The Daedalus European Security:

The Interactions of NATO, EU, WEU

Introduction

From the beginning of the 90's the future of the European security was linked
to the vision of the replacement of the old bipolar structures with new co-operative
ones. These would lead to the establishment of a new Pan European co-operative
security regime, in which the new challenges and risks would be dealt. Although the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) could constitute the main
forum in which a new effort would develop, mainly because of its membership which
includes the United States, Canada and Russia, Í ÁÔÏ has emerged finally as the
main organiser of the new European security architecture.

Ten years after key elements of the new European security include a
transformed and expanded NATO and a European Union committed to pursue a
common defence and security policy. The first steps have been already made, but are
they in the right direction, do they promote the desirable co-operative security regime
for the whole Europe? The study examines how the European security structures
evolved after the end of the Cold War by exploring the policies of the US and the
major European actors with an eye to evaluate the progress that has been made
towards the establishment of a new co-operative perception of security throughout
Europe.

In the first chapter the parameters of the European security in the post-Cold war
environment are examined. Since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the
Soviet Union significant changes have taken place in Europe. But not everything has
changed. The U.S. security interests in Europe not only remained undiminished but they
increased further, because of the unique position that the US obtained in the world affairs.
Furthermore, the policies of the major European states retained the daedalus character,
which in the past prevented them from expanding the European unification attempt in the
area of defence and security. It was in that context that the European and Atlantic security
policies had to be developed in order firstly to handle the new risk and challenges to
European security, and secondly to promote co-operation in three levels: at a transatlantic
level, at a European and at a pan-European level, which includes Russia and other former
communist states.

This twofold hard task was considered to be fulfilled by the adaptation of the
European security institutions to the new conditions. Chapter two describes how NATO,
Western European Union and the European Union tried to co-ordinate their adaptation
process in order to promote co-operative arrangements in security and defence issues.
While Europe found itself trapped in the contradictions between the policies of France,
Britain and Germany, the U.S., through NATO, became gradually the basic organiser of the
new European structures by adapting NATO. But it was after 1995, when priority was
given in practice to the U.S. approach to co-operative security for Europe. And that was
inevitable since the Europeans were not effective enough to meet the challenges of the
future.

1
 In Chapter three, the study further examines the continuing process of NATO's
transformation, and the efforts of the major European states to materialise the vision of an
autonomous but compatible to NATO European security and defence policy. As far as
NATO is concerned, emphasis is given on the "open doors" policy, which includes the
enlargement of the alliance, the relations with Russia and the other states of Eastern and
Central Europe, and to the NATO/ESDI/WEU-EU arrangement which was designed to
promote the updating of the transatlantic link. As far as the Europeans is concerned, the
decisions taken during the last five years are described with a critical approach, which
questions the declared willingness for giving the EU the appropriate means to play its full
role on the international stage.

Finally, by using the Kosovo crisis as a case study, in chapter four the study argues
that neither NATO nor EU was not properly prepared, after ten years of efforts, to address
the new crisis in Yugoslavia in a co-operative way. The EU and WEU were involved in the
management of the crisis only within a borderline, the major European states prove one
more time that their national policies and aims faces a great lack of harmonisation, and
NATO's policy in Kosovo demonstrated the difficulties that faced in this case to promote
co-operative actions. The study concludes that unless, the U.S. decides what to do with its
power and the major European states what kind of Europe they want, it will not be easy to
meet the challenge of co-operation.

2
1. Parameters of European Security in the Post Cold War Era

From the beginning of the 90's the future of the European security was linked
to the vision of the replacement of the old bipolar structures with new ones of a co-
operative character. The challenge was double. First it was not certain whether the co-
operation regime would be sustained at the Euro-Atlantic level but also at the western
European one, as the external threat which brought together the allies in the past was
over and the end of the Cold War was raising doubts about their ability to continue to
co-operate versus their propensity to disintegrate. Secondly, in the level of the East-
West relations, it was not clear if their older confronting character could be overcome
and consequently in what way something like that could be achieved.

In the post-Cold War framework the concept of the co-operative security

emerged as the appropriate tool for establishing a new Pan-European security order.
But it should be noticed that at that moment it was not clear what the concept of the
co-operative security exactly suggests or how it would be implemented, although it
was in circulation since the 1970s. In contrast, the use of the term reflected to a great
extent the International Community's fond hopes for a new world without dividing
lines, where security would be indivisible and the means of its protection would be
collective. But which were the new menaces to the European security?

1.1. New challenges and risks

The end of the cold war and the subsequent changes in the international security
environment have raised new possibilities and expectations for the creation of a new
peaceful and stable Europe at a political level. The fall of the Berlin Wall (November 1989)
and the subsequent evolutions in Eastern Europe, the German unification (October 1990),
the demise of the Warsaw Pact (April1991) and the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked
the beginning of a new era, in which the political, economic and military East-West
conflict has disappeared, as the nuclear threat has, too.

The optimism about the peaceful future of the European continent is illustrated in a
very characteristic way in the Paris Charter, which was signed on 21St November 1990 by
all the member states of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE and
then OSCE), which functioned as a forum for the political deliberation between the two
blocs during the Cold War. In the first chapter entitled "A new era of Democracy, Peace
and Unity", it is officially declared that "The era of confrontation and division of Europe
has ended.". It continued by stating that "Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the
past. […] Ours is a time for fulfilling the hopes and expectations our peoples have
cherished for decades."1

In this context, emphasis was given on the development of a new co-operative

security system for Europe and on the emerging of CSCE as the statutory frame in which
this new security system should evolve.2 Former communist states were the most ardent
1
Arie Bloed (ed), The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Analysis and Basic
Documents, 1972-1993 (Dordrecht/ Boston/ London: Kluwer Academic publishers, 1993), p. 537.
2
James Goodby, "A New European Concert: Settling Disputes in CSCE", Arms Control Today, Vol.
21, No.1 (January/February 1991). Charles A. Kupchan & Clifford A. Kupchan, Concerts, Collective
Security, and the Future of Europe, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Summer 1991).
3
supporters of this perspective initially. In their Moscow Declaration on 7th June 1990, the
Warsaw Treaty members called for the overcoming of the division of Europe and for the
initiation of a continuous and comprehensive institutionalisation of the CSCE process.3 In
a relevant article, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic at
that time, mentions: "However, it is quite possible that, by the turn of the millennium,
NATO members themselves will come to the conclusion that the further existence of the
Alliance is unnecessary. […] There is no doubt that the solving of security issues on a bloc
or inter-bloc basis has become outdated and that it is the CSCE framework itself that
provides the spring-board for the future.".4

At the same time, others didn’t share this optimism. Grave concerns have been
expressed about the future of Europe, which were mostly based on the "long peace"
Hypothesis, which John Lewis Gaddis5 had developed in his book, entitled The Long
peace, two years earlier. According to that hypothesis, the absence of war in Europe since
1945 has been due to the bipolar distribution of military power, the approximate military
equality between the two Alliances and the fact that each super-power was armed with a
large nuclear arsenal.

One of the most characteristic articles, entitled "Back to the Future. Instability in
Europe After the Cold War", questioned the diffusive optimism about the European future.
In his article John Mearsheimer argued that "… the Cold War was principally responsible
for transforming a historically violent region into a very peaceful place. […] the demise of
the Cold War order is likely to increase the chances that war and major crises will occur in
Europe. Many observers now suggest that a new age of peace is dawning; in fact the
opposite is true.".6

In fact, at that unique historical moment both approaches, extreme optimism on the
one hand and absolute pessimism on the other, were right to some degree. Optimism was
justified because the possibilities of a nuclear first strike or a conventional surprise attack,
and, even worse, those of an inadvertent nuclear war or an intentional escalation in Europe,
had disappeared. Pessimism was also justified because of Europe's history. In relation to
this Sir Michael Howard (President of the International Institute for Strategic Studies)
pointed out in an article on Europe’s traditional attitudes towards war, entitled "Europe -
Land of Peace or Land of War?", "So we Europeans must understand our past if we are not
to repeat it; understand why we have been a land of war if we are successfully to become a
land of peace.".7

Furthermore, both approaches expressed the same concern, although in a different

way, that is what the future of Europe will be since the old security structures have
collapsed. In other words, both proponents of optimism and pessimism seem to have agreed
on two things: first that the old continent had to face the challenge of establishing a new
order of stability, security and peace, and secondly, that the conditions in Europe were and

3
For the Declaration by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 7 June 1990 see in Disarmament: A
periodic Review by the United Nations, Vol. XIII, No.4, 1990.
4
Zdenek Matejka, Building an All-European Security System: A Czechoslovak View, Disarmament: A
periodic Review by the United Nations, Vol. XIV, No.1, 1991, p. 39.
5
John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace (New York: Oxford 1987).
6
John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future. Instability in Europe After the Cold War", International
Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990). See also, "Why we will soon miss the Cold War", The
Atlantic, Vol. 266, No. 2 ( August 1990).
7
Sir Michael Howard, "Europe - Land of Peace or Land of War?", Aussen Politik, German Foreign
Affairs Review, Vol. 47 (4/96), p. 325.
4
they will remain, in the foreseeable future, in a state of flux and that any developments will
mark a transitory epoch.8

In these terms, the need for the creation of a new European security
architecture was the principal objective and the main question was how to organise
the new European security regime. The classical models for world order systems had
been already tested. The balance of power model had been associated with the
destructive past of Europe, the model of collective defence was not any more
especially relevant and the model of collective security had been associated with the
failure in applying it during the Cold War. Now it was time for Europe to pursue the
establishment of a co-operative security regime.

The term "co-operative" suggests that co-operation is more beneficial than

competition in many circumstances and especially in security issues. The base of such
a regime, as it was declared in the early nineties, would be the "Co-operative
security", which is a process whereby countries with common interests work jointly
through agreed mechanisms to: reduce tension and suspicion; resolve or mitigate
disputes; build confidence; enhance development prospects; and maintain stability in
their regions.9

So, in that context the need to cope with the following issues emerged:

• The definition of the new threats and dangers for the European security.
• The readjustment of the existing institutions and organisations (of Í ÁÔÏ ,
WEU, EU and CSCE) to the new conditions.
• The reconsideration and updating of the transatlantic link on the basis of
reducing the USA role in European affairs and the European’s taking-on more
responsibilities and burdens.
• The re-incorporation of the former East-European countries to the European
structures.
• The definition of the role of Russia but also of Ukraine in European security
matters.

The initial euphoria gave place to an intense speculation as it was found out that the
questions concerning the European Security have not really become much easier to answer
since the end of the Cold War. Instead, elements of instability and in some cases even war,
have become all too frequent in Central and Eastern Europe after the demise of the
communist bloc. The fall of communism has given way to disintegration of multinational
states, a painful process of political and economic transition towards democracy and the
market economy, and the re-emergence of nationalism as a destabilising factor in the
region.

Specifically, the development of chauvinistic passions in Yugoslavia and the civil

war, which followed, proved not only that it was not difficult to locate the new forms of
danger for the European security, but also that the dealing with these dangers should be
rapid. Europe did not have the luxury to elaborate theoretical schemes for a future
8
See: Richards K. Betts, Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control and
the New Europe, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992).
9
See: "Cooperative Security: conflict prevention and building mutual reassurance", Wilton Park
Conference WPS98/9 In Cooperation with Cooperative Monitoring Center, Sandia National
Laboratories, Albuquerque, Monday 3 - Friday 7 August 1998.

5
organisation of its security. On the contrary, Europe should reorganise its security
structures under the pressure of developments at that time.

Because of that, a common consent among European security organisations was

developed during the first half of the 90’s, for the new risks and challenges that had to be
confronted.

Í ÁÔÏ was the organisation which responded swiftly to these new developments
by adopting the new Strategic Concept in 1991. In the relevant document adopted in the
meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on the 7th-8th Nov. 1991,10 there is a
mention of the security challenges and risks, which are described as: " The security
challenges and risks which NATO faces are different in nature from what they were in the
past. The threat of a simultaneous, full-scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has
effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy.
Particularly in Central Europe, the risk of a surprise attack has been substantially reduced,
and minimum allied warning time has increased accordingly. In contrast with the
predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in
nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess."

Particularly, the sources of danger are described as follows: á ) The adverse

consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political
difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many
countries in central and eastern Europe. b) The conventional and nuclear capabilities of
Russia, which have to be taken into account if stability and security in Europe are to be
preserved. c) The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the disruption of the flow
of vital resources and the actions of terrorism and sabotage.

During the extraordinary meeting of the Council of WEU Ministers in Noordwijk,

Netherlands, on the 14th of November 1994, the subject of which was the formulation of a
Common European Defence policy, it was noted that: "The full development of a common
defence policy will require a common assessment and definition of the requirements and
substance of a European defence which would first require a clear definition of the security
challenges facing the European Union and a determination of appropriate responses."11

In May 1995, during the WEU meeting of the Council of Ministers in Lisbon, the
first document that identifies the potential risks to European security was adopted. The
document, which is entitled "Common Reflection on the new European security
conditions"12 identified four broad categories of new risks: a) potential armed conflicts, b)
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, c) international
terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking, uncontrolled and illegal immigration and d)
environmental risks.

The common remark between all risk assessments was that the emergence of the
new national, religious, ethnic and cultural conflicts in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe
constituted the most direct threat to European security. Therefore, dealing with these

10
NATO Mini. Comm. The Alliance's New Strategic Concept, Agreed by the Heads of State and
Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991.
Source: Official Website of NATO.
11
Extraordinary Council of Ministers, Preliminary Conclusions on the Formulation of a Common
European Defence Policy, Noordwijk, 14 November 1994. Source: Official Website of WEU.
12
WEU Council of Ministers, Common Reflection on the new European security conditions, Lisbon,
15 May 1995. Source: Official Website of WEU.
6
dangers would be the corner stone for the organisation of the future co-operative structures
and for the transformation of the security organisations by redefining their role without
creating new separating lines in Europe. This, then, was the framework in which European
and Atlantic security policies had to be developed.

1.2. The policies of European States

During the Cold War the security policies of the major European states (U.K.,
France, Germany) evolved both in the framework of NATO in order to confront the Soviet
threat, and on the basis of their national pursuits defined by historical memories and visions
inherited by age-long European history. This second parameter of security policies of the
three major European states diminished the possibility of extending European integration
from economical only to political security and foreign affairs.

In the new era, beginning with the fall of the old bipolar structures, Europe had to
assume more responsibilities for preserving its security. The invasion of Kuwait showed
that Europe still lacked the political cohesion to provide a military response to events
beyond its doorstep. European Community’s uneven response to the Persian Gulf War
raised doubts about the plausibility of a common security policy in the near future. Only
France and Britain dispatched ground forces to the multinational coalition assembled in
Saudi Arabia and those contingents comprised less than one-tenth the number of the US
forces there.13

Several statements from European leaders proved the widespread dissatisfaction

with the 12-nation community’s reaction to the first global crisis in the aftermath of the
Cold War. British Prime minister John Major said that the European response to the war
demonstrates the futility of trying to achieve European political Union (including a
common foreign and security policy) while Italian Foreign Minister Gianni de Michelis
acknowledged that developing a joint European defence must be a slow and cautious
exercise.14

The "Eurodefence debate" had already emerged and the way of resolving it was a
point of intense dissent between European states because it restored old disputes from a
past full of conflicts, threatening their ability to co-operate and boosting tendency to
disintegrate. The fears about the power and the future role of the reunited Germany, the
concerns and conflicting views related to the national ambitions of France and Britain,
about the degree of the US commitment to European security, and, as a consequence of the
first two, the worries that Europe might revert to its destructive past of power politics,15 set
the frame in which the solutions for the organisation of European security had to be looked
for.

13
“Reduced Threat, Budgets Driving NATO To New Strategy as Europe Tries to Unify", Aviation
Week & Space Technology,
14
"Europe Disunited in Gulf Response", The Washington Post, February 19, 1991.
15
After what was noticed by Dr. Rockman, a political scientist at the University of Pittsburgh "What
we are seeing is the Europe between 1848 and 1914.", "End of the Cold War Tests Bush, Allies On
Foreign Policy", The Christian Science Monitor, August 21, 1992. The question whether Europe will
go back to the situation of the 1920s, when national interests overshadowed any common desire by
states to form alliances, was also discussed at a meeting in 1993 between U.S. military officials and
European security analysts. "U.S., European leaders tell Aspin NATO needs direction", The
Washington Post, September 12, 1993.
7
 In other words, the solution to the "Eurodefence debate" or the debate over Europe's
security architecture that had appeared mostly between France, Britain and the reunified
Germany was not easy to find out, since the security concerns and relative power
considerations in the calculations of the major Western European states vis-a-vis one
another, led to multiple dilemmas and contradicting alternatives concerning the future
creation of a European common security policy. The decisions taken were not the result of
common acceptance; on the contrary, they were the result of continuous compromises in a
range of matters. Consequently, not only were these decisions hardly effective, but also the
image of a daedalus European puzzle was created, the assembly of which still seems very
difficult.

To be more specific, after the end of the Cold War, both Britain and France were
seriously worried about German unification and they agreed that it was necessary to
examine the scope for a closer Franco-British defence co-operation.16 Furthermore, both
were anxious about the political-military role the United States would play in Europe and
how it would play it. It was at this point that the convergence between the policies of the
two states stopped and the divergence began.

Britain chose to balance the reunited Germany by preserving the NATO alliance
and keeping the United States militarily engaged in Europe. At the same time, by doing this
Britain was also consistent to its traditional policy of enhancing its Atlantic ties. So, the
British policy was: do whatever to preserve NATO.

France chose to do the same thing (to balance the reunited Germany) by
strengthening the European Community in political, economic and monetary issues and
forming a European defence identity on an intergovernmental basis and, at the moment,
preferably outside the EC context by pursuing an autonomous role for the WEU, which
would be responsible to the EC. At the same time, by doing this France was preserving its
autonomy in foreign and defence affairs, while it was also consistent to its traditional
policy of seeking a special role in European security and eliminating the role of the US. So,
the French policy was: do whatever to establish an autonomous European defence identity.

On the other hand, the German Chancellor H. Kohl wanted to assure his European
partners that he was committed to "Europeanising Germany", not "Germanising Europe",
but at the same time he wanted Germany to regain the status of a power equal to Britain or
France. This very idea was expressed in Foreign Ministry's spokesman H. Schumacher's
statement: "We have abandoned any policy of power politics. Ours is a policy of taking
over responsibilities in Europe, with our European partners. One thing has changed: The
time when Bonn was carrying out the so-called convoy role of following others is over". 17
In this frame, Germany backed the French initiatives and avoided breaking NATO
cohesion while playing a leading part in promoting political rapprochement with Eastern
Europe states.

16
In her memoirs Margaret Thatcher, describing the two meetings between herself and the President
Mitterrand in December 1989 and in January 1990 in order to discuss Germany' s reunification, writes:
"At the end of the meeting we agreed that our Foreign and Defence Ministers should get together to
talk over the issue of reunification and also examine the scope for closer Franco-British defence co-
operation.". Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), p.p.
796-798.
17
"Germany's New Destiny: reunited Country Seeks An Expanded World Role", The Washington Post,
September 18, 1991.
8
 It was in that controversial context that Europe had to move forward. A clash over
those conflicting interests and policies was expressed at that time in three inter-locking
debates: in the European Community' s intergovernmental conference, the Western
European Union and the NATO strategy review. During the European Community' s
intergovernmental conference in 1991, Jacques Dellors, president of the European
Commission, supported by Germany, proposed that the EC should have its own defence
policy, but Britain did not share the opinion.18

In an article for the Financial Times, the British Foreign Secretary wrote: "Our
approach in the intergovernmental conference is to say: Let us be European but let us not
be arrogant or unrealistic. NATO must be an integral part of the future defence of Europe.
It provides irreplaceable elements in our security, not just for the time being but
permanently. We need to work out in detail how the alliance, the European input and
European union will be linked. An approach which emphasised the separateness of Europe
would seriously weaken our real security.".19 In addition to that, two months later the
Minister said: "We cannot afford to exchange a suit of armour for a husk"20 in order to
divert France’s insistence on promoting an independent European defence identity.

While disputes over the future of European defence were in progress, France
utilised the Yugoslavian crisis outbreak, as an opportunity for Europe to take action
independently. The French President stated: "If, for legal reasons, the United Nations
excuses itself, France expects the European Community to take the initiative of sending
troops."21 Britain expressed its reluctance to accept the idea of a WEU peacekeeping force
and during the special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers of the WEU the idea was
rejected.

On October 1991, France and Germany called for the creation of a strong Western
European corps army, by strengthening the existing 5,000 brigade, as a step towards giving
the region an independent defensive capability.22 They also indicated that military units
from other countries in the European Community could eventually join the force.
Furthermore, in a letter to other European leaders President F. Mitterrand and Chancellor
H. Kohl also proposed that the Western European Union should become the pillar of a joint
European security and defence policy. It is remarkable that just two weeks before joining
that initiative, Germany endorsed an American plan to strengthen NATO's ties with the
emerging democracies of Eastern Europe.

The above mentioned initiative was launched one month before the NATO summit
meeting in Rome, where it was expected to define the alliance's new strategic concept, and
two months before the EC meeting at Maastricht, where decisions about the future of the
European Community and the creation of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI)
would be taken. In addition, two weeks before the aforementioned proposal, another joint
British-Italian one was announced which called for the creation of a European rapid-
reaction force, but it emphasised that any regional military group should remain subservient
to NATO.

18
The following articles present the disagreement: "Europe- A great Idea, Up to a Point", The
Washington Post, April 25, 1991. "Europe's security reduces U.S. role", The Washington Times, June
24, 1991.
19
Douglas Hurd, "No European defense identity without NATO", Financial Times, April 15 1991.
20
"NATO's Difficult Career Change", The New York Times, June 9, 1991.
21
"Mitterrand Seeks Talks On USSR", The Washington Post, September 12, 1991.
22
"Paris And Germans Propose Creation Of European Army", The New York Times, October 17,
1991.
9
 Britain immediately challenged the Franco-German initiative as a potential
threat to NATO. "It does raise some substantial question. We would not support
duplication"23 was the comment of Britain's Defence Minister, T. King. Britain did
not confine itself in critical announcements only, but it threatened that no agreement
on European defence matters was going to be achieved in the EC summit meeting in
Maastricht without the precise definition of the WEU' s future role.24 At the same
time, the U.S. Defence Secretary and NATO Secretary-General strongly opposed to
any initiative that could weaken NATO.25

Under these circumstances, the European states came to the first compromise
for the future role of Europe in defence and security matters. With the Maastricht
Treaty the first Common Foreign and Security Policy has been established which,
could lead to the creation of a common European defence in the future. In addition to
that, a double role was assigned to the Western European Union. It should evolve not
only as the defence component of the EU, but as the European pillar of NATO as
well. This was just the beginning of a constant procedure of determining the future
European Security and Defence Identity through compromises in multiple levels of
national policies of France, Britain, and Germany.

