IMPACT OF
WAR IN UKRAINE
An Indian Perspective
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
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Date
February 2023
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Table of Contents
ABSTRACT 4
INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY 6
1.1 Primacy of the Chinese rivalry 6
1.2 Modi’s economic focus 6
1.3 Europe’s marginal role 7
MANAGING A DECLINING FRIENDSHIP 8
2.1 Strategic benefits 8
2.2 Original Crimea response 8
INDIA RESPONDS TO THE WAR 10
3.1 Neutral stance 10
3.2 Evacuating students 10
3.3 Diplomatic challenges 11
3.4 India’s diplomatic activity 12
ECONOMIC FALLOUT 13
4.1. Inflation focus 13
4.2 Energy crisis 13
4.3 Discounted oil 14
4.4 Diamonds and urea 14
4.5 Lowered growth 15
AFTER THE WAR 16
5.1. Questions about Moscow 16
5.2 Energy equation 16
5.3 Russia-China axis? 17
5.4 Closer to the West 17
ABOUT THE AUTHOR 19
4 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
Abstract
The Indian response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was deter-
mined by domestic economic considerations and higher strategic
priorities, specifically its concerns about a more assertive and pow-
erful China. India carefully maintained its declining relationship with
Russia and took a neutral position regarding the Ukraine conflict, as
the primary strategic benefits of its relationship with Russia were to
keep Moscow neutral when New Delhi and Beijing clashed and an in-
expensive military supply chain. India took a realpolitik position, with
hard-nosed reasons to maintain relations with Russia but none when
it came to being involved in a far-off regional conflict.
The war in Ukraine presented several diplomatic and economic
challenges for India. Diplomatically, India required the US, its pri-
mary partner in a larger strategic response to China, to accept its
neutrality, which proved easy as Washington took the view that In-
dia’s strategic importance to the Quad and its Indo-Pacific strategy
was paramount. The US applied no pressure on the Narendra Modi
government to change its Ukraine position. India was unconcerned
about European criticism given its self-serving stance on Chinese
aggression.
Economically, the war not only sharply reduced India’s economic
growth prospects but also triggered an inflationary crisis that be-
came New Delhi’s primary policy focus between February and Oc-
tober. As food and fuel were the main inflation drivers, India began
buying discounted Russian oil and fertilizer to mitigate the social and
economic damages.
By spring, India began thinking of ways to help bring the war to a
close and privately and later publicly pressed Russia to consider ne-
gotiations with Ukraine, in coordination with the West.
The geopolitical implications of the war for India remain in flux. To
begin with, India seeks to determine the extent to which Russia has
become dependent on China following its isolation from the West.
5
Second, the war seems to have reassured India that the US is pre-
pared to take a geopolitical view of their relationship and overlook
inevitable differences in lesser policy areas. Third, India will observe
whether Germany and other European nations rebuild their military
capabilities and begin treating China as a strategic threat because of
the Ukraine war. If Europe does both, India will have cause to believe
security and defence relations with Europe are worth investing in; at
present, it maintains defence relations only with France. Finally, India
will, in the short term, pull back from its aggressive net zero climate
plans (given the drop in its growth rates) and its increased coal con-
sumption caused by the spike in oil and gas prices.
6 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
1 India’s Foreign Policy
1.1 Primacy of the Chinese rivalry
The defining strategic focus of Indian foreign policy is responding
to a more assertive and powerful China. After several years of failed
attempts to achieve a modus vivendi with Beijing, the most evident
example being a bloody Himalayan border clash in 2020, New Delhi
began deepening its security ties with the US. Even before the clash,
India had been screening Chinese investment into critical economic
sectors and later banning or limiting Chinese software and equip-
ment that handled data. There were several other results of the
border clash. India supported the Quad’s upgrade to a summit-level
technology coalition with an implicitly anti-Chinese bias. Domesti-
cally, restrictions on Chinese business in India increased in scope,
including a ban on Chinese hardware from India’s 5G telecom net-
work. The India-US relationship when Russia invaded Ukraine was
arguably at a strategic level not seen since the Kennedy years1.
