system, but the SKALA registered a here on 3 May 1986 due to
decay heat. The roof of the
manual SCRAM signal. Despite this, the question as to when or even whether the EPS-5
turbine hall is damaged
button was pressed has been the subject of debate. There have been assertions that the (image centre). Roof of the
manual SCRAM was initiated due to the initial rapid power acceleration. Others have adjacent reactor 3 (image
suggested that the button was not pressed until the reactor began to self-destruct, while lower left) shows minor fire
others believe that it happened earlier and under calm conditions.[48]:578[49] damage. Igor Kostin would
take some of the clearer
When the EPS-5 button was pressed, the insertion of control rods into the reactor core pictures of the roof of the
began. The control rod insertion mechanism moved the rods at 0.4 metres per second buildings when he was
physically present on the
(1.3 ft/s), so that the rods took 18 to 20 seconds to travel the full height of the core, about
roof of reactor 3, in June of
7 metres (23 ft). A bigger problem was the design of the RBMK control rods, each of
that year.[47]
which had a graphite neutron moderator section attached to its end to boost reactor output
by displacing water when the control rod section had been fully withdrawn from the
reactor. That is, when a control rod was at maximum extraction, a neutron-moderating graphite extension was centered in the core
with 1.25 metres (4.1 ft) columns of water above and below it. Consequently, injecting a control rod downward into the reactor in
a SCRAM initially displaced (neutron-absorbing) water in the lower portion of the reactor with (neutron-moderating) graphite.
Thus, an emergency SCRAM initially increased the reaction rate in the lower part of the core as the graphite extensions of rods
moving down in the reactor displaced water coolant. This behaviour was discovered when the initial insertion of control rods in
another RBMK reactor at Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant in 1983 induced a power spike, but as the subsequent SCRAM of that
reactor was successful, the subsequently disseminated information had been deemed of little importance.

A few seconds into the SCRAM, a power spike did occur and the core overheated, causing some of the fuel rods to fracture,
blocking the control rod columns and jamming the control rods at one-third insertion, with the graphite water-displacers still in
the lower part of the core. Within three seconds the reactor output rose above 530 MW.[33]:31

The subsequent course of events was not registered by instruments; it has been reconstructed through mathematical simulation.
Per the simulation, the power spike would have caused an increase in fuel temperature and steam buildup, leading to a rapid
increase in steam pressure. This caused the fuel cladding to fail, releasing the fuel elements into the coolant, and rupturing the
channels in which these elements were located.[50]

Then, according to some estimations, the reactor output jumped to around 30,000 MW thermal, ten times its normal operational
output. The last reading on the control panel was 33,000 MW. It was not possible to reconstruct the precise sequence of the
processes that led to the destruction of the reactor and the power unit building, but a steam explosion, like the explosion of a
steam boiler from excess vapour pressure, appears to have been the next event. There is a general understanding that it was
explosive steam pressure from the damaged fuel channels escaping into the reactor's exterior cooling structure that caused the
explosion that destroyed the reactor casing, tearing off and blasting the upper plate, to which the entire reactor assembly is
fastened, through the roof of the reactor building. This is believed to be the first explosion that many heard.[51]:366 This explosion
ruptured further fuel channels, as well as severing most of the coolant lines feeding the reactor chamber, and as a result the
remaining coolant flashed to steam and escaped the reactor core. The total water loss in combination with a high positive void
coefficient further increased the reactor's thermal power.

A second, more powerful explosion occurred about two or three seconds after the first; this explosion dispersed the damaged core
and effectively terminated the nuclear chain reaction. This explosion also compromised more of the reactor containment vessel
and ejected hot lumps of graphite moderator. The ejected graphite and the demolished channels still in the remains of the reactor
vessel caught fire on exposure to air, greatly contributing to the spread of radioactive fallout and the contamination of outlying
areas.[40]

According to observers outside Unit 4, burning lumps of material and sparks shot into the air above the reactor. Some of them fell
onto the roof of the machine hall and started a fire. About 25 percent of the red-hot graphite blocks and overheated material from
the fuel channels was ejected. Parts of the graphite blocks and fuel channels were out of the reactor building. As a result of the
damage to the building an airflow through the core was established by the high temperature of the core. The air ignited the hot
graphite and started a graphite fire.[33]:32

After the larger explosion, a number of employees at the power station went outside to get a clearer view of the extent of the
damage. One such survivor, Alexander Yuvchenko, recounts that once he stepped outside and looked up towards the reactor hall,
he saw a "very beautiful" laser-like beam of light bluish light caused by the ionization of air that appeared to "flood up into
infinity".[52][53][54]

There were initially several hypotheses about the nature of the second explosion. One view was that the second explosion was
caused by the combustion of hydrogen, which had been produced either by the overheated steam-zirconium reaction or by the
reaction of red-hot graphite with steam that produced hydrogen and carbon monoxide. Another hypothesis, by Checherov,
published in 1998, was that the second explosion was a thermal explosion of the reactor as a result of the uncontrollable escape of
fast neutrons caused by the complete water loss in the reactor core.[55] A third hypothesis was that the second explosion was
another steam explosion. According to this version, the first explosion was a more minor steam explosion in the circulating loop,
causing a loss of coolant flow and pressure that in turn caused the water still in the core to flash to steam; this second explosion
then caused the majority of the damage to the reactor and containment building.

The force of the second explosion and the ratio of xenon radioisotopes released after the accident (a vital tool in nuclear
forensics) indicated to Yuri V. Dubasov in a 2009 publication (suggested before him by Checherov in 1998), that the second
explosion could have been a nuclear power transient resulting from core material melting in the absence of its water coolant and
moderator. Dubasov argues that the reactor did not simply undergo a runaway delayed-supercritical/exponential increase in power
into the multi-gigawatt power range. This permitted a dangerous "positive feedback"/runaway condition, given the lack of
inherent safety stops when power levels began to increase above the commercial level.

Although a positive-feedback power excursion that increased until the reactor disassembled itself by means of its internal energy
and external steam explosions[38] is the more accepted explanation for the cause of the explosions, Dubasov argues instead that a
runaway prompt supercriticality occurred, with the internal physics being more similar to the explosion of a fizzled nuclear
weapon, and that this failed/fizzle event produced the second explosion.[56]

This nuclear fizzle hypothesis, then mostly defended by Dubasov, was examined further in 2017 by retired physicist Lars-Erik De
Geer in an analysis that puts the hypothesized fizzle event as the more probable cause of the first explosion.[57][58][59] The more
energetic second explosion, which produced the majority of the damage, has been estimated by Dubasov in 2009 as equivalent to
40 billion joules of energy, the equivalent of about ten tons of TNT. Both the 2009 and 2017 analyses argue that the nuclear fizzle
event, whether producing the second or first explosion, consisted of a prompt chain reaction (as opposed to the consensus delayed
neutron mediated chain-reaction) that was limited to a small portion of the reactor core, since expected self-disassembly occurs
rapidly in fizzle events.[56][57][60]

Contrary to safety regulations, bitumen, a combustible material, had been used in the construction of the roof of the reactor
building and the turbine hall. Ejected material ignited at least five fires on the roof of the adjacent reactor 3, which was still
operating. It was imperative to put those fires out and protect the cooling systems of reactor 3.[33]:42 Inside reactor 3, the chief of
the night shift, Yuri Bagdasarov, wanted to shut down the reactor immediately, but chief engineer Nikolai Fomin would not allow
this. The operators were given respirators and potassium iodide tablets and told to continue working. At 05:00, Bagdasarov made
his own decision to shut down the reactor, leaving only those operators there who had to work the emergency cooling
systems.[33]:44

Radiation levels
The ionizing radiation levels in the worst-hit areas of the reactor building have been estimated to be 5.6 roentgens per second
(R/s), equivalent to more than 20,000 roentgens per hour. A lethal dose is around 500 roentgens (~5 Gray (Gy) in modern
radiation units) over 5 hours, so in some areas, unprotected workers received fatal doses in less than a minute. However, a
dosimeter capable of measuring up to 1,000 R/s was buried in the rubble of a collapsed part of the building, and another one
failed when turned on. All remaining dosimeters had limits of 0.001 R/s and therefore read "off scale". Thus, the reactor crew
could ascertain only that the radiation levels were somewhere above 0.001 R/s (3.6 R/h), while the true levels were much higher
in some areas.[33]:42–50

Because of the inaccurate low readings, the reactor crew chief Alexander Akimov assumed that the reactor was intact. The
evidence of pieces of graphite and reactor fuel lying around the building was ignored, and the readings of another dosimeter
brought in by 04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that the new dosimeter must have been defective.[33]:42–50 Akimov
stayed with his crew in the reactor building until morning, sending members of his crew to try to pump water into the reactor.
None of them wore any protective gear. Most, including Akimov, died from radiation exposure within three weeks.[46]:247–248

Immediate crisis management

Fire containment
Shortly after the accident, firefighters arrived to try to extinguish the fires. First
on the scene was a Chernobyl Power Station firefighter brigade under the
command of Lieutenant Volodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 of acute
radiation sickness. They were not told how dangerously radioactive the smoke Extremely high levels of radioactivity
in the lava under the Chernobyl
and the debris were, and may not even have known that the accident was
number four reactor in 1986
anything more than a regular electrical fire: "We didn't know it was the reactor.
No one had told us."[61]

Grigorii Khmel, the driver of one of the fire engines, later described what happened:

"We arrived there at 10 or 15 minutes to two in the morning ...

We saw graphite scattered about. Misha asked: "Is that
graphite?" I kicked it away. But one of the fighters on the other
truck picked it up. "It's hot," he said. The pieces of graphite were
of different sizes, some big, some small, enough to pick them
up [...] We didn't know much about radiation. Even those who
 worked there had no idea. There was no water left in the trucks.
Misha filled a cistern and we aimed the water at the top. Then
those boys who died went up to the roof—Vashchik, Kolya and
others, and Volodya Pravik ... They went up the ladder ... and I
never saw them again.”[62]

Anatoli Zakharov, a fireman stationed in Chernobyl since 1980, offers a different

description in 2008:

"I remember joking to the others, 'There must be an incredible Firefighter Leonid Telyatnikov being
amount of radiation here. We'll be lucky if we're all still alive in decorated for bravery
the morning.'"[63]

He also stated:

"Of course we knew! If we'd followed regulations, we would never have gone near the reactor. But it was a moral
obligation—our duty. We were like kamikaze."[63]

The immediate priority was to extinguish fires on the roof of the station and the area around the building containing Reactor
No. 4 to protect No. 3 and keep its core cooling systems intact. The fires were extinguished by 5:00, but many firefighters
received high doses of radiation. The fire inside reactor 4 continued to burn until 10 May 1986; it is possible that well over half of
the graphite burned out.[33]:73

The fire was extinguished by a combined effort of helicopters dropping over 5,000 metric tons (4,900 long tons; 5,500 short tons)
of sand, lead, clay, and neutron-absorbing boron onto the burning reactor and injection of liquid nitrogen. It is now known that
virtually none of the neutron absorbers reached the core.[64] Historians estimate that about 600 Soviet pilots risked dangerous
levels of radiation to fly the thousands of flights needed to cover reactor No. 4 in this attempt to seal off radiation.[65]

From eyewitness accounts of the firefighters involved before they died (as reported on the CBC television series Witness), one
described his experience of the radiation as "tasting like metal", and feeling a sensation similar to that of pins and needles all over
his face. (This is similar to the description given by Louis Slotin, a Manhattan Project physicist who died days after a fatal
radiation overdose from a criticality accident.)[66]

The explosion and fire threw hot particles of the nuclear fuel and also far more dangerous
fission products, radioactive isotopes such as caesium-137, iodine-131, strontium-90 and
other radionuclides, into the air: the residents of the surrounding area observed the
radioactive cloud on the night of the explosion.