As Robert J. Art points out, " Neither European Political Union nor European
Defence Identity makes sense unless we understand that security concerns and
relative power considerations continue to play an important role in the calculations of
the Western European states vis-a-vis one another. […] Closer economic relations
will not work unless security concerns are properly dealt with first. Therefore, if
Europe as a whole is ever to achieve a large measure of peace, Western Europe must
play a central role, but it will be unable to do so unless its own nightmares are held in
check.".26

Two years after the first "European compromise", in a Report entitled "A
European Security Policy" submitted to the Assembly of Western European Union in
its fortieth ordinary session in November 1994, on behalf of the Political Committee it
was noted that "A European defence policy and, even more so, a European defence is
dependent on the achievement of a European security policy based on a joint
perception of risk and threats to European security, and a joint concept of the ways in
which this security should be guaranteed."27 The same report, following a
comparative analysis of the defence white papers of the three main European actors
(France, UK and Germany), concludes that "While these three documents all allude in
one way or another to the importance of European and transatlantic co-operation, it
is nevertheless clear that the aims of the policies of the countries in question are

23
"Army Proposal Divides NATO", Defence News, October 21, 1991.
24
"Two sides dig in over European defence", Financial Times, October 30, 1991.
25
The U.S Defence Secretary, R. Cheney äÞëù óå ÷áñáêôçñéóôéêÜ: "I think our concern would be that
whatever forces are assigned to the new entity would not be subtracted from those forces assigned to
NATO. We would think that would be a weakening of NATO and we would think that would not be
wise.". Áí ôßóôï é÷ç Þôáí êáé ç äÞëùóç ôï õ Ãà ôï õ Í ÁÔÏ , M. Woerner: "NATO is the alliance for the
security and defence of its members in Europe and North America… It does not make sense to have a
rival force for the same purposes.". "Cheney: NATO must be intact", The Washington Times, October
22, 1991.
26
Robert J. Art, "Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO", Political Science
Quarterly, 111 (Spring 1996).
27
Document 1439, Assembly of Western European Union. "A European Security policy", Report
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Soell, 10th November 1994, p. 6.
10
defined in terms of purely national interests. […] However, in the foregoing
documents there is nothing to imply that the harmonisation of national interests
constitutes an important goal…” .28

A Security and Defence Policy is a deep reflection of a nation's culture and the
sense of its role in the world. As the Gulf War and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia
demonstrated, Europe is blessed with many diverse cultures.

1.3. USA’s continuing security interests in Europe

The other main actor in the development of the framework of Euro-Atlantic

security policy is the United States. For 45 years, the American leadership in world affairs
has been tightly linked to the US military presence in Europe and the containment of the
Soviet threat. The following statement by US Secretary Acheson is indicative of the role
that Europe played in the national security of US: “ We have learned our history lesson
from two world wars in less than half a century. That experience has taught us that the
control of Europe by a single aggressive, unfriendly power would constitute an intolerable
threat to the national security of the United States. We participated in those two great
wars to preserve the integrity and independence of the European half of the Atlantic
community in order to preserve the integrity and independence of the American half”.29

The decision of the United States after World War II to participate in a regional
defensive alliance represented a fundamental change in American foreign policy, as the
definition of national security until 1940 was limited mainly to the protection of domestic
tranquillity, US borders and neighbouring areas in the Western Hemisphere.

Among the accomplishments of the immediate post-war period was the creation of
NATO. Although the primary rationale for this Alliance was the Soviet threat, a significant
secondary result was the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into Western
Europe. In much of the continent, US commitment to NATO was seen as an important
balance to Germany’s potential power. As it has often been mentioned, during the Cold
War the West relied on NATO “to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the
Germans down”.30

The dissolution of the Warsaw pact, the crumbling of the Soviet Union and the
reunification of Germany clearly changed the purpose of the Alliance, founded to counter
the threat from those entities. America, the core actor in NATO, is seen as the strongest
free nation, both economically and militarily. The rapidly changing geopolitical
environment is reviving the seeds of nationalism, the spread of weapons, instability, vast
migrations, ecological damage, festering poverty and separatist violence. So, the US had to

28
Ibid., p.8.
29
Text of Secretary Acheson's Broadcast on Atlantic Accord, The New York Times,
March 19, 1949. It was about the basic principle of the geopolitical theorem which was initially put
forward by Mackinder and was revised by N. Spykman, according to which "Who controls the Rimland
rules Eurasia. Who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the World.". During post war period United
States' policy pursued the preservation of the control over the whole territory of Eurasia with a view to
preventing the USSR from expanding south, as Russia was the power who controlled the central
highlands of Eurasia. See:Nicholas Spykman, America's strategy in World Politics, the United States
and the balance of power (New York: Harcourt Prace, 19944), p.43.
30
“European Insecurity”, The Christian Science Monitor, June 26, 1991.
11
redefine its role on the international scene. Now that the Warsaw Pact has disbanded and
the US presence is shrinking, what happens to the American leadership in Europe? Do the
United States still have security interests in Europe?31

As the US learned its lessons from the past, decided that its interest in Europe
remained vital. It has to be recalled that twice in this century the United States, after having
withdrawn from Europe, had to return to sort out the awful mess that had ensued. After
World War II everybody disarmed and went home, it was then that the US had to come
back and create NATO.

As the only institutional link the U.S. had in Europe was NATO, its main goal in
the new transformed world in the early 1990s, was the reaffirmation of NATO's role as the
central security institution in Europe. NATO was viewed as America’s only hope to retain
its political influence in Europe, as the Continent grew increasingly integrated. As
Secretary of State James Baker said: “ We think it’s still very important to maintain our
commitment to the security of Europe. It is very important that it continue and it will
continue”.32

But this commitment and the Washington’s desire to shift more of the financial
burden of defending Europe to its NATO partners were not matched with a willingness to
consider a larger security role for institutions other than NATO.33 Ever since NATO was
established, US political leaders have been urging the European nations to assume more
responsibility for their own defence and to pay a larger portion of the cost. Washington has
also consistently expressed its support for greater European unity on both economic and
security matters. Despite such official enthusiasm for a strong “European pillar” to support
NATO, US policy-makers have, in reality, been ambivalent about European allies; taking
greater initiative.

During the Cold War, Washington viewed with suspicion any signs that European
powers were pursuing independent policies, such as Bonn’s Ostpolitic strategy in the
1970s or Chancellor Kohl’s reunification overtures to Moscow in the weeks following the
opening of the Berlin Wall. What the US has always wanted is the best of both worlds: a
democratic Europe strong enough to relieve the US from some of its security burdens, but
no so strong as to challenge US primacy.

Washington’s uneasiness about a meaningful European security role has become

even more apparent regarding their European allies taking greater initiative. Secretary of
Defence Cheney’s opposition to the creation of a “rapid reaction force” under the auspices
of the European Community is merely one manifestation of that ambivalence.34

The U.S. has backed the development of a European security organisation that
would bear more responsibility, project a European voice, cooperate with NATO and be
able to act outside the NATO area. But when WEU foreign and defence Ministers
supported the idea of the WEU becoming the European security and defence pillar, the US

31
About the relevant speculation See: Robert J. Art, A Defensible Defense. America's Grand Strategy
After the Cold War, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Spring 1991). Josef Joffe, "Bismarck" or
"Britain"? Toward an American Grand Strategy after Bipolarity, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4
(Spring 1995). Richard Holbrooke, America, A European Power, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No.2
(March/April 1995).
32
“For Bush NATO talks May Test His Strategy”, The New York Times, November 6, 1991.
33
“ NATO Defense Ministers Press Autonomy Theme”, Defence News, July 1, 1991.
34
“US Must Shake its NATO Habit”, The Christian Science Monitor, June 19, 1991.
12
sent a letter to the WEU capitals voicing concern about a WEU caucus approach in
NATO.35

Thus the controversy over whether there should be an autonomous European

defence, led the US Ambassador to NATO William Taft to say: “ Any attempt by the
Europeans to take over their own defence would be viewed with suspicion by Washington.
The US public won’t understand any proposal to replace NATO with a different
mechanism to undertake its fundamental role of deterrence and defence”.36

This stance emerged in a very characteristic way, during the Rome Summit in
1991, when President Bush called on allies to affirm their support for continued US
military presence in Europe: “ Our premise is that the American role in the defence and the
affairs of Europe will not be made superfluous by European Union. If our premise is
wrong-if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defence-
the time to tell us is today”.37

German Chancellor Kohl moved to allay US concerns about its continued role in
Europe. He called a united Europe without NATO “unthinkable”. French President
Francois Mitterrand said NATO would continue to play a key role, but that more room
should be made for the European Community.

In the year that followed, similar controversies in key issues, such as transatlantic
military ties, how to "rescue" Eastern Europe,38 farm trade etc, became more frequent.
France sought to build a new European armed force outside NATO. The US wanted
NATO to retain the main role.39 France was convinced that the European Community
could only achieve a distinctive role on the world stage by acting more independently from
the United States. The resurrection of Cold War language such as that used by President
Bush in January 1992, when he accused the European Community of hiding behind an
“iron curtain” of protectionism-appears symptomatic of the new hostility. Bush’s words
provoked an angry response from Mitterrand: “ France is not ready to bow to American
demands, nor to submit to the interests of any other country”.40 These tensions seemed to
ease when both France and US engaged in Bosnia-Herzegovina.41

Under Clinton administration, the US commitment to Europe and therefore to

NATO remained undiminished. The US has been open to work out a new kind of security
partnership between the Americans and the Europeans. “ Clinton feels this new European
defence identity is something to be welcomed. It’s time for a new page to be turned and
there is a new openness on both sides to do so”.42

But, the fact was that apart from the studies and the talks about European defence
by the Europeans, in many circumstances only the US was prepared to act if such a need
emerged. Talking about a common foreign and security policy for Europe, part of a new
35
“Europe Pushes for New Security Organization”, The Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 1991.
36
“Europe Convinces US that EC Army Won’t Harm NATO", The Wall Street Journal, October 18,
1991.
37
“Bush is Assured Europe Wants US in NATO”, The Wall Street Journal, November 8, 1991.
38
"NATO Explores New Paths to Closer East Europe Ties", Defense News, September 30, 1991.
39
“Stale French-American Quarrels”, The New York Times, July 29, 1992.
40
“Tensions Between France and US Said to Turn Allies into Rivals”, The Washington Post, January
22, 1992.
41
“ NATO Offers 6000 Troops for UN Duty in Bosnia”, Associated Press, September 3, 1992.
42
“Clinton Sends Emissaries to Reassure Europeans on His Foreign Policy”, The Washington Post,
October 8, 1992.
13
dividing up of security responsibilities with the United States, sounded hollow when the
European powers proved themselves unable to do anything useful about the war between
Serbia and Croatia. Yugoslavia was a European nation and a European responsibility.
Washington left the leadership to Brussels and promised its backing. It resulted in failure.43

As US Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs at that time,
Richard Holbrooke later stated: "Unless the United States is prepared to put its political
and military muscle behind the quest for solutions to European instability, nothing really
gets done."44 Even critics acknowledge that nothing moved without America.

During the direct negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, where the Presidents of Bosnia,
Croatia and Serbia sought for a peaceful settlement in Bosnia, US President reaffirmed its
country interests in Europe: Making peace in Bosnia is important to America. …Making
peace will prevent the war from spreading. So far, we have been able to contain this
conflict to the former Yugoslavia. But the Balkans lie at the heart of Europe, next door to
several of our key NATO allies and to some of the new, fragile European democracies. If
the war there reignites, it could spread and spark a much larger conflict, the kind of
conflict that has drawn Americans into two European wars in this century…. Making
peace will advance our goal of a peaceful, democratic and undivided Europe, a Europe at
peace with extraordinary benefits to our long-term security and prosperity, a Europe at
peace with partners to meet the challenges of the new century -- challenges that affect us
here at home like terrorism and drug trafficking, organised crime and the spread of
weapons of mass destruction. Our enduring interest in the security and stability of Europe
demand it.”45

The U.S. security interests in Europe remain unchanged until nowadays, despite the
profound changes that have swept Europe since Clinton took office eight years ago. Key
elements of the new Europe include an expanded NATO alliance and a European Union
committed to accepting new members among its former adversaries. NATO expansion
resulted in a new European security system and an affirmation of Washington's
commitment to Europe.

In her preliminary comments on NATO enlargement, before the Senate Armed

Services Committee, Secretary Albright stated: “The United States has important security
interests in central and eastern Europe. If there were a major threat to the peace and
security of this region, there is already a high likelihood that we would decide to act,
whether NATO enlarges or not. The point of NATO enlargement is to deter such a threat
from ever arising”.46 The Secretary of Defence William Cohen in his Statement before
the same Committee, noted: "NATO enlargement is critical to protecting and promoting
our vital national security interests in Europe. If we fail to seize this historic opportunity to
help integrate, consolidate, and stabilise Central and Eastern Europe, we would risk
paying a much higher price later.".

NATO's enlargement was a symbol of the fact that, contrary to what everybody was
expecting after the end of the Cold War, there was more of America in Europe, not less. As
Secretary of State Albright said in an interview:"Those interests we have in a stable
Europe, that have led us to deploy forces in Europe, that have led us to enlarge the NATO
43
“Europe Doesn’t Do the Jon”, The SUN, November 14, 1991.
44
"Europe' s Dallying Amid Crises Scares Its Critics", International Herald Tribune, February 8, 1996.
45
Bosnia Negotiations: Statement by President Clinton, Office of the Press Secretary, October 31,
1995.
46
Albright Testimony on NATO Enlargement, Office of the Press Secretary, 4/23/97.
14
alliance are the very same interests that are at stake. They're not the same, specific facts,
but the interests are the same. The stability of Europe is a vital interest of US national
interests."47

Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, in his book

entitled "the Grand Chessboard", explains why:48 The collapse of the enemy left the
USA in a unique position. They became both the first and the only real major
universal power. (p. 31). For America the major geopolitical gain was Eurasia. (p.
63). Europe is the substantive geopolitical bridgehead of USA in the Eurasian
continent the strategical interests of USA are huge […] NATO is barricading directly
the American political influence and military strength in the Eurasian continent. At
this point of American-European relations, while the allied European nations are still
depending on USA protection any expansion of European influence is becoming a
direct expansion of US influence. Reversibly, without tight transatlantic bonds
American primacy in Eurasia is not in force. (pp. 109-110).49

In other words, American presence in Europe helps also vital US interests in other
places. As Secretary Albright has often stated: "US as a global power with interests and
connections on every continent, … we have a vital stake in creating and sustaining the
conditions for global prosperity.",50 or “America is a global power with global interests.
To protect those interests, it is important that the United States be fully and appropriately
represented in key capitals around the world”.51 These global interests such as the
democratic and free market reforms in Russia,52 the expansion of co-operation and the
narrowing of differences with China as it emerges as a key Asian and global power,53 the
routes to oil supplies in Caucasus and Middle East regions, are served with U.S. presence
in Europe. And the U.S. presence in Europe was considered to be best served through the
pursuing of a strategy that ensures primacy but in a co-operative context where the
Europeans would assume more responsibilities and burdens, former adversaries become
partners and the U.S. retain the prerogative of selective engagement in European security
matters.54

47
Interview on CNN, Secretary of State Albright, 6/10/99.
48
In March 200, Secretary Albright in her remarks at Aspen European Dialogue stated that “Professor
Brzezinski taught me everything I know while at Columbia, and then how to apply that knowledge at
the National Security Council in the 1970's.”.
49
The extracts come from the Greek version of the book, that is why there may be differences from the
original text, which, however, don't change the initial meaning. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand
Chessboard, (Athens: Nea Sinora, 1998) (in Greek).
50
Albright's address on International Economic Leadership, 97/09/18.
51
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Approval of Ambassadorial Nominations July 30, l997.
52
Pickering: International Affairs in the 21st Century, 97/11/18.
53
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright , Statement before the Senate Finance Committee,
Washington, D.C., June 10, 1997.
54
See: Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy, International
Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97).
15
2. The European Security Institutions: A first attempt to
achieve co-operative security

Until 1990 there was a broad functional division in security matters among
NATO, European Community and Western European Union, while CSCE functioned
mostly as a political forum for consultations among its member states. This neat
division did not survive at the end of the Cold War, all four institutions had to adjust
to a very different security environment, where no single organisation could handle
the whole European security process. Although the need for a co-operative security
system within the context of CSCE was acknowledged in official documents, priority
was given in practice to the U.S. approach to co-operative security for Europe. And
that was inevitable since the Europeans were not effective enough to meet the
challenges of the future. The U.S. through NATO became gradually the basic
organiser of the new European co-operative structures by effectively adapting NATO
to the new situation.

2. 1 The North Atlantic (Political ?) Organization

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation was formed against the backdrop of
emerging tensions after World War II. It has been argued that NATO had been a European
initiative from the beginning: it was as explicit an invitation as has ever been extended from
smaller powers to a great power to construct an empire and include them within it.55 On
April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, and
the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty, the political framework for a defensive
alliance designed to prevent aggression, or, if necessary, to resist attack against any alliance
member. On September 17, 1949, the first North Atlantic Council session was held in
Washington and in December 1949 adopted the Alliance' s first strategy which approved
plans for the defence of Western Europe including US use of nuclear weapons, if necessary,
to defend NATO nations.56

During the Cold War, NATO' s collective defence strategy was primarily based on
the principle of deterrence. Given the marked inferiority of allied conventional strength in
Europe, the NATO guarantee rested primarily on the nuclear superiority of the United States
and the so-called strategy of "massive retaliation". In the conclusion of a 1967
comprehensive review of NATO strategy, the alliance adopted a revised approach to its
common defence, based on a balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all
levels of aggression or threats of aggression. The basis of the new concept of "flexible
response"57 was the belief that NATO should be able to deter and counter military force with
a range of responses designed to defend directly against attack at an appropriate level, or, if
necessary, to escalate the attack to the level necessary to persuade an aggressor to desist.
55
John Lewis Gaddis, We know now: Rethinking Cold war history (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p.
49.
56
For a detailed analysis and a historical overview of NATO' s Strategy Documents, see: NATO
Strategy Documents 1949-1969, Edited by Dr. Gregory W. Pedlow, (Chief , Historical Office Supreme
Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in collaboration with NATO International Staff Central Archives).
Source: NATO' s official Website.
57
Flexible response is the accompanying nuclear strategy, which envisages meeting an overwhelming
conventional attack first with battlefield and then more destructive strategic nuclear weapons.
16
 At the same time, the Alliance accepted the recommendations of the report written
by former Belgium Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel and entitled "Future Tasks of the
Alliance"58 which outlined the need to work towards the achievement of disarmament and
balanced force reductions. The maintenance of adequate military forces would be coupled
with an effort to improve East-West relations. On May 30-31, 1972 NATO agreed to start
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; members also proposed talks on
Mutual Balanced Force Reductions.

Soviet deployment of new mobile theater nuclear missiles (SS-20s) called into
question the accepted NATO strategy of deterrence based on the concepts of forward
defence59 and flexible response and lead to a decision in 1979 to modernise its defensive
capability. NATO decided to deploy Pershing II missiles in Europe if the Soviets refused to
negotiate withdrawal of SS-20 missiles in Eastern Europe. The resulting "dual-track"
decision by the Alliance combined arms control negotiations with appropriate responding to
the increased imbalance created by the new Soviet systems. Alliance governments agreed to
deploy U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe.

The successful conclusion of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in

1987, while eliminating all Soviet and U.S. land-based, intermediate-range missiles,
required a new appraisal of NATO's policy. In response, the alliance developed its
"Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament," which provided a framework
for alliance policy in nuclear, conventional, and chemical fields of arms control and tied
defence policies to progress in arms control.

Through this brief retrospection, it is ascertained that NATO has made successive
readjustments of its military doctrine in order to cope with the changes in the framework of
the security environment. But during the early 90’s NATO dealt with a different challenge
since the radical changes that occurred in the international scene questioned its cause of
existence.

2.1.1 The new strategic concept

Until the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe began in 1989, the confrontation
between the Warsaw Pact and NATO had dominated the world politics. The Warsaw Pact,
which had 5 million troops and ensured Moscow's domination throughout the Eastern Bloc,
began on May 14, 1955 as a response to the West Germany's entrance into NATO. Since the
countries of Eastern Europe broke away, one by one, from the Soviet sphere of influence in
1989 and the Kremlin spoke of the end of the cold War with the West, the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact was considered inevitable. 60

Europe's new security milieu affected the future role of NATO. In the past several
years’ efforts to reconfigure NATO have led to doctrinal changes and unilateral force
reductions. An alliance for common defence cannot reinvent itself without a new
unambiguous adversary. So for NATO it was the to-be-or-not-to-be question: Who needs
NATO any more, now that the Soviet Union is no longer a threat?61 At the same time many
58
See, The Harmel Report : full reports by the rapporteurs on the future tasks of the Alliance. Source:
NATO' s official Website.
59
Forward defense refers to the alliance's conventional force posture, which required large numbers of
troops along NATO's eastern borders, mostly in Germany.
60
"End of Warsaw Pact Means a new Europe", The Christian Science Monitor, April 15, 1991.
61
"Institution in Need of a Cause", The SUN, September 4, 1991.
17
questioned the relevance of NATO after the Cold War and feared a neglected gray zone
between Western Europe and Russia.

As it was becoming clear the new dangers to Euro-Atlantic security did not lie in
threats of a direct armed attack, but rather in trans-national perils (ethnonationalist rebellion,
migration, terrorism) against which the armoured divisions of NATO had no effect. In
recognition of the radical political changes in Europe and the improved security
environment, the Ministers mandated a fundamental review of the Alliance's political and
military strategy.

In July 1990, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) issued the "London Declaration on
a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance"62 trying to adapt to the new realities in Europe
mostly by enhancing the political component of the Alliance. The Ministers pledged to
intensify political and military contacts with Moscow and with Central and East European
capitals and to work not only for the common defence but to build new partnerships with all
the nations of Europe as well. They underlined the need to undertake broader arms control
and confidence-building agreements to limit conventional armed forces in Europe.

Policy disagreements between France and the United States were blocking NATO
progress towards formulating the alliance's post-Cold War. More than a year after the fall of
the Berlin wall, the future of NATO was so murky that an alliance-wide summit devoted to
the subject had been on hold.63

France and the US had been at loggerheads since London summit over their
respective visions of NATO's role in the post-Cold War world. The US wanted to decrease
its military responsibilities in Europe in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal from Eastern
Europe, but without relinquishing political influence. Therefore, the US backed an expanded
role for Europe, but it also wanted to revamp NATO as a more political body with a broader
reach. France, pointing to the disappearing threat from the Soviet Union, envisaged a
diminished NATO, with political control of European security policy transferred to
European community. France wanted to create a stronger Europe, but with an independent
security and defence identity. Arguing that the US is unwilling to give Europeans any
leadership role within NATO, France opposed to efforts to give NATO new political tasks.64

On March 7, the president of the European Commission proclaimed that a common

defence policy, written into the Treaty of Rome, is an essential goal if the Western alliance
is to remain effective. Jacques Delors said that the Gulf crisis, in which the EC failed to
offer a united response to Iraqi aggression, had provided an object lesson on the EC's present
limitations. Without a common defence policy Europe would never be able to face its
international responsibilities.65 Delors said the EC had to face that challenge.