1.2 Modi’s economic focus
A deeper motivation of the Narendra Modi government’s worldview
was finding the means to leverage foreign relations to boost the
economic and technological trajectory of India. Modi has declared
the ambitious goal of making India a $5 trillion economy by 2025. In
pursuit of this target, he carried out some of the most sweeping eco-
nomic reforms the country had seen in three decades, with the idea
of making the private sector the driver of growth, streamlining a frag-
mented domestic economy, reviving the country’s weak manufactur-
ing sector, and using digital technology to leapfrog India’s economy
into the future. Within a few months of his coming to office, Modi
realised closer relations with the US and US allies like Japan and the
United Arab Emirates would be needed to achieve this growth story.
China, in contrast, was a negative: Indian manufacturers struggled
against cheap Chinese imports and Chinese entities posed a securi-
1 Mohan, C.R., 2022. India, America and the China challenge, Indian Express, 19 October. Available at:
https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-america-and-the-china-challenge-8214579/.
7
ty to India’s digital economy2.
1.3. Europe’s marginal role
India had traditionally seen Europe as important for trade and invest-
ment but geopolitically irrelevant. India’s Europe policy was a bundle
of bilateral relations focussed largely on the United Kingdom for fi-
nance and investment, France for defence equipment and Germany
for trade. Brexit forced India to review its relations with the European
Union. But as India’s relations with China deteriorated and those with
the US grew in importance, the ambiguous response of the EU to-
wards China and geographic distance from the Indo-Pacific region
meant Europe’s geopolitical relevance to India steadily decreased
(with the exception of France).
2 Private conversations with Indian officials and Bharatiya Janata Party advisors over several years.
8 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
2 Managing a Declining
Friendship
2.1 Strategic benefits
While India’s relationship with Russia has its roots in its proximity
to the Soviet Union since 1965, it has been flat lining since the early
1990s. The tangible heart of the relationship is military equipment.
Russia provides nearly half of India’s arsenal today, though this is a
decline from 75% in the 1990s. There was little to show for econom-
ic relations other than Indian fertilizer and diamond imports. Before
the war in Ukraine, Russia represented 1% of India’s external trade.
India’s largest investments in Russia were equity stakes in Eastern
Russian oil and gasfields, profitable but not directly consequential to
Indian energy needs3.
Indian officials say the primary strategic benefit of the Russian re-
lationship is keeping Moscow neutral when New Delhi and Beijing
clash. Otherwise, India and Russia have had their share of differenc-
es, including those over the US military presence in Afghanistan and
the strategic relevance of the Indo-Pacific. The Modi government
also noticed the increasingly erratic foreign policy of Vladimir Pu-
tin, evident while supporting the return of the Taliban government
or refusing to support his own ally, Armenia, in its 2002 war with
Azerbaijan4.
2.2 Original Crimea response
New Delhi had to work overtime to keep the relationship from foun-
dering. Its energy investments and purchase of systems like the
Russian S-400 air defence systems were designed to bolster an
otherwise flagging relationship. It also provided rhetorical support to
Russia on issues where India felt a lack of tangible interests. When
3 Unnikrishnan, N., 2015. With expensive wish list, Modi flies to Moscow, Observer Research Founda-
tion commentaries, 22 December. Available at: https://www.orfonline.org/research/with-expensive-
wish-list-modi-flies-to-moscow/.
4 Private conversations with Indian diplomats from January to April 2022
9
Putin overran the Crimean peninsula and parts of eastern Ukraine in
2013-14, for example, the liberal-left Manmohan Singh government
declared Russia had “legitimate” security interests in Crimea. India
took a realpolitik position: it had hard-nosed reasons to maintain its
relationship with Russia but none when it came to this small con-
flict in a far-off region. But the Indo-Russian relationship, despite a
relative degree of goodwill between the two governments, is clearly
struggling to find points of convergence. India’s shift to a more pri-
vate sector, market-driven economy, its need for a new generation of
smart weapons, its plans for green energy transition and Sino-Indian
hostility all work against the Indo-Russian relationship5.
5 Times News Network., 2014. Russian interests in Crimea legitimate: India, Times of India, 7 March.
Available at: https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/russian-interests-in-crimea-legitimate-india/
articleshow/31557852.cms.