Equipment assembled included remote-controlled bulldozers and robot-carts that could

detect radioactivity and carry hot debris. Valery Legasov, first deputy director of the
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy in Moscow, said in 1987: Soviet badge awarded to
Chernobyl liquidator
But we learned that robots are not the great remedy for everything. Where
there was very high radiation, the robot ceased to be a robot—the
electronics quit working.[67]
Evacuation
The nearby city of Pripyat was not immediately evacuated. The townspeople, in
the early hours of the morning, at 01:23 local time, went about their usual
business, completely oblivious to what had just happened. However, within a
few hours of the explosion, dozens of people fell ill. Later, they reported severe
headaches and metallic tastes in their mouths, along with uncontrollable fits of
coughing and vomiting.[68] As the plant was run by authorities in Moscow, the
government of Ukraine did not receive prompt information on the accident.[69] Pripyat with the Chernobyl Nuclear
Power Plant in the distance
Valentyna Shevchenko, then Chairman of the Presidium of Verkhovna Rada
Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, recalls that Ukraine's acting Minister of
Internal Affairs Vasyl Durdynets phoned her at work at 09:00 to report current affairs; only at the end of the conversation did he
add that there had been a fire at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, but it was extinguished and everything was fine. When
Shevchenko asked "How are the people?", he replied that there was nothing to be concerned about: "Some are celebrating a
wedding, others are gardening, and others are fishing in the Pripyat River".[69]

Shevchenko then spoke over the phone to Volodymyr Shcherbytsky, Head of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of
Ukraine and de facto head of state, who said he anticipated a delegation of the state commission headed by the deputy chairman
of the Council of Ministers of USSR.[69]

A commission was established later in the day to investigate the accident. It was headed by Valery Legasov, First Deputy Director
of the Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy, and included leading nuclear specialist Evgeny Velikhov, hydro-meteorologist Yuri
Izrael, radiologist Leonid Ilyin, and others. They flew to Boryspil International Airport and arrived at the power plant in the
evening of 26 April.[69] By that time two people had already died and 52 were hospitalized. The delegation soon had ample
evidence that the reactor was destroyed and extremely high levels of radiation had caused a number of cases of radiation
exposure. In the early daylight hours of 27 April, approximately 36 hours after the initial blast, they ordered the evacuation of
Pripyat. Initially it was decided to evacuate the population for three days; later this was made permanent.[69]

By 11:00 on 27 April, buses had arrived in Pripyat to start the evacuation.[69] The evacuation began at 14:00. A translated excerpt
of the evacuation announcement follows:

For the attention of the residents of Pripyat! The City Council informs you that due to the accident at Chernobyl
Power Station in the city of Pripyat the radioactive conditions in the vicinity are deteriorating. The Communist
Party, its officials and the armed forces are taking necessary steps to combat this. Nevertheless, with the view to
keep people as safe and healthy as possible, the children being top priority, we need to temporarily evacuate the
citizens in the nearest towns of Kiev region. For these reasons, starting from 27 April 1986, 14:00 each apartment
block will be able to have a bus at its disposal, supervised by the police and the city officials. It is highly
advisable to take your documents, some vital personal belongings and a certain amount of food, just in case, with
you. The senior executives of public and industrial facilities of the city has decided on the list of employees
needed to stay in Pripyat to maintain these facilities in a good working order. All the houses will be guarded by
the police during the evacuation period. Comrades, leaving your residences temporarily please make sure you
have turned off the lights, electrical equipment and water and shut the windows. Please keep calm and orderly in
the process of this short-term evacuation.[70]

To expedite the evacuation, residents were told to bring only what was necessary, and that they would remain evacuated for
approximately three days. As a result, most personal belongings were left behind, and remain there today. By 15:00, 53,000
people were evacuated to various villages of the Kiev region.[69] The next day, talks began for evacuating people from the 10-
kilometre (6.2 mi) zone.[69] Ten days after the accident, the evacuation area was expanded to 30 kilometres
(19 mi).[71]:115, 120–121 This "exclusion zone" has remained ever since, although its shape has changed and its size has been
expanded.

Delayed announcement
Evacuation began long before the accident was publicly acknowledged by the Soviet Union. In the morning of 28 April, radiation
levels set off alarms at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant in Sweden,[72][73] over 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) from the Chernobyl
Plant. Workers at Forsmark reported the case to the Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, which determined that the radiation had
originated elsewhere.[73] That day, the Swedish government contacted the Soviet government to inquire about whether there had
been a nuclear accident in the Soviet Union.[73] The Soviets initially denied it, and it was only after the Swedish government
suggested they were about to file an official alert with the IAEA, that the Soviet government admitted an accident took place at
Chernobyl.[73]

At first, the Soviets only conceded that a minor accident had occurred, but once they began evacuating over 100,000 people, the
full scale of the situation was realized by the global community.[74] At 21:02 the evening of 28 April, a 20-second announcement
was read in the TV news programme Vremya: "There has been an accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant. One of the
nuclear reactors was damaged. The effects of the accident are being remedied. Assistance has been provided for any affected
people. An investigative commission has been set up."[17][75][75] This was the entirety of the announcement of the accident. The
Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) then discussed Three Mile Island and other American nuclear accidents, an
example of the common Soviet tactic of emphasizing foreign disasters when one occurred in the Soviet Union. The mention of a
commission, however, indicated to observers the seriousness of the incident,[76] and subsequent state radio broadcasts were
replaced with classical music, which was a common method of preparing the public for an announcement of a tragedy.[17]

Around the same time, ABC News released its report about the disaster.[77] Shevchenko was the first of the Ukrainian state top
officials to arrive at the disaster site early on 28 April. There she spoke with members of medical staff and people, who were calm
and hopeful that they could soon return to their homes. Shevchenko returned home near midnight, stopping at a radiological
checkpoint in Vilcha, one of the first that were set up soon after the accident.[69]

There was a notification from Moscow that there was no reason to postpone the 1 May International Workers' Day celebrations in
Kiev (including the annual parade), but on 30 April a meeting of the Political bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU took
place to discuss the plan for the upcoming celebration. Scientists were reporting that the radiological background level in Kiev
was normal. At the meeting, which was finished at 18:00, it was decided to shorten celebrations from the regular 3.5–4 hours to
under 2 hours.[69] Several buildings in Pripyat were officially kept open after the disaster to be used by workers still involved
with the plant. These included the Jupiter Factory which closed in 1996 and the Azure Swimming Pool, used by the liquidators
for recreation during the clean-up, which closed in 1998.

Steam explosion risk

Two floors of bubbler pools beneath the reactor served as a large water reservoir for the emergency cooling pumps and as a
pressure suppression system capable of condensing steam in case of a small broken steam pipe; the third floor above them, below
the reactor, served as a steam tunnel. The steam released by a broken pipe was supposed to enter the steam tunnel and be led into
the pools to bubble through a layer of water. After the disaster, the pools and the basement were flooded because of ruptured
cooling water pipes and accumulated firefighting water, and constituted a serious steam explosion risk.

The smoldering graphite, fuel and other material above, at more than 1,200 °C (2,190 °F),[79] started to burn through the reactor
floor and mixed with molten concrete from the reactor lining, creating corium, a radioactive semi-liquid material comparable to
lava.[78][80] If this mixture had melted through the floor into the pool of water, it was feared it could have created a serious steam
explosion that would have ejected more radioactive material from the reactor. It became necessary to drain the pool.[81]
The bubbler pool could be drained by opening its sluice gates. However, the
valves controlling it were underwater, located in a flooded corridor in the
basement. Volunteers in wetsuits and respirators (for protection against
radioactive aerosols) and equipped with dosimeters, entered the knee-deep
radioactive water and managed to open the valves.[82][83] These were the
engineers Alexei Ananenko and Valeri Bezpalov (who knew where the valves
were), accompanied by the shift supervisor Boris Baranov.[84][85][86] Upon
succeeding, all risk of a further steam explosion was eliminated. All three men
were awarded the Order For Courage by President Petro Poroshenko in May Chernobyl corium lava, formed by
2018. [87]. fuel-containing mass, flowed into the
basement of the plant.[78]
Research by Andrew Leatherbarrow, author of Chernobyl 01:23:40,[82]
determined that the frequently recounted story is a gross exaggeration. Alexei
Ananenko continues to work in the nuclear energy industry, and rebuffs the growth of the Chernobyl media sensationalism
surrounding him.[88] While Valeri Bezpalov was found to still be alive by Leatherbarrow, the 65-year-old Baranov had lived until
2005 and had died of heart failure.[89] Once the bubbler pool gates were opened by the Ananenko team, fire brigade pumps were
then used to drain the basement. The operation was not completed until 8 May, after 20,000 metric tons (20,000 long tons; 22,000
short tons) of highly radioactive water were pumped out.

With the bubbler pool gone, a meltdown was less likely to produce a powerful steam explosion. To do so, the molten core would
now have to reach the water table below the reactor. To reduce the likelihood of this, it was decided to freeze the earth beneath the
reactor, which would also stabilize the foundations. Using oil drilling equipment, the injection of liquid nitrogen began on 4 May.
It was estimated that 25 metric tons of liquid nitrogen per day would be required to keep the soil frozen at −100 °C
(−148 °F).[33]:59 This idea[90] was soon scrapped and the bottom room where the cooling system would have been installed was
filled with concrete.

