1.) [ G.R. No.

238875, March 16, 2021 ]

SENATORS FRANCIS "KIKO" N. PANGILINAN, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, PAOLO BENIGNO "BAM" AQUINO IV,
LEILA M. DE LIMA, RISA HONTIVEROS, AND ANTONIO 'SONNY' F. TRILLANES IV, PETITIONERS, VS. ALAN
PETER S. CAYETANO, SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, TEODORO L. LOCSIN, JR., AND SALVADOR S.
PANELO, RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 239483, March 16, 2021]

PHILIPPINE COALITION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (PCICC), LORETTA ANN P.
ROSALES, DR. AURORA CORAZON A. PARONG, EVELYN BALAIS-SERRANO, JOSE NOEL D. OLANO,
REBECCA DESIREE E. LOZADA, EDELIZA P. HERNANDEZ, ANALIZA T. UGAY, NIZA CONCEPCION
ARAZAS, GLORIA ESTER CATIBAYAN-GUARIN, RAY PAOLO "ARPEE" J. SANTIAGO, GILBERT TERUEL
ANDRES, AND AXLE P. SIMEON, PETITIONERS, VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO, AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC
OF THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

[G.R. No. 240954, March 16, 2021]

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
REPRESENTED BY HON. SALVADOR C. MEDIALDEA, THE DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
REPRESENTED BY HON. ALAN PETER CAYETANO AND THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY HON. TEODORO LOCSIN, JR.,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Treaties may effectively implement the constitutional imperative to protect human rights and consider social justice
in all phases of development—but so can a statute, as Republic Act No. 9851, the Philippine Act on Crimes Against
International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, does.

The president, as primary architect of our foreign policy and as head of state, is allowed by the Constitution to make
preliminary determinations on what, at any given moment, might urgently be required in order that our foreign policy
may manifest our national interest.

Absent a clear and convincing showing of a breach of the Constitution or a law, brought through an actual, live
controversy and by a party that presents direct, material, and substantial injury as a result of such breach, this Court
will stay its hand in declaring a diplomatic act as unconstitutional.

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court. On March 16,
2018, it formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-
General's Chef de Cabinet. The Secretary General received this communication the following day, March 17, 2018.

Through these actions, the Philippines completed the requisite acts of withdrawal. This was all consistent and in
compliance with what the Rome Statute plainly requires. By this point, all that were needed to enable withdrawal
have been consummated. Further, the International Criminal Court acknowledged the Philippines' action soon after
it had withdrawn. This foreclosed the existence of a state of affairs correctible by this Court's finite jurisdiction. The
Petitions were, therefore, moot when they were filed.1 The International Criminal Court's subsequent consummate
acceptance of the withdrawal all but confirmed the futility of this Court's insisting on a reversal of completed actions.

In any case, despite the withdrawal, this Court finds no lesser protection of human rights within our system of laws.
Neither do we agree with petitioners' implied statements that without the treaty, the judiciary will not be able to fulfill
its mandate to protect human rights.
Moreover, the Senate never sought to enforce what would have been its prerogative to require its concurrence for
withdrawal. To date, Resolution No. 249, which seeks to express the chamber's position on the need for
concurrence, has yet to be tabled and voted on.2 Individual senators have standing to question the constitutionality
of the actions of their chamber. Yet, in this case, as shown by the Resolution which petitioners co-authored, they
acknowledged that an action by the Senate was necessary before coming to this Court. Thus, no actual conflict or
constitutional impasse has yet arisen even as implied by their actions.

This Court cannot compel or annul actions where the relevant incidents are moot. Neither can this Court, without
due deference to the actions of a co-equal constitutional branch, act before the Senate has acted.

Nonetheless, the President's discretion on unilaterally withdrawing from any treaty or international agreement is not
absolute.

As primary architect of foreign policy, the president enjoys a degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties. However,
this leeway cannot go beyond the president's authority under the Constitution and the laws. In appropriate cases,
legislative involvement is imperative. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty if there is subsequent
legislation which affirms and implements it.

Conversely, a treaty cannot amend a statute. When the president enters into a treaty that is inconsistent with a prior
statute, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it, unless the prior statute is amended to be consistent with the
treaty. A statute enjoys primacy over a treaty. It is passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
and is ultimately signed into law by the president. In contrast, a treaty is negotiated by the president, and legislative
participation is limited to Senate concurrence. Thus, there is greater participation by the sovereign's democratically
elected representatives in the enactment of statutes.

The extent of legislative involvement in withdrawing from treaties is further determined by circumstances attendant
to how the treaty was entered into or came into effect. Where legislative imprimatur impelled the president's action
to enter into a treaty, a withdrawal cannot be effected without concomitant legislative sanction. Similarly, where the
Senate's concurrence imposes as a condition the same concurrence for withdrawal, the president enjoys no
unilateral authority to withdraw, and must then secure Senate concurrence.

Thus, the president can withdraw from a treaty as a matter of policy in keeping with our legal system, if a treaty is
unconstitutional or contrary to provisions of an existing prior statute. However, the president may not unilaterally
withdraw from a treaty: (a) when the Senate conditionally concurs, such that it requires concurrence also to
withdraw; or (b) when the withdrawal itself will be contrary to a statute, or to a legislative authority to negotiate and
enter into a treaty, or an existing law which implements a treaty.

This Court resolves consolidated Petitions for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to: (a) declare the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute as invalid or ineffective, since
it was done without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Senate's members; and (b) compel the executive
branch to notify the United Nations Secretary-General that it is cancelling, revoking, and withdrawing the Instrument
of Withdrawal.3 Petitioners maintain that the Instrument of Withdrawal is inconsistent with the Constitution.

The Rome Statute is a multilateral treaty that established the International Criminal Court, where the gravest crimes
under international law are prosecuted.4

Since 1996, under Fidel V. Ramos's (President Ramos) presidency, the Philippines has participated in the court's
establishment, taking an active role in the deliberations as a member of the Drafting Committee.5

On December 28, 2000, the Philippines, through then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada (President Estrada), signed
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.6

President Estrada's act of signing the Rome Statute signified the Philippines' intent to be bound by the provisions of
the treaty, subject to the domestic requirements for its validity and enforceability.7 Particularly, Article VII, Section 21
of the 1987 Constitution8 requires the concurrence by at least two-thirds of all members of the Senate for a treaty to
be valid, binding, effective, and enforceable.
In the meantime, on July 1, 2002, the International Criminal Court's Rome Statute entered into force.9

On December 11, 2009, with Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute still pending, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (President Macapagal-Arroyo) signed into law Republic Act No. 9851, otherwise known as the
Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity.
Republic Act No. 9851 replicated many of the Rome Statute's provisions.10

Senate concurrence to the Rome Statute was obtained following President Benigno Aquino III's (President Aquino)
election. On August 23, 2011, the Senate, with a vote of 17-1, passed Resolution No. 546—enabling the Philippines'
consummate accession to the Rome Statute.11

On August 30, 2011, the Philippines deposited the instrument of ratification of the Rome Statute. On November 1,
2011, the Rome Statute entered into force in the Philippines. The country was the 16th state party to belong to the
Group of Asia-Pacific State Parties in the International Criminal Court.12

On June 30, 2016, President Aquino's term ended and President Rodrigo Roa Duterte (President Duterte) took his
oath as chief executive.

On April 24, 2017, Atty. Jude Sabio filed a complaint before the International Criminal Court pertaining to alleged
summary killings when President Duterte was the mayor of Davao City.13

On June 6, 2017, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV and Representative Gary Alejano filed a "supplemental
communication" before the International Criminal Court with regard to President Duterte's drug war.14

On February 8, 2018, the Office of International Criminal Court Trial Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda (Prosecutor
Bensouda) commenced the preliminary examination of the atrocities allegedly committed in the Philippines pursuant
to the Duterte administration's "war on drugs."15

On March 15, 2018, the Philippines announced that it was withdrawing from the International Criminal Court.
President Duterte claimed that the country never became a state party to the Rome Statute since the treaty was not
published in the Official Gazette.16

On March 16, 2018, the Philippines formally submitted its Notice of Withdrawal from the International Criminal Court
to the United Nations. Enrique Manalo, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines to the
United Nations in New York, deposited the Note Verbale to Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Chef de Cabinet of the United
Nations' Secretary-General Antonio Guterres.17

The full text of this notification reads:

The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations presents its compliments to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and has the honor to inform the Secretary-General of the decision of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to withdraw from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statute.

The Philippines assures the community of nations that the Philippine Government continues to be guided by the rule
of law embodied in its Constitution, which also enshrines the country's long-standing tradition of upholding human
rights.

The Government affirms its commitment to fight against impunity for atrocity crimes, notwithstanding its withdrawal
from the Rome Statute, especially since the Philippines has a national legislation punishing atrocity crimes. The
Government remains resolute in effecting its principal responsibility to ensure the long-term safety of the nation in
order to promote inclusive national development and secure a decent and dignified life for all.

The decision to withdraw is the Philippines' principled stand against those who politicize and weaponize human
rights, even as its independent and well-functioning organs and agencies continue to exercise jurisdiction over
complaints, issues, problems and concerns arising from its efforts to protect its people.
The Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations avails itself of this opportunity to
renew to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the assurances of its highest consideration.18

On March 17, 2018, the Secretary-General of the United Nations received the notification from the Philippine
government.19

On May 16, 2018, Senators Francis Pangilinan (Senator Pangilinan), Franklin Drilon, Paolo Benigno Aquino, Leila
De Lima, Risa Hontiveros, and Antonio Trillanes IV filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus,20 assailing the
executive's unilateral act of withdrawing from the Rome Statute for being unconstitutional. This Petition was
docketed as G.R. No. 238875.

Later, Senator Pangilinan would manifest in the oral arguments incidents relating to Senate Resolution No. 289, a
"Resolution Expressing the Sense of the Senate that Termination of, or Withdrawal from, Treaties and International
Agreements Concurred in by the Senate shall be Valid and Effective Only Upon Concurrence by the Senate." The
Resolution was noted to have not been calendared for agenda in the Senate.21

Meanwhile, on June 13, 2018, the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, and
its members, Loretta Ann P. Rosales, Dr. Aurora Corazon A. Parong, Evelyn Balais-Serrano, among others, also
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 239483.22

On July 6, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Consolidated Comment to the Petitions.23

On August 14, 2018, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed its own Petition,24 and an Omnibus Ex-Parte Motion
for Consolidation and for Inclusion in the Oral Arguments.25 This Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 240954.

Oral arguments were conducted on August 28, 2018, September 4, 2018, and October 9, 2018. At the termination
of oral arguments, this Court required the parties to file their respective memoranda within 30 days.26

In his March 18, 2019 press release, the Assembly of State Parties' President Mr. O-Gon Kwon "reiterated his regret
regarding the withdrawal of the Philippines, effective as of 17 March 2019, from the Rome Statute[.]"27 He
expressed hope that the country rejoins the treaty in the future.28

The three consolidated Petitions before this Court seek similar reliefs.

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators argue that, as a treaty that the Philippines validly entered into, the Rome
Statute "has the same status as an enactment of Congress,"29 as "a law in the Philippines."30 They claim that the
President "cannot repeal a law."31 They aver that the country's withdrawal from a treaty requires the concurrence of
at least two-thirds of the Senate.32

In G.R. No. 239483, petitioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its members assert that
their rights to life, personal security, and dignity were impaired by the withdrawal from the Rome Statute.33 Citing a
decision of the South African High Court, they also claim that the ratification of and withdrawal from a multilateral
treaty require the Senate's concurrence.34 According to them, contrary to the President's assertion, the Rome
Statute is effective in Philippine jurisdiction by virtue of the Constitution's incorporation clause, despite lack of
publication.35

Petitioners pray that the notification of withdrawal be declared "invalid or ineffective"36 or "void ab initio"37 and that
the executive, through the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Philippine Permanent Mission to the United
Nations, be required to notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations that the notice is cancelled, revoked, or
withdrawn.38

Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, counter that the petitioners in G.R. No. 238875 do not
have locus standi as they do not represent "the official stand of the Senate as a body."39 Neither do the petitioners
in G.R. No. 239483 have standing to question "the wisdom of the President's sovereign power to withdraw from the
Rome Statute, absent any proof of actual or immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of said
withdrawal."40
Respondents claim that a Rule 65 petition is improper because the acts of the President complained of were not in
the exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial powers.41 Moreover, mandamus cannot lie against a discretionary act of a
president, much less an act which is not enjoined as a duty, such as the ratification of a treaty.42

They posit that the Petitions do not present a justiciable controversy because the withdrawal from a treaty is a
political question, being a policy determination delegated to the "wisdom of the executive."43 Specifically, the
President is the "sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations."44 Respondents assert that the Constitution does not expressly require Senate concurrence in withdrawing
from a treaty.45

Respondents maintain that the withdrawal was valid for having complied with the Rome Statute, which requires only
a written notification of withdrawal.46

Respondents also allege that the decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute "was an act to protect national
sovereignty from interference and to preserve the judiciary's independence,"47 which was necessary given
Prosecutor Bensouda's preliminary examination. This allegedly violates the complementarity principle under the
Rome Statute.48

Lastly, respondents aver that the rights being protected under the Rome Statute are adequately safeguarded by
domestic laws.49 The withdrawal's only effect, they say, is that the "Philippines will no longer be under the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court."50

Respondents pray that the consolidated Petitions be denied for lack of merit.51

For this Court's resolution are the following issues:

First, whether or not petitioners have sufficiently discharged their burden of showing that this case is justiciable.
Subsumed under this issue are the following:

1. Whether or not the consolidated Petitions present an actual, justiciable controversy;

2. Whether or not each of the consolidated Petitions were timely filed;

3. Whether or not petitioners have the requisite standing to file their respective Petitions;

4. Whether or not the consolidated Petitions were filed in violation of the principle of hierarchy of courts;

5. Whether or not the issues raised by the consolidated Petitions pertain to political questions; and

6. Whether or not petitioners' resort to the procedural vehicles of petitions for certiorari and mandamus is
proper.

Second, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations is valid, binding, and effectual. This involves the following issues:

1. Whether or not the Philippines complied with all the requisites for withdrawal from the Rome Statute;

2. Whether or not the executive can unilaterally withdraw from a treaty. This encompasses:

a. Whether or not the executive had valid grounds to withdraw from the Rome Statute;

b. Whether or not withdrawing from a treaty requires legislative action;

c. Whether or not the executive 's withdrawal from the Rome Statute violated any legislative act or
prerogative; and
 d. Whether or not withdrawing from a treaty demands the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate.

Third, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome Statute places the Philippines in breach of its
obligations under international law.

Lastly, whether or not the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome statute will diminish the Filipino people's protection
under international law; and even if it does, whether or not this is a justiciable question.

Through Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, the Rome Statute, an international instrument, was transformed
and made part of the law of the land. Entry into the Rome Statute represented the Philippines' commitment to the
international community to prosecute individuals accused of international crimes. Its validity and effectivity hinged on
the passage of Senate Resolution No. 546, which embodied the Senate's concurrence to the Philippines' accession
to the Rome Statute.

Petitioners believe that President Duterte's unilateral withdrawal from the Rome Statute transgressed legislative
prerogatives.

Ultimately, this Court may only rule in an appropriate, justiciable controversy raised by a party who suffers from
direct, substantial, and material injury. Once again, we clarify our role within the constitutional order. We take this
occasion to emphasize the need for this Court to exercise restraint in cases that fail to properly present justiciable
controversies, brought by parties who fail to demonstrate their standing. This is especially true when our
pronouncements will cause confusion in the diplomatic sphere and undermine our international standing and repute.

Petitioners are before us through the vehicles of petitions for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Philippine Notice of Withdrawal be declared void ab initio, and that the withdrawal itself be
declared invalid. They also pray for a writ of mandamus to direct the Executive Secretary to recall and revoke the
Notice of Withdrawal, and to submit the issue before the Senate for its deliberation.52

These Petitions fail on significant procedural grounds.

It is true that this Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, can craft a framework to interpret Article VII, Section 21
of the Constitution and determine the extent to which Senate concurrence in treaty withdrawal is imperative.
However, it will be excessive for any such framework to be imposed on the circumstances surrounding these
present Petitions, seeing as how the incidents here are fait accompli.

Petitioners insist that the protection of human rights will be weakened, yet their contentions are mere surmises.
Ample protection for human rights within the domestic sphere remain formally in place. It is a canon of adjudication
that "the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
applied."53

Contrary to petitioners' claim, these cases do not deal with the results of the ongoing preliminary examination by
Prosecutor Bensouda. Article 127 of the Rome Statute covers that.54 Neither at issue here is whether a future
president may decide to re-enter the Rome Statute and secure the requisite Senate concurrence. It is possible that
whatever the results in these cases are, a future administration under a new president can make that decision.

Petitioners want a different political result from what the President has done, and so they implore this Court to veto
his action, raising serious policy implications in so doing. This Court must exercise restraint in the face of political
posturing, and must anchor its determinations not on political results, but on principles and the text found in the
Constitution and law. The most basic of these principles are parameters that determine the justiciability of cases.
Judicial office impels capacity to rule in keeping with what the Constitution or law mandates, even when potentially
contrary to what a magistrate may prefer politically.

II
To understand the implications of these cases, a brief overview of the Rome Statute is necessary.

On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted in a conference participated in
by 120 states.55 It created the International Criminal Court, a permanent autonomous institution,56 that was given
jurisdiction to "investigate, prosecute, and try" individuals accused of international crimes of genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.57

On the heels of World War I, during the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, an international tribunal that will prosecute
leaders accused of international crimes was first proposed in modern times. In 1937, the League of Nations held a
conference in Geneva, where 13 states signed the first convention aiming to establish a permanent international
court. However, none of the states ratified it and its aims failed to materialize.58

Following World War II and the Axis Powers' aggressive military campaigns59 in Europe and Asia,60 the allied
powers established ad hoc tribunals to try Axis leaders accused of international crimes.61

Consequently, a draft of the charter of an international tribunal was prepared in a meeting in London among
representatives from France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
On August 8, 1945, the London Agreement was signed. It established the Nuremburg International Military
Tribunal.62 The tribunal sat in Nuremberg, Germany and tried the most notorious Nazi war criminals.63 Its
jurisdiction was limited to crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.64 Nineteen other states
subsequently supported the London Agreement.65

In January 1946, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur, established the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more commonly known as the Tokyo International Military
Tribunal.66 The Tokyo Trial was conducted from May 3, 1946 to November 12, 1948.67

Upon termination of their respective trials, the Nuremburg and Tokyo International Military Tribunals also ceased to
operate.68

The United Nations General Assembly later put to task the International Law Commission, a committee of legal
experts who worked for the development and codification of international law. The commission was asked to look
into the possibility of establishing a permanent international criminal court. Drafts were subsequently produced, but
the Cold War impeded its progress.69

As work continued on the draft, the United Nations Security Council established two more ad hoc tribunals in the
early 1990s. To address large-scale atrocities involving the Yugoslavian wars of dissolution and the Rwandan
genocide of 1994,70 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda were established. These temporary tribunals underscored the need for a permanent
international court.

In 1994, the International Law Commission submitted a proposal to the United Nations General Assembly, creating
a permanent international criminal court.71 The year after, a Preparatory Committee was convened.72

In April 1998, the amended draft treaty was presented to the United Nations General Assembly, and the Rome
Conference commenced in June 1998.73

On July 17, 1998, 120 states voted in favor of the draft treaty, resulting in its adoption.74

On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court entered into force upon ratification by 60
states.75 This formally constituted the International Criminal Court.

The International Criminal Court has an international legal personality,76 and sits at The Hague in the
Netherlands.77 It may exercise its functions and powers "on the territory of any [s]tate [p]arty and, by special
agreement, on the territory of any other [s]tate."78

State parties to the Rome Statute recognize the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over the following:
 ARTICLE 5
Crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court

1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:

(a) The crime of genocide;

(b) Crimes against humanity;

(c) War crimes;

(d) The crime of aggression.

The International Criminal Court's jurisdiction is "complementary to national criminal

jurisdictions."79 Complementarity means that the International Criminal Court may only exercise jurisdiction if
domestic courts were "unwilling or unable" to prosecute.80 Article 17 of the Rome Statute contemplates these
situations:

2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of
due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable:

(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of
shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court
referred to in article 5;

(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is inconsistent with
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;

(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and they were or are
being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person
concerned to justice.

3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary
evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)

The International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over natural persons. Criminal liability shall attach to one who:

(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another person,
regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;

(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is attempted;

(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its
commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its commission;

(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a crime by a group of
persons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall either:

i. Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group, where
such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; or

ii. Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;

(e) In respect of the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit genocide;
 (f) Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means of a
substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the person's
intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise prevents the
completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the attempt to commit that
crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal purpose.81

Individual criminal responsibility under the Rome Statute does not affect state responsibility in international
law.82 Further, the Rome Statute provides additional grounds of criminal responsibility for commanders and other
superiors.83

In determining liability under the Rome Statute, a person's official capacity is irrelevant:

1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, an
elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility
under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.

2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, whether
under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a
person.84

The Rome Statute provides that state parties are obliged to give their full cooperation toward the International
Criminal Court's investigation and prosecution of crimes within its jurisdiction.85 The International Criminal Court
may request, "through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be designated by each State
Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession," state parties to cooperate.86 It may employ measures
to "ensure the safety or physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their families."87

The International Criminal Court may also ask for cooperation and assistance from any intergovernmental
organization pursuant to an agreement with the organization and in accordance with its competence and
mandate.88 State parties are required to ensure that their national law provides a procedure "for all of the forms of
cooperation" specified in Part 9 of the treaty.89

A state party's failure to comply with the International Criminal Court's request to cooperate would warrant the
International Criminal Court's finding to that effect. It will then "refer the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or,
where the Security Council referred the matter to the International Criminal Court, to the Security Council."90

The Assembly of States Parties is the International Criminal Court's management oversight and legislative body,
comprised of representatives of all the states that ratified and acceded to the Rome Statute.91

Upon a finding of conviction, the International Criminal Court may impose any of the following penalties:

(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or

(b) A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual
circumstances of the convicted person.

2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:

(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;

(b) A forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, without
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. 92

All disputes involving the International Criminal Court's judicial functions are settled by its decision.93 Disputes of at
least two state parties which relate to the application of the Rome Statute, and which are unsettled by "negotiations
within three months of their commencement, shall be referred to the Assembly of States Parties." The Assembly
may "settle the dispute or may make recommendations on further means of settlement of the dispute."94
Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may withdraw from it:

1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute
while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced
prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued
consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which
the withdrawal became effective.

Burundi is, thus far, the only other state party to withdraw from the Rome Statute. In accordance with Article 127(1)
of the Rome Statute, it sent a written notification of withdrawal to the Secretary-General of the International Criminal
Court on October 27, 2016. Burundi's withdrawal was effected on October 26, 2017.95

Following Burundi, South Africa, Gambia, and the Philippines manifested their intent to withdraw. Nonetheless,
Gambia and South Africa rescinded their notifications of withdrawal on February 10, 2017 and March 7, 2017,
respectively.96

III

On March 24, 1998, President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 387, which created a task force on the
proposed establishment of the International Criminal Court. The task force was composed of the following:

Department of Foreign Affairs Chairman

Department of Justice Co-

Chairman

Office of the Solicitor General Member

Office of the Executive Secretary/(Office of the Chief Member

Presidential Legal Counsel)

Department of Interior and Local Government Member

University of the Philippines Member97

College of Law

The task force had the following duties:

1. Undertake studies and researches pertaining to the proposed establishment of the International Criminal
Court;

2. Formulate policy recommendations to serve as inputs in the review and consolidation of the Philippine
Government's position in the Preparatory Committee meetings of the ICC and the United Nations General
Assembly;

3. Identify and recommend legislative measures necessary in the furtherance of the foregoing;

4. Serve as a forum for the resolution of issues and concerns pertaining to the establishment of the ICC;

5. Pursue other related functions which may be deemed necessary by the President.98
From June 15, 1998 to July 17, 1998, the Philippines participated in the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court in Rome. Then Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Lauro L. Baja, the Philippine Head of Delegation,99 delivered a speech that explained the country's
position, commitment, and historical participation on the establishment of the International Criminal Court. His points
are summarized, as follows:

7. Mr. Baja (Philippines) said that his country aspired to the establishment of an international criminal court
that would dispense justice efficiently and effectively; an institution that was ineffective in addressing the
problem of impunity of the perpetrators of the most heinous violations of the laws of humanity would not
serve justice or help to maintain international peace and security. The position of the Philippines, consistent
with its constitutional and legal traditions, was based on those considerations and on its desire to uphold the
current evolution of international law.

8. National judicial systems should have primacy in trying crimes and punishing the guilty. The International
Criminal Court should complement those systems and seek action only when national institutions did not
exist, could not function or were otherwise unavailable. The Court should have jurisdiction over the core
crimes of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and aggression, but its Statute should contain an
additional provision allowing for the future inclusion of other crimes that affect the very fabric of the
international system.

9. The Prosecutor should be independent and be entitled to investigate complaints proprio motu, subject to
the safeguards provided by a supervisory pre-trial chamber. The use of weapons of mass destruction,
including nuclear weapons, must be considered a war crime. The definition of war crimes and crimes against
humanity should include special consideration of the interests of minors and of gender sensitivity. The
Statute should provide for an age below which there was exemption from criminal responsibility, and
persons under 18 years of age should not be recruited into the armed forces. The sexual abuse of women
committed as an act of war or in a way that constituted a crime against humanity should be deemed
particularly reprehensible. The crime of rape should be gender-neutral and classified as a crime against
persons. A schedule of penalties should be prescribed for each core crime defined in the Statute, following
the principle that there was no crime if there was no penalty, which would also meet the due process
requirement that the accused should be fully apprised of the charges against them and of the penalties
attaching to the alleged crimes.

10. The Philippines supported the positions set out by the States members of the Movement of Non-Aligned
Countries at the Ministerial Meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries,
held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, in May 1998, and was prepared to make the necessary changes to
its national laws required by the establishment of the Court.100 (Emphasis supplied)

In the same conference, the Philippines, through its Alternate Head of Delegation, Hon. Franklin M.
Ebdalin,101 voted to adopt the Rome Statute, and explained its vote:

[T]he Statute contained the vital elements of an international criminal court, with jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity and war crimes, gender-based and sex-related crimes and acts committed in non-international
armed conflicts. The Prosecutor could initiate proceedings proprio motu, independently of the Security Council.

22. The restrictions on admissibility had been reduced to an acceptable minimum. The principle of
complementarity was assured, giving due regard to the national jurisdiction and sovereignty of States
parties. Finally, there were provisions for restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims.

23. On the other hand, some provisions detracted from those strengths. Some new definitions of war crimes
constituted a retrograde step in the development of international law. The applicability of the aggression
provisions had been postponed pending specific definition of the crime, and States parties had the option of
reservations on the applicability of war crimes provisions. Finally, the Security Council could seek deferral of
prosecution for a one-year period, renewable for an apparently unlimited number of times.

24. Nevertheless, he was confident that the International Criminal Court could succeed with the support of
the international community and had therefore decided to vote in favour of the Statute.102 (Emphasis
supplied)
On December 28, 2000, the Philippines103 signed the Rome Statute. However, it was still "subject to ratification,
acceptance or approval by signatory [s]tates."104 It was also necessary that instruments of ratification be deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.105

Later, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., Representative Loretta Ann Rosales, the Philippine Coalition for the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, and the Families of
Victims of Involuntary Disappearances, among others, filed a petition for mandamus before this Court to compel the
Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute to the Senate for its concurrence.106

Their petition was dismissed. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Executive Secretary,107 this Court noted that it was beyond its
"jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of the Rome Statute to the
Senate."108 Pimentel Jr. quoted Justice Isagani A. Cruz, who had earlier explained the following concerning the
treaty-making process:

The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and exchange of the
instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration and publication under the U.N. Charter,
although this step is not essential to the validity of the agreement as between the parties.

Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this task to his authorized
representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials known as full powers, which they exhibit to the
other negotiators at the start of the formal discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft
of the proposed treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent
negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved, and may even
"collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points under consideration.

If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for signature. This step is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of
the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty
is required. The document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.

Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty
concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to enable the contracting states to examine the treaty
more closely and to give them an opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests.
It is for this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of the
government other than that which negotiated them.

....

The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification, which usually also
signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is
dispensed with and no effectivity clause is embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its
signature.109 (Emphasis in the original)

This Court declared that submission to ratification is "generally held to be an executive act,"110 and it binds the
state to the signed statute. It concluded that upon signature through a representative, the president exercises
discretion on whether to ratify the statute or not:

After the treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened
with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical
to the interest of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty
by the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were so, the requirement of
ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to
ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes
without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons.
Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the
concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or
concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the
Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a
treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within
the competence of the President alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This
Court has no jurisdiction over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official
duties.111 (Citations omitted)

In 2009, President Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law Republic Act No. 9851, which replicated many of the then
unratified Rome Statute's provisions.

Some provisions, however, are significantly different. In some aspects, the law went beyond the Rome Statute. It
broadened the definition of torture, added the conscription of child soldiers as a war crime,112 and stipulated
jurisdiction over crimes against humanity anywhere in the world, as long as the offender or victim is Filipino.113 This
removes complementarity as a requirement for prosecution of crimes against humanity under the ratified treaty.
While the treaty's language had to be refined to take the interests of other countries into consideration,114 the law
was independently passed considering all our interests. This independent, voluntary initiative strengthened our own
criminal justice system.

On February 28, 2011, President Aquino sent the signed Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.115 On
August 23, 2011, the Senate passed Resolution No. 546, which embodied the country's accession to the Rome
Statute.116

On August 30, 2011, the Philippines deposited its instrument of ratification to the United Nations Secretary-General.
Thus, the Rome Statute took effect in the Philippines on November 1, 2011.117

IV

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention) defines treaties as "international agreement[s]
concluded between states in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation."118

In our jurisdiction, we characterize treaties as "international agreements entered into by the Philippines which
require legislative concurrence after executive ratification. This term may include compacts like conventions,
declarations, covenants and acts."119

Treaties under the Vienna Convention include all written international agreements, regardless of their nomenclature.
In international law, no difference exists in the agreements' binding effect on states, notwithstanding how nations opt
to designate the document.

However, Philippine law distinguishes treaties from executive agreements.

Treaties and executive agreements are equally binding on the Philippines. However, an executive agreement: "(a)
does not require legislative concurrence; (b) is usually less formal; and (c) deals with a narrower range of subject
matters."120 Executive agreements dispense with Senate concurrence "because of the legal mandate with which
they are concluded."121 They simply implement existing policies, and are thus entered into:

(1) to adjust the details of a treaty;

(2) pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; or

 (3) in the exercise of the President's independent powers under the Constitution.

The raison d'être of executive agreements hinges on prior constitutional or legislative authorizations.122 (Emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)

However, this Court had previously stated that this difference in form is immaterial in international law:

The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international agreements.
International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations of international agreements, ranging
from the traditional notion of a treaty — which connotes a formal, solemn instrument — to engagements concluded
in modem, simplified forms that no longer necessitate ratification. An international agreement may take different
forms: treaty, act, protocol, agreement, concordat, compromis d'arbitrage, convention, covenant, declaration,
exchange of notes, statute, pact, charter, agreed minute, memorandum of agreement, modus vivendi, or some other
form. Consequently, under international law, the distinction between a treaty and an international agreement or even
an executive agreement is irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and obligations.123 (Citations
omitted, emphasis in the original)

This Court also cautioned that this local affectation does not mean that the constitutionally required Senate
concurrence may be conveniently disregarded:

However, this principle does not mean that the domestic law distinguishing treaties, international agreements,
and executive agreements is relegated to a mere variation in form, or that the constitutional requirement of Senate
concurrence is demoted to an optional constitutional directive. There remain two very important features that
distinguish treaties from executive agreements and translate them into terms of art in the domestic setting.

First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization under the Constitution,
statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the validity and effectivity of executive agreements
under serious question for the main function of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by
the Legislature, not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. In turn, executive agreements cannot
create new international obligations that are not expressly allowed or reasonably implied in the law they purport to
implement.

Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. Treaties are products of the
acts of the Executive and the Senate unlike executive agreements, which are solely executive actions. Because of
legislative participation through the Senate, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute. If there is
an irreconcilable conflict, a later law or treaty takes precedence over one that is prior. An executive agreement is
treated differently. Executive agreements that are inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are considered
ineffective. Both types of international agreement are nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the Constitution.

This rule does not imply, though, that the President is given carte blanche to exercise this discretion. Although the
Chief Executive wields the exclusive authority to conduct our foreign relations, this power must still be exercised
within the context and the parameters set by the Constitution, as well as by existing domestic and international
laws[.]124 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

International agreements125 fall under these two general categories, and are outlined in Executive Order No. 459,
which provides guidelines on how these agreements enter into force in the domestic sphere.126

VI

Though both are sources of international law, treaties must be distinguished from generally accepted principles of
international law.

Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the sources of international law:127

a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the
contesting states;
 b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;

c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;

d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.

Two constitutional provisions incorporate or transform portions of international law into the domestic sphere, namely:
(1) Article II, Section 2, which embodies the incorporation method; and (2) Article VII, Section 21, which covers the
transformation method. They state:

ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies Principles

....

SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice,
freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

....

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

The sources of international law—international conventions, international custom, general principles of law, and
judicial decisions—are treated differently in our jurisdiction.

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution declares that international custom and general principles of law are
adopted as part of the law of the land. No further act is necessary to facilitate this:

"Generally accepted principles of international law" refers to norms of general or customary international law which
are binding on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign
immunity, a person's right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others. The concept of
"generally accepted principles of law" has also been depicted in this wise:

Some legal scholars and judges look upon certain "general principles of law" as a primary source of international
law because they have the "character of jus rationale" and are "valid through all kinds of human societies."
O'Connell holds that certain principles are part of international law because they are "basic to legal systems
generally" and hence part of the jus gentium. These principles, he believes, are established by a process of
reasoning based on the common identity of all legal systems. If there should be doubt or disagreement, one must
look to state practice and determine whether the municipal law principle provides a just and acceptable
solution.128 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In his separate opinion in Government of the United States of America v. Purganan,129 Justice Jose C. Vitug
(Justice Vitug) underscored that as a source of international law, general principles of law are only secondary to
international conventions and international customs. He stressed that while international conventions and customs
are "based on the consent of nations,"130 general principles of law have yet to have a binding definition:131

Article 38 (1) (c) is identified as being a "secondary source" of international law and, therefore, not ranked at par
with treaties and customary international law. The phrase is innately vague; and its exact meaning still eludes any
general consensus. The widely preferred opinion, however, appears to be that of Oppenheim which views "general
principles of law" as being inclusive of principles of private or municipal law when these are applicable to
international relations. Where, in certain cases, there is no applicable treaty nor a generality of state practice giving
rise to customary law, the international court is expected to rely upon certain legal notions of justice and equity in
order to deduce a new rule for application to a novel situation. This reliance or "borrowing" by the international
tribunal from general principles of municipal jurisprudence is explained in many ways by the fact that municipal or
private law has a higher level of development compared to international law. Brownlie submits that the term
"generally-accepted principles of international law" could also refer to rules of customary law, to general principles of
law, or to logical propositions resulting from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing international law and
municipal law analogies.

In order to qualify as a product of the subsidiary law-creating process, a principle of law must fulfill three
requirements: (1) it must be a general principle of law as distinct from a legal rule of more limited functional scope,
(2) it must be recognized by civilized nations, and (3) it must be shared by a fair number of states in the community
of nations.

....

Clarifying the term "generally-accepted principles of international law" during the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission, Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna points out that "when we talk of generally-accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, we mean that it is part of the statutory part of laws, not of
the Constitution.["]

The remark is shared by Professor Merlin M. Magallona who expresses that the phrase "as part of the law of the
land" in the incorporation clause refers to the levels of legal rules below the Constitution such as legislative acts and
judicial decisions. Thus, he contends, it is incorrect to so interpret this phrase as including the Constitution itself
because it would mean that the "generally-accepted principles of international law" falls in parity with the
Constitution.132 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

In Rubrico v. Arroyo,133 Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Carpio Morales) refined Justice Vitug's proposed
framework. She conceded that the Constitution's mention of generally accepted principles of international law was
ℒαwρhi ৷

"not quite the same" as, and was not specifically included in Article 38's "general principles of law recognized by
civilized nations[.]"134 Yet, she noted:

Renowned publicist Ian Brownlie suggested, however, that "general principles of international law" may refer to rules
of customary law, to general principles of law as in Article 38 (1) (c), or to logical propositions resulting from judicial
reasoning on the basis of existing international law and municipal analogies.

Indeed, judicial reasoning has been the bedrock of Philippine jurisprudence on the determination of generally
accepted principles of international law and consequent application of the incorporation clause.

In Kuroda v. Jalandoni, the Court held that while the Philippines was not a signatory to the Hague Convention and
became a signatory to the Geneva Convention only in 1947, a Philippine Military Commission had jurisdiction over
war crimes committed in violation of the two conventions before 1947. The Court reasoned that the rules and
regulations of the Hague and Geneva Conventions formed part of generally accepted principles of international
law. Kuroda thus recognized that principles of customary international law do not cease to be so, and are in fact
reinforced, when codified in multilateral treaties.

In International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, the Court invalidated as discriminatory the practice of
International School, Inc. of according foreign hires higher salaries than local hires. The Court found that, among
other things, there was a general principle against discrimination evidenced by a number of international
conventions proscribing it, which had been incorporated as part of national laws through the Constitution.

The Court thus subsumes within the rubric of "generally accepted principles of international law" both "international
custom" and "general principles of law," two distinct sources of international law recognized by the ICJ
Statute. 135 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In other words, Justice Carpio Morales opined that, per jurisprudence, international customs and general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations form part of the law of the land.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his dissent in Bayan Muna v. Romulo,136 echoed Justice Carpio Morales's supposition
and further discussed:

[T]he doctrine of incorporation which mandates that the Philippines is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law which automatically form part of Philippine law by operation of the Constitution.

In Kuroda v. Jalandoni, this Court held that this constitutional provision "is not confined to the recognition of rules
and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory." The pertinent portion of Kuroda states:

It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations of The Hague and Geneva Conventions form part of and are
wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international law. . . . Such rule and principles, therefore, form
part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions embodying them, for our
Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rules
and principles of international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a
signatory.

Hence, generally accepted principles of international law form part of Philippine laws even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations of the Philippines.

Generally accepted principles of international law, as referred to in the Constitution, include customary international
law. Customary international law is one of the primary sources of international law under Article 38 of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice. Customary international law consists of acts which, by repetition of States of
similar international acts for a number of years, occur out of a sense of obligation, and taken by a significant number
of States. It is based on custom, which is a clear and continuous habit of doing certain actions, which has grown
under the aegis of the conviction that these actions are, according to international law, obligatory or right. Thus,
customary international law requires the concurrence of two elements: "1 the established, wide-spread, and
consistent practice on the part of the States; and 2 a psychological element known as opinion juris sive
necessitatis (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it."137 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, generally accepted principles of international law include international customs and general principles of law.
Under the incorporation clause, these principles form part of the law of the land. And, "by mere constitutional
declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law."138

Pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution, treaties become "valid and effective" upon the Senate's
concurrence:

The Senate's ratification of a treaty makes it legally effective and binding by transformation. It then has the force and
effect of a statute enacted by Congress. In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque
III, et al.:

Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when,
by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law.

Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution ... Thus, treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the
Constitution for it to be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.139

As discussed in Bayan v. Zamora,140 concurring m a treaty or international agreement is:

. . . essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent body possessed of its own erudite mind, has
the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and whatever action it takes in the exercise of its
wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the legality of the act.141
Thus, in doing so:

. . . the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles of separation of powers and of
checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments remain true to their form in a
democratic government such as ours.142

However, the provision on treaty-making is under Article VII of the Constitution, which concerns the executive
department. A review of the evolution of this constitutional provision may aid this Court in interpreting its text.

In his concurring opinion in Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines v. Ochoa,143 Justice Arturo D. Brion
(Justice Brion) discussed the antecedents of the transformation method:

Under the 1935 Constitution, the President has the "power, with the concurrence of a majority of all the members of
the National Assembly, to make treaties . . . ." The provision, Article VII, Section 11, paragraph 7 is part of the
enumeration of the President's powers under Section 11, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution. This recognition clearly
marked treaty making to be an executive function, but its exercise was nevertheless subject to the concurrence of
the National Assembly. A subsequent amendment to the 1935 Constitution, which divided the country's legislative
branch into two houses, transferred the function of treaty concurrence to the Senate, and required that two-thirds of
its members assent to the treaty.

By 1973, the Philippines adopted a presidential parliamentary system of government, which merged some of the
functions of the Executive and Legislative branches of government in one branch. Despite this change, concurrence
was still seen as necessary in the treaty-making process, as Article VIII, Section 14 required that a treaty should be
first concurred in by a majority of all Members of the Batasang Pambansa before they could be considered valid and
effective in the Philippines, thus:

SEC. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa.

This change in the provision on treaty ratification and concurrence is significant for the following reasons:

First, the change clarified the effect of the lack of concurrence to a treaty, that is, a treaty without legislative
concurrence shall not be valid and effective in the Philippines.

Second, the change of wording also reflected the dual nature of the Philippines' approach in international relations.
Under this approach, the Philippines sees international law and its international obligations from two perspectives:
first, from the international plane, where international law reigns supreme over national laws; and second, from
the domestic plane, where the international obligations and international customary laws are considered in the same
footing as national laws, and do not necessarily prevail over the latter. The Philippines' treatment of international
obligations as statutes in its domestic plane also means that they cannot contravene the Constitution, including the
mandated process by which they become effective in Philippine jurisdiction.

Thus, while a treaty ratified by the President is binding upon the Philippines in the international plane, it would need
the concurrence of the legislature before it can be considered as valid and effective in the Philippine domestic
jurisdiction. Prior to and even without concurrence, the treaty, once ratified, is valid and binding upon the Philippines
in the international plane. But in order to take effect in the Philippine domestic plane, it would have to first undergo
legislative concurrence as required under the Constitution.

Third, that the provision had been couched in the negative emphasizes the mandatory nature of legislative
concurrence before a treaty may be considered valid and effective in the Philippines.

The phrasing of Article VIII, Section 14 of the 1973 Constitution has been retained in the 1987 Constitution, except
for three changes: First, the Batasang Pambansa has been changed to the Senate to reflect the current setup of our
legislature and our tripartite system of government. Second, the vote required has been increased to two-thirds,
reflective of the practice under the amended 1935 Constitution. Third, the term "international agreement" has been
added, aside from the term treaty. Thus, aside from treaties, "international agreements" now need concurrence
before being considered as valid and effective in the Philippines.144 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
The 1935145 and 1973146 Constitutions used the same words as Article II, Section 2147 of the present Constitution
does, and adopted "the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land."148 However, there have been significant changes in constitutional provisions on treaty-making.

Article VII, Section 10(7) of the 1935 Constitution reads:

ARTICLE VII
Executive Department

SECTION 10. . . .

....

(7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate to make
treaties, and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, he shall appoint ambassadors, other public
ministers, and consuls. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the Government
of the Philippines.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the power to make treaties was lodged in the President, subject to the Senate's
concurrence. Although the 1973 Constitution shifted our system of government from presidential to parliamentary,
its provision on treaty-making still required the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, the body on which
legislative power rested:

ARTICLE VIII
Batasang Pambansa

SECTION 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the Batasang Pambansa. (Emphasis supplied)

On this note, it has been previously surmised that:

The concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa was duly limited to treaties.

However, the first clause of this provision, "except as otherwise provided," leaves room for the exception to the
requirement of legislative concurrence. Under Article XIV, Section 15 of the 1973 Constitution, requirements of
national welfare and interest allow the President to enter into not only treaties but also international agreements
without legislative concurrence, thus:

ARTICLE XIV THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND THE PATRIMONY OF THE NATION

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 15. Any provision of paragraph one, Section fourteen, Article Eight and of this Article notwithstanding, the
Prime Minister may enter into international treaties or agreements as the national welfare and interest may require.

This Court, in the recent case of Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, characterized this exception as having "left a
large margin of discretion that the President could use to bypass the Legislature altogether." This Court noted this
as "a departure from the 1935 Constitution, which explicitly gave the President the power to enter into treaties only
with the concurrence of the National Assembly."

As in the 1935 Constitution, this exception is no longer present in the current formulation of the provision. The power
and responsibility to enter into treaties is now shared by the executive and legislative departments. Furthermore, the
role of the legislative department is expanded to cover not only treaties but international agreements in general as
well, thus:
 ARTICLE VII Executive Department
xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

In discussing the power of the Senate to concur with treaties entered into by the President, this Court in Bayan v.
Zamora remarked on the significance of this legislative power:

For the role of the Senate in relation to treaties is essentially legislative in character; the Senate, as an independent
body possessed of its own erudite mind, has the prerogative to either accept or reject the proposed agreement, and
whatever action it takes in the exercise of its wide latitude of discretion, pertains to the wisdom rather than the
legality of the act. In this sense, the Senate partakes a principal, yet delicate, role in keeping the principles
of separation of powers and of checks and balances alive and vigilantly ensures that these cherished rudiments
remain true to their form in a democratic government such as ours. The Constitution thus animates, through this
treaty-concurring power of the Senate, a healthy system of checks and balances indispensable toward our nation's
pursuit of political maturity and growth. True enough, rudimentary is the principle that matters pertaining to the
wisdom of a legislative act are beyond the ambit and province of the courts to inquire.

Therefore, having an option does not necessarily mean absolute discretion on the choice of international
agreement. There are certain national interest issues and policies covered by all sorts of international agreements,
which may not be dealt with by the President alone. An interpretation that the executive has unlimited discretion to
determine if an agreement requires senate concurrence not only runs counter to the principle of checks and
balances; it may also render the constitutional requirement of senate concurrence meaningless:

If executive-agreement authority is un-contained, and if what may be the proper subject-matter of a treaty
may also be included within the scope of executive-agreement power, the constitutional requirement of
Senate concurrence could be rendered meaningless. The requirement could be circumvented by an
expedient resort to executive agreement.

The definite provision for Senate concurrence in the Constitution indomitably signifies that there must be a regime of
national interests, policies and problems which the Executive branch of the government cannot deal with in terms of
foreign relations except through treaties concurred in by the Senate under Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution. The problem is how to define that regime, i.e., that which is outside the scope of executive-agreement
ℒαwρhi ৷

power of the President and which exclusively belongs to treaty-making as subject to Senate concurrence.

Article VII, Section 21 does not limit the requirement of senate concurrence to treaties alone. It may cover
other international agreements, including those classified as executive agreements, if: (1) they are more
permanent in nature; (2) their purposes go beyond the executive function of carrying out national policies
and traditions; and (3) they amend existing treaties or statutes.

As long as the subject matter of the agreement covers political issues and national policies of a more permanent
character, the international agreement must be concurred in by the Senate.149 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

The constitutional framers were not linguistically ignorant. Treaties follow a different process to become part of the
law of the land. Their delineation from generally accepted principles of international law was deliberate. So was the
use of different terminologies and mechanisms in rendering them valid and effective.

In consonance with the Constitution and existing laws, presidents act within their competence when they enter into
treaties. However, for treaties to be effective in this jurisdiction, Senate concurrence must be obtained. The
president may not engage in foreign relations in direct contravention of the Constitution and our laws:

After the treaty is signed by the state's representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened
with the responsibility and the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical
to the interest of the state and its people.150
As explained in Pimentel, Jr.:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in
external relations and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign
policy, the President acts as the country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain
diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of
treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides
a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of the Senate for the validity of the
treaty entered into by him. . . .

....

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide a check on
the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered
into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nation's
pursuit of political maturity and growth.151 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The context of the provision in question, alongside others, provides enlightenment. Under Article VI of the
Constitution, legislative power is checked by the executive:

SECTION 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses in joint session assembled, voting
separately, shall have the sole power to declare the existence of a state of war.

(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited
period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease upon the
next adjournment thereof.

SECTION 28. (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive
system of taxation.

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations
and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious,
charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.

(4) No law granting any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of
the Congress.

Conversely, some executive powers under Article VII of the Constitution are checked by the legislature, by one of its
chambers, by legislative committees, or by other bodies attached to the legislature:

SECTION 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards.

....
SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not exceeding sixty
days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting
jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation
or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the
Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such proclamation or suspension, convene
in accordance with its rules without any need of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis
of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

....

SECTION 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.

....

SECTION 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the Members of the Senate. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, treaty-making is a function lodged in the executive branch, which is headed by the president. Nevertheless,
a treaty's effectivity depends on the Senate's concurrence, in accordance with the Constitution's system of checks
and balances.

VII

While Senate concurrence is expressly required to make treaties valid and effective, no similar express mechanism
concerning withdrawal from treaties or international agreements is provided in the Constitution or any statute.
Similarly, no constitutional or statutory provision grants the president the unilateral power to terminate treaties. This
vacuum engenders the controversy around which the present consolidated Petitions revolve.

Frameworks in evaluating executive action, vis-à-vis legislative prerogatives, have been formulated in other
jurisdictions. Judicious discernment makes these frameworks worthy of consideration.

To be clear, however, while legal principles in a legal system similar to ours may hold persuasive value in our
courts, we will not adopt such principles without considering our own unique cultural, political, and economic
contexts. The Philippines has long struggled against colonialism. We will not betray efforts at evolving our own just
but unique modalities for judicial review by summarily adopting foreign notions.

In Goldwater v. Carter,152 a case resolved by the United States Supreme Court, certain members of Congress
assailed then President Jimmy Carter's (President Carter) unilateral abrogation of the Sino-American Mutual
Defense Treaty. Relevant events were chronicled in a Yale Law journal article:

On December 15, 1978, President Carter announced his intention to recognize and establish diplomatic relations
with the People's Republic of China and to terminate, as of January 1, 1980, the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
between the United States and Taiwan. Seven U.S. Senators and eight Members of the House of Representatives
sued the President and the Secretary of State in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They sought an
injunction and a declaration that the President's attempt to unilaterally terminate the treaty was "unconstitutional,
illegal, null and void" unless "made by and with the full consultation of the entire Congress, and with either the
advice and consent of the Senate, or the approval of both Houses of Congress."

When the 96th Congress opened, several Senators introduced resolutions asserting that the President had
encroached on Congress's constitutional role with respect to treaty termination generally and the Taiwan Mutual
Defense Treaty in particular. In October 1979, the district court held that to be effective under the Constitution, the
President's notice of termination had to receive the approval of either two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both
houses of Congress.

A fragmented D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, heard the case on an expedited basis on November 13 and just
seventeen days later ruled for the President. Declining to treat the matter as a political question, the circuit court
instead held on the merits that the President had not exceeded his authority in terminating the bilateral treaty in
accordance with its terms. Pressed to decide the case before the designated January 1, 1980 termination date, the
Supreme Court issued no majority opinion. Instead, in a 6-3 per curiam decision, the Court dismissed the complaint
without oral argument as nonjusticiable.153 (Citations omitted)

Even back in 1979, before the case reached the United States Supreme Court, Circuit Court Judge
MacKinnon154 had previously cautioned that a grant of absolute power of unilateral termination to the president
may be easily used in the future to "develop other excuses to feed upon congressional prerogatives that a Congress
lacking in vigilance allows to lapse into desuetude."155 The District Court eventually ruled that President Carter did
not exceed his authority in terminating the bilateral agreement without Senate concurrence.

In a Resolution, the United States Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals
judgment, and remanded the case to the District Court, "with directions to dismiss the complaint."156

Four justices observed that there is an "absence of any constitutional provision governing the termination of a treaty"
and that "different termination procedures may be appropriate for different treaties."157

Observations articulated in Goldwater reveal stark similarities between the American and the Philippine legal
systems concerning ensuing debates on the necessity of Senate concurrence in abrogating treaties:

No constitutional provision explicitly confers upon the President the power to terminate treaties. Further, Art. II, 2, of
the Constitution authorizes the President to make treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate. Article VI
provides that treaties shall be a part of the supreme law of the land. These provisions add support to the view
that the text of the Constitution does not unquestionably commit the power to terminate treaties to the President
alone....

We are asked to decide whether the President may terminate a treaty under the Constitution without congressional
approval. Resolution of the question may not be easy, but it only requires us to apply normal principles of
interpretation to the constitutional provisions at issue.... The present case involves neither review of the President's
activities as Commander in Chief nor impermissible interference in the field of foreign affairs. Such a case would
arise if we were asked to decide, for example, whether a treaty required the President to order troops into a foreign
country. But "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."... This case "touches" foreign relations, but the question presented to us concerns only the
constitutional division of power between Congress and the President.158 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

Yale Law School Professor Harold Hongju Koh159 (Professor Koh) opined that a president has no general unilateral
power to terminate treaties; instead, Senate concurrence on treaty abrogation is imperative.160 He posited:

In future cases, the constitutional requirements for termination should be decided based on the type of agreement in
question, the degree of congressional approval and subject matter in question, and Congress's effort to guide the
termination and withdrawal process by framework legislation.161 (Emphasis supplied)
Professor Koh proposed the operation of what he dubbed as the "mirror principle," where "the degree of legislative
approval needed to exit an international agreement must parallel the degree of legislative approval originally
required to enter it."162 He further said:

Under the mirror principle, the Executive may terminate, without congressional participation, genuinely "sole"
executive agreements that have lawfully been made without congressional input. But the President may not entirely
exclude Congress from the withdrawal or termination process regarding congressional-executive agreements or
treaties that were initially concluded with considerable legislative input. That principle would make Congress's input
necessary for disengagement even from such international agreements as the Paris Climate Agreement, which
broadly implicate Congress's commerce powers, and which—while never subjected to an up-or-down vote—were
nevertheless enacted against a significant background of congressional awareness and support that implicitly
authorized the presidential making, but not the unmaking, of climate change agreements. Congress also should
participate in an attempt to withdraw the United States even from such political agreements as the Iran Nuclear Deal
(also known as the JCPOA), where the President is exercising plenary foreign commerce powers that were
delegated by Congress and where the U.S. termination has now triggered actionable claims of violation of
international law.163 (Citations omitted)

Professor Koh considered that, as a functional matter, overboard unilateral executive power to terminate treaties
risks presidents making "overly hasty, partisan, or parochial withdrawals," thus weakening systemic stability, as well
as the credibility and negotiating leverage of all presidents.164

The mirror principle echoes the points raised by Justice Robert H. Jackson's renowned concurrence165 in the
separation-of-powers case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.166 There, he laid down three categories of
executive action as regards the necessity of concomitant legislative action:

Category One: "when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority
is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate";

Category Two: "when the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can
only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain"; and

Category Three: "when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at his lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter."167

This framework has since been dubbed as the Youngstown framework,168 and was adopted in subsequent
American cases, among them Medellin v. Texas.169

Medellin involved a review of the president's power in foreign affairs. In turn, Medellin was considered in our
jurisdiction by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) in examining the constitutionality of the Visiting
Forces Agreement.170 Chief Justice Puno, opined:

An examination of Bayan v. Zamora, which upheld the validity of the VFA, is necessary in light of a recent change in
U.S. policy on treaty enforcement. Of significance is the case of Medellin v. Texas, where it was held by the U.S.
Supreme Court that while treaties entered into by the President with the concurrence of the Senate are binding
international commitments, they are not domestic law unless Congress enacts implementing legislation or unless
the treaty itself is "self-executing".

An Examination of Medellin v. Texas

In Medellin v. Texas, Jose Ernesto Medellin (Medellin), a Mexican national, was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death in Texas for the gang rape and brutal murders of two Houston teenagers. His conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal.
Medellin then filed an application for post-conviction relief and claimed that the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (Vienna Convention) accorded him the right to notify the Mexican consulate of his detention; and because
the local law enforcement officers failed to inform him of this right, he prayed for the grant of a new trial.

The trial court, as affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, rejected the Vienna Convention claim. It was
ruled that Medellin failed to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his
conviction or punishment. Medellin then filed his first habeas corpus petition in the Federal District Court, which also
rejected his petition. It held that Medellin failed to show prejudice arising from the Vienna Convention.

While Medellin's petition was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in the Case
Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Avena). The ICJ held that the U.S. violated Article 36 (1) (b) of the
Vienna Convention by failing to inform 51 named Mexican nationals, including Medellin, of their Vienna Convention
rights. The ICJ ruled that those named individuals were entitled to a review and reconsideration of their U.S. state
court convictions and sentences regardless of their failure to comply with generally applicable state rules governing
challenges to criminal convictions.

In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon — issued after Avena but involving individuals who were not named in
the Avena judgment, contrary to the ICJ's determination — the U.S. Federal Supreme Court held that the Vienna
Convention did not preclude the application of state default rules. The U.S. President, George W. Bush, then issued
a Memorandum (President's Memorandum) stating that the United States would discharge its international
obligations under Avena by having State courts give effect to the decision.

Relying on Avena and the President's Memorandum, Medellin filed a second Texas state-court habeas
corpus application, challenging his state capital murder conviction and death sentence on the ground that he had
not been informed of his Vienna Convention rights. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's
application as an abuse of the writ, since under Texas law, a petition for habeas corpus may not be filed
successively, and neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum was binding federal law that could displace the
State's limitations on filing successive habeas applications.

Medellin repaired to the U.S. Supreme Court. In his petition, Medellin contends that the Optional Protocol, the
United Nations Charter, and the ICJ Statute supplied the "relevant obligation" to give the Avena judgment binding
effect in the domestic courts of the United States.

The Supreme Court of the United States ruled that neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum constitutes
directly enforceable federal law that pre-empts state limitations on the filing of successive habeas corpus petitions. It
held that while an international treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law
unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or unless the treaty itself is "self-executing". It further held
that decisions of the ICJ are not binding domestic law; and that absent an act of Congress or Constitutional
authority, the US. President lacks the power to enforce international treaties or decisions of the ICJ.

Requirements for Domestic Enforceability of Treaties in the U.S.

The new ruling is clear-cut: "while a treaty may constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law
unless Congress has enacted statutes implementing it or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be "self-
executing" and is ratified on that basis."

The Avena judgment creates an international law obligation on the part of the United States, but it is not
automatically binding domestic law because none of the relevant treaty sources — the Optional Protocol, the U.N.
Charter, or the ICJ Statute — creates binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and no such
legislation has been enacted.

The Court adopted a textual approach in determining whether the relevant treaty sources are self-
executory[.]171 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Later, Saguisag v. Ochoa172 reviewed the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America. In Saguisag, Justice Brion found
the Youngstown framework to be a better approach than simply anchoring this Court's position in one constitutional
provision. He proposed the examination of the president's act in the context of how our system of government
works:

[E]ntry into international agreements is a shared function among the three branches of government. In this light and
in the context that the President's actions should be viewed under our tripartite system of government, I cannot
agree with the ponencia's assertion that the case should he examined solely and strictly through the constitutional
limitation found in Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution.

IV.B (2) Standards in Examining the President's Treaty-Making Powers

Because the Executive's foreign relations power operates within the larger constitutional framework of separation of
powers, I find the examination of the President's actions through this larger framework to be the better approach m
the present cases. This analytical framework, incidentally, is not the result of my original and independent thought; it
was devised by U.S. Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert Jackson in his Concurring Opinion in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.

Justice Jackson's framework for evaluating executive action categorizes the President's actions into three: first,
when the President acts with authority from the Congress, his authority is at its maximum, as it includes all the
powers he possesses in his own right and everything that Congress can delegate.

Second, "when the President acts in the absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely on his own independent powers, but there is a [twilight zone where] he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or where its distribution is uncertain." In this situation, presidential authority can derive support from
"congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence."

Third, "when the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is
at its lowest ebb," and the Court can sustain his actions "only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the
subject."

This framework has been recently adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Medellin v. Texas, a case involving the
President's foreign affairs powers and one that can be directly instructive in deciding the present case.

In examining the validity of an executive act, the Court takes into consideration the varying degrees of authority that
the President possesses. Acts of the President with the authorization of Congress should have the "widest latitude
of judicial interpretation" and should be "supported by the strongest of presumptions." For the judiciary to overrule
the executive action, it must decide that the government itself lacks the power. In contrast, executive acts that are
without congressional imprimatur would have to be very carefully examined.173 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)

The Youngstown framework was favorably considered and employed by this Court in its discussions in Gonzales v.
Marcos174 penned by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando.

In Gonzales, Ramon A. Gonzales alleged that in issuing Executive Order No. 30, the President encroached on the
legislative prerogative when it created:

[A] trust for the benefit of the Filipino people under the name and style of the Cultural Center of the Philippines
entrusted with the task to construct national theatre, a national music hall, an arts building and facilities, to awaken
our people's consciousness in the nation's cultural heritage and to encourage its assistance in the preservation,
promotion, enhancement and development thereof, with the Board of Trustees to be appointed by the President, the
Center having as its estate the real and personal property vested in it as well as donations received, financial
commitments that could thereafter be collected, and gifts that may be forthcoming in the future[.]175 (Citation
omitted)

However, during the pendency of the case, Presidential Decree No. 15 was promulgated, creating the Cultural
Center of the Philippines. This development prompted this Court to dismiss the appeal. In so doing, this Court
proceeded to explain:
It would be an unduly narrow or restrictive view of such a principle if the public funds that accrued by way of
donation from the United States and financial contributions for the Cultural Center project could not be legally
considered as "governmental property." They may be acquired under the concept of dominium, the state as
a persona in law not being deprived of such an attribute, thereafter to be administered by virtue of its prerogative
of imperium. What is a more appropriate agency for assuring that they be not wasted or frittered away than the
Executive, the department precisely entrusted with management functions? It would thus appear that for the
President to refrain from taking positive steps and await the action of the then Congress could be tantamount to
dereliction of duty. He had to act; time was of the essence. Delay was far from conducive to public interest. It was as
simple as that. Certainly then, it could be only under the most strained construction of executive power to conclude
that in taking the step he took, he transgressed on terrain constitutionally reserved for Congress.

This is not to preclude legislative action in the premises. While to the Presidency under the 1935 Constitution was
entrusted the responsibility for administering public property, the then Congress could provide guidelines for such a
task. Relevant in this connection is the excerpt from an opinion of Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer "When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only
rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have
concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent
presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperative of events and
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." To vary the phraseology, to recall Thomas
Reed Powell, if Congress would continue to keep its peace notwithstanding the action taken by the executive
department, it may be considered as silently vocal. In plainer language, it could be an instance of silence meaning
consent. The Executive Order assailed was issued on June 25, 1966. Congress until the time of the filing of the
petition on August 26, 1969 remained quiescent. Parenthetically, it may be observed that petitioner waited until
almost the day of inaugurating the Cultural Center on September 11, 1969 before filing his petition in the lower
court. However worthy of commendation was his resolute determination to keep the Presidency within the bounds of
its competence, it cannot be denied that the remedy, if any, could be supplied by Congress asserting itself in the
premises. Instead, there was apparent conformity on its part to the way the President saw fit to administer such
governmental property.176 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The Youngstown framework was also employed by Chief Justice Puno in evaluating the situations subject of Bayan
v. Zamora177 and Akbayan v. Aquino.178

In Bayan, Chief Justice Puno, citing the Youngstown framework, stated: "The U.S. Supreme Court itself has
'intimated that the President might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he might act
contrary to an Act of Congress."'179 He reiterated this in Akbayan.

Thus, in appropriate cases, the validity of the president's actions—when there are countervailing legislative
prerogatives—may be appraised in light of the Youngstown framework.

All told, the president, as primary architect of foreign policy, negotiates and enters into international agreements.
However, the president's power is not absolute, but is checked by the Constitution, which requires Senate
concurrence. Treaty-making is a power lodged in the executive, and is balanced by the legislative branch. The
textual configuration of the Constitution hearkens both to the basic separation of powers and to a system of checks
and balances. Presidential discretion is recognized, but it is not absolute. While no constitutional mechanism exists
on how the Philippines withdraws from an international agreement, the president's unbridled discretion vis-à-vis
treaty abrogation may run counter to the basic prudence underlying the entire system of entry into and domestic
operation of treaties.

VIII

The mirror principle and the Youngstown framework are suitable starting points in reviewing the president's acts in
the exercise of a power shared with the legislature. However, their concepts and methods cannot be adopted
mechanically and indiscriminately. A compelling wisdom underlies them, but operationalizing them domestically
requires careful consideration and adjustment in view of circumstances unique to the Philippine context.
The mirror principle is anchored on balancing executive action with the extent of legislative participation in entering
into treaties. It is sound logic to maintain that the same constitutional requirements of congressional approval—
which attended the effecting of treaties following original entry into them—must also be followed in their termination.

As proposed by Chief Justices Fernando and Puno, along with Justice Brion, the Youngstown framework may also
guide us in reviewing executive action vis-à-vis the necessity of concomitant legislative action in withdrawing from
treaties. When the president clearly shares power with the legislature, and yet disavows treaties despite no
accompanying action by Congress, the Youngstown framework considers this an instance when the president relies
exclusively on their limited independent powers. Thus, the validity of the withdrawal, the exercise of which should
have been concurrent with Congress, must be critically examined. The basic, underlying fact of powers being
shared makes it difficult to sustain the president's unilateral action.

Having laid out the parameters and underlying principles of relevant foreign concepts, and considering our own
historical experience and prevailing legal system, this Court adopts the following guidelines as the modality for
evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from international agreements.

First, the president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary
to the Constitution or statutes.

The Constitution is the fundamental law of the land. It mandates the president to "ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed."180 Both in negotiating and enforcing treaties, the president must ensure that all actions are in keeping
with the Constitution and statutes. Accordingly, during negotiations, the president can insist on terms that are
consistent with the Constitution and statutes, or refuse to pursue negotiations if those negotiations' direction is such
that the treaty will turn out to be repugnant to the Constitution and our statutes. Moreover, the president should not
be bound to abide by a treaty previously entered into should it be established that such treaty runs afoul of the
Constitution and our statutes.