10 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
3 India Responds to the
War
3.1 Neutral stance
Like most governments, India was caught by surprise when Russia
invaded Ukraine with the intention of overthrowing the regime and,
subsequently, as surprised by the degree of Ukrainian resistance. As
it assumed a limited and one-sided conflict (and given the prepon-
derance of its interests were with Russia), the Indian government
took a neutral stance. Materially, it remained dependent on Russian
military supplies to maintain its defence position with regard to Chi-
na. India and China still had 120,000 soldiers in forward positions
against each other following the Ladakh clash of 2020. It saw no
reason to change its original strategic equation with Russia when it
came to China or other regional interests like Central Asia6.
3.2 Evacuating students
Indian neutrality was most evident when the United Nations Secu-
rity Council first took up the Ukraine war and India abstained, with
eventually 11 votes criticizing Russian aggression or supporting
sanctions against the Russian regime. New Delhi had an additional
reason to keep a bridge to both sides when it discovered that it had
over 20,000 Indians, mostly students, stranded in Ukraine. The last
became the primary concern of the Indian polity in the initial months
of the war, with the government pulling out all stops to evacuate the
students via Poland and Romania. One student was killed in the pro-
cess, but the whole exercise came to be seen as both a success for
the Modi government and an example of why India benefited from
keeping communications open with both antagonists in the war7.
6 Outlook., 2022. Ladakh Stand-Off: India, China Agree To Hold Next Round Of Talks Soon, 31 May.
Available at: https://www.outlookindia.com/national/ladakh-stand-off-india-china-agree-to-hold-next-
round-of-talks-soon-news-199539.
7 IANS., 2022. Explained: How India got Its citizens out of Ukraine under Operation Ganga, Business
Standard, 15 March. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/explained-
how-india-got-its-citizens-out-of-ukraine-under-operation-ganga-122031500135_1.html.
11
3.3 Diplomatic challenges
Diplomatically, India faced several major challenges. One was to ex-
plain its posture to the US. This proved quite easy with the Joe Biden
administration taking the view that India’s strategic importance to
the Quad and integral role in the US’s response to China was of over-
riding importance. Indian and US officials both say that there was
no pressure on the Modi government to change its neutral stance,
though New Delhi faced some criticism in the US media and Con-
gress. India also understood that the US relationship was sufficiently
important that it had to make a special effort to explain its position.
New Delhi had no such sentiment regarding Europe. While the govern-
ments of the UK and France accepted India’s arguments, there was
a lot more criticism of India’s posture in Europe at official and civil
society levels. With the Europeans, the Indian government was more
brusque in its response. In New Delhi’s view, the EU member-states
were being hypocritical when they said Ukraine was about upholding
international law and a rules-based order, given how silent the EU had
been when China forcibly captured much of the South China Sea in
defiance of a UN court ruling or, for that matter, when Chinese troops
attacked Indian soldiers in 2020. Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishan-
kar’s strong rebuttal of European criticism at the Bratislava Forum in
June that year became one of the most popular video clips in India
that month and was translated into over three dozen languages8.
New Delhi’s response to the Russian invasion also evolved over time.
Its initial policy response was to ensure its military supply chain giv-
en tensions with China and work to the evacuation of its nationals
caught in the conflict area. It then turned to buffering the economic
consequences of the war, described below, through the purchase of
large amounts of discounted Russian oil and (later) fertilizer. By the
end of March, it had begun to look at what it could do diplomatically
to initiate a process to end the war9.
8 News18., 2022. EAM S Jaishankar Goes Viral for Savage Reply to Question About India’s Stance on
Ukraine, 3 June, 2022. Available at: https://www.news18.com/news/buzz/eam-s-jaishankar-goes-viral-
for-savage-reply-to-question-about-indias-stance-on-ukraine-5305867.html.
9 Roy, S., 2022. Why telling Russia to abandon war is in India’s interest, Indian Express, 25 September.
Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-global/why-telling-russia-to-aban-
don-war-is-in-indias-interest-8168623/.
12 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
3.4 India’s diplomatic activity
The Modi government had already reached out to Ukraine, with sev-
eral conversations being held between Modi and the Ukrainian Pres-
ident Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the two foreign ministers. According
to diplomatic sources, the Ukrainian ask was whether Modi would be
prepared to act as a conduit to Putin as and when the need arose.