It is likely that intense alpha radiation hydrolysed the water, generating a low-pH hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) solution akin to an
oxidizing acid.[91] Conversion of bubbler pool water to H2O2 is confirmed by the presence in the Chernobyl lavas of studtite and
metastudtite,[92][93] the only minerals that contain peroxide.[94]

Debris removal
In the months after the explosion, attention turned to removing the radioactive
debris from the roof.[95] The worst of the radioactive debris was collected inside
what was left of the reactor, however it was estimated that there was
approximately 100 tons of debris on that roof that resulted from the explosion
and which had to be removed to enable the safe construction of the 'sarcophagus'
– a concrete structure which would entomb the reactor and reduce radioactive
dust being released into the atmosphere.[95] The initial plan was to utilise robots
to clear the debris off the roof. The Soviets used approximately 60 remote-
controlled robots, most of them built in the Soviet Union although many failed Chernobyl power plant in 2006 with
due to the high amounts of radiation on electronics.[95] the sarcophagus containment
structure
Consequently, the most highly radioactive materials were shoveled by Chernobyl
liquidators from the military wearing heavy protective gear (dubbed "bio-robots"
by the military); these soldiers could only spend a maximum of 40-90 seconds working on the rooftops of the surrounding
buildings because of the extremely high doses of radiation given off by the blocks of graphite and other debris. Though the
soldiers were only supposed to perform the role of the "bio-robot" a maximum of once, some soldiers reported having done this
task five or six times. Only 10% of the debris cleared from the roof was performed by robots with the other 90% removed by
approximately 5,000 men who absorbed, on average, an estimated 25 rem of radiation each (five times normal yearly
standards).[95]

At the time there was still fear that the reactor could re-enter a self-sustaining nuclear chain-reaction and explode again, and a
new containment structure was planned to prevent rain entering and triggering such an explosion, and to prevent further release of
radioactive material. This was the largest civil engineering task in history, involving a quarter of a million construction workers
who all reached their official lifetime limits of radiation.[64] Ukrainian filmmaker Vladimir Shevchenko captured film footage of
an Mi-8 helicopter as its main rotor collided with a nearby construction crane cable, causing the helicopter to fall near the
damaged reactor building and killing its four-man crew on 2 October 1986.[96] By December 1986, a large concrete sarcophagus
had been erected to seal off the reactor and its contents.[71] A unique "clean up" medal was given to the workers.[97] Although
many of the radioactive emergency vehicles were buried in trenches, many of the vehicles used by the liquidators, including the
helicopters, still remain parked in a field in the Chernobyl area. Scavengers have since removed many functioning, but highly
radioactive, parts.[98]

Liquidators worked under deplorable conditions, poorly informed and with poor protection. Many, if not most of them, exceeded
radiation safety limits.[71]:177–183[99]:2 Some exceeded limits by over 100 times—leading to rapid death.[71]:187

During the construction of the sarcophagus, a scientific team re-entered the reactor as part of an investigation dubbed "Complex
Expedition", to locate and contain nuclear fuel in a way that could not lead to another explosion. These scientists manually
collected cold fuel rods, but great heat was still emanating from the core. Rates of radiation in different parts of the building were
monitored by drilling holes into the reactor and inserting long metal detector tubes. The scientists were exposed to high levels of
radiation and radioactive dust.[64]

After six months of investigation, in December 1986, they discovered with the help of a remote camera an intensely radioactive
mass in the basement of Unit Four, more than two metres wide, which they called "the elephant's foot" for its wrinkled
appearance.[100] The mass was composed of melted sand, concrete and a large amount of nuclear fuel that had escaped from the
reactor. The concrete beneath the reactor was steaming hot, and was breached by now-solidified lava and spectacular unknown
crystalline forms termed chernobylite. It was concluded that there was no further risk of explosion.[64]

The official contaminated zones became stage to a massive clean-up effort lasting seven months.[71]:177–183 The official reason
for such early (and dangerous) decontamination efforts, rather than allowing time for natural decay, was that the land must be re-
peopled and brought back into cultivation. Indeed, within fifteen months 75% of the land was under cultivation, even though only
a third of the evacuated villages were resettled. Defence forces must have done much of the work. Yet this land was of marginal
agricultural value. According to historian David Marples, the administration had a psychological purpose for the clean-up: they
wished to forestall panic regarding nuclear energy, and even to restart the Chernobyl power station.[71]:78–79, 87, 192–193

Causes

INSAG-1 report, 1986

The first official explanation of the accident, later acknowledged to be erroneous, was published in August 1986. It effectively
placed the blame on the power plant operators. To investigate the causes of the accident the IAEA created a group known as the
International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG), which in its report of 1986, INSAG-1, on the whole also supported this
view, based on the data provided by the Soviets and the oral statements of specialists.[101] In this view, the catastrophic accident
was caused by gross violations of operating rules and regulations. "During preparation and testing of the turbine generator under
run-down conditions using the auxiliary load, personnel disconnected a series of technical protection systems and breached the
most important operational safety provisions for conducting a technical exercise."[44]:311
The operator error was probably due to their lack of knowledge of nuclear reactor physics and engineering, as well as lack of
experience and training. According to these allegations, at the time of the accident the reactor was being operated with many key
safety systems turned off, most notably the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), LAR (Local Automatic control system),
and AZ (emergency power reduction system). Personnel had an insufficiently detailed understanding of technical procedures
involved with the nuclear reactor, and knowingly ignored regulations to speed test completion.[44]

The developers of the reactor plant considered this combination of events to be impossible and therefore did not
allow for the creation of emergency protection systems capable of preventing the combination of events that led to
the crisis, namely the intentional disabling of emergency protection equipment plus the violation of operating
procedures. Thus the primary cause of the accident was the extremely improbable combination of rule
infringement plus the operational routine allowed by the power station staff.[44]:312

In this analysis of the causes of the accident, deficiencies in the reactor design and in the operating regulations that made the
accident possible were set aside and mentioned only casually. Serious critical observations covered only general questions and
did not address the specific reasons for the accident.

The following general picture arose from these observations, and several procedural irregularities also helped to make the
accident possible, one of which was insufficient communication between the safety officers and the operators in charge of the
experiment being run that night.

The reactor operators disabled safety systems down to the generators, which the test was really about. The main process
computer, SKALA, was running in such a way that the main control computer could not shut down the reactor or even reduce
power. Normally the computer would have started to insert all of the control rods. The computer would have also started the
"Emergency Core Protection System" that introduces 24 control rods into the active zone within 2.5 seconds, which is still slow
by 1986 standards. All control was transferred from the process computer to the human operators.

On the subject of the disconnection of safety systems, Valery Legasov said, in 1987, "It was like airplane pilots experimenting
with the engines in flight."[102]

This view is reflected in numerous publications and also artistic works on the theme of the Chernobyl accident that appeared
immediately after the accident,[33] and for a long time remained dominant in the public consciousness and in popular
publications.

INSAG-7 report, 1992

Ukraine has declassified a number of KGB documents from the period between
1971 and 1988 related to the Chernobyl plant, mentioning for example previous
reports of structural damages caused by negligence during construction of the
plant (such as splitting of concrete layers) that were never acted upon. They
document over 29 emergency situations in the plant during this period, 8 of
which were caused by negligence or poor competence on the part of
personnel.[104]

In 1991 a Commission of the USSR State Committee for the Supervision of

Safety in Industry and Nuclear Power reassessed the causes and circumstances Reactor hall No. 1 of the Chernobyl
Plant
of the Chernobyl accident and came to new insights and conclusions. Based on
it, in 1992 the IAEA Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) published an
additional report, INSAG-7,[38] which reviewed "that part of the INSAG-1 report in which primary attention is given to the
reasons for the accident," and was included the USSR State Commission report as Appendix I.[38]
In this INSAG report, most of the earlier accusations against staff for breach of
regulations were acknowledged to be either erroneous, based on incorrect
information obtained in August 1986, or less relevant. This report reflected a
different view of the main reasons for the accident, presented in Appendix I.
According to this account, the operators' actions in turning off the Emergency
Core Cooling System, interfering with the settings on the protection equipment,
and blocking the level and pressure in the separator drum did not contribute to
the original cause of the accident and its magnitude, although they may have A simplified diagram of the major
been a breach of regulations. In fact, turning off the emergency system designed differences between the Chernobyl
to prevent the two turbine generators from stopping was not a violation of RBMK and the most common
nuclear reactor design, the Light
regulations.[38]
water reactor. 1. The use of a
Human factors, however, contributed to the conditions that led to the disaster. graphite moderator in a water cooled
reactor. 2. A positive steam void
These included operating the reactor at a low power level—less than 700 MW—
coefficient that made the power
a level documented in the run-down test programme, and operating with a small excursion possible, which blew the
operational reactivity margin (ORM). The 1986 assertions of Soviet experts reactor vessel. 3. The control rods
notwithstanding, regulations did not prohibit operating the reactor at this low were very slow, taking 18–20
power level.[38]:18 seconds to be deployed. With the
control rods having graphite tips that
However, regulations did forbid operating the reactor with a small margin of moderated and therefore increased
reactivity. Yet "post-accident studies have shown that the way in which the real the fission rate in the beginning of
the rod insertion. 4. No reinforced
role of the ORM is reflected in the Operating Procedures and design
containment building.[38][40][103]
documentation for the RBMK-1000 is extremely contradictory", and
furthermore, "ORM was not treated as an operational safety limit, violation of
which could lead to an accident".[38]:34–25

According to the INSAG-7 Report, the chief reasons for the accident lie in the
peculiarities of physics and in the construction of the reactor. There are two such
reasons:[38]:18

1. The reactor had a dangerously large positive void coefficient of

reactivity. The void coefficient is a measurement of how a reactor
responds to increased steam formation in the water coolant. Most
other reactor designs have a negative coefficient, i.e. the nuclear
reaction rate slows when steam bubbles form in the coolant, since as
Lumps of graphite moderator ejected
the vapour phase in the reactor increases, fewer neutrons are
slowed down. Faster neutrons are less likely to split uranium atoms, from the core. The largest lump
so the reactor produces less power (a negative feedback). shows an intact control rod channel.
Chernobyl's RBMK reactor, however, used solid graphite as a
neutron moderator to slow down the neutrons, and the water in it, on
the contrary, acts like a harmful neutron absorber. Thus neutrons are slowed down even if steam bubbles form in
the water. Furthermore, because steam absorbs neutrons much less readily than water, increasing the intensity
of vaporization means that more neutrons are able to split uranium atoms, increasing the reactor's power output.
This makes the RBMK design very unstable at low power levels, and prone to suddenly increasing energy
production to a dangerous level. This behaviour is counter-intuitive, and this property of the reactor was unknown
to the crew.
2. A more significant flaw was in the design of the control rods that are inserted into the reactor to slow down the
reaction. In the RBMK reactor design, the lower part of each control rod was made of graphite and was 1.3
metres (4.3 ft) shorter than necessary, and in the space beneath the rods were hollow channels filled with water.
The upper part of the rod, the truly functional part that absorbs the neutrons and thereby halts the reaction, was
made of boron carbide. With this design, when the rods are inserted into the reactor from the uppermost position,
the graphite parts initially displace some water (which absorbs neutrons, as mentioned above), effectively
causing fewer neutrons to be absorbed initially. Thus for the first few seconds of control rod activation, reactor
power output is increased, rather than reduced as desired. This behaviour is counter-intuitive and was not known
to the reactor operators.
Other deficiencies besides these were noted in the RBMK-1000 reactor design, as were its non-compliance with accepted
standards and with the requirements of nuclear reactor safety. While INSAG-1 and INSAG-7 reports both identified operator
error as an issue of concern, the INSAG-7 identified that there were numerous other issues that were contributing factors that led
to the incident. These contributing factors include:

The plant was not designed to safety standards in effect and incorporated unsafe features
"Inadequate safety analysis" was performed[38]
There was "insufficient attention to independent safety review"[38]
"Operating procedures not founded satisfactorily in safety analysis"[38]
Safety information not adequately and effectively communicated between operators, and between operators and
designers
The operators did not adequately understand safety aspects of the plant
Operators did not sufficiently respect formal requirements of operational and test procedures
The regulatory regime was insufficient to effectively counter pressures for production
There was a "general lack of safety culture in nuclear matters at the national level as well as locally"[38]

Analysis
Both views were heavily lobbied by different groups, including the reactor's designers, power plant personnel, and the Soviet and
Ukrainian governments. According to the IAEA's 1986 analysis, the main cause of the accident was the operators' actions. But
according to the IAEA's 1993 revised analysis the main cause was the reactor's design.[105] One reason there were such
contradictory viewpoints and so much debate about the causes of the Chernobyl accident was that the primary data covering the
disaster, as registered by the instruments and sensors, were not completely published in the official sources.