There are treaties that implement mandates provided in the Constitution, such as human rights. Considering the
circumstances of each historical period our nation encounters, there will be many means to acknowledge and
strengthen existing constitutional mandates. Participating in and adhering to the creation of a body such as the
International Criminal Court by becoming a party to the Rome Statute is one such means, but so is passing a law
that, regardless of international relations, replicates many of the Rome Statute's provisions and even expands its
protections. In such instances, it is not for this Court—absent concrete facts creating an actual controversy—to
make policy judgments as to which between a treaty and a statute is more effective, and thus, preferable.

Within the hierarchy of the Philippine legal system—that is, as instruments akin to statutes—treaties cannot
contravene the Constitution. Moreover, when repugnant to statues enacted by Congress, treaties and international
agreements must give way.

Article VII, Section 21 provides for legislative involvement in making treaties and international agreements valid and
effective, that is, by making Senate concurrence a necessary condition. From this, two points are discernible: (1)
that there is a difference in the extent of legislative participation in enacting laws as against rendering a treaty or
international agreement valid and effective; and (2) that Senate concurrence, while a necessary condition, is not in
itself a sufficient condition for the validity and effectivity of treaties.

In enacting laws, both houses of Congress participate. A bill undergoes three readings in each chamber. A bill
passed by either chamber is scrutinized by the other, and both chambers consolidate their respective versions
through a bicameral conference. Only after extensive participation by the people's elected representatives—
members of the Senate who are elected at large, and, those in the House of Representatives who represent districts
or national, regional, or sectoral party-list organizations—is a bill presented to the president for signature.

In contrast, in the case of a treaty or international agreement, the president, or those acting under their authority,
negotiates its terms. It is merely the finalized instrument that is presented to the Senate alone, and only for its
concurrence. Following the president's signature, the Senate may either agree or disagree to the entirety of the
treaty or international agreement. It cannot refine or modify the terms. It cannot improve what it deems deficient, or
tame apparently excessive stipulations.
The legislature's highly limited participation means that a treaty or international agreement did not weather the rigors
that attend regular lawmaking. It is true that an effective treaty underwent a special process involving one of our two
legislative chambers, but this also means that it bypassed the conventional republican mill.

Having passed scrutiny by hundreds of the people's elected representatives in two separate chambers which are
committed—by constitutional dictum—to adopting legislation, statutes enacted by Congress necessarily carry
greater democratic weight than an agreement negotiated by a single person. This is true, even if that person is the
chief executive who acts with the aid of unelected subalterns. This nuancing between treaties and international
agreements, on one hand, and statutes on the other, is an imperative borne by the Philippines basic democratic and
republican nature: that the sovereignty that resides in the people is exercised through elected representatives.181

Thus, a valid treaty or international agreement may be effective just as a statute is effective. It has the force and
effect of law. Still, statutes enjoy preeminence over international agreements. In case of conflict between a law and
a treaty, it is the statute that must prevail.

The second point proceeds from the first. The validity and effectivity of a treaty rests on its being in harmony with the
Constitution and statutes. The Constitution was ratified through a direct act of the sovereign Filipino people voting in
a plebiscite; statutes are adopted through concerted action by their elected representatives. Senate concurrence is
the formal act that renders a treaty or international agreement effective, but it is not, in substance, the sole criterion
for validity and effectivity. Ultimately, a treaty must conform to the Constitution and statutes.

These premises give the president leeway in withdrawing from treaties that he or she determines to be contrary to
the Constitution or statutes.

In the event that courts determine the unconstitutionality of a treaty, the president may unilaterally withdraw from it.

Owing to the preeminence of statutes enacted by elected representatives and hurdling the rigorous legislative
process, the subsequent enactment of a law that is inconsistent with a treaty likewise allows the president to
withdraw from that treaty.

As the chief executive, the president swore to preserve and defend the Constitution, and faithfully execute laws.
This includes the duty of appraising executive action, and ensuring that treaties and international agreements are
not inimical to public interest. The abrogation of treaties that are inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes is in
keeping with the president's duty to uphold the Constitution and our laws.

Thus, even sans a judicial determination that a treaty is unconstitutional, the president also enjoy much leeway in
withdrawing from an agreement which, in his or her judgment, runs afoul of prior existing law or the Constitution. In
ensuring compliance with the Constitution and laws, the president performs his or her sworn duty in abrogating a
treaty that, per his or her bona fide judgment, is not in accord with the Constitution or a law. Between this and
withdrawal owing to a prior judicial determination of unconstitutionality or repugnance to statute however, withdrawal
under this basis may be relatively more susceptible of judicial challenge. This may be the subject of judicial review,
on whether there was grave abuse of discretion concerning the president's arbitrary, baseless, or whimsical
determination of unconstitutionality or repugnance to statute.

Second, the president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur.

The Constitution devised a system of checks and balances in the exercise of powers among the branches of
government. For instance, as a legislative check on executive power, Congress may authorize the president to fix
1aшphi1

tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts subject to limitations
and restrictions it may impose.182 The president can likewise grant amnesty, but with the concurrence of a majority
of all members of Congress.183

Considering that effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative
branches,184 Congress may expressly authorize the president to enter into a treaty with conditions or limitations as
to negotiating prerogatives.
Similarly, a statute subsequently passed to implement a prior treaty signifies legislative approbation of prior
executive action. This lends greater weight to what would otherwise have been a course of action pursued through
executive discretion. When such a statute is adopted, the president cannot withdraw from the treaty being
implemented unless the statute itself is repealed.

When a treaty was entered into upon Congress's express will, the president may not unilaterally abrogate that
treaty. In such an instance, the president who signed the treaty simply implemented the law enacted by Congress.
While the president performed his or her function as primary architect of international policy, it was in keeping with a
statute. The president had no sole authority, and the treaty negotiations were premised nor only upon his or her own
diplomatic powers, but on the specific investiture made by Congress. This means that the president negotiated not
entirely out of his or her own volition, but with the express mandate of Congress, and more important, within the
parameters that Congress has set.

While this distinction is immaterial in international law, jurisprudence has treated this as a class of executive
agreements. To recall an executive agreement implements an existing policy, and is entered "to adjust the details of
a treaty . . . pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature; executive agreements [hinge] on prior
constitutional or legislative authorizations."185 Executive agreements "inconsistent with either a law or a treaty are
considered ineffective."186

Consistent with the mirror principle, any withdrawal from an international agreement must reflect how it was entered
into. As the agreement was entered pursuant to congressional imprimatur, withdrawal from it must likewise be
authorized by a law.

Here, Congress passed Republic Act No. 9851 well ahead of the Senate's concurrence to the Rome Statute.
Republic Act No. 9851 is broader than the Rome Statute itself. This reveals not only an independent, but even a
more encompassing legislative will—even overtaking the course—of international relations. Our elected
representatives have seen it fit to enact a municipal law that safeguards a broader scope of rights, regardless of
whether the Philippines formally joins the International Criminal Court through accession to the Rome Statute.

Third, the President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate
concurred and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence.

The Senate may concur with a treaty or international agreement expressly indicating a condition that withdrawal
from it must likewise be with its concurrence. It may be embodied in the same resolution in which it expressed its
concurrence. It may also be that the Senate eventually indicated such a condition in a subsequent resolution.
Encompassing legislative action may also make it a general requirement for Senate concurrence to be obtained in
any treaty abrogation. This may mean the Senate invoking its prerogative through legislative action taken in tandem
with the House of Representatives—through a statute or joint resolution—or by adopting, on its own, a
comprehensive resolution. Regardless of the manner by which it is invoked, what controls is the Senate's exercise
of its prerogative to impose concurrence as a condition.

As effecting treaties is a shared function between the executive and the legislative branches, the Senate's power to
concur with treaties necessarily includes the power to impose conditions for its concurrence. The requirement of
Senate concurrence may then be rendered meaningless if it is curtailed.

Petitioner Senator Pangilinan manifested that the Senate has adopted this condition in other resolutions through
which the Senate concurred with treaties. However, the Senate imposed no such condition when it concurred in the
Philippines' accession to the Rome Statute. Likewise, the Senate has yet to pass a resolution indicating that its
assent should have been obtained in withdrawing from the Rome Statute. While there was an attempt to pass such
a resolution, it has yet to be calendared, and thus, has no binding effect on the Senate as a collegial body.

In sum, at no point and under no circumstances does the president enjoy unbridled authority to withdraw from
treaties or international agreements. Any such withdrawal must be anchored on a determination that they run afoul
of the Constitution or a statute. Any such determination must have clear and definite basis; any wanton, arbitrary,
whimsical, or capricious withdrawal is correctible by judicial review. Moreover, specific circumstances attending
Congress's injunction on the executive to proceed in treaty negotiation, or the Senate's specification of the need for
its concurrence to be obtained in a withdrawal, binds the president and may prevent him or her from proceeding with
withdrawal.
 IX

It is wrong to state that matters of foreign relations are political questions, and thus, beyond the judiciary's reach.

The Constitution expressly states that this Court, through its power of judicial review, may declare any treaty or
international agreement unconstitutional:

SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.187 (Emphasis
supplied)

We take this opportunity to clarify the pronouncements made in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion,188 where this Court
summarized the rules when courts are confronted with a conflict between a rule of international law and municipal
law. It stated:

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with situations
in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or
statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to
be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of
international law in observance of the observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional
provision[.] In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal
courts. . . for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all
circumstances[.] The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not pertain to or
imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of
incorporation, as applied in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with, but
are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat priori takes effect
— a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law
of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution[.]189 (Citations omitted)

Lantion discussed the incorporation doctrine embodied in Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. Through
incorporation, the Philippines adopts international custom and general principle of law as part of the law of the
land. Lantion clarified that despite being part of the legal system, this "does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere."190 However, it goes on to state that "lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect—a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty."191

Previously, we have extensively discussed how, despite being both sources of international law, treaties must be
distinguished from generally accepted principles of international law. Article II, Section 2
automatically incorporates generally accepted principles of international law into the domestic sphere. On the other
hand, Article VII, Section 21 operates differently and concerns an entirely distinct source of international law. It
signifies that treaties and international agreements are not automatically incorporated to the Philippine legal system,
but are transformed into domestic law by Senate concurrence.

Thus, Lantion’s pronouncement that—"lex posterior derogat priori takes effect—a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty"192—is misplaced and unsupported by its internal logic. Its fallacy frustrates its viability
as precedent. Besides, it was mere obiter dictum as this Court did not even rule on the constitutionality of the
assailed Republic of the Philippines-United States Extradition Treaty.
Courts, in which judicial power is vested, may void executive and legislative acts when they violate the
Constitution.193

The president is the head of state and chief executive. The Constitution mandates that in performing his or her
functions, the president must "ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."194 Thus, upon assuming office, a
president swears to "faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties. . . preserve and defend [the] Constitution,
execute. . . laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation."195

Accordingly, in fulfilling his or her functions as primary architect of foreign policy, and in negotiating and enforcing
treaties, all of the president's actions must always be within the bounds of the Constitution and our laws. This
mandate is exceeded when acting outside what the Constitution or our laws allow. When any such excess is so
grave, whimsical, arbitrary, or attended by bad faith, it can be invalidated through judicial review.

The Petitions here raise interesting legal questions. However, the factual backdrop of these consolidated cases
renders inopportune a ruling on the issues presented to this Court.

Separation of powers is fundamental in our legal system. The Constitution delineated the powers among the
legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the government, with each having autonomy and supremacy within its
own sphere.196 This is moderated by a system of checks and balances "carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts" of each branch.197

Among the three branches, the judiciary was designated as the arbiter in allocating constitutional
boundaries.198 Judicial power is defined in Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution as:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

A plain reading of the Constitution identifies two instances when judicial power is exercised: (1) in settling actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable; and (2) in determining whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.

In justifying judicial review in its traditional sense, Justice Jose P. Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
Commission199 underscored that when this Court allocates constitutional boundaries, it neither asserts supremacy
nor annuls the legislature's acts. It simply carries out the obligations that the Constitution imposed upon it to
determine conflicting claims and to establish the parties' rights in an actual controversy:

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution.200

The latter conception of judicial power that jurisprudence refers to as the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction"201 was
an innovation of the 1987 Constitution:202

This situation changed after 1987 when the new Constitution "expanded" the scope of judicial power[.]
....

In Francisco v. The House of Representatives, we recognized that this expanded jurisdiction was meant "to ensure
the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse of discretion by 'any branch or instrumentalities of
government."' Thus, the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 engraves, for the first time in its history, into
black letter law the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, whose nature and purpose had been provided in
the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion.

....

Meanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to enforce this "expanded" constitutional definition
of judicial power and because of the commonality of "grave abuse of discretion" as a ground for review under Rule
65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court based on its power to relax its rules allowed Rule 65 to
be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction based on its power to relax its Rules.
This is however an ad hoc approach that does not fully consider the accompanying implications, among them, that
Rule 65 is an essentially distinct remedy that cannot simply be bodily lifted for application under the judicial power's
expanded mode. The terms of Rule 65, too, are not fully aligned with what the Court's expanded jurisdiction signifies
and requires.

On the basis of almost thirty years' experience with the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Court should now fully
recognize the attendant distinctions and should be aware that the continued use of Rule 65 on an ad hoc basis as
the operational remedy in implementing its expanded jurisdiction may, in the longer term, result in problems of
uneven, misguided, or even incorrect application of the courts' expanded mandate.203

Tañada v. Angara204 characterized this not only as a power, but as a duty ordained by the Constitution:

It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, "the judiciary is the
final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature "

As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before
it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the
government.205 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Despite its expansion, judicial review has its limits. In deciding matters involving grave abuse of discretion, courts
cannot brush aside the requisite of an actual case or controversy. The clause articulating
expanded certiorari jurisdiction requires a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed
governmental act which, in essence, is the actual case or controversy. Thus, "even now, under the regime of the
textually broadened power of judicial review articulated in Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is not dispensed with."206

In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of Labor and Employment:207

An actual case or controversy is "one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution." A case is justiciable if the issues presented are "definite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests." The conflict must be ripe for judicial determination, not
conjectural or anticipatory; otherwise, this Court's decision will amount to an advisory opinion concerning legislative
or executive action.

....

Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory
opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the
conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all,
legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases
will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have
more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties,
there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of
constitutional text.208

Thus, whether in its traditional or expanded scope, the exercise of judicial review requires the concurrence of these
requisites for justiciability:

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance . . . ; (c) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.209 (Citations omitted)

XI

The Petitions are moot. They fail to present a persisting case or controversy that impels this Court's review.

In resolving constitutional issues, there must be an "existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory."210

An actual case deals with conflicting rights that are legally demandable and enforceable. It involves definite facts
and incidents to be appreciated, and laws to be applied, interpreted and enforced vis-à-vis ascertained facts. It must
be "definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interest; a real and substantial
controversy admitting of specific relief."211

A constitutional question may not be presented to this Court at an inopportune time. When it is premature, this
Court's ruling shall be relegated as an advisory opinion for a potential, future occurrence. When belated, concerning
matters that are moot, the decision will no longer affect the parties.

Either way, courts must avoid resolving hypothetical problems or academic questions. This exercise of judicial
restraint ensures that the judiciary will not encroach on the powers of other branches of government. As Angara v.
Electoral Commission212 explained:

[T]his power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary
in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.213

The requirement of a bona fide controversy precludes advisory opinions and judicial legislation. For this Court, "only
constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be entertained,"214 and only
when they are raised at the opportune time.

A case is moot when it "ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value."215 There may have been conflicting rights, disputed
facts, or meritorious claims warranting this Court's intervention, but a supervening event rendered the issue stale.
In Peñafrancia Sugar Mill, Inc. v. Sugar Regulatory Administration:216

A case or issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of
supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no practical value
or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would
be negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on the
ground of mootness. This is because the judgment will not serve any useful purpose or have any practical legal
effect because, in the nature of things, it cannot be enforced.217 (Citations omitted)
On March 19, 2019, the International Criminal Court itself, through Mr. O-Gon Kwon, the president of the Assembly
of States Parties, announced the Philippines' departure from the Rome Statute effective March 17, 2019. It made
this declaration with regret and the hope that such departure "is only temporary and that it will re-join the Rome
Statute family in the future."218

This declaration, coming from the International Court itself, settles any doubt on whether there are lingering factual
occurrences that may be adjudicated. No longer is there an unsettled incident demanding resolution. Any discussion
on the Philippines' withdrawal is, at this juncture, merely a matter of theory.

However, even prior to the filing of these Petitions,219 the President had already completed the irreversible act of
withdrawing from the Rome Statute.

To reiterate, Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute provides the mechanism on how its state parties may withdraw:

A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from
this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless the
notification specifies a later date.

The Philippines announced its withdrawal from the Rome Statute on March 15, 2018, and formally
submitted its Notice of Withdrawal through a Note Verbale to the United Nations Secretary-General's Chef
de Cabinet on March 16, 2018. The Secretary-General received the notification on March 17, 2018. For all
intents and purposes, and in keeping with what the Rome Statute plainly requires, the Philippines had, by
then, completed all the requisite acts of withdrawal. The Philippines has done all that were needed to
facilitate the withdrawal. Any subsequent discussion would pertain to matters that are fait accompli.

On March 20, 2018, the International Criminal Court issued a statement on the Philippines' Notice of Withdrawal.
The United Nations certified that the Philippines deposited the written notification on March 17, 2018. It stressed that
while withdrawal from the Rome Statute is a sovereign decision, it has no impact on any pending
proceedings.220 In any case, the International Criminal Court expressed no reservation on the efficacy of the
withdrawal.

At that point, this Court's interference and ruling on what course of action to take would mean an imposition of its will
not only on the executive, but also on the International Criminal Court itself. That is not the function of this Court,
which takes on a passive role in resolving actual controversies when proper parties raise them at an opportune time.
In the international arena, it is the president that has the authority to conduct foreign relations and represent the
country. This Court cannot encroach on matters beyond its jurisdiction.

Moreover, while its text provides a mechanism on how to withdraw from it, the Rome Statute does not have any
proviso on the reversal of a state party's withdrawal. We fail to see how this Court can revoke—as what petitioners
are in effect asking us to do—the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute, without writing new terms into the
Rome Statute.

Petitioners harp on the withdrawal's effectivity, which was one year from the United Nations Secretary-General's
receipt of the notification. However, this one-year period only pertains to the effectivity, or when exactly the legal
consequences of the withdrawal takes effect. It neither concerns approval nor finality of the withdrawal.
Parenthetically, this one-year period does not undermine or diminish the International Criminal Court's jurisdiction
and power to continue a probe that it has commenced while a state was a party to the Rome Statute.

Here, the withdrawal has been communicated and accepted, and there are no means to retract it. This Court cannot
extend the reliefs that petitioners seek. The Philippines's withdrawal from the Rome Statute has been properly
received and acknowledged by the United Nations Secretary-General, and has taken effect. These are all that the
Rome Statute entails, and these are all that the international community would require for a valid withdrawal. Having
been consummated, these actions bind the Philippines.

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners posit:

If the Executive can unilaterally withdraw from any treaty or international agreement, he is in a position to abrogate
some of the basic norms in our legal system. Thus, the Executive can unilaterally withdraw from the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva Conventions[,] and the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, without any checking mechanism from Congress. This would be an undemocratic concentration of power in
the Executive that could not have been contemplated by the Constitution.221

We reiterate that courts may only rule on an actual case. This Court has no jurisdiction to rule on matters that are
abstract, hypothetical, or merely potential. Petitioners' fear that the President may unilaterally withdraw from other
treaties has not transpired and cannot be taken cognizance of by this Court in this case. We have the duty to
determine when we should stay our hand, and refuse to rule on cases where the issues are speculative and
theoretical, and consequently, not justiciable.222

Legislative and executive powers impel the concerned branches of government into assuming a more proactive role
in our constitutional order. Judicial power, on the other hand, limits this Court into taking a passive stance. Such is
the consequence of separation of powers. Until an actual case is brought before us by the proper parties at the
opportune time, where the constitutional question is the very lis mota, we cannot act on an issue, no matter how
much it agonizes us.

XII

Parties have standing if they stand to be benefited if the case is resolved in their favor, or if they shall suffer should
the case be decided against them.223

In Falcis III v. Civil Registrar General,224 this Court explained:

Much like the requirement of an actual case or controversy, legal standing ensures that a party is seeking a
concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by courts:

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal
standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury
guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect,
assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both "built on the
principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch
of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government." In addition, economic reasons justify the rule.
Thus:

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues
is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial
service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and
suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of
justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended m the name of the real party-in-interest,
interest being "material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case[,] [not
just] mere curiosity about the question involved." Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present
substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those
who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought. . . .

Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens, this Court has noted that the party
must claim some kind of injury-in-fact.225 (Citations omitted)

In G.R. No. 238875, petitioners-senators were then incumbent minority senators who allege that the Senate's
constitutional prerogative to concur in the government's decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute has been
impaired. They add that they were likewise suing as citizens, as this case allegedly involves a "public right and its
object . . . is to procure the enforcement of a public duty."226

Petitioners-senators also claim that the issue has transcendental importance, which may potentially impact
constitutional checks and balances, our domestic legal system, and the country's relations with the international
community.227

In G.R. No. 239483, petitioner Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court and its individual members
assert that, as Philippine citizens and as human beings, they have rights to life and personal security. The
withdrawal from the Rome Statute, they claim, violates their rights to ample remedies for the protection of their
rights, "and of their other fundamental rights especially the right to life."228

They likewise contend that their Petition is a taxpayers' suit, since the executive department spent substantial
taxpayer's money in attending negotiations and in participating in the drafting of what would be the Rome
Statute.229

In G.R. No. 240954, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines comes to this Court on essentially the same ground: as a
group of concerned citizens, it invokes its members' right to life and due process that may be affected by the
withdrawal. Additionally, it claims that as a body that aims to uphold the rule of law, it has standing to the question
whether the withdrawal was proper.230

Jurisprudence has consistently recognized each legislator's individual standing and prerogative independent of the
House of Representatives or the Senate as a collegial body.231 A legislator's individual standing and prerogative
remains and is not abandoned in this case. However, the precise circumstances here subvert the otherwise
generally recognized standing which anchors the individual legislators' capacity to seek relief. Here, the Senate's
inaction makes premature petitioners-senators' capacity to seek relief. The Senate's institutional reticence subverts
the capacities otherwise properly accruing to petitioners-senators.

The Senate has refrained from passing a resolution indicating that its assent should have been obtained in
withdrawing from the Rome Statute. Senate Resolution No. 289,232 or the "Resolution Expressing the Sense of the
Senate that Termination of, or Withdrawal from, Treaties and International Agreements Concurred in by the Senate
shall be Valid and Effective Only Upon Concurrence by the Senate," has been presented to but, thus far, never
adopted by the Senate.

During the September 4, 2018 oral arguments, petitioner Senator Pangilinan himself manifested the resolution's
pendency, which he claimed was "not rejected . . . but was not calendared for adoption."233 Thus, Senate
Resolution No. 289 has absolutely no legal effect. Such reticence on this matter means that, as a collegial body,
and in its wisdom, the Senate has chosen not to assert any right or prerogative which it may feel pertains to it, if any,
to limit, balance, or otherwise inhibit the President's act.

The passage of Resolution No. 289 would have been a definite basis on which petitioners-senators can claim a
right. However, the Senate itself appears to have not seen the need for it. Thus, petitioners-senators cannot validly
come to this Court with a case that is already foreclosed by their own institution's inaction.

Moreover, as discussed, petitioner Senator Pangilinan mentioned during oral arguments that the Senate has passed
17 resolutions concurring on different treaties, each of which came with a clause that specifically required its
concurrence for withdrawal.234 In contrast, no similar clause was contained in Senate Resolution No.
546,235 through which the Senate ratified the Rome Statute. Thus, the Senate's inaction itself precludes a source
from which petitioners-senators could claim a right to require Senate concurrence to withdrawing from the Rome
Statute.

Incidentally, in Goldwater, the United States Supreme Court also declined to rule on the substance of the case.
There, then Senator Barry Goldwater and other Congress members assailed then President Carter's unilateral
nullification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty, claiming that this should have required Senate
concurrence. However, Congress had not formally taken a stance contrary to the president's action through any
resolution. There was a draft Senate resolution, but no vote was taken on it.236 Justice Powell noted:
This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial review Prudential
considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President is not ready for judicial review
unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional authority. Differences between the
President and the Congress are commonplace under our system. The differences should, and almost invariably do,
turn on political, rather than legal, considerations. The Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the
allocation of power between the President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse.
Otherwise, we would encourage small groups, or even individual Members, of Congress to seek judicial resolution
of issues before the normal political process has the opportunity to resolve the conflict.

In this case, a few Members of Congress claim that the President's action in terminating the treaty with Taiwan has
deprived them of their constitutional role with respect to a change in the supreme law of the land. Congress has
taken no official action. In the present posture of this case, we do not know whether there ever will be an actual
confrontation between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Although the Senate has considered a resolution
declaring that Senate approval is necessary for the termination of any mutual defense treaty, no final vote has been
taken on the resolution. Moreover, it is unclear whether the resolution would have retroactive effect. It cannot be
said that either the Senate or the House has rejected the President's claim. If the Congress chooses not to confront
the President, it is not our task to do so.237 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Similarly, this Court should stay its hand when the Senate itself, as a collegial body, has not officially confronted the
President's act. This is in keeping with the limits of judicial review.

On the other hand, persons invoking their rights as citizens must satisfy the following requisites to file a suit: (1) they
must have "personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
government"; (2) "the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action"; and (3) "the injury is likely to be redressed
by a favorable action."238

In G.R. Nos. 239483 and 240954, what petitioners assail is an act of the President, in the exercise of his executive
power. They failed to show the actual or imminent injury that they sustained as a result of the President's withdrawal
from the Rome Statute. Again, "whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have 'a present substantial
interest,' not a 'mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest."'239

Similarly, petitioners have no standing as taxpayers. In cases involving expenditure of public funds, also known as a
taxpayer's suit, "there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is
unconstitutional[.]"240

Petitioners here failed to show any illegal expenditure of public funds. To allow these petitioners who suffer no injury
to invoke this Court's discretion would be to allow everyone to come to courts on the flimsiest of grounds.

Parties must possess their own right to the relief sought, and a general invocation of citizen's or a taxpayer's rights
is insufficient. This Court must not indiscriminately open its doors to every person urging it to take cognizance of a
case where they have no demonstrable injury. This may ultimately render this Court ineffective to dispense justice
as cases clog its docket.241

This Court has also recognized that an association may file petitions on behalf of its members on the basis of third
party standing. However, to do so, the association must meet the following requirements: (1) "the [party bringing
suit] must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact,' thus giving [it] a 'sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute"; (2) "the party must have a close relation to the third party"; and (3) "there must exist some hindrance to
the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."242

In Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,243 this Court found that an
association "has the legal personality to represent its members because the results of the case will affect their vital
interests":244

The modern view. . . . fuses the legal identity of an association with that of its members. An association has standing
to file suit for its workers despite its lack of direct interest if its members are affected by the action. An organization
has standing to assert the concerns of its constituents.
....

We note that, under its Articles of Incorporation, the respondent was organized ... to act as the representative of any
individual, company, entity or association on matters related to the manpower recruitment industry, and to perform
other acts and activities necessary to accomplish the purposes embodied therein. The respondent is, thus, the
appropriate party to assert the rights of its members, because it and its members are in every practical sense
identical. . . The respondent [association] is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make
more effective the expression of their voices and the redress of their grievances.245

In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines,246 this Court did not allow the association of bus
operators to represent its members. There were no board resolutions or articles of incorporation presented to show
that it was authorized to file the petition on the members' behalf. Some of the associations even had their certificates
of incorporation revoked. This Court ruled that it is insufficient to simply allege that the petitioners are associations
that represent their members who will be directly injured by the implementation of a law:

The associations in Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines, Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc., and The Executive Secretary were allowed to sue on behalf of their members because they
sufficiently established who their members were, that their members authorized the associations to sue on their
behalf, and that the members would be directly injured by the challenged governmental acts.

The liberality of this Court to grant standing for associations or corporations whose members are those who suffer
direct and substantial injury depends on a few factors.

In all these cases, there must be an actual controversy. Furthermore, there should also be a clear and convincing
demonstration of special reasons why the truly injured parties may not be able to sue.

Alternatively, there must be a similarly clear and convincing demonstration that the representation of the association
is more efficient for the petitioners to bring. They must further show that it is more efficient for this Court to hear only
one voice from the association. In other words, the association should show special reasons for bringing the action
themselves rather than as a class suit, allowed when the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons. In a class suit, a number of the members of the class are permitted to sue and to
defend for the benefit of all the members so long as they are sufficiently numerous and representative of the class to
which they belong.

In some circumstances similar to those in White Light, the third parties represented by the petitioner would have
special and legitimate reasons why they may not bring the action themselves. Understandably, the cost to patrons in
the White Light case to bring the action themselves—i.e., the amount they would pay for the lease of the motels—
will be too small compared with the cost of the suit. But viewed in another way, whoever among the patrons files the
case even for its transcendental interest endows benefits on a substantial number of interested parties without
recovering their costs. This is the free rider problem in economics. It is a negative externality which operates as a
disincentive to sue and assert a transcendental right.247 (Citation omitted, emphasis supplied)

Here, both petitioners-associations, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Philippine Coalition for the
International Criminal Court, failed to convince this Court why they must be heard as associations. Advocating
human rights as an institution is insufficient. No special reason was alleged, let alone proved, why its allegedly
injured members may not file the case themselves.

Worse, the members of the Philippine Coalition for the International Criminal Court joined the case as petitioners,
albeit likewise failing to exhibit actual or imminent injury from which they stand to suffer.

XIII

Transcendental importance is often invoked in instances when the petitioners fail to establish standing in
accordance with customary requirements. However, its general invocation cannot negate the requirement of locus
standi. Facts must be undisputed, only legal issues must be present: and proper and sufficient justifications why this
Court should not simply stay its hand must be clear.
Falcis explained:

Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In
cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this
Court. This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this Court emphasized that transcendental importance — originally
cited to relax rules on legal standing and not as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts — applies only to
cases with purely legal issues. We explained that the decisive factor in whether this Court should permit the
invocation of transcendental importance is not merely the presence of "special and important reason[,]" but the
nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no disputed facts, and the
issues raised should only be questions of law:

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the
legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought
before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual questions.

Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to exercise its power of judicial review just because a case is
attended with purely legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from justiciability. Jurisdiction pertains to
competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case." On the other hand,

[d]etermining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is justiciable is an exercise of the power granted to a
court with jurisdiction over a case that involves constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if this Court has jurisdiction,
the canons of constitutional adjudication in our jurisdiction allow us to disregard the questions raised at our
discretion.

Appraising justiciability is typified by constitutional avoidance. This remains a matter of enabling this Court to act in
keeping with its capabilities. Matters of policy are properly left to government organs that are better equipped at
framing them. Justiciability demands that issues and judicial pronouncements be properly framed in relation to
established facts:

Angara v. Electoral Commission imbues these rules with its libertarian character. Principally, Angara emphasized
the liberal deference to another constitutional department or organ given the majoritarian and representative
character of the political deliberations in their forums. It is not merely a judicial stance dictated by courtesy, but is
rooted on the very nature of this Court. Unless congealed in constitutional or statutory text and imperatively called
for by the actual and non-controversial facts of the case, this Court does not express policy. This Court should
channel democratic deliberation where it should take place.

....

Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from
speculating on the facts of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead. Likewise, this Court should
avoid projecting hypothetica.l situations where none of the parties can fully argue simply because they have not
established the facts or are not interested in the issues raised by the hypothetical situations. In a way, courts are
mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial skepticism. What we think may be happening may not at all be the case.
Therefore, this Court should always await the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.

Thus, concerning the extent to which transcendental importance carves exceptions to the requirements of
justiciability, "[t]he elements supported by the facts of an actual case, and the imperatives of our role as the
Supreme Court within a specific cultural or historic context, must be made clear":

They should be properly pleaded by the petitioner so that whether there is any transcendental importance to a case
is made an issue. That a case has transcendental importance, as applied, may have been too ambiguous and
subjective that it undermines the structural relationship that this Court has with the sovereign people and other
departments under the Constitution. Our rules on jurisdiction and our interpretation of what is justiciable, refined with
relevant cases, may be enough.
Otherwise, this Court would cede unfettered prerogative on parties. It would enable the parties to impose
their own determination of what issues are of paramount; national significance, warranting immediate
attention by the highest court of the land.248 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Chamber of Real Estate and Builders' Associations, Inc. v. Energy Regulatory Commission249 lists the following
considerations to determine whether an issue is of transcendental importance:

(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the
government; and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions
being raised.250 (Citation omitted)

Here, all petitioners invoked the supposed transcendental importance of the constitutional issues. However, none of
the exceptional conditions warranting the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction is present here. This case does not
involve funds or assets. Neither was there any express disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition.
Petitioners also failed to show that no other party has a more direct, personal, and material interest. Petitioners
failed to invoke any source of right to bring these Petitions.

This Court is competent to decide legal principles only in properly justiciable cases. That a party must have standing
in court is not a mere technical rule that may easily be waived. Courts should be scrupulous in protecting the
principles of justiciability, or else their legitimacy may be undermined.251 Transcendental importance of issues
excusing requisite standing should not be so recklessly invoked, and is justified only in extraordinary circumstances.

