TITLE: People v.

Sandiganbayan

GR NO. 233061-62

DATE: July 28, 2020

SUBJECT MATTER: Speedy Disposition of cases in Preliminary Investigation and

Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINES: 1. The general rule is that orders granting motions to dismiss are
subject to appeal or petition for review for they belong to the
category of "judgment, final order or resolution" as they
dispose of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done
but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court. It has been held that an order dismissing a case is a
final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom
is timely filed.
2. The case of People v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (First Division)
summarizes the principles and guidelines in determining
inordinate delay in the disposition of cases:
The speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies is a right Constitutionally-
guaranteed to all persons. Juxtaposed with the right to speedy
trial, the right to a speedy disposition of cases is a right
commonly invoked in fact-finding investigations and
preliminary investigations conducted by the Ombudsman
because while these proceedings do not form part of the
criminal prosecution proper the respondent may already be
prejudiced by such proceedings, and equally because the
Ombudsman itself is constitutionally committed to act
promptly on complaints filed before it.

3. To determine whether a respondent's right to a speedy

disposition of cases, the 1983 case of Martin v. Ver adopted
the balancing test laid down in the U.S. case of Barker v.
Wingo. The balancing test compels the courts to approach
cases on an ad hoc basis, with the conduct of both the
prosecution and defendant weighed using the four-fold
factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) reason for the
delay; (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his
right; and (4) prejudice to defendant resulting from the
delay. These factors are to be considered together.
4. On July 31, 2018, a definitive ruling on the concept of
inordinate delay was laid down by the Court en banc in
Cagang v. Sandiganbayan as follows:
(1) The right to speedy disposition of cases is different from the
right to speedy trial.
The [latter] may only be invoked in criminal prosecutions
 against courts of law while the [former] may be invoked before
any tribunal as long as the respondent may already be
prejudiced by the proceeding.
(2) For purposes of determining inordinate delay, a case is
deemed to have commenced from the filing of the formal
complaint and the subsequent conduct of the preliminary
investigation. (3) Courts must determine which party carries
the burden of proof.
If it has been alleged that there was delay within the time
periods (i.e., according to the time periods that will be issued
by the Ombudsman), the burden is on the defense to show
that there has been violation of their rights to speedy
disposition of case or to speedy trial. The defense must
prove: (a) that the case took much longer than was
reasonably necessary to resolve; and (b) that efforts were
exerted to protect their constitutional rights.
If the delay occurs beyond the given time period and the
right is invoked, the prosecution has the burden of justifying
the delay. The prosecution must prove: (a) that it followed
the prescribed procedure in the conduct of preliminary
investigation and case prosecution; (b) the delay was
inevitable due to the complexity of the issues and volume
of evidence; and (c) accused was not prejudiced by the
delay.
(4) Determination of the length of delay is never mechanical.
Courts must consider the entire context of the case, the
amount of evidence and the complexity of issues involved.
An examination of the delay is no longer necessary to
justify the dismissal of the case if the prosecution of the
case was solely motivated by malice.
(5) The right to speedy disposition of cases (or the right to
speedy trial) must be timely raised.
The respondent or the accused must file the appropriate
motion upon the lapse of the statutory or procedural
periods, otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their
right.

FACTS: The case involves Raul Y. Desembrana, an Assistant City Prosecutor

of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Quezon City, who was charged
with two counts of violating Section 7(d) in relation to Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713), for allegedly soliciting and
accepting money in exchange for the dismissal of a case assigned to
him for preliminary investigation. The charges were filed on November
15, 2014, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. SB-14-CRM-0427 and
SB-14-CRM-0428.