Once again, the human factor had to be considered as a major element in causing the accident. INSAG notes that both the
operating regulations and staff handled the disabling of the reactor protection easily enough: witness the length of time for which
the ECCS was out of service while the reactor was operated at half power. INSAG's view is that it was the operating crew's
deviation from the test programme that was mostly to blame. "Most reprehensibly, unapproved changes in the test procedure were
deliberately made on the spot, although the plant was known to be in a very different condition from that intended for the
test."[38]:24

As in the previously released report INSAG-1, close attention is paid in report INSAG-7 to the inadequate (at the moment of the
accident) "culture of safety" at all levels. Deficiency in the safety culture was inherent not only at the operational stage but also,
and to no lesser extent, during activities at other stages in the lifetime of nuclear power plants (including design, engineering,
construction, manufacture, and regulation). The poor quality of operating procedures and instructions, and their conflicting
character, put a heavy burden on the operating crew, including the chief engineer. "The accident can be said to have flowed from
a deficient safety culture, not only at the Chernobyl plant, but throughout the Soviet design, operating and regulatory
organizations for nuclear power that existed at that time."[38]:24

Environmental effects

Spread of radioactive substances

Although no informing comparisons can be made between the accident and a strictly air burst-fuzed nuclear detonation, it has still
been approximated that about four hundred times more radioactive material was released from Chernobyl than by the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. By contrast the Chernobyl accident released about one hundredth to one thousandth of the
total amount of radioactivity released during the era of nuclear weapons testing at the height of the Cold War, 1950–1960s, with
the 1/100 to 1/1000 variance due to trying to make comparisons with different spectrums of isotopes released.[106]
Approximately 100,000 square kilometres (39,000 sq mi) of land was significantly contaminated with fallout, with the worst hit
regions being in Belarus, Ukraine and Russia.[107] Slighter levels of contamination were detected over all of Europe except for
the Iberian Peninsula.[108][109][110]

The initial evidence that a major release of radioactive material was affecting other countries came not from Soviet sources, but
from Sweden. On the morning of 28 April,[111] workers at the Forsmark Nuclear Power Plant (approximately 1,100 km (680 mi)
from the Chernobyl site) were found to have radioactive particles on their clothes.[112]

It was Sweden's search for the source of radioactivity, after they had determined there was no leak at the Swedish plant, that at
noon on 28 April, led to the first hint of a serious nuclear problem in the western Soviet Union. Hence the evacuation of Pripyat
on 27 April, 36 hours after the initial explosions, was silently completed before the disaster became known outside the Soviet
Union. The rise in radiation levels had at that time already been measured in Finland, but a civil service strike delayed the
response and publication.[113]

Areas of Europe contaminated with 137Cs[114]

37–185 kBq/m2 185–555 kBq/m2 555–1,480 kBq/m2 > 1,480 kBq/m2

Country
km2 % of country km2 % of country km2 % of country km2 % of country

Belarus 29,900 14.4 10,200 4.9 4,200 2.0 2,200 1.1

Ukraine 37,200 6.2 3,200 0.53 900 0.15 600 0.1
Russia 49,800 0.29 5,700 0.03 2,100 0.01 300 0.002
Sweden 12,000 2.7 — — — — — —
Finland 11,500 3.4 — — — — — —
Austria 8,600 10.3 — — — — — —
Norway 5,200 1.3 — — — — — —
Bulgaria 4,800 4.3 — — — — — —
Switzerland 1,300 3.1 — — — — — —
Greece 1,200 0.91 — — — — — —
Slovenia 300 1.5 — — — — — —
Italy 300 0.1 — — — — — —
Moldova 60 0.2 — — — — — —

Totals 162,160 km2 19,100 km2 7,200 km2 3,100 km2

Contamination from the Chernobyl accident was scattered irregularly depending on weather conditions, much of it deposited on
mountainous regions such as the Alps, the Welsh mountains and the Scottish Highlands, where adiabatic cooling caused
radioactive rainfall. The resulting patches of contamination were often highly localized, and water-flows across the ground
contributed further to large variations in radioactivity over small areas. Sweden and Norway also received heavy fallout when the
contaminated air collided with a cold front, bringing rain.[115]:43–44, 78 There was also groundwater contamination.

Rain was purposely seeded over 10,000 square kilometres (3,900 sq mi) of the Belorussian SSR by the Soviet air force to remove
radioactive particles from clouds heading toward highly populated areas. Heavy, black-coloured rain fell on the city of
Gomel.[116] Reports from Soviet and Western scientists indicate that Belarus received about 60% of the contamination that fell on
the former Soviet Union. However, the 2006 TORCH report stated that half of the volatile particles had landed outside Ukraine,
Belarus, and Russia. A large area in Russia south of Bryansk was also contaminated, as were parts of northwestern Ukraine.
Studies in surrounding countries indicate that over one million people could have been affected by radiation.[117]
Recently published data from a long-term monitoring program (The Korma Report II)[118] shows a decrease in internal radiation
exposure of the inhabitants of a region in Belarus close to Gomel. Resettlement may even be possible in prohibited areas provided
that people comply with appropriate dietary rules.

In Western Europe, precautionary measures taken in response to the radiation included seemingly arbitrary regulations banning
the importation of certain foods but not others. In France some officials stated that the Chernobyl accident had no adverse
effects.[119] Official figures in southern Bavaria in Germany indicated that some wild plant species contained substantial levels of
caesium, which were believed to have been passed onto them during their consumption by wild boars, a significant number of
which already contained radioactive particles above the allowed level.[120]

Radioactive release
Like many other releases of radioactivity into the environment, the Chernobyl release was controlled by the physical and
chemical properties of the radioactive elements in the core. Particularly dangerous are the highly radioactive fission products,
those with high nuclear decay rates that accumulate in the food chain, such as some of the isotopes of iodine, caesium and
strontium. Iodine-131 and caesium-137 are responsible for most of the radiation exposure received by the general population.[15]

Detailed reports on the release of radioisotopes from the site were published in 1989[121] and 1995,[122] with the latter report
updated in 2002.[15]

At different times after the accident, different isotopes were responsible for the
majority of the external dose. The remaining quantity of any radioisotope, and
therefore the activity of that isotope, after 7 decay half-lives have passed, is less
than 1% of its initial magnitude,[123] and it continues to reduce beyond 0.78%
after 7 half-lives to 0.10% remaining after 10 half-lives have passed and so
on.[124][125] (Some radionuclides have decay products that are likewise
radioactive, which is not accounted for here.) The release of radioisotopes from
the nuclear fuel was largely controlled by their boiling points, and the majority
Contributions of the various isotopes
of the radioactivity present in the core was retained in the reactor.
to the external (atmospheric)
All of the noble gases, including krypton and xenon, contained within absorbed dose in the contaminated
the reactor were released immediately into the atmosphere by the area of Pripyat, from soon after the
first steam explosion.[15] The atmospheric release of xenon-133, with accident, to 27 years after the
a half-life of 5 days, is estimated at 5200 PBq.[15] accident.
50 to 60% of all core radioiodine in the reactor, about 1760 PBq
(1760 × 1015 becquerels), or about 0.4 kilograms (0.88 lb), was
released, as a mixture of sublimed vapour, solid particles, and
organic iodine compounds. Iodine-131 has a half-life of 8 days.[15]
20 to 40% of all core caesium-137 was released, 85 PBq in
all.[15][126] Caesium was released in aerosol form; caesium-137,
along with isotopes of strontium, are the two primary elements
preventing the Chernobyl exclusion zone being re-inhabited.[127]
8.5 × 1016 Bq equals 24 kilograms of caesium-137.[127] Cs-137 has
a half-life of 30 years.[15]
Tellurium-132, half-life 78 hours, an estimated 1150 PBq was
released.[15]
The external relative gamma dose for
An early estimate for total nuclear fuel material released to the
a person in the open near the
environment was 3 ± 1.5%; this was later revised to 3.5 ± 0.5%. This
corresponds to the atmospheric emission of 6 metric tons (5.9 long Chernobyl disaster site.
tons; 6.6 short tons) of fragmented fuel.[122]
Two sizes of particles were released: small particles of 0.3 to 1.5 micrometres, each an individually unrecognizable small dust or
smog sized particulate matter and larger settling dust sized particles that therefore were quicker to fall-out of the air, of 10
micrometres in diameter. These larger particles contained about 80% to 90% of the released high boiling point or non-volatile
radioisotopes; zirconium-95, niobium-95, lanthanum-140, cerium-144 and the transuranic elements, including neptunium,
plutonium and the minor actinides, embedded in a uranium oxide matrix.

The dose that was calculated is the relative external gamma dose rate for a person standing in the open. The exact dose to a
person in the real world who would spend most of their time sleeping indoors in a shelter and then venturing out to consume an
internal dose from the inhalation or ingestion of a radioisotope, requires a personnel specific radiation dose reconstruction
analysis.

Environmental residual radioactivity

Water bodies
The Chernobyl nuclear power plant is located next to the Pripyat River, which
feeds into the Dnieper reservoir system, one of the largest surface water systems
in Europe, which at the time supplied water to Kiev's 2.4 million residents, and
was still in spring flood when the accident occurred.[71]:60 The radioactive
contamination of aquatic systems therefore became a major problem in the
immediate aftermath of the accident.[128]

In the most affected areas of Ukraine, levels of radioactivity (particularly from

radionuclides 131I, 137Cs and 90Sr) in drinking water caused concern during the Reactor and surrounding area in
April 2009
weeks and months after the accident,[128] though officially it was stated that all
contaminants had settled to the bottom "in an insoluble phase" and would not
dissolve for 800–1000 years.[71]:64 Guidelines for levels of radioiodine in drinking water were temporarily raised to 3,700 Bq/L,
allowing most water to be reported as safe,[128] and a year after the accident it was announced that even the water of the
Chernobyl plant's cooling pond was within acceptable norms. Despite this, two months after the disaster the Kiev water supply
was abruptly switched from the Dnieper to the Desna River.[71]:64–65 Meanwhile, massive silt traps were constructed, along with
an enormous 30-metre (98 ft) deep underground barrier to prevent groundwater from the destroyed reactor entering the Pripyat
River.[71]:65–67

Bio-accumulation of radioactivity in fish[129] resulted in concentrations (both in western Europe and in the former Soviet Union)
that in many cases were significantly above guideline maximum levels for consumption.[128] Guideline maximum levels for
radiocaesium in fish vary from country to country but are approximately 1000 Bq/kg in the European Union.[130] In the Kiev
Reservoir in Ukraine, concentrations in fish were several thousand Bq/kg during the years after the accident.[129]

In small "closed" lakes in Belarus and the Bryansk region of Russia, concentrations in a number of fish species varied from 100
to 60,000 Bq/kg during the period 1990–92.[131] The contamination of fish caused short-term concern in parts of the UK and
Germany and in the long term (years rather than months) in the affected areas of Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia as well as in parts
of Scandinavia.[128]

Groundwater was not badly affected by the Chernobyl accident since radionuclides with short half-lives decayed away long
before they could affect groundwater supplies, and longer-lived radionuclides such as radiocaesium and radiostrontium were
adsorbed to surface soils before they could transfer to groundwater.[24] However, significant transfers of radionuclides to
groundwater have occurred from waste disposal sites in the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone around Chernobyl. Although there is a
potential for transfer of radionuclides from these disposal sites off-site (i.e. out
of the 30 km (19 mi) exclusion zone), the IAEA Chernobyl Report[24] argues
that this is not significant in comparison to current levels of washout of surface-
deposited radioactivity.