After Modi said he had no issues in playing that role, Ukraine indicat-
ed it had no concerns about Indian neutrality. Kyiv has been largely
quiet about India’s stance and praised New Delhi for its provision
of aid to Ukraine. At the G-7 summit in Germany, the leaders there
asked Modi if he could play a mediator’s role. India had already acted
as a go-between when the West became concerned about Russian
attacks in the vicinity of a Ukrainian nuclear reactor. At the bilateral
level, as the war dragged on and so did the economic consequences,
India began pressuring Russia to consider negotiations with Ukraine
and started thinking about how to bring the conflict to an end. Modi
began pushing Putin on this point in their private conversations and
similar messages were made to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov when he visited Delhi in April. The Indian leader went a step
further at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Sep-
tember, where he publicly told Putin that this is “not an era of war”.
India played a key role in getting that and similar language on the
Ukraine war into a joint resolution of the G-20 summit in Bali, getting
both Russia and the West on board with the language10.
10 Private conversations with US and Indian diplomats; Laskar, R., 2022. G20 summit 2022: India’s
views on Ukraine war help chart draft communiqué, Hindustan Times, 16 November. Available at:
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/g20-summit-2022-india-s-views-on-ukraine-war-help-
chart-draft-communiqu-101668538554186.html.
13
4 Economic Fallout
4.1 Inflation focus
India emerged from two years of COVID-induced lockdowns with
an expectation of a rebounding economy: projections at the start of
2022 spoke of 8.5 or 9% GDP growth. This was all the more import-
ant because Modi was heading for general elections in early 2024,
and addressing unemployment problems caused by COVID lock-
downs was a key concern of his party. The outbreak of war not only
clipped two or more percentage points of growth but triggered an
inflationary crisis that became New Delhi’s primary policy focus be-
tween February and October. Few things are as politically devastat-
ing in India as inflation and, as a large-scale importer of oil and gas, it
is particularly vulnerable to fuel price surges11.
4.2 Energy crisis
The imposition of sanctions on Russia, one of the world’s largest
producers of oil and gas, by the US and other Western countries im-
mediately led to a surge in global energy prices. The fighting’s disrup-
tion of wheat exports from the Black Sea led to global grain prices
rising. India’s consumer inflation rate rose sharply, peaking at 7.8%
in April, nearly double its figure from the year before, with fuel and
food prices being the primary contributors. India’s crude oil basket
price rose from $ 84.7 in January to a high of $116 in June. Foreign
portfolio investors also shifted their capital out of emerging econo-
mies like India, weakening the rupee exchange rate against the dollar
and eroding India’s foreign exchange reserves. Foreign exchange re-
serves had fallen $ 110 billion by September, on a yearly basis. The
rupee’s decline further aggravated inflation as most of India’s energy
imports were dollar-denominated. Shoring up the Indian economy on
multiple fronts was the overriding policy priority of the Modi govern-
ment by the spring of 202212.
11 Gera, I., 2022. India lost out more than its peers in forecast revisions for 2022, Business Standard,
10 October. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-lost-out-
more-than-its-peers-in-forecast-revisions-for-2022-122101001330_1.html.
12 Bandyopadhyay, T., 2022. Blame it on oil, Business Standard, 14 March. Available at: https://www.
business-standard.com/article/opinion/blame-it-on-oil-122031300823_1.html.
14 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
4.3 Discounted oil
Oil and gas stocks were already tight because of a global underin-
vestment in fossil fuel production over the past few years. The war’s
risk premium and Europe’s hunt for alternative oil and gas supplies
beyond Russia drove up energy prices globally. While India’s gas
supplies were largely secured by long-term contracts, oil supplies
were not. India’s crude oil price basket, which had been a comfort-
able $84.67 in January, spiked when the war broke out, peaking at a
crippling $116 in June. New Delhi saw the offer of discounted oil by
Russia as an economic lifeline. India was careful to see that its pur-
chases did not run afoul of the letter of Western sanctions, clearing
its payments with the US Treasury department and using the same
banks that were handling the continuing European gas purchases
from Russia. India’s oil purchases slowly rose to about one million
barrels a day by June, about a fifth of the country’s total imports, and
at about 7% lower than what it paid for other types of oil13. The gov-
ernment left it to individual oil companies to make their own arrange-
ments regarding shipping, payment and the like. The companies
would sometimes play Russia against more traditional oil suppliers
like Saudi Arabia and Iraq to get additional discounts from the latter
two exporters.