Filing of Charges: On November 15, 2014, Desembrana was charged

with two counts of violating RA 6713 for allegedly soliciting and
accepting money from Dr. Alexis Montes in exchange for dismissing a
 case.
Motion to Suspend Arraignment: On November 21, 2014,
Desembrana filed a Motion to Suspend Arraignment to allow for a
preliminary investigation.
Sandiganbayan's Directive: On July 8, 2015, the Sandiganbayan
directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) to conduct a "full
and complete preliminary investigation" within 60 days.
OSP's Recommendation: On September 29, 2015, the OSP found
probable cause against Desembrana for Direct Bribery under Article
210 of the Revised Penal Code and recommended withdrawing the
information in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0427.
Motion for Reconsideration: On November 9, 2015, Desembrana filed
a Motion for Reconsideration with the OSP, which was pending at the
time the OSP filed its Compliance with Omnibus Motion on November
10, 2015.
Sandiganbayan's Delay: The Sandiganbayan took over a year to
resolve the Compliance with Omnibus Motion, finally issuing a
decision on January 20, 2017, holding the case in abeyance pending
the resolution of Desembrana's Motion for Reconsideration.
Motion to Dismiss: On February 6, 2017, Desembrana filed a Motion
to Dismiss, citing the violation of his right to speedy disposition of
cases due to the delays in the preliminary investigation.

ISSUE/S: 1. Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari is the
proper remedy in assailing the Sandiganbayan’s issuances
2. Did the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
dismissing the complaints for the alleged inordinate delay

RULING: 1. The remedy of special civil action for certiorari was

properly availed in assailing the Sandiganbayan’s
issuances

Sections 1 and 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court read:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the
Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may
file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari.
The petition may include an application for a writ of preliminary
injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the
same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action
or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
Section 2. Time for filing; extension. — The petition shall be filed
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for
new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the
docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within
which to file the petition.

the instant petition for certiorari is the correct remedy in seeking to

annul the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
With this, the Court shall now proceed to determine whether the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal case filed
against Diaz due to the Ombudsman's violation of his right to the
speedy disposition of his case.

2. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in

dismissing the complaints below by reason of an alleged
inordinate delay

First. In its Resolution dated July 8, 2015, the Sandiganbayan directed

the OSP to conduct a full and complete preliminary investigation within
sixty (60) days from notice or until September 11, 2015.

The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in citing Sales to

interpret full and complete preliminary investigation, and thereafter, to
do away with leave of court as required in the Ombudsman's Rules of
Procedure.
Elementary circumspection would have instructed the Sandiganbayan
that this Court had already restricted the Sales ruling[30] only to the
preliminary investigation of Ombudsman cases under the then Section
7 of the Ombudsman Rules of Procedure. As Sales relevantly stated:
Third, a person under preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman is
entitled to file a motion for reconsideration of the adverse resolution.
This right is provided for in the very Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, which states:
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration.
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an
approved order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be
filed within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof with the Office
of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman as the case
may be.

b) No motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation shall be

entertained after the information shall have been filed in court,
except upon order of the court wherein the case was filed....

Clearly, unlike in the old Section 7 upon which Sales was based, the
governing Section 7 no longer bars the Office of the Ombudsman or
more properly the OSP from filing the Information with the
Sandiganbayan. As a result, it stands to reason that preliminary
investigation as a matter of right is full and complete immediately after
the opportunity to hear the parties and the finding of probable cause,
since at that stage the Information may already be filed with the
Sandiganbayan, without awaiting either the filing or the lapse of the
period for filing any motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation, or if
one has been filed, the resolution thereof. Further, once the
Information has been filed with the Sandiganbayan, action by the OSP
on the motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation is no longer a
matter of right but a privilege, as the Sandiganbayan has to grant
leave to the OSP in order for it to act on the motion for reconsideration
or reinvestigation.

There is no legal right to move for reconsideration beyond what the

rule allows. A motion for reconsideration is not inherent to due process
but is merely granted subject to the conditions for its exercise or
availability. It is a privilege and must be invoked only in the manner so
provided.