Since then, NATO moved forward very fast. In its ministerial meeting in
Copenhagen in June 1991 France lost a vigorous debate on the breadth and depth of NATO's
future political role in Europe. Foreign ministers decided against a French-led effort to limit
NATO's purview to strictly military matters.66 In a June 7 statement, the ministers endorsed

62
London Declaration On A Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, North Atlantic Council, London 5-6
July 1990. Source: Official Website of NATO.
63
"NATO without the Pact", The Sun, April 2, 1991.
64
US-French Row blocs NATO progress on Defense Strategy, Defense News, February 11, 1991.
65
"EC Chief calls for Common European Defense Policy", The Christian Science Monitor, March 11,
1991.
66
“ NATO rethinks Role After Soviet Breakup”, Defense News, September 9, 1991.
18
the US position that NATO should be the key forum for both political and military decisions
involving the security of NATO members.

In August 1991, the West's reaction to the failed coup that temporarily toppled
Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev confirmed the largely political role the NATO
alliance has assumed in the post-Cold War period. Throughout the Soviet crisis, NATO's
central command, its bulwark against a Soviet invasion, went about peacetime activities
without a break. NATO was the forum for the West's collective reaction to the coup. The
European Community also voted to suspend $1.145 billion in technical and food aid until
the Soviets re-establish democratic reform.67

But NATO offered the chance for the leaders of Western Europe and the U. S. to
address the crisis collectively. The August 21 NATO gathering was a meeting of the North
Atlantic Council (NAC), the organisation's foreign ministers, rather than the Defense
Planning Committee. During their deliberations, NATO Secretary-General Manfred
Woerner was summoned to take a telephone call from Boris N. Yeltsin, president of the
Russian republic and the leader who put down the revolt.68 Yeltsin told Woerner he had
assumed control of the military in Gorbachev's absence and that the Red Army's tanks were
withdrawing from Moscow. That the ad hoc leader of the Soviet Union would be consulting
with the secretary-general of NATO at such a moment reassured members that their
judgement at the 1990 London summit had been correct.

Soviet coup prompted rethinking of security arrangements in Europe.69 British

Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd implied that the West could look forward to an even more
co-operative relationship with the Soviet Union than it has had in the last two years. US
Secretary Baker said that “The crisis has demonstrated the importance of NATO Alliance
first as a political instrument for supporting democracy and reform in Eastern Europe as
well as the Soviet Union, second as a forum to co-ordinate a Western response to common
political as well as military challenges, and third as a firm bulwark for our common
security”.70

NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner said that the new situation emerged after the
soviet coup had failed, has forced NATO to review its strategy, which was two years in the
making and scheduled to be unveiled in Rome. This grand strategy has been overtaken by
events in the Soviet Union.71

In the light of changed circumstances, in November 1991, the Rome Declaration on

Peace and Co-operation further underlined NATO's intention to redefine its objectives by
adopting the alliance's "New Strategic Concept".72 The New Strategic Concept identifies that
the threat of a massive full-scale Soviet attack, which had provided the focus of NATO's
strategy during the Cold War, had disappeared but at the same time new broader challenges
to alliance security interests, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
regional instability, and terrorism had emerged. The Alliance acknowledged that these risks

67
“Europeans Delaying Aid, Demanding Assurances, The Washington Post, August 20, 1991.
68
“Baker hopes the crisis hastens pace of reform”, The Washington Times, August 22, 1991.
69
“Soviet events send NATO back to drawing board", The Washington Times, September 5, 1991.
70
“Soviet coup prompted rethinking of security arrangements in Europe”, The Christian Science
Monitor, August 23, 1991.
71
“NATO Shief: Soviets Face Costly Transition, The Washington Times, September 8, 1991.
72
The Alliance's New Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in
the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th Nov. 1991. Source: Official Website of
NATO.
19
were less predictable73 and beyond the focus of traditional concerns. Instead of an
identifiable foe, NATO saw ''economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes,'' as being flash points against which the alliance's members
need protection.

In that context the strategy adopts a broader approach to security, centered

more on crisis management and conflict prevention while at the same time pursuing
political efforts favouring dialogue with Russia and the other countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. In order to fulfil its new tasks the alliance recognises, first that "the
creation of a European identity in security and defence will underline the
preparedness of the Europeans to take a greater share of responsibility for their
security and will help to reinforce transatlantic solidarity." and second that "Other
European institutions such as the EC, WEU and CSCE also have roles to play, in
accordance with their respective responsibilities and purposes, in these fields.".

The declaration also outlined the alliance's future tasks in the context of a
framework of interlocking and mutually reinforcing institutions, including the
European Union, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
the Western European Union (WEU), and the Council of Europe, working together to
build a new European security system. However it keeps the main responsibility for
the alliance itself since "the extent of its membership and of its capabilities gives
NATO a particular position in that it can perform all four-core security functions.
NATO is the essential forum for consultation among the Allies and the forum for
agreement on policies bearing on the security and defence commitments of its
members under the Washington Treaty.".74

As far as the military strategy is concerned, the new strategic concept provided
that the Alliance will maintain a mixture of nuclear and conventional forces based in
Europe, although at significantly lower levels. To ensure effectiveness, alliance forces
must become increasingly mobile to respond to a range of contingencies and must be
prepared for flexible build-up to react to regional instability and crises. Collective
defence arrangements will rely on multinational forces within the integrated military
structure. Nuclear forces continue to play an essential role in Allied strategy but will
be maintained at the minimum level sufficient to preserve stability.

With the adoption of the new strategic concept NATO's first attempt of
adjusting to the new security environment was completed and the basic axes of future
action concerning further approach of NATO's internal and external dimension of
adaptation were determined.75 Í ÁÔÏ remained basically a defence coalition but since
a clear threat did not exist, the transformation into a European security organisation
capable of dealing with crisis in Europe and to perform multilateral peace operations

73
NATO General Secretary Manfred Woerner characterized the situation as ``a lot of risks that you cannot clearly
define.'', "NATO's New Strategy Stresses Mobility for `Crisis' Management", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, June 3, 1991.
74
It was the response of USA and Britain to the dispute about USA and NATO role in Europe In his comment
the U. S. President George Bush had said that if European officials believed the U. S. should not be on the
Continent, it was the time to say so. The comment was aimed at France, which wanted the European defense force
to work ''in parallel'' with NATO. Britain championed the opposite view, that any separate European force must be
a ''pillar'' for NATO. "NATO Strategy Review Moves Faster On Political Rather Than Military Front", Aviation
Week & Space Technology, November 11, 1991.
75
See: Manfred Worner, (NATO Secretary General), NATO Transformed: The significance of the
Rome Summit, and General John R. Galvin, (saceur), From Immediate Defence Towards Long-term
Stability, NATO Review, Web Edition, Vol. 39, No. 6 (Dec. 1991).
20
was promoted. Before assuming this new role, NATO's legitimisation in three levels
(internal-allied, relations with the former USSR and international institutions) had to
precede. Based on these objectives NATO's further transformation was promoted.

2.1.2 The Adaptation Process

Following the adoption of the new strategic concept, NATO was deeply
involved in a complex process involving both internal and external adaptation. The
first dimension of adaptation describes the transformation process of NATO's internal
structures the objective of which was first the upgrading of European allies’ role in
defense and security matters, and second the development of a new command
structure capable of coping with the demands of NATO's new role. To that twofold
end two new interrelated concepts developed in the framework of NATO. The first
was the European Security and Defence identity (ESDI) and the second the concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs).

Discussions about the enhancement of European role within NATO began in

the early 90's while the CJTF concept was launched in late 1993. The milestone for
further development of these concepts was the January 1994 NATO summit in
Brussels, which endorsed streamlining the internal structure of the Alliance, in order
to prepare NATO for new roles and missions. Specifically, in the adopted Declaration
it is mentioned that " We have agreed: to adapt further the Alliance's political and
military structures to reflect both the full spectrum of its roles and the development of
the emerging European Security and Defence Identity, and endorse the concept of
Combined Joint Task Forces". 76

ESDI provided the solution to the puzzling of the early 90’s concerning US
aspiration of reinforcing European role within the NATO framework and to the
dispute between European states whether Europe should promote an autonomous
defence and security identity. The issue of how Europeans could develop a common
foreign and security policy which might lead to a common defence policy, without
duplicating and weakening NATO was resolved through the elaboration and
implementation of the ESDI. As the EU would develop its common foreign and
security policy in order to achieve a common defence policy, NATO would continue
to develop the ESDI in order to enable Europeans to take more responsibility for their
own security and defence, working within the Alliance.

Since the Maastricht Treaty, which had established the Common Foreign and
Security Policy (CFSP), stipulated that it was the Western European Union's task to
elaborate and implement defence-related decisions and actions of the European
Union, while at the same time WEU was the European pillar of NATO, the proper
channel for developing ESDI was the establishment of an evolving and effective co-
operation between NATO and WEU. The Brussels Declaration mentioned
characteristically:

"We support strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance through the
Western European Union, which is being developed as the defence component of the
European Union. The Alliance's organisation and resources will be adjusted so as to

76
Press Communique M-1(94)3, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, NATO Headquarters,
Brussels, 11 Jan. 1994.
21
facilitate this. […] We therefore stand ready to make collective assets of the Alliance
available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU
operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their Common Foreign
and Security Policy. We support the development of separable but not separate
capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to
Alliance security."

In order to fulfil this provision NATO adopted the CJTF concept. One month
later, in an article, the Secretary General of NATO, M. Woerner described the concept
by writing: "The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept represents the next
logical step in this adaptation of our force structures. It will provide the flexibility
that would be required to allow NATO and non-NATO forces to act together in
peacekeeping and other contingency operations. Using a "building bloc" approach,
command elements could be detached from major NATO commands for operations
under NATO or, where NATO decides not to become involved, under WEU auspices.
The concept therefore provides a mechanism for cooperation with units from states
that are not part of the Alliance's integrated military structure, or with units
representing other organisations. In this manner, forces can also be created to permit
Allies to act jointly with Cooperation Partners or other states. ".77

The second dimension, the so called external adaptation, refers to the

institutional reinforcement of the relations between NATO and former Warsaw Pact
states (including Russia) according to the "open doors" policy and to the expansion of
the Alliance. At first, many East Europeans leaders believed the best solution was to
create new structures under the umbrella of the CSCE. The futility of the CSCE's
condemnation of Soviet use of force in the Baltics made them sceptical whether
CSCE could fill that role. One of the most outspoken proponents of the CSCE,
Czechoslovakia's President Vaclav Havel said: "NATO is Europe's only functioning
democratic security structure".78 Most Central and Eastern leaders were seeking
alignment with the West to balance their geographical proximity to Russia, and their
continuing economic dependence on it.

Although in the London summit NATO heads of state proposed friendly relations
with their former adversaries and there have been named diplomatic liaisons, since then 79
NATO leaders worried that too close an embrace with the East Europeans would isolate
Moscow and heighten concerns of Soviet military and political hard-liners. Hans-Dietrich
Genscher, the German foreign minister said that it would be unwise for East Europeans
countries to try to join NATO.80 In February 1991, a high level NATO team discouraged
any embarrassing application for NATO membership from Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland.81 As the first East European head of state to pay a visit to the headquarters of the
NATO, Havel appealed for closer relations between NATO and the new democracies of
Eastern Europe to ease the dangers of a security vacuum created by the collapse of Warsaw

77
Manfred Worner (Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council), Shaping The
Alliance for the Future, NATO Review, vol. 42, no. 1, (feb 1994), web edition.
78
" Western European Nations Edging closer to NATO", The Wall Street Journal, February 15, 1991.
79
"East Europeans Seek closer ties with NATO", The Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1991.
80
"East ends its military alliance", The Washington Times, April 1, 1991. The official Tass News
Agency warned former members of the Pact, that they would threaten Soviet security interest if the
joined the rival alliance.
81
"Warsaw Pact Dissolution Opens no NATO doors", Defense News, March 4, 1991.
22
Pact: "Instability, poverty, misfortune and disorder in the countries … could threaten the
West just as the arms arsenal of the former despotic governments did".82

In an effort to ease the concerns of Eastern European countries still worried about a
possible return of soviet occupation forces,83 so that these former Warsaw Pact countries
would stop asking to join NATO, the Alliance declared that “any coercion or intimidation”
aimed at the countries of Central and eastern Europe would be treated as a matter of “direct
and material concern” to the 16 member of NATO.84 In its ministerial meeting in
Copenhagen in June 1991, the Ministers of the NAC stated with emphasis that their purpose
was not "to isolate any country, nor see a new division of the Continent.".85

NATO Secretary Manfred Woerner disclosed that during the Soviet crisis in August
1991, NATO reinforced its links with the former Soviet satellites of East and Central
Europe.86 NATO had declined requests from these countries for Western military protection
during the past two years out of fear of provoking the Soviet Union's reaction. The military
implications were not lost on the Central Europeans who used the coup to reassert their
interest in joining the Alliance.87 As word spread that the revolt failed, the Baltic Republic
of Latvia declared independence, joining Estonia and Lithuania in splitting with the
Kremlin.88 The failed hard-line coup in Moscow has also caused a virtual revolution in the
Ukraine, which had been counted on as a conservative communist bastion that would join
Gorbachev’s new Soviet Federation. Ukrainian independence followed some days later.89

Thus, the following Rome meeting90 created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
(NACC) in order to develop an institutional relationship of consultation and co-operation on
political and security issues between NATO and its former adversaries. This initiative
culminated in the participation of Foreign Ministers and representatives from the 16 NATO
countries, six Central European countries, and the three Baltic States at the inaugural
meeting of the NACC in December 1991. At the second NACC meeting in March 1992, the
new independent states of the former Soviet Union became members, except Georgia, which
was admitted the following month. Albania joined the NACC in June 1992.

The Brussels Summit, in 1994, launched the Partnership for Peace (PfP),91 which
expands and intensifies practical political and military co-operation between NATO and
countries of central Europe and former Soviet republics, as well as some of Europe's
traditionally neutral countries, and allows them to consult with NATO in the event of a
direct threat to their security. The program, conceived at the time by US Secretary of
Defence Les Aspin, was intended to encourage non-NATO members to develop civilian
82
"Havel Urges NATO to seek ties with East's new Democracies", The Washington Post, March 22,
1991.
83
“Eastern Europe feels ignored by NATO, EC”, The Washington Times, August 1, 1991.
84
"NATO tries to Ease Military Concerns in Eastern Europe", The New York Times, June 7, 1991.
85
Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Statement issued by the North Atlantic
Council, Meeting in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991. Source: Official Website of
NATO.
86
"NATO Chief: Soviets Face Costly Transition", The Washington Times, September 8, 1991.
87
“Coup’s Lessons for Central Europe”, The Christian Science Monitor, August 26, 1991.
88
“Hard-Liners Fold, Yeltsin’s triumph saves Gorbachev”, The Washington Times, August 22, 1991.
89
“Ukrainian Leader Asks Removal of Soviets’ Nuclear Weapons”, The Washington Post, August 30,
1991.
90
Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation, Press Communique S-1(91)86 Issued
by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Rome 8th Nov. 1991.
91
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/ North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NATO
Headquarters, Brussels, 10-11 January 1994.
23
control of defence ministries and to start joint planning and joint military exercises with
NATO.92

Since NATO's new post-Cold War military strategy, CIS states have responded with
everything, from requests for associate membership status in the NATO alliance to joint
training exercises. Although PfP does not extend NATO security guarantees, it was the
initial effort to achieve some of those aims. But it was also a mechanism for creating co-
operative relations with the former adversaries. In Brussels, NATO leaders also welcomed
an evolutionary expansion of NATO membership to include new democracies in the region.
A study on NATO Enlargement was also initiated by NATO Foreign Ministers in December
1994 and published in September 1995.93

While promoting the internal and external adaptation of NATO, emphasis was
put on developing the organisation's new role in peacekeeping operations. At the
Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo (June 4, 1992) NATO
Foreign Ministers affirmed for the first time their readiness to support peacekeeping
activities under the auspices of the OSCE on a case-by-case basis in June 1992.94 On
July 1992, the OSCE at the Helsinki follow-up Conference expressed his approval for
CSCE peacekeeping activities by NATO. On the same day the North Atlantic Council
agreed on a NATO maritime operation in the Adriatic, in co-ordination with the
WEU, to monitor compliance with the UN embargo against Serbia and Montenegro.

In September the NAC agreed on measures to make Alliance resources

available in support of UN, CSCE, and EC efforts to bring peace in former
Yugoslavia. NATO began enforcing UN economic sanctions against Serbia-
Montenegro and the arms embargo against former Yugoslav states (Operation Sharp
Guard) on November 18, 1992. On December UN Secretary General requested access
to NATO contingency plans for possible military operations in former Yugoslavia,
including enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina, establishment of
safe havens for civilians in Bosnia and ways to prevent the spread of conflict to
Kosovo and the Former Republic of Macedonia. As the crisis in the former
Yugoslavia was evolving and the EU was unable to act effectively, NATO, gradually
turned out to be the principal organisation dealing with the crisis.

NATO enforced a UN Security Council resolution banning military flights

(the "No-Fly Zone") over Bosnia-Herzegovina since April 12, 1993. On June 8, 1993,
an agreement was reached to place the NATO/WEU Adriatic task force under the
operational command of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Similarly, the
intensive NATO air operations over Bosnia-Herzegovina, including the threat of UN-
sanctioned air strikes, constitute the largest ongoing series of military air missions
flown over southern Europe since World War II.95 Following its August 1, 1995
declaration that direct threats or attacks on UN-designated "safe areas" would prompt
a decisive response, NATO initiated an extensive two-week-long air and artillery
campaign on Sarajevo. Subsequent to September and October agreements on a
Bosnian cease-fire and other measures, NATO completed preparations to implement
the military aspects of Dayton Peace Agreement. In December 1995 UN

92
“ NATO Confronts a New Role: Regional Policeman”, The New York Times, April 22, 1999.
93
Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995.
94
para. 11, [Link]\docu\comm\49-95\[Link]
95
"NATO over Europe: Bosnian air ops test NATO/U.N", Aviation Week & Space Technology August 30,
1993.
24
peacekeeping forces (UNPROFOR) handed over command of military operations in
Bosnia to the NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR).

Through the above mentioned actions NATO succeeded in passing the first
crucial test to its process of transformation. It was the first time in its history that
NATO carried out "out-of-area" combat missions. NATO managed to tide over the
previous restriction of the alliance mandate to safeguard the territory of its member-
states.96 Furthermore, NATO achieved that, in general, in a co-operative way. First,
the military action was the outcome of co-operation and co-ordination with UN and it
was based upon the resolutions of UN.97 However since the first co-operation of UN
and USA, there had been a difference of opinion concerning when, how and in which
cases UN had to interfere in regional conflicts.98

Secondly, during the NATO crisis management in Bosnia , the USA made
efforts to include Russia in activities and, to a large extent, avoid actions which could
be interpreted as a provocation by the latter. The participation of Russia in IFOR in
January1996, was the first example of Russia and NATO working together, although
a clearly discernible cooling of relations became evident when NATO began internal
deliberations in 1995 on enlargement. But it was a big step towards the establishment
of a co-operative security regime since one of the prerequisites is the members of such
a regime to agree on principles, roles and norms not only for peacefully reducing
conflict between them but also for their intervention in the conflicts of states outside
their sphere of co-operation.99

2.2 The Vision of a European Security & Defence Policy and the WEU

For almost 40 years, the European unification attempt that had begun in the
50’s with the formation of the European Community did not include collaboration in
the area of defence and security. The failure of the Pleven plan,100 which resulted
from a French attempt to prevent the re-establishment of the German army by forming
a European Defence Community and therefore creating a European army,
96
As M. Woerner, NATO's then-Secretary General, predicted: "NATO is moving in practical and
political areas into peacekeeping and someday, I don't doubt peacemaking in Europe.", "NATO Is
Forced by Events Into More Assertive Role", The Washington Post, March 28, 1993. Also see: F.
Stephen Larrabee, "Implications for Transatlantic Relations" in The Implications of the Yugoslav
Crisis for Western Europe's Foreign Relations, Chaillot Papers 17 , (Institute for Security Studies
WEU: October, 1994), p.p. 17-34.
97
NATO's Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia, NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 4 (March
1997). M. Woerner, NATO's then-Secretary General apparently annoyed by the criticism exercised on
NATO about the alliance's limited actions, said repeatedly that the United Nations had to lead the way
on the former Yugoslavia. See: "NATO Talks Fail to Reach Accord on Bosnia Plan", The New York
Times, May 26, 1993.
98
The United States expressed the opinion, that agrees to send armed forces on peace-keeping missions
only if its vital interests are at stake and if these missions are placed under the direction of NATO or a
coalition similar to the one formed for the Iraq Operation. For the disagreements between the UN and
the USA See: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Don't make the U.N.'s Hard Job Harder", The New York Times,
August 20, 1993. "Clinton Seeks Limits On Peace Keeping", The Washington Post, September 27,
1993.
99
See: Edward A. Kolodziej, "U.S. Regional Cooperation", in William Zartman and Victor kremenyuk
(eds), Cooperative Security. Reducing Third World Wars (New York: Syracuse University press,
1995), p.p. 289-312.
100
For further analysis see: Daniel Lerner & Raymond Aron, France Defeats EDC (London: Thames &
Hudson, 1957), passim.
25
demonstrated that the attempt for unification had to be confined to the field of
economy only. Besides, the reasons that led to the French initiative did not apply after
Germany’s entrance in NATO. Germany would begin arming itself while armament
control would be performed by WEU.

Under different circumstances this time, in the early 60’s, three years after the
establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom, which
were essentially economic, France came up with a new proposal known as the
"Fouchet Plan".101 This plan anticipated the formation of a statutory framework of
collaboration for Foreign Affairs and Defence within the EEC. However, it was not
widely accepted and yet another attempt failed. The bipolar structure of the
international system imposed coiling around USA through NATO against the Soviet
threat.

Finally, the only successful attempt was the formation of the European
Political Co-operation (EPC),102 in 1970. The aim of EPC was an informal
collaboration and deliberation among members on matters concerning Foreign
Affairs. From 1970 to 1986, the members of the European Communities confined to
this collaboration, on the basis of informal agreements without permanent structures,
even though a series of proposals for daring steps towards European unification,
including matters of defence and security were submitted during this period. The
Single European Act in 1986, which reformed the European Communities, made a
special reference to the European foreign policy co-operation and a "EPC" Secretariat
was established. But the Single Act does not refer to a "common foreign policy" and
the divide between the activities of the Communities and those of EPC remained
unquestionable.