The alleged transcendental importance of the issues raised here will be better served when there are actual cases
with the proper parties suffering an actual or imminent injury. No injury so great and so imminent was shown here,
such that this Court cannot instead adjudicate on the occasion of an appropriate case.

XIV

The writ of certiorari which may be issued under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court must be distinguished from the writ
of certiorari that may be issued pursuant to the "expanded certiorari jurisdiction"252 under Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2 of the 1987 Constitution.253 The latter is a remedy for breaches of constitutional rights by any branch
or instrumentality of the government. Meanwhile, the special civil action under Rule 65 is limited to a review of
judicial and quasi-judicial acts. The following summarizes the distinctions between the two avenues for certiorari:

Certiorari under Rule 65 Expanded Certiorari

Basis Rule 65 of the Rules of Court Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of

the Constitution

Assailed without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave grave abuse of discretion amounting
act abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to lack or excess of jurisdiction
jurisdiction

By whom any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or any branch or instrumentality of the
quasi-judicial functions government

Other requisites there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law

While these two avenues are distinct, this Court has allowed—in view of its power to relax its rules of procedure—
recourse to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 to enable reliefs that invoke expanded certiorari jurisdiction.254

Regardless, "the expansion of this Court's judicial power is by no means an abandonment of the need to satisfy the
basic requisites of justiciability."255 Ultimately, the nature of judicial power means that this Court is competent to
decide legal principles only when there is an actual case brought by the proper parties who suffer direct, material,
and substantial injury.
 XV

The special civil actions of petitions for certiorari and mandamus cannot afford petitioners the reliefs they seek.

Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to resolve constitutional issues. Instead, they "are filed to address the
jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions."256 Rule 65, Section 1 of
the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a)

The petition shall also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46. (3a)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only when the following requisites are present (1) the writ "must be
directed against a tribunal, a board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions"; (2) "the tribunal, board,
or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion"; and (3) "there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."257

Not every instance of abuse of discretion should lead this Court to exercise its power of judicial review. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Sinon v. Civil Service
Commission258 explains:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.259 (Citation omitted)

A writ of certiorari is unavailing here. The assailed government act is the President's withdrawal from the Rome
Statute. This, by any stretch of the imagination, may not be considered an exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial
power.

A political question exists when the issue does not call on this Court to determine legality and adjudicate, but to
interpret the wisdom of a law or an act.260 It has been defined as a question "which, under the Constitution, [is] to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government."261

In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora:262

One class of cases wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom not the legality, of a particular act or measure
being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not
normally interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to
step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.

. . . In the classic formulation of Justice Brennan in Baker v. Carr, prominent on the surface of any case held to
involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on the one
question.263 (Citation omitted)

Courts cannot resolve a political question. It is not within the purview of judicial functions, and must be left to the
sound discretion of the political agents—the executive or the legislature.

It is true that we have previously said that it is wrong to mistake matters of foreign relations as political questions,
which are completely beyond the reach of judicial review. Nevertheless, generally, the pursuit of foreign relations is
in the executive domain, and thus, pertains to the president,264 the primary architect of foreign policy. As explained
in Bayan v. Zamora:265

By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office, the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and
authority in the external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the chief architect of the nation's
foreign policy, his "dominance in the field of foreign relations is then conceded." Wielding vast powers and influence,
his conduct in the external affairs of the nation . . . is "executive altogether."266 (Citations omitted)

Between the executive and this Court, it is the executive that represents the Philippines in the international sphere.
This Court interprets laws hut its determinations are effective only within the bounds of Philippine jurisdiction. Even
within these bounds, this Court must caution itself in interpreting the Constitution and our laws, for it can undermine
the discretion of the political agencies. This Court's mandate is clear: it is the presence of grave abuse of discretion
that sanctions us to act. It is not merely discretion, but abuse of that discretion; and it is not only abuse of discretion,
but grave abuse of discretion.

The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism provided in the treaty.
The Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A state party and its agents cannot
be faulted for merely acting within what the Rome Statute expressly allows.

As far as established facts go, all there is for this Court to rely on are the manifest actions of the executive, which
have nonetheless all been consistent with the letter of the Rome Statute. Suggestions have been made about
supposed political motivations, but they remain just that: suggestions and suppositions.

Were the situation different—where it is shown that the President's exercise of discretion ran afoul of established
procedure; or was done in manifest disregard of previously declared periods for rectification, terms, guidelines, or
injunctions, belying any rhyme or reason in the course of action hastily and haphazardly taken; or was borne out of
vindictiveness, as retaliation, merely out of personal motives, to please personal tastes or to placate personal
perceived injuries—whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion may be appreciated, impelling this Court to rule on
the substance of petitions and grant the reliefs sought.

XVI

Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects
the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may tile
a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required
to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
the wrongful acts of the respondent.

Lihaylihay v. Treasurer of the Philippines267 discussed the requisites for the issuance of a writ of mandamus:

A writ of mandamus may issue in either of two (2) situations: first, "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
office, trust, or station"; second, "when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person . . . unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled."

The first situation demands a concurrence between a clear legal right accruing to petitioner and a correlative duty
incumbent upon respondents to perform an act, this duty being imposed upon them by law.

Petitioner's legal right must have already been clearly established. It cannot be a prospective entitlement that is yet
to be settled. In Lim Tay v. Court of Appeals, this Court emphasized that "[m]andamus will not issue to establish a
right, but only to enforce one that is already established." In Pefianco v. Moral, this Court underscored that a writ of
mandamus "never issues in doubtful cases."

Respondents must also be shown to have actually neglected to perform the act mandated by law. Clear in the text
of Rule 65, Section 3 is the requirement that respondents "unlawfully neglect" the performance of a duty. The mere
existence of a legally mandated duty or the pendency of its performance does not suffice.

The duty subject of mandamus must be ministerial rather than discretionary. A court cannot subvert legally vested
authority for a body or officer to exercise discretion. In Sy Ha v. Galang:

[M]andamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon him
the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment
that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

This Court distinguished discretionary functions from ministerial duties, and related the exercise of discretion to
judicial and quasi-judicial powers. In Samson v. Barrios:

Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right conferred upon them by law of acting
officially, under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own judgments and consciences,
uncontrolled by the judgments or consciences of others. A purely ministerial act or duty, in contradistinction to a
discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. . . .
Mandamus will not lie to control the exercise of discretion of an inferior tribunal . . . , when the act complained of is
either judicial or quasi-judicial. . . . It is the proper remedy when the case presented is outside of the exercise of
judicial discretion. . . .

Mandamus, too, will not issue unless it is shown that "there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law." This is a requirement basic to all remedies under Rule 65, i.e., certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus.268 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

A writ of mandamus lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial, and not those that are
discretionary. Petitioners must show that they have a clear legal right and that there was a neglected duty which
was incumbent upon the public officer.

Here, however, there is no showing that the President has the ministerial duty imposed by law to retract his
withdrawal from the Rome Statute. Certainly, there is no constitutional or statutory provision granting petitioners the
right to compel the executive to withdraw from any treaty. It was discretionary upon the President, as primary
architect of our foreign policy, to perform the assailed act.

Moreover, issuing a writ of mandamus will not ipso facto restore the Philippines to membership in the International
Criminal Court. No provision in the Rome Statute directs how a state party may reverse its withdrawal from the
treaty. It cannot be guaranteed that the Note Verbale's depositary, the United Nations Secretary-General, will assent
to this Court's compulsion to reverse the country's withdrawal.

This Court is not an international court. It may only rule on the effect of international law on the domestic sphere.
What is within its purview is not the effectivity of laws among states, but the effect of international law on the
Constitution and our municipal laws. Not only do petitioners pray for a relief directed at a discretionary function, but
the relief they seek through this Court's finite authority is ineffectual and futile. Ultimately, mandamus will not lie.

XVII

Pacta sunt servanda is a generally accepted principle of international law that preserves the sanctity of treaties. This
principle is expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention:

Article 26
"Pacta sunt servanda"

Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.

A supplementary provision is found in Article 46:

Article 46
Provisions of internal law regarding
competence to conclude treaties

1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of
a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless
that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance.

2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in
accordance with normal practice and in good faith.

A state party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law to justify its failure to perform a treaty. Under
international law, we cannot plead our own laws to excuse our noncompliance with our obligations.

The March 15, 2018 Note Verbale submitted by the Department of Foreign Affairs, through our Ambassador to the
United Nations, partly reads:

The Government of the Republic of the Philippines has the honor to inform the Secretary-General, in his capacity as
depositary of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, of its decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Statute.

The Philippines assures the community of nations that the Philippine Government continues to be guided by the rule
of law embodied in its Constitution, which also enshrines the country's long-standing tradition of upholding human
rights.

The Government affirms its commitment to fight against impunity for atrocity crimes, notwithstanding its withdrawal
from the Rome Statute, especially since the Philippines has a national legislation punishing atrocity crimes. The
Government remains resolute in effecting its principal responsibility to ensure the long-term safety of the nation in
order to promote inclusive national development and secure a decent and dignified life for all.

The decision to withdraw is the Philippines' principled stand against those who politicize and weaponize human
rights, even as its independent and well-functioning organs and agencies continue to exercise jurisdiction over
complaints, issues, problems and concerns arising from its efforts to protect its people.269 (Emphasis supplied)

The Philippines' withdrawal was submitted in accordance with relevant provisions of the Rome Statute. The
President complied with the provisions of the treaty from which the country withdrew. There cannot be a violation
of pacta sunt servanda when the executive acted precisely in accordance with the procedure laid out by that treaty.
Article 127(1) of the Rome Statute states:
 1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.

From its text, the Rome Statute provides no room to reverse the accepted withdrawal from it. While there is a one-
year period before the withdrawal takes effect, it is unclear whether we can read into that proviso a permission for a
state party to rethink its position, and retreat from its withdrawal.

In any case, this Court has no competence to interpret with finality—let alone bind the International Criminal Court,
the Assembly of States Parties, individual state parties, and the entire international community—what this provision
means, and conclude that undoing a withdrawal is viable. In the face of how the Rome Statute enables withdrawal
but does not contemplate the undoing of a withdrawal, this Court cannot compel external recognition of any
prospective undoing which it shall order. To do so could even mean courting international embarrassment.

Just the same, any such potential embarrassment or other unpalatable consequences arc risks that we, as a
country, are willing to take is better left to those tasked with crafting foreign policy.

The Rome Statute contemplates amendments, and is replete with provisions on it:

Article 121
Amendments

1. After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose
amendments thereto. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of
the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.

2. No sooner than three months from the date of notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its next
meeting, shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The
Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so
warrants.

3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference
which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority States Parties.

4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one year
after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the United
Nations by seven-eighths of them.

5. Any amendment to Articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into force for those States Parties
which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or
acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise
its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals
or on its territory.

6. If an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths of States Parties in accordance with paragraph 4,
any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with immediate
effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by giving notice no
later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment.

7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment adopted
at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference.

Article 122
Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature
 1. Amendments to provisions of this Statute which are of an exclusively institutional nature, namely, article
35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, article 37, article 38, article 39, paragraphs 1 (first two sentences), 2 and
4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, and articles 44, 46, 47 and 49, may be
proposed at any time, notwithstanding article 121, paragraph 1, by any State Party. The text of any
proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or such other
person designated by the Assembly of States Parties who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties and
to others participating in the Assembly.

2. Amendments under this article in which consensus cannot be reached shall be adopted by the Assembly
of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a two-thirds majority of States Parties. Such amendments
shall enter into force for all States Parties six months after their adoption by the Assembly of, as the case
may be, by the Conference.

Article 123
Review of Statute

1. Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall
convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, but is
not limited to, the list of crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those participating in
the Assembly of State Parties and on the same conditions.

2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes set out in paragraph 1, the
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene a
Review Conference.

3. The provisions of article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into force of any
amendment to the Statute considered in a Review Conference.

Generally, jus cogens rules of customary international law cannot be amended by treaties. As Articles 121, 122, and
123 allow the amendment of provisions of the Rome Statute, this indicates that the Rome Statute is not jus cogens.
At best, its provisions are articulations of customary law, or simply, treaty law. Article 121(6) sanctions the
immediate withdrawal of a state party if it does not agree with the amending provisions of the Rome Statute.
Therefore, withdrawal from the Rome Statute is not aberrant. Precisely, the option is enabled for states parties.

Petitioners' contention—that withdrawing from the Rome Statute effectively repeals a law—is inaccurate. The Rome
Statute remained in force for its states parties, and Article 127 specifically allows state parties to withdraw.

In withdrawing from the Rome Statute, the President complied with the treaty's requirements. Compliance with its
textual provisions cannot be susceptible of an interpretation that his act violated the treaty. Hence, withdrawal per se
from the Rome Statute does not violate pacta sunt servanda.

XVIII

Petitioners in G.R. No. 239483 invoke the case of South Africa, which had previously attempted to withdraw from
the Rome Statute. When the withdrawal was challenged by the South African Opposition Democratic Alliance, the
South African High Court ruled that the president's withdrawal was premature, procedurally irrational, and may not
be done without the approval of the Parliament. It said:

The matter was argued largely on the basis that there is no provision in the Constitution or in any other legislation
for withdrawal from international treaties. . . . However, it appears to us that there is probably a good reason why the
Constitution provides for the power of the executive to negotiate and conclude international agreements but is silent
on the power to terminate them. The reason is this: As the executing arm of the state, the national executive needs
authority to act. That authority will flow from the Constitution or from an act of parliament. The national executive can
exercise only those powers and perform those functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, or by law which is
consistent with the Constitution. This is a basic requirement of the principle of legality and the rule of law. The
absence of a provision in the Constitution or any other legislation of a power for the executive to terminate
international agreements is therefore confirmation of the fact that such power does not exist unless and until
parliament legislates for it. It is not a lacuna or omission.270

The ruling on South Africa's withdrawal cannot be taken as binding precedent.

First, foreign judgments are not binding in our jurisdiction. At most, they may hold persuasive value.271 Francisco v.
House of Representatives272 teaches that this Court, in passing upon constitutional questions, "should not be
beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs."273

Second, a comparison of the Philippines' and South Africa's respective governmental structures and constitutions
reveals stark differences.

Our Constitution states: "No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate."274

On the other hand, the South African Constitution provides:

SECTION 231. International Agreements

(1) The negotiating and signing of all international agreements is the responsibility of the national executive

(2) An international agreement binds the Republic only after it has been approved by resolution in both the
National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces, unless it is an agreement referred to in subsection
(3).275 (Emphasis supplied)

Our Constitution requires that when the president enters into a treaty, at least two-thirds of all members of the
Senate must concur for it to be valid and effective. On the other hand, the South African Constitution expressly
requires that the entire parliament must approve the international agreement.

Per our system of checks and balances, the Senate concurred with entering into the Rome Statute through Senate
Resolution No. 546. In contrast, the South African parliament had to enact a law, the Implementation of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 2002,276 for the Rome Statute to be adopted in South Africa.
Thus, treaty-making in South Africa is vested in their parliament, making it a concurrently legislative and not an
exclusively executive act. In the Philippines, treaty-making is an executive act, vested in the president; the Senate's
involvement is limited to mere concurrence.

While there may be similarities between our constitutions, these are not enough to take South Africa's case as
binding precedent. We are under a presidential form of government. The way our system of checks and balances
operates is different from how such a system would operate m a parliamentary government.

XIX

Withdrawing from the Rome Statute does not discharge a state party from the obligations it has incurred as a
member. Article 127(2) provides:

A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it
was as a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not
affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which
the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the
withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was
already under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective. (Emphasis
supplied)

A state party withdrawing from the Rome Statute must still comply with this provision. Even if it has deposited the
instrument of withdrawal, it shall not be discharged from any criminal proceedings. Whatever process was already
initiated before the International Criminal Court obliges the state party to cooperate.
Until the withdrawal took effect on March 17, 2019, the Philippines was committed to meet its obligations under the
Rome Statute. Any and all governmental acts up to March 17, 2019 may be taken cognizance of by the International
Criminal Court.

Further, as petitioners in G.R. No. 239483 underscored:

[U]nder this reverse complementarity provision in [Republic Act No. 9851, the Preliminary Examination opened by
the [International Criminal Court] on the President's drug war is not exactly haram (to borrow a word used in Islam to
mean any act forbidden by the Divine). Assuming such a [Preliminary Examination] proceeds . . . when Art. 18 (3) of
the Rome Statute comes into play, [Republic Ad No. 9851 may be invoked as basis by Philippine authorities to defer
instead to the [International Criminal Court] in respect of any investigation on the .same situation.277

Consequently, liability for the alleged summary killings and other atrocities committed in the course of the war on
drugs is not nullified or negated here. The Philippines remained covered and bound by the Rome Statute until
March 17, 2019.

XX

Petitioners claim that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute violated their right to be provided with ample
remedies for the protection of their right to life and security.

This fear of imagined diminution of legal remedies must be assuaged. The Constitution, which embodies our
fundamental rights, was in no way abrogated by the withdrawal. A litany of statutes that protect our rights remain in
place and enforceable.

As discussed, Republic Act No. 9851 or the Philippine Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law,
Genocide, and Other Crimes Against Humanity, echoes the substantive provisions of the Rome Statue. It was
signed into law on December 11, 2009, two years before the Senate concurred with the Rome Statute. Republic Act
No. 9851 covers rights similarly protected under the Rome Statute. Consequently, no new obligations arose from
our membership in the International Criminal Court. Given the variances between the Rome Statute and Republic
Act No. 9851, it may even be said that the Rome Statute amended Republic Act No. 9851.

Republic Act No. 9851 declares the State policy of valuing "the dignity of every human person and guarantee[ing]
full respect for human rights, including the rights of indigenous cultural communities and other vulnerable groups,
such as women and children[.]"278 It guarantees protection against "the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole . . . and their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the
national level in order to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crime[.]279 It recognizes that the State
must "exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes[.]"280

This is enforced by the Republic Act No. 9851's assertion of jurisdiction over crimes committed anywhere in the
world:

SECTION 17. Jurisdiction. — The State shall exercise jurisdiction over persons, whether military or civilian,
suspected or accused of a crime defined and penalized in this Act, regardless of where the crime is committed,
provided, any one of the following conditions is met:

(a) The accused is a Filipino citizen;

(b) The accused, regardless of citizenship or residence, is present in the Philippines; or

(c) The accused has committed the said crime against a Filipino citizen.

In the interest of justice, the relevant Philippine authorities may dispense with the investigation or prosecution of a
crime punishable under this Act if another court or international tribunal is already conducting the investigation or
undertaking the prosecution of such crime. Instead, the authorities may surrender or extradite suspected or accused
persons in the Philippines to the appropriate international court, if any, or to another State pursuant to the applicable
extradition laws and treaties.
No criminal proceedings shall be initiated against foreign nationals suspected or accused of having committed the
crimes defined and penalized in this Act if they have been tried by a competent court outside the Philippines in
respect of the same offense and acquitted, or having been convicted, already served their sentence.281

Republic Act No. 9851 expressly confers original and exclusive jurisdiction on regional trial courts over the offenses
it punishes. It also provides that this Court shall designate special courts to try these cases.282 Unlike the Rome
Statute, Republic Act No. 9851 dispenses with complementarity as a requirement for prosecution of crimes against
humanity.

Notably, Republic Act No. 9851 proclaims as state policy the protection of human rights of the accused, the victims,
and the witnesses, and provides for accessible and gender-sensitive avenues of redress:

The State shall guarantee persons suspected or accused of having committed grave crimes under international law
all rights necessary to ensure that their trial will he fair and prompt in strict accordance with national and
international law and standards for fair trial, It shall also protect victims, witnesses and their families, and provide
appropriate redress to victims and their families.. It shall ensure that the legal systems in place provide accessible
and gender-sensitive avenues of redress for victims of armed conflict[.]283

These State policies are operationalized in the following provisions:

SECTION 13. Protection of Victims and Witnesses. – In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law for the
protection of victims and witnesses, the following measures shall be undertaken:

(a) The Philippine court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and physiological
well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the court shall have regard of all
relevant factors, including age, gender and health, and the nature of the crime, in particular, but not limited
to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against children. The prosecutor shall
take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes. These measures
shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial;

(b) As an exception to the general principle of public hearings, the court may, to protect the victims and
witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera or allow the presentation of
evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures shall be implemented in the
case of the victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or is a witness, unless otherwise ordered by
the court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the victim or witness;

(c) Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the court shall permit their views and concerns
to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the court in
manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair and impartial trial.
Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims where the court
considers it appropriate in accordance with the established rules of procedure and evidence; and

(d) Where the disclosure of evidence or information pursuant to this Act may lead to the grave
endangerment of the security of a witness for his/her family, the prosecution may, for the purposes of any
proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial; withhold such evidence or information and
instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial to
or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and to a fair and impartial trial.

SECTION 14. Reparations to Victims. – In addition to existing provisions in Philippine law and procedural rules for
reparations to victims, the following measures shall be undertaken:

(a) The court shall follow the principles relating to the reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision, the court may, wither upon request
or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, loss and
injury to, or in respect of, victims and state the principles on which it is acting:
 (b) The court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations to,
or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation; and

(c) Before making an order under this section, the court may invite and shall take account of representations
from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims or other interested persons.

Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or international law.284

Chapter III285 of Republic Act No. 9851 defines war crimes, genocide, and other crimes against humanity, as
similarly characterized in the Rome Statute.

However, there are significant differences between the Rome Statute and Republic Act No. 9851.

Republic Act No. 9851 defines torture as "the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical,
mental, or psychological, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions."286 Meanwhile,
psychological means of torture are not covered by the Rome Statute. This is also a departure from Republic Act No.
9745, or the Anti-Torture Act of 2009, which limits torture to those "inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the
consent or acquiescence of a person in authority or agent of a person in authority"287 for specific purposes.

Republic Act No. 9851 clustered war crimes or crimes against international humanitarian law into three categories:
(1) an international armed conflict; (2) a non-international armed conflict; and (3) other serious violations of laws and
customs applicable in armed conflict. It then listed specific acts against protected persons or properties, or against
persons taking no active part in hostilities. The broader definition of war crimes under Republic Act No. 9851 as
compared with the Rome Statute is emphasized below:

SECTION 4. War Crimes. —- For the purpose of this Act, "war crimes" or "crimes against International Humanitarian
Law" means:

(a) In case of an international armed conflict, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant
Geneva Convention:

....

(6) Arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population or unlawful confinement;

(7) Taking of hostages;

(8) Compelling a prisoner of war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile power;
and

(9) Unjustifiable delay in the repatriation of prisoners of war or other protected persons.

(b) In case of a non-international armed conflict, serious violations of common Article 3 to the four (4)
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking
no active part in the hostilities, including members of the armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:

(1) Violence to life and person, in particular, willful killings, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

....

(3) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and
personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocol III in
conformity with international law;
 ....

(6) Launching an attack against works or installations containing dangerous forces in the knowledge
that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects, and
causing death or serious injury to body or health;

....

18) Killing or wounding a person in the knowledge that he/she is hors de combat, including a
combatant who, having laid down his/her arms or no longer having means of defense, has
surrendered at discretion;

(9) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or the military insignia and uniform of the
enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions or
other protective signs under International Humanitarian Law, resulting in death, serious personal
injury or capture;

....

(12) Killing, wounding or capturing an adversary by resort to perfidy;

....

(19) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization,
or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions or
a serious violation of common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions;

....

(21) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects
indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the
Geneva Convention and their Additional Protocols;

....

(24) Committing any of the following acts;

(i) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of fifteen (15) years into the
national armed forces;

(ii) Conscripting, enlisting or recruiting children under the age of eighteen (18) years into an
armed force or group other than the national armed forces; and

(iii) Using children under the age of eighteen (18) years to participate actively in hostilities;
and

....

Any person found guilty of committing any of the acts specified herein shall suffer the penalty provided under
Section 7 of this Act.288 (Emphasis supplied)

Acts of willful killing, as opposed to "murder" under the Rome Statute, deportation or forcible transfer of populations,
torture, and the sexual offenses under the third category of war crimes are also listed as "other crimes against
humanity" under Republic Act No. 9851.
Unlike the Rome Statute, Republic Act No. 9851 also adds or includes among other crimes against humanity
persecution against any individual, group, or collectivity based on their sexual orientation. Enforced or "involuntary
disappearance of persons" is also a punishable crime against humanity.289

Republic Act No. 9851 holds superiors liable as principals for crimes committed by subordinates under their effective
command and control.290 This provides for command responsibility "as a form of criminal complicity" that
jurisprudence has recognized:291

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors
it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency.

Relatedly, the legislature came up with Republic Act No. 98)1 to include command responsibility as a form of
criminal complicity in crimes against international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is thus the
substantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their position, still fail to take
all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to prevent or repress the commission of illegal acts or to
submit these matters to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.292 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

All told, the more restrictive Rome Statute may have even weakened the substantive protections already previously
afforded by Republic Act No. 9851. In such a case, it may well be beneficial to remove the confusion brought about
by maintaining a treaty whose contents are inconsistent with antecedent statutory provisions.

XXI

It has been opined that the principles of law in the Rome Statute are generally accepted principles of international
law. Assuming that this is true and considering the incorporation clause, the Philippines' withdrawal from the Rome
Statute would be a superfluity thus, ultimately ineffectual. The Philippines would remain bound by obligations
expressed in the Rome Statute:

[G]enerally accepted principles of international law form part of Philippine laws even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations of the Philippines.

....

Some customary international laws have been affirmed and embodied in treaties and conventions. A treaty
constitutes evidence of customary law if it is declaratory of customary law, or if it is intended to codify customary
law. In such a case, even a State not party to the treaty would be bound thereby. A treaty which is merely a formal
expression of customary international law is enforceable on all States because of their membership in the family of
nations. For instance, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to binding even on non-party States because
the provisions of the Convention are mostly codified rules of customary international law binding on all States even
before their codification into the Vienna Convention. Another example is the Law of the Sea, which consists mostly
of codified rules of customary international law, which have been universally observed even before the Law of the
Sea was ratified by participating States.

Corollarily, treaties may become the basis of customary international law. While States which are not parties to
treaties or international agreements are not bound thereby, such agreements, if widely accepted for years by many
States, may transform into customary international laws, in which case, they bind even non-signatory States.

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, this Court held that even in the absence of the Constitution, generally accepted
principles of international law remain part of the laws of the Philippines. During the interregnum, or the period after
the actual takeover of power by the revolutionary government in the Philippines, following the cessation of
resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution),
the 1973 Philippine Constitution was abrogated and there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that even during this period, the provisions of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the
Philippines is a signatory, remained in effect in the country. The Covenant and Declaration are based on generally
accepted principles of international law which are applicable in the Philippines even in the absence of a constitution,
as during the interregnum. Consequently, applying the provisions of the Covenant and the Declaration, the Filipino
people continued to enjoy almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights despite the abrogation of the 1973
Constitution.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court was adopted by 120 members of the United Nations (UN) on
17 July 1998. It entered into force on 1 July 2002, after 60 States became party to the Statute through ratification or
accession. The adoption of the Rome Statute fulfilled the international community's long-time dream of creating a
permanent international tribunal to try serious international crimes. The Rome Statute, which established an
international criminal court and formally declared genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity as
serious international crimes, codified generally accepted principles of international law, including customary
international laws. The principles of law embodied in the Rome Statute were already generally accepted principles
of international law even prior to the adoption of the Statute. Subsequently, the Rome Statute itself has been widely
accepted and, as of November 2010, it has been ratified by 114 states, 113 of which are members of the UN.

There are at present 192 members of the UN. Since 113 member states have already ratified the Rome Statute,
more than a majority of all the UN members have now adopted the Rome Statute as part of their municipal laws.
Thus, the Rome Statute itself is generally accepted by the Community of nations as constituting a body of generally
accepted principles of international law. The principles of law found in the Rome Statute constitute generally
accepted principles of international law enforceable in the Philippines under the Philippine Constitution. The
principles of law embodied in the Rome Statute are binding on the Philippines even if the Statute has yet to be
ratified by the Philippine Senate. In short, the principles of law enunciated in the Rome Statute are now part of
Philippine domestic law pursuant to Section 2 , Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.293 (Emphasis in the
original, citations omitted)

Chapter VII, Section 15 of Republic Act No. 9851 enumerates the applicable sources of international law that guide
its interpretation and implementation:

SECTION 15. Applicability of International Law. — In the application and interpretation of this Act, Philippine courts
shall be guided by the following sources:

(a) The 1948 Genocide Convention;

(b) The 1949 Geneva Conventions I-IV, their 1977 Additional Protocols I and II and their 2005 Additional
Protocol III;

(c) The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, its
First Protocol and its 1999 Second Protocol;

(d) The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and its 2000 optional Protocol on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict;

(e) The rules and principles of customary international law;

(f) The judicial decisions of international courts and trbunals;

(g) Relevant and applicable international human rights instruments;

(h) Other relevant international treaties and conventions ratified or acceded to by the Republic of the
Philippines; and

(i) Teachings of the most highly qualified publicists and authoritative commentaries on the foregoing sources
as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of international law.
As listed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Philippines also remained as state party to these international
conventions and human rights instruments:

(a) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;

(b) The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights;

(c) The Convention Against Torture;

(d) The Convention on the Discrimination Against Women; an Elimination of Discrimination; and

(e) The Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.294

Thus, petitioner’s concern that the country's withdrawal from the Rome Statute abjectly and reversibly subverts our
basic human rights appears to be baseless and purely speculative.

All told, the consolidated Petitions are dismissed for failing to demonstrate justiciability. While we commend the
zealousness of petitioners in seeking to ensure that the President acts within the bounds of the Constitution, they
had no standing to file their suits. We cannot grant the reliefs they seek. The unfolding of events, including the
International Criminal Court’s acknowledgment of withdrawal even before the lapse of one year from initial notice,
rendered the Petitions' moot, removing any potential relief from this Court’s sphere.

Mechanisms that safeguard human rights and protect against the grave offenses sought to be addressed by the
Rome Statute remain formally in place in this jurisdiction. Further, the International Criminal Court retains jurisdiction
over any and all acts committed by government actors until March 17, 2019. Hence, withdrawal from the Rome
Statute does not affect the liabilities of individuals charged before the International Criminal Court for acts committed
up to this date.

As guide for future cases, this Court recognizes that, as primary architect of foreign policy, the President enjoys a
degree of leeway to withdraw from treaties which are bona fide deemed contrary to the Constitution or our laws, and
to withdraw in keeping with the national policy adopted pursuant to the Constitution and our laws.

However, the President's discretion to withdraw is qualified by the extent of legislative involvement on the manner
by which a treaty was entered into or came into effect. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from treaties that
were entered into pursuant to the legislative intent manifested in prior laws, or subsequently affirmed by succeeding
laws. Treaties where Senate concurrence for accession is expressly premised on the same concurrence for
withdrawal likewise cannot be the subject of unilateral withdrawal. The imposition of Senate concurrence as a
condition may be made piecemeal, through individual. Senate resolutions pertaining to specific treaties, or through
encompassing legislative action, such as a law, a joint resolution by Congress, or a comprehensive Senate
resolution.

Ultimately, the exercise of discretion to withdraw from treaties and international agreements is susceptible to judicial
review in cases attended by grave abuse of discretion, as when there is no clear, definite, or reliable showing of
repugnance to the Constitution or our statutes, or in cases of inordinate unilateral withdrawal violating requisite
legislative involvement. Nevertheless, any attempt to invoke the power of judicial review must conform to the basic
requisites of justiciability. Such attempt can only proceed when attended by incidents demonstrating a properly
justiciable controversy.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated Petitions in G.R. Nos. 238875, 239483, and 240954 are DISMISSED for being
moot.
 2.) [ G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020 ]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC
SALIBAD Y MALLARI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Can the police conduct a warrantless int1usive search of a vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by
an anonymous informant? On this question, jurisprudence has vacillated over the years. The Court definitively
settles the issue once and for all.

In threshing out this issue, it must be remembered that in criminal prosecutions, including prosecutions for violations
of the law on dangerous drugs, our constitutional order does not adopt a stance of neutrality - the law is heavily in
favor of the accused. By constitutional design, the accused is afforded the presumption of innocence1 - it is for the
State to prove the guilt of the accused. Without the State discharging this burden, the Court is given no alternative
but to acquit the accused.

Moreover, if the process of gathering evidence against the accused is tainted by a violation of the accused's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is a most cherished and protected right under the Bill of Rights,
the evidence procured must be excluded, inevitably leading to the accused's acquittal.

Therefore, while the Court recognizes the necessity of adopting a decisive stance against the scourge of illegal
drugs, the eradication of illegal drugs in our society cannot be achieved by subverting the people's constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures. In simple terms, the Constitution does not allow the end to justify
the means. Otherwise, in eradicating one societal disease, a deadlier and more sinister one is cultivated - the
trampling of the people's fundamental, inalienable rights. The State's steadfastness in eliminating the drug menace
must be equally matched by its determination to uphold and defend the Constitution. This Court will not sit idly by
and allow the Constitution to be added to the mounting body count in the State's war on illegal drugs.