Flora and fauna

After the disaster, four square kilometres (1.5 sq mi) of pine forest directly
downwind of the reactor turned reddish-brown and died, earning the name of the
"Red Forest".[132] Some animals in the worst-hit areas also died or stopped
reproducing. Most domestic animals were removed from the exclusion zone, but
horses left on an island in the Pripyat River 6 km (4 mi) from the power plant
died when their thyroid glands were destroyed by radiation doses of 150– Radiation levels in 1996 around
200 Sv.[133] Some cattle on the same island died and those that survived were Chernobyl
stunted because of thyroid damage. The next generation appeared to be
normal.[133]

A robot sent into the reactor itself has returned with samples of black, melanin-
rich radiotrophic fungi that are growing on the reactor's walls.[136]

Of the 440,350 wild boar killed in the 2010 hunting season in Germany,
approximately one thousand were contaminated with levels of radiation above
the permitted limit of 600 becquerels of Cesium per kg, due to residual
radioactivity from Chernobyl.[137] While all animal meat contains a natural level
of potassium 40 at a similar level of activity, with both wild and farm animals in
Italy containing "415 ± 56 becquerels kg−1 dw" of that naturally occurring
gamma emitter.[138] The cesium contamination issue has historically reached
some uniquely isolated and high levels approaching 20,000 Becquerels of
Cesium per kg in some specific tests, however as it has not been observed in the
wild boar population of Fukushima after the 2011 accident.[139] Evidence exists
to suggest that the wild German and Ukrainian boar population are in a unique
location were they have subsisted on a diet high in plant or fungi sources that After the disaster, four square
biomagnifies or concentrates radio-cesium, with the most well known food kilometres (1.5 sq mi) of pine forest
source the consumption of the outer shell or wall of the "deer- directly downwind of the reactor
truffle"/Elaphomyces which along with magnifying radio-cesium also magnifies turned reddish-brown and died,
earning the name of the "Red
or concentrates natural soil concentrations of Arsenic.[140]
Forest", though it soon
The Norwegian Agricultural Authority reported that in 2009 a total of 18,000 recovered.[132] This photograph was
livestock in Norway required uncontaminated feed for a period before slaughter, taken years later, in March 2009,[134]
after the forest began to grow again,
to ensure that their meat had an activity below the government permitted value
with the lack of foliage at the time of
of cesium per kg deemed suitable for human consumption. This contamination the photograph merely due to the
was due to residual radioactivity from Chernobyl in the plants they graze on in local winter at the time.[135]
the wild during the summer. 1,914 sheep required uncontaminated feed for a
time before slaughter during 2012, and these sheep were located in just 18 of
Norway's municipalities, a decrease of 17 from the 35 municipalities affected animals were located in during 2011 (117
municipalities were affected during 1986).[141]
The after-effects of Chernobyl were expected to be seen for a further 100 years, although the severity of the effects would decline
over that period.[142] Scientists report this is due to radioactive caesium-137 isotopes being taken up by fungi such as Cortinarius
caperatus which is in turn eaten by sheep whilst grazing.[141]

The United Kingdom was forced to restrict the movement of sheep from upland areas when radioactive caesium-137 fell across
parts of Northern Ireland, Wales, Scotland and northern England. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster in 1986, the
movement of a total of 4,225,000 sheep was restricted across a total of 9,700 farms, to prevent contaminated meat entering the
human food chain.[143] The number of sheep and the number of farms affected has decreased since 1986, Northern Ireland was
released from all restrictions in 2000 and by 2009 369 farms containing around 190,000 sheep remained under the restrictions in
Wales, Cumbria and northern Scotland.[143] The restrictions applying in Scotland were lifted in 2010, whilst those applying to
Wales and Cumbria were lifted during 2012, meaning no farms in the UK remain restricted because of Chernobyl
fallout.[144][145]

The legislation used to control sheep movement and compensate farmers (farmers were latterly compensated per animal to cover
additional costs in holding animals prior to radiation monitoring) was revoked during October and November 2012 by the
relevant authorities in the UK.[146]

Human impact
In the accident’s aftermath 237 people suffered from acute radiation sickness, of
whom 31 died within the first three months.[147][148] In 2005, the Chernobyl
Forum, composed of the IAEA, other UN organizations and the governments of
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, published a report on the radiological
environmental and health consequences of the Chernobyl accident.

On the death toll, the report states that 28 emergency workers ("liquidators")
died from acute radiation syndrome, including beta burns, and 15 patients died
from thyroid cancer in the following years, and it roughly estimated that cancer
deaths caused by Chernobyl may reach a total of about 4,000 among the Pripyat lies abandoned with the
5 million persons residing in the contaminated areas. The report projected cancer Chernobyl facility visible in the
distance
mortality "increases of less than one per cent" (~0.3%) on a time span of 80
years, cautioning that this estimate was "speculative" since at this time only a
few cancer deaths are linked to the Chernobyl disaster.[149] The report says it is impossible to reliably predict the number of fatal
cancers arising from the incident as small differences in assumptions can result in large differences in the estimated health costs.
The report says it represents the consensus view of the eight UN organizations.

Of all 66,000 Belarusian emergency workers, by the mid-1990s their government reported that only 150 (roughly 0.2%) died. In
contrast, 5,722 casualties were reported among Ukrainian clean-up workers up to the year 1995, by the National Committee for
Radiation Protection of the Ukrainian Population.[107][150]

The four most harmful radionuclides spread from Chernobyl were iodine-131, caesium-134, caesium-137 and strontium-90, with
half-lives of 8.02 days, 2.07 years, 30.2 years and 28.8 years respectively.[151]:8 The iodine was initially viewed with less alarm
than the other isotopes, because of its short half-life, but it is highly volatile, and now appears to have travelled furthest and
caused the most severe health problems in the short term.[107]:24 Strontium, on the other hand, is the least volatile of the four, and
of main concern in the areas near Chernobyl itself.[151]:8 Iodine tends to become concentrated in thyroid and milk glands,
leading, among other things, to increased incidence of thyroid cancers. Caesium tends to accumulate in vital organs such as the
heart,[152]:133 while strontium accumulates in bones, and may thus be a risk to bone-marrow and lymphocytes.[151]:8 Radiation is
most damaging to cells that are actively dividing. In adult mammals cell division is slow, except in hair follicles, skin, bone
marrow and the gastrointestinal tract, which is why vomiting and hair loss are common symptoms of acute radiation
sickness.[153]:42

Assessment difficulties
By the year 2000, the number of Ukrainians claiming to be radiation 'sufferers'
(poterpili) and receiving state benefits had jumped to 3.5 million, or 5% of the
population. Many of these are populations resettled from contaminated zones, or
former or current Chernobyl plant workers.[99]:4–5 According to IAEA-affiliated
scientific bodies, these apparent increases of ill health result partly from
economic strains on these countries and poor health-care and nutrition; also, they
suggest that increased medical vigilance following the accident has meant that
many cases that would previously have gone unnoticed (especially of cancer) are
now being registered.[107] Piglet with dipygus on exhibit at the
Ukrainian National Chornobyl
The World Health Organization states, "children conceived before or after their
Museum.
father's exposure showed no statistically significant differences in mutation
frequencies".[154] This statistically insignificant increase was also seen by
independent researchers analyzing the children of the Chernobyl liquidators.[155]

On farms in Narodychi Raion of Ukraine it is claimed that in the first four years of the disaster nearly 350 animals were born with
gross deformities such as missing or extra limbs, missing eyes, heads or ribs, or deformed skulls; in comparison, only three
abnormal births had been registered in the five years prior.[156][157][158][159][160][161] The two primary individuals involved with
the attempt to suggest that the mutation rate amongst animals was, and continues to be, higher in the Chernobyl zone, are the
Anders Moller and Timothy Mousseau group.[162][163][164][165] Apart from continuing to publish experimentally unrepeatable
and discredited papers, Mousseau routinely gives talks at the Helen Caldicott organized symposiums for "Physicians for Social
Responsibility", an anti-nuclear advocacy group, devoted to bring about a "nuclear free planet".[166] Moreover, in years past
Moller was previously caught and reprimanded for publishing papers that crossed the scientific "misconduct"/"fraud" line.[167]
The duo have more recently attempted to publish meta-analyses in which the primary references they weigh-up, analyze and draw
their conclusions from is their own prior papers along with the discredited book Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for
People and the Environment.[168]

In 1996, geneticist colleagues Ronald Chesser and Robert Baker published a paper on the thriving vole population within the
exclusion zone, in which the central conclusion of their work was essentially that "The mutation rate in these animals is hundreds
and probably thousands of times greater than normal", this claim occurred after they had done a comparison of the mitochondrial
DNA of the "Chernobyl voles" with that of a control group of voles from outside the region.[169] These alarming conclusions led
the paper to appear on the front cover of the prestigious journal Nature, however not long after publication Chesser & Baker
discovered a fundamental error in their research in which they had incorrectly classified the species of vole, and therefore were
comparing the genetics of two entirely different vole species to start with.[162][170]

Abortions
Following the accident, journalists mistrusted many medical professionals (such as the spokesman from the UK National
Radiological Protection Board), and in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them.[171] Throughout the European continent, due
to this media-driven framing of the slight contamination and in nations where abortion is legal, many requests for induced
abortions, of otherwise normal pregnancies, were obtained out of fears of radiation from Chernobyl, including an excess number
of abortions in Denmark in the months following the accident.[172] In Greece, following the accident many obstetricians were
unable to resist requests from worried pregnant mothers over fears of radiation. Although it was determined that the effective
dose to Greeks would not exceed 1 mSv (100 mrem), a dose much lower than that which could induce embryonic abnormalities
or other non-stochastic effects, there was an observed 2,500 excess of otherwise wanted pregnancies being terminated, probably
out of fear in the mother of radiation risk.[173] A slightly above the expected number of requested induced abortions occurred in
Italy.[174][175]

Worldwide, an estimated excess of about 150,000 elective abortions may have been performed on otherwise healthy pregnancies
out of unfounded fears of radiation from Chernobyl, according to Robert Baker and ultimately a 1987 article published by Linda
E. Ketchum in the Journal of Nuclear Medicine which mentions but does not reference an IAEA source on the
matter.[171][172][176][177][173][178]

The available statistical data excludes the Soviet–Ukraine–Belarus abortion rates, as they are presently unavailable. From the
available data, an increase in the number of abortions in what were healthy developing human offspring in Denmark occurred in
the months following the accident, at a rate of about 400 cases.[172] In Greece, there was an observed 2,500 excess of otherwise
wanted pregnancies being terminated.[173] In Italy, a "slightly" above the expected number of induced abortions occurred,
approximately 100.[174][175]

As the increase in radiation in Denmark was so low...the public debate and anxiety among the pregnant women
and their husbands "caused" more fetal deaths in Denmark than the accident. This underlines the importance of
public debate, the role of the mass media and of the way in which National Health authorities participate in this
debate.