2.2.1 The Maastricht Treaty

With the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed on February 7th, 1992 and came
in force on November 1st , 1993, Europeans made the first step towards determining
Europe’s role in defence and security matters in a statutory level. Before that NATO's
new strategic concept had been adopted, in which it was pointed out that there would
be a future European security and defence identity through the framework of NATO.
At the prelude of the agreement the members of EU stated their determination to
apply a common foreign and security policy, including the future formation of a
common defence policy, that, in a given time, may lead to common defence. This
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was enacted with article. J Title V of
the Treaty.

The establishment of a systematic collaboration among members, the adoption

of common positions and the gradual application of common actions in fields of
important common interests for the member states would be necessary to materialise
the CFSP, (article J.2, J.3). As for matters concerning defence, it was decided that the
Western European Union (WEU) constitutes the appropriate statutory framework
101
For a "Fouchet Plan" analysis, see: Alessandre Silj, Europe' s Political Puzzle: A study of the
Fouchet Negotiations and the 1963 veto (Massachusetts: Harvard Center for International Affairs,
1967), passim.
102
Panagiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation. Towards a framework of supranational
diplomacy (UK: Gowers, 1987), passim. Simon J. Nutall, European Political Co-operation (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1992), passim.
26
within which the development of the defensive dimension of CFSP would evolve.
Specifically, in the article J.4.2 it is mentioned: "the Union requests the Western
European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union,
to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence
implications.". Furthermore, in a relevant Declaration annexed to the Treaty, it is
stressed out that the development of an authentic European security and defence
identity will be promoted in a complementary to NATO way.103

The signing of the Treaty would have been a unique moment in European
history if the outbreak of the Yugoslavian crisis and the failure of the 12 members of
EU to apply consistent and common policy while confronting the crisis had not
occurred. While the Intergovernmental Conference was in progress, in order to adopt
the definite plan of the Treaty, it was assessed that the Yugoslavian crisis was an
opportunity for EU to prove its capability to handle a crisis that constitutes a threat for
its stability and security.104

The facts did not confirm these expectations. On the contrary, the facts proved
the European states’ inability to agree on a common strategy in order to confront the
crisis, bringing to surface the lack of political will for harmonisation of national
choices for defence and security matters.105 With the absence of substantial politics
for convergence of opinions, the June '91 declarations concerning the Yugoslavian
crisis composed a major blow to EU’s future credibility. As stated by Henry Kissinger
"The Western democracies, with the best intentions, made the likely inevitable".106

Two years later, the newly formed EU found itself in the difficult position to
account for an unsuccessful CFSP, just after the Maastricht Treaty came into force.
Furthermore, Europe has shown that, from the moment the United States avoids
involvement, as in the case of the first stages in the Yugoslav crisis, its military means
of action remained limited. It was not even ready to group the forces of WEU member
states under a single command even in application of measures decided by the United
Nations.

It was not only that negative situation which was undermining the future of the
European CFSP, but also the provisions of the Treaty itself that described the aims
and the means of materialisation in a vague way, reflecting the confusion prevailing
during the works of the Intergovernmental Conference and the inability of the
members to adopt a common vision of Europe’s future. The period between the
summit in Maastricht and the time that the Treaty became effective, was characterised
by uncertainty concerning EU's future.107

In the following years until the revision of the Maastricht Treaty, the EU
members, in some cases, succeeded in harmonising their policies and applying

103
Declaration on The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union
and with the Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991, Source: official website of WEU. For
WEU’s role in European security according to the Maastricht Treaty see below.
104
According to Foreign Minister of Luxembourg , Jacques Poos the EU' s intervention in Yugoslavia
was "the hour for Europe, not the hour of the United States", Los Angeles Times, "EC Urges End to
Yugoslav Violence, Threatens Aid Cut", June 29, 1991.
105
"Europe Doesn't Do the Job", The Sun, November 14, 1991. Nicole Gnesotto, Lessons of
Yugoslavia, Chaillot Papers 14 , (Institute for Security Studies WEU: March , 1994).
106
International Herald Tribune, 21 September 1992.
107
Hans Arnold, "Maastricht"-The Beginning or End of a Development?, Aussen Politik, Vol. 44,
(3/93).
27
common actions through CFSP. For example, in 1994-95, one of the first joint actions
by the European Union in the framework of the CFSP concerned the non-proliferation
of nuclear weapons. During the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NTP) Review Conference
in April-May 1995, the country members of the Union played an essential role in
ensuring the indefinite extension of the NPT, although the European too often
appeared divided during the discussions.108

What became obvious during the following years was the radical
disagreements among members about Europe’s role in security and defence matters.
The Maastricht Treaty provisions concerning CFSP were the product of a compromise
between the so-called "Atlanticists", led by the UK, and the so-called "Europeanists",
led by France and Germany, as well as their disagreement whether Europe should
claim an autonomous security and defence identity. At the same time, the evolution of
Franco-German collaboration 109 gave the impression that the breach between the two
approaches was becoming wider and that the cohesion of the two countries could be
disturbed easily since their opinions contradicted. As a result there was an increased
confusion about what Europe's role was going to be.

It has been written that "The Maastricht Treaty of December 1992 marked the
striking of a relatively fragile security bargain among the Europeanists and the
Atlanticists: in the short term recognizing NATO' s primacy but clearly defining the
path for future independent Europeanist evolution.".110 In the middle of this security
bargain there was WEU and the question of how its future role would evolve.

2.2.2 The past of WEU: A guide for the future

The end of the bipolar confrontation in Europe created a unique opportunity for the
WEU to redefine its future role in European security matters, after a long hibernation
period imposed by the conditions created after the end of the Cold War.

The extent of this involvement is related to the course of events taking place in
NATO and EU since WEU was initially connected to the newly formed at that time
NATO, and subsequently, to the different pursuits of the European states concerning the
creation of an autonomous European rallying in defence and security matters. Any notion
referring to WEU’s new role should include a brief account of its history in retrospect.

The reasons for WEU’s formation can be found in the conditions created in post-
war Europe. The main concern of the European states was to prevent the reappearance of a
revisionary power in the Continent. In this framework the European powers (France, UK

108
For a description of the matter see Harald Muller (ed.), European Non-Proliferation Policy 1993-
1995 (Brussels: European Interuniversity Press, 1996), passim. Camille Grand, The European Union
and the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Chaillot Papers 37 , (Institute for Security Studies
WEU: January, 2000).
109
For an analysis see: Peter Schmidt, The Special Franco-German Security Relationship in the 1990s,
Chaillot Papers 8 , (Institute for Security Studies WEU: June, 1993). William T. Jjohnsen & Thomas
Durell-Young, "Franco-German Security Accommodation: Agreeing to Disagree", in European
Security Toward the Year 2000, McNair Paper 20, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic
Studies, August 1993), p.p. 1-30.
110
Catherine McArdle Kelleher, The Future of European Security, Brookings Occasional Papers
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 58.
28
and the members of BENELUX) signed the Brussels Treaty on March 27th 1948.111 The
Treaty established a political and military collaboration forum, through the formation of
the Western Union, known as the Brussels Treaty Organisation, the forerunner of today's
Western European Union. As far as the main aim of the Organisation is concerned, at the
prelude of the founding Treaty it is mentioned that the members are determined "To afford
assistance to each other, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in
maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression; To
take such steps as may be held to be necessary in the event of a renewal by Germany of a
policy of aggression".112

Developments in the international scene forewarned of the deterioration of USA-

USSR relations and disorientated the security priorities of the European states. Germany
was not the threat any more. It was the USSR. And the question was USA's involvement
in European security.113 The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 and
NATO’s creation achieved this. In December 1950, the newly formed defensive
mechanism of Western Union was handed over to NATO.

The pending matters, mainly formerly revisionary Germany’s reaccession in the

European security structures in a way that French and British concerns could be
overcome, were settled in the Conference that took place in London between September
28th and October 3rd 1954 with the participation of the five members of the Western
Union, Germany, Italy, USA and Canada. On October 23rd the agreements, including the
revised Brussels Treaty that enacted the succession of the Western Union by the WEU,
were signed.

From the day of its formation until 1973, WEU, despite its limited action,
contributed to solving three crucial problems concerning the restoration of inter-European
post-war balance. Specifically :

• It functioned as a safety valve for the incorporation of Western Germany in the

euro-atlantic security system. Right after the foundation of WEU, the occupation
regime was brought to an end and both WEU and NATO accepted Western
Germany. Furthermore, the revised Brussels Treaty guaranteed Germany's right to
be rearmed. France and Britain would perform armament control.
• It contributed decisively to solving the dispute over the control of the industrial
region of Saar, which caused tension to German-French relations.
• It functioned as a forum on the collaboration between Britain and the six members
of EC until Britain joined the European Communities.

111
France and Britain’s signing of the Dunkirk Treaty in March 1947 had preceded. It concerned the
confrontation of Germany in case it attempted to employ a dynamic revisionist policy. The creation of
the organization of the Brussels Treaty was the result of British initiative for expanding the Anglo-
French alliance by forming a new allied conveyor with the participation of the BENELUX countries.
112
Brussels Treaty, TREATY OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL COLLABORATION
AND COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENCE, Signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948. Source: Official
Website of WEU.
113
It has been said that the Brussels Treaty was used as a diplomatic tool for USA's involvement in
European security. According to Alfred Cahen (former Secretary-General of the Western European
Union) "the signing of that diplomatic instrument was to play a major role in the launching of the
Atlantic Alliance and NATO. President Truman told Congress that a great step had been taken along
the road towards the building of Europe's defence, adding, "This development merits our unqualified
support. I am sure that America will take the measures necessary to provide the free countries with any
assistance that their situation might call for". Alfred Cahen, The Western European Union and NATO,
Brassey' s Atlantic Commentaries No.1 (UK: Brassey' s, 1989), p. 2.
29
 It should be noted that even though WEU’s contribution to handling the above
mentioned matters was important, further activation of the WEU in European security
matters faced constraints caused by both the structural pressure applied during the Cold
War and the definite choice of Europeans that NATO remained the cornerstone of
European security. 114 Consequently the WEU gradually came to a state of hibernation
during the 70’s.115

At the beginning of the 80’s the reactivation of the WEU 116 with the adoption of
the Rome Declaration,117 favoured a double cause: the prevention of EPC expansion to
security matters and the boosting of American commitment to ensure European security.
A number of coincidental factors preceded: the Genscher initiative in November 1981,
that intended to expand the EPC in defence and security matters, Reagan’s “Strategic
Defence Initiative” (SDI)118 in 1983 without consulting with the Europeans and the
“Euromissile crisis” that created the impression that the transatlantic link with Europe had
loosened.

A further boost to WEU’s revival was given after the Reykjavik Summit meeting
in October 1986.119 Negotiations between the two Super-Powers for the withdrawal of
medium range nuclear weapons, posed essential security dilemmas to the Europeans.
Could the Europeans still depend on the nuclear shielding of the USA? If not, should they
just reinforce NATO's European pillar or should they create an autonomous European
defensive system? The response to these questions defined the future nature of the WEU.

114
Besides article IV of the founding Treaty states: "In the execution of the Treaty, the High
Contracting Parties and any Organs established by Them under the Treaty shall work in close co-
operation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Recognising the undesirability of duplicating
the military staffs of NATO, the Council and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities
of NATO for information and advice on military matters.". Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural
Collaboration and Collective Self-defence Signed at Brussels on March 17, 1948, as Amended by the
'Protocol Modifying and Competing the Brussels Treaty", Signed at Paris on October 23, 1954. Source:
Official Website of WEU.
115
It is indicatively mentioned that it was a period of inactivity for the WEU Council's functions, while
between 1974 and 1977 the post of Secretary-General remained vacant. In many cases the Council
refused to answer Assembly's questions explaining that the European defensive collaboration was not
mature enough to express a common position.
116
For WEU reactivation by the Rome Declaration see: Panos Tsakaloyannis (ed.), The Reactivation of
the Western European Union: the Effects on EC and its Institutions, European Institute of Public
Administration (Maastricht: The Netherlands, 11985), passim.
117
Because of the French and Belgian governments’ initiative, two Foreign Affairs and Defense
minister meetings that led to the adoption of the Rome Treaty took place in Rome (26th and 27th of
October). Article 3 of the Declaration mentions: " Conscious of the continuing necessity to strengthen
western security and of the specifically Western European geographical, political, psychological and
military dimensions, the Ministers underlined their determination to make better use of the WEU
framework in order to increase cooperation between the member States in the field of security policy
and to encourage consensus. In this context, they called for continued efforts to preserve peace,
strengthen deterrence and defence and thus consolidate stability through dialogue and cooperation.".
WEU Council of Ministers Rome Declaration, Rome, 27 October 1984. Source: Official Website of
WEU.
118
For more details concerning the "Strategic Defence Initiative" and the European Security see: Louis
Deschamps, The SDI and European Security Interests, Atlantic Paper No 62, The Atlantic Institute for
International Affairs (Great Britain: Biddles Ltd, 1987). See also, Panayiotis Ifestos, Nuclear Strategy
and European Security Dilemmas: Towards an Autonomous European Defence System? (Brookfield:
Gower Publishing Company, 1988), p.p 169-271.
119
See After Reykjavic: Planning for the Nineties (United Nations Meeting of Experts in Dagomys,
USSR 8-12 June), Disarmament, A periodic review by the United Nations, Vol. X, No. 3 (Autumn
1987).
30
 In October 1987, WEU’s Council adopted the “Hague Platform” (The Platform on
European Security Interests).120 The platform made the choice to promote the European
defence effort within the Alliance by reinforcing NATO's European pillar clear. In Part É,
para. 4 it is remarked that: "We intend therefore to develop a more cohesive European
defence identity which will translate more effectively into practice the obligations of
solidarity to which we are committed through the modified Brussels and North Atlantic
Treaties."

However, the stated intention to upgrade the WEU by improving relations with
NATO did not come along with statutory reform that could transform it into an effective
organisation for dealing with the operational tasks of defence matters. The emphasis
which was given on the nuclear arsenal of France and Britain and their decision to retain
their autonomy of nuclear prevention capability121 regardless developments in USSR-USA
relations was impressive. It can be said that the Platform was British and French politics’
reply to the nuclear disarmament negotiations of this period of time.

Until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the WEU with its reactivation
marginally developed its operational role in crisis situations as for example during the
Gulf Crisis.122

2.2.3 The new co-operative role: Defence component of the EU and NATO's
European Pillar

Through a parallel process of NATO's transformation and CFSP promotion by the

EU, the WEU had to develop a double role: as the defence component of the process of
the European unification (according to the Maastricht Treaty) and as a means of
strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance (according to the Rome Declaration
1991). To become, in other words, the operational link between Í ÁÔÏ and EU, and to
materialise the co-operative upgrading of the transatlantic link. The Declaration of "The
Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with
the Atlantic Alliance",123 which annexed in the Maastricht Treaty, is the first post-Cold
War document that describes WEU’s new role and remarks on the need to develop a close
working relationship with the EU and NATO, and to strengthen WEU's operational role
by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means.

120
WEU Ministerial Council, Platform on European Security Interests, The Hague, 27 October 1987.
Source: Official Website of WEU.
121
Specifically the Declaration mentions: "The independent forces of France and the United Kingdom
contribute to overall deterrence and security." ( part II, paragraph 4). "In the nuclear field also, we
shall continue to carry our share: some of us by pursuing appropriate cooperative arrangements with
the US; the UK and France by continuing to maintain independent nuclear forces, the credibility of
which they are determined to preserve." (part III, paragraph a.3). For a relevant analysis see [Link],
[Link], R.A. Levine, Western European Nuclear Forces, (RAND, 1995), passim.
122
As the Political Director of WEU, Alyson Bailes, pointed out: "But at this stage WEU's role was
still largely limited to a "talking shop"; and though a couple of European naval operations in the Gulf
were put nominally under a WEU flag, this was a matter of coordination between the nations involved
with no real central mechanism of command.". Speech by Alyson Bailes, Political Director WEU,
Europe and the United States: Organizing the Cooperation between NATO and WEU/EU (DGAP
Summer School, Berlin, 20 August 1999). Source: Official Website of WEU. As for WEU' s role
during the Gulf Crisis, see: Willem van Eekelen, 'WEU and the Gulf Crisis", Survival, 32(6)
(November/December 1990). Michael Chichester, "The Gulf: The Western European Union Naval
deployment to the Middle East", Navy International, 96 (2) (February 1991).
123
The Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the
Atlantic Alliance, Maastricht, 10 December 1991.
31
 The WEU had to accomplish a complex task in order to achieve an effective
transformation enabling it to fulfil its future role because:

• The lack of homogeneity among members of the three organisations imposed a

problem that should be overcome. Both NATO and EU included nations that
were not WEU members. How could the WEU function as the statutory link
between the two for European defence and security matters?
• The field of action should be determined. Operational capabilities (structures
and means) compatible to NATO, should be promoted.
• The relation of WEU between NATO and EU should be defined precisely.

In order to overcome the first problem, 124 in 1991, at Maastricht, WEU

Members invited States, which were Members of the European Union (Greece,
Denmark, Ireland) to accede to WEU, or to become observers if they wish so. Greece
became the tenth Member State in March 1995. Ireland and Denmark also joined the
Organisation with Observer status. Subsequently Austria, Finland and Sweden,
became Observers following their accession to the EU in 1995. Simultaneously, other
European Members of NATO were invited to become Associate Members of WEU in
a way which would enable them to participate fully in the activities of the
Organisation. Iceland, Norway and Turkey became Associate Members at that time.

The status of Associate Partner was created in Kirchberg in May 1994. It

covers the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which have signed a Europe
Agreement with the European Union. Thus, from 1994, WEU welcomed as Associate
Partners the 10 new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and
Slovenia. Since 1991, WEU has developed a framework within which an increasing
number of European countries have become associated with its activities. In1995,
there were 25 countries in the WEU family of nations, encompassing four types of
status: Member State, Associate Member, Observer and Associate Partner. Only the
10 Member States were signatories to the modified Brussels Treaty and have full
decision-making rights in WEU. The other 15 countries have been associated with
WEU activities. The shape, which was finally adopted instead of reinforcing the
efficiency of the Organisation, it created a "Daedalus" framework in which decisions
for action had to be taken.

Concerning the promotion of WEU’s operational role, on June19th 1992, the

Council of WEU defined the missions that would be carried out by the organisation
known as the "Petersburg tasks"125 that included three mission categories: a) humanitarian
and rescue tasks, b) peacekeeping tasks and c) tasks of combat forces in crisis
management, including peacemaking.

Furthermore, it was decided that a planning cell would be established under

the authority of the Council, that would be responsible for: a) preparing contingency
plans for the employment for forces under WEU auspices; b) preparing
recommendations for the necessary command, control and communication
arrangements, including standing operating procedures for headquarters which might

124
See: Document 1360, Assembly of Western European Union. The enlargement of WEU , Report
submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Ward, 19th April 1993.
125
Western European Union Council of Ministers Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992.
32
be selected, c) keeping an updated list of units and combinations of units which might
be allocated to WEU for specific operations. Finally, the first steps which set the
general framework for military units answerable to WEU were taken. WEU member
States declared that they were prepared to make military units available from the
whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under
the authority of WEU.

At the ministerial meeting on 22nd November 1993, it was made clear that the
European corps (Belgium, France, Germany/ later Spain and Luxembourg
participated), the Multinational Division (central), consisting of units from Belgium,
Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, and the UK/Netherlands
amphibious force had already been declared as multinational forces answerable to
WEU (FAWEU). In the Kirchberg declaration of 9th May 1994, the Council of
Ministers of WEU has confirmed the importance which it attaches to the continued
operational development of WEU. In 1995, a permanent fund to cover the start-up
costs of any WEU operation was created in WEU' s budget. Other measures aimed at
developing the WEU's operational capabilities include the establishment of the
Satellite Centre in Torrejon, Spain, the creation of a Situation Centre.

Some progress was achieved on the question as to how transatlantic

relationships in security and defence matters and specifically co-operation between
WEU and NATO might be developed. Regarding the development of close working
links between the two organisations, even though since 1991 a number of common
Council sessions of WEU and NATO had taken place, it was not until May 1996
before a Security Agreement was reached between NATO and WEU permitting the
exchange of classified information and documents between the two organisations. The
concept of CJTFs, which was intended to provide a mechanism for an effective co-
operation with WEU, remained in the papers until 1996, as little progress was made
on developing the modalities of such a co-operation. In addition the fact that both
WEU and NATO considered they would have responsibilities in peace operations and
crisis management, meant that the division of tasks between them would become a
practical problem which had to be resolved.126

There has been less progress in the working relationship between the EU and
WEU, mainly because of the European members' inability to materialise the
predictions for the CFSP. The first application of provisions set out in the Maastricht
Treaty with regard to the WEU (article J.4.2) occurred, for example, in November
1996 when the Council of the EU adopted a decision requesting the WEU to examine
how it could contribute to the EU's humanitarian efforts in support of the refugees and
displaced persons in the Great Lakes region in Africa. That was the main reason why
WEU has been margined in the Yugoslav crisis. As it was noticed "WEU can play a
credible and effective role in this area only if all the governments give a decisive
political impetus to the achievement of the various projects to which the Council and

126
In this framework the worry of WEU's being pushed aside was often expressed, following the
continuously growing role of NATO in crisis management matters. See, for example: Document 1388,
Assembly of Western European Union. WEU Assembly proposals for the forthcoming NATO summit
meeting, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Baumel, 8th November 1993.
Document1548, Assembly of Western European Union. The future role of WEU, Report submitted on
behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Liapis, 13 November 1996.
33
its subsidiary organs are committed.".127 Although WEU had an operational deficit in
order to barge in the Yugoslav crisis, the reality was that the WEU suffered more
from a political deficit.

127
Document 1418, Assembly of Western European Union. European Security: crisis-prevention and
management, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. De Puig, 11th May 1994, p.
11.
34
3. Shaping European Security: The 2nd Attempt

While the co-operative process in Europe was just at the beginning, it was
after the Bosnian crisis that the U.S. vision of creating a co-operative security system
that pursues the US interests in Europe started being materialised thoroughly. The
theoretical base of this policy had already been defined. In 1993, a paper on NATO's
future by three American analysts at the Rand Corp. -Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler
and Stephen Larrabee, outlined the appropriate American policy for Europe,
provoking the most stir in the United States.128 According to the above mentioned
analysts "A new U.S.-European strategic bargain is needed, one that extends NATO's
collective defence and security arrangements to those areas where the seeds for future
conflict in Europe lie: the Atlantic alliance's eastern and southern borders.". 129

They argued that although the conflicts would occur in Europe's periphery,
they would be central to European security. After defining the main threat to the
European security they concluded that "the obvious tool for this new Western strategy
is NATO" and proposed six steps in order to adapt the Trans-Atlantic relationship to
the new challenges. These steps were:

• The transformation of NATO "into an alliance committed to projecting

democracy, stability and crisis management",
• the harmonisation of interests between the U.S. and its European allies
mostly by a "Franco-American rapprochement",
• "Germany's strategic emancipation",
• "the integration of Visegrand countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech
republic and possibly Slovakia) into both the European Union and
NATO",
• the expansion and deepening of "security dialogue with Russia", the
development of "a constructive Ukrainian policy" and finally
• the militarily reorganisation of the alliance in order to "improve NATO's
capability to conduct military operations beyond its borders".