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal2 filed by the accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari
(accused-appellant Sapla), assailing the Decision3 dated April 24, 2018 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals
(CA)4 in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 09296, which affirmed the Judgment5 dated January 9, 2017 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jerry
Sapla y Guerrero a. k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari, finding accused-appellant Sapla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165,6 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002," as amended.

The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

The facts and antecedent proceedings, as narrated by the CA in the assailed Decision, and as culled from the
records of the case, are as follows:

In an Information dated 14 January 2014, the appellant was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No.
9165. The accusatory portion of the said Information reads:

"That at around 1:20 in the afternoon of January 10, 2014 at Talaca, Agbannawag, Tabuk City, Kalinga and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession, control and custody four (4) bricks of marijuana leaves, a dangerous [drug], with a total net weight
of 3,9563.111 grams and transport in transit through a passenger [jeepney] with Plate No. AYA 270 the said
marijuana without license, permit or authority from any appropriate government entity or agency.

CONTRARY TO LAW."
The next day, or on 15 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] was committed to the Bureau of Jail Management
and Penology (BJMP) at Tabuk City, Kalinga.

Upon his arraignment on 29 January 2014, [accused-appellant Sapla] pleaded "not guilty" to the crime charged
against him. In the court a quo's Pre-Trial Order dated 11 March 2014, the Prosecution and the Defense stipulated
their respective legal issues to be resolved by the court a quo. Also, the Prosecution identified and marked its pieces
of evidence, while the Defense made no proposals nor pre-mark[ed] any exhibits.

Trial ensued thereafter.

The Prosecution presented three (3) police officers as its witnesses, namely: 1) Police Officer (PO)2 Jim Mabiasan
(hereinafter referred to as PO2 Mabiasan), an officer assigned at the 3rd Maneuver Company, Regional Public
Safety Battalion (RPSB) at Tabuk City and was the seizing officer; 2) PO3 Lito Labbutan (hereinafter referred to
as PO3 Labbutan), an intelligence operative of Kalinga Police Provincial Office - Provincial Anti-Illegal Drugs Special
Operations Task Group (KPPO PAIDSOTG) who was tasked as the arresting officer; and 3) Police Senior Inspector
(PSI) Delon Ngoslab (hereinafter referred to as PSI Ngoslab), deputy company commander of the RPSB and team
leader of the joint checkpoint operation.

The evidence for the Prosecution established that on 10 January 2014, at around 11:30 in the morning, an officer on
duty at the RPSB office received a phone call from a concerned citizen, who informed the said office that a certain
male individual [would] be transpiring marijuana from Kalinga and into the Province of Isabela. PO2 Mabiasan then
relayed the information to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab, who subsequently called KPPO-PAIDSOTG for a
possible joint operation. Thereafter, as a standard operating procedure in drug operations, PO3 Labbutan, an
operative of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Afterwards, the
chief of KPPO-PAIDSOTG, PSI Baltazar Lingbawan (hereinafter referred to as PSI Lingbawan), briefed his
operatives on the said information. Later on, the said operatives of KPPO-PAIDSOTG arrived at the RPSB. PSI
Ngoslab immediately organized a team and as its team leader, assigned PO2 Mabiasan as the seizing officer, PO3
Labbutan as the arresting officer, while the rest of the police officers would provide security and backup. The said
officers then proceeded to the Talaca detachment.

At around 1:00 in the afternoon, the RPSB hotline received a text message which stated that the subject male
person who [would] transport marijuana [was] wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
[was] carrying a blue sack on board a passenger jeepney, with plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
Subsequently, a joint checkpoint was strategically organized at the Talaca command post.

The passenger jeepney then arrived at around 1:20 in the afternoon, wherein the police officers at the Talaca
checkpoint flagged down the said vehicle and told its driver to park on the side of the road. Officers Labbutan and
Mabiasan approached the jeepney and saw [accused-appellant Sapla] seated at the rear side of the vehicle. The
police officers asked [accused-appellant Sapla] if he [was] the owner of the blue sack in front of him, which the latter
answered in the affirmative. The said officers then requested [accused-appellant Sapla] to open the blue sack. After
[accused-appellant Sapla] opened the sack, officers Labbutan and Mabiasan saw four (4) bricks of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, wrapped in newspaper and an old calendar. PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested [accused-
appellant Sapla], informed him of the cause of his arrest and his constitutional rights in [the] Ilocano dialect. PO2
Mabiasan further searched [accused-appellant Sapla] and found one (I) LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter, PO2
Mabiasan seized the four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves and brought [them] to their office at the
Talaca detachment for proper markings.

At the RPSB's office, PO2 Mabiasan took photographs and conducted an inventory of the seized items, one (1) blue
sack and four (4) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves, wherein the same officer placed his signature on the
said items. Also, the actual conduct of inventory was witnessed by [accused-appellant Sapla], and by the following:
1) Joan K. Balneg from the Department of Justice; 2) Victor Fontanilla, an elected barangay official; and 3)
Geraldine G. Dumalig, as media representative. Thereafter, PO3 Labbutan brought the said [accused-appellant
Sapla] at the KPPO-PAIDSOTG Provincial Crime Laboratory Office at Camp Juan M. Duyan for further
investigation.

At the said office, PO2 Mabiasan personally turned over the seized items to the investigator of the case, PO2
Alexander Oman (hereinafter referred to as PO2 Oman), for custody, safekeeping and proper disposition. Also, PSI
Lingbawan wrote a letter addressed to the Provincial Chief, which requested that a chemistry examination be
conducted on the seized items. The following specimens were submitted for initial laboratory examination: 1) one (1)
blue sack with label J&N rice, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 2) one (1)
brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 998.376 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-
1" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 3) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 929.735
grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-2" PNP-TALACA and signature;" 4) one (1) brick of suspected dried
marijuana leaves, which weighed 1,045.629 grams, marked "2:30PM JAN. 10, 2014 EXH "A-3" PNP-TALACA and
signature;" 5) one (1) brick of suspected dried marijuana leaves, which weighed 979.371 grams, marked "2:30PM
JAN. 10, 2014 EXH. "A-4" PNP-TALACA and signature,"· The said initial examination revealed that the specimens
"A-1" to "A-4" with a total net weight of 3,9563.111 grams, yielded positive results for the presence of marijuana, a
dangerous drug. In addition, Chemistry Report No. D-003-2014 revealed that indeed the said specimens [did]
contain marijuana and that the said report indicated that the "specimen[s] submitted are retained in this laboratory
for future reference."

Also, further investigation revealed that [accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal his true identity by using a
fictitious name - Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators were able to contact [accused-appellant Sapla's] sister,
who duly informed the said investigators that [accused appellant Sapla's] real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.

On the other hand, the Defense presented [accused-appellant Sapla] as its sole witness.

The [accused-appellant Sapla] denied the charges against him and instead, offered a different version of the
incident. He claimed that on 8 January 2014, he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain relative named Tony Sibal. Two
(2) days later, [accused-appellant Sapla] boarded a jeepney, and left for Roxas, Isabela to visit his nephew. Upon
reaching Talaca checkpoint, police officers f1agged down the said jeepney in order to check its passenger[s']
baggages and cargoes. The police of1icers then found marijuana inside a sack and were looking for a person who
wore fatigue pants at that time. From the three (3) passengers who wore fatigue pants, the said police officers
identified him as the owner of the marijuana found inside the sack. [Accused-appellant Sapla] denied ownership of
the marijuana, and asserted that he had no baggage at that time. Thereafter, the police officers arrested [accused-
appellant Sapla] and brought him to the Talaca barracks, wherein the sack and marijuana bricks were shown to
him.7

The Ruling of the RTC

On January 9, 2017, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting accused-appellant Sapla for violating Section 5 of
R.A. 9165. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the crime. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds accused JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO, a.k.a. ERIC
SALIBAD Y MALLARI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The accused to pay the fine of Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos.

The 4 bricks of dried marijuana leaves be submitted to any authorized representative of the PDEA for proper
disposition.

SO ORDERED.8

Feeling aggrieved, accused-appellant Sapla filed an appeal before the CA.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied accused-appellant Sapla's appeal and affirmed the RTC 's Decision with
modifications. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 January 2017 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tabuk City, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 11-2014-C is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that
accused-appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay the fine
of P1,000,000.00.

SO ORDERED.9

The CA found that although the search and seizure conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was without a search
warrant, the same was lawful as it was a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle. The CA held that the
essential requisite of probable cause was present, justifying the warrantless search and seizure.

Hence, the instant appeal.

The Issue

Stripped to its core, the essential issue in the instant case is whether there was a valid search and seizure
conducted by the police officers. The answer to this critical question determines whether there is enough evidence
to sustain accused-appellant Sapla's conviction under Section 5 of R.A. 9165.

The Court's Ruling

The instant appeal is impressed with merit. The Court finds for accused-appellant Sapla and immediately orders his
release from incarceration.

The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

As eloquently explained by the Court in People v. Tudtud (Tudtud),10 "the Bill of Rights is the bedrock of
constitutional government. If people are stripped naked of their rights as human beings, democracy cannot survive
and government becomes meaningless. This explains why the Bill of Rights, contained as it is in Article III of the
Constitution, occupies a position of primacy in the fundamental law way above the articles on governmental
power."11

And in the Bill of Rights, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is "at the top of the hierarchy of
rights, next only to, if not on the same plane as, the right to life, liberty and property, x x x for the right to personal
security which, along with the right to privacy, is the foundation of the right against unreasonable search and
seizure."12

The right of the people against unreasonable searches and seizures is found in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Hence, as a rule, a search and seizure operation conducted by the authorities is reasonable only when a court
issues a search warrant after it has determined the existence of probable cause through the personal examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses presented before the court, with the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized particularly described.

Because of the sacrosanct position occupied by the right against unreasonable searches and seizures in the
hierarchy of rights, any deviation or exemption from the aforementioned rule is not favored and is strictly construed
against the government.

Valid Warrantless Searches and Seizures

There are, however, instances wherein searches are reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant, taking
into account the "uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence
or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched,
and the character of the articles procured."13

The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are:

(1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(2) seizure of evidence in plain view;

(3) search of a moving vehicle;

(4) consented warrantless search;

(5) customs search;

(6) stop and frisk; and

(7) exigent and emergency circumstances.14

Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non-Applicability in the Instant Case

In upholding the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the authorities, the RTC and CA considered the
police operation as a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to
routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection."15

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."16

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case is a search of a moving
vehicle. The situation presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado17 (Comprado) is controlling inasmuch as the facts of the said case
are virtually identical to the instant case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the authorities as regards an alleged courier of
marijuana who had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to
Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually called the authorities and informed them that the alleged drug courier had
boarded a bus with body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added
that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." With this
information, the police officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the authorities did in the instant case. Afterwards,
upon seeing the bus bearing the said body and plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar to the
instant case, the said vehicle was flagged down. The police officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the
description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack placed on his lap.
The man was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so, the police officers saw a transparent
cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In
this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person."18 The Court added that "in search
of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that
the information relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such
that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given
by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus."19

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the search conducted
was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle.
The target of the search was the person who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB
Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the
floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the
target person to ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such
vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint in order to search the target person."20

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Probable Cause as an Indispensable Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive Warrantless Search of a Moving
Vehicle

In any case, even if the search conducted can be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle, the operation
undertaken by the authorities in the instant case cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of a moving vehicle.

In People v. Manago,21 the Court, through Senior Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, explained that a
variant of searching moving vehicles without a warrant may entail the setting up of military or police checkpoints.
The setting up of such checkpoints is not illegal per se for as long as its necessity is justified by the exigencies of
public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists.

However, in order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to be non-violative of an individual's right against
unreasonable searches, the search must be limited to the following: (a) where the officer merely draws aside the
curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds; (b) where the officer simply looks into a
vehicle; (c) where the officer flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (d) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.22

Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless searches in
the absence of probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, as opposed to a
mere routine inspection, "such a warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers
conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched."23

Simply stated, a more extensive and intrusive search that goes beyond a mere visual search of the vehicle
necessitates probable cause on the part of the apprehending officers.

It was in Valmonte v. de Villa24 ( Valmonte) where the Court first held that vehicles can be stopped at a checkpoint
and extensively searched only when there is "probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of the men at the
checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents of the vehicle are or have been instruments of
some offense."25 This doctrine was directly adopted from United States jurisprudence, specifically from the
pronouncement of the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) in Dyke v. Taylor.26

As subsequently explained by the Court in Caballes v. Court of Appeals,27 probable cause means that there is the
existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or
subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched:

x x x a reasonable ground of suspicion supp01ied by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a

cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of
such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to
seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each
case.28

Sheer Unverified Information from an Anonymous Informant does not engender Probable Cause on the part of the
Authorities that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search of a Moving Vehicle

As readily admitted by the CA, the singular circumstance that engendered probable cause on the part of the police
officers was the information they received through the RPSB Hotline (via text message) from an anonymous person.
Because of this information, the CA held that there was probable cause on the part of the police to conduct an
intrusive search.29

Does the mere reception of a text message from an anonymous person suffice to create probable cause that
enables the authorities to conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a search warrant? The answer is a
resounding no.

The Court has already held with unequivocal clarity that in situations involving warrantless searches and seizures,
"law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how
reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will
arouse suspicion."30

A. United States Jurisprudence on Probable Cause vis-a-vis Tipped Information

Considering that the doctrine that an extensive warrantless search of a moving vehicle necessitates probable cause
was adopted by the Court from United States jurisprudence, examining United States jurisprudence can aid in a
fuller understanding on the existence of probable cause vis-a-vis tipped information received from confidential
informants.

In the 1964 case of Aguilar v. Texas,31 the SCOTUS delved into the constitutional requirements for obtaining a
state search warrant. In the said case, two Houston police officers applied to a local Justice of the Peace for a
warrant to search for narcotics in the petitioner's home based on "reliable information" received from a supposed
credible person that the "heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being
kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law."32

In invalidating the search warrant, the SCOTUS held that a two pronged test must be satisfied in order to determine
whether an informant's tip is sufficient in engendering probable cause, i.e., (1) the informant's "basis of knowledge"
must be revealed and (2) sufficient facts to establish either the informant's "veracity" or the "reliability" of the
informant's report must be provided:

Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information, and need not reflect the direct personal observations of
the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying
circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some
of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be
disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U. S. 528, was "credible" or his information "reliable."33

Subsequently, in the 1983 case of Illinois v. Gates,34 the police received an anonymous letter alleging that the
respondents were engaged in selling drugs and that the car of the respondents would be loaded with drugs. Agents
of the Drug Enforcement Agency searched the respondents' car, which contained marijuana and other contraband
items.

In finding that there was probable cause, the SCOTUS adopted the totality of circumstances test and held that
tipped information may engender probable cause under "a balanced assessment of the relative weights of all the
various indicia of reliability (and unreliability) attending an informant's tip"35 In the said case, the SCOTUS found
that the details of the informant's tip were corroborated by independent police work.
The SCOTUS emphasized however that "standing alone, the anonymous letter sent to the Bloomingdale Police
Department would not provide the basis for a magistrate's determination that there was probable cause to believe
contraband would be found in the Gateses' car and home. x x x Something more was required, then, before a
magistrate could conclude that there was probable cause to believe that contraband would be found in the Gateses'
home and car."36

B. The Line of Philippine Jurisprudence on the Inability of a Solitary Tip to Engender Probable Cause

As early as 1988, our own Court had ruled that an extensive warrantless search and seizure conducted on the sole
basis of a confidential tip is tainted with illegality. In People v. Aminnudin,37 analogous to the instant case, the
authorities acted upon an information that the accused would be arriving from Iloilo on board a vessel, the M/V
Wilcon 9. The authorities waited for the vessel to arrive, accosted the accused, and inspected the latter's bag
wherein bundles of marijuana leaves were found. The Court declared that the search and seizure was illegal,
holding that, at the time of his apprehension, Aminnudin was not "committing a crime nor was it shown that he was
about to do so or that he had just done so. x x x To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension."38

Subsequently, in People v. Cuizon,39 the Court, through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that the
warrantless search and subsequent arrest of the accused were deemed illegal because "the prosecution failed to
establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had
committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made."40 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court found that the authorities merely relied on "the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning."41 The Court characterized the tip received by the authorities from an anonymous informant
as "hearsay information"42 that cannot engender probable cause.

In People v. Encinada,43 the authorities acted solely on an informant's tip and stopped the tricycle occupied by the
accused and asked the latter to alight. The authorities then rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs
that were loaded inside the tricycle. The authorities then found a package of marijuana inserted between the two
chairs. The Court, again through former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, held that "raw intelligence"44 was not
enough to justify the warrantless search and seizure. "The prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious
behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating
a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances."45

Likewise analogous to the instant case is People v. Aruta46 (Aruta) where an informant had told the police that a
certain "Aling Rosa" would be transporting illegal drugs from Baguio City by bus. Hence, the police officers situated
themselves at the bus terminal. Eventually, the informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her
as "Aling Rosa." Subsequently, the authorities apprehended the woman and inspected her bag which contained
marijuana leaves.

In finding that there was an unlawful warrantless search, the Court in Aruta held that "it was only when the informant
pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out
as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive
finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for
them to suspect that accused-appellant was committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the
informant."47 Hence, the Court held that the search conducted on the accused therein based solely on the pointing
finger of the informant was "a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure."48

Of more recent vintage is People v. Cogaed49 (Cogaed), which likewise involved a search conducted through a
checkpoint put up after an "unidentified civilian informer" shared information to the authorities that a person would
be transporting marijuana.

In finding that there was no probable cause on the part of the police that justified a warrantless search, the Court,
through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, astutely explained that in cases finding sufficient probable
cause for the conduct of warrantless searches, "the police officers using their senses observed facts that led to the
suspicion. Seeing a man with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, based on their experience, is
indicative of a person who uses dangerous and illicit drugs."50 However, the Court reasoned that the case of the
accused was different because "he was simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There
was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion
was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver who signaled to the police that
Cogaed was 'suspicious.'"51

In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in engendering probable cause that justifies a valid warrantless search, "[i]t is the
police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic
right to security of one's person and effects."52 The Court explained that "the police officer, with his or her personal
knowledge, must observe the (acts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act," and not merely rely on the information
passed on to him or her.53

Adopting former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin's Dissenting Opinion in Esquillo v. People,54 the Court in Cogaed
stressed that reliance on only one suspicious circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable
search.55 The Court emphasized that the matching of information transmitted by an informant "still remained only
as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a
valid search warrant."56

Subsequently, in Veridiano v. People57 (Veridiano), a concerned citizen informed the police that the accused was
on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. Based on this tip, the authorities set up a checkpoint. The police
officers at the checkpoint personally knew the appearance of the accused. Eventually, the police chanced upon the
accused inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. The jeepney was flagged down and the
police asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to
check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered
from the accused a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.

In finding the warrantless search invalid, the Court, again through Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen,
held that the accused was a "mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police officers
reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. x x x There was no evidence to show that the
police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious."58

The Court correctly explained that "law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information.
A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence
of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion."59

A year after Veridiano, the Court decided the case of Comprado. As in the instant case, the authorities alleged that
they possessed reasonable cause to conduct a warrantless search solely on the basis of information relayed by an
informant.

The Court held in Comprado that the sole information relayed by an informant was not sufficient to incite a genuine
reason to conduct an intrusive search on the accused. The Court explained that "no overt physical act could be
properly attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime."60

The Court emphasized that there should be the "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which,
taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity."61 In the said case, as in the instant case, the
accused was just a passenger carrying his bag. "There is nothing suspicious much less criminal in said act.
Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting officers to believe that accused-appellant
was in possession of marijuana."62

Recently, the Court unequivocally declared in People v. Yanson63 (Yanson) that a solitary tip hardly suffices as
probable cause that warrants the conduct of a ·warrantless intrusive search and seizure.

In Yanson, which involves an analogous factual milieu as in the instant case, "the Municipal Police Station of M'lang,
North Cotabato received a radio message about a silver gray Isuzu pickup - with plate number 619 and carrying
three (3) people - that was transporting marijuana from Pikit. The Chief of Police instructed the alert team to set up a
checkpoint on the riverside police outpost along the road from Matalam to M'lang."64

Afterwards, "[a]t around 9:30 a.m., the tipped vehicle reached the checkpoint and was stopped by the team of police
officers on standby. The team leader asked the driver about inspecting the vehicle. The driver alighted and, at an
officer's prodding, opened the pickup's hood. Two (2) sacks of marijuana were discovered beside the engine."65

In the erudite ponencia of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen, the Court held that, in determining
whether there is probable cause that warrants an extensive or intrusive warrantless searches of a moving vehicle,
"bare suspicion is never enough. While probable cause does not demand moral certainty, or evidence sufficient to
justify conviction, it requires the existence of 'a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.'"66

The Court explained that in prior cases wherein the Court validated warrantless searches and seizures on the basis
of tipped information, "the seizures and arrests were not merely and exclusively based on the initial tips. Rather,
they were prompted by other attendant circumstances. Whatever initial suspicion they had from being tipped was
progressively heightened by other factors, such as the accused's failure to produce identifying documents, papers
pertinent to the items they were carrying, or their display of suspicious behavior upon being approached."67 In such
cases, the finding of probable cause was premised "on more than just the initial information relayed by assets. It
was the confluence of initial tips and a myriad of other occurrences that ultimately sustained probable
cause."68 However, the case of Yanson was markedly different from these other cases. Just as in the instant case,
the police officers proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the basis of a solitary tip:

This case is markedly different. The police officers here proceeded to effect a search, seizure, and arrest on the
basis of a solitary tip: the radio message that a certain pickup carrying three (3) people was transporting marijuana
from Pikit. When the accused's vehicle (ostensibly matching this description) reached the checkpoint, the arresting
officers went ahead to initiate a search asking the driver about inspecting the vehicle. Only upon this insistence did
the driver alight. It was also only upon a police officer's further prodding did he open the hood.

The records do not show, whether on the basis of indubitably established facts or the prosecution's mere
allegations, that the three (3) people on board the pickup were acting suspiciously, or that there were other odd
circumstances that could have prompted the police officers to conduct an extensive search. Evidently, the police
officers relied solely on the radio message they received when they proceeded to inspect the

vehicle.69

In ruling that the sole reliance on tipped information, on its own, furnished by informants cannot produce probable
cause, the Court held that "[e]xclusive reliance on information tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the existence of such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place to be searched."70

As correctly explained by the Court in Yanson, "[t]o maintain otherwise would be to sanction frivolity, opening the
floodgates to unfounded searches, seizures, and arrests that may be initiated by sly informants."71

And very recently, on September 4, 2019, the Court, through former Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, promulgated
its Decision in People v. Gardon-Mentoy72 (Gardon-Mentoy). In the said case, police officers had set up a
checkpoint on the National Highway in Barangay Malatgao, Narra, Palawan based on a tip from an unidentified
informant that the accused-appellant would be transporting dangerous drugs on board a shuttle van. Eventually, the
authorities flagged down the approaching shuttle van matching the description obtained from the informant and
conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle, yielding the discovery of a block-shaped bundle
containing marijuana.

In holding that the warrantless search and seizure were without probable cause, the Court held that a tip, in the
absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming from the personal knowledge of the
searching officers, was not yet actionable for purposes of conducting a search:
Without objective facts being presented here by which we can test the basis for the officers' suspicion about the
block-shaped bundle contained marijuana, we should not give unquestioned acceptance and belief to such
testimony. The mere subjective conclusions of the officers concerning the existence of probable cause is never
binding on the court whose duty remains to "independently scrutinize the objective facts to determine the existence
of probable cause," for, indeed, "the courts have never hesitated to overrule an officer's determination of probable
cause when none exists."

But SPO2 Felizarte also claimed that it was about then when the accused-appellant panicked and tried to get down
from the van, impelling him and PO1 Rosales to restrain her. Did such conduct on her part, assuming it did occur,
give sufficient cause to search and to arrest?

For sure, the transfer made by the accused-appellant of the block shaped bundle from one bag to another should
not be cited to justify the search if the search had earlier commenced at the moment PO1 Rosales required her to
produce her baggage. Neither should the officers rely on the still-unverified tip from the unidentified informant,
without more, as basis to initiate the search of the personal effects. The officers were themselves well aware that
the tip, being actually double hearsay as to them, called for independent verification as its substance and reliability,
and removed the foundation for them to rely on it even under the circumstances then obtaining. In short, the tip, in
the absence of other circumstances that would confirm their suspicion coming to the knowledge of the searching or
arresting officer, was not yet actionable for purposes of effecting an arrest or conducting a search.73

The Court is not unaware that in the recent case of Saluday v. People74 (Saluday), a bus inspection conducted by
Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint was considered valid. However, in the said case, the authorities merely
conducted a "visual and minimally intrusive inspection"75 of the accused's bag-by simply lifting the bag that
noticeably appeared to have contained firearms. This is markedly dissimilar to the instant case wherein the search
conducted entailed the probing of the contents of the blue sack allegedly possessed by accused-appellant Sapla.

Moreover, in Saluday, the authorities never received nor relied on sheer information relayed by an informant, unlike
in the instant case. In Saluday, the authorities had relied on their own senses in determining probable cause, i.e.,
having personally lifted the bag revealing that a firearm was inside, as well as having seen the very suspicious looks
being given by the accused therein.

Further, in Saluday, the Court laid down the following conditions in allowing a reasonable search of a bus while in
transit: (1) the manner of the search must be least intrusive; (2) the search must not be discriminatory; (3) as to the
purpose of the search, it must be confined to ensuring public safety; and (4) the courts must be convinced that
precautionary measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.76

It must be stressed that none of these conditions exists in the instant case.

First, unlike in Saluday wherein the search conducted was merely visual and minimally intrusive, the search
undertaken on accused-appellant Sapla was extensive, reaching inside the contents of the blue sack that he
allegedly possessed.

Second, the search was directed exclusively towards accused appellant Sapla; it was discriminatory. Unlike
in Saluday where the bags of the other bus passengers were also inspected, the search conducted in the instant
case focused exclusively on accused-appellant Sapla.

Third, there is no allegation that the search was conducted with the intent of ensuring public safety. At the most, the
search was conducted to apprehend a person who, as relayed by an anonymous informant, was transporting illegal
drugs.

Lastly, the Court is not convinced that sufficient precautionary measures were undertaken by the police to ensure
that no evidence was planted against accused-appellant Sapla, considering that the inventory, photographing, and
marking of the evidence were not immediately conducted after the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla at the
scene of the incident.

C. The Divergent Line of Jurisprudence

At this juncture, the Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of jurisprudence holding that information received by
the police provides a valid basis for conducting a warrantless search,77 tracing its origins to the 1990 cases
of People v. Tangliben78 (Tangliben) and People v. Maspil, Jr.79 (Maspil, Jr.). Several of the cases following this
line of jurisprudence also heavily rely on the 1992 case of People v. Bagista80 (Bagista).

It is high time for a re-examination of this divergent line of jurisprudence.

In Tangliben, acting on information supplied by informers that dangerous drugs would be transported through a bus,
the authorities conducted a surveillance operation at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando,
Pampanga. At 9:30 in the evening, the police noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting
suspiciously. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag. The police found marijuana leaves wrapped
in a plastic wrapper inside the bag.

It must be stressed that in Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct the warrantless search did not
rest solely on the tipped information supplied by the informants. The authorities, using their own personal
observation, saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.

Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases upholding the validity of a warrantless search and seizure on the
basis of a confidential tip, the police did not rely exclusively on information sourced from the informant. There were
overt acts and other circumstances personally observed by the police that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the
holding that an inclusive warrantless search can be conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information is far from
being an established and inflexible doctrine.

To cite but a few examples, in the early case of People v. Malmstdedt,81 the authorities set up a checkpoint in
response to some reports that a Caucasian man was coming from Sagada with dangerous drugs in his possession.
At the checkpoint, the officers intercepted a bus and inspected it. Upon reaching the accused, the police personally
observed that there was a bulge on the accused's waist. This prompted the officer to ask for the accused's
identification papers, which the accused failed to provide. The accused was then asked to reveal what was bulging
on his waist, which turned out to be hashish, a derivative of marijuana. In this case, the Court ruled that the probable
cause justifying the warrantless search was based on the personal observations of the authorities and not solely on
the tipped information:

It was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection,
that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when
ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity.82

In People v. Tuazon,83 the authorities did not solely rely on confidential information that the accused would deliver
an unspecified amount of shabu using a Gemini car bearing plate number PFC 411. Upon conducting a visual
search of the motor vehicle that was flagged down by the authorities, the police personally saw a gun tucked on the
accused's waist. Moreover, the accused was not able to produce any pertinent document related to the firearm. This
was what prompted the police to order the accused to alight from the vehicle.

In People v. Quebral,84 the authorities did not solely rely on the police informer's report that two men and a woman
on board an owner type jeep with a specific plate number would deliver shabu, a prohibited drug, at a Petron
Gasoline Station in Balagtas, Bulacan. The authorities conducted a surveillance operation and personally saw the
accused handing out a white envelope to her co-accused, a person included in the police's drug watch list.

In People v. Saycon,85 in holding that the authorities had probable cause in conducting an intrusive warrantless
search, the Court explained that probable cause was not engendered solely by the receipt of confidential
information. Probable cause was produced because a prior test-buy was conducted by the authorities, which
confirmed that the accused was engaged in the transportation and selling of shabu.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,86 the person subjected to a warrantless search and seizure was
personally observed by the police to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he
appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he
tried to resist. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost the accused-appellant to determine
if he was actually "high" on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information,
this area was a haven for drug addicts.87

In People v. Solayao,88 "police officers noticed a man who appeared drunk. This man was also 'wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit.' Upon seeing the police, the man fled. His flight added to the suspicion. After
stopping him the police officers found an unlicensed 'homemade firearm' in his possession."89

In People v. Lo Ho Wing,90 the authorities did not rely on an anonymous, unverified tip. Deep penetration agents
were recruited to infiltrate the crime syndicate. An undercover agent actually met and conferred with the accused,
personally confirming the criminal activities being planned by the accused. In fact, the agent regularly submitted
reports of his undercover activities on the criminal syndicate.

The jurisprudence cited by the CA in holding that the anonymous text message sent to the RPSB Hotline sufficed to
engender probable cause on the part of the authorities, i.e., People v. Tampis91 (Tampis), stated that "tipped
information is - sufficient to provide probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure."92

However, in Tampis, as in the aforementioned jurisprudence, the police did not merely rely on information relayed
by an informant. Prior to the warrantless search conducted, the police actually "conducted a surveillance on the
intended place and saw both appellants packing the suspected marijuana leaves into a brown bag with the markings
'Tak Tak Tak Ajinomoto' inscribed on its side."93 In Tampis, the authorities were able to personally witness the
accused packing illegal drugs into the brown bag prior to the warrantless search and seizure.

Moreover, it is observed that when the Court in Tampis held that "tipped information is sufficient to provide probable
cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure,"94 the Court cited the case of Aruta as its basis. However, the
Court in Aruta did not hold that tipped information in and of itself is sufficient to create probable cause. In fact,
in Aruta, as already previously explained, despite the fact that the apprehending officers already had prior
knowledge from their informant regarding Aruta's alleged activities, the warrantless search conducted on Aruta was
deemed unlawful for lack of probable cause.

The earliest case decided by the Court which upheld the validity of an extensive warrantless search
based exclusively on a solitary tip is the case of Maspil, Jr., wherein the authorities set up a checkpoint, flagged
down the jeep driven by the accused, and examined the contents thereof on the sole basis of information provided
by confidential informers.

In justifying the validity of the warrantless search, the Court in Maspil, Jr. depended heavily on the early case
of Valmonte, which delved into the constitutionality of checkpoints set up in Valenzuela City.

It bears stressing that the Court in Valmonte never delved into the validity of warrantless searches and seizures on
the pure basis of confidential information. Valmonte did not hold that in checkpoints, intrusive searches can be
conducted on the sole basis of tipped information. Valmonte merely stated that checkpoints are not illegal per
se.95 In fact, in Valmonte, the Court stressed that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot
be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search."96

Hence, the jurisprudential support of the Court's holding in Maspil, Jr. is, at best, frail.

With respect to Bagista, the Court held therein that the authorities had probable cause to search the accused's
belongings without a search warrant based solely on information received from a confidential informant.