No evidence of changes in the prevalence of human deformities/birth congenital anomalies which might be associated with the
accident, are apparent in Belarus or the Ukraine, the two republics which had the highest exposure to fallout.[179] In Sweden,[180]
and Finland where no increase in abortion rates occurred, it was likewise determined that "no association between the temporal
and spatial variations in radioactivity and variable incidence of congenital malformations [was found]."[181] A similar null
increase in the abortion rate and a healthy baseline situation of no increase in birth defects was determined by assessing the
Hungarian Congenital Abnormality Registry,[182] Findings also mirrored in Austria.[183] Larger, "mainly western European" data
sets approaching a million births in the EUROCAT database, divided into "exposed" and control groups were assessed in 1999.
As no Chernobyl impacts were detected, the researchers conclude "in retrospect the widespread fear in the population about the
possible effects of exposure on the unborn fetus was not justified".[184] Despite studies from Germany and Turkey, the only
robust evidence of negative pregnancy outcomes that transpired after the accident were these elective abortion indirect effects, in
Greece, Denmark, Italy etc., due to the anxieties created.[179]

In very high doses, it was known at the time that radiation can cause a physiological increase in the rate of pregnancy anomalies,
but unlike the dominant linear-no threshold model of radiation and cancer rate increases, it was known, by researchers familiar
with both the prior human exposure data and animal testing, that the "Malformation of organs appears to be a deterministic effect
with a threshold dose" below which, no rate increase is observed.[185] This teratology (birth defects) issue was discussed by
Frank Castronovo of the Harvard Medical School in 1999, publishing a detailed review of dose reconstructions and the available
pregnancy data following the Chernobyl accident, inclusive of data from Kiev's two largest obstetrics hospitals.[185] Castronovo
concludes that "the lay press with newspaper reporters playing up anecdotal stories of children with birth defects" is, together
with dubious studies that show selection bias, the two primary factors causing the persistent belief that Chernobyl increased the
background rate of birth defects. When the vast amount of pregnancy data does not support this perception as no women took part
in the most radioactive liquidator operations, no in-utero individuals would have been expected to have received a threshold
dose.[185]

In one small behavioral study in 1998, with low statistical power and limited Multivariate analysis which akin to the widely
published Hiroshima and Nagasaki studies, investigated and selected the children; who were in utero during the rapidly dividing
and therefore radiosensitive phase of neurogenesis(8 to 16 weeks of gestation), and whose mothers were evacuated from some of
the more energetic hot-spot parts of the Chernobyl exclusion zone following the accident. From a random selection of 50
individuals in late-childhood in 1998, a low quality statistically-significant increase in the rate of severe IQ reduction was found,
with a threshold of a suggested ~ 0.30 Sv(300 mSv) as a thyroid dose to the developing human head, for the beginning emergence
of cerebral disorder.[186][187]

The Chernobyl liquidators, essentially an all-male civil defense emergency workforce, would go on to father normal children,
without an increase in developmental anomalies or a statistically significant increase in the frequencies of germline mutations in
their progeny.[155] This normality is similarly seen in the children of the survivors of the Goiana accident.[188]

Сancer assessments
A report by the International Atomic Energy Agency examines the environmental consequences of the accident.[24] The United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation has estimated a global collective dose of radiation exposure
from the accident "equivalent on average to 21 additional days of world exposure to natural background radiation"; individual
doses were far higher than the global mean among those most exposed, including 530,000 primarily male recovery workers (the
Chernobyl liquidators) who averaged an effective dose equivalent to an extra 50 years of typical natural background radiation
exposure each.[189][190][191]

Estimates of the number of deaths that will eventually result from the accident vary enormously; disparities reflect both the lack
of solid scientific data and the different methodologies used to quantify mortality—whether the discussion is confined to specific
geographical areas or extends worldwide, and whether the deaths are immediate, short term, or long term.

In 1994, 31 deaths were directly attributed to the accident, all among the reactor staff and emergency workers.[147] As of the 2008
report by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, and the total number of confirmed deaths
from radiation was 64 and was expected to continue to rise.

The Chernobyl Forum predicts that the eventual death toll could reach 4,000 among those exposed to the highest levels of
radiation (200,000 emergency workers, 116,000 evacuees and 270,000 residents of the most contaminated areas); this figure is a
total causal death toll prediction, combining the deaths of approximately 50 emergency workers who died soon after the accident
from acute radiation syndrome, 15 children who have died of thyroid cancer and a future predicted total of 3935 deaths from
radiation-induced cancer and leukaemia.[12]

In a peer-reviewed paper in the International Journal of Cancer in 2006, the authors expanded the discussion on those exposed to
all of Europe (but following a different conclusion methodology to the Chernobyl Forum study, which arrived at the total
predicted death toll of 4,000 after cancer survival rates were factored in) they stated, without entering into a discussion on deaths,
that in terms of total excess cancers attributed to the accident:[192]

The risk projections suggest that by now [2006] Chernobyl may have caused about 1000 cases of thyroid cancer
and 4000 cases of other cancers in Europe, representing about 0.01% of all incident cancers since the accident.
Models predict that by 2065 about 16,000 cases of thyroid cancer and 25,000 cases of other cancers may be
expected due to radiation from the accident, whereas several hundred million cancer cases are expected from
other causes.

Two anti-nuclear advocacy groups have publicized non-peer-reviewed estimates that include mortality estimates for those who
were exposed to even smaller amounts of radiation. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) calculated that, among the
hundreds of millions of people exposed worldwide, there will be an eventual 50,000 excess cancer cases, resulting in 25,000
excess cancer deaths, excluding thyroid cancer.[193] However, these calculations are based on a simple linear no-threshold model
multiplication and the misapplication of the collective dose, which the International Commission on Radiological Protection
(ICRP) states "should not be done" as using the collective dose is "inappropriate to use in risk projections".[194]
Along similar lines to the UCS approach, the 2006 TORCH report, commissioned by the European Greens political party,
likewise simplistically calculates an eventual 30,000 to 60,000 excess cancer deaths in total, around the globe.[108]

In 2004, the UN collaborative, Chernobyl Forum, revealed thyroid cancer among

children to be one of the main health impacts from the Chernobyl accident. This
is due to the ingestion of contaminated dairy products, along with the inhalation
of the short-lived, highly radioactive isotope, Iodine-131. In that publication,
more than 4,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer were reported. It is important
to note that there was no evidence of an increase in solid cancers or leukemia. It
said that there was an increase in psychological problems among the affected
population.[149] The WHO's Radiation Program reported that the 4,000 cases of
thyroid cancer resulted in nine deaths.[12]
Thyroid cancer incidence in children
According to the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic and adolescents in Belarus
Radiation, up to the year 2005, an excess of over 6,000 cases of thyroid cancer Adults, ages 19 to 34
have been reported. That is, over the estimated pre-accident baseline thyroid Adolescents, ages 15 to 18
cancer rate, more than 6,000 casual cases of thyroid cancer have been reported in Children, ages up to 14
children and adolescents exposed at the time of the accident, a number that is
expected to increase. They concluded that there is no other evidence of major
health impacts from the radiation exposure.[195]

Well-differentiated thyroid cancers are generally treatable,[196] and when treated the five-year survival rate of thyroid cancer is
96%, and 92% after 30 years.[197] the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation had reported 15
deaths from thyroid cancer in 2011.[11] The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also states that there has been no
increase in the rate of birth defects or abnormalities, or solid cancers—such as lung cancer—corroborating the assessments by the
UN committee.[149] UNSCEAR raised the possibility of long term genetic defects, pointing to a doubling of radiation-induced
minisatellite mutations among children born in 1994.[198] However, the risk of thyroid cancer associated with the Chernobyl
accident is still high according to published studies.[199][200]

The German affiliate of the ultra-anti-nuclear energy organization, the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
suggest that 10,000 people are affected by thyroid cancer as of 2006 and that 50,000 cases are expected in the future.[201]

Other health disorders

Fred Mettler, a radiation expert at the University of New Mexico, puts the number of worldwide cancer deaths outside the highly
contaminated zone at perhaps 5,000, for a total of 9,000 Chernobyl-associated fatal cancers, saying "the number is small
(representing a few percent) relative to the normal spontaneous risk of cancer, but the numbers are large in absolute terms".[202]
The same report outlined studies based in data found in the Russian Registry from 1991 to 1998 that suggested that "of 61,000
Russian workers exposed to an average dose of 107 mSv about 5% of all fatalities that occurred may have been due to radiation
exposure."[149]

The report went into depth about the risks to mental health of exaggerated fears about the effects of radiation.[149] According to
the IAEA the "designation of the affected population as "victims" rather than "survivors" has led them to perceive themselves as
helpless, weak and lacking control over their future". The IAEA says that this may have led to behaviour that has caused further
health effects.[203]

Fred Mettler commented that 20 years later: "The population remains largely unsure of what the effects of radiation actually are
and retain a sense of foreboding. A number of adolescents and young adults who have been exposed to modest or small amounts
of radiation feel that they are somehow fatally flawed and there is no downside to using illicit drugs or having unprotected sex. To
reverse such attitudes and behaviours will likely take years although some youth groups have begun programs that have
promise."[202] In addition, disadvantaged children around Chernobyl suffer from health problems that are attributable not only to
the Chernobyl accident, but also to the poor state of post-Soviet health systems.[149]

The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR), part of the Chernobyl Forum, have
produced their own assessments of the radiation effects.[204] UNSCEAR was set up as a collaboration between various United
Nation bodies, including the World Health Organization, after the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, to assess the
long-term effects of radiation on human health.[205]

Radiation exposure deaths

The number of potential deaths arising from the Chernobyl disaster is heavily debated. The WHO's prediction of 4000 future
cancer deaths in surrounding countries[206] is based on the Linear no-threshold model (LNT), which assumes that the damage
inflicted by radiation at low doses is directly proportional to the dose.[207] Radiation epidemiologist Roy Shore contends that
estimating health effects in a population from the LNT model "is not wise because of the uncertainties".[208]

According to the Union of Concerned Scientists the number of excess cancer deaths worldwide (including all contaminated areas)
is approximately 27,000 based on the same LNT.[209]