It was in that context that the US further pursued its co-operative security
policy in Europe and the basic instrument would be the new, transformed NATO.

3.1 NATO at fifties

In September 1994, a study on NATO Enlargement was initiated by the

Alliance and published one year later in September 1995 outlining the arrangements
of the Enlargement. As U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated "At last
December's NAC, we launched the first phase of NATO's enlargement. The NATO
enlargement study, which the alliance recently completed, will form the foundation of
our enlargement effort."130

128
See, "NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business", The Wall Street Journal, August 11, 1993.
129
Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler and Stephen Larrabee, " Security for All of Europe, in Seven tricky
Steps", The New York Times, August 27, 1993.
130
95/12/05: Intervention By Secretary Of State Warren Christopher At The At The North Atlantic
Council. Source: U.S. Department of State.
35
 Thus, by mid 90's NATO had studied the whole question of its enlargement,
the materialisation of which started after 1995 and a large boost to the process of the
organisation's transformation was given.

3.1.1 The "Open Doors" Policy

NATO's eastward expansion stirred a heated policy debate that went on in

Washington since 1993. Foreign policy thinkers, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski and
Heny Kissinger, were writing articles drawing attention to the potentially destabilising
security vacuum in central Europe.131 Prominent officials from State Department like
Strobe Talbot, or from Ministry of Defence like Joseph Nye remained sceptical.
Finally the Clinton administration overcame its initial caution and the Pentagon’s
scepticism about expanding NATO. In November 1994 US President B. Clinton
stated that "The question is no longer whether NATO will take on new members, but
when and how".132

At that time major NATO members had agreed on a formula under which
NATO would offer membership to the countries of Eastern Europe. The following
standards might be met so that a nation to be able to be admitted to the Organisation:
An irreversible commitment to democracy; civilian control of the military; military
forces independent of security services; military equipment and communications
interchangeable with those of NATO members. 133 The doubt about the prospect of the
organisation's enlargement had come to an end.

Russia did not welcome that prospect at first, even though the Russian
President had not rejected the likelihood of Poland's entry to NATO a year earlier, but
it receded a few months later. The Russian Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev,
characterised NATO's advancement eastward as an "unfriendly step" and emphasised
that "If the West is willing to assist us in solving this problem, (to persuade public
opinion that a great Russia is the Russia of Andrei Zakharov and not of Vladimir
Zhirinovsky), it should shape its policy toward Russia in such a way to avoid stoking
the national humiliation complex.".134 As a response to NATO's intentions, Kozyrev
stunned NATO foreign Ministers in Brussels in December 1994, when he refused to
sign documents to formalise Russia’s military co-operation with NATO.135

Russian President's, B. Yeltsin, statements were expressed in a more intense

tone, and he warned the West that allowing former Soviet satellites to join NATO
soon could "sow seeds of mistrust" and plunge the region into a "new cold peace".136
During their one to one meeting in Moscow in April 1995, President Yeltsin urged
Clinton three times to delay NATO expansion beyond year 2000.137 Clinton rejected

131
“Hope After Chechnya”, The Washington Post, February 1, 1995. “For US Leadership a Moment
Missed”, The Washington Post, May 12, 1995.
132
"NATO rumbles to the east", U.S. News and World Report, November 15, 1994.
133
“Criteria for NATO entry to be etched in stone”, The Washington Times, November 8, 1994.
134
"NATO: Russian Policy….", The Washington Post, November 9, 1994. Andrei Kozyrev, "The risks
in Russia's sense of humiliation", The Washington Times, September 18, 1994.
135
“US and Russia at Odds, Despite Talks”, The New York Times, January 19, 1995.
136
"U.S. Plans New Tack On Russia-NATO Tie", The Washington Post, January 16, 1995. "No Need
to Expand NATO", The Christian Science Monitor, February 6, 1995.
137
“ Wider Alliance Would Increase US Commitments”, The Washington Post, July 5, 1995.
36
the appeal arguing it was in Russia’s interests to keep America in Europe and NATO's
enlargement was the best way to achieve this goal.

Although Russia was unlikely to bless NATO's expansion, in 1995 the

immediate purpose of Russia's policy was to discourage a rapid NATO expansion
hoping that it could prevent or at least influence any expansion in the distant future.
The change became obvious when Russian officials proposed reaching a non-
aggression pact with NATO if the Western alliance ever decided to admit new
members such as Poland or Hungary.138 The determination of the U.S. to press on,
with or without Russian approval,139 was the main factor for this change in the
Russian policy and the value for the moment was a close linkage between Russia and
NATO. West was willing to offer some assurances to Russia. As stated French
Foreign Minister Alain Juppe, "We should consider an agreement, treaty or charter
between the Atlantic alliance and Russia in parallel with the enlargement of NATO,
".140
In order to smooth the relations with Russia, the Clinton Administration made
written assurances to President Yeltsin that Washington had no objection in principle
to the “new Russia” becoming a full member of the alliance.141 The Clinton message
caused some nervousness among US Allies, several of which said that Washington
was trying to move too fast on the expansion of NATO and the development of a
“parallel track” of negotiations with Russia.142 A previous statement of German
Defense Minister Ruehe is characteristic: “If Russia were to become a member of
NATO it would blow NATO apart. It would be like the United Nations of Europe, it
wouldn’t work”.143

During the May 1995 meeting between the U.S. and Russian President, Boris
Yeltsin announced that Russia would formally begin the initial stage of NATO
membership (PfP) and join in a broader security dialogue.144 The NATO-Russia
dialogue began on June 1, 1995 with a symbolic session on the margins of a NATO
ministerial conference, where Russia's Foreign Minister stressed the need for NATO
reassurances that Russia is not still the enemy.145 Since then, the enlargement process
will move fast while at the same time the relation between NATO and Russia will
reach a new level.

138
"Russia Intends to Pursue Guarantees From NATO", The Washington Post, March 11, 1995.
139
This attitude, on behalf of the American government, had caused much internal debate over the
advisability and correctness of NATO's eastward expansion. See: Fred C. Ikle, "How To Ruin NATO",
The New York Times, January 11, 1995. Michael Brown, "Should NATO membership grow ?", The
Washington Times, January 22, 1995. Zbigniew Brezinski, "Correcting our Russian policy course",
The Washington Times, February 24, 1995. "A new U.S. doctrine for a new world", The Washington
Times, April 18, 1995. Thomas L. Friedman, "The Cold Peace", The New York Times, April 26, 1995.
140
"EU tries to woo Russia on Chechnya, NATO issues", The Washington Times, March 20, 1995.
141
“US Offers Assurances on NATO”, The Washington Post, May 8, 1995. “Russia in Line for partial
NATO membership”, The Washington Times, March 23, 1995.
142
" We are absolutely committed to the goal of NATO enlargement. The Russian Government knows
that. We're also committed to the goal of a Russia-NATO relationship that would proceed on a separate
track but at about the same speed as the process of NATO enlargement.", Daily Press Briefing, U.S.
Department of State 95/12/12.
143
“ Allies Seek New Ties to Bind NATO”, The Washington Post, September 12, 1994.
144
"Clinton and Yeltsin Find Way To Easy Strains at Least a Bit", "The Growth of NATO: Will
Moscow Go Along?", The New York Times, May 11, 1995. "NATO's New Partner", The Washington
Post, June 6, 1995.
145
"NATO and Russian Officials Meet to Try to Forge Closer Link", The New York Times, June 1,
1995.
37
 In its June 1996 Berlin communique, the NAC reaffirmed the continuing work
on enlargement and declared that "The process of enlargement is on track ". In
September 1996, Secretary of State at that time Christopher called for the
establishment of an Atlantic Partnership Council (now Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council, EAPC) which would integrate PfP and the NACC to give Partners a stronger
voice with the Alliance and would provide a deeper cooperative and consultative
relationship between NATO and Partners on such issues as peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, humanitarian missions as well as search and rescue ones, and PFP
exercises. At the December 1996 NAC meeting, the Ministers approved of a
comprehensive package of PfP enhancements, including greater Partner participation
in decision making and expanding the scope of PfP operations to include peace
enforcement.146

In addition, in December 1996, the Ministers called for a summit meeting in

July 1997 at which one or more countries would be invited to begin accession
negotiations with the Alliance, with a view to welcoming the first new members into
NATO by the 50th anniversary of NATO, in 1999. However, as NATO's enlargement
had become reality, there was the need for a way to upgrade and further strengthen the
relations with Russia. The EAPC was too little and the veto was too much.

The solution lay in the signing of the Founding Act, which helped pave the
way for the accession of the three countries.147 This procedure aimed to satisfy
Russia’s permanent requests that Russia’s relationship with NATO be different from
those of other non-members. 148 Before the July Summit, on May 27, 1997 in Paris,
NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and
Security between NATO and the Russian Federation.149 The Founding Act provided
the basis for a co-operation between NATO and Russia. A Permanent Joint Council
(PJC) would guide NATO-Russian relations through consultations, co-operation and,
where appropriate, joint-action.

The document, did not satisfy Moscow's initial demands concerning the
consolidation of the right for veto with respect to key NATO decisions, as the
estimated consultations would not concern internal matters of either Russia, NATO or
NATO member states. However, Russia could acquire a de facto political weight in
the evolutions to come. The PJC held its inaugural meeting in New York in
September, 1997. Russia established military liaisons at SHAPE and other command
points, while in addition the Founding Act provided a NATO Information Office in
Moscow.

Following this evolution in NATO-Russian relations, at the July 1997 Summit

meeting in Madrid, the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary were invited to begin
accession talks, 150 however, the Madrid Declaration clearly stated that the Alliance
146
Press Communique, M-NAC-2, (96)165.
147
See: Karl-Heinz Kamp, The NATO-Russia Founding Act. Trojan Horse or Milestone of
Reconciliation ?, Aussen Politik, Vol.48 (4/97).
148
“ NATO's moment of Truth at Hand", The Washington Times, May 10, 1995.
149
Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian
Federation, Paris, 27 May 1997.
150
According to Nicholas Burns, Department of State Spokesman : “ There are two important factors
that we think should guide the discussion of enlargement. First, any new member invited into NATO
ought to meet a test of effectiveness or credibility, meaning that new members ought to strengthen the
Alliance, not weaken it. They ought to be ready to take on the obligations of membership and not just
enjoy the rights of membership. Secretary Albright said again today what she said in her speech last
38
remains open to new members and will maintain an active relationship with those
nations which may express an interest in NATO membership, now or in the future.151
The Madrid summit stated the open-door policy towards membership in NATO that
is, that the alliance would be open to countries that are interested in membership, able
to take on its responsibilities, and whose membership would serve the interests of
European security and stability. At the Madrid Summit in July 1997, NATO explicitly
mentioned Slovenia, Romania and Baltic countries as particularly deserving of
consideration the next time around (Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and
Cooperation, 8th July 1997, para. 8). Furthermore, NATO and Ukraine, which has
been one of the most active members of the Partnership for Peace, formally signed a
Charter on Distinctive Partnership in July 1997.152

On March 12, 1999 during the 50th anniversary NATO Summit in

Washington, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic officially joined the Atlantic
Alliance as new members. President Clinton welcomed the new members, saying
their presence will make the United States safer and NATO, stronger. ``For years they
struggled with dignity and courage to regain their freedom. And now they will help us
defend it for many years to come.'' Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov called the expansion
of NATO ``a movement in the wrong direction. All European states must cooperate in
creating a joint security system. All European states must work together in the
interests of all countries rather than of separate groups.''' he said.153

The Washington Declaration stressed for one more time that "… Alliance
remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able
to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance
overall security and stability in Europe. ".154At the Washington Summit NATO
launched the Membership Action Plan initiative, as a mean to assist countries aspiring
to NATO membership. The nine countries that have declared an interest in joining
NATO and are participating in the MAP was Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia. 155

Although NATO secretary General George Robertson, stated that no

enlargement decisions will be made before 2002, NATO committed itself to an open
enlargement process.

week, NATO is not a scholarship fund. NATO is a collective security organization. The United States
believes it is very important to take in those countries that can actually meet the commitments that
NATO members must have to each other. We ought to have very high standards when we consider
which countries ought to be brought in. The second factor, which is very important, is what we are
calling the Open Door. We Americans think it is very important that Madrid not be the first and last
time that countries in Central Europe are invited to join NATO. In fact, we believe this should be an
evolutionary process, that there ought to be further rounds where NATO does expand, so that some
countries which are not invited in at Madrid, will be invited in the future”. Press Briefing on Secretary
Albright's Intervention at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting Sintra, Portugal, May 29,
1997.
151
Press Release M-1 (97) 81, Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Madrid, 8th July 1997, para. 8.
152
Olga Alexandrova, The NATO-Ukraine Charter: Kiev's Euro-Atlantic Integration, Aussen Politik,
Vol.48 ( 4/97).
153
"NATO Adds Three New Members", AP Online, 12-Mar-1999.
154
The Washington Declaration, Press Release NAC-S(99)63, 23 Apr. 1999.
155
THE WHITE HOUSE: NATO Summit -- NATO's newest members, M2 Communications Ltd. 26-
Apr-1999.
39
3.1.2 The Daedalus arrangement: NATO/ESDI/WEU-EU

As it has already been mentioned one major development in the early nineties
was NATO's decision to adapt its standards to the growing European capabilities in
the security field in order to “allow the Europeans to address their concerns within
the context of the transatlantic alliance”.156 France's partial rapprochement with
NATO,157 especially after the announcement in 1995 by the French defence minister
his country's intention to improve relations with NATO, opened the way for further
enhancement of the European role, known as the European Security and Defence
Identity, within NATO.

France had not given up its strategic goal of minimising American influence in
Europe, but as long as WEU was unable to supplant NATO, France became willing to
co-operate with the Alliance. France’s decision to pursue the ESDI within the
Alliance was the main cause of a general agreement in the principles of ESDI at
Berlin. At the June 1996 North Atlantic Council Ministerial NATO Foreign Ministers
agreed that the European role would be developed within the Alliance and that the
ESDI would include the development of "separable but not separate" European
capabilities, under the CJTF concept, which could be made available to undertake
independent European missions led by WEU.

US Secretary Christopher in his Address to the North Atlantic Council

acknowledged the role France played in this matter: “ Today, we have agreed on a
process by which we can make NATO assets available for military operations led by
the Western European Union, and we will develop European command arrangements
within the Alliance that preserve NATO's transatlantic foundation. Our progress
today was made possible by France's decision to take part more completely in the
work of NATO. President Clinton and I warmly welcome President Chirac's historic
choice to pursue ESDI within the Alliance. France has now rejoined the Military
Committee; its Defence Minister will now once again participate in NATO Defence
Minister meetings; its soldiers are playing a critical role under NATO command in
Bosnia; and it is playing an indispensable part in our common effort to build a new
NATO in a secure and undivided Europe”.158

But since not all the details had been settled up, more work had to be done.
Talking about the work on the principles that were accepted in Berlin about ESDI,
French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette stated in a joint press conference with US
Secretary Albright: “I think one should never underestimate the work that was done
but we have indeed quite some work to complete before the whole matter can be
considered as fully accepted. The question is very simple. It is based on shared
responsibility between the Europeans and the Americans.". 159

The Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation issued by

the Heads of State and Government at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (8th

156
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright; Secretary of Defense William Cohen, National Security
Advisor Sandy Berger, and White House Press Secretary Mike McCurry, Press Briefing on NATO
Summit, Madrid, Spain, July 8, 1997.
157
See: Robbin Laird, French Security Policy in Transition. Dynamics of Continuity and Change,
McNair Paper 38, (Washington, D.C.: Institute For National Strategic Studies, March 1995).
158
North Atlantic Council Address, June 3, 1996.
159
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright and French Foreign Minister Herve De Charette,
Press Conference, Quai d'Orsay, Paris, France, February 17, 1997.
40
July 1997), stated: “… the Alliance is building ESDI, grounded on solid military
principles and supported by appropriate military planning and permitting the
creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the
political control and strategic direction of the WEU. …We direct the Council in
Permanent Session to complete expeditiously its work on developing ESDI within
NATO, in cooperation with the WEU.”.

At the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Luxembourg on

28 May 1998, Ministers welcomed progress on the elaboration of arrangements for
ESDI within NATO, including the transfer, monitoring, return or recall of NATO
assets and capabilities, focusing on a framework for an agreement between NATO
and WEU. Therefore, while through the aforementioned process emphasis was given
on the materialisation of the ESDI through the enhancement of the working
relationship between NATO and WEU, so that the later could be able to conduct crisis
management operations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Franco-
British rapprochement created new data.

In a surprising move towards the European Defence, in December 1998,

France and Britain, during their summit at Saint-Malo, pledged to work together to
create a framework to provide the EU with autonomous military action, either within
or outside of NATO, in response to crises. The two nations also explored ways to
consolidate procurement and R&D efforts as well as military forces to provide the
muscle to back up a common EU security policy. British officials stressed that
whatever the outcome, the transatlantic relationship underlying NATO is at the heart
of European security and must be protected.160 The leading role played by the U.K.,
the U.S.' closest ally, in this process helped allay fears in Washington that such moves
may weaken transatlantic ties.

The US found this initiative very important although some worries were
expressed. According to Secretary Albright: “ what happened there was very
important. There is a reason for the Europeans to find an identity in their own
defence, but this is a thing that cannot be a duplication or discrimination. It is a
manner by which the Europeans can share in the work of NATO. It is something that
cannot hurt NATO because this is the most important alliance. But we think it is very
important that the Europeans work in this manner because it is something that helps
us in burden sharing.”.161

This development, however, could severely overturn whichever progress had

been achieved until then in view of the materialisation of the ESDI, as the Franco-
British initiative by-passed the figure NATO-WEU-EU on which the efforts to
develop ESDI had relied. It was in that context that some voices raised some concerns
about ESDI concept: “If ESDI is misconceived, misunderstood or mishandled, it
could create the impression - which could eventually lead to the reality - that a new,
European-only alliance is being born out of the old, trans-Atlantic one. If that were
to happen, it would weaken, perhaps even break those ties that I spoke of before - the
ones that bind our security to yours. We, on our side of the Atlantic, have another
concern as well: it is essential that ESDI not take a form that discriminates against
those Allies who are not members of the EU.”.162
160
Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 14, 1998.
161
12/8/98 Albright newscon at NATO Headquarters.
162
“ A New NATO for a New Era”, Deputy Secretary Talbott, Address at the Royal United Services
Institute, London, United Kingdom, March 10, 1999.
41
 At the NATO Washington Summit (24th April 1999), Ministers approved of
the work completed on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European
Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its
effectiveness; and launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative (DCI). So, the
development of ESDI, coupled with an emphasis on improving European defence
capabilities since it had become clear that there is a clear gap between U.S. and
European military capabilities and that NATO must prepare for the future by
developing systems that affect the mobility, the flexibility and the survivability and
sustainability of its forces, having to operate many times in very austere
circumstances.163

At Washington Ministers reached a basic understanding. NATO is the

preferred institution to act "wherever possible." At the same time, they recognised that
the Alliance might not act. And in those circumstances, they agreed to make NATO
assets and capabilities available to the WEU or "as otherwise agreed". This last
phrasing accompanies every Washington Summit Communique's reference to ESDI,
showing in that way the confusion prevailing concerning the question whether the
WEU would still constitute the proper channel for developing ESDI, or not.

For the U.S. the marginalization of the WEU did not cause any particular
worries as what mainly interested, and still does, regardless the way the European
members will choose to promote ESDI is:164

• First, to make sure that the European Security and Defence Identity will
continue to be developed within NATO.
• Secondly, in case the European Union gives a further impetus to its efforts
to strengthen its security and defence dimension, to ensure the role of non-
EU Allies as full participants.

As EU turned for the first time its interest in improving the military
capabilities of its member states, in the US fears of the implications these efforts
might bring to the NATO-EU link were expressed again. Despite the often positions
like “…we all share the view that ESDI must reinforce trans-Atlantic ties, improve
European defence capabilities, while avoiding duplication and serve as a bridge, not
a barrier, to close relations between the EU and NATO”165, the same policy-makers
have raised in other fora these concerns and some of their statements are characteristic
of this criticism:

“ So we want them to share the burden and we have, in fact, thought it was
important for the Europeans to have what is called a defense identity. But our
differences at the moment are over the following issues. We believe that this European
defense identity should be within NATO and it should not duplicate NATO activities.
It should not discriminate against those countries that are not a part of NATO or the
EU and it should not, in fact, in any way diminish or de-link the United States from

163
Secretary Albright, Press Briefing on NATO Summit and Kosovo, The Briefing Room, The White
House Washington, D.C., April 20, 1999.
164
See: F. Stephen Larrabee, The European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and American
Interests, Testimony RAND, CT-168, March 2000. Stanley R. Sloan, The United States and European
Defence, Chaillot Papers 39 , (Institute for Security Studies WEU: April, 2000).
165
11/9/99 Albright et al re US-EU Ministerial , Joint Press following the U.S.-EU Ministerial,
November 9, 1999.
42
Europe. So we are into a very nuanced discussion as to how the Europeans describe
their defense identity and as to whether it is separate on the outside of NATO or is
connected to it. But we do believe that Europe needs to carry its share of the burden
and we agree with that. We just don't want it to be duplicative or discriminatory or
de-linking.”.166

3.2 EU's CFSP : Beyond Amsterdam

3.2.1 A new type of missions and capabilities for EU

The question of reinforcing the efficiency of the CFSP preoccupied the

European members at the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference for the review of
the Maastricht Treaty. Besides, as the EU Commission had pointed out about CFSP's
policy in a report on the function of the Maastricht Treaty "the aim of a substantial
improvement has not been achieved".167

Such an effort was made in the Amsterdam Treaty, which was officially
signed on the 2nd of October 1997. If one reads the provisions for the CFSP of the
Title V of the Amsterdam Treaty and the previous Maastricht Treaty in parallel, one
can come to the conclusion that neither this time had there been any important
progress towards a meaningful explanation of the CFSP aims and the ways to
materialise it. On the contrary, one could claim that, including the protection of the
Union's integrity as well as its external borders' (Title V, article J.1) in its aims, the
breach between the aims pursued and the chances of their materialisation is becoming
wider.

It should also be noted that in the new Treaty there are some provisions, which
strengthened CFSP to some degree. One of the Treaty's innovation was the
establishment of "Mr. CFSP" the High Representative for the common foreign and
security policy (Title V, article J.8 ), as well as the anticipation of creating a new
"foreign policy planning and early warning unit" which would function under High
Representative's responsibility, (Declaration to the Final Act on the establishment of a
policy planning and early warning unit). With both theses anticipations the EU seems
to acquire an institutional structure concerning the management of CFSP's matters.