In Bagista, the Court relied heavily on the SCOTUS' decision in Carroll vs. U.S97 (Carroll) in holding that "[w]ith
regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought."98

Does Carroll support the notion that an unverified tipped information engenders probable cause? In Carroll, which
upheld the validity of a warrantless search of a vehicle used to transport contraband liquor in Michigan, the
SCOTUS found that the warrantless search was justified in light of the following circumstances:
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal prohibition agents, and one
Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car was going westward on the highway between Detroit and
Grand Rapids at a point 16 miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as
follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand Rapids. Three men came to that
apartment, a man named Kruska and the two defendants, Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as
one Stafford, working in the Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey.
The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end of Grand Rapids to get the
liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska
came back and said they could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would deliver it
the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of
which Cronenwett then identified, a[s] did Scully. The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the
evidence disclosed no explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real
character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first name when arrested in
December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to
Grand Rapids, looking for violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On
the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same Oldsmobile Roadster, passed
Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch,
that the Carroll boys had passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see
where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to Detroit, but there lost trace of them.
On the 15th of December, some two months later, Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with
Peterson, the State officer, were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll met
and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to Grand Rapids. The government
agents turned their car and followed the defendants to a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they
stopped them and searched the car.

xxxx

We know in this way that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and that Detroit and its neighborhood along
the Detroit River, which is the International Boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into
this country spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. It is obvious from the evidence that the prohibition
agents were engaged in a regular patrol along the important highways from Detroit to Grand Rapids to stop and
seize liquor carried in automobiles. They knew or had convincing evidence to make them believe that the Carroll
boys, as they called them, were so-called "bootleggers" in Grand Rapids, i.e., that they were engaged in plying the
unlawful trade of selling such liquor in that city. The officers had soon after noted their going from Grand Rapids half
way to Detroit, and attempted to follow them to that city to see where they went, but they escaped observation. Two
months later, these officers suddenly met the same men on their way westward, presumably from Detroit. The
partners in the original combination to sell liquor in Grand Rapids were together in the same automobile they had
been in the night when they tried to furnish the whisky to the officers which was thus identified as part of the firm
equipment. They were coming from the direction of the great source of supply for their stock to Grand Rapids, where
they plied their trade. That the officers, when they saw the defendants, believed that they were carrying liquor we
can have no doubt, and we think it is equally clear that they had reasonable cause for thinking so. Emphasis is put
by defendant's counsel on the statement made by one of the officers that they were not looking for defendants at the
particular time when they appeared. We do not perceive that it has any weight. As soon as they did appear, the
officers were entitled to use their reasoning faculties upon all the facts of which they had previous knowledge in
respect to the defendants.99

Hence, in Carroll, the probable cause justifying the warrantless search was not founded on information relayed by
confidential informants; there were no informants involved in the case whatsoever. Probable cause existed because
the state authorities themselves had personally interacted with the accused, having engaged with them in an
undercover transaction.

Therefore, just as in Maspil, Jr., the jurisprudential support upon which Bagista heavily relies is not strong.

It is also not lost on the Court that in Bagista, the Court did not decide with unanimity.

In his Dissenting Opinion in Bagista, Associate Justice Teodoro R. Padilla expressed the view that "the information
alone received by the NARCOM agents, without other suspicious circumstances surrounding the accused, did not
give rise to a probable cause justifying the warrantless search made on the bag of the accused." In explaining his
dissent, Justice Padilla correctly explained that:

In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the bag of the accused on the basis alone of an information they
received that a woman, 23 years of age with naturally curly hair, and 5'2" or 5'3" in height would be transporting
marijuana. The extensive search was indiscriminately made on all the baggages of all passengers of the bus where
the accused was riding, whether male or female, and whether or not their physical appearance answered the
description of the suspect as described in the alleged information. If there really was such an information, as
claimed by the NARCOM agents, it is a perplexing thought why they had to search the baggages of ALL
passengers, not only the bags of those who appeared to answer the description of the woman suspected of carrying
marijuana.

Moreover, the accused was not at all acting suspiciously when the NARCOM agents searched her bag, where they
allegedly found the marijuana.

From the circumstances of the case at bar, it would seem that the NARCOM agents were only fishing for evidence
when they searched the baggages of all the passengers, including that of the accused. They had no probable cause
to reasonably believe that the accused was the woman carrying marijuana alluded to in the information they
allegedly received. Thus, the warrantless search made on the personal effects of herein accused on the basis of
mere information, without more, is to my mind bereft of probable cause and therefore, null and void. It follows that
the marijuana seized in the course of such warrantless search was inadmissible in evidence.100

It is said that dissenting opinions often appeal to the intelligence of a future age.101 For Justice Padilla's Dissenting
Opinion, such age has come. This holding, which is reflected in the recent tide of jurisprudence, must now fully find
the light of day as it is more in line with the basic constitutional precept that the Bill of Rights occupies a position of
primacy in the fundamental law, hovering above the articles on governmental power. The Court's holding that tipped
information, on its own, cannot engender probable cause is guided by the principle that the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures sits at the very top of the hierarchy of rights, wherein any allowable
transgression of such right is subject to the most stringent of scrutiny.

Hence, considering the foregoing discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that
exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search - which include both long-standing and the most recent
jurisprudence - should be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.

Adopting a contrary rule would set an extremely dangerous and perilous precedent wherein, on the sheer basis of
an unverified information passed along by an alleged informant, the authorities are given the unbridled license to
undertake extensive and highly intrusive searches, even in the absence of any overt circumstance that engenders a
reasonable belief that an illegal activity is afoot.

This fear was eloquently expressed by former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in People v. Montilla.102 In holding that law and jurisprudence require stricter grounds for valid arrests and
searches, former Chief Justice Panganiban explained that allowing warrantless searches and seizures based on
tipped information alone places the sacred constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures in great
jeopardy:

x x x Everyone would be practically at the mercy of so-called informants, reminiscent of the Makapilis during the
Japanese occupation. Any one whom they point out to a police officer as a possible violator of the law could then be
subject to search and possible arrest. This is placing limitless power upon informants who will no longer be required
to affirm under oath their accusations, for they can always delay their giving of tips in order to justify warrantless
arrests and searches. Even law enforcers can use this as an oppressive tool to conduct searches without warrants,
for they can always claim that they received raw intelligence information only on the day or afternoon before. This
would clearly be a circumvention of the legal requisites for validly effecting an arrest or conducting a search and
seizure. Indeed, the majority's ruling would open loopholes that would allow unreasonable arrests, searches and
seizures.103

It is not hard to imagine the horrid scenarios if the Court were to allow intrusive warrantless searches and seizures
on the solitary basis of unverified, anonymous tips.
Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated information to the police.
Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate another by simply
giving false information to the police, allowing the latter to invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person
on the sole basis of a bogus tip.

On the side of the authorities, unscrupulous law enforcement agents can easily justify the infiltration of a citizen's
vehicle or residence, violating his or her right to privacy, by merely claiming that raw intelligence was received, even
if there really was no such information received or if the information received was fabricated.

Simply stated, the citizen's sanctified and heavilv-protected right against unreasonable search and seizure will be at
the mercy a phony tips. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures will be rendered hollow and
meaningless. The Court cannot sanction such erosion of the Bill of Rights.

D. The Absence of Probable Cause in the Instant Case

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police merely adopted the unverified and
unsubstantiated suspicion of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. Apart
from the information passed on to them, the police simply had no reason to reasonably believe that the passenger
vehicle contained an item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.

What further militates against the finding that there was sufficient probable cause on the part of the police to conduct
an intrusive search is the fact that the information regarding the description of the person alleged to be transporting
illegal drugs, i.e., wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack, was
relayed merely through a text message from a completely anonymous person. The police did not even endeavor to
inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain in any manner whether the
information coming from the complete stranger was credible. After receiving this anonymous text message, without
giving any second thought, the police accepted the unverified information as gospel truth and immediately
proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. To be sure, information coming from a complete and anonymous
stranger, without the police officers undertaking even a semblance of verification, on their own, cannot reasonably
produce probable cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive search.

In fact, as borne from the cross-examination of PO3 Mabiasan, the authorities did not even personally receive and
examine the anonymous text message. The contents of the text message were only relayed to them by a duty
guard, whose identity the police could not even recall:

Q x x x [W]ho received the information, was it you or another person, Mr. Witness?

A The duty guard, sir.

Q And usually now, informations (sic) is usually transmitted and text (sic) to the duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you produce the transcript of the text message (sic) can you write in a piece of paper, Mr. Witness?

A Our duty guard just informed us the information, sir.

Q So the text was not preserve (sic), Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Who is you duty guard, Mr. Witness?

A I cannot remember, sir.104

Simply stated, the information received through text message was not only hearsay evidence; it is double hearsay.
Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself, tipped information received by the authorities through the duty
guard was unwritten and unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by a
police station that shall be duly considered by the authorities should be properly written in a log book or police
blotter:

Q Is it not an (sic) Standard Operating Procedure that any information received by the Police Stations or a
detachment properly written in a log book or written in a Police blotter, that is the Standard Operating Procedure,
correct, Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q It was not written the information that you received, correct, Mr. Witness?

A Not at that time, sir.105

Further, it does not escape the attention of the Court that, as testified to by PSI Ngoslab on cross-examination, the
mobile phone which received the anonymous person's text message was not even an official government issued
phone.106 From the records of the case, it is unclear as to who owned or possessed the said phone used as the
supposed official hotline of the RPSB Office. Furthermore, PSI Ngoslab testified that he was not even sure whether
the said official hotline still existed.107

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise from double
hearsay evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and prudent man will
surely not believe that an offense has been committed and that the item sought in connection with said offense are
in the place to be searched based solely on the say-so of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text
message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete stranger.

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search, considering that
the police officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous
tip, the warrantless search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving
vehicle.

The Inapplicability of The Other Instances of Reasonable Warrantless Searches and Seizures

Neither are the other instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures applicable in the instant case.

Without need of elaborate explanation, the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla was not incidental to a
lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that precedes the search, which is not the case here. Further, the
prosecution has not alleged and proven that there was a seizure of evidence in plain view, that it was a customs
search, and that there were exigent and emergency circumstances that warranted a warrantless search.

Neither can the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla be considered a valid stop and frisk search. The
Court has explained that stop and frisk searches refer to 'the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband.' Thus, the allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is
limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."108 The search conducted by the authorities on
accused-appellant Sapla went beyond a protective search of outer clothing for weapons or contraband.

Moreover, while it was clarified by the Court in Malacat v. Court of Appeals109 that probable cause is not required to
conduct stop and frisk searches, "mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a 'stop and frisk.' A genuine reason
must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person
detained has weapons concealed about him."110 In Comprado, Cogaed, and Veridiano, the Court has held that
mere reliance on information relayed by an informant does not suffice to provide a genuine reason for the police to
conduct a warrantless search and seizure. In other words, in the aforesaid cases, the Court has held that
information from an informant is mere suspicion that does not validate a stop and frisk search.

Invalid Consented Warrantless Search

Neither can the Court consider the search conducted on accused-appellant Sapla as a valid consented search.

The CA found that accused-appellant Sapla "consented to the search in this case and that the illegal drugs - four (4)
bricks of marijuana, discovered as a result of consented search [are] admissible in evidence."111

The Court disagrees.

In Tudtud, the Court held that there can only be an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:

1. It must appear that the rights exist;

2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and

3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.112

Considering that a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, the Court has held that "[t]he
fundamental law and jurisprudence require more than the presence of these circumstances to constitute a valid
waiver of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights; acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is
not to be presumed. The fact that a person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto."113

Hence, even in cases where the accused voluntarily handed her bag114 or the chairs containing marijuana to the
arresting officer,115 the Court has held there was no valid consent to the search.116

Again, in Veridiano, the Court emphasized that the consent to a warrantless search and seizure must
be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and unattended by duress or coercion.117 Mere passive conformity to
the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence which does not amount to consent and that the presence of
a coercive environment negates the cl2im that the petitioner therein consented to the warrantless search.118

The very recent case of Yanson is likewise instructive. As in the instant case, "Sison, [the therein accused] who was
then unarmed, was prodded by the arresting officers to open the pickup's hood. His beguiling conformity is easily
accounted by how he was then surrounded by police officers who had specifically flagged him and his companions
down. He was under the coercive force of armed law enforcers. His consent, if at all, was clearly vitiated."119

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence presented convinces the Court that accused-appellant Sapla's
apparent consent to the search conducted by the police was not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be seriously denied that accused-appellant Sapla was subjected to
a coercive environment, considering that he was confronted by several armed police officers in a checkpoint.

In fact, from the testimony of PO3 Mabiasan himself, it becomes readily apparent that accused-appellant Sapla's
alleged voluntary opening of the sack was not unequivocal. When PO3 Mabiasan asked accused-appellant Sapla to
open the sack, the latter clearly hesitated and it was only "[a]fter a while [that] he voluntarily opened [the sack]."120

At most, accused-appellant Sapla's alleged act of opening the blue sack was mere passive conformity to a
warrantless search conducted in a coercive and intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot consider the
search conducted as a valid consented search.

The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine

The necessary and inescapable consequence of the illegality of the search and seizure conducted by the police in
the instant case is the inadmissibility of the drug specimens retrieved.

According to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures [is] deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for
any purpose in any proceeding."121

Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated marijuana bricks, there is no more need for the Court to discuss
the other issues surrounding the apprehension of accused-appellant Sapla, particularly the gaps in the chain of
custody of the alleged seized marijuana bricks, which likewise renders the same inadmissible. The prosecution is
left with no evidence left to support the conviction of accused-appellant Sapla. Consequently, accused-appellant
Sapla is acquitted of the crime charged.

Epilogue

The Court fully recognizes the necessity of adopting a resolute and aggressive stance against the menace of illegal
drugs. Our Constitution declares that the maintenance of peace and order and the promotion of the general welfare
are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.122

Nevertheless, by sacrificing the sacred and indelible right against unreasonable searches and seizures for
expediency's sake, the very maintenance of peace and order sought after is rendered wholly nugatory. By
disregarding basic constitutional rights as a means to curtail the proliferation of illegal drugs, instead of protecting
the general welfare, oppositely, the general welfare is viciously assaulted. In other words, when the Constitution i.s
disregarded, the battle waged against illegal drugs becomes a self-defeating and self-destructive enterprise. A battle
waged against illegal drugs that tramples on the rights of the people is not a war on drugs; it is a war against the
people.123

The Bill of Rights should never be sacrificed on the altar of convenience. Otherwise, the malevolent mantle of the
rule of men dislodges the rule of law.124

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated April 24, 2018 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 09296 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-
appellant Jerry Sapla y Guerrero a.k.a. Eric Salibad y Mallari is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention unless he is being lawfully held for
another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City, for immediate
implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
Decision the action he has taken.
 3.) [ G.R. No. 217910, September 03, 2019 ]

JESUS NICARDO M. FALCIS, III, PETITIONER, V. CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL, RESPONDENT.

LGBTS CHRISTIAN CHURCH, INC., REVEREND CRESENCIO "CEEJAY" AGBAYANI, JR., MARLON FELIPE,
AND MARIA ARLYN "SUGAR" IBAÑEZ, PETITIONERS-IN-INTERVENTION.

ATTY. FERNANDO P. PERITO, ATTY. RONALDO T. REYES, ATTY. JEREMY I. GATDULA, ATTY. CRISTINA A.
MONTES, AND ATTY. RUFINO POLICARPIO III, INTERVENORS-OPPOSITORS.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Cultural hegemony often invites people to conform to its impositions on their identities. Yet, there are some who,
despite pressures, courageously choose to be authentic to themselves. This case is about the assurance of genuine
individual autonomy within our constitutional legal order. It is about the virtue of tolerance and the humane goal of
non-discrimination. It is about diversity that encourages meaningful—often passionate—deliberation. Thus, it is
about nothing less than the quality of our freedom.

This Court does not have a monopoly in assuring this freedom. With the most difficult political, moral, and cultural
questions, the Constitution requires that we share with the political departments of government, especially with
Congress, the quest for solutions which balance interests while maintaining fealty to fundamental freedoms.

Adjudication enables arguments between parties with respect to the existence and interpretation of fundamental
freedoms. On the other hand, legislation ideally allows public democratic deliberation on the various ways to assure
these fundamental rights. The process of legislation exposes the experiences of those who have been oppressed,
ensuring that they are understood by those who stand with the majority. Often, public reason needs to be first
shaped through the crucible of campaigns and advocacies within our political forums before it is sharpened for
judicial fiat.

Judicial wisdom is, in large part, the art of discerning when courts choose not to exercise their perceived
competencies.

In this case, this Court unanimously chooses the path of caution.

Those with sexual orientations other than the heteronormative, gender identities that are transgender or fluid, or
gender expressions that are not the usual manifestations of the dominant and expected cultural binaries—the
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, intersex, and other gender and sexual minorities (LGBTQI+) community
—have suffered enough marginalization and discrimination within our society. We choose to be careful not to add to
these burdens through the swift hand of judicial review.

Marriage, as conceived in our current laws, may hew to the dominant heteronormative model, but asserting by
judicial fiat that it should—with all its privileges and burdens—apply to same-sex couples as well will require a
precision in adjudication, which the circumstances in this case do not present. To do so assumes a blind unproven
judicial faith that the shape of marriage in our current laws will be benign for same-sex couples. Progressive passion
asserted recklessly may unintentionally impose more burdens rather than less.

The pleadings assert a broad right of same-sex couples to official legal recognition of their intimate choices. They
certainly deserve legal recognition in some way. However, whether such recognition should come by way of the
exact same bundle of rights granted to heterosexual couples in our present laws is a proposition that should invite
more public discussion in the halls of Congress.

Given the factual context of this case, this Court declines, for now, to grant the broad relief prayed for in the Petition.
Furthermore, the exercise of this Court's power of judicial review is among the most elementary matters imparted to
aspiring lawyers. One who brandishes himself a lawyer is rightly presumed to be well-acquainted with the bare
rudiments of court procedure and decorum. To forget these rules and practices—or worse, to purport to know them,
but really, only to exploit them by way of propaganda—and then, to jump headlong into the taxing endeavor of
constitutional litigation is a contemptuous betrayal of the high standards of the legal profession.

Lawyers, especially those engaged in public interest litigation, should always be mindful that their acts and
omissions before the courts do not only affect themselves. By thrusting themselves into the limelight to take up the
cudgels on behalf of a minority class, public interest lawyers represent the hopes and aspirations of a greater mass
of people, not always with the consent of all the members of that class. Their errors and mistakes, their negligence
and lethargy have a ripple effect even on persons who have no opportunity to consent to the stratagems and tactics
employed by ill-prepared and sophomoric counsels.

On May 18, 2015, Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III (Falcis) filed pro se before this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.1 His Petition sought to "declare Articles 1 and 2 of
the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4)2 and 55(6)3 of the Family Code."4

Falcis claims that a resort to Rule 65 was appropriate, citing5 Magallona v. Executive Secretary,6 Araullo v.
Executive Secretary,7 and the separate opinion8 of now-retired Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion (Associate Justice
Brion) in Araullo. Again citing Associate Justice Brion's separate opinion, he claims that this Court should follow a
"'fresh' approach to this Court's judicial power"9 and find that his Petition pertains to a constitutional case attended
by grave abuse of discretion.10 He also asserts that the mere passage of the Family Code, with its Articles 1 and 2,
was a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion,11 and that the issues he raised were of such transcendental
importance12 as to warrant the setting aside of procedural niceties.

Falcis further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of judicial review: (1) actual case or controversy;
(2) standing; (3) was raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) that the constitutional question is the very lis mota of
the case.13 As to standing, he claims that his standing consisted in his personal stake in the outcome of the case,
as he "is an open and self-identified homosexual"14 who alleges that the Family Code has a "normative
impact"15 on the status of same-sex relationships in the country. He was also allegedly injured by the supposed
"prohibition against the right to marry the same-sex[,]"16 which prevents his plans to settle down in the
Philippines.17

Falcis justifies the direct recourse to this Court by citing, in addition to the alleged transcendental importance of the
issues he raised, the supposed lack of need for trial concerning any factual issues. He also insists that the
constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code were the very lis mota of his case.18

According to Falcis, a facial challenge on Articles 1 and 2 is permitted as these two (2) provisions regulate
fundamental rights such as "the right to due process and equal protection, right to decisional and marital privacy,
and the right to found a family in accordance with religious convictions."19

Falcis further claims that strict scrutiny should be the test used in appraising the constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2
of the Family Code, and that the compelling state interest involved is the protection of marriage pursuant to Article
XV, Section 2 of the Constitution, not the protection of heterosexual relationships.20 He argues that like opposite-
sex couples, same-sex couples are equally capable of founding their own families and fulfilling essential marital
obligations.21 He claims that contrary to Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,22 procreation is not an essential marital
obligation. Because there is allegedly no necessity to limit marriage as only between a man and a woman, Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code are supposedly unconstitutional for depriving Falcis of his right to liberty without
substantive due process of law.23

To support his allegation that strict scrutiny is the appropriate test, Falcis extensively referenced and quoted—
devoting more than five (5) pages of his 29-page Petition—the separate concurring opinion of retired Chief Justice
Reynato Puno (retired Chief Justice Puno) in Ang Ladlad Party-list v. Commission on Elections.24 However, he
claims that retired Chief Justice Puno incorrectly concluded that the appropriate test is intermediate or heightened
review.25 Nonetheless, he argues that even under the rational basis test, there is a violation of the equal protection
clause since there is no substantial distinction between same-sex and opposite-sex couples.26
Finally, Falcis claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the existence of "individuals belonging to
religious denominations that believe in same-sex marriage"27 and that they have a "right to found a family in
accordance with their religious convictions."28 He claims that the religious weddings conducted by these
denominations have been denied civil recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics and Muslims."29

On June 30, 2015, this Court ordered the Civil Registrar General to comment on the Petition.30

On June 22, 2015, Fernando P. Perito (Perito) filed pro se an Answer-in-Intervention31 to the Petition. He claims
that the Petition failed to comply with several requirements of Rule 65, including: (1) the annexing of a certified true
copy of the judgment, order, or resolution subject of the case; (2) there being no act of any tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; and (3) that the Petition had to be filed within 60 days from notice of
the assailed judgment, order, or resolution.32 Perito also claims that Falcis did not present any statistics or evidence
showing discrimination against the LGBTQI+ community33 and that Falcis did not show any specific injury, such as
the denial of a marriage license or refusal of a solemnizing officer to officiate a same-sex marriage.34

Perito further points out that Falcis is estopped from questioning the validity of the Family Code, it having been
effective since 1987.35 He also extensively cites the Christian Bible as authority for defending Articles 1 and 2's
limitation of marriage as between a man and a woman.36

This Answer-in-Intervention was treated by this Court as a motion to intervene with answer-in-intervention, which
was granted in this Court's July 28, 2015 Resolution.37 This Court, in the same Resolution, further required Falcis to
reply to the Answer-in-Intervention.

Falcis filed his Reply38 to the Answer-in-Intervention on September 21, 2015. He reiterates his claims concerning
his compliance with procedural requirements. His Reply was noted in this Court's October 6, 2015 Resolution.39

The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam)40 on
March 29, 2016. It prays that this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that the Petition was not
in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal only to Falcis.41 Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to
show injury-in-fact and an actual case or controversy, but was rather seeking an advisory opinion that this Court
cannot issue.42

The Civil Registrar General also faults Falcis for not impleading Congress, as his Petition actually challenged the
current legislative policy on same-sex marriage, and not any act committed by the Civil Registrar-General.43 Finally,
it claims that Falcis has not proven that the issues in this case are of such transcendental importance, there being
no law or facts contained in his Petition to determine any principles concerning the constitutionality of same-sex
marriage in the Philippines.44

On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church), Reverend Crescencio "Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr.
(Reverend Agbayani), Marlon Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn "Sugar" Ibañez (Ibañez)—collectively, petitioners-
intervenors—whose counsel was Falcis himself, filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-
in-Intervention.45 They ask this Court to allow them to intervene in the proceedings, claiming that: (1) they offer
further procedural and substantive arguments; (2) their rights will not be protected in a separate proceeding; and (3)
they have an interest in the outcome of this case. They adopt by reference the arguments raised by Falcis in his
Petition.46

Subsequently, they filed their Petition-in-Intervention,47 which is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, seeking the same reliefs as those in Falcis' Petition, namely: (1) the declaration of unconstitutionality of
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code; and (2) the invalidation of Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code.48

Similar to Falcis, petitioners-intervenors claim that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is an appropriate
remedy.49 They aver that the requisites of judicial review are present. First, they have an actual case or controversy
since petitioners-intervenors Reverend Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibanez were supposedly denied a marriage license on
August 3, 2015.50 Second, they have legal standing. LGBTS Church claims third-party standing, even as it also
claims that its own right to religious freedom was directly, not just indirectly violated. Petitioners-intervenors
Reverend Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibañez claim standing on the basis of their supposed attempts to secure marriage
licenses. This was despite LGBTS Church claiming that it has third-party standing because its own members, which
included petitioners-intervernors Reverend Agbayani, Felipe, and Ibañez, were "unlikely"51 to file suit.52

Petitioners-intervenors restate Falcis' claims that the issues were raised at the earliest opportunity, that the
constitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code is the lis mota of the case, and that a direct recourse to this
Court was proper.53

Petitioners-intervenors use arguments from Christian theology to prove that there should be no civil restriction
against same-sex marriage.54 They also claim that the lack of civil recognition for their religious ceremonies, as
contrasted with the recognition granted to "Filipino Catholics and Filipino Muslims[,]"55 violate the equal protection
clause.56

This Court noted the Motion to Intervene and Petition-in-Intervention in its June 7, 2016 Resolution.57

On August 10, 2016, Falcis filed a Motion to Set the Case for Oral Arguments.58 He also filed a Reply59 to the
Comment (Ad Cautelam), again reiterating his procedural arguments.

In compliance with this Court's December 6, 2016 Resolution,60 the Office of the Solicitor General
manifested61 that it was maintaining the arguments stated in its Comment (Ad Cautelam), but reserved its right to
comment on the Petition-in-Intervention. Its Manifestation was noted in this Court's February 7, 2017 Resolution.62

On March 28, 2017, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Petition-in-Intervention and
required the Civil Registrar General and Perito to comment on the Petition-in-Intervention.63

The Civil Registrar General filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam) on the Petition-in-Intervention,64 which this Court
noted in its August 8, 2017 Resolution.65 The Civil Registrar General claims that the issues raised in the Petition
are political questions, saying that marriage's legal definition is a policy issue for Congress to determine,66 and that
any amendment to the definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code should be addressed to Congress.67

In a March 6, 2018 Resolution,68 this Court set the case for oral arguments, with a scheduled preliminary
conference on June 5, 2018.69 Perito manifested that he would not be able to attend the preliminary conference.70

During the preliminary conference, Falcis, who appeared on his own behalf and on behalf of petitioners-intervenors,
was ordered to show cause why he should not be cited in direct contempt:

Considering that petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III was attired with a casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers
without socks, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen directed him to show cause by June 6, 2018, why he should
not be cited in direct contempt for his failure to observe the required decorum during the preliminary conference
which is a formal session of the Court. Petitioner was likewise advised to request a briefing from his former
professors, or the law firm he is going to retain, on the proper protocols to be observed inside the Court, to facilitate
an orderly and smooth proceeding during the oral argument.71

On June 6, 2018, Falcis filed his Compliance72 with the show-cause order. In a July 3, 2018 Resolution,73 this
Court found Falcis guilty of direct contempt of court:

Atty. Falcis acted in a contumacious manner during the June 5, 2018 preliminary conference.

Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years. As
an officer of the court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude essential to the proper
administration of justice. He is charged with knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct
themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility exhort him
to maintain the requisite decency and to afford dignity to this Court.

Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Atty. Falcis' appearance
and behavior during the preliminary conference reveal the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the
Advisory for Oral Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the preliminary conference, it was
inexcusably careless for any of them to appear before this Court so barely prepared.

The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it was essential to the orderly conduct of proceedings
and, ultimately, to the judicious disposition of this case. Appearance in it by counsels and parties should not be
taken lightly.

Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even uttering a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with
this Court. His bearing and demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human rights advocacy he purports
to represent.74 (Citation omitted)

Falcis was admonished to properly conduct himself in court and to be more circumspect of the duties attendant to
his being a lawyer. He was sternly warned that any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely.75

On June 8, 2018, Ronaldo T. Reyes, Jeremy I. Gatdula, Cristina A. Montes, and Rufino Policarpio III (intervenors-
oppositors) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit the Opposition-in-Intervention.76 They claim that they
have a legal interest in this case since the grant of the Petition would run counter to their religious beliefs.77

In their Opposition-in-Intervention,78 they claim that this Court has no jurisdiction to act upon the Petition, none of
the requisites of justiciability having been met. They further assert that they have standing to intervene in these
proceedings as the proposed definition of marriage in the Petition is contrary to their religious beliefs and religious
freedom as guaranteed in Article III, Sections 4 and 5 of the Constitution. They claim to be concerned taxpayers
who seek to uphold the Constitution.79

Intervenors-oppositors argue that granting the Petition would be tantamount to judicial legislation, thus violating the
doctrine of separation of powers. They claim that the definition of marriage in the Family Code was a valid exercise
of legislative prerogative which this Court must uphold.80 Further, there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Civil Registrar General, as there was no violation of the equal protection clause or of Falcis' right to liberty.
They claim that there are substantial differences between opposite-sex and same-sex unions that account for state
recognition only of the former, and that such limitation is for the common good.81 For them, children's welfare is a
compelling state interest justifying intrusion into certain liberties, including the non-recognition of same-sex
marriage. They assert that there was no violation of the right to privacy since Falcis and petitioners-intervenors "are
not prohibited from publicly identifying as homosexuals or from entering into same-sex relationships[.]"82

On June 13, 2018, Atty. Aldrich Fitz U. Dy (Atty. Dy), Atty. Keisha Trina M. Guangko (Atty. Guangko), Atty. Darwin
P. Angeles (Atty. Angeles), and Atty. Alfredo B. Molo III (Atty. Molo) entered their appearance as co-counsels for
Falcis and petitioners-intervenors .83

The Civil Registrar General filed its Supplemental Comment with Leave of Court84 on June 14, 2018. Addressing
the substantive issues of the Petition, it claims that since the Constitution only contemplates opposite-sex marriage
in Article XV, Section 2 and other related provisions, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are constitutional.85

Oral arguments were conducted on June 19, 201886 and June 26, 2018.87 On June 26, 2018, this Court ordered
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days.88

On July 25, 2018, both the Civil Registrar General89 and intervenors-oppositors90 filed their respective
Memoranda, which were noted in this Court's July 31, 2018 Resolution.91

On July 26, 2018, rather than file their memoranda, Falcis and petitioners-intervenors, through counsels Atty.
Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Christoper Ryan R. Maranan (Atty. Maranan) of Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and
Coloma Law Offices, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum.92 Without this Court's prior
favorable action on their Motion for Extension, they filed their Memorandum93 on August 3, 2018.

In its August 7, 2018 Resolution,94 this Court denied the Motion for Extension and dispensed with Falcis' and
petitioners-intervenors' Memorandum. The Resolution read, in part:
[W]ith the exception of Intervenor-Oppositor Atty. Fernando P. Perito, the other parties in this case have fully
complied with this Court's Order within the imposed deadline. These show that even considering the complexity of
issues to be resolved in this case, the parties are capable of submitting and filing their respective Memoranda.95

In the same Resolution, Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan were all required96 to show cause
why they should not be cited in indirect contempt for failing to comply with this Court's June 26 2018 Order.97

On August 9, 2018, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan filed their Manifestation with Motion for Leave
to Admit Memorandum.98 They, along with Falcis, filed their Manifestation and Compliance with the August 7, 2018
Resolution on August 13, 2018.99

For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Petition and/or the Petition-in-Intervention are properly
the subject of the exercise of our power of judicial review. Subsumed under this are the following procedural issues:

First, whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an actual case or controversy reviewable by this
Court;

Second, whether or not the self-identification of petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III as a member of the LGBTQI+
community gives him standing to challenge the Family Code;

Third, whether or not the Petition-in-Intervention cures the procedural defects of the Petition; and

Fourth, whether or not the application of the doctrine of transcendental importance is warranted.

Should the Petition and/or Petition-in-Intervention show themselves to be appropriate subjects of judicial review, this
Court may proceed to address the following substantive issues:

First, whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom to marry are cognates of the right to life and
liberty;

Second, whether or not the limitation of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples is a valid exercise of police power;

Third, whether or not limiting civil marriages to opposite-sex couples violates the equal protection clause;

Fourth, whether or not denying same-sex couples the right to marry amounts to a denial of their right to life and/or
liberty without due process of law;

Fifth, whether or not sex-based conceptions of marriage violate religious freedom;

Sixth, whether or not a determination that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are unconstitutional must necessarily
carry with it the conclusion that Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family Code, on homosexuality and lesbianism as
grounds for annulment and legal separation, are also unconstitutional; and

Finally, whether or not the parties are entitled to the reliefs prayed for.

From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict marriage on the basis of sex,100 gender,101 sexual
orientation,102 or gender identity or expression.103

Article XV of the 1987 Constitution concerns the family and operates in conjunction with Article II, Section
12.104 Article XV, Section 1 pertains to the family in general, identifying it "as the foundation of the nation[,]" and
articulates the State's overarching commitment to "strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development."105 Article XV, Section 2 concerns marriage, in particular, and articulates a broad commitment to
protecting its inviolability as a social institution. It states:
SECTION 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.