Another study critical of the Chernobyl Forum report was commissioned by Greenpeace, which asserted that the most recently
published figures indicate that in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine the accident could have resulted in 10,000–200,000 additional
deaths in the period between 1990 and 2004.[210] The Scientific Secretary of the Chernobyl Forum criticized the report's reliance
on non-peer-reviewed locally produced studies. Although most of the study's sources were from peer-reviewed journals,
including many Western medical journals, the higher mortality estimates were from non-peer-reviewed sources,[210] while
Gregory Härtl (spokesman for the WHO) suggested that the conclusions were motivated by ideology.[211]

Chernobyl: Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment is a 2007 Russian publication that concludes that
there were 985,000 premature deaths as a result of the radioactivity released.[212] The results were criticized by M. I. Balonov of
the Institute of Radiation Hygiene in St. Petersburg, who described them as biased, drawing from sources which were difficult to
independently verify and lacking a proper scientific base. Balanov expressed his opinion that "the authors unfortunately did not
appropriately analyze the content of the Russian-language publications, for example, to separate them into those that contain
scientific evidence and those based on hasty impressions and ignorant conclusions".[212]

According to U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission member and Professor of Health Physics Kenneth Mossman,[213] the "LNT
philosophy is overly conservative, and low-level radiation may be less dangerous than commonly believed."[214] Yoshihisa
Matsumoto, a radiation biologist at the Tokyo Institute of Technology, cites laboratory experiments on animals to suggest there
must be a threshold dose below which DNA repair mechanisms can completely repair any radiation damage.[208] Mossman
suggests that the proponents of the current model believe that being conservative is justified due to the uncertainties surrounding
low level doses and it is better to have a "prudent public health policy".[213]

Another significant issue is establishing consistent data on which to base the analysis of the impact of the Chernobyl accident.
Since 1991 large social and political changes have occurred within the affected regions and these changes have had significant
impact on the administration of health care, on socio-economic stability, and the manner in which statistical data is collected.[215]
Ronald Chesser, a radiation biologist at Texas Tech University, says that "the subsequent Soviet collapse, scarce funding,
imprecise dosimetry, and difficulties tracking people over the years have limited the number of studies and their reliability".[208]

Social economic effect

It is difficult to establish the total economic cost of the disaster. According to
Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet Union spent 18 billion rubles (the equivalent of
US$18 billion at that time, or $41.1 billion in today's dollars[216]) on
containment and decontamination, virtually bankrupting itself.[16] In 2005, the
total cost over 30 years for Belarus alone was estimated at US$235 billion; about
$301 billion in today's dollars given inflation rates.[149]

Ongoing costs are well known; in their 2003–2005 report, The Chernobyl Forum
stated that between 5% and 7% of government spending in Ukraine is still Abandoned buildings in Chernobyl
related to Chernobyl, while in Belarus over $13 billion is thought to have been
spent between 1991 and 2003, with 22% of national budget having been
Chernobyl-related in 1991, falling to 6% by 2002.[149] In 2018, Ukraine spent
5–7% of its national budget on recovery activities related to the Chernobyl
disaster.[217] Overall economic loss is estimated at $235 billion in Belarus.[217]
Much of the current cost relates to the payment of Chernobyl-related social
benefits to some 7 million people across the three countries.[149]

A significant economic impact at the time was the removal of 784,320 ha

(1,938,100 acres) of agricultural land and 694,200 ha (1,715,000 acres) of forest Russian President Medvedev and
from production. While much of this has been returned to use, agricultural Ukrainian President Yanukovych lay
production costs have risen due to the need for special cultivation techniques, wreaths at a memorial to victims of
fertilizers and additives.[149] the Chernobyl disaster on 26 April
2011.
Politically, the accident gave great significance to the new Soviet policy of
glasnost,[218][219] and helped forge closer Soviet–US relations at the end of the
Cold War, through bioscientific cooperation.[99]:44–48 The disaster also became a key factor in the Union's eventual 1991
dissolution, and a major influence in shaping the new Eastern Europe.[99]:20–21

Both Ukraine and Belarus, in their first months of independence, lowered legal radiation thresholds from the Soviet Union's
previous, elevated thresholds (from 35 rems per lifetime under the USSR to 7 rems per lifetime in Ukraine and 0.1 rems per year
in Belarus).[220]:46–47, 119–124

Aftermath
Following the accident, questions arose about the future of the plant and its
eventual fate. All work on the unfinished reactors 5 and 6 was halted three years
later. However, the trouble at the Chernobyl plant did not end with the disaster in
reactor 4. The damaged reactor was sealed off and 200 cubic meters (260 cu yd)
of concrete was placed between the disaster site and the operational buildings.
The work was managed by Grigoriy Mihaylovich Naginskiy, the deputy chief
engineer of Installation and Construction Directorate – 90. The Ukrainian Portraits of deceased Chernobyl
government continued to let the three remaining reactors operate because of an liquidators used for an anti-nuclear
energy shortage in the country. power protest in Geneva

Decommissioning
In October 1991, a fire broke out in the turbine building of reactor 2;[221] the authorities subsequently declared the reactor
damaged beyond repair, and it was taken offline. Reactor 1 was decommissioned in November 1996 as part of a deal between the
Ukrainian government and international organizations such as the IAEA to end operations at the plant. On 15 December 2000,
then-President Leonid Kuchma personally turned off Reactor 3 in an official ceremony, shutting down the entire site.[222]

Confinement
Soon after the accident, the reactor building was quickly encased by a mammoth
concrete sarcophagus in a notable feat of construction under severe conditions.
Crane operators worked blindly from inside lead-lined cabins taking instructions
from distant radio observers, while gargantuan-sized pieces of concrete were
moved to the site on custom-made vehicles. The purpose of the sarcophagus was
to stop any further release of radioactive particles into the atmosphere, mitigate
damage should the core go critical and explode, and provide safety for the
continued operations of adjacent reactors 1, 2 and 3.[18]
New Safe Confinement in October
2017
The concrete sarcophagus was never intended to last very long, with a lifespan
of only 30 years. On 12 February 2013, a 600 m2 (6,500 sq ft) section of the roof
of the turbine-building collapsed, adjacent to the sarcophagus, causing a new release of radioactivity and temporary evacuation of
the area. At first it was assumed that the roof collapsed because of the weight of snow, however the amount of snow was not
exceptional, and the report of a Ukrainian fact-finding panel concluded that the collapse was the result of sloppy repair work and
aging of the structure. Experts warned the sarcophagus itself was on the verge of collapse.[223][224]

In 1997, the international Chernobyl Shelter Fund was founded to design and build a more permanent cover for the unstable and
short-lived sarcophagus. It received over €810 million and was managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). The new shelter was named the New Safe Confinement and construction began in 2010. It is a metal arch
105 metres (344 ft) high and spanning 257 metres (843 ft) built on rails adjacent to the reactor 4 building so that it could be slid
over top the existing sarcophagus. The New Safe Confinement was completed in 2016 and slid into place over top the
sarcophagus on November 29.[225] The huge steel arch was moved into place over several weeks.[226] Unlike the original
sarcophagus, the New Safe Confinement is designed to allow the reactor to be safely dismantled using remotely operated
equipment.

Waste management
As of 2006, some fuel remained in the reactors at units 1 through 3, most of it in each unit's spent fuel pool, as well as some
material in a small spent fuel interim storage facility pond (ISF-1). In 1999 a contract was signed for construction of a radioactive
waste management facility to store 25,000 used fuel assemblies from units 1–3 and other operational wastes, as well as material
from decommissioning units 1–3 (which will be the first RBMK units decommissioned anywhere). The contract included a
processing facility able to cut the RBMK fuel assemblies and to put the material in canisters, which were to be filled with inert
gas and welded shut.

The canisters were to be transported to dry storage vaults, where the fuel containers would be enclosed for up to 100 years. This
facility, treating 2500 fuel assemblies per year, would be the first of its kind for RBMK fuel. However, after a significant part of
the storage structures had been built, technical deficiencies in the concept emerged, and the contract was terminated in 2007. The
interim spent fuel storage facility (ISF-2) will now be completed by others by mid-2013.

Another contract has been let for a liquid radioactive waste treatment plant, to handle some 35,000 cubic metres (1,200,000 cu ft)
of low- and intermediate-level liquid wastes at the site. This will need to be solidified and eventually buried along with solid
wastes on site. In January 2008, the Ukrainian government announced a 4-stage decommissioning plan that incorporates the
above waste activities and progresses towards a cleared site.[117]
Fuel-containing materials
According to official estimates, about 95% of the fuel in Reactor 4 at the time of the accident (about 180 metric tons (180 long
tons; 200 short tons)) remains inside the shelter, with a total radioactivity of nearly 18 million curies (670 PBq). The radioactive
material consists of core fragments, dust, and lava-like "fuel containing materials" (FCM)—also called "corium"—that flowed
through the wrecked reactor building before hardening into a ceramic form.

Three different lavas are present in the basement of the reactor building: black, brown, and a porous ceramic. The lava materials
are silicate glasses with inclusions of other materials within them. The porous lava is brown lava that dropped into water and thus
cooled rapidly. It is unclear how long the ceramic form will retard the release of radioactivity. From 1997 to 2002 a series of
published papers suggested that the self-irradiation of the lava would convert all 1,200 metric tons (1,200 long tons; 1,300 short
tons) into a submicrometre and mobile powder within a few weeks.[227]

It has been reported that the degradation of the lava is likely to be a slow and gradual process rather than sudden and rapid.[228]
The same paper states that the loss of uranium from the wrecked reactor is only 10 kg (22 lb) per year; this low rate of uranium
leaching suggests that the lava is resisting its environment.[228] The paper also states that when the shelter is improved, the
leaching rate of the lava will decrease.[228]

Exclusion zone
An area originally extending 30 kilometres (19 mi) in all directions from the
plant is officially called the "zone of alienation". It is largely uninhabited, except
for about 300 residents who have refused to leave. The area has largely reverted
to forest, and has been overrun by wildlife because of a lack of competition with
humans for space and resources. Even today, radiation levels are so high that the
workers responsible for rebuilding the sarcophagus are only allowed to work
five hours a day for one month before taking 15 days of rest. As of 2016, 187
locals had returned and were living permanently in the zone.[229]
Entrance to the zone of alienation
In 2011 Ukraine opened up the sealed zone around the Chernobyl reactor to around Chernobyl
tourists who wish to learn more about the tragedy that occurred in
1986.[230][231][232] Sergii Mirnyi, a radiation reconnaissance officer at the time
of the accident, and now an academic at National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in Kiev, Ukraine, has written about the
psychological and physical effects on survivors and visitors, and worked as an advisor to Chernobyl tourism groups.[232][233]

Forest fire concerns

During the dry seasons, a perennial concern is forests that have been contaminated by radioactive material catching on fire. The
dry conditions and build-up of debris make the forests a ripe breeding ground for wildfires.[234] Depending on the prevailing
atmospheric conditions, the fires could potentially spread the radioactive material further outwards from the exclusion zone in the
smoke.[235][236] In Belarus, the Bellesrad organization is tasked with overseeing the food cultivation and forestry management in
the area.

