Date and Time: Saturday 29 October 2022 1:43:00 PM IST

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Documents (5)

1. 2(A) Rationale of Strict Liability

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2. 2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
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3. More English and Indian Cases Relating to Rylands v. Fletcher
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4. 2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
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5. 2(C) Rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
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 2(A) Rationale of Strict Liability
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition)
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition) > Ratanlal and Dhirajlal Law of Torts 26
Edition > CHAPTER XIX NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS > 2. STRICT LIABILITY

2. STRICT LIABILITY

2(A) Rationale of Strict Liability

There are many activities which are so hazardous that they constitute constant danger to person and property of
others. The law may deal with them in three ways. It may prohibit them altogether. It may allow them to be carried
on for the sake of their social utility but only in accordance with statutory provisions laying down safety measures
and providing for sanctions for non-compliance. It may allow them to be tolerated on condition that they pay their
way regardless of any fault. 209The last is the doctrine of strict liability. The undertakers of the act ivities have to
compensate for the damage caused irrespective of any carelessness on their part. The basis of liability is the
foreseeable risk inherent in the very nature of the activities. In this aspect, the principle of strict liability resembles
negligence which is also based on foreseeable harm. But the difference lies in that the concept of negligence
comprehends that the foreseeable harm could be avoided by taking reasonable precautions and so if the defendant
did all that which could be done for avoiding the harm, he cannot be held liable except possibly in those cases
where he should have closed down the undertaking. Such a consideration is not relevant in cases of strict liability
where the defendant is held liable irrespective of whether he could have avoided the particular harm by taking
precautions. The rationale behind strict liability is that the activities coming within its fold are those entailing
extraordinary risk to others, either in the seriousness or the frequency of the harm threatened. “Permission to
conduct such an act ivity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an
appropriate item of its overhead.” 210

209 For ‘Fault’ see Chapter 2, title 5, p. 28.

210 FLEMING, Torts, 6th edition, p. 302. Similar observations were made by Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta v. Union of
India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [LNIND 1986 SC 539], p. 421.

End of Document
 2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition)
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition) > Ratanlal and Dhirajlal Law of Torts 26
Edition > CHAPTER XIX NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS > 2. STRICT LIABILITY

2. STRICT LIABILITY

2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

Strict liability has its origin in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, 211where the facts were that the defendants who had a
mill near Ainsworth in Lancashire wanted to improve its water-supply. They constructed a reservoir by employing
reputed engineers to do it. When the reservoir was filled, water flowed down the plaintiff’s neighbouring coal mine
causing damage. The engineers were independent contractors. There was some negligence on their part in not
properly sealing disused mine shafts which they had come across during the construction of the reservoir and it was
through those shafts that the water flooded the plaintiff’s mine. The defendants were in no way negligent having
employed competent engineers to do the job and as the engineers were independent contractors, the defendants
could not be made vicariously liable for their negligence. The court of Exchequer dismissed the claim as showing no
cause of action. But the court of Exchequer Chamber allowed the appeal. The judgment of Blackburn, J., of that
court which laid down a new basis of liability was approved by the House of Lords. The basis of liability was laid
down by Blackburn, J. in these words: “The rule of law is that the person who, for his own purpose, brings on his
land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril; and if he
does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape.”
212Blackburn, J., further said: “The general rule as above stated seems on principle just. The person whose grass or

corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his
neighbour’s reservoir, or whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour’s privy, or whose habitation is made
unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour’s alkali work is damnified without any fault of his
own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour, who has brought something on his own property
which was not naturally there, harmless to other so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows to
be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does
not succeed in confining it to his own property. But for his act in bringing it there no mischief could have accrued,
and it seems but just that he should at his peril keep it there so that no mischief may accrue, or answer for the
natural and anticipated consequences.” 213In the House of Lords, Lord Cairns while approving the judgment of
Blackburn, J., laid down that the rule applied when there was non-natural user of land. This qualification was
emphasised by the Privy Council in Rickards v. Lothian. 214In the words of Lord Moulton in this case: “It is not every
use to which land is put that brings into play this principle. It must be some special use bringing with it increased
danger to others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for the general
benefit of the community.” 215Another qualification of the rule is that the non-natural use by the defendant should
result in “escape” of the thing from his land which causes damage and so in the absence of “escape”, the rule has
no application. This qualification came in the forefront before the House of Lords in Read v. J. Lyons & Co., 216In
this case, the defendants undertook the management and control of an Ordnance Factory where they made high
explosive shells for the Government. There was an explosion in the factory in which the plaintiff and some others
employed within the factory were injured. In the plaintiff’s claim for damages, negligence was not alleged nor was it
proved during the trial. The case rested on the allegation that the defendants were manufacturing high explosive
shells which they knew to be dangerous things and that the plaintiff suffered damage when one of the shells
exploded. The House of Lords upheld the decision of the court of Appeal that in the absence of any proof of
negligence no cause of action was made out. It was ruled that the Rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was conditioned by
two elements, viz. the non-natural use of the land by the defendant and the escape from his land of something
which causes damage and that at least the second element was absent in the case. It was urged before the House
of Lords that it would be strange result to hold the defendants liable if the injured person was just outside their
premises but not liable if he was just within them and that escape in the context of the rule meant escape from
control and it was irrelevant where damage took place. These arguments were rejected though it was observed that
they had considerable force on the reasoning that the rule itself was an extension of the general rule and it was
 Page 2 of 6
2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

undesirable or there was no logical necessity to extend it further. The case also cast some doubt on the question
whether a person could recover damages for personal injuries on the basis of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher.

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was again considered by the House of Lords in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v.
Eastern Counties Leather Plc 217 The plaintiff in this case was a company licensed to supply water in the Cambridge
area. The water for supply was taken by borehole extraction from underground strata. The defendant was another
company engaged in manufacture of fine leather. The tanning works of the defendant were at a distance of 1.3
miles from the plaintiff’s borehole. The defendant used a volatile solvent known as perchlorethene (PCE) for
degreasing pelts at its tanning works. PCE seeped into the ground beneath the defendant’s works and thence
having been conveyed in percolating water in the direction of the borehole contaminated the water available from
the borehole. The time taken for PCE to seep from the tannery to the borehole was 9 months. The defendant
started using PCE from 1950. PCE was introduced into a tank at the base of dry cleaning machines. Spillage of
PCE in small quantities took place during topped up process upto 1976. It could not then be foreseen that small
quantities of PCE spilled on the concrete floor of the defendant’s works will enter the underground strata beneath
the works and will be carried by percolating water to the defendant’s borehole 1.3 miles away. Any spillage would
have been expected to evaporate rapidly in the air. The water so contaminated was never held to be dangerous to
health. In 1980 EEC issued directives to the member states relating to the quality of water intended for human
consumption. This directive was implemented in the united Kingdom by legislation in 1985. After 1985 the water
from the borehole ceased to be wholesome and could not be lawfully supplied because of presence of PCE. The
borehole was therefore taken out of commission and the plaintiff claimed damages. The plaintiff’s claim for
damages was essentially based on nuisance and strict liability rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. The claim was negatived
on the ground that damage of the nature suffered by the plaintiff was not foreseeable. The House of Lords affirmed
the rule laid down by the Privy Council in Wagon Mound No. (2) that foreseeability of damage is essential to
establish a claim for damages in nuisance. 218Further, the House of Lords held that irrespective of whether the rule
in Rylands v. Fletcher was treated as an aspect of nuisance or as a special rule of strict liability, it was appropriate
to take the view that foreseeability of damage of the relevant type should be regarded as a prerequisite of liability in
damages under the rule. 219It appears that PCE that was spilled till 1976 was still in existence in the substrata below
the defendant’s works when the claim was filed and was being tried and the escape of PCE was continuing to the
borehole. It was, therefore, argued that since the escape of PCE was continuing even after it has become known,
the defendant could be made liable either in nuisance or under the strict liability rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. This
argument was not accepted on the reasoning that the PCE was irretrievably lost in the ground below beyond the
defendant’s control long before the enforcement of relevant legislation making it unlawful to supply water
contaminated with PCE from the borehole and long before it became known that PCE was being carried from the
defendant’s works to the borehole by underground percolating water. This was held to be a case of historical
pollution for which the defendant could not be made liable. 220The House of Lords, however, held that storage of
substantial quantities of chemicals on industrial premises should be regarded as a classic case of non-natural use
and there could be no objection in imposing strict liability for foreseeable damage caused in the event of their
escape. 221