Lacking a manifestly restrictive textual definition of marriage, the Constitution is capable of accommodating a
contemporaneous understanding of sexual orientation, gender identity and expression, and sex characteristics
(SOGIESC). The plain text and meaning of our constitutional provisions do not prohibit SOGIESC. These
constitutional provisions in particular, and the Constitution in general, should be read through the lens of "a holistic
approach in legal interpretation"106:

The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic rather than parochial: to consider context and
the interplay of the historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial interpretation entails the
convergence of social realities and social ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus, chief of
which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes
the Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of constitutional primacy.107

As a social institution, the family is shaped by economic forces and other social structural forces, such as ideologies
and politics.108 For instance, the discovery of agriculture has transformed the concept of family and marriage by
elevating the ownership of property as a central consideration:

[T]he right to own land and pass it on to heirs meant that women's childbearing abilities and male domination
became more important. Rather than kinship, marriage became the center of family life and was increasingly based
on a formal contractual relationship between men, women, and their kinship groups. The property and gender
implications of marriage are evident in the exchange of gifts between spouses and families and clearly defined rules
about the rights and responsibilities of each marital partner. During the Middle Ages, economic factors influenced
marital choices more than affection, even among the poor, and women's sexuality was treated as a form of property
(Coltrane and Adams 2008:54). Wealth and power inequalities meant that marriages among the elite and/or
governing classes were based largely on creating political alliances and producing male children (Coontz
2005). Ensuring paternity became important in the transfer of property to legitimate heirs, and the rights and
sexuality of women were circumscribed. Ideologies of male domination prevailed, and women, especially those who
were married to powerful men, were typically treated like chattel and given very few rights.109 (Emphasis supplied)

Consequently, this has placed great significance on procreation as a purpose or end of the family.

Then, in the 18th century, women and children were seen as capable of operating factory machinery and, thus,
entered the factory labor system to meet the surge in the demand for workers.110 This "potential for economic
independence altered families by making children less reliant on families for their survival and women freer from
male domination."111

Eventually, the economic transition that came with the spread of industrialization resulted in massive social,
geographical, and familial changes:

Industrialization shifted populations from rural to urban areas in search of work; for example, in 1830 most
Americans still lived in rural areas and were employed in farming, but by 1930, most lived in towns and cities and
were engaged in non-farming occupations. Urbanization, immigration, and adjustment to the industrial labor market
took a toll on the stability of families. Industrial production undermined the family-based economy, food production
technologies reduced the need for farmers, and essentials once produced by families were now produced in
massive quantities in factories. New professional institutions emerged (e.g., public schools, hospitals) and assumed
responsibility for many of the functions once fulfilled by families, ultimately making people less dependent on the
family and leading some social scientists to predict its demise.112

This reorganization of work in the industrial economy "disrupted the gender order of many families by pulling women
into the paid labor force and spawning new visions of gender equality."113 As a consequence, marriage based on
free choice, romantic love, and companionship developed.114

Eventually, the modern family was seen primarily as:

. . . a nuclear, marriage-based entity in which men provided economically for their families and women performed
housework and took care of children. . . . Socially defined notions of masculinity and femininity reflected these
gendered family roles; for example, men were characterized as being naturally aggressive and rational—traits
valuable in the competitive area of work—and women as being essentially submissive, domestic, and nurturing.115

The evolution of the social concept of family reveals that heteronormativity in marriage is not a static anthropological
fact. The perceived complementarity of the sexes is problematized by the changing roles undertaken by men and
women, especially under the present economic conditions.

To continue to ground the family as a social institution on the concept of the complementarity of the sexes is to
perpetuate the discrimination faced by couples, whether opposite-sex or same-sex, who do not fit into that mold. It
renders invisible the lived realities of families headed by single parents, families formed by sterile couples, families
formed by couples who preferred not to have children, among many other family organizations. Furthermore, it
reinforces certain gender stereotypes within the family.

II

In a proper case, a good opportunity may arise for this Court to review the scope of Congress' power to statutorily
define the scope in which constitutional provisions are effected. This is not that case. The Petition before this Court
does not present an actual case over which we may properly exercise our power of judicial review.

There must be narrowly-framed constitutional issues based on a justiciable controversy:

Contemporaneous construction and aids that are external to the text may be resorted to when the text is capable of
multiple, viable meanings. It is only then that one can go beyond the strict boundaries of the document.
Nevertheless, even when meaning has already been ascertained from a reading of the plain text, contemporaneous
construction may serve to verify or validate the meaning yielded by such reading.

Limited resort to contemporaneous construction is justified by the realization that the business of understanding the
Constitution is not exclusive to this Court. The basic democratic foundation of our constitutional order necessarily
means that all organs of government, and even the People, read the fundamental law and are guided by it. When
competing viable interpretations arise, a justiciable controversy may ensue requiring judicial intervention in order to
arrive with finality at which interpretation shall be sustained. To remain true to its democratic moorings, however,
judicial involvement must remain guided by a framework or deference and constitutional avoidance. This same
principle underlies the basic doctrine that courts are to refrain from issuing advisory opinions. Specifically as regards
this Court, only constitutional issues that are narrowly framed, sufficient to resolve an actual case, may be
entertained.116 (Citations omitted)

Founded on the principle of supremacy of law, judicial review is the courts' power to decide on the constitutionality
of exercises of power by the other branches of government and to enforce constitutional rights.117

Judicial review is inherent in this Court's judicial power. Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution states:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Article VIII, Section 1 expands the territory of justiciable questions and narrows the off-limits area of political
questions. In Estrada v. Desierto:118

To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits
the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine which rests on
the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of
constitutional law. In the United States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political
were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr, viz:

". . . Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case
at bar, there should be no dismissal for non justiciability on the ground of a political question's presence. The
doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions', not of political cases'."

In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of
the inner and outer perimeters of a political question. Our leading case is Tañada v. Cuenco, where this Court,
through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held that political questions refer "to those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review
of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but
also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the
"thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the new provision, however,
courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the
1987 Constitution trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII
which empowers this Court in limpid language to ". . . review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ
(of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof. . . ."119 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

Nonetheless, the expansion of this Court's judicial power is by no means an abandonment of the need to satisfy the
basic requisites of justiciability.120 In Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines v. Department of
Labor and Employment:121

As a rule, "the constitutionality of a statute will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned." A controversy is said to be justiciable if: first, there is an actual case or controversy involving legal rights
that are capable of judicial determination; second, the parties raising the issue must have standing or locus standi to
raise the constitutional issue; third, the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and fourth,
resolving the constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.122

Fundamentally, for this Court to exercise the immense power that enables it to undo the actions of the other
government branches, the following requisites must be satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
involving legal rights that are capable of judicial determination; (2) the parties raising the issue must have standing
or locus standi to raise the constitutional issue; (3) the constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity, thus ripe for adjudication; and (4) the matter of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case, or
that constitutionality must be essential to the disposition of the case.123

III

This Court's constitutional mandate does not include the duty to answer all of life's questions.124 No question, no
matter how interesting or compelling, can be answered by this Court if it cannot be shown that there is an "actual
and an antagonistic assertion of rights by one party against the other in a controversy wherein judicial intervention is
unavoidable."125
This Court does not issue advisory opinions.126 We do not act to satisfy academic questions or dabble in thought
experiments. We do not decide hypothetical, feigned, or abstract disputes, or those collusively arranged by parties
without real adverse interests.127 If this Court were to do otherwise and jump headlong into ruling on every matter
brought before us, we may close off avenues for opportune, future litigation. We may forestall proper adjudication
for when there are actual, concrete, adversarial positions, rather than mere conjectural posturing:

Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section 1 does not provide license to provide advisory
opinions. An advisory opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical. In such cases, the
conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all,
legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the parties. Those who bring theoretical cases
will have no such limits. They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future parties who may have
more motives to choose specific legal arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the parties,
there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly determine whether there has been a breach of
constitutional text.128 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

As this Court makes "final and binding construction[s] of law[,]"129 our opinions cannot be mere counsel for unreal
conflicts conjured by enterprising minds. Judicial decisions, as part of the legal system,130 bind actual persons,
places, and things. Rulings based on hypothetical situations weaken the immense power of judicial review.131

IV

It is not enough that laws or regulations have been passed or are in effect when their constitutionality is questioned.
The judiciary interprets and applies the law. "It does not formulate public policy, which is the province of the
legislative and executive branches of government."132 Thus, it does not—by the mere existence of a law or
regulation—embark on an exercise that may render laws or regulations inefficacious.

Lest the exercise of its power amount to a ruling on the wisdom of the policy imposed by Congress on the subject
matter of the law, the judiciary does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making prerogative by a swift determination that
a rule ought not exist. There must be an actual case, "a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced
on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."133

IV (A)

In Philippine Press Institute, Inc. v. Commission on Elections,134 the petitioner did not assert a specific act
committed against it by the Commission on Elections in enforcing or implementing the questioned law. This Court
found that there was no actual case or controversy.

In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,135 the core issue that the petitioner prayed for this Court to resolve was deemed
to be delving into the policy or wisdom underlying the law. This Court noted that the full discretionary authority to
formulate policy was vested in Congress.

In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council,136 the possibility of abuse in the
execution of law was deemed insufficient to trigger judicial review. This Court emphasized that there must first be an
actual act of abuse.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Roque,137 no actual case or controversy existed as the respondents could not
point to an instance when the assailed law was said to have been implemented against them.

In Corales v. Republic,138 the petition to assail an executive issuance was found to be premature and "based
entirely on surmises, conjectures[,] and speculations."

In our 2018 ruling in Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines,139 an alleged diminution of the
petitioners' income, wholly based on speculation, did not warrant the exercise of judicial review.

IV (B)

There are instances when this Court exercised the power of judicial review in cases involving newly-enacted laws.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,140 this Court fixed the point at which a legal issue matures into an actual case or
controversy—at the pre-occurrence of an "overt act":141

In the unanimous en banc case Tañada v. Angara, this Court held that when an act of the legislative department is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, settling the controversy becomes the duty of this Court. By the
mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened
into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. Said the Court:

"In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition
no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. . . .
The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.' Once a 'controversy as
to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court . . ., it becomes a legal
issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. '

....

"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it will not shirk, digress from or abandon its
sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before
it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."

In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy:

". . . Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. The
courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not
only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case, settling the dispute
becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.142 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, in Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain,143 this Court stated: "[t]hat the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness."144

Subsequently, this Court, in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.,145 stated:

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the
issues.146 (Emphasis in the original)

This Court's liberality in scrutinizing a petition for an actual case or controversy was more recently illustrated
in Belgica and Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa.147 In Belgica, this Court found that there was an actual case or
controversy:

The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization — such as the 2013 GAA for
the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund — are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners
as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.148

Belgica was followed by Araullo v. Aquino III,149 where this Court stated:
An actual and justiciable controversy exists in these consolidated cases. The incompatibility of the perspectives of
the parties on the constitutionality of the DAP and its relevant issuances satisfy the requirement for a conflict
between legal rights. The issues being raised herein meet the requisite ripeness considering that the challenged
executive acts were already being implemented by the DBM, and there are averments by the petitioners that such
implementation was repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution. Moreover, the implementation of the DAP
entailed the allocation and expenditure of huge sums of public funds. The fact that public funds have been allocated,
disbursed or utilized by reason or on account of such challenged executive acts gave rise, therefore, to an actual
controversy that is ripe for adjudication by the Court.150

In Spouses Imbong, this Court found that there was an actual case or controversy, despite the Petition being a facial
challenge:

The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH
Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.

The Court is not persuaded.

In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that
is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious
freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.

In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with
some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statutes, it
has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving religious freedom,
and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the
U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever
vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to
life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed
legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can
indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual
case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the
Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.151 (Emphasis in the original,
citations omitted)

IV (C)

Here, the Petition cannot be entertained as a facial challenge to Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code.

A facial challenge is "an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its
actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities."152 It is distinguished from "as-
applied" challenges, which consider actual facts affecting real litigants.153

Facial challenges are only allowed as a narrow exception to the requirement that litigants must only present their
own cases, their extant factual circumstances, to the courts. In David v. Arroyo:154

[F]acial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing
constitutional adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge
a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before
the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or
her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are
permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as
applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.155

However, in Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice,156 this Court distinguished those facial challenges that could be
properly considered as presenting an actual case or controversy:

When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio
T. Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission on Elections, "we must view these statements of the
Court on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar
as these doctrines are used to mount 'facial' challenges to penal statutes not involving free speech."

In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a violation of his constitutional right can raise any
constitutional ground - absence of due process, lack of fair notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.

But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on
grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling effect"
on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free speech. A person who does not know whether his
speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.157 (Citations omitted)

To be entertained by this Court, a facial challenge requires a showing of curtailment of the right to freedom of
expression, because its basis is that an overly broad statute may chill otherwise constitutional speech.158

The imperative of justiciability was reiterated in Philippine Constitution Association v. Philippine Government:159

In Province of North Cotabato v. GRP (MOA-AD case), . . . the Court explained the limits of the power of judicial
review and the prerequisites for the judicial determination of a case.

In [that] case, the Court rejected the argument of the Solicitor General that there was no justiciable controversy that
was ripe for adjudication. . . . The Court ruled that "[w]hen an act of a branch of government is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute."
Moreover, in the MOA-AD case, the Executive was about to sign the initialed MOA-AD with the MILF in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia in the presence of representatives of foreign states. Only the prompt issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order stopped the signing, averting the implications that such signing would have caused.

In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the Solicitor General that there is no actual case or controversy
requiring a full-blown resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners.
Unlike the unconstitutional MOA-AD, the CAB, including the FAB, mandates the enactment of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law in order for such peace agreements to be implemented. In the MOA-AD case, there was nothing in the
MOA-AD which required the passage of any statute to implement the provisions of the MOA-AD, which in essence
would have resulted in dramatically dismembering the Philippines by placing the provinces and areas covered by
the MOA-AD under the control and jurisdiction of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.

....

Further, under the MOA-AD, the Executive branch assumed the mandatory obligation to amend the Constitution to
conform to the MOA-AD. The Executive branch guaranteed to the MILF that the Constitution would be drastically
overhauled to conform to the MOA-AD. ... the Executive branch usurped the sole discretionary power of Congress to
propose amendments to the Constitution as well as the exclusive power of the sovereign people to approve or
disapprove such proposed amendments. . . . such ultra vires commitment by the Executive branch constituted grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

....

Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law, it would still not be subject to judicial review.
The Court held in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or
unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. As the Court in Montesclaros noted, invoking
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a
proposed bill. The power of judicial review comes into play only after the passage of a bill, and not before. Unless
enacted into law, any proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in Congress is not subject to judicial
review.160 (Citations omitted)

Ultimately, petitions before this Court that challenge an executive or legislative enactment must be based on actual
facts, sufficiently for a proper joinder of issues to be resolved.161 If litigants wish to assail a statute or regulation on
its face, the burden is on them to prove that the narrowly-drawn exception for an extraordinary judicial review of
such statute or regulation applies.

When faced with speculations—situations that have not yet fully ripened into clear breaches of legally demandable
rights or obligations—this Court shall refrain from passing upon the case. Any inquiries that may be made may be
roving, unlimited, and unchecked.162 In contrast to political branches of government, courts must deal with
specificities:

It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In political
forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of the text of the law is based on a general discussion of factual
circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the executive branch. Thus, the
creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.

Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific case-to-
case basis, where parties affected by the legal provision seek the courts' understanding of the law.

The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to ensure that
the rights of the general public are upheld at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches of government
must afford due respect and deference for the duties and functions constitutionally delegated to the other. Courts
cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can
craft doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.163

Jurisprudence on justiciability in constitutional adjudication has been unequivocal on the requirement of actual
cases and controversies. In Angara v. Electoral Commission:164

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by
the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.165 (Emphasis supplied)

Even now, under the regime of the textually broadened power of judicial review articulated in Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution, the requirement of an actual case or controversy is not dispensed with.166 In Association
of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.:167

Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is the presence
of an actual case or controversy. For a dispute to be justiciable, a legally demandable and enforceable right must
exist as basis, and must be shown to have been violated.

....

The Court's expanded jurisdiction — itself an exercise of judicial power — does not do away with the actual case or
controversy requirement in presenting a constitutional issue, but effectively simplifies this requirement by merely
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act.168 (Emphasis
supplied, citation omitted)

V(A)

It is the parties' duty to demonstrate actual cases or controversies worthy of judicial resolution.

Pleadings before this Court must show a violation of an existing legal right or a controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. In a concurring opinion in Belgica:169

Basic in litigation raising constitutional issues is the requirement that there must be an actual case or controversy.
This Court cannot render an advisory opinion. We assume that the Constitution binds all other constitutional
departments, instrumentalities, and organs. We are aware that in the exercise of their various powers, they do
interpret the text of the Constitution in the light of contemporary needs that they should address. A policy that
reduces this Court to an adviser for official acts by the other departments that have not yet been done would
unnecessarily tax our resources. It is inconsistent with our role as final arbiter and adjudicator and weakens the
entire system of the Rule of Law. Our power of judicial review is a duty to make a final and binding construction of
law. This power should generally be reserved when the departments have exhausted any and all acts that would
remedy any perceived violation of right. The rationale that defines the extent of our doctrines laying down
exceptions to our rules on justiciability are clear: Not only should the pleadings show a convincing violation of a
right, but the impact should be shown to be so grave, imminent, and irreparable that any delayed exercise of judicial
review or deference would undermine fundamental principles that should be enjoyed by the party complaining or the
constituents that they legitimately represent.170

Facts are the basis of an actual case or controversy. To reiterate, "there must be sufficient facts to enable the Court
to intelligently adjudicate the issues."171 Thus, as illustrated in Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc.:

Petitioners' obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist fronts" in no
way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function.
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has
no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by "double contingency," where both the
activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized,
lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the
realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any
power granted by law may be abused. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may
step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.172 (Emphasis
in the original, citations omitted)

V(B)

Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct adverse effect on them. In Lozano v.
Nograles:173

An aspect of the "case-or-controversy" requirement is the requisite of "ripeness". In the United States, courts are
centrally concerned with whether a case involves uncertain contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness:
first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the parties entailed by withholding
court consideration. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. An alternative road to review similarly taken would be to determine whether an action
has already been accomplished or performed by a branch of government before the courts may step
in.174 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

VI

The need to demonstrate an actual case or controversy is even more compelling in cases concerning minority
groups. This Court is a court of law. We are equipped with legal expertise, but we are not the final authority in other
disciplines. In fields such as politics, sociology, culture, and economics, this Court is guided by the wisdom of
recognized authorities, while being steered by our own astute perception of which notions can withstand reasoned
and reasonable scrutiny. This enables us to filter unempirical and outmoded, even if sacrosanct, doctrines and
biases.

This Court exists by an act of the sovereign Filipino people who ratified the Constitution that created it. Its
composition at any point is not the result of a popular election reposing its members with authority to decide on
matters of policy. This Court cannot make a final pronouncement on the wisdom of policies. Judicial
pronouncements based on wrong premises may unwittingly aggravate oppressive conditions.

The scrutiny on the existence of actual facts becomes most necessary when the rights of marginalized, minority
groups have been thrust into constitutional scrutiny by a party purporting to represent an entire sector.

VI (A)

In Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections,175 this Court acknowledged that the LGBTQI+ community
has historically "borne the brunt of societal disapproval":

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves,
have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious
beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to
criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been
convincingly transplanted into the realm of law.176 (Citation omitted)
A common position taken by those who socially disapprove of the LGBTQI+ community is that this community
violates the complementarity of the sexes. Relying on natural law, the concept asserts that the sexual differences
between a man and a woman are constitutive of one's identity, out of which the family is created.177

Consequently, this views the sexual orientation, gender identity, and gender expression of members of the
LGBTQI+ community as unnatural, purely ideological, or socially constructed. These identities are criticized for
being "often founded on nothing more than a confused concept of freedom in the realm of feelings and wants, or
momentary desires provoked by emotional impulses and the will of the individual, as opposed to anything based on
the truths of existence."178 Lacking "an essential and indispensable finality"179—that is, procreative possibility
—"homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered and can in no case be approved of."180

However, contrary to this view, same-sex conduct is a natural phenomenon:

Homosexuality has been observed in most vertebrate groups, and also among insects, spiders, crustaceans, octopi
and parasitic worms. The phenomenon has been reported in close to 1000* animal species, and is well documented
for half that number, but the real extent is probably much higher.

The frequency of homosexuality varies from species to species. In some species, homosexuality has never been
reported, while in others the entire species is bisexual. In zoos around 1 in 5 pairs of king penguins are of the same
sex. The record is held by orange fronted parakeets, where roughly half of all pairs in captivity are of the same
sex.181

At the moment, there is no consensus among scientists about the exact reasons as to how an individual develops a
particular sexual orientation.182 It has been suggested in scientific studies that sexual orientation is polygenetic and
sociocultural:

Although we emphasize the polygenicity of the genetic effects on same-sex sexual behavior, we identified five SNPs
whose association with same-sex sexual behavior reached genome-wide significance. Three of these replicated in
other independent samples whose measures related to identity and attraction rather than behavior. These SNPs
may serve to generate new lines of enquiry. In particular, the finding that one of the replicated SNPs (rs28371400-
15q21.3) is linked to male pattern balding and is nearby a gene (TCF12) relevant to sexual differentiation
strengthens the idea that sex-hormone regulation may be involved in the development of same-sex sexual behavior.
Also, that another replicated SNP (rs34730029-11q12.1) is strongly linked to several genes involved in olfaction
raises intriguing questions. Although the underlying mechanism at this locus is unclear, a link between olfaction and
reproductive function has previously been established. Individuals with Kallmann syndrome exhibit both delayed or
absent pubertal development and an impaired sense of smell because of the close developmental origin of fetal
gonadotropin-releasing hormone and olfactory neurons.

Our study focused on the genetic basis of same-sex sexual behavior, but several of our results point to the
importance of sociocultural context as well. We observed changes in prevalence of reported same-sex sexual
behavior across time, raising questions about how genetic and sociocultural influences on sexual behavior might
interact. We also observed partly different genetic influences on same-sex sexual behavior in females and males;
this could reflect sex differences in hormonal influences on sexual behavior (for example, importance of testosterone
versus estrogen) but could also relate to different sociocultural contexts of female and male same-sex behavior and
different demographics of gay, lesbian, and bisexual groups. With these points in mind, we acknowledge the
limitation that we only studied participants of European ancestry and from a few Western countries; research
involving larger and more diverse samples will afford greater insight into how these findings fare across different
sociocultural contexts.

Our findings provide insights into the biological underpinnings of same-sex sexual behavior but also underscore the
importance of resisting simplistic conclusions—because the behavioral phenotypes are complex, because our
genetic insights are rudimentary, and because there is a long history of misusing genetic results for social
purposes.183 (Citations omitted)

Sexual orientation has also been correlated with physiological features in the brain. In 1991, neuroscientist Simon
LeVay (LeVay) conducted research on "the anterior hypothalamus, which contains four cell groups called the
interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH)."184 LeVay's "research found that a particular group of
neurons called INAH3 was significantly larger in heterosexual men than in homosexual men."185 Other researchers
that same year also proposed that the anterior commissure, a bundle of nerves that connects a small region of the
right and left sides of the brain, "is bigger in homosexual men than in heterosexual men."186 These studies propose
that there are anatomical differences between men of different sexual orientations.

To insulate the human species from the natural phenomenon of same-sex conduct is to reinforce an inordinately
anthropocentric view of nature. Giving primacy to "human reason and sentience[,]"187 anthropocentrism is "the
belief that there is a clear and morally relevant dividing line between humankind and the rest of nature, that
humankind is the only principal source of value or meaning in the world."188

This "human-nature dualism contains a problematic inconsistency and contradiction,"189 for it rejects the truth that
human beings are part of nature.190 Further, human superiority is conceived from the lens of human cognitive
abilities191 and imposes a socially constructed moral hierarchy between human beings and nature.192

Human-nature dualism lays the foundation "for a cultural context that legitimized domination. . . . [which] is at the
root of other modern 'imaginary oppositions' such as the split between reason-emotion, mind-body, and masculine-
feminine."193 This dichotomy propels numerous forms of gender oppression in that anything attached to reason and
culture is associated with masculinity, while anything attached to emotion, body, and nature is associated with
femininity.194 This anthropocentric view can only manifest itself "in a violent and self-destructive manner, fatal both
to human and non-human life[.]"195

VI (B)

In the realm of the social sciences, a great number of 20th-century psychoanalysts unfortunately viewed
homosexuality as something pathological.196 This influenced the field of American psychiatry in the mid-20th
century that when the American Psychological Association published the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual in 1952, "it listed all the conditions psychiatrists then considered to be a mental disorder. DSM-I classified
'homosexuality' as a 'sociopathic personality disturbance.'"197

It was not until the research of biologist Alfred Kinsey and other scientists challenged the orthodoxy that
homosexuality was delisted as a mental disorder in the next iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual:

The Kinsey reports, surveying thousands of people who were not psychiatric patients, found homosexuality to be
more common in the general population than was generally believed, although his now-famous '10%' statistic is
today believed to be closer to 1%-4%. This finding was sharply at odds with psychiatric claims of the time that
homosexuality was extremely rare in the general population. Ford and Beach's study of diverse cultures and of
animal behaviors, confirmed Kinsey's view that homosexuality was more common than psychiatry maintained and
that it was found regularly in nature. In the late 1950s, Evelyn Hooker, a psychologist, published a study in which
she compared psychological test results of 30 gay men with 30 heterosexual controls, none of whom were
psychiatric patients. Her study found no more signs of psychological disturbances in the gay male group, a finding
that refuted psychiatric beliefs of her time that all gay men had severe psychological disturbances.198

However, the official removal of homosexuality from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual as a mental disorder was
not the last word on the subject. Homosexuality was still considered a "disorder," and it was not until several years
later that all traces of what was mistakenly thought to be a "disease" would be completely removed from the manual:

In any event, the events of 1973 did not immediately end psychiatry's pathologizing of some presentations of
homosexuality. For in 'homosexuality's' place, the DSM-II contained a new diagnosis: Sexual Orientation
Disturbance (SOD). SOD regarded homosexuality as an illness if an individual with same-sex attractions found them
distressing and wanted to change. The new diagnosis legitimized the practice of sexual conversion therapies (and
presumably justified insurance reimbursement for those interventions as well), even if homosexuality per se was no
longer considered an illness. The new diagnosis also allowed for the unlikely possibility that a person unhappy
about a heterosexual orientation could seek treatment to become gay.

SOD was later replaced in DSM-III by a new category called 'Ego Dystonic Homosexuality' (EDH). However, it was
obvious to psychiatrists more than a decade later that the inclusion first of SOD, and later EDH, was the result of
earlier political compromises and that neither diagnosis met the definition of a disorder in the new nosology.
Otherwise, all kinds of identity disturbances could be considered psychiatric disorders. 'Should people of color
unhappy about their race be considered mentally ill?' critics asked. What about short people unhappy about their
height? Why not ego-dystonic masturbation? As a result, ego-dystonic homosexuality was removed from the next
revision, DSM-III-R, in 1987. In so doing, the APA implicitly accepted a normal variant view of homosexuality in a
way that had not been possible fourteen years earlier.199 (Citations omitted)

Homosexuality was officially removed from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in 1986.200 According to the
American Psychological Association:

[L]esbian, gay and bisexual orientations are not disorders. Research has found no inherent association between any
of these sexual orientations and psychopathology. Both heterosexual behavior and homosexual behavior are
normal aspects of human sexuality. Both have been documented in many different cultures and historical eras.
Despite the persistence of stereotypes that portray lesbian, gay and bisexual people as disturbed, several decades
of research and clinical experience have led all mainstream medical and mental health organizations in this country
to conclude that these orientations represent normal forms of human experience. Lesbian, gay and bisexual
relationships are normal forms of human bonding. Therefore, these mainstream organizations long ago abandoned
classifications of homosexuality as a mental disorder.201 (Emphasis supplied)

The American Psychological Association's revision marked the "beginning of the end of organized medicine's official
participation in the social stigmatization of homosexuality"202 as similar movements also followed. In 1990, the
World Health Organization removed homosexuality per se from the International Classification of Diseases.

Social forces have likewise shaped the use of penal laws to further discrimination and persecution of the LGBTQI+
community:

To a large extent, the religious and medical discourses became the bases for legal or state-prescribed discourses in
early Western societies. As a result, the argument that homosexuality is both a sin and a sickness is strengthened.
An illustration of this would be the laws against same-sex relations in colonies of the British Empire during the
19th century. The inclusion of Section 377, which refers to carnal intercourse between same-sex individuals, as an
offense "against the order of nature" and "unnatural" is a clear indication that homosexuality is viewed as both a sin
and a sickness (Carey, 2011; Kannabiran & Singh, 2009). Although the said legislation did not explicitly mention
male-to-male or female-to-female sexual relations as a crime, they are considered to be "against the order of
nature" and punishable by law (Indian Penal Code, 1860). Among the countries that adopted this law were Australia,
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Fiji, Hong Kong, India, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Myanmar
(Burma), Nauru, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga,
Tuvalu, and Western Samoa in the Asia Pacific region; and Botswana, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe in the African region (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Germany, one of the most powerful
countries during the Second World War, likewise had its own version of the sodomy law stated in Paragraph 175 of
the German Criminal Code (Awareness Harmony Acceptance Advocates [AHAA], 2014).

LGBT discrimination has a long history and serves as a remnant of the colonial era when the most powerful nations
used laws as mechanisms of control over morality and standards of behavior (Human Rights Watch, 2008; United
Nations Human Rights Commission [UNHRC], n.d.). The criminalization of homosexuality led to the LGBT people's
repression, which persisted even beyond the end of the Second World War when the international community
pushed for the recognition and respect for human rights.

....

As of 2015, 113 United Nations member states have legally recognized same-sex relations (ILGA, 2015). Also, key
international documents and human rights instruments were achieved, among them the Yogyakarta Principles in
2006, the UNHRC Resolution on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) in 2011, and the
UNHRC Core State Obligations on LGBT Human Rights in 2012.203

A 2012 coalition report204 submitted by OutRight Action International,205 together with 40 Philippine LGBTQI+ and
human rights groups206 and 13 activists,207 to the 106th Session of the United Nations Human Rights
Committee208 showed that from 1996 to 2012, 163 LGBTQI+ persons have been murdered due to their gender
identity, gender expression, or sexual orientation.209 The report documented discriminatory acts against LGBTQI+
groups and persons both by State and non-State actors.
In 2016, EnGendeRights, Inc. and OutRight Action International, as with 34 Philippine groups and
individuals,210 submitted a report211 to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women.212 This report documented the lack of national anti-discrimination, gender recognition, and hate crime
legislation, as well as cases of discrimination by police,213 health workers,214 educators,215 employers,216 and
the judiciary217 against LGBTQI+ persons.

A more recent report submitted in 2017218 by civil society organizations219 to the Universal Periodic Review of the
United Nations Human Rights Council continued to document human rights violations against LGBTQI+ persons,
including an existing legal framework inadequate to address systemic problems of discrimination and exclusion.

This is not to say that there is a universal experience for the LGBTQI+ community. To do so would be to "provide
homogenized and distorted views"220 of the community, "advancing the interest of more privileged
individuals."221 As first noted by American professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw:

This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those who are multiply-burdened and obscures
claims that cannot be understood as resulting from discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest further that this
focus on otherwise-privileged group members creates a distorted analysis of racism and sexism because the
operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in experiences that actually represent only a subset of a
much more complex phenomenon.222

Axes of privilege and empowerment, on one hand, and oppression and marginalization, on the other, provide a
spectrum that reflects the diversity of lived experiences of LGBTQI+ persons and groups. This is not confined to the
spheres of SOGIESC: class and economic status, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, and other identities223 all play
roles in the intersections of LGBTQI+ persons.

Therefore, any entity that attempts to speak for and on behalf of a diverse community must be able to adequately
thread the needle in representation of them, assisting this Court's understanding with sufficient facts that would
enable it to empower, and not further exclude, an already marginalized community.

VI (C)

There is a perception within the LGBTQI+ community that the Philippines is considered among the most gay-friendly
countries in the world.224

Accounts on the pre-colonial Philippine society report that different SOGIESC expressions were recognized and
accepted in the islands.

For instance, the Vocabulario de la Lengua Tagala, published in 1860, and the Vocabulario de la Lengua Bicol, in
1865, both make reference to the word asog, which refers to men who dress in women's clothes and keep relations
with fellow men.225 These persons exercised significant roles in the pre-colonial Philippine society and were even
revered as authorities:

[F]rom the earliest encounters between the Spanish and the natives, gender-crossing was already very much a
reality in a number of communities across the entire archipelago. Local men dressed up as—and acting like—
women were called, among others, bayoguin, bayok, agi-ngin, asog, bido, and binabae. The Spanish thought them
remarkable not only because they effectively transitioned from male to female, but also because as spiritual
intermediaries or babaylan, they were revered figures of authority in their respective communities. It's important to
remember that their taking on the customary clothes of women—as well as their engagement in feminine work—was
of a piece with a bigger and more basic transformation, one that redefined their gender almost completely as
female. More than mere cross-dressers, these "men" were gender-crossers, for they didn't merely assume the form
and behavior of women. Their culture precisely granted them social and symbolic recognition as binabae
("womanlike").226 (Emphasis supplied)

It has been noted that it was difficult to recognize the asogs, bayoguins, and binabayis as men because they carried
extraordinary clothing, appearance, and actions similar to women.227 This has been considered a manifestation of
freedom as they had "liberty over their choice of wear, behavior, beliefs and way of living."228
Aside from this fluidity in gender expression, it has also been observed that "the local concept of matrimony was not
imprisoned into male-and-female only."229 According to various cronicas y relaciones, the bayoguin, bayok, agi-
ngin, asog, bido, and binabae, among others, "were "married" to men, who became their maridos ("husbands"), with
whom they indulged in regular sexual congress."230

It was only during the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in the Philippine islands that these activities previously
engaged in by the asog, bayoguin, and binabayi became suppressed:

The right of men to wed their fellow men was suppressed, and the tradition of the asog wearing long skirts and
feminine clothes vanished. More than these, men were banned from having sexual relations with fellow men for this
ran contrary to the dominant religion anointed by the Spanish. The church had a corresponding punishment for the
natives who violated this rule. All sinners had to go through the sanctity of confession, for confession was the spring
that cleansed man's sins (Rafael, 1988).231

In contemporary times, as this Court has noted, there is no penalty in the Philippines for engaging in what may be
called "homosexual conduct."232 Notably, Republic Act No. 11166, or the Philippine HIV and AIDS Policy Act,
states a policy of non-discrimination in Section 2:

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policies. — . . .