4.4 Diamonds and urea
India was also concerned about non-oil supplies from Russia, with
the most important being fertilizer. As urea’s feedstock is normal-
ly natural gas, fertilizer prices had risen in tandem with gas prices
around the world. This had a direct bearing on food prices. India
began importing discounted urea from Russia. The price was still
much higher than normal, so an additional domestic subsidy was
introduced with the sole purpose of keeping food prices under check.
By one official calculation, India would have to fork out some $30 bil-
lion in fertilizer subsidies as a consequence14. India had an addition-
13 Kaul, V., 2022. Why India has been buying Russian oil, Mint, 10 November. Available at: https://
www.livemint.com/market/mark-to-market/why-india-has-been-buying-russian-oil-11667976443299.
html.
14 Shukla, A., 2022. Fertilizer Min sees subsidy bill at Rs 2.30 L Cr: FinMin disagrees, Economic
Times, 29 November. Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/indl-goods/svs/
chem-/-fertilisers/pre-budget-discussions-fertilizer-ministry-sees-subsidy-bill-at-2-30-lakh-cr-finmin-
15
al burden of providing fuel, food and fertilizer to other countries in its
larger neighbourhood including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Yemen,
as they all struggled to keep their economies afloat. There were ad-
ditional imports like diamonds, which were needed for India’s gems
and jewelry industry, and thermal coal, as industry began switching
from overly expensive oil and gas. India explored the possibility of di-
rect rupee-ruble trading in an attempt to preserve its hoard of dollars,
but, at the time of writing, this had not proven successful15.
4.5 Lowered growth
By October, India’s consumer price index had stabilised at about
6-7%, still higher than its central bank’s target of 4%, but the figure
was expected to fall over the next few quarters. It had worked out
a steady supply of oil and coal, including that from Russia, to en-
sure protection against the sort of power cuts and blackouts that
afflicted many of its foreign exchange-stressed neighbours like Pa-
kistan and Bangladesh. The rupee had lost nearly 10% of its value
against the dollar by December, year on year, but performed better
than most other emerging economy currencies. By November, for-
eign exchange reserves began to rise again. However, India’s current
account deficit ballooned thanks to higher energy imports. Growth
rate forecasts had been cut to 6 to 6.5%. This was a major (but not
the only) contributor to India’s increasingly critical stance towards
Russia over the war16.
disagrees/articleshow/95837010.cms?from=mdr
15 Mishra, D. R. and Seth, D., 2022. Non-oil imports from Russia surge; exports face hurdles, Mint, 24
September. Available at: livemint.com/news/world/nonoil-imports-from-russia-surge-exports-face-
hurdles-11663954508418.html.
16 Indian Express, 2022. CPI Inflation October 2022: India’s retail inflation eases to 3-month low of
6.77% in October, shows govt data, 14 November. Available at: https://indianexpress.com/article/
business/economy/india-october-2022-cpi-consumer-price-index-retail-inflation-mospi-nso-da-
ta-8267745/.
16 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
5 After the War
5.1 Questions about Moscow
There are several possible geopolitical consequences of the Ukraine
war with regard to India. The most important is the degree to which
Russia’s invasion will accelerate the already declining trajectory of
the Indo-Russian relationship. India had already begun phasing out
Russian weapons platforms on the grounds of slipping technological
standards. The failure of Russia on the battlefield will contribute to
this, as will questions about the ability of Russia to produce more
sophisticated weapons if it continues to be blocked from accessing
German machine tools, South Korean chips and other high-end in-
puts.