The rule in Ryland v. Fletcher was also considered by the House of Lords in Transco plc v. Stockport MBC. 222The
plaintiff in this case had installed a gas main along an embankment on a stretch of a disused railway line. The
defendant local authority later purchased the line with the plaintiff continuing to have the right of support from the
embankment for its main. On a nearby site owned by the defendant lay a tower block of flats which was supplied
with water by means of water pipe which the defendant had constructed between the tower block and the water
main. Without any negligence of the defendant the water pipe which supplied water to the flats fractured and
discharged considerable quantities of water leading to the collapse of the embankment. The plaintiff was compelled
to do considerable work to remedy the situation and claimed damages on the basis of the rule in Ryland v. Fletcher.
The House of Lords in negativing the claim held that the provision of a water supply to a large block of flats did not
amount to a special hazard constituting an extraordinary use of land. But the House of Lords did not accept the
submission that the rule had no relevance in the 21st Century and should be abolished as done in Australia.
223They expressed the view that it only needed clarification.

As clarified in Transco the rule was a sub-species of nuisance. The rule required that an occupier of land had
brought on to his land or was keeping there some dangerous thing which posed an exceptionally high risk to
neighbouring property should it escape and which amounted to an extraordinary and unusual use of the land
judged by the standards appropriate at the relevant place and time and that there had been escape, on to some
other property causing damage which was a foreseeable consequence of the escape. The rule has no application
when the defendant acts under statutory authority or when the escape is as a result of Act of God or because of the
intervention of a third party. The case also supports the doubt which was expressed in Read v. J. Lyans & Co.,
 Page 3 of 6
2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
224thatthe rule is not concerned with liability for personal injuries and holds that the doubt is now settled and the
rule being a species of nuisance does not apply for recovery of damages for personal injuries. 225

The above discussion of authorities leads to the conclusion 226 that if the defendant makes ‘non-natural use’ of land
in his occupation in the course of which there is escape of something which causes foreseeable damage to person
or property outside the defendant’s premises, the defendant is liable irrespective of any question of negligence on
the basis of the rule of strict liability propounded in Rylands v. Fletcher. It is difficult to define the expression “non-
natural use” except to say what was said in Rickards v. Lothian 227 that it must be some special use bringing with it
into play increased damage to others and must not be merely the ordinary use of the land. The concept of non-
natural use is flexible. A particular use which was non-natural a century back may be quite natural now.
Considerations of time, place, surroundings, circumstances and purpose all enter in the determination of the
question whether a particular use is natural or non-natural. The requirement of “escape” which was stressed most
emphatically in the case of Read v. Lyons, 228 brings about an unfortunate and illogical distinction between the
persons injured inside and those just outside the dangerous premises. It has halted the development of the general
theory of liability in the English law in contrast to American law where the rule is stated to be that “one who comes
on an ultra-hazardous act ivity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognise as
likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the act ivity for harm resulting thereto from that which
makes the activity ultra-hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.” 229The House of
Lords in Cambridge Water Co.’s case 230 took notice of the above criticism but declined to extend the strict liability
rule observing that it is more appropriate for strict liability in respect of operations of high risk to be imposed by
Parliament than by courts. 231The rule being a species of nuisance does not apply for recovery of damages for
personal injuries. 232

In India the rule has been considered by the Supreme Court in some cases and applied to personal injuries. It has
even been extended to cover accidents arising out of use of motor vehicles on the road.

In State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators 233 where damage was caused by overflow of water from a breach in a
canal the Supreme Court held that use of land for construction of a canal system is an ordinary use and not a non
natural use. The case was decided in favour of the plaintiff on the finding of negligence. This case does not modify
the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher. It was so held in Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P.) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat 234 which was a
case of damage caused by overflow of water from a reclamation bundh constructed by the State of Gujarat for
reclamation of vast area of land from saltish water of sea. This case too was decided not on the reasoning that this
was non natural use of land but on the basis of violation of public duty and negligence which lay in defective
planning and construction of the bundh. The rule of Rylands v. Fletcher was again referred to in Indian Council for
Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India, 235but the case was decided on the Mehta principle of strict liability which was
held to have laid down an appropriate principle suited to our country, apart from being of binding authority.

The strict liability rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has, however, been extended recently by the Supreme Court in
Kusuma Begum (Smt.) v. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. 236by relying on some general obiter observation in
Gujarat SRTC v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai, (1987) 3 SCC 234 [LNIND 1987 SC 472], to apply to accidents arising
out of use of motor vehicles on the road, in addition to no fault liability statutorily provided in the Motor Vehicles Act,
without the necessity of establishing any negligence on the part of the driver of the motor vehicle causing the
accident. The accident in this case arose on capsizing of a jeep due to tyreburst when the Motor Vehicles Act 1939
was in force and the dependants of the victim could have been allowed only Rs. 15000 as compensation on no fault
basis under section 92A of the Act unless they proved negligence. The case was, however, decided when the
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 had come into force. The tribunal negatived negligence but allowed Rs. 50,000 as
compensation on no fault basis under the corresponding provision viz., section 140 of the new Act. The claimants
went in appeal to the High Court where they lost and, therefore, they went up in further appeal to the Supreme
Court. In 1994 another provision section 136A was added in the Motor Vehicles Act which also provides
compensation on no fault basis but on quite liberal terms in accordance with the structural formula given in the
second schedule in cases where the annual income of the deceased was upto Rs. 40,000. It would have been too
much to apply that provision directly to an accident which took place even before the 1988 Act was enacted. But it
seems the Supreme Court was not satisfied with the quantum of compensation of Rs. 50,000 allowed to the
dependants and it had to find out some basis for enhancing the compensation. That is probably the inarticulate
reason for extending the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher to motor accidents. In this way the dependents were allowed
Rs. 1,18,000 as compensation which could have been allowed to them under section 163A had it been applicable.
In view of this decision a claimant can claim compensation on no fault liability under section 140 or section 163A of
the Act or under the rule of strict liability of Rylands v. Fletcher. After introduction of section 163A which provides for
compensation on liberal terms, it is hardly likely that any claim would be filed (where the deceased’s annual income
 Page 4 of 6
2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

was upto Rs. 40,000) under the strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, where certain defences would be open
which are not open to a claim under section 140, or section 163A. Use of a motor vehicle on the road cannot be
said to be in modern times non-natural use of either the vehicle or the road and a motor vehicle causing the
accident on the road cannot also be said to have escaped from land or premises in occupation of the owner of the
motor vehicle. It is, therefore, difficult to see how the conditions for applicability of the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher are
satisfied in case of an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle on the road. Instead of extending the rule of
Rylands v. Fletcher to cover the case treating it to be a case of no negligence, it would have been easier to apply
the rule of res ipsa loquitur and raise the presumption of negligence as was done in Barkway v. South Wales
Transport Co. Ltd., [ (1948) 2 All ER 460 ] which was also a case of tyreburst and which was approvingly referred in
Krishna Bus Service v. Mangoli. 237A reading of a Three Judge Bench judgment in Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United
Insurance Co. Ltd. 238shows that apart from sections 140, 163A of the M.V. Act or any other statutory provision, the
claim for compensation can be only on the ground of fault. “Section 166 of the M.V. Act” the court said provides for
“a complete machinery for laying the claim on fault liability.” The case of Deepal Girishbhai Soni was followed by a
two judge bench of the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Premlata Shukla C.A. 2526 of 2007 decided
on 15-5-2007 [2007-3 M.P.H.T. 225 (S.C.)] where it was held (para 10): “Proof of rashness and negligence on the
part of the driver of the vehicle is therefore sine-qua-non for maintaining an application under section 166 of the
Act.” It is submitted that the case of Kusuma Begum requires reconsideration.