The Sandiganbayan thus gravely abused its discretion in faulting the

OSP for seeking leave of court before it could have acted on private
respondent's motion for reconsideration. The OSP had already
conducted full and complete preliminary investigation when it filed with
the Sandiganbayan on November 10, 2015 its "Compliance with
Omnibus Motion (for Withdrawal of Information docketed as SB-14-
CRM-0427) and for the Lifting of the Resolution, dated July 8, 2015,"
appending thereto the OSP's Resolution dated September 29, 2015
as approved by the Office of the Ombudsman on October 21, 2015.
Private respondent's motion for reconsideration did not reduce the
fullness or completeness of the preliminary investigation conducted by
the OSP. For the OSP was within its right to file the Informations with
or without private respondent's motion.

The guidelines to be observed in resolving the instant case are: "If the
delay occurs beyond the given time period and the right is invoked,
the prosecution has the burden of justifying the delay. The prosecution
must prove: (a) that it followed the prescribed procedure in the
conduct of preliminary investigation and case prosecution; (b) the
delay was inevitable due to the complexity of the issues and volume of
evidence; and (c) accused was not prejudiced by the delay." This is
because the Sandiganbayan has set the time-limit of 60 days from its
directive to conduct a preliminary investigation. Additionally, it must be
stressed that the "[d]etermination of the length of delay is never
mechanical."

All in all, from July 8, 2015 to November 10, 2015, in less than 120
days, the OSP was able to complete the preliminary investigation. On
its face, and especially with the circumstances driving this preliminary
investigation, we cannot say that the timeline of 120 days constituted
inordinate delay. It is a very reasonable period to complete a
preliminary investigation.

Three things stand out from the foregoing trajectory of timelines.

For one, the Sandiganbayan is responsible for the delay. It could have
easily said what it ruled on January 20, 2017 on November 10, 2015
or at the latest November 24, 2015. There was nothing complex about
the issues presented in the "Compliance with Omnibus Motion" to
justify a timeline of more than a year to resolve it. By exercising
ordinary diligence, the Sandiganbayan could have decided the motion
within just a week, as in fact it was able to issue its Resolution just two
weeks from the end of our famous long and festive holiday break in
December. In any event, as explained above, the Sandiganbayan
gravely abused its discretion in blindly relying upon Sales to justify its
ruling or stance that "we did not have to tell you so," as regards the
leave of court for the OSP to resolve private respondent's motion for
reconsideration.

For another, private respondent did not assert his right to the speedy
disposition of his cases during the impasse at the Sandiganbayan.
From November 2015 to January 2017, he sat idly by, which to us in
hindsight smacks of traces of bad faith, because he waited in ambush.
Moreover, though the proceedings were sluggish, he was given every
opportunity to be heard. He vigorously participated in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan and filed his share of pleadings. His
motions and pleadings likewise contributed to the delay in this case. It
is reasonable to infer from these circumstances that private
respondent suffered no damage as a result of the delay.

Here, private respondent is out on bail. As observed by his active

participation in the proceedings below, it can be said that steps had
been taken to mitigate any anxiety and concerns that he may have
about the preliminary investigation and his trial. As importantly, there
is definitely no possibility that his defense will be impaired because he
had taken advantage of every opportunity to be heard available to
him. We see no prejudice to private respondent as objectified above.

Lastly, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion not only in

imputing blame to the OSP for the delay on the basis of an
inapplicable case law, but also in failing to move the case forward
upon the lapse of the period to conduct preliminary investigation.

The Sandiganbayan was obliged to move the cases forward. It should

have thus set a date for private respondent's arraignment and directed
the OSP to resolve private respondent's motion for reconsideration
within a period not exceeding sixty (60) days. If the OSP had failed to
do within the prescribed period, the Sandiganbayan should have
proceeded with the arraignment and thereafter the trial.

Indubitably, neither the OSP nor the Office of the Ombudsman is guilty
of inordinate delay in the disposition of the cases against private
respondent. The ball was already in the Sandiganbayan's court, so to
speak. Instead of proceeding with the arraignment of private
respondent and the rest of the rigmarole, the Sandiganbayan
procrastinated, and worse, on the basis of a case law that has been
overtaken by time and legal developments.