Recovery projects
The Chernobyl Trust Fund was created in 1991 by the United Nations to help victims of the Chernobyl accident.[237] It is
administered by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, which also manages strategy
formulation, resources mobilization, and advocacy efforts.[238] Beginning 2002, under the United Nations Development
Programme, the fund shifted its focus from emergency assistance to long-term development.[217][238]
The Chernobyl Shelter Fund was established in 1997 at the Denver 23rd G8 summit to finance the Shelter Implementation Plan
(SIP). The plan calls for transforming the site into an ecologically safe condition by means of stabilization of the sarcophagus
followed by construction of a New Safe Confinement (NSC). While the original cost estimate for the SIP was US$768 million,
the 2006 estimate was $1.2 billion. The SIP is being managed by a consortium of Bechtel, Battelle, and Électricité de France, and
conceptual design for the NSC consists of a movable arch, constructed away from the shelter to avoid high radiation, to be slid
over the sarcophagus. The NSC was moved into position in November 2016 and is expected to be completed in late-2017.[239]

In 2003, the United Nations Development Programme launched the Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (CRDP)
for the recovery of the affected areas.[240] The programme was initiated in February 2002 based on the recommendations in the
report on Human Consequences of the Chernobyl Nuclear Accident. The main goal of the CRDP's activities is supporting the
Government of Ukraine in mitigating long-term social, economic, and ecological consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe.
CRDP works in the four most Chernobyl-affected areas in Ukraine: Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Chernihivska and Rivnenska.

The International Project on the Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident was created and received US$20 million, mainly from
Japan, in hopes of discovering the main cause of health problems due to 131I radiation. These funds were divided among Ukraine,
Belarus, and Russia, the three main affected countries, for further investigation of health effects. As there was significant
corruption in former Soviet countries, most of the foreign aid was given to Russia, and no positive outcome from this money has
been demonstrated.

Chernobyl Children International (CCI) is a UN-accredited, non-profit, international development, medical, and humanitarian
organization that works with children, families and communities that continue to be affected by the economic outcome of the
Chernobyl accident. The organization's founder and chief executive is Adi Roche. The CCI was founded in 1991 in response to
an appeal from Ukrainian and Belarusian doctors for aid. Roche then began organizing 'rest and recuperation' holidays for a few
Chernobyl children.[241][242] It works closely with the Belarusian government, the United Nations, and many thousands of
volunteers worldwide to deliver a broad range of economic supports to the children and the wider community. It also acts as an
advocate for the rights of those affected by the Chernobyl explosion, and engages in research and outreach activities to encourage
the rest of the world to remember the victims and understand the long-term impact on their lives.[241][242]

Commemoration
The Front Veranda (1986), a lithograph by Susan Dorothea White in the National Gallery of Australia,[243] exemplifies
worldwide awareness of the event. Heavy Water: A Film for Chernobyl was released by Seventh Art in 2006 to commemorate the
disaster through poetry and first-hand accounts.[244] The film secured the Best Short Documentary at Cinequest Film Festival as
well as the Rhode Island "best score" award[245] along with a screening at Tate Modern.[245]

Chernobyl Way is an annual rally run on 26 April by the opposition in Belarus as a remembrance of the Chernobyl disaster.

Nuclear debate
The Chernobyl accident attracted a great deal of interest. Because of the distrust that many people had in the Soviet authorities, a
great deal of debate about the situation at the site occurred in the First World during the early days of the event. Because of
defective intelligence based on satellite imagery, it was thought that unit number three had also suffered a dire accident.
Journalists mistrusted many professionals, and they in turn encouraged the public to mistrust them.[171]

In Italy, the Chernobyl accident was reflected in the outcome of the 1987 referendum. As a result of that referendum, Italy began
phasing out its nuclear power plants in 1988, a decision that was effectively reversed in 2008. A 2011 referendum reiterated
Italians' strong objections to nuclear power, thus abrogating the government's decision of 2008.
In Germany, the Chernobyl accident led to the creation of a federal environment
ministry, after several states had already created such a post. The minister was
given the authority over reactor safety as well, which the current minister still
holds as of 2015. The events are also credited with strengthening the anti-nuclear
movement in Germany, which culminated in the decision to end the use of
nuclear power that was made by the 1998–2005 Schröder government.[246]

In direct response to the Chernobyl disaster, a conference to create a Convention

on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident was called in 1986 by the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The resulting treaty has bound signatory Nuclear power protest in Berlin, 2011
member states to provide notification of any nuclear and radiation accidents that
occur within its jurisdiction that could affect other states, along with the
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.

In the United States people became motivated by the Chernobyl disaster to investigate and draw parallels to their own
government's nuclear problems. The Hanford Site has become known as "America's Chernobyl" and many parallels have been
drawn between the causes of the Chernobyl accident and the causes of the catastrophic and ongoing situation at Hanford.[247][248]
Additionally, Chernobyl, along with the space shuttle Challenger disaster, the Three Mile Island accident, and the Bhopal disaster
have been used together as case studies, both by the US government and by third parties, in research concerning the root causes
of such disasters, such as sleep deprivation[249] and mismanagement.[250]

See also
Chernobyl New Safe Confinement
Children of Chernobyl Benefit Concert
Comparison of Chernobyl and other radioactivity releases
List of Chernobyl-related articles
List of industrial disasters
Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
Nuclear and radiation accidents and incidents
Threat of the Dnieper reservoirs

References

Notes
1. Although most reports on the Chernobyl accident refer to a number of graphite fires, it is highly unlikely that the
graphite itself burned. According to the General Atomics website:[3] "It is often incorrectly assumed that the
combustion behavior of graphite is similar to that of charcoal and coal. Numerous tests and calculations have
shown that it is virtually impossible to burn high-purity, nuclear-grade graphites." On Chernobyl, the same source
states: "Graphite played little or no role in the progression or consequences of the accident. The red glow
observed during the Chernobyl accident was the expected color of luminescence for graphite at 700°C and not a
large-scale graphite fire, as some have incorrectly assumed." Similarly, nuclear physicist Yevgeny Velikhov,[4]
noted some two weeks after the accident, "Until now the possibility of a catastrophe really did exist: A great
quantity of fuel and graphite of the reactor was in an incandescent state." That is, all the nuclear-decay heat that
was generated inside the uranium fuel (heat which would normally be extracted by back-up coolant pumps, in an
undamaged reactor) was instead responsible for making the fuel itself and any graphite in contact with it, glow
red-hot. This is contrary to the often cited interpretation, which is that the graphite was red-hot chiefly because it
was chemically oxidizing with the air.
 a. "No one believed the first newspaper reports, which patently understated the scale of the catastrophe and often
contradicted one another. The confidence of readers was re-established only after the press was allowed to
examine the events in detail without the original censorship restrictions. The policy of openness (glasnost) and
'uncompromising criticism' of outmoded arrangements had been proclaimed at the 27th Congress (of the
Communist Party of Soviet Union), but it was only in the tragic days following the Chernobyl disaster that
glasnost began to change from an official slogan into an everyday practice. The truth about Chernobyl that
eventually hit the newspapers opened the way to a more truthful examination of other social problems. More and
more articles were written about drug abuse, crime, corruption and the mistakes of leaders of various ranks. A
wave of 'bad news' swept over the readers in 1986–87, shaking the consciousness of society. Many were
horrified to find out about the numerous calamities of which they had previously had no idea. It often seemed to
people that there were many more outrages in the epoch of perestroika than before although, in fact, they had
simply not been informed about them previously." Kagarlitsky 1989, pp. 333–334.
b. "The mere fact that the operators were carrying out an experiment that had not been approved by higher officials
indicates that something was wrong with the chain of command. The State Committee on Safety in the Atomic
Power Industry is permanently represented at the Chernobyl station. Yet the engineers and experts in that office
were not informed about the program. In part, the tragedy was the product of administrative anarchy or the
attempt to keep everything secret." Medvedev 1990,pp. 18–20.
c. The accumulation of Xe-135 in the core is burned out by neutrons. Higher power settings bring higher neutron
flux and burn the xenon out more quickly. Conversely, low power settings result in the accumulation of xenon.[43]
d. The RBMK is a boiling water reactor, so in-core boiling is normal at higher power levels. The RBMK design has a
negative void coefficient above 700 MW.

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Sources
The source documents relating to the emergency, published in unofficial sources:

Technological Regulations on operation of 3 and 4 power units of Chernobyl NPP (http://accidont.ru/archive/Regl

ament.pdf) (in force at the moment of emergency)
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tml)

Further reading
Abbott, Pamela (2006). Chernobyl: Living With Risk and Uncertainty. Health, Risk & Society 8.2. pp. 105–121.
 Cohen, Bernard Leonard (1990). "The Chernobyl accident – can it happen here?". The Nuclear Energy Option:
An Alternative for the 90's. Plenum Press. ISBN 9780306435676.
Dyatlov, Anatoly (2003). Chernobyl. How did it happen (in Russian). Nauchtechlitizdat, Moscow.
ISBN 9785937280060.
Hoffmann, Wolfgang (2001). Fallout From the Chernobyl Nuclear Disaster and Congenital Malformations in
Europe. Archives of Environmental Health.
Karpan, Nikolaj V. (2006). Chernobyl. Vengeance of peaceful atom (in Russian). Dnepropetrovsk: IKK "Balance
Club". ISBN 9789668135217.
Medvedev, Grigori (1989). The Truth About Chernobyl. VAAP. First American edition published by Basic Books in
1991. ISBN 9782226040312.
Medvedev, Zhores A. (1990). The Legacy of Chernobyl (Paperback. First American edition published in 1990
ed.). W.W. Norton & Company. ISBN 9780393308143.
Read, Piers Paul (1993). Ablaze! The Story of the Heroes and Victims of Chernobyl. Random House UK
(paperback 1997). ISBN 9780749316334.
Shcherbak, Yurii (1991). Chernobyl. New York: St. Martin's Press. ISBN 9780312030971.

External links
Official UN Chernobyl site (http://chernobyl.undp.org/)
International Chernobyl Portal chernobyl.info, UN Inter-Agency Project ICRIN (http://chernobyl.info/)
Frequently Asked Chernobyl Questions (https://web.archive.org/web/20110225215043/http://www.iaea.or.at/New
sCenter/Features/Chernobyl-15/cherno-faq.shtml), by the IAEA
Chernobyl Recovery and Development Programme (United Nations Development Programme) (https://web.archi
ve.org/web/20120213074912/http://www.crdp.org.ua/en/)
Photographs from inside the zone of alienation and City of Prypyat (2010) (https://web.archive.org/web/20110715
154617/http://www.rapik.com/photo/thumbnails.php?album=38)
Photographs from the City of Pripyat, and of those affected by the disaster (https://web.archive.org/web/2012032
2030018/http://www.chelu.eu/Blog/?p=88)
English Russia Photos of a RBMK-based power plant (http://englishrussia.com/index.php/2009/04/29/at-the-nucl
ear-power-plant/), showing details of the reactor hall, pumps, and the control room
Post-Soviet Pollution: Effects of Chernobyl (https://web.archive.org/web/20121215050646/http://repository.library.
georgetown.edu/handle/10822/552539) from the Dean Peter Krogh Foreign Affairs Digital Archives (http://www.li
brary.georgetown.edu/digital/krogh)

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