The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher applies to a proprietor who stores electricity on his land if it escapes therefrom
and injures a person or the ordinary use of property. It does not apply to the case of injury done to a peculiar trade
apparatus unnecessarily so constructed as to be affected by minute currents of the escaping force. 239The Supreme
Court applied the strict liability rule of Rylands v. Fletcher against the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board in a case
where a cyclist was electrocuted by a live electric wire lying on the road. 240The court also held that the defence that
the live wire was lying on the road due to clandestine pilferage of a stranger could not be availed of by the Board to
negate its strict liability. 241The Board has statutory authority to transmit electricity, therefore, it is submitted that the
case should have been more appropriately decided on the basis of negligence which was held to exist. 242The
court in Sushil Kumar’s case relied upon a Privy Council decision 243 which was decided essentially on the
interpretation of Articles 1053 and 1054 of the Quebe code 244 and not on the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher.
Indeed, their Lordships said that in construing these Articles of the Code“Rylands v. Fletcher and Nicholas v.
Marsland have better be left out of account.” 245Sushil Kumar’s case was distinguished in SDO Grid Corporation of
Orissa Ltd. v. Timiduoram 246 on the ground that there was a finding of negligence in that case which was tried as a
suit. Timiduoram holds that when the fact of negligence is denied, the claim should never be entertained in a writ
petition and should be left to be tried in a civil suit. The court clearly held that “the mere fact that the wire of electric
transmission line belonging to the appellants had snapped and the deceased had come into contact with it and died
by itself was not sufficient for awarding compensation. The court was required to examine as to whether the wire
had snapped as a result of any negligence on the part of the appellants as a result of which the deceased had
come in contact with the wire.” 247It is submitted that the case of Sushil Kumar requires reconsideration. The use of
electric energy for lighting or other domestic purposes is so reasonable and prevalent that to bring electricity upon
land or premises for such purposes is to use the land or premises in a natural and not an unnatural way. A person
who keeps on his premises electric energy for domestic purposes is bound to exercise reasonable care to prevent
damage therefrom accruing, but he is not responsible for damage not due to his own default. 248It has also been
observed that during bad weather, where there is a risk of electric wires being snapped from the pole, it is the duty
of the electricity department to ascertain that the wires passing overhead are in-tact and it would constitute
negligence if this exercise is not carried out. 249

211 (1868) LR 3 HL 330.

212 Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, 279.
213 PER BLACKBURN, J., in Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) LR 1 Ex 265, 280 : 4 H & C 263, 271, confirmed in LR 3 HL 330;
Manindra Nath v. Mathradas, (1945) 49 CWN 827 : 80 CLJ 90.
214 (1913) AC 263 : 108 LT 225 : 29 TLR 281 (PC).
215 Rickards v. Lothian, (1913) AC 263, 280 : 108 LT 225 : 29 TLR 281; Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape
Town Tram Co., (1902) AC 381, 393 : 57 LTR 1990; Western Engraving Co., v. Film Lab. Ltd., (1936) 1 All ER 106;
Collingwood v. Home & Colonial Stores, (1936) 1 All ER 74 : 55 LT 550; State of Punjab v. Modern Cultivators, AIR
1965 SC 17 [LNIND 1964 SC 182] p. 22.
216 (1947) AC 156 (HL).
 Page 5 of 6
2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

217 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL).

218 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)., p. 72.
219 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)., p. 76.
220 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)., p. 77.
221 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL)., p. 79.
222 (2003) 3 WLR 1467 (HL).
223 Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty. Ltd., (1994) 179 CLR 520. Also see (2004) 78 ALJ 177.
224 See p. 489 text and footnote 28.
225 (2003) 3 WLR 1467, pp. 1473, 1474 (para 9) (LORD BRIGHAM), 1481 (para 35) (LORD HOFFMAN), p. 1486 (para 52)
LORD HOBHOUSE. See further Donal Nolan, ‘The Distinctiveness of Rylands v. Fletcher, (2005) 121 Law Quarterly
Review 421.
226 For statement of the rule see also M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [LNIND 1986 SC 539], p. 419 : AIR
1987 SC 965 [LNIND 1986 SC 40].
227 (1913) AC 263 : 108 LT 225 : 29 TLR 281 (PC). See text and footnote 26, p. 489, supra .
228 (1947) AC 156 (HL). See text and footnote 28, p. 489, supra .
229 American Restatement Article 519 Restatement 2d substituted “abnormally dangerous” for ultrahazardous. FLEMING,
Torts, 6th edition, p. 313.
230 (1994) 1 All ER 53 (HL).
231 (1994) 1 All ER 53, pp. 75, 76.
232 See text and footnote 37, supra.
233 AIR 1965 SC 17 [LNIND 1964 SC 182].
234 (1994) 4 SCC 1 : JT 1994 (3) SC 492 .
235 AIR 1996 SC 1446 [LNIND 1996 SC 353]: 1996 (2) SCALE 44 [LNIND 1996 SC 353], p. 69; See further, Munni Devi v.
Babu Lal (2010) 4 All LJ 161.
236 AIR 2001 SC 485 [LNIND 2001 SC 19]: JT 2001 (1) SC 37.
237 (1976) 1 SCC 791 [LNIND 1975 SC 517] p. 799.
238 AIR 2004 SC 2107 [LNIND 2004 SC 358], pp. 2120, 2121.
239 Eastern and South African Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways Co., (1902) AC 381; National Telephone Co. v.
Baker, (1893) 2 Ch 186 : 50 WLR 657 : 86 LT 457.
240 M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, AIR 2002 SC 551 ; Followed in Mankunwar v. Chairman & Another, AIR 2010
MP 26 : (2010) 93 AIC 323 : (2010) 2 MPLJ 536
241 M.P. Electricity Board v. Shail Kumari, AIR 2002 SC 551 p. 554. The court differed on this point from an earlier decision
in W.B. Electricity Boad v. Sachin Banerjee, AIR 2000 SC 3629 (1) : (1999) 9 SCC 21. Followed in Ramesh Singh
Pawar v. Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board, AIR 2005 MP. 2 [LNIND 2004 MP 114]; See also, Chuni Lal & others v.
State of Jammu and Kashmir & Another, AIR 2010 (NOC) 740 (J&K); Chellama & others v. Kerala State Electricity
Board, Trivandrum, AIR 2010 (NOC) 355 (Ker); Alamelu v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 114 AIC 707.
242 See text and cases in footnote 1, p. 566; CLERK AND LINDSELL on Torts, 15th edition, para 24.55 p. 1232; Transco
plc v. Stockport, (2003) 3 WLR 1467 (text and footnote 34, p. 490, supra ).
243 Supra , footnote 70.
244 Quebe Railway, Light, Heat and Power Company Ltd. v. Vandly, AIR 1920 PC 181, p. 185 to 187.
245 Quebe Railway, Light, Heat and Power Company Ltd. v. Vandly, AIR 1920 PC 181, p. 187.
246 (2005) 6 SCC 156 [LNIND 2005 SC 565], p. 160 (para 8) : AIR 2005 SC 3971 [LNIND 2005 SC 565].
247 (2005) 6 SCC 156 [LNIND 2005 SC 565], p. 159 (para 6). To the same effect are: Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v.
Sukmani Das, AIR 1999 SC 3412 [LNIND 1999 SC 810]: (1999) 7 SCC 298 [LNIND 1999 SC 810]; Tamil Nadu
Electricity Board v. Sumathi, AIR 2000 SC 1603 [LNIND 2000 SC 750]: (2000) 4 SCC 543 [LNIND 2000 SC 750].
248 Dhanal Soorma v. Rangoon Indian Telegraph Association Ltd., (1935) 13 ILRRAN 369.
249 Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Kuppayammal (2012) 3 LW 170; Raju Govind Dansingani v. Tamil Nadu Electricity
Board, (2012) 4 CTC 167 [LNIND 2011 MAD 4094]
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2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