In addition, two new elements of the Treaty gave out a clearer picture of the
Union's future role in defence and security matters. The first one has to do with the
explicit phrasing of the prospect of WEU's integration into the EU, in contrast with
the Maastricht Treaty, which simply implied such likelihood. 168 Namely, in Title V,
article J.7 it is mentioned that: "The Western European Union (WEU) is an integral

166
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Remarks and Q&A Before the Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, Chicago, Illinois, November 10, 1999, As released by the Office of the Spokesman,
November 12, 1999, U.S. Department of State.
167
European Commission, Commission Report on the Functioning of the Treaty on European Union
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1995).
168
It is about the outcome of one more compromise among France, Germany and Britain. At the
Amsterdam Summit France and Germany (with support from other countries) put forward a proposal
calling for a common European defence including the full integration of the WEU into the EU. This
project was stopped by Britain and the neutral countries. "Paris and Bonn Launch European Defence
Plan", The Guardian, March 22, 1997.
43
part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an
operational capability notably in the context of paragraph 2. It supports the Union in
framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in
this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the
WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union,
should the European Council so decide."

The second element regards the clearest definition, in a minimal way of

course, of the matters which are referred to in the provisions anticipating the
progressive formation of a common defence policy and concerning the conduct of the
so-called Petersburg tasks. Namely, in Title V, article J.7.2 it is mentioned that:
"Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including
peacemaking.".

Before the Amsterdam Treaty has even taken effect, the debate on the creation
of a European defence identity has been reopened. But this time it was Britain, not
France, who introduced it. The President of the Assembly of WEU, describes the
British initiative in the following terms:

"It was at an informal meeting of the European Council on 24 and 25 October

1998 at Portschach, Austria, that Mr. Blair made his statement on the United
Kingdom's revised position. No official text was released of the contributions made by
those present at the Portschach summit, but press reports reveal that it was the
British Prime Minister who introduced the debate on security and defence policy. […]
He appears to have argued that three solutions were open to the Fifteen: developing a
European Security and Defence Identity within NATO; merging WEU and the
European Union and finding way in which WEU, NATO and the European Union
could work in conjunction with one another. In a press conference he gave on 25
October, Mr. Blair made the point that: 'We are at the very beginning of that debate,
we need to get the institutional mechanism right, we need to make sure that that
institutional mechanism in no way undermines NATO but rather is complementary to
it.' ".169

What followed that initiative was two summits, one Franco-German and one
Franco-British, and of course the last one attracted the most attention. The British-
French Summit took place in Saint-Malo, France on 3 December 1998, where Britain
and France reached a 'historic agreement' outlining a common defence policy for
Europe. As the French Foreign Minister Juppe at that time had stated: “The Franco-
German partnership is the driving force of the European building. But a Franco-
German management of Europe would be a bad idea… We must maintain close
collaboration with our other partners”.170

In the joint Declaration issued at the Summit the two states emphasised that
"The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the

169
Document 1636, Assembly of Western European Union. WEU and European Defence: beyond
Amsterdam, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Puig, 15 March 1999, p.p.
5-6.
170
“ France Cultivates Closer Ties to NATO but for Own Reasons”, Defense News, September 6-12,
1993.
44
international stage.", and expressed their determination to unite their efforts in
enabling the EU to give concrete expression to the following objectives: 171

• "The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis,

covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of
European Union."
• "… the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by
credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to
do so, in order to respond to international crises."
• "…the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set
out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty)
must be maintained."
• " Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European
Union."
• "… the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for
analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant
strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the
existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In
this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable
military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's
European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the
NATO framework). "

Following French Prime Minister L. Jospin's statement, during the Press

Conference after the Summit, the agreement was possible because " The United
Kingdom has moved on this matter, we moved too and I think that we need to do that
in looking to the future defence and security policy for Europe, it is necessary that
policy goes forward through actions like this."172 It was about one of the scarce times
when these two countries had harmonised their positions on European defence and
security issues to such a degree. That is why the meeting was characterised as
"historic" by the Press.

At the Vienna European Council, on 11 and 12 December 1998, the Fifteen,

although they didn't take decisions of an institutional nature, they stressed that "The
European Council welcomes the new impetus given to the debate on a common
European policy on security and defence. …. It welcomes the Franco-British
declaration made on 4 December 1998 in St Malo.".173

However, while the Europeans were busy looking for ways of a substantial
reinforcement of the European security and defence identity, the resurgence of the
crisis in Kosovo found Europe unprepared again. At the time when NATO's
operations in Kosovo started (in March 1999), the EU mainly focused on accusations
of financial scandals which were revealed and led to the resignation of the European
Commission. While NATO was ready to operate, the Europeans were looking for

171
JOINT DECLARATION ISSUED AT THE BRITISH-FRENCH SUMMIT, SAINT-MALO,
FRANCE, 3-4 DECEMBER 1998. Source: Official website of Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
[Link]/uk .
172
Edited transcript of press conference by president Jacques Chirac, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin and
Prime Minister Tony Blair, British-French summit, Saint-Malo, France, Friday 4 December 1998.
Source: official website of foreign & commonwealth office.
173
VIENNA EUROPEAN COUNCIL 11 AND 12 DECEMBER 1998, RESIDENCY
CONCLUSIONS. Source: Official website of EU, [Link]/ .
45
ways to deal with the crisis which had emerged in the EU itself, at the Berlin's
meeting.174

This fact in combination with, at least initially, the EU's limited participation in the
diplomatic effort of finding a political solution pointed out its inability to play an important
role in the developments. It is characteristic that the EU delayed discussing its further
participation in the Kosovo crisis at a special meeting (not until mid April),175 whereas it
proceeded to the appointment of the Finish President, Martti Ahtisaari, as an international
mediator in the Kosovo conflict on the 17th of May, 176 that is two months after the crisis had
started. However, one should not forget that the EU's delay was the choice of the European
States, mainly the three big ones, as neither France nor Germany wished EU's participation
through WEU, as they had done at the beginning of the 90's during the first Yugoslavian
crisis.

Just like in the past, the European members hurried to announce their political
will for the development of the European security and defence policy. On May 10,
1999 European Union defence ministers pledged in Bremen to work towards a
common security policy by December 2000, acknowledging they had a long way to
go. German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping admitted it was a ``tight timetable''
given the persistent shortcomings of Europeans in defence matters. Europeans lacked
sufficient airlift capability to move troops, hardware and humanitarian supplies, their
satellite capabilities paled compared to those of the United States, and they had no
joint command and control system. But, despite the difficulties, the German Minister
of Defence announced that: "The defence ministers meeting was a ... starting shot for
the concrete development of a common security and defence policy in Europe,".177 In
fact, Kosovo could really constitute, as it has already been mentioned,178 the military
"Euro" to lead to the creation of a European security and defence identity in the same
way as the Euro represents the economic and monetary unification?

EU leaders debated the issue in more detail at a summit in Cologne on 3-4

June and this time everyone seemed to be on board. The European Council decided to
embark on a new course designed to give Europe credible means for taking action in
response to regional crises, by means of a strengthened Common European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). The principal decision taken by the European Council
was that EU would have to be able to carry out the so-called "Petersburg tasks" in an
autonomous way without having to avail itself of WEU. It must have the capability to
conduct EU-led operations either using NATO assets or without recourse to NATO
assets and capabilities.

To this end the European Council declared that " the Union must have the
capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to
decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international
crises without prejudice to actions by NATO.", and tasked the "General Affairs
Council to prepare the conditions and the measures necessary to achieve these

174
"Kosovo crisis overshadows gathering of EU leaders", CNN, March 24, 1999. "Italy's Prodi To
Head Europe Union", Associated Press, Thursday, March 25, 1999.
175
"EU summit over Kosovo calls for larger EU, UN roles", ITAR/TASS News Agency, April 14,
1999.
176
U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #66, 99-05-18.
177
"EU To Create Defense Policy", The New York Times, May 10, 1999.
178
From the Professor at the University of Berlin, Ulrich Beck. See, "In Uniting Over Kosovo, a New
Sense of Identity for Europeans", The New York Times, April 28, 1999.
46
objectives, including the definition of the modalities for the inclusion of those
functions of the WEU which will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new
responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg tasks." 179 The decisions required to
achieve these objectives are to be taken by the end of the year 2000. The European
council considered that " In that event, the WEU as an organisation would have
completed its purpose.". In addition the EU agreed to appoint Javier Solana, then
Secretary General of NATO, as its High Representative for Foreign and Security
Policy. 180

In November 1999, European leaders announced their plans to create within

three years a rapid reaction force that could field 50,000 soldiers and 300 to 500
aircraft for up to a year to a future conflict like the one in Kosovo.181 The principal
European defence and foreign ministers agreed loosely on this goal in Luxembourg,
while on a following meeting in London Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and
President Jacques Chirac of France reaffirmed both countries' determination to co-
operate so that Europe could take care of its own military problems if the United
States was not available to help.

In the EU Helsinki summit on 10-11 December 1999 focus was given on

developing the Union's military crisis management capability, although there was a
mention of the reinforcement of its non-military crisis management capabilities. The
EU decided to create by the year 2003 a 60,000-man rapid reaction force that can be
sustained up to a year. It was also decided that a non-military crisis management
mechanism will be established. Finally, at the Helsinki NATO's central role in the
collective defence and crisis management was recognised, while it is stated that the
EU can act "where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.".182

But this provision does not specify the exact link between the EU and NATO
and how it will work. The American view is the following“ Done right, ESDP can
strengthen all of us. There are some issues for us: NATO First. We believe that crises
require swift, coordinated action. If NATO members and partners wish to join an
effort, it would be fruitless, even dangerous, to delay action while a debate took place
over whether the EU or NATO will lead. NATO should lead”.183

Whether France and Britain are in full accord on the relationship that any
future European force should have with the NATO alliance is less clear. British
Defence Secretary, Geoff Hoon, said, "What we want to see is a stronger European
contribution to NATO. I accept that different countries have different views. But what
Britain will do is negotiate effectively to ensure, first of all, that European nations can
pull their weight within NATO military operations but at the same time preserve the
essential link with NATO.".

179
European Council Declaration On strengthening the common European Policy on Security and
Defence, annexed to the Presidency Conclusions, Cologne European Council, 3 And 4 June 1999.
180
Henry Kissinger used to say that he wished that he had one phone number to call in Europe to find
out what Europe's foreign policy was. Well, now, there is.
181
“Europe Says Its Strike Force Won't Impair Role of NATO”, The New York Times, December 1,
1999.
182
Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki European Council, 10 And 11December 1999.
183
"A Transatlantic Community for the 21st Century", Thomas Pickering, Under Secretary for Political
Affairs, Address to the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, Bratislava, Slovakia, February 4, 2000.
47
 But France's foreign minister, Hubert Vedrine acknowledged that France was
out in front of some of its allies in arguing that a European reaction force should be
able to operate with complete autonomy even if it was put together from units that
formally belonged to the alliance. "If the Americans and we Europeans ourselves had
decided that Europeans should take charge of operations against Serbia, that would
not have been possible," French Defence Minister Alain Richard said. Speaking to his
European Union colleagues in Brussels, Belgium, about the need for stronger
European defences in a meeting on Nov. 15, Richard did not say a word about the
relationship that a European military staff would have to NATO. 184

Particularly French President Jacques Chirac, in an attempt to divert USA's

worries, declared: "The Americans kept saying Europe had to do more for its own
defence, so we finally said, all right, we will," "Now you shouldn't criticise us for
doing what you wanted us to do." While France's foreign minister stated "The United
States has to make a choice," "They have always been for sharing the burden.
They've never been much for sharing the decision-making. Obviously, there are some
real questions we have to answer, such as how are we going to organise this so as
not to interfere with the alliance. We are well aware that it's complicated.".185

While there is growing consensus on the need for Europe to restructure its defences,
many of the European allies are actually cutting on military spending. U.S. Defence Secretary
William Cohen criticised Germany for spending only 1.5 percent of its gross domestic
product on defence, by saying that "The decisions Germany makes in the next few months and
years will have a profound and lasting impact on the capabilities, not only of this nation, but
of the alliance as a whole,".

But the main concern for the U.S. is that the new push for an independent European
military arm will divert resources and attention from NATO. Lord Robertson, Secretary
General of the NATO alliance, defending the EU's effort assured that U.S. fears that an
independent European defence would weaken Trans-Atlantic ties were groundless stating that
"Those who are nervous in the United States that with the Europeans carrying more of the
burden, that they would break away, are wrong,".

3.2.2 Does the WEU Have a Role?

The Amsterdam Treaty in order to enhance the EU's CFSP established the
provision that "The Union will avail itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement
decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications. The competence
of the European Council to establish guidelines in accordance with Article J.3 shall
also obtain in respect of the WEU for those matters for which the Union avails itself
of the WEU. When the Union avails itself of the WEU to elaborate and implement
decisions of the Union on the tasks referred to in paragraph 2 all Member States of
the Union shall be entitled to participate fully in the tasks in question.", (title V,
article J. 7.3).

The aforementioned anticipations, in relation to the Maastricht Treaty, too,

resulted in an hierarchical grading in the relationship between EU and WEU. While
the later was expressing a balanced relationship between the two organisations,

184
“European Leaders Plan a Rapid Intervention Force”, The New York Times, November 26, 1999.
185
"With a 'Don't Be Vexed' Air, Chirac Assesses U.S.", The New York Times, December 17, 1999.
48
following the anticipation that " The union requests the Western European Union
(WEU), … to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have
defence implications", the Amsterdam Treaty established instead a relationship in
which the EU avail itself of WEU and WEU elaborate and implement decisions and
actions of the EU without having the alternative to turn down those decisions.186

Of course the advisability of the aforementioned anticipations should be

interpreted in the light of article J, 7.1, in which it was mentioned that: "The Union
shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the
possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council
so decide. ".

The "Declaration of the WEU on the Role of Western European Union and its
Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance" which was
adopted by the WEU Council of Ministers on 22 July 1997 and attached to the Final
Act of the Intergovernmental Conference concluded with the signature of the Treaty
of Amsterdam on 2 October 1997, described the future role of WEU in the European
security and defence matters, in the above mentioned context.

Following the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty and the NATO Summit in
Madrid, there was a common perception that WEU became finally an organisation
with a clearly defined role, since the Amsterdam and Madrid decisions have put an
end to the debate about its future as an institution. This optimism illustrated in the
Erfurt Declaration of 18 November 1997, where the Ministers of WEU declared that
"The enhancement of WEU's pivotal role between the European Union and NATO
remains therefore a high priority on WEU's agenda".

Since the WEU still remained the basic institutional link for the development of the
ESDI within NATO, emphasis was given on elaborating further the operational capabilities
so that the WEU to be able to conduct WEU-led crisis management operations. But, after the
signature of Amsterdam Treaty, WEU has been involved in only one joint action with the
EU, the mission of the Multinational Advisory Police Element (MAPE)187 in Albania, while
the possibility of a WEU-led operation in the CJTF concept was still a distant likelihood.
But of course that was not the fault of WEU. "With NATO still in the process of developing
a new Strategic Concept, and EU absorbed by the consequences of monetary union, the
blame cannot be put at the doorstep of WEU, which remains 'on hold', ready to operate for
both of them", as Mr. Guido Lenzi, former director of the WEU Institute for Security
Studies, pointed out.188

During the escalation of the Kosovo crisis, at the beginning of 1999 it became
obvious that the European countries still lacked the political will for mobilising the WEU.

After the resumption of the debate, following the initiatives by Britain and France
that led to Saint-Malo process, on how a European security and defence policy might be
achieved, the future role of WEU has been seriously challenged. Especially the main

186
See relevant analysis, Martin Ï rtega, "Some questions on legal aspects", in Guido Lenzi (ed.), WEU
at Fifty, (Paris, Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1998), p.p. 1-13.
187
MAPE has asessed the operational capabilities of Albanian police units and tailored training needs
accordingly. Akey part of MAPE' s work has been also to provide advice to the Ministry of Public
Order on restructuring the Albanian police.
188
Guido lenzi, "WEU's future: from subcontractor to conveyor belt?", in WEU at Fifty, (Paris,
Institute for Security Studies of WEU, 1998), p. 123.
49
challenge that WEU faces after the EU Cologne and Helsinki summits is to fall again in an
abeyance situation, following the anticipation of the transfer of the operational functions and
mechanisms of the organism into the EU by the year 2000. This anticipation cancels the new
successive roles which the two Treaties of the EU (the Maastricht one and the Amsterdam
one) had reserved for the WEU.

As far as the future of the organisation is concerned, although at the Cologne Summit
the European Council declared that after the "inclusion of those functions of the WEU which
will be necessary for the EU to fulfil its new responsibilities in the area of the Petersberg
tasks the WEU as an organisation would have completed its purpose", it has not been clear
yet whether the WEU will stop existing as an organisation or it will go back to the status it
had before the 90's, that is to say be a defensive organism in hibernation, even though the
second possibility seems to be prevailing.

What is quite surprising is the swing of the French policy mainly but also the
German policy in whatever concerns the role of the WEU. Two years before the Cologne
Summit, the same countries submitted to the Intergovernmental Conference a separate
document containing four articles setting out three phases for the full integration of WEU in
the European Union.189 What has changed? Whatever has changed it is important to notice
that the vision of integrating the WEU into the EU in the medium-term future was a kind of
an unrealistic task.

There were and still are outstanding problems for the full integration of WEU
(including article V of the modified Brussels treaty, which provides the mutual assistance
obligation) into the EU:

• some EU member states, with a tradition of neutrality have difficulty in accepting

the idea of a common defence
• some countries especially UK do not want the EU to take on the responsibility
for common defence
• it has already been decided that a ESDI should be developed within NATO, but
three European member states of NATO do not belong to the EU
• the European countries do not share the same vision about the final objective of
European integration, including the fields of defence and security.

However, the abolition of an authentic European defensive organisation, which in the

post-bipolar environment was strongly associated with the prospect of the creation of a
Common European defence, will create serious doubts about what extent the European
enterprise can really reach. The aforementioned is proved by the "Message from the WEU
Assembly to the Governments and parliaments of Europe": "By not making a commitment to
a common defence an obligation for the European Union, as the Maastricht and Amsterdam
Treaties envisaged for the long term, the Cologne programme runs the risk of radically
changing the very purpose of EU construction". "European construction must encompass a
common defence. […] For as long as that is impossible within the framework of the Treaty
on European Union, the modified Brussels Treaty and Article V in particular, must be
preserved.".190
189
Document 1564, Assembly of Western European Union, Maastricht II: the WEU Assembly's
proposal for European cooperation on security and defence, Report submitted on behalf of the Political
Committee by Mr. Antretter and Mrs. Squarcialupi, 9 May 1997, p.p. 34-39.
190
Document 1662, Assembly of Western European Union, Security and Defence: the challenge for
Europe after Cologne, Report submitted on behalf of the Political Committee by Mr. Marshal, 19
October 1999, p.p.10, 11.
50
4. Co-operative Security: The Way Ahead

Ten years after the end of the Cold War the key elements of the new European
security include a transformed and expanded NATO and a European Union
committed to pursue a common defence and security policy. Even though the relevant
decisions were taken in 1999 in NATO's Washington Summit and in Cologne and
Helsinki EU's Summits respectively, the year 1999 was in fact less a deadline than a
starting point for the construction of a new system of security and defence on the
basis of achieving lasting and viable co-operative arrangements.

A decade before the challenge was to address the problems of the emerging new
threats and dangers for the European security, the readjustment of the existing institutions
and organisations to the new conditions, the reconsideration and updating of the
transatlantic link, the re-incorporation of the former East-European countries to the
European structures and the definition of Russia's role in European security matters. The
first steps have been already made, but are they in the right direction, do they promote a
new co-operative security regime for the whole Europe? Unless U.S. decides what to do
with its power, and the major European states decide what kind of Europe they want, it will
not be easy to meet the challenge of co-operation, as the crisis in Kosovo has shown.

4.1 European National Policies and Kosovo Crisis

After the crisis in Kosovo and the NATO's elevation, for once more, as the only
organisation which can manage crisis situations that could be a threat to European security,
the most outlined conclusion was that Europe is short of the necessary operational and
military capabilities in order to act in an autonomous way.191 However, the biggest
difficulties in forming an autonomous European security and defence policy, which were not
overcome till recently, concern the harmonisation of the national policies of the three
European leading countries.

As it has been said, the problem is the lack of political will. It is not that Europe has
the same military strength as the U.S., but if one considers European countries' defensive
potential as a unified one, this potential is not at all insignificant and crisis management, as
the one in Kosovo, is definitely within its capability. There is no common conception of the
European defence and the differences in this section are the source of Europe's weakness.192

The case-study analysis of the crisis in Kosovo offers an outstanding analytical tool
for the detection of basic axons of the foreign and defensive policy of Britain, France and
Germany. The incompatibility of their pursuits during the crisis, not only did it make any
reference to the European security and defence identity impossible, but it also put NATO's
cohesion in danger.

191
"NATO: Europe Needs US Help in Crises", AP Online, June 30 1999. "Air War Exposed Arms Gap
Within NATO", The Washington Post, June 28, 1999.
192
Luis Maria de Puig, President of the Assembly of WEU, "Kosovo: Europe's weakness", Letter from
the Assembly, No 30, May 1999. See also the relevant analysis: Dominique Moisi, Dreaming of
Europe, Foreign Policy, Nu. 115, Summer 1999.
51
The period of the agreement: The bombings, acceptable tool for Milosevic's
compliance

NATO began its operations against Yugoslavia on the 24th of March 1999 with the
declared purpose of avoiding an upcoming humanitarian disaster as a result of President
Milosevic's policy in Kosovo.193 Before this, there was the 1998 crisis and the negotiations in
Rambouillet in February and in Paris in March, under the aegis of the Contact Group in
which Britain, France and Germany took part. Since the beginning of the crisis all three of
them appeared aligned with the American policy of using military power to make President
Milosevic comply with the demands stated during the previous negotiations.194

Two days after the beginning of the operations, on the 23rd of March, the French
Prime-Minister Lionel Jospin, in a speech to the French National Assembly stated
characteristically: "Our country, you know, has done all it can in order to find a political exit
for the crisis in Kosovo, … the use of force became unavoidable".195 Even when it came to
the legitimacy of NATO's bombings, the French Prime-Minister justified NATO's initiative
by saying: "While there was an emergency, it was up to us to take responsibility, notably
within the Atlantic Alliance ( NATO).".

