Case #1

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC VS. NATIONAL

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services, a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo as a
domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1, 1997. Thereafter, Divina’s 12-
month contract expired nonetheless, Divina continued working for her Taiwanese employer,
Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the Philippines on February 4,
2000. Shortly after her return, she filed a complaint before NLRC against Sunace, one Adelaide
Perez, the Taiwanese broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for
three months and that she was underpaid. Furthermore, she asserted that her 2-year extension
was with knowledge and consent of Sunace.
Sunace filed its answer to the complaints and stated that Divina could not anymore claim
nor entitled for the refund as she already took her saving last year and the employer did not decut
any money from her salary and further stated that her 2-year extension was without knowledge
and consent of Sunace.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Divina is entitled for a refund of her 24-month savings.
Whether or not her 2-year extension was with knowledge and consent of Sunace.
RULING:
The court ruled that the finding of the Court of Appeals solely on the basis of the above-
quoted telefax message, that Sunace continually communicated with the foreign "principal" and
therefore was aware of and had consented to the execution of the extension of the contract is
misplaced. The message does not provide evidence that Sunace was privy to the new contract
executed after the expiration on February 1, 1998 of the original contract. That Sunace and the
Taiwanese broker communicated regarding Divina’s allegedly withheld savings does not
necessarily mean that Sunace ratified the extension of the contract. The theory of imputed
knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer Xiong, not
the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be
imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under
the 2-year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and
its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina’s claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied
revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when, after the termination of the
original employment contract, the foreign principal directly negotiated with Divina and entered
into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan.
Case #2
ANTONIO M. SERRANO VS. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW
NAVIGATION CO., INC
G.R. No. 167614
March 24, 2009

FACTS:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved
Contract of Employment with the terms stating that the contract duration is 12 months and the
petitioner will be the Chief Officer with a basic salary of US$1,400.00. On his departure,
petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of
Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of
respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. But the promise was
not delivered hence, the petitioner refused to stay. He only served two (2) months and seven (7)
days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
The petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for constructive dismissal and
for payment of money claims which was granted by the LA. The award of lump-sum salary was
based on the salary period of three months only -- rather than the entire unexpired portion of nine
months and 23 days of petitioner's employment contract - applying the subject clause. Hence the
petition to declare the subject clause of Republic Act 8042.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Section 10 (par 5) of RA 8042 is unconstitutional

RULING:
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract periods or the
unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their monetary
benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a uniform rule of
computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment
contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a differentiated rule of
computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed OFWs based on their employment
periods, in the process singling out one category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of
one year or
more and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary awards limited
to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion thereof, whichever is less, but all the
while sparing the other category from such prejudice, simply because the latter’s unexpired
contracts fall short of one year. Prior to R.A. No. 8042, a uniform system of computation of the
monetary awards of illegally dismissed OFWs was in place. This uniform system was applicable
even to local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause does not state or imply
any definitive governmental purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not
just petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due process under
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the
entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law
and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
Case #3
 CLAUDIO S. YAP VS. THENAMARIS SHIP'S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE
MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.
G.R. No. 179532
May 30, 2011

FACTS:
Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14
August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping
Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the
General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months. He commenced his job as
electrician on 23 August 2001. However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.
Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the
same was sold and will be scrapped. Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra
bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he
refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage as he asserted that he is entitled to the
unexpired portion of the contract.
Respondents, for their part, contended that Yap was not illegally dismissed. Wages has
been paid and that Yap’s employment contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the
vessel and no arrangement was made for Yap’s transfer to Thenamaris’ other vessels, hence, the
complaint. The LA rendered decision favoring the petitioner. The CA affirmed. But the award of
wages was denied by the CA, hence the appeal.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by
reason of his illegal dismissal was proper.
2. Is the 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 violative of substantive due process?

RULING:
The court held that respondents’ invocation of Serrano is unavailing. The word salaries in
Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers,
in which salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other
bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work "performed" in excess of the regular
eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days
and holidays.
A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not
categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part
of the basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in their petition for certiorari before the
CA averred that petitioner’s basic salary, pursuant to the contract, was "US$1,300.00 +
US$130.00 tanker allowance." If respondents intended it differently, the contract per se should
have indicated that said allowance does not form part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract
should have separated it from the basic salary clause.
On the constitutionality of 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042, the court ruled that in Serrano
vs. Gallant Maritime, the clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal
protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said
clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in
the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged,
it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more
in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term
employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage.
Moreover, the Court held that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive
governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal
protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.

Case #4
 SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. VS. JOY C CABILES
G.R. No. 170139
August 5, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency. The respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in
Taiwan. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. Joy
was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00
when she signed the employment contract. Thereafter, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior
notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her
salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation.", hence the
complaint.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Sameer and held that there was no illegal dismissal
that took place because the termination of the services of the respondent was for a just cause. It
gave credence to the contention of Sameer that the respondent was terminated from service
because of her inefficiency. On appeal, the NLRC ruled in favor of the respondent and held that
she is illegally dismissed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of NLRC. Hence, the current
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Cabiles was illegally dismissed.
RULING:
The court ruled that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was
just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due
process of law. Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality
standards at work. They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply
with these standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly,
employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that
are inimical to the interest of the employer.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:
1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will
be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s
performance assessment.
The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or
she meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set
for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to
meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to him
or her.
In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.
 There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards
against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the
position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.
The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just
cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.