End of Document
 More English and Indian Cases Relating to Rylands v. Fletcher
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition)
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition) > Ratanlal and Dhirajlal Law of Torts 26
Edition > CHAPTER XIX NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS > 2. STRICT LIABILITY > 2(B)(i)
Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

2. STRICT LIABILITY

2(B)(i) Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

More English and Indian Cases Relating to Rylands v. Fletcher

The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher was held to apply where a company stored in close proximity nitrate of soda
and dinitrophenol for the purpose of making munitions for Government, with the result that on a fire breaking out
they exploded with terrific violence causing loss of life and serious damage to adjoining property. 250Similarly where
the defendants drove a very large number of piles into the soil, thereby setting up such heavy vibrations as to cause
serious structural damage to an old house belonging to the plaintiffs, with the result that the greater part had to be
taken down in compliance with a dangerous structure notice, it was held that the defendants were responsible as
insurers for all damages caused by the escape of the vibrations, they had so created. 251

Under the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher, a person who brings dangerous substances upon premises and carries
on a dangerous trade with them is liable if, though without negligence on his part, these substances cause injury to
persons or property in their neighbourhood. 252It is immaterial whether he is or is not aware of the danger at the time
when he brings and uses them. Thus a tramway company was held liable for using wood-blocks coated with
creosote which gave off fumes which injured plants and shrubs of the plaintiff whose premises were near the road.
253This liability exists whether the land is or is not owned by the person responsible for the bringing upon it and use

of the dangerous substances. 254

If a man brings on to his premises a dangerous thing which is liable to cause fire, such as a motor-car with petrol in
it, the carburettor of which is not unlikely to get on fire when the engine is started, and a fire results and escapes
causing damage to adjoining property, though without any negligence on his part, he is liable, for the rule is that he
must keep such a thing under control at his peril. 255The dangerous thing which is liable to cause fire should have
been brought by the defendant on his premises in the course of some non-natural user. 256If a person uses a
traction engine which emits sparks in spite of all precautions being taken to prevent their emission, he will be liable
if another person’s hayrick be set on fire by the sparks, upon the ground that such an engine is a dangerous
machine. 257

The principle of Rylands v. Fletcher is followed in several Indian cases. 258

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher applies only if the defendant brings or accumulates on his own land something that
is likely to escape and do mischief, irrespective of the question whether that was done by the defendant wilfully or
negligently. 259

An ability to foresee indirect or economic loss to another person as the result of the defendant’s conduct does not
automatically impose on the defendant a duty to take care to avoid that loss. 260

Water. —The defendant in erecting a house put down pipes to convey water from the roof, but did not connect them
with any drain. The water came through the pipes into the cellar of the house, collected there into a pool and flowed
from there into the cellar of the adjoining house of the plaintiff, which was on a lower level: it was held that the
plaintiff was entitled to damages in respect of the injuries caused thereby. 261
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By reason of an unprecedented rainfall a quantity of water was accumulated against one of the sides of the
defendants’ railway embankment, to such an extent as to endanger the embankment, when, in order to protect their
embankment, the defendant cut trenches in it by which the water flowed through, and went ultimately on to the land
of the plaintiff which was on the opposite side of the embankment and at a lower level, and flooded and injured it to
a greater extent than it would have done had the trenches not been cut. In an act ion for damages for such injury
the Jury found that the cutting of the trenches was reasonably necessary for the protection of the defendants’
property and that it was not done negligently. It was held that though the defendants had not brought the water on
their land, they had no right to protect their property by transferring the mischief from their own land to that of the
plaintiff, and that they were therefore liable. 262

When a person constructs a dam on his land which has the effect of diverting the water from its natural channel on
to the land of a neighbour and damage to the neighbour’s property results, he is liable to his neighbour. An owner of
property has no right to let off water which has naturally accumulated therein even for the purpose of its
preservation from damage therefrom if this will have the effect of transferring his misfortune to the property of
another. 263

The plaintiffs were the owners of electric cables which had been laid under certain public streets; defendants were
the owners of hydraulic mains which had been laid under the same streets. These mains burst in four different
places, in each case damaging the plaintiff’s cables. The bursting of the mains was not due to any negligence on
the part of the defendants. It was held that the defendants were liable although the site of the plaintiff’s injury was
occupied by them only under a licence and not under any right of property in the soil. 264

A municipal authority, in laying out a park, constructed a concrete paddling pond for children in the bed of a stream,
altered the course of the stream and obstructed the natural flow of water therefrom. Owing to a rainfall of
extraordinary violence the stream overflowed at the pond, and, as the result of the operations of the authority, a
great volume of water, which would have been carried off by the stream in its natural course without mischief,
poured down a public street into the town and damaged the property of two railway companies. It was held that the
extraordinary rainfall was not an act of God which absolved the authority from responsibility, and that they were
liable in damages to the railway companies. 265

Where water coming through two natural channels in the plaintiff’s land had accumulated in the agal portion of the
defendant’s tank and the latter in order to get rid of the consequences of that injury to his land got constructed an
embankment with a view to transfer that water to the land of the plaintiff, it was held that it was not open to the
defendant to erect such an embankment. 266

Injury caused by bee-hives. —Plaintiff and defendant resided on adjacent farms. The defendant kept a number of
beehives. The bees swarming from these hives frequently caused annoyance to the inhabitants of the neighbouring
farm. One day the defendant, for removing honey, smoked the hives with a ‘smoker’ without warning the plaintiff
who was tackling his horse. The bees, irritated by the smoking operation, swarmed upon the plaintiff and his horse.
The horse dragged the plaintiff and threw him violently against a wall, causing him severe injuries. It was held that
the defendant was liable. 267

Damage by rats to adjoining owner .—The defendants carried on the business of bone manure manufacturers on
premises near the plaintiff’s farm. For the purpose of their business they had on their premises a heap of bones,
which caused large number of rats to assemble there. The rats made their way from the defendants’ premises on to
the plaintiff’s land, and ate his corn, causing substantial loss, in respect of which the plaintiff claimed damages from
the defendants. It was held that no cause of act ion was established against the defendants. 268

Eating of yew tree leaves by horse. —The defendants planted on their own land, but so close to the boundary, as to
project into the adjoining meadow in the occupation of the plaintiff, a yew tree, and the plaintiff’s horse whilst
feeding in the meadow ate off the portion of the tree which projected and died inconsequence, it was held that the
defendants were liable for the value of the horse. 269But if the poisonous leaves had not extended to the defendant’s
neighbour’s boundary, he would not have been liable; for his legal duty to his neighbour stopped with his boundary,
within which he was free to do or grow whatever he wished so long as the boundary was not overpassed. Thus,
where the plaintiff’s horse ate off the branches of a yew tree no part of which extended over his field, and the
defendants were under no liability to fence against the plaintiff, it was held that they were not liable since they owed
no duty of care in respect of trespassing animals. 270
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Swallowing of pieces of iron rope by cow. —The defendants’ land adjoining the plaintiff’s was fenced by a wire rope
repaired by them. Through exposure the rope decayed and pieces of it fell on the grass on the plaintiff’s land,
whose cow in grazing swallowed one of the pieces, and died in consequence. The defendants were held liable to
the plaintiff for the loss of the cow. 271