Aligned with the French Prime-Minister, the German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
stated, two days before the beginning of the operations, that there were very small chances
for a peaceful solution to the crisis. While referring to the humanitarian situation in the area
he stressed that: "It is time to bring an end to the brutality".196

In an equivalent speech in the British Parliament on the 23rd of March, the

British Prime-Minister, Tony Blair, mentioned that: "Britain stands ready with our
NATO allies to take military action".197 In addition, following his statements after the
beginning of the operations he presumed that NATO's action was drawing its
legitimacy from the Security Council's resolutions which invited Milosevic to comply
with what was agreed, while he also supported that a further mandate on behalf of the
UN is not necessary to make it legal.198

The support of NATO's operation from the three countries was not restricted only to
the justification of the necessity of conducting it, but it also had an operational character
through the supply of means and military forces. 199

More specifically, the German Ministry of Defence announced that the German Air
force was prepared to take part in NATO's air-strikes campaign and that over fifteen Tornado
warplanes with 500 soldiers would participate in the military operations against Yugoslavian
targets.200 At the same time, Germany made its UAV’s available and also some service-bases
for the US aircrafts. This position shows that Germany has abandoned the district role, which
it had during the crisis in Bosnia, claiming a more substantial one.
193
For a critical approach of the subject, See: Charles Krauthammer, "The Short, Unhappy Life of
Humanitarian War", The National Interest, Nu. 57 (Fall 1999).
194
"NATO Says It's Ready to Act to Stop Violence in Kosovo", The New York Times, January 29,
1999.
195
"French Prime Minister Justifies NATO Action Against Yugoslavia", Xinhua News Agency, March
26, 1999.
196
"Schroeder: Little Hope for Peaceful Kosovo Solution", Xinhua News Agency, March 22, 1999.
197
"Britain Stands Ready to Strike Yugoslavia", Xinhua News Agency, March 23, 1999.
198
Voice of America, 99-03-24.
199
"Where NATO Allies Stand on Kosovo", Associated Press, May 20, 1999.
200
"Germany Foresees No Chance of Peace in Kosovo", Xinhua News Agency, March 23, 1999.
52
 In the same way, France's response to the air-strikes operations was immediate. As the
French Prime-Minister declared in his previously mentioned speech in the French Parliament,
forty French warplanes were participating in the first two days NATO bombing missions
against anti-air defense systems of the Yugoslav army and 2,400 French ground troops were
deployed in FYROM for a future peacekeeping mission in Kosovo. Furthermore, France
made a number of PUMA helicopters and UAV's available, while soldiers of the French
airforce were moved to Albania with a view to helping the Americans. At the same time, it
made a number of airfields available for the service of U.S. aircrafts.

The British contribution with 13.000 ground forces, submarines, aircraft carrier,
Harrier and Tornado aircraft, which took part in the bombings from the first days of NATO's
operation as well as with the supply of conveniences in British bases, showed the
determination of Blair's government to give to its country a primary role in the development
of the European defence. This situation differed substantially the current British leadership
from the previous ones.

The First Breach: France and Germany in search for ways of political crisis
management

This unified position of the three European Allies was soon broken through. As
NATO's bombing in the area went on with continuously wider kinds of targets and
continuously unclear the discrimination between military and political targets, at the
beginning of April France asserted the initiative in looking for a peaceful solution to the crisis
in Kosovo as well as in having a word in the choice of the targets to be attacked.

According to the statements of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, France's foreign

policy, regarding the crisis in question, was coming into a new phase,201 the main
characteristic of which was the pursuit of a peaceful solution through a close collaboration
with Russia.202 In this framework, France developed its contacts with the latter203 and
suggested a plan to follow for the solution of the crisis with an upgraded role of the EU and
UN.204

This initiative was not at all welcome by the USA and NATO, a fact that put the
relationship of the two countries to the test. An indication of this contrast is the article
appeared in the British newspaper "Daily Telegraph" 205 which mentions that Washington
worries about a direct or indirect potential leaking of information on behalf of France towards
Yugoslavia, since France has started to except itself from some NATO's operations.

Although that publication was denied by both the State Department and the French
Minister of Defence,206 the divergence of views between France and USA was obvious, at
201
"France backs Contact Group, G-8 meetings over Yugoslavia", ITAR/TASS News Agency,
03-Apr-1999.
202
"France Proposes to Russia Emergency Meeting on Yugoslavia", Xinhua News Agency, 03-Apr-
1999. "France praises Russia's role in Kosovo settlement", ITAR/TASS News Agency,
29-Apr-1999.
203
"Chirac leaves for Russia on visit", ITAR/TASS News Agency, May 12, 1999.
"Chirac: Talks Bring France, Russia Closer on Kosovo", Xinhua News Agency,
May 13, 1999.
204
"Yeltsin, Chirac discuss Kosovo by telephone", ITAR/TASS News Agency, April 12, 1999. "France
Suggests EU Provisionary Administration in Kosovo", Xinhua News Agency, April 14, 1999.
205
ITAR/TASS News Agency, April 09, 1999.
206
U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing #47, 99-04-09. Voice of America, 99-04-09.
53
least concerning the legitimisation of NATO's action without previous authorisation from the
Security Council. During the NATO's Summit in Washington, the French President Jacques
Chirac stated: "There is a wide difference between President Clinton and me on the need to
ask the United Nations (before taking action),''. 207 In any case, France's request for
participation in the process of reaching decisions concerning the operations was satisfied by
Washington with the establishment of a "management commission" consisting of the USA,
France, Britain, Germany and Italy's Ministers of Foreign Affairs.208

In parallel with this change in the French policy, the German policy also
turned to the pursuit of ways of a peaceful settlement of the crisis, as the reactions
against bombings, both in the country and in the governmental coalition, increased.209
The intensity of the reactions inside the Social-Democratic party forced Schroeder to
call an extraordinary meeting where he launched an appeal for the conservation of the
unity of the party stating in a characteristic way: "We have a responsibility toward our
allies in NATO,'' "Especially as Germans, our response must be clear: We must never
again allow murder, expulsions and deportations to be tolerated by politicians,''.210

Almost at the same time as the French initiative, Germany presented a suggestion for
a political solution to the crisis in Kosovo with the diplomatic intermediation of Russia. 211
On the 14th of April 1999, following the initiative of Germany which had assumed the
presidency of the EU, an extraordinary summit meeting of the EU took place where the
German plan was discussed, which anticipated among others a 24-hour pause of the
bombings, on condition that the Serbian forces would leave Kosovo and the UN would take
over.

In total contrast to these two initiatives, the British position remained stable in the
continuation of the operations until Milosevic retreated. As the British Prime-Minister stated,
there is no question of negotiation or compromise with Milosevic, we have expressed our
demands and aims, which must be fully satisfied.212

The Definitive Split: The prospect of developing ground forces in Kosovo

But, while the operations went on without bringing the desirable results, the
divergence of views on matters concerning the future way of the Alliance's action was
becoming more and more obvious. An example of this divergence concerned the question of
imposing an oil blockade to Yugoslavia. Germany was vigorously for this position, whereas
France was against both the idea of a blockade, for which it felt that there should be a
Security Council's decision,213 and the inspection of the vessels, which would refuse to
comply with the blockade. This position forced NATO to decide that its crafts would not use
force to stop vessels carrying oil, while the relevant NATO's activity was characterised as "a
visit and inspection".214

207
"United on Kosovo, NATO Looks Ahead, AP Online, April 24, 1999.
208
"France Played Skeptic on Kosovo Attacks", The Washington Post, September 20, 1999.
209
"German Parties Slam Government Policy on Kosovo", Xinhua News Agency, May 30, 1999.
"German Greens Debate Kosovo Stand", AP Online, May 13,1999.
210
"German Leader Wants Unity on Kosovo", AP Online, April 12,1999.
211
"Germany Seeks EU Resolve on Kosovo & Germany Offers Kosovo Peace Plan", AP Online,
April 14, 1999.
212
NATO: Transcript of press conference given by NATO Sec General, Mr J. Solana, & British Prime
Minister, M2 Communications Ltd. , 21-Apr-1999.
213
The Washington Post, Special Report, 25-Apr-99.
214
"NATO Backs Off Naval Blocade of Oil to Yugoslavia", The Washington Post, April 8, 1999.
54
 However, the main point of the divergence concerned the prospect of sending ground
forces to Kosovo. Despite the fact that this likelihood had been examined in the Summit
Meeting for the 50th NATO's anniversary on the 25th of April as a potential choice which had
divided the allies, Britain brought the question back almost a month later. It should be noted
that during the initial discussion of the matter, Chancellor Schroeder, following his
statements to CNN, appeared willing to support the dispatch of ground forces in Kosovo if
NATO decides to use them. 215 According to the subsequent suggestion expressed by the
British Minister of Foreign Affairs NATO should prepare a plan to send ground forces to
Kosovo in order to take advantage of the weakening of the Serbian forces by the air strikes.216

This time Germany appeared to be opposed to this prospect by rejecting this

likelihood and expressing its belief that the intensive bombing could bring the desirable
result. 217 This position was supported by other countries, too (e.g. Italy), but France avoided
commenting on the suggestion, which showed its silent approval.218 One month later, in an
interview, the French President confirmed the aforementioned appreciation by stating that the
uncertainty about the choice of ground forces had to have been maintained in order to
discourage Milosevic.219 In any case, it should be noted that even for this question France felt
that there should be a previous Security Council resolution.

In this phase, Britain stood out as a country bearing in public the burden of the
support for the sending of ground forces.220 With this suggestion it pursued to direct the
evolutions passing past even the USA (which had sent confusing messages on this matter
until then stressing that all the choices are possible and the Alliance should carry on the same
strategy until to the end). An indication of the tension of Blair's statements was Clinton's
personal intervention in order to urge Blair to stop talking in public about ground operations
because these statements created internal alliance problems and made the Russians unwilling
to contribute to a diplomatic solution.221

Germany turned out to be the biggest opponent to such a choice persisting in

the continuation of the double NATO's strategy (that is air-strikes as well as finding a
political solution), following the German Chancellor's statement during his visit to the
headquarters of the Alliance on the 19th of May. 222 Germany had expressed its
different view on the subject long before, but this intense opposition was something
new. Schroeder's answer on BBC to a relevant question is characteristic: "I will not
participate in this specifically British debate on war theories".223

Particularly, Schroeder tried to make his view sound even more serious by
emphasising the fact that he was bearing the Presidency of the EU. In this framework
Germany activated itself intensively towards the finding of a diplomatic solution with

215
CNN, 25-4-99.
216
"NATO Allies Divided on Path to Peace in Kosovo,Britain Presses for a Massing of Ground
Troops", The Washington Post, May 18, 1999.
217
"NATO Split on Ground Invasion of Kosovo", The Washington Post, May 20, 1999.
218
"Kosovo Land Threat May have Won War", The Washington Post, September 19, 1999.
219
Television interview given by M. Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, to "TF1", Paris, 10
June 1999, [Link] .
220
"Blair a Loyal U.S. Ally", AP Online, June 17, 1999.
221
"Kosovo Land Threat May Have Won War", The Washington Post, September 19, 1999.
222
Press Conference by NATO Secretary General, Mr Javier Solana and German Chancellor Gerhard
Schroeder, 19 May 1999, [Link]/docu/speech.
223
"Germany's Leader Pledges to Bloc Combat on Ground", The New York Times, May 20, 1999.
55
the participation of the UN, EU and Russia.224 The fact that Milosevic chose the
German Chancellor to send him a letter to make known that he accepted the proposals
of the G-8,225 so that the processes for the adoption of the relevant Security Council
resolution could be accomplished and NATO's operations stopped, constitutes the
proof of the success of these movements.

The question of NATO's military strategy continued preoccupying the allies.

Britain insisted on the choice of ground operations and Germany opposed to this
likelihood intensely. Even though the different and sometimes opposite pursuits of the
three main European actors, as they described above, did not lead to a crisis in the
Alliance, they brought to the surface the difficulty the three countries face in
harmonising their policies. This ascertainment was not at all disregarded by the U.S
following the statement of the American Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott,
that there would have been major difficulty in keeping the Alliance's cohesion,
solidarity and determination if the Serbian leader had not retreated on the 3rd of
June.226

4.2 Hot Topics for NATO's future policy

The Kosovo crisis revealed many important issues that NATO must take into
account in order to formulate its future policy. Some of them, which are closely
related with the co-operative regime that NATO envisions, are analysed below. First
the outbreak of Kosovo war brought down to earth the american-pushed efforts to
revamp NATO in some sort of global alliance. Second it showed clearly that Russia
and China couldn’t be ignored. Third it revealed for one more time the existing
differences between the Allies concerning UN’s role in authorisation of action. All
these are topics that must be resolved if a true co-operative security regime is to be
established in Europe.

The Out of Area limits of the New NATO

During the early 90s, the “out of area or out of business” was a common
slogan. In Washington’s new strategic concept, the Alliance embraced for the first
time military missions in volatile regions beyond their own borders. The NATO
summit approved a communique that said the alliance must be prepared "to meet the
challenges of the future’’ but did not specify where.

The much-debated initiative, which Secretary General Javier Solana called a

“road map to navigate the security challenges" of the next millennium, was hailed by
19 heads of government as a renewed sense of identity and purpose for the North
Atlantic Alliance in the post Cold War era. "For five years now, we have been
working to build a new NATO prepared to deal with the security challenges of the
new century" President Clinton told a news conference on the summit's second day.
"We have reaffirmed our readiness . . . to address regional and ethnic conflicts
beyond the territory of NATO members."227

224
"German govt seeking to draw Russia into Kosovo settlement", ITAR/TASS News Agency, April
19, 1999.
225
"NATO Sending Tough Terms to Belgrade", The Washington Post, June 2, 1999.
226
"NATO's inner Kosovo conflict", BBC Online News, August 20, 1999, [Link]/ .
227
“ NATO Widens Security 'Map'”, The Washington Post, April 25, 1999.
56
 Before the Kosovo crisis, the U.S. had been trying to persuade NATO members to
consider expanding the defensive alliance's reach beyond Europe as a way of maintaining
an important post-Cold War role in the world. But most European nations opposed to the
idea and had only reluctantly agreed in 1995 to act outside NATO borders by launching
limited air strikes against Serb forces in Bosnia and then a peacekeeping mission to halt
ethnic cleansing.

In December 1998 US secretary of state Albright reassured US allies that the United
States is not trying to create a new global NATO as the alliance planned its future strategic
concept. In her remarks she explained that NATO must be ready to deal with threats outside
its borders, including a ballistic missile attack that uses a weapon of mass destruction. Her
pledge to work together to prevent proliferation of weapons was generally welcome by her
colleagues from France and Germany. But they questioned just how far the United States
wanted to extend NATO's reach. German foreign minister Joschka Fischer asked her if
Korea would be NATO's boundary and quoted her as saying 'no.' However, she did say
NATO should have constructive engagement with its partners which include a countries as
far east as Kazakhstan.228

NATO's operations in Kosovo demonstrated that the allies still have much work to
do to secure Europe's future. So, at April's 50-year anniversary NATO summit in
Washington, U.S. officials backed away from a specific call to expand the alliance's global
role. According to Secretary of State Albright, although ethnic cleansing won't be tolerated,
NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia shouldn't be considered as a precedent for future
intervention by the alliance elsewhere. "Every circumstance is unique,'' Albright told the
Council on Foreign Relations. "NATO is a European and Atlantic -- not a global –
institution”. Albright said that any decision to use force against another country will be
made by the President after weighing a host of factors. "Some hope, and others fear, that
Kosovo will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution
against any such sweeping conclusions."229

NATO's deepening involvement in the Balkans is having a profound effect on

the alliance's future, diverting its attention and resources to southern Europe. So
difficult were the politics of the war, and so costly the prospect of dispatching 50,000
peacekeeping troops into Kosovo, that the European consensus in NATO now is that
this out-of-area gambit may be the last. Many strategists within the alliance expect the
Balkans to become an absorbing ordeal that will tie up troops and resources for years.
NATO forces are already dispatched in Bosnia, Albania, FYROM; and Kosovo.
According to the entire prognosis they are going to be there a long time, possibly like
the troops who have been in Korea for half a century. No one could have thought they
would be there that long.

While NATO has agreed not to consider additional expansion until the year
2002, the Kosovo conflict has bolstered the stature and strategic importance of
Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, increasing the chances that these nations will be
among the next to join the pact. Momentum is certainly halted, for now, for extending
NATO's reach to these areas or even to more far-flung interests in Persian Gulf oil,
the halt of nuclear weapons and missiles across Asia and the Middle East, or in
fighting terrorist crimes on a transnational scale.

228
Voice of America, 98-12-08.
229
“ Albright: NATO Bombing Not Precedent”, Associated Press, June 28, 1999.
57
Relations with Russia

NATO's operations in Kosovo made a severe damage to US-Russian and

therefore to NATO-Russian relations. Russia felt betrayed by NATO, which won
grudging Russian acceptance of the alliance's expansion to take in former Warsaw
Pact countries by insisting it was a defensive alliance only.

Some of the implications were mentioned in an article by the Russian envoy

on the Balkans Victor Chernomyrdinin: "The new NATO strategy, the first practical
instance of which we are witnessing in Yugoslavia, has led to a serious deterioration
in Russia-U.S. contacts. I will be so bold as to say it has set them back by several
decades… It is impossible to talk peace with bombs falling. This is clear now. So I
deem it necessary to say that, unless the raids stop soon, I shall advise Russia's
president to suspend Russian participation in the negotiating process, put an end to
all military-technological co-operation with the United States and Western Europe,
put off the ratification of START II and use Russia's veto as the United Nations
debates a resolution on Yugoslavia. On this, we shall find understanding from great
powers such as China and India. Of this, I am sure."230

The fragility of the U.S.-Russian relationship has been highlighted by the fact
that only a week after Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott was hailing Russia for
playing a constructive international role, he rushed to Moscow to defuse a crisis while
British forces confronted Russian and Serb troops at the airport in Pristina. The
sudden, unexpected deployment of Russian troops to the Kosovo capital of Pristina, in
advance of the international military force (KFOR), has added to the mistrust and
tension between the two countries, especially since it came hours after Ivanov
promised Albright deployment would not take place before an agreement over
Russia's role in KFOR.

Critics say that the Clinton administration has pushed Russia too hard by
expanding NATO231 and prosecuting a war in Kosovo over Moscow's objections
while failing to foster a lasting basis for relations with Russia.232 Although Russia, the
largest country in the world, covering more than 10 percent of the total land area of
the globe, does not have as much global influence as it once did, it is trying to project
power. Moscow sometimes during the Kosovo case felt humiliated when every
remark was ignored or dismissed (Yeltsin was ignored when he asked not to bomb
Serbia a day before the bombing began).

A paradigm of Russia’s feelings is the complaint of President Yeltsin, clearly

bristling over President Clinton's criticism of Russia's military assault on Chechnya,
that the United States was not treating Russia with the respect due for a nuclear
power.233 The European countries and the United States have made some allowances
for Moscow's conduct of the war, recognising that what Russia is trying to do in
Chechnya is very different from what the Serbs tried to do in Kosovo. But they still

230
The Washington Post, May 27, 1999.
231
John Lewis Gaddis criticized strongly the Clinton's administration initiative to enlarge NATO. See,
History, Grand Strategy and NATO Enlargement, Survival, The ISS Quarterly, Vol. 40. No. 1 (Spring
1998).
232
"Mistrust Marks U.S.-Russian Efforts on Kosovo”, The Washington Post, June 13, 1999.
233
“Russian Leader Complains of Lack of Respect From U.S.”, The New York Times, December 10,
1999.
58
pointed out that the Russian tactics could cost thousands of innocent lives. "The
continuation of it and the amassing of hundreds of thousands of refugees," will further
alienate the global community from Russia." President Clinton said. Those remarks,
and mostly verbal criticism by the European Union, provoked chilling ire from
President Boris Yeltsin as he was visiting China. "Clinton allowed himself to pressure
Russia yesterday. He must have forgotten for a moment what Russia is. It has a full
arsenal of nuclear weapons."234

NATO should expect that it will be harder to enlist Russia’s help in the future.
Russia issued one of its harshest rebuttals yet of Western criticism of its Chechnya
campaign, describing NATO ministers as cynical and accusing the alliance of trying
to worsen the conflict.235 According to analysts, NATO's strained relationship with
Moscow has contributed to hampering membership prospects for the Baltic States, the
one-time Soviet republics of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. They border Russia,
which would be irritated if they joined. The shift in NATO thinking comes despite the
relative success of the three nations in their transition to free-market economies and in
easing ethnic tensions with Russian minorities since regaining independence in
1991.236

Isolated by the West, Moscow tried to consolidate what Russia calls a

"strategic partnership'' with Beijing. Sino-Russian relations have improved since
NATO's Kosovo campaign against Yugoslavia, which both opposed.

Relations with China

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade has harmed an already

battered long-term relationship between the United States and Beijing. The accidental
bombing by NATO, which is being portrayed in China as deliberate, played to one of
China's historical sensitivities: humiliation at the hands of foreigners. China had
repeatedly attacked against NATO over its bombing campaign, to which Beijing
opposed from the start.

Apart from Kosovo case, NATO's expansion has alarmed Chinese strategists
who see an American-spun web of security relationships from Kosovo to Kazakhstan,
Mongolia to Manila, tightening around China's borders. Over the past three years,
U.S. forces have also held exercises or seminars with the armies of Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which border China. In a peacekeeping seminar led by
the U.S. Central Command at Florida's MacDill Air Force Base in mid-May, officers
from neighbouring Mongolia came to observe.

An article published in the influential magazine Outlook said the United States
had only one goal: "the hegemonic domination of the world". The article said the U.S.
plan to "control the world" was based on two prongs, NATO's eastward expansion
and close defence ties with Japan.237 Chinese strategists fear that U.S. moves to

234
“ Yeltsin Angrily Touts Russia's Nuclear Arsenal”, The New York Times, December 9, 1999.
"HANDS OFF, The No Man's Land in the Fight for Human Rights”, The New York Times, December
12, 1999.
235
“Russia Calls NATO 'Cynical' Over Chechnya”, Reuters, December 3, 1999.
236
“ NATO Looks To Balkans For Growth, Baltic States Fear They May Get Overlooked in
Expansion”, The Washington Post, July 7, 1999.
237
“China Rethinks Security After NATO Attack, Beijing Alarmed by U.S. Ties With Neighbors”, The
Washington Post, June 11, 1999.
59
bolster military relations with China's bordering states. Recent reports in the United
States have placed China at the top of Americans' list of possible enemies.238

China and Russia issued a joint statement filled with attacks on American
foreign policy. The statement said that unidentified parties, obviously the United
States, are trying to force on the world "a single model of culture, value concepts and
ideology" and are violating the sovereignty of countries under the guise of
"humanitarian intervention."239

The Question of Mandates

The alliance’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia has set a controversial

precedent, attacking a sovereign nation without explicit authority from the United
Nations. NATO contended it had authority from previous resolutions. A set of issues
surrounds the questions about the authority needed to intervene with force
internationally even in the face of major humanitarian disaster and at a time when the
concept of sovereignty is used to bloc such steps.