5.2 Energy equation
India will continue its investments in Russian fossil fuel assets as
Western investors avoid the Russian market, largely because of their
profitability rather than any energy security concerns. This will be a
diminishing trend if India is able to implement its far-reaching green
energy transition plans. The fuel crisis that was partly caused by the
war has renewed a “coal lobby” in India which argues the Modi gov-
ernment must link its green energy plans to tangible financing from
the West. The prime minister’s personal commitment to this cause
is considerable but another year of disrupted energy supplies may
force India to dilute its Net-Zero commitments. Diplomatically, India
will increasingly find more in common with the US, France and possi-
bly the UK over the coming years. France is already the most depend-
able ally of India at the UN Security Council and has been seeking to
position itself as the “new Russia”, capable of providing the nuclear
submarines and frontline fighters presently provided by Russia17.
17 Caulcutt, C. 2022. France aims to lure India from its main arms dealer: Russia, politico.eu, 25
November. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/france-eyes-opportunity-for-geopolitical-re-
alignment-in-india-indo-pacific-russia-arms-modi-macron-putin-g20/.
17
5.3 Russia-China axis?
The most important determinant of the future of the Indo-Russian
relationship will be the degree to which the war will drive Moscow
and Beijing together. Russia has gone out of its way to promise India
it remains a dependable provider of arms and will keep its relations
with India and China independent of each other. Even while it was
struggling to provide armaments to its own soldiers, Moscow made
it a point to keep providing spares and promised shipments of weap-
ons to India. But New Delhi will be carefully monitoring the post-war
Sino-Russian relationship, as it cannot tolerate a situation wherein its
defence supplies lie under the thumb of Beijing18.
5.4 Closer to the West
One consequence of the war has been the strengthening of the
US-India relationship. By giving India a free pass on its Ukraine pol-
icy, Washington proved to New Delhi that it was prepared to take
what US diplomats call “the long view” on the relationship. In other
words, it was willing to overlook various differences and frictions as
long as India remained committed to the broader strategic vision of
constraining China. Indian officials are also curious as to whether
the Ukraine war will kindle a geopolitical mindset in countries like
Germany, poised to make them possible partners in the Indo-Pacific
and other global theatres. Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s promise to spend
$100 billion on defence was welcomed by India though there is now
a sense that Germany is already trying to avoid re-militarisation and,
therefore, will not be adopting a more strategic vision of its foreign
policy or at least one that encompasses China19.
India, the US and some EU member-states should consider trilater-
al dialogues to discuss the present strategic environment in both
Europe and the Indo-Pacific and how each of them is responding
to them. There are too many variables to predict the specific policy
18 Manchi, A and Kotasthane, P. 2022. India’s Russia problem will grow, Times of India, 23 September;
Menon, R., and Rumer, E. 2022. Russia and India: A new chapter, Carnegie Endowment for Internation-
al Peace, 20 September. Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/20/russia-and-india-
new-chapter-pub-87958.
19 Private conversations with Indian diplomats between June and November 2022
18 IMPACT OF WAR IN UKRAINE
path of each member, but a better understanding of their specific
strategic logic and transparency into their decision-making process
will help one discover their respective congruences and divergences.
The US is notable for having established institutional structures for
such discussions with India and the US, but there remains a consid-
erable gap between India and Europe. India continues to be sceptical
about buying non-French European weapons because of concerns
that spares and supplies will become hostage to human rights (or
similar) issues given the EU’s activism in these areas. If Europe wish-
es to help move India away from its dependence on Russian arms, it
needs a dialogue on ways to overcome such Indian concerns. Last,
as technology itself becomes more strategic, there must be a con-
certed effort to make the new India-EU Trade Technology Mission
successful in terms of providing for India’s long-term technological
ambitions and, therefore, allowing India to place itself at a greater
distance from Russia and China.
19
About the Author
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri
Pramit Pal Chaudhuri is a senior
columnist with the Hindustan
Times and a distinguished fellow
of the Ananta Aspen Centre. He
served on the Prime Minister’s
National Security Advisory Board
from 2011-15 and is an advisor
to the Rhodium Group, New York;
BowerGroupAsia, Washington DC
and Mitsubishi India. As a mem-
ber of the Aspen Strategy Group of
India, he is a member of track two
strategic dialogues between India
and the US, Japan, Israel and South Korea. He is also part of two
climate and energy dialogues with the US and the UK. He was a dele-
gate for a track two India-Bhutan Dialogue between 2015 - 2019 and
regularly lectures to the diplomats and military officers graduating
from Bhutan’s Royal Institute of Governance and Strategic Studies.
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