Allowing thistles to grow .—Where an occupier of land allowed thistles, which he had not brought on to his land, but
which were its natural produce, to seed, so that the seed was carried on to the adjoining land which was thereby
injured it was held that no action lay for the damage caused thereby. 272

Injury by chair detached from chair-o-plane .—The plaintiff was tenant of a stand on a fair-ground belonging to the
defendants. While she was on her stand, a chair, with its occupant, became detached from a chair-o-plane, the
property of and operated by the defendants, and severely injured the plaintiff. It was found as a fact that the act ion
was due to the recklessness of the occupant of the chair. It was held that the defendants were liable without proof
of negligence on their part. 273

Escape of virus : Loss of business. —In consequence of the escape of a virus imported by the defendants and used
by them for experimental work of foot and mouth disease on premises owned and occupied by them, cattle in the
vicinity of the premises became infected with the disease. Accordingly an order was made under statutory power
closing cattle markets in the district, with the result that the plaintiffs, who were auctioneers, were unable to carry on
their business on those markets and suffered loss. On the question whether an action by the plaintiffs for damages
for the loss was sustainable, it was held that the defendants were not liable in negligence, because their duty to
take care to avoid the escape of the virus was due to the foreseeable fact that the virus might infect cattle in the
neighbourhood and thus was owed to owners of cattle, but, as the plaintiffs were not the owners of cattle, no such
duty was owed to them by the defendants and that the plaintiffs were not also entitled to recover under the rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher because they had no interest in the cattle endangered by the escape of the virus and loss to the
plaintiffs was not a sufficiently proximate and direct consequence of the escape of the virus. 274

250 Rainham Chemical Works Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co., (1921) 2 AC 465 : 126 LT 70.
251 Hoare & Co. v. Mcalpine, (1923) 1 Ch 167 : 128 LT 526 : 39 TLR 97.
252 Belvedere Fish Guano Co. v. Rainham Chemical Works, (1920) 2 KB 487; Hale v. Jennings Brothers, (1938) 1 All ER
579 : 82 SJ 193.
253 West v. Bristol Tramways Co., (1908) 2 KB 14.
254 Charing Cross, West End & Electric Co. v. London Hydraulic Power Co., (1913) 3 KB 442; Rainham Chemical Works
Ltd. v. Belvedere Fish Guano Co., (1921) 2 AC 465.
255 Musgrove v. Pandelis, (1919) 2 KB 43 : 35 TLR 219 : 120 LT 601.
256 Mason v. Levy Auto Parts, (1967) 2 All ER 62 : (1967) 2 QB 530.
257 Powell v. Fall, (1880) 5 QBD 597 : 43 LT 562.
258 A suit for damages was held to lie against a proprietor who penned back the water of a stream by erecting a bund
upon his land, so as to inundate the land of his neighbour, without his license and consent: Becharam Chowdhary v.
Puhubnath Jha, (1869) 2 Beng LR (Appx.) 53. The defendant closed up the outlet of a bank upon his own land,
whereby the surface drainage water had immemorially flowed from the plaintiff’s land into and over the defendant’s land
and so escaped. By reason of the closing of those outlets the water was unable to escape, and the plaintiff’s land
became flooded and the crops therein damaged. It was held that the defendant was liable for the damage caused:
Mussamut Annundmoyee Dossee v. Mussamut Hameedoonissa, (1862) Marsh. 85, sub-nom. Must. Hameedoonissa
v.Musst. Anundmoyee Dossee , (1862) 1 Hay 152. The Bombay High Court has held that before a person can be made
liable in damages for injury caused to his neighbour’s land by water either flowing from the former’s land to the latter’s
or percolating from the one into the other it must be shown that the water was brought or collected on his land by him
voluntarily for his own purposes in a non-natural use of it. Otherwise he is not liable: Moholal v. Bai Jivkore, (1904) 6
Bom LR 529; ILR 28 Bom 472. This case has been doubted and distinguished in Ramanuja Chariar v. Krishnaswami
Mudali, (1907) ILR 31 Mad 169, which decided that the retention of water by a person on a portion of his land to
prevent its passing on to other portions of his land was not an act done in the natural and usual course of enjoyment
and the person so doing was liable for damage caused thereby. A suit for damages, based on an allegation that
defendant had neglected to drain his garden so as to prevent water from collecting there and injuring the adjoining
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property of the plaintiff is not maintainable as the owner of property is under no legal obligation to incur expenses upon
it for the benefit of his neighbours, where it has not been altered in character by his acts or with his permission in such
a way as to expose them to any injury: Baldeo Das v. Secretary of State, (1883) PR No. 30 of 1883. Where the
defendants with a view to make their land cultivable lowered its level with the consequence that water in a tank
belonging to a third party passed to that land and subsequently overflowed into lands belonging to the plaintiff, it was
held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any cause of action: Kenaram Akhuli v. Sristidhar Chatterjee, (1912) 16 CWN
875. Where Government constructs an irrigation canal it undertakes a duty to protect other parties against damage
arising from the water of the canal and if it does not take adequate precautions to deal with the overflow of water from
the canal, for instance, by means of an outlet at the tail end of the canal, it is liable to compensate those to whom
damage may be caused by such overflow: Secretary of State for India in Council v. Ramtahal Ram, (1925) 6 PLT 708.
The retention of water by a person on a portion of his land to prevent its passing on to the other portions of his land is
not an act done in the natural and usual course of enjoyment and the person so doing is liable for damage caused
thereby: Dhanusao v. Sitabai, ILR 1948 Nag 698. Where the defendant set fire to his land without taking necessary
precaution to prevent the same from spreading into the lands in the neighbourhood, he was ‘playing with fire’ and to be
deemed to have foreseen the possibility of the fire spreading into the lands adjoining his land and is liable for any
damage caused to them: M. Madappa v. K. Kariappa, AIR 1964 Mys 80 . Where the defendant installed a big ore
melting furnace near the plaintiff’s house, he was held liable for emission of harmful gases with offensive smell and
heating causing discomfort : Darshan Ram v. Nazar Ram, AIR 1989 P&H 253.
259 Dhanusao v. Sitabai, ILR (1948) Nag 698.
260 Weller v. Foot and Mouth Disease etc., (1965) 3 All ER 560 : (1965) 3 WLR 1082 : (1966) 1 QB 569.
261 Snow v. Whitehead, (1884) 27 Chd 588, dissenting from Ballard v. Tomlinson, (1884) 26 Chd 194.
262 Whalley v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., (1884) 13 QBD 131; Greyvensteyn v. Hattingh, (1911) AC 355;
Swamiullah v. Makund Lal, (1921) ILR 43 All 688. Whalley’s case has been distinguished by the former Nagpur High
Court in a case in which it has held that it is lawful for a person to erect an embankment on his land to protect his land
from the influx of water from adjoining land, and he is not liable for damage caused by the water being thrown on the
land of another; Shankar v. Laxman, ILR 1938 Nag 289; Ramnath v. Kalanath, ILR 1950 Nag 509.
263 Ramnath v. Kalanath, ILR 1950 Nag 509.
264 Charing Cross Elec. Sup. Co. v. Hydraulic Power Co., (1914) 3 KB 772 : 83 LJKB 116.
265 Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway, (1917) AC 556 : 117 LT 483 : 33 TLR 531.
266 Guhiram v. Uday Chandra, AIR 1963 Pat 455 .
267 O’Gorman v. O’Gorman, (1903) 2 IR 573.
268 Stearn v. Prentice Brothers, Limited, (1919) 1 KB 394 : 35 TLR 207 : 120 LT 455.
269 Crowhurst v. Amersham Burail Board, (1878) 4 Ex D 5.
270 Ponting v. Noakes, (1894) 2 QB 281.
271 Firth v. Bowling Iron Co., (1878) 3 CPD 254.
272 Giles v. Walker, (1890) 24 QBD 656 : 62 LT 933.
273 Hale v. Jenning Bros., (1938) 1 All ER 579 : 82 SJ 193.
274 Weller v. Foot and Mouth Disease etc., (1965) 3 All ER 560 : (1966) 1 QB 569 : (1965) 3 WLR 1082.