The dispute is not a new one, but it is still unresolved. In Bosnia, where the
United Nations played a central mediating role, UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali
had asserted that he alone had the authority to approve air strikes.240 In the end, by
agreeing to give the UN Secretary General the right to approve any first strike, the
United States backed away from its earlier insistence that Security Council resolutions
gave the United States and its allies the power to act on their own initiative.241

The debate addresses the fact that the US wants recognition of NATO's right
to take action on its own initiative, while some European countries stress the need for
an explicit UN Security Council mandate. French Foreign Affairs Minister Vedrine
insisted that missions calling for the use of force should be placed under the authority
of the UN, while Chancellor Schroeder made Germany’s position clear: “ But the
readiness to assume more responsibility also means that international, out of area
military missions must be based on an unequivocal mandate under international law.
As a rule, this would be a mandate from the UN Security Council or action under the
aegis of the OSCE. A community defined by values such as our transatlantic Alliance
cannot afford to be complacent on this issue. This principle may only be abandoned in
exceptional cases: to prevent humanitarian catastrophes and grave violations of
human rights, i.e. when immediate action is urgently called for on humanitarian
grounds”.242

Opening the last UN General Assembly debate in the 20th century, Secretary
General Annan told presidents and prime ministers that ''massive and systematic
violations of human rights, wherever they may take place, should not be allowed to
stand''. He said the danger was that others, such as NATO in its bombing of Serbia

238
“Report Warns of Big Gains to Chinese From Spying”, The New York Times, April 22, 1999.
“China Envoy Calls Report `Vicious'”, The New York Times, May 28, 1999.
239
"An Old Sore Spot Further Irritates U.S.-Chinese Relations”, The New York Times, December 12,
1999.
240
“US Asks Allies to Broaden Threats against Serb Forces”, The New York Times, August 6, 1993.
241
“Serbs Must Withdraw Promptly Or Face Air Strikes, US Insists”, The New York Times, August
12, 1993.
242
Document 1637, Assembly of Western European Union, “The NATO Summit and its Implications
for Europe”, Defence Committee, 15 March 1999, p. 9.
60
over Kosovo in 1999, would take international law in their own hands if the 15-
member UN Security Council did not enforce its decisions. The French prime
minister said the UN Security Council, where France has veto power, must retain
prime authority over all intervention, even if humanitarian emergencies occasionally
required an exception, as in Kosovo. British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said that
while intervention must always be the last resort, "we have a shared responsibility to
act also when confronted with genocide, mass displacement of people or major
breaches of international humanitarian law. To know that such atrocities are being
committed and not to act against them is to make us complicit in them. And to be
passive in the face of such events is to make it more likely they will be repeated,''
Cook said.243

Russia and China argued that NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia violated
international law and undermined the UN Charter, which says council authorisation is
required to use force against a sovereign state. As permanent members of the UN
Security Council, they spoke out against "the replacing of international law with
power politics and even resorting to force, and the jeopardising of the sovereignty of
independent states using the concepts of `human rights are superior to sovereignty'
and `humanitarian intervention". The Security Council's "status and function should
not be doubted or lessened under any circumstances,'' they added''.244

The two powers baldly rejected the evolving Western doctrine, born of the
carnage in countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, that state
sovereignty no longer provides cover for gross human rights violations and the
international community has a moral duty to protect citizens from abusive
governments. They declared in a joint communique they would fight the "use of
pretexts such as human rights and humanitarian intervention to destroy the
sovereignty of independent states.''245 Beijing and Moscow want to force the issue
back to the UN Security Council, where their veto gives both countries clouts that
they no longer have in other forums.

Others as the Russian envoy on the Balkans, Viktor Chernomyrdin, appealed

for a stronger Security Council to enable the United Nations to stand up to regional
pressures "We cannot allow the UN role to be weakened," he said in a speech to the
Council of Europe parliamentary assembly (June, 24) which was debating the
situation in Yugoslavia. If not strengthened by reforms, "the UN could follow the
undesirable path taken by the League of Nations, which proved unable to deal with
the rigid, egotistical stance of numerous European powers and collapsed under the
weight of its inconsistencies" Chernomyrdin said.

Opposition grew fastest in the developing world. "NATO is blindly bombing

Yugoslavia" Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee said. "There is a dance of
destruction going on there. Thousands of people rendered homeless. And the United
Nations is a mute witness to all this. Is NATO's work to prevent war or to fuel one?".
Such feelings have been exacerbated by the impression that the United States and
NATO have largely ignored the United Nations and international opinion in launching
the air campaign.246
243
“ World Leaders Argue Over Rights Abuser”, Reuters, September 21, 1999.
244
“Yelstin, Jiang Share Stance on U.S.”, Associated Press, December 10, 1999.
245
"Yeltsin Flies Home, Lifted by China's Support", The New York Times, December 10, 1999.
246
“Bombing of Yugoslavia Awakens Anti-U.S. Feeling Around World”, The Washington Post, May
18, 1999.
61
 In Washington summit communique, it is mentioned that Allies "recognize the
primary responsibility of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of
international peace and security." Chirac hailed this language as "a triumph for
French diplomacy." But U.S. officials said it is virtually meaningless, because it does
not require the alliance to obtain explicit UN Security Council for NATO military
actions beyond its territory. 247

The consequences concerning the legal basis for NATO peacekeeping

operations were to be found in others instances too. NATO leaders at the summit
conference authorised a selective search of ships in the Adriatic suspected of ferrying
oil to Serbia through Montenegro. The initiative foundered over concerns raised by
France and other NATO governments about the legality of forcibly interdicting
tankers in the absence of a formal declaration of war against Yugoslavia or a United
Nations resolution. General Naumann indicated the plan is intended largely to deter,
not forcibly interdict, noting that NATO's action lacks the legal authority of a United
Nations-sanctioned oil blockade. "A 'visit and search' regime does not give us the
right to force anyone to abandon his course. So we cannot stop a merchant vessel by
the use of force," the general said.

In the case of Chechnya no-one intervened. "Human rights are no reason to

interfere in the internal affairs of a state," Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
protested last week, offering the same argument that Russia and Yugoslav President
Milosevic made during last spring's NATO air war against the Serbian attempt at
"ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo. Beijing kept the same stance: "China's principled stand
is very clear. China has always been opposed to interference in other countries'
internal affairs by any country in any name. We think that the Chechnya issue is the
internal affair of Russia. And I think that most countries in the world have already
acknowledged this fact,'' Zhang said.248

The New York Times wrote that critics of inaction in Chechnya, like critics of
inaction in Rwanda, argue that there's a double standard, and so there is. President
Clinton offered an answer to that objection early in the Kosovo operation last spring,
when he laid out his sense of America's obligation to intervene: when it can. "We
can't respond to every tragedy in every corner of the world, but just because we can't
do everything for everyone doesn't mean that, for the sake of consistency, we should
do nothing for no one," he said.249

The problem of sovereignty and action authorisation, is a cause for tension not
only in western Europe but in other areas too. In some instances, divisions within
NATO had “prolonged conflicts” which at its most extreme, may lead to NATO's
inaction. This problem is far from being resolved and needs to be addressed. But what
is clear is that the UN remains the appropriate forum for achieving multilateral
solutions and as it has been demonstrated during the Kosovo crisis the U.S. cannot
achieve effective multilateralism without the United Nations.250

247
“ NATO Widens Security 'Map'”, The Washington Post, April 25, 1999.
248
"China Backs Russia Move on Chechnya", The Associated Press , December 7, 1999.
249
“ HANDS OFF, the No Man's Land in the Fight for Human Rights, The New York Times, December
12, 1999.
250
See: Michael Hirsh, "The Fall Guy. Washington's Self-Defeating Assault on the UN", Foreign
Affairs, Vol. 78, Nu. 6 (November/December 1999).
62
4.3 NMD: A test for Co-operative Security?

Following the above analysis of some topics, which must be resolved in order
to, have a co-operative security regime, another recent paradigm presents an
opportunity to test the real will of the all the main players in European security in
overcoming the historical differences between them.

In recent years, United States has turned its interest towards the danger of
long-range ballistic missiles from third countries that could reach the country. US
have developed, but not yet decided upon a limited national missile defence system
that deals with the threats that are anticipated. The goal of this program, whose cost is
estimated at up to $60 billion on top of development spending, is simple. Stopping a
"rogue" state armed with nuclear missiles capable of striking American shores.

President Clinton has said that he will make a decision later in the year, based
upon four criteria: What is the nature of the threat. What is the technological
feasibility of the system. What is the cost of the system, and how it is related to other
priorities. What the overall effect of such a system on the national security in general
is, not just on the immediate threat.

The U.S. would like to do that in the context of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
Treaty (ABM) that is modified in some respects. The bilateral US-USSR treaty bans
national missile defences, ensuring that each side could destroy the other and, in
theory, deterring either side from launching a first strike. The logic of the ban was that
if such a shield were developed, rival nations would simply deploy more and more
missiles to penetrate it.

The United States has sought to assure Moscow that a limited defence against
a small number of strategic missiles could not neutralise Russia's massive nuclear
arsenal. Russia has repeatedly expressed opposition to ABM changes, saying they
would undermine the entire arms control regime.251 As described in a draft U.S.
protocol presented to the Russians in January 2000, the first phase of the U.S. missile
defence program would involve construction of 100 launchers and interceptor missiles
with an upgraded radar in Alaska to meet a possible attack from North Korea. That
could be supplemented sometime later with additional 100 launchers at a second site,
possibly North Dakota, to meet missile threats from countries in the Persian Gulf.252

The existence of such a threat is widely accepted by the Clinton administration

and some of its Republican critics, but questioned by some policy experts in US and
abroad. Many US policymakers warn that a rogue state might attack the United States
even if the inevitable result would be retaliation so massive that the attacking state
would be obliterated. Yet, some policy experts question the assumption that there are
such irrational rogues.253 The technological feasibility of this project has also raised
many concerns.254 A respected body of opinion amongst academics says that there is
no technical way in which this project can work. The program has already suffered
serious setbacks, after prototypes missed mock incoming nuclear weapons.255

251
"Russia Criticizes U.S. Missile Plans", The Washington Post, May 5, 2000.
252
"Russia Has Offer On Missile Defense", The Washington Post, April 29, 2000.
253
"'Rogue' States: Is It Reality or Rhetoric?", The Washington Post, May 29, 2000.
254
"Ex-Defense Officials Decry Missile Plan", The Washington Post, May 17, 2000.
255
"US missile test fails", BBC News Online, 19 January, 2000.
63
 In Europe, the U.S. proposal to build a national missile defence (NMD)
system is provoking growing alarm among America's allies. President Jacques Chirac
of France voiced the fears of many Europeans: "How do you convince (nations) to
stop piling up new arms when more powerful countries say it's necessary to develop
technologies that put hard-won strategic balances into question?''.256

Europeans fear that an American NMD could trigger crises with Russia and
China.257 Also, Europeans hold strikingly different views about the threat from
"rogue" states such as North Korea and Iraq that Washington says the system is
designed to counter. For example, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine noted that
there is no translation for rogue state in French. "It's not a geopolitical category we
use. It is difficult for Europeans to imagine one of these rogue states attacking the
United States."258

Europeans also differ over the potential effect the system would have on their
relations with Russia, and whether a U.S. antimissile program would reassure
Americans about European security and thus help keep the United States committed
to Europe. Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy representative, said
Europe fears the cure might be worse than the threat if the U.S. system were to spur
Russia and China to take countermeasures such as bolstering their nuclear arsenals
and developing decoys that could foil interceptors. Solana also said many Europeans
would be outraged if the United States abrogated the ABM Treaty. The following
statement of German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is characteristic: "We have to
take care that the ABM treaty is not going to be substantially damaged and that the
international arms control regime will be strengthened".259

Finally, Solana said Washington must bear in mind the risk that other NATO
allies would feel that a missile defence system just for America would create separate
security zones within NATO, one country protected against missile attack, the others
not. That could "decouple" the United States from Europe and Canada.

During his visit to Europe US President Clinton, trying to calm fears of a

nuclear arms race that would leave Europe vulnerable, promised to share any new
missile defence technology with "other civilised nations", a reference to allies in
Europe, saying ``it would be unethical'' to keep it solely for America's protection. It
was not clear from Clinton's comments whether he would include Russia among the
nations sharing in the technology.260 The EU's foreign policy representative, Javier
Solana, said that the dialogue has already started in the context of NATO and he was
confident a common understanding could be reached with the United States on the
missile-defence issue. 261

In the following summit meeting at Moscow President Clinton and President

Putin did not narrow the differences over the national missile defence system. Deputy

256
"Missile Defense System Criticized", Associated Press Online, 05/31/2000.
257
"A Look At . . . The China Puzzle; Goal: Build A Missile Defense. Problem: How To Handle
Beijing", The Washington Post, March 5, 2000 .
258
"'Rogue' States: Is It Reality or Rhetoric?", The Washington Post, May 29, 2000.
259
"Russia, NATO allies, unconvinced of need for new U.S. missile defence", from
[Link]
260
"U.S. Set to Share Missile-Defense Research", TheWashington Post, June 1, 2000.
261
"Clinton says US would share missile-defence tech", Reuters , June 1, 2000,
[Link] .
64
Secretary of State Talbott stressed that "President Putin made absolutely clear to
President Clinton that Russia continues to oppose the changes to the ABM treaty that
the United States has proposed since last September. Russia believed that the anti-
missile plan will undermine strategic stability, threaten Russia's strategic deterrent
and provoke a new arms race.".262

But in an unexpected move, Putin agreed with the American assessment that
so-called rogue states pose a nuclear threat and offered a new alternative antimissile
plan. "As to new threats that they talk about in the United States, we agree with that.
We should create new mechanisms that will protect us from these threats. If you are
talking about threats that are directed or could be directed at Russia or at the United
States, there are countries that have that capability today that can only do that from
their own territory." Putin proposed that the United States and Russia could
collaborate on a Russian project to shoot down enemy missiles soon after they were
launched (boost phase defence), instead of intercepting warheads on their way down.
"So we could jointly put up these umbrellas above potential areas of threat. With this
umbrella, we could jointly protect all of Europe".263

Walter Slocombe, U.S. Undersecretary of Defence said that US "welcomes the

prospect of co-operation in principle, but as a supplement, not as a substitute for the
timely deployment of the system which we have in mind".264 According to the New
York Times, American experts outside the administration were more positive, as
Putin's plan might lead to a better system from the point of view of American as well
as Russian interests. They argued that a boost-phase system would be far more
effective than the US administration's proposal because it would intercept attacking
missiles before they reached their full speed and dispersed their warheads and decoys,
since "It is a lot easier to put a lid over North Korea than an umbrella over the United
States and Eastern Pacific."265

Then Putin proposed that Russia cooperate with NATO in the construction of
a joint European missile defence system. "Russia proposed working with Europe and
NATO to create an anti-rocket defense system for Europe. On one hand, it would
avoid all the problems linked to the balance of force. On the other, it would permit in
an absolute manner a 100 percent guarantee of the security of every European
country.".266 NATO' officials were briefed by Russian Defence Minister Igor
Sergeyev. As NATO Secretary-General Robertson said after the meeting of the
NATO-Russia Joint Permanent Council "We're not in a position to evaluate the points
made this morning.".267 Sergeyev would say only that the plan "does not violate or
compromise in any way the ABM treaty.".

The NMD case presents one more challenge for NATO and European allies to
prove that co-operative security is something more than a 18 letter word.

262
"Clinton and Putin Fail to Close Gap on Missile Barrier", The New York Times, June 5, 2000.
263
"Putin Offers Alternative Antimissile Plan", The New York Times, June 3, 2000.
264
"NATO allies hear details on Russian missile defense plans", CNN, June 9, 2000.
265
"Putin Offers Alternative Antimissile Plan", The New York Times, June 3, 2000.
266
"Putin Goes to Rome to Promote Russian Arms Control Alternative", The New York Times, June 6,
2000.
267
"NATO allies hear details on Russian missile defense plans", CNN, June 9, 2000.

65
66
5. Concluding Remarks

The developments in the area of Kosovo, during the first months of 2000 (500
people were murdered), proved for once more the inability of Europe to cope with
crisis which could threaten the stability throughout its boundaries. The
underperformance revealed during the Kosovo war is matched by the inability of
European States to provide an effecting peace keeping in the wounded area.

Despite the similar crisis experienced in former Yugoslavia in 1992, and the
pronounced will of the formulation of an indigenous European security policy, the
most important conclusion is that Europe, did not succeed in overpassing the
difficulties of forming one. Since 1992 several initiatives towards the development of
an European Security policy have been taken, i.e. the formulation of a Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the relative arrangements for the European
Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO. While NATO was
acknowledged to be in sole charge of collective defence, the autonomous European
institutions, EU and WEU would develop the appropriate structures and capabilities in
order to deal with crisis situations.

However, the experience of the first Yugoslavian crisis has confirmed, among
others, that at present Western Europe needs to make use of NATO mechanisms and
assets and the support of the United States when confronted with crisis like the above
mentioned. In this context, in the Amsterdam Treaty EU has decided to appoint a
High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), to create an
early warning and policy planning capability and declared the right to use WEU
directly as an instrument for military action under guidance from the European
Council. WEU for its part had to built up the politico-military and military structures
to launch an operation under European control, and to develop a systematic interface
with EU and NATO.

But one more crisis in Yugoslavia, this time in Kosovo, proved that Europe,
for the second time, was not appropriately prepared to cope with such challenges. The
solution to the security problems of the European continent was given again by
NATO. That event caused the Europeans to speculate again on the actions to be taken
in order to avoid Europe's being in similar inability in the future. At the summit held
in Cologne, the EU declared its determination to move forward some new steps
towards the reinforcement of the CFSP especially in the area of crisis management
with the development of credible operational capabilities. To this end, the European
Council decided the inclusion of those functions of the WEU, which will be necessary
for EU to fulfil its responsibilities in the area of Petersburg tasks according to the
Amsterdam Treaty. Furthermore, in the EU Helsinki summit, focus was given on
developing the Union's military crisis management capability, by creating by the year
2003 a 60,000 man rapid reaction force. At the following summit in Feira (June
2000), the EU by creating a 5.000 man police force recognised the need of civilian
intervention as a necessary step to ensure peace.

However, the prospect of a more active involvement of EU in security issues

will depend on whether the three main European countries will be able to overcome
their inability to share a common vision of the future of the European security and

67
defence identity. Historical differences and not so common interests complicate the
credibility of such a prospect.

Along with Europe’s effort to obtain a defence and security identity and take
an active part in the new security environment, NATO has verified one more time its
role as the primary framework for European security with the efficient conduct of the
crisis in Balkans, the adoption of the new strategic concept, and the realisation of the
first phase of the enlargement process. In other words, it has proved itself capable and
adaptable.

In addition, it has contributed, to the construction of a new co-operative model

of security in Europe, which includes two types of co-operation. The first one refers to
the establishment of a new form of security co-operation between Europe and the
USA through the reinforcement of the European Security and Defence Identify within
NATO and the transfer of more responsibilities to the European countries and
institutions. The second type refers to the co-operation on security issues between
putative opponents, that is to say among NATO and Russia but also the rest of the
former communist countries. The development of Partnership for Peace as a program
of military co-operation designed to improve the ability of Allies and Partners for
joint action in a crisis; the establishment of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council which
brings Allied and Partner politicians, diplomats and military officers together
regularly to consult, exchange information and co-ordinate our policies; the
implementation of a Charter for a distinctive partnership with Ukraine; and the
signing of the "Founding Act" with Russia which, in order to promote a permanent
co-operative relationship between NATO and Russia, are the most well known
initiatives that are designed to promote co-operation between NATO and former
adversaries.

Even though important steps towards this direction have been made since the
beginning of the decade, the Kosovo crisis has shown that co-operation in Europe is
still a hard task. Increasingly international problems are not bilateral ones that could
be addressed by the above standard mechanism of diplomacy or war, but operate on a
much larger scale. They requires states to come together to deal with them or large
international organisations to cope with them. The ultimate scope of a co-operative
security regime is to provide solutions to the security problems through co-operation.

The Europeans are facing some difficulties in promoting co-operation between

them, because their national policies present a lack of harmonisation. Co-operation
between US and the Europeans faces also challenges because of the conflicting views
about the degree of dependence of Europe from NATO and the US, about the
ambiguous american attitude regarding European integration, about the decision-
making process in NATO, about NATO's enlargement, about relations with other
institutions like UN etc. Furthermore co-operative relation between NATO and other
powers like Russia although it is desirable, it will be difficult to be maintained if these
nations feel that they face a "Versailles" approach. Excluding Russia, as Germany was
punished after World War I, could bear similarly disastrous results.

Co-operative security structures can be build with foresight enough to

anticipate the time when new powers will emerge in the international arena: China or
India. In twenty years new economic powers may join the European Union: Russia
and China are the most probable candidates. In structuring a European security
regime, we cannot assume that the United States will remain forever dominant.
68
Although its role as initiator is indispensable and its contribution of a large share of
resources certainly required, future decision making should be distributed broadly
enough so that the US does not remain the central pole of the European security tent
indefinitely.

In that context, where the daedalus European security is evolving, the

prospects for the establishment of a real co-operative security regime for Europe
depends primarily on the major powers: US, France, Germany, UK and Russia. Since
the co-operative security is a process that depends upon the activity of the participants
in co-operation, the main actors in the European security stage have to reconsider if
their policy is really promoting co-operation, in terms of providing mutual benefits for
all participants. If the security in Europe is indivisible, then the efforts to safeguard it
should be common and the case of NMD offers an excellent opportunity for
exercising on co-operative arrangements.

69
70
 Table of Contents
Introduction...........................................................................................................................1

1. Parameters of European Security in the Post Cold War Era .............................................3

1.1. New challenges and risks.........................................................................................3
1.2. The policies of European States ...............................................................................7
1.3. USA’s continuing security interests in Europe .......................................................11

2. The European Security Institutions: A first attempt to achieve co-operative security.........16

2. 1 The North Atlantic (Political ?) Organization............................................................16
2.1.1 The new strategic concept ....................................................................................17
2.1.2 The Adaptation Process.......................................................................................21
2.2 The Vision of a European Security & Defence Policy and the WEU ..........................25
2.2.1 The Maastricht Treaty..........................................................................................26
2.2.2 The past of WEU: A guide for the future..............................................................28
2.2.3 The new co-operative role: Defence component of the EU and NATO's European
Pillar ............................................................................................................................31

3. Shaping European Security: The 2nd Attempt ...................................................................35

3.1 NATO at fifties......................................................................................................35
3.1.1 The "Open Doors" Policy....................................................................................36
3.1.2 The Daedalus arrangement: NATO/ESDI/WEU-EU............................................40
3.2 EU's CFSP : Beyond Amsterdam...............................................................................43
3.2.1 A new type of missions and capabilities for EU....................................................43
3.2.2 Does the WEU Have a Role?...............................................................................48

4. Co-operative Security: The Way Ahead ...........................................................................51

4.1 European National Policies and Kosovo Crisis ..........................................................51
4.2 Hot Topics for NATO's future policy.........................................................................56
4.3 NMD: A test for Co-operative Security ?...................................................................63

5. Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................67

71