End of Document
 2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition)
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition) > Ratanlal and Dhirajlal Law of Torts 26
Edition > CHAPTER XIX NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS > 2. STRICT LIABILITY

2. STRICT LIABILITY

2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

The judgment of Blackburn, J., approved by the House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher itself recognised that the
liability is not absolute being subject to certain exceptions. Blackburn, J. made it a part of the rule that “he (the
defendant) can excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default; or perhaps that the
escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God.” 275In the light of that passage, a person is not liable if
the damage is owing to the following causes: 276

1. Act of God (vis major), which is defined to be such a direct violent, sudden, and irresistible act of nature as could
not, by any amount of ability, have been foreseen, or if foreseen, could not by any amount of human care and skill
have been resisted. 277Thus those acts which are occasioned by the elementary forces of nature, unconnected with
the agency of man or other cause will come under the category of acts of God, 278e.g., storm, tempest, 279lightning,
extraordinary fall of rain, 280extraordinary high tide, 281extraordinary severe frost, 282or a tidal bore which sweeps a
ship in midwater. 283 In order that a phenomenon should fall within the operation of the rule of law with regard to the
act of God, it is not necessary that it should be unique, that it should happen for the first time; it is enough that it is
extraordinary, and such as could not reasonably be anticipated. 284

The phrase vis major imports something abnormal and with reference to the context means that the property by the
act of God has been rendered useless, for the time being, that is to say, it was rendered incapable of any
enjoyment. 285

Vis major, to afford a defence, must be the proximate cause, the causa causans, and not merely a causa sine qua
non of the damage complained of. The mere fact that vis major co-existed with or followed on the negligence is no
adequate defence. Before an act of God may be admitted as an excuse, the defendant must himself have done all
that he is bound to do. 286

The defendant in Nicholas v. Marsland, 287had a series of artificial lakes on his land, in the construction or
maintenance of which there had been no negligence. Owing to a most unusual fall of rain, so great that it could not
have been reasonably anticipated, some of the reservoirs burst and carried away four country bridges. It was held
that the defendant was not liable, inasmuch as the water escaped by the act of God. Similarly, a water-company
whose apparatus was constructed with reasonable care, and to withstand ordinary frost, was held not liable for the
bursting of the pipe by an extraordinarily severe frost. 288But Nicholas v. Karsland was criticised by the House of
Lords in Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway. 289 In this case the Corporation obstructed and altered the
course of a stream by constructing a concrete paddling pool for children. Due to a rainfall of extraordinary violence
a great volume of water which would normally have been carried off by the stream overflowed the pad and caused
damage to plaintiff’s property. It was held that the rainfall was not an act of God and the Corporation was liable as it
was their duty “so to work as to make proprietors or occupiers on a lower level as secure against injury as they
would have been had nature not been interfered with.” 290The Supreme Court in another context said that before
heavy rain can be accepted as a defence for the collapse of a culvert the defendant must indicate what anticipatory
preventive action was taken. 291

Injury by snow. —Owing to extraordinarily severe snow-storms, snow and ice had accumulated on the roof of the
defendant’s premises. No steps were taken to remove the snow or to warn the public of its presence. The plaintiff,
while standing on the pavement outside the premises and looking through the window of the defendant’s shop, was
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2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

injured by a fall of snow which had accumulated on the roof. The snow could have been removed from the roof but
this was not done. She claimed damages, alleging nuisance, or, alternatively, negligence. It was held that the
accumulation of snow constituted a public nuisance of which, in view of the severity of the storms, the defendants
must be deemed to have had knowledge; that there was a duty on the part of the defendants to safeguard members
of the public using the pavement from the danger occasioned by the snow; and that as they failed to abate the
nuisance they were liable both in nuisance and in negligence and that the plea that the storms were an act of God
was no defence as it was the snow, and not the storms, which directly caused the injury. 292

Damage by water. —A State Government erected a reservoir adjoining the plaintiff’s land in order to provide
drinking water facilities to a village in the State. The State acquired a part of the plaintiffs land for the purpose of
constructing a channel for carrying the overflow of water from the reservoir to a Nalla which was at a distance of
about 1500 feet from the waste-weir of the reservoir. This channel was however not constructed except to the
extent of 250 feet on the side of the Nalla. Due to very heavy rainfall the water from the reservoir overflowed into
the waste-weir and thereafter flowed over the plaintiffs land, causing considerable damage to the land and the
crops standing thereon. In a suit by the plaintiffs for damages they alleged that due to the negligence of the State in
not taking proper precautions to guard against the overflow of water they had sustained the loss. The State inter
alia contended that the loss was due to heavy rain which was an act of God and therefore they were not liable and
further that the construction of the reservoir was an act of the State in the sovereign capacity and, therefore, it was
not liable for the tortious or negligent acts of its servants. It was held that the fact that the danger materialised
subsequently by an Act of God was not a matter which absolved the State from its liability for the earlier negligence
in that no proper channel for the flow or overflow of water from the waste-weir was constructed by it in time; that the
act of the State in constructing the reservoir for the supply of drinking water to its citizens at best could be
considered a welfare act and not an act in its capacity as a sovereign; and that, therefore, the State was liable in
negligence for the loss caused to the plaintiff. 293

2. Wrongful act of a third party. 294A landlord using his premises in an ordinary and proper manner is bound to
exercise all reasonable care, but he is not responsible for damage not due to his own default, whether that damage
be caused by inevitable accident or wrongful acts of third persons. 295

Though the act of a third party may be relied on by way of defence, the defendant may still be held liable in
negligence if he failed in foreseeing and guarding against the consequences to his works of that third party’s act. 296

Where the reservoir of the defendant was caused to overflow by a third party sending a great quantity of water
down the drain which suppliedit, and damage was done to the plaintiff, it was held that the defendant was not liable.
297

Plaintiff’s hotel was destroyed by a fire caused by the escape and ignition of natural gas which percolated through
the soil and penetrated into the hotel basement from a fractured welded joint in a main, under the street, belonging
to the defendants. The cause of the break in the welded joint through which the gas leaked was due to operations
caused by the local authority in constructing a storm sewer beneath the main. It was held that as the defendants
were carrying gas at high pressure which was very dangerous, if it should escape, they owed a duty to the owners
of the hotel, to exercise reasonable care and skill that the owners should not be damaged; that the local authority
might at any time be conducting operations in connection with their sewers in the vicinity of defendants’ mains, and
it was the duty of the defendants to watch such operation; and that a failure by the defendants to know of them was
not consistent with due care on their part in the interests of members of the public likely to be affected. 298In an
action for damage to property located on the second floor of a building leased to the defendant, through a
continuous overflow of water from a lavatory basin on the top floor caused by the water tap having been turned on
full and the water-pipe plugged by some third person, it was held that the defendant was not responsible unless he
instigated the act or unless he ought to have prevented it; and that although he was bound to exercise all
reasonable care he was not responsible for damage not due to his own default, whether caused by inevitable
accident or the wrongful act of third persons. 299

3. Plaintiff’s own default. 300The plaintiff and defendant occupied adjoining farms, which they rented from the same
landlord. A fence upon the plaintiff’s farm which, under his agreement of tenancy, he was liable, as between himself
and the landlord, to keep and have in good repair, and which divided the farms, became out of repair, with the result
that two of the defendant’s horses escaped from a field forming part of the farm occupied by him into a field forming
part of the farm occupied by the plaintiff and injured a colt belonging to him. The defendant had entered into an
agreement with the landlord, in terms similar to that of the plaintiff, to keep in repair the fences on his holding. It was
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2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

held that the defendant was liable to the plaintiff in damages for the injuries caused to the plaintiff’s colt, inasmuch
as the general principle that owners of animals must keep them upon their land at their peril applied, and the mere
fact that the plaintiff had committed a breach of the obligation he was under as between himself and the landlord to
repair the fence, was not enough to bring the case within the exception of damage caused by the plaintiff’s own
default. 301

4. Artificial work maintained for the common benefit of plaintiff and defendant, 302or with the consent of the plaintiff.
303Where the plaintiff and the defendant occupy parts of the same building, whether it be two floors of a warehouse,

two sets of offices, or two flats, and water which is laid on to the building escapes and does damage, the person
from whose part the escape takes place is not liable in the absence of negligence. The reason for the escape is
immaterial as long as the exercise of reasonable care would not have prevented it. 304

Gnawing of rain-water box. —The defendant was the plaintiff’s landlord and was living on the floor above him.
Some rats gnawed a rain-water box maintained by the defendant for the benefit both of himself and the plaintiff, and
the water running through injured plaintiff’s goods below; it was held that no act ion lay. 305

Leakage of cistern .—The defendant was the owner of premises to which water was laid on, and he had a cistern
on the fourth floor. The plaintiff became tenant of the ground floor, and took his supply of water from the defendant.
A leakage from the cistern having been noticed by the plaintiff, he informed the defendant, who instructed a
competent plumber to remedy it. In consequence of the negligence of the plumber an overflow occurred, which
damaged the plaintiff’s goods. It was held that the defendant was not liable since the plaintiff had assented to the
water being on the premises, and therefore the defendant, by instructing a competent plumber to remedy the
leakage, had discharged his duty to the plaintiff. 306

5. When it is the consequence of an act done under the authority of a statute. 307“No act ion will lie for doing that
which the legislature has authorized, if it be done without negligence, although it does occasion damage to anyone;
but an action does lie for doing that which the legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently. And...if by a
reasonable exercise of the powers,...the damage could be prevented, it is, within this rule, ‘negligence’ not to make
such reasonable exercise of their powers.” 308The statute must authorise the use of the dangerous thing either
expressly or by necessary implication. This exception to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher has recently been affirmed
by the House of Lords in Transco plc. v. Stockport. 309

275 Fletcher v. Rylands, (1866) LR 1 Ex. 265; approved in Rylands v. Fletcher, LR 3 HL 330.
276 These exceptions are enumerated in Narayanan Bhattathripad v. Government of Travancore-Cochin, ILR 1956 TC 639
[LNIND 1955 KER 141]. M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [LNIND 1986 SC 539], p. 419 : AIR 1987 SC
965 [LNIND 1986 SC 40].
277 Nugent v. Smith, (1876) CPC 423, 433; Vithaldas v. Municipal Commissioner of Bombay, (1902) 4 Bom LR 914; Hubli
Municipality v. Ralli Brothers, (1911) 13 Bom LR 1138 [LNIND 1911 BOM 91]: ILR 35 Bom 492; Lallu v. Vazl Haq,
(1918) 1 UPLR (Oudh) 15.
278 Forward v. Pittard, (1785) 1 TR 27.
279 Nugent v. Smith, Supra
280 Nichols v. Marsland, ; Ram Lall Singh v. L. Dhary Muthon, (1877) 3 ILRCAL 776.
281 Nitrophosphate & C. Manure Co. v. L. & St. Katherine Docks, (1878) 9 Ch D 503.
282 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781 .
283 R. Navigation Co. v. Ram Krishna, AIR 1968 Assam 38 .
284 Nitrophosphate & C. Manure Co. v. London & St. K.D. Co., (1878) 9 Chd 503, 515.
285 Apcharaddin Abdul Gani v. Gurudayal Kapali, (1947) 83 CLJ 108.
286 Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. Vasudeo Ramchandra, (1904) 6 Bom LR 899. In this case the damage caused
was due to the insufficiency of precautions taken by the defendant, in constructing bridges and embankments in a
creek for carrying duct line to cope with conditions which might reasonably have been anticipated, and it was held that
the defendant was liable. See Seetharama Swami v. Secretary of State for India in Council, (1925) MWN 352 : 21 MLW
449.
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2(B)(ii) Exceptions to the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher

287 Nichols v. Marsland, (1875) LR 10 Ex 255. See Ram Lall Singh v. Lill Dhary Muhton, (1877) ILR 3 Cal 776; Gooroo
Churn v. Ram Dutt, (1865) 2 WR 43.
288 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., (1856) 11 Ex 781 .
289 (1917) AC 556 (HL) : 117 LT 483 : 33 TLR 531.
290 (1917) AC 556 (HL), p. 579. Extraordinary high wind will be governed by the same considerations. Cushing v. Walker &
Sons (1941) 2 All ER 693, p. 695. So also extraordinary high tide: Greenwood Tileries Ltd. v. Clapson, (1937) 1 All ER
765, p. 772.
291 S. Vendantacharya v. Highways Department of South Arcot, (1987) 3 SCC 400.
292 Slater v. Worthington’s Cash Stores, (1941) 1 KB 488.
293 State of Mysore v. Ramchandra, (1970) 73 Bom LR 732.
294 Box v. Jubb, (1879) 4 Ex D 76.
295 Rickards v. Lothian, (1913) AC 263 : 108 LT 225 : 29 TLR 281.
296 Northwestern Utilities, Ld. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., (1936) AC 108,125.
297 Box v. Jubb, (1879) 4 Exd 76.
298 Northwestern Utilities Ld. v. London Guarantee and Accident Co., (1936) AC 108 : 154 LT 89 : 52 TLR 93.
299 Rickards v. Lothian, (1913) AC 263 : 108 LT 225 : 29 TLR 281.
300 See text and footnote 88, p. 498, supra .
301 Holgate v. Bleazard, (1917) 1 KB 443.
302 Carstairs v. Taylor, (1871) LR 6 Ex 217; Bomanji v. Mahomedali, (1905) 7 Bom LR 713.
303 See cases in footnote 30, infra .
304 Kiddle v. City Business Properties Ld., (1942) 1 KB 269, 274.
305 Carstairs v. Taylor, (1871) LR 6 Ex 217; Bomanji v. Mahomedali, (1905) 7 Bom LR 713.
306 Blake v. Woolf, (1898) 2 QB 426; Anderson v. Oppenheimer, (1880) 5 QBD 602; Ross v. Fedden, (1872) LR 7 QB 661.
307 Madras Railway Co. v. Zemindar of Carvatenagarum, (1874) 1 IA 364; Ramchandram Nagaram Rice and Oil Mills Ltd .,
Gaya v. The Municipal Commissioner of the Purulia Municipality, ILR (1943) 22 Pat 359 .
308 PER LORD BACKBURN in Geddis v. Proprietors of Bann Reservoir, (1878) 3 App Cas 430, 455.
309 (2003) 3 WLR 1467 (HL). See text and footnote 27, p. 474.

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 2(C) Rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition)
Ratanlal & Dhirajlal

Ratanlal & Dhirajlal : The Law of Torts (26th Edition) > Ratanlal and Dhirajlal Law of Torts 26
Edition > CHAPTER XIX NEGLIGENCE AND ALLIED TOPICS > 2. STRICT LIABILITY

2. STRICT LIABILITY

2(C) Rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India

A more stringent rule of strict liability than the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was laiddown by the Supreme Court
recently in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India. 310The case related to the harm caused by escape of Oleum
gas from one of the units of Shriram Foods and Fertiliser Industries. The court held that the rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher which was evolved in the 19th century did not fully meet the needs of a modern industrial society with
highly developed scientific knowledge and technology where hazardous or inherently dangerous industries were
necessary to be carried on as part of the development programme and that it was necessary to lay down a new rule
not yet recognised by English law, to adequately deal with the problems arising in a highly industrialised economy.
The court laid down the rule as follows: “Where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous
act ivity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas, the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to
compensate all those who are affected by the accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions
which operate vis-a-vis the tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. 311 The court
earlier pointed out that this duty is “absolute and non-delegable” and the enterprise cannot escape liability by
showing that it had taken all reasonable care and there was no negligence on its part. The bases of the new rule as
indicated by the Supreme Court are two: (1) If an enterprise is permitted to carry on an hazardous or inherently
dangerous act ivity for its profit, the law must presume that such permission is conditional on the enterprise
absorbing the cost of any accident (including indemnification of all those who suffer harm in the accident) arising on
account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its over-heads; and (2) The
enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers and to provide warning against
potential hazards.

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher requires non-natural use of land by the defendant and escape from his land of the
thing which causes damage. The rule in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India is not dependant on these conditions. The
necessary requirements for applicability of the new rule are that the defendant is engaged in a hazardous or
inherently dangerous act ivity and that harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of such
hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher will not cover cases of harm to persons
within the premises for the rule requires escape of the thing which causes harm from the premises. The new rule
makes no such distinction between persons within the premises where the enterprise is carried on and persons
outside the premises for escape of the thing causing harm from the premises is not a necessary condition for the
applicability of the rule. Further, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher though strict in the sense that it is not dependent on
any negligence on the part of the defendant and in this respect similar to the new rule, is not absolute as it is
subject to many exceptions 312 but the new rule in Mehta case is not only strict but absolute and is subject to no
exception. Another important point of distinction between the two rules is in the matter of award of damages.
Damages awardable where the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher applies will be ordinary or compensatory; but in cases
where the rule applicable is that laid down in M.C. Mehta’s case the court can allow exemplary damages and the
larger and more prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it. 313But in
Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, 314doubts were expressed as to correctness of this view as to damages by Misra
C.J. that the view taken in Mehta case was obiter and was a departure from the law applied in western countries.
But doubts expressed by MISRA C.J. have not been accepted in Indian Council for Enviro Legal Action v. Union of
India 315 and it was held that the rule laid down in Mehta case was not obiter and was appropriate and suited to the
conditions prevailing in our country. This was a case where hazardous chemical industries had released highly toxic
sludge and toxic untreated waste water which had percolated deep into the soil rendering the soil unfit for cultivation
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2(C) Rule in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India

and water unfit for irrigation, human or animal consumption resulting in untold misery to the villagers of surrounding
areas.

A Division Bench of the M.P. High Court 316 has applied the rule of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (p.503) against the
M.P. Electricity Board although there was also finding of negligence against the Board. It is extremely doubtful if the
rule in M.C. Mehta can be applied to transmission of electricity. M.C. Mehta related to escape of oleum gas and was
applied in Charan Lal Sahu where there was escape of MIC gas. These gases were highly toxic gases. The
transmission of Electricity is not that hazardous. Moreover, there appears to be no statutory authority to support the
manufacture of obum gas or MIC. It is still a question open for decision of the Supreme Court if M.C. Mehta rule
applies when there is statutory authority to carry out the hazardous industry. The Supreme Court has so far not
applied this rule to transmission of Electricity or in a case where there is statutory authority to support the act ivity.

two Judge bench of the Supreme Court, however in a case arising under section 124A of the Railway Act which
provides for strict liability has made obiter observations to the effect: “Apart from the principle of strict liability in
section 124A of the Railway Act and other statutes, we can and should develop the law of strict liability dehors
statutory provisions in view of the Constitution Bench decision of this court in M.C. Mehta case. 317

Mention must also be made of the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 which is an important legislation to promptly
compensate members of the public from accidents arising out of hazardous industries. As the long title discloses,
this is an Act to provide for public liability insurance for the purpose of providing immediate relief to the persons
affected by accident occurring while handling any hazardous substance. Section 3 of the Act provides for liability on
no fault basis to the extent mentioned in the schedule in case of death or injury resulting from an accident while
handling any hazardous substance. Hazardous substance is defined in section 2 (d) to mean any substance or
preparation which is defined as hazardous under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and exceeding such
quantity as may be specified, by notification, by the Central Government. The liability is on the owner and in favour
of any person other than workmen for they are already protected under Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. It is
the duty of the owner to insure himself against liability created by section 3 of the Act. The extent of liability in case
of death or total permanent disablement is Rs. 25,000 and in case of permanent partial disability is on the basis of
the percentage of disability as certified by an authorised physician. Further, there is provision for reimbursement of
medical expenses upto Rs. 12,500 and relief for loss of wages not exceeding Rs. 1,000 p.m. due to temporary
partial disability for a maximum period of 3 months. Compensation for damage to property can also be claimed upto
Rs. 6,000. The liability to pay relief under the Act does not take away the right of the victim or his dependants to
claim higher compensation under any other law but the amount of such compensation shall be reduced by the
amount of relief paid under the Act. The liability created by the Act thus does not in any way affect the liability under
the tort law except to the extent of the amount of relief paid under the Act.

310 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [LNIND 1986 SC 539] : AIR 1987 SC 965 [LNIND 1986 SC 40].
311 M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 [LNIND 1986 SC 539], p. 421. Approved (except as to quantum of
damages) in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1480 [LNIND 1989 SC 639], pp. 1531, 1549, 1550 :
(1990) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 1989 SC 639].
312 See title 2B(ii), p. 498.
313 See Chapter IX, title 1(D)(ii) text and footnotes 60, 61, p. 204.
314 AIR 1990 SC 1480 [LNIND 1989 SC 639], pp. 1545, 1557 : (1990) 1 SCC 613 [LNIND 1989 SC 639]. See further
Chapter IX title 1D(ii), text and footnote 58, p. 204. But in determining compensation payable to Bhopal gas victims
Mehta principle was applied: Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273 [LNIND 1989 SC 805], pp.
280, 281: (1989) 3 SCC 38 [LNIND 1989 SC 922].
315 AIR 1996 SC 1446 [LNIND 1996 SC 353]: 1996 (2) SCALE 44 [LNIND 1996 SC 353] p. 69 : (1996) 3 SCC 212 [LNIND
1996 SC 353]. But “the compensation to be awarded must have some broad correlation not only with the magnitude
and capacity of the enterprise but also with the harm caused by it”: Deepak Nitrite v. State of Gujarat, (2004) 6 SCC
402 [LNIND 2004 SC 614], p. 407 (para 6).
316 Jagdish v. Naresh Soni, (2007) 3 MPHT 234.
317 Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijay Kumar, (2008) 9 SCC 527 [LNIND 2008 SC 1066] para 47 : (2008) 4 JT 598; This
Rule of strict liability has been relied upon by Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Railway Claims
Tribunal (2012) 5 Mad LJ 562 : (2012) 3 LW 889 : (2012) 2 MWN (Civil) 805
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