....

Policies and practices that discriminate on the basis of perceived or actual HIV status, sex, gender, sexual
orientation, gender identity and expression, age, economic status, disability, and ethnicity hamper the enjoyment of
basic human rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Constitution and are deemed inimical to national interest.

However, discrimination remains. Hence, the call for equal rights and legislative protection continues.

To address the continuing discrimination suffered by the LGBTQI+ community in the Philippines, a number of
legislative measures have been filed in Congress.

For instance, the following bills were filed in the 17th Congress: (1) House Bill No. 267, or the Anti-SOGIE (Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity or Expression) Discrimination Bill,233 which was eventually consolidated, along with
other bills, into House Bill No. 4982234; (2) House Bill No. 79, which focused on the same subject as House Bill No.
267;235 (3) House Bill No. 2952, which aims to establish LGBT help and protection desks in all Philippine National
Police stations nationwide;236 House Bill No. 5584, which aims to define domestic violence against individuals,
including members of the LGBTQI+ community other than women and children;237 and Senate Bill No. 1271,
otherwise known as the Anti-Discrimination Bill.238

As of the 18th Congress, steps are being taken to pass the Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity, and Gender
Expression (SOGIE) Equality Bill, with at least 10 congressional bills239 and four Senate bills240 against
discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity pending.

While comprehensive anti-discrimination measures that address the specific conditions faced by the LGBTQI+
community have yet to be enacted, Congress has made headway in instituting protective measures. Republic Act
No. 11313, or the Safe Spaces Act, specifically addresses "transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs" and
penalizes gender-based street and public spaces sexual harassment:

SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:

(a) Catcalling refers to unwanted remarks directed towards a person, commonly done in the form of wolf-
whistling and misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs;

....
SECTION 4. Gender-based Streets and Public Spaces Sexual Harassment. — The crimes of gender-based streets
and public spaces sexual harassment are committed through any unwanted and uninvited sexual actions or remarks
against any person regardless of the motive for committing such action or remarks.

Gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment includes catcalling, wolf-whistling, unwanted invitations,
misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist slurs, persistent uninvited comments or gestures on a person's
appearance, relentless requests for personal details, statement of sexual comments and suggestions, public
masturbation or flashing of private parts, groping, or any advances, whether verbal or physical, that is unwanted and
has threatened one's sense of personal space and physical safety, and committed in public spaces such as alleys,
roads, sidewalks and parks. Acts constitutive of gender-based streets and public spaces sexual harassment are
those performed in buildings, schools, churches, restaurants, malls, public washrooms, bars, internet shops, public
markets, transportation terminals or public utility vehicles.

In the absence of a comprehensive national law, local government units have passed ordinances recognizing and
upholding SOGIESC. In Quezon City, City Ordinance No. 2357, or the Quezon City Gender-Fair Ordinance, was
passed.241 In Davao City, Ordinance No. 0417-12 was passed, penalizing acts that discriminate sexual and gender
orientation.242 In 2018, the Davao City Government announced that it would establish an "all-gender" comfort room
to accommodate members of the LGBTQI+ community.243 Its purpose, Vice Mayor Bernard Al-ag stated, is "to
reduce discrimination in the preferred gender of the people."244

Meanwhile, the San Juan City Government passed Ordinance No. 55, which provides for anti-discrimination of
members of the LGBT community.245 The Mandaluyong City Government passed Ordinance No. 698 in 2018 to
"uphold the rights of all Filipinos especially those discriminated by reason of gender identity and sexual
orientation."246 In 2019, during the Metro Manila Pride March and Festival, the Marikina City Government
announced the enactment of City Ordinance No. 065, its anti-discrimination ordinance.247

Moreover, the Philippine Commission on Women has listed other local government units that adopted anti-
discrimination ordinances to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity:

Angeles City in Pampanga, Antipolo City, Bacolod City in Negros Occidental, Batangas City in Batangas, Candon
City in Ilocos Sur, Cebu City, Dagupan City in Pangasinan, . . . Mandaue City, Puerto Princesa, . . . Vigan City in
Ilocos Sur, Municipality of San Julian in Eastern Samar, Province of Agusan del Norte, Province of Batangas [,] and
Province of Cavite.248

The history of erasure, discrimination, and marginalization of the LGBTQI+ community impels this Court to make
careful pronouncements—lest it cheapen the resistance, or worse, thrust the whole struggle for equality back to the
long shadow of oppression and exclusion. The basic requirement of actual case or controversy allows this Court to
make grounded declarations with clear and practical consequences.

VII

Here, petitioner has no actual facts that present a real conflict between the parties of this case. The Petition
presents no actual case or controversy.

Despite a goal of proving to this Court that there is a continuing and pervasive violation of fundamental rights of a
marginalized minority group, the Petition is woefully bereft of sufficient actual facts to substantiate its arguments.

A substantive portion of the Petition merely parrots the separate concurring opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno
in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, concerning the concept of suspect classifications. Five (5) pages of the 29-page Petition
are block quotes from retired Chief Justice Puno, punctuated by introductory paragraphs of, at most, two (2)
sentences each.

A separate opinion is the expression of a justice's individual view apart from the conclusion held by the majority of
this Court.249 Even first year law students know that a separate opinion is without binding effect.250 This Court
may adopt in a subsequent case the views in a separate opinion, but a party invoking it bears the burden of proving
to this Court that the discussion there is the correct legal analysis that must govern.
Petitioner made no such effort. He did not explain why this Court should adopt the separate opinion of retired Chief
Justice Puno. It is not enough, as petitioner has done, to merely produce copious quotations from a separate
opinion. Even more curious, petitioner would eventually betray a lack of confidence in those quotations by ultimately
saying that he "disagrees with the former Chief Justice's conclusion."251 From his confused and disjointed
reference to retired Chief Justice Puno, petitioner would arrive at the conclusion that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code must be examined through the lens of the strict scrutiny test.

In his separate concurring opinion in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, retired Chief Justice Puno referred to submissions
made by petitioner Ang Ladlad Party-List before respondent Commission on Elections on the "history of purposeful
unequal treatment"252 suffered by the LGBTQI+ community. This Court, however, cannot recognize Ang Ladlad
Party-List's allegations, since they were made by a different party, in a different case, on a different set of facts, for a
different subject matter, concerning a different law, to a different governmental body. These are not "actual facts"
sufficient to engender a justiciable controversy here. They cannot be summarily imported and given any weight in
this case, to determine whether there is a clash of rights between adversarial parties.

All told, petitioner's 29-page initiatory pleading neither cites nor annexes any credible or reputable studies, statistics,
affidavits, papers, or statements that would impress upon this Court the gravity of his purported cause. The Petition
stays firmly in the realm of the speculative and conjectural, failing to represent the very real and well-documented
issues that the LGBTQI+ community face in Philippine society.

Even petitioner's choice of respondent exposes the lack of an actual case or controversy.

He claims that he impleaded the Civil Registrar General as respondent because "it is the instrumentality of the
government that is tasked to enforce the law in relation with (sic) marriage[.]"253

Lest petitioner himself forget, what he asserts as ground for the allowance of his suit is the existence of grave abuse
of discretion;254 specifically, grave abuse of discretion in the enactment of the Family Code:

20. Petitioner submits that a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion exists in the passage of Articles 1 and 2
of the Family Code. Limiting the definition of marriage as between man and woman is, on its face, a grave abuse of
discretion[.]255

Respondent Civil Registrar General was not involved in the formulation or enactment of the Family Code. It did not
participate in limiting the definition of marriage to only opposite-sex couples. That is the province and power of
Congress alone.

His choice of the Civil Registrar General as respondent is manifestly misguided. No factual antecedents existed
prior to the filing of the Petition apart from the passage of the Family Code. Petitioner has never applied for a
marriage license. He has never even visited the premises of respondent's office, or of anyone acting under its
authority. Petitioner has never bothered to show that he himself acted in any way that asked respondent to
exercise any kind of discretion. Indeed, no discretion was ever exercised by respondent. Without an exercise of
discretion, there could not have been abuse of discretion, let alone one that could conceivably be characterized as
"grave."

This rudimentary, but glaring, flaw was pointed out by Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin during the oral arguments:

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor. We believe that it is proper to implead the Civil Registrar-General because when it comes to Rule
65 Petitions, Your Honors, in the way that petitions, petitioners invoked it, it's in the expanded . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

Yeah. I understand. Now, the expanded jurisdiction under the Second Paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII, refers
to abuse of discretion.

ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honors.

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

The Civil Registrar has no discretion. Meaning, it has only a ministerial duty to issue you a license or to deny you
that license. So, could you not ever resulted (sic) to mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of where you have a
refusal? You should have done that.

ATTY. FALCIS:

Your Honor, with this Court's indulgence, we are of the submission that in other laws that were questioned, other,
the constitutionality of other laws that were questioned . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE BERSAMIN:

No, you cannot make your case similar to those other laws because those other laws were against other branches
of government. They were seeking genuine judicial review. Here, you are asking us to perform a very ordinary task
of correcting somebody's mistake which was not even a mistake because there was no instance where you asked
that official to function as such.256 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner himself admitted that he has not suffered from respondent's enforcement of the law he is assailing:

JUSTICE BERNABE:

Have you actually tried applying for a marriage license?

ATTY. FALCIS:

No, Your Honors, because I would concede that I do not have a partner and that even if I do have a partner, it is not
automatic that my partner might want to marry me and so, Your Honors, I did not apply or I could not apply for a
marriage license.257

Petitioner noted258 that grave abuse of discretion may be shown by prima facie evidence. This does not help his
case. What it indicates is his own acknowledgement that proof cannot be dispensed with, and that he cannot win his
case based on pure allegations of actual or imminent injury caused by respondent.259 The burden is on petitioner
to point to any grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent to avail of this Court's
extraordinary certiorari power of review.260

By petitioner's own standards, his Petition lacks an essential requisite that would trigger this Court's review.

VIII

Aware of the need to empower and uphold the dignity of the LGBTQI+ community, this Court is mindful that swift,
sweeping, and indiscriminate pronouncements, lacking actual facts, may do more harm than good to a historically
marginalized community.

A proper ventilation of issues requires an appreciation of marriage past its symbolic value and towards a holistic
view of its practical, cross-cutting, and even permanent consequences. This entails an overlapping process of
articulation, deliberation, and consensus, which members of the LGBTQI+ community must undertake within their
circles and through the political branches of the government, towards crafting a policy that truly embraces the
particularities of same-sex intimacies.

VIII (A)

Despite seeking access to the benefits of marriage, petitioner miserably fails to articulate what those benefits are, in
both his filed pleadings and his submissions during oral arguments.
More than being the "foundation of the family[,]"261 the state of marriage grants numerous specific rights and
privileges that affect most, if not all, aspects of marital and family relationships.

VIII (A)(1)

Included in the bundle of rights granted by the Family Code to married spouses is the right of support, shown in the
obligation of each spouse to "render mutual help and support"262 and to provide support to the family.263 For
instance, spouses are mandated to contribute to the expenses for the management of the household.264 Likewise,
spouses are jointly responsible for the "sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education[,] and
transportation"265 of the family.266 The entitlement to this right continues even during proceedings for legal
separation, annulment of marriage, or declaration of nullity of marriage.267

As these obligations are enforceable, they concomitantly grant either spouse relief when the other spouse reneges
on his or her duty or commits acts that "tend to bring danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the
family[.]"268 Either spouse may likewise object to the profession, occupation, business or activity of the other
spouse on "valid, serious, and moral grounds."269

Although the Family Code does not grant the right to compel spouses to cohabit with each other,270 it maintains
that spouses are duty bound to "live together"271 and to "fix the family domicile."272 This is consistent with the
policy of promoting solidarity within the family.273

Furthermore, the Family Code allows spouses to constitute a family home,274 which shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment.275 The family home may not be sold, donated, assigned, or otherwise
encumbered by either spouse without the other's written consent.276 Though an unmarried head of a family may
constitute a family home,277 only those persons enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code may be considered
beneficiaries.278

The Civil Code also offers an expansive coverage on the rights and privileges of spouses should either of them die.
The law grants surviving legitimate spouses the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased
spouse.279 Accordingly, "no human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of[,] or exhumed"280 without
proper consent from the legitimate spouse, who shall have a better right than the other persons enumerated in
Article 199 of the Family Code.

In relation to this, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7170 permits the surviving spouse to donate all or any part of the
body of the deceased legitimate spouse, as long as there is no actual notice of contrary intentions by the deceased,
or of opposition by a member of his or her immediate family.281

The Civil Code also covers the successional rights granted to spouses. This includes the division and partition of the
deceased spouse's estate among the surviving spouse and other surviving descendants, ascendants, and collateral
relatives.

A surviving spouse succeeds concurrently with the deceased spouse's legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants.282 As compulsory heirs, they are entitled to receive a specific and definite portion of the deceased's
estate.283

In cases where the deceased spouse left a will, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-half of the testator's entire
estate.284 If the spouse survives with legitimate or illegitimate children or descendants and/or acknowledged natural
children, he or she receives a share equivalent to the share of a legitimate child.285

If either spouse dies without any will and the surviving spouse is the sole heir of the deceased, the spouse is entitled
to the entire estate "without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews[,] and nieces"286 of the
deceased. If the spouse survives with the legitimate or illegitimate children or descendants of the deceased then the
spouse is entitled to receive the same amount of share that a legitimate child is entitled to receive.287

The Civil Code also covers situations where the spouses were married in articulo mortis, and one (1) of them died
three (3) months after such marriage. In these cases, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-third of the deceased's
estate. However, where the spouses were living together as husband and wife five (5) years before a spouse dies,
the surviving spouse is entitled to half of the estate.288

Aside from the rights and privileges between married spouses, the Civil Code also provides for the relationships
between the spouses, as parents, and their children. Consistent with the constitutional provision on the "right and
duty of parents in rearing the youth,"289 the Family Code states that spouses shall exercise joint parental
authority,290 legal guardianship,291 and custody over common children.

Parental authority encompasses a bundle of rights for unemancipated children. This includes the right to represent
the common children in matters affecting their interests and to impose discipline on them as may be necessary,
among others.292

The Family Code likewise provides that spouses shall exercise legal guardianship over the property of the minor
child by operation of law.293 This entitles the spouses to a right over the fruits of the child's property, which shall be
used primarily for child support and secondarily for the family's collective needs.294

Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 8552 covers the rights and privileges attached to adoption. One (1) of the significant
rights granted by this law is the legitimate spouses' right to jointly adopt a child. Spouses who jointly adopt shall
exercise joint parental authority and custody over the adoptee.295

The adoptees shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as legitimate children of the adoptive parents.296 As
legitimate children, they may bear the surname of their adoptive parents.297 They are likewise granted the right to
receive support, the legitime, and other successional rights from both of the adoptive parents.

Moreover, inter-country adoption permits Filipino citizens permanently residing abroad to jointly file for adoption with
their spouse. Though Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8043 restricts adopters to persons who are "at least twenty-
seven (27) years of age and at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to be adopted, at the time of
application[,]" the same provision allows an exception in favor of an adopter who is the legitimate spouse of the
adoptee's natural parent.298

VIII (A)(2)

Marriage has consequences in criminal law as well.

For instance, anyone who, after having suddenly come upon his or her legitimate spouse in the act of committing
sex with another, kills any or both is only liable to suffer destierro. Should the offending spouse inflict physical
injuries upon his or her spouse or the other person, he or she shall be exempt from criminal liability.299

Marital relations also influence the imposable penalty for crimes. Any person's criminal act in defense of his or her
spouse is a justifying circumstance,300 while immediate vindication of a grave offense to one's spouse is a
mitigating circumstance.301 That the victim is the spouse of the offender is considered an alternative circumstance,
which may be considered as aggravating or mitigating depending on "the nature and effects of the crime and the
other conditions attending its commission."302 Commission of the crime in full view of the spouse of the victim-
spouse is also an aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape.303 The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as
amended, also qualifies trafficking if the offender is a spouse of the trafficked person.304 Further, a spouse who is
an accessory to a crime is generally exempt from criminal liability.305

In the crimes of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness, and rape, the marriage between the offending and the
offended party extinguishes the criminal action and remits the penalty already imposed upon the offender.306 In
marital rape, "the subsequent forgiveness" of the offended wife extinguishes the criminal action or penalty against
the offending husband.307 Likewise, adultery and concubinage cannot be prosecuted when the offended spouse
has pardoned the offenders or has consented to the offense.308

Bigamy is committed by a person who has been previously married and who contracts a subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by a court judgement.309 Penalizing the act of contracting a subsequent marriage where one is still legally
married to another person safeguards the institution of marriage, protecting the rights and status of the legitimate
spouse.

VIII (A)(3)

The State's interest in marriage and married persons extends to taxation.

Under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10963, the income taxes of married
individuals are generally computed separately based on their respective total taxable income.310 However, for any
income that "cannot be definitely attributed to or identified as income exclusively earned or realized by either of the
spouses,"311 Section 24 of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides that the amount shall be
equally divided between the spouses for the computation of their respective taxable incomes.

Further, in the computation of an individual's taxable income, the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended,
excludes from the computation of the gross income any amount received by an heir of an official or employee from
the employer "as a consequence of separation of such official or employee from the service of the employer
because of death sickness or other physical disability or for any cause beyond the control of the said official or
employee."312 Likewise, benefits received by a spouse from the Social Security System, in accordance with
Republic Act No. 8282, as well as benefits received from the Government Service Insurance System, in accordance
with Republic Act No. 8291, are excluded from the computation of an individual's gross income.313

On the filing of income tax returns, the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides that married
individuals, regardless of citizenship or residence, "who do not derive income purely from compensation," shall file
an income tax return that includes the income of both spouses, except "where it is impracticable for the spouses to
file one return," in which case each spouse may file separate income tax returns.314

As for estate tax, the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides that "the capital of the surviving
spouse of a decedent"315 is not deemed part of the gross estate. Consequently, "the net share of the surviving
spouse in the conjugal partnership property" is "deducted from the net estate of the decedent."316

Likewise, when the decedent is a Filipino citizen or a resident of the Philippines, the National Internal Revenue
Code, as amended, allows a deduction of the "current fair market value of the decedent's family home"317 up to
P10 million from the amount of the gross estate. Further, "any amount received by the heirs from the decedent's
employee as a consequence of the death of the decedent-employee in accordance with Republic Act No.
4917"318 is also deducted from the amount of the gross estate.

VIII (A)(4)

Even the Labor Code and other labor laws are influenced by the institution of marriage.

The narrow definition of "dependents" under the Labor Code includes "the legitimate spouse living with the
employee."319 As a consequence, the legitimate spouse is entitled to compensation from the state insurance fund
in case of the disability or death of the employee.320

Further, under the Social Security Act of 1997321 and the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997,322 the legal spouse of the member is included in the list of his or her dependents.

Similarly, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Act includes the legal spouse in the list of dependents of
overseas Filipino workers.323 Thus, certain benefits afforded to overseas Filipino workers are extended to the legal
spouse.324

The Labor Code confines an employee's "primary beneficiaries" to his or her dependent spouse, until he or she
remarries, and his or her dependent children.325 Primary beneficiaries are entitled to receive full death benefits
under the Labor Code.326
In addition, under the Social Security Act of 1997327 and the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997,328 the dependent spouse is included in the list of primary beneficiaries of the employee, until he or she
remarries.

The Social Security Act of 1997 entitles the "primary beneficiaries as of the date of retirement" to receive the
retirement benefits of the retired member upon his or her death.329 They are also entitled to receive death benefits
"[u]pon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36) monthly contributions prior to the semester of
death."330 The primary beneficiaries as of the disability are also entitled to receive the monthly pension of a
permanent total disability pensioner upon the pensioner's death.331

On the other hand, the Government Service Insurance System Act of 1997 entitles the dependent spouse, as a
primary beneficiary, to survivorship pension upon the death of a member.332 This entitlement is likewise afforded to
qualified beneficiaries "[u]pon the death of an old-age pensioner or a member receiving the monthly income benefit
for permanent disability."333 Further, funeral benefits are provided under the Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997.334

Moreover, under the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract,335 a
seafarer's beneficiaries are entitled to a list of compensation and benefits in the event of the seafarer's work-related
death.336

Meanwhile, under Republic Act No. 7192, or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act, "[m]arried
persons who devote full time to managing the household and family affairs" shall be entitled to voluntary coverage
under Pag-IBIG, the Government Service Insurance System, and Social Security System, which is equivalent to half
of "the salary and compensation of the working spouse."337 These contributions "shall be deducted from the salary
of the working spouse."338

VIII (A)(5)

Aside from influencing provisions in substantive law, the status of marriage is also recognized in the Rules of Court.

For instance, spouses may not be compelled to testify for or against each other during their marriage.339 Likewise,
during or even after their marriage, spouses, by reason of privileged communication, "cannot be examined without
the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage[.]"340

Moreover, the law accords to family courts exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for guardianship, custody of children,
adoption of children, and support, as well as complaints for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage, and
property relations.341

A disputable presumption under our Rules on Evidence is that a man and a woman who deport themselves as
spouses have entered into marriage.342 It is also presumed that a property that is acquired by a man and a woman,
who have the capacity to marry and live exclusively with each other as spouses without being actually married, was
obtained by their joint efforts, work, or industry.343 If such man and woman have acquired property through their
actual joint contribution, their contributions shall also be presumed as equal.344

VIII (A)(6)

Marriage likewise affects the application of other special laws. Several statutes grant a range of rights in favor of
legitimate spouses. Among these is the National Health Insurance Act of 2013, which gives a legitimate spouse, as
a "legal dependent," the right to receive health care benefits.345 This right includes inpatient hospital care and
payment for the services of healthcare professionals, and diagnostic and other medical services, among others.346

Furthermore, the Insurance Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 10607, acknowledges that every person has an
insurable interest in the life of his or her legitimate spouse.347 This allows a married person to enter into an
insurance policy upon the life of his or her spouse as owner and/or beneficiary.
As to survivorship benefits, legitimate spouses of retired chairpersons and commissioners of constitutional
commissions—the Commission on Audit, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Elections—as well as of the
Ombudsman are entitled under Republic Act No. 10084 to receive all the retirement benefits that the deceased
retiree was receiving at the time of his or her demise.348 Likewise, surviving legitimate spouses of deceased
members of the judiciary, who were retired or eligible to retire at the time of death, are entitled to all the retirement
benefits of the deceased judge or justice under Republic Act No. 910, as amended.349 In both cases, the surviving
legitimate spouse shall continue to receive such benefits until he or she remarries.

Similarly, the surviving legitimate spouses of police or military personnel, including firefighters, who died in the
performance of duty or by reason of their position, shall be given special financial assistance under Republic Act.
No. 6963. They are also entitled to receive whatever compensation, pension, or any form of grant, to which the
deceased person or his or her family was entitled.350

In addition, Republic Act No. 9049 entitles surviving legitimate spouses of deceased awardees of medals of valor to
a lifetime monthly gratuity pay of P20,000.00, which shall accrue in equal shares and with the right of accretion, until
he or she remarries and the common children reach the age of majority. This is separate from the pension, to which
the surviving legitimate spouse is also entitled.351

Under Republic Act No. 10699, the "primary beneficiaries" of a deceased national athlete or coach, which include
the surviving legitimate spouse, shall be entitled to a lump sum amount of P30,000.00 for funeral expenses.352

Republic Act No. 6173 entitles spouses who are both public officials and employees the right to jointly file their
statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth and disclosure of business interests and financial connections.353

Meanwhile, legitimate spouses of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation for lawful reasons are
granted visitation rights under Republic Act No. 7438.354

Republic Act No. 9505, or the Personal Equity and Retirement Act, prescribes the aggregate maximum contribution
of P100,000.00 per contributor. The same law includes a provision in favor of married contributors, such that each
spouse may make a maximum contribution of P100,000.00 or its equivalent in any convertible foreign currency per
year.355

Republic Act No. 8239, otherwise known as the Philippine Passport Act, also grants diplomatic passports to
legitimate spouses of "persons imbued with diplomatic status or are on diplomatic mission[.]" They include the
president, vice president, members of Congress and the judiciary, cabinet secretaries, and ambassadors, among
others.356 Moreover, an official passport shall be issued in favor of the legitimate spouses of all government
officials who are "on official trip abroad but who are not on a diplomatic mission or delegates to international or
regional conferences or have not been accorded diplomatic status" when accompanying them.357

More recently, in Republic Act No. 11035, legitimate spouses of science, technology, or innovation experts engaged
in a long-term program have been granted certain privileges, such as roundtrip airfares from a foreign country to the
Philippines and other special relocation benefits.358

VIII (B)

Yet, orienting same-sex relationships towards a state-sanctioned marriage cannot be attuned solely to its benefits
and advantages. This approach usually ignores the burdens associated with marriage. As a legally-binding
relationship that unites two (2) individuals, marriage becomes an "enabling constraint"359 that imposes certain
duties on married couples and even limitations on their actions.

The law imposes certain limitations on the property relations between spouses. For instance, the Family Code
prescribes that in the absence of any settlement between the spouses, their properties shall be governed by the
regime of absolute community of property.360

Under this regime, each spouse is considered a co-owner of all the properties they brought into the marriage, as
well as those properties they will acquire after marriage, regardless of their actual contribution.361
The spouses may also choose a system of conjugal partnership of gains as their property regime. Under this, "the
husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties
and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance[.]"362 Here, each spouse retains
power and control over his or her exclusive properties, such that he or she may mortgage, encumber, alienate, or
dispose of them during the marriage even without the consent of the other spouse.363 However, each spouse bears
the burden of proving that those properties acquired during the marriage form part of their exclusive property, as the
law creates a presumption that property is conjugal even if the properties were made, contracted or registered in the
name of only one spouse.364

The spouses may also decide on a separation of property during the marriage, subject to a judicial order.365 Should
the spouses choose this property regime, they may, in their individual capacity, dispose of their own properties even
without the consent of the other.366 However, despite the separation, the law mandates that the income of the
spouses shall account for the family expenses.367

Donations made by reason of marriage are also governed by the Family Code.368 While the provisions on ordinary
donations under the Civil Code may apply, there are specific rules which restrict the kind of donations that can be
made during marriage and even between the spouses. For instance, the Family Code provides that, should the
married spouses choose a property regime other than the absolute community of property, the husband and the
wife cannot donate more than one-fifth of their present property to each other.369 If the spouses select the absolute
community of property regime, they are proscribed from donating any part of the community property without the
consent of the other spouse.370

Corollary to the right granted to spouses, as parents, over the person and property of their children is the
responsibility to discipline them as may be required under the circumstances. Thus, under the law, spouses exercise
joint parental authority directly and primarily. They are solidarily liable for the damage caused by the acts or
omissions of their minor children who are living in their company and under their parental authority.371 The courts
may admonish those who exercise parental authority over delinquent children.372

While married persons may jointly adopt or be adopted, the law provides that either spouse may not adopt or be
adopted without the written consent of the other spouse.373 Thus, should a spouse seek to adopt his or her own
illegitimate child, the other spouse must still consent.374

Some crimes include marital relations among their elements. For instance, parricide covers the killing of one's
legitimate spouse and is penalized by reclusion perpetua to death.375

In the crimes of theft, swindling, or malicious mischief, no criminal liability is incurred if the spouse is the
offender.376

Further, Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits the spouse
of any public official from "requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any other
person having some business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the government, in which such
public official has to intervene."377 Spouses of the president, vice president, senate president, and speaker of the
House of Representatives are also forbidden to intervene in any business, transaction, contract, or application with
the government.378 Moreover, in determining the unexplained wealth of a public official, the spouses' properties,
bank deposits, and manifestly excessive expenditures are also considered.379

In civil actions, spouses are generally joint parties in a case irrespective of who incurred the obligation.380 In
criminal actions, the court may also cite in contempt the spouse of a drug dependent who refuses to cooperate in
the treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependent.381

Thus, the claim for a state-sanctioned marriage for same-sex couples should come with the concomitant willingness
to embrace these burdens, as well as to submit to the State certain freedoms currently enjoyed outside the
institution of marriage:

Critical awareness of the state's role as now-fundamental partner in the recognition and protection of a form of
sexual rights should push us to regard these "victories" as necessarily ethically compromised.
The moral atrophy that has kept us from recognizing the tragedy of these strategies and outcomes is where more
critical, and indeed discomfiting, work needs to be done by theorists and activists alike. This means rethinking the
horizon of success. "Victory" in the sense of gaining the state as a partner, rather than an adversary, in the struggle
to recognize and defend LGBT rights ought to set off a trip wire that ignites a new set of strategies and politics. This
must necessarily include a deliberate effort to counteract, if not sabotage, the pull of the state to enlist rights-based
movements into its larger governance projects, accompanied by an affirmative resistance to conceptions of
citizenship that figure nationality by and through the creation of a constitutive other who resides in the state's and
human rights' outside.382 (Emphasis supplied)

Yet, petitioner has miserably failed to show proof that he has obtained even the slightest measure of consent from
the members of the community that he purports to represent, and that LGBTQI+ persons are unqualifiedly willing to
conform to the State's present construct of marriage.

VIII (C)

Limiting itself to four (4) specific provisions in the Family Code, the Petition prays that this Court "declare Articles 1
and 2 of the Family Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4) and 55(6) of the Family
Code."383 However, should this Court rule as the Petition asks, there will be far-reaching consequences that extend
beyond the plain text of the specified provisions.

Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code provide a definition and spell out basic requisites, respectively. Without passing
upon the validity of the definition under Article 1, this Court nonetheless observes that this definition serves as the
foundation of many other gendered provisions of the Family Code and other laws.

A significant number of provisions under current marriage arrangements pertain to benefits to or burdens on a
specific sex (and are therefore dependent on what is assigned at birth based on the appearance of external
genitalia). As our current laws are confined to a heteronormative standard, they do not recognize the existence and
specificities of other forms of intimacy.

For instance, an incident of marriage granted by the law to spouses, specifically to wives, is the option to adopt their
husbands' surname under the Civil Code.384 The law also provides that should a marriage be annulled and the wife
is an innocent party, she may continue to employ her husband's surname unless the court decrees otherwise, or
when she or the former husband remarries.385 If the husband dies, the wife may still use his surname as though he
were alive.386

In case of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or of a donor, the Family Code specifies
that, to establish paternity and filiation, the husband must consent to the procedure in a written instrument prior to
the child's birth.387

The Family Code also contains provisions that favor the husband over the wife on certain matters, including property
relations between spouses. For one, the administration over the community property belongs to the spouses jointly,
but in case of disagreement, the husband's decision prevails.388 Similarly, the administration over conjugal
partnership properties is lodged in both spouses jointly, but in case of disagreement, the husband's decision
prevails, without prejudice to the wife's right to file a petition before the courts.389 And, in case of a disagreement
between the spouses on the exercise of parental authority over their minor children, the father's decision shall also
prevail.390

Our penal laws likewise contain sex-specific provisions. For instance, adultery is committed by a wife who had sex
with a man who is not her husband.391 In contrast, concubinage is committed when a husband keeps a mistress in
the conjugal dwelling, has sex under scandalous circumstances, or cohabits in another place with a woman who is
not his wife.392 While a woman who commits adultery shall be punished with imprisonment, a man who commits
adultery shall only suffer the penalty of destierro. Further, a husband who engages in sex with a woman who is not
his wife does not incur criminal liability if the sexual activity was not performed under "scandalous
circumstances."393
In labor law, Republic Act No. 8187, otherwise known as the Paternity Leave Act of 1996, provides that "every
married male employee in the private and public sectors shall be entitled to a paternity leave394 of seven (7) days
with full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of the legitimate spouse with whom he is cohabiting."395

VIII (D)

The litany of provisions that we have just recounted are not even the entirety of laws relating to marriage. Petitioner
would have this Court impliedly amend all such laws, through a mere declaration of unconstitutionality of only two
(2) articles in a single statute. This Court cannot do what petitioner wants without arrogating legislative power unto
itself and violating the principle of separation of powers.

Petitioner failed to account for any of these provisions. He failed to consider whether his own plea for relief
necessarily encompassed these and other related provisions. Thus, he failed in his burden of demonstrating to this
Court the precise extent of the relief he seeks. He merely stated that we may somehow grant him relief under his
generic, catch-all prayer for "other just and equitable reliefs." During the oral arguments:

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So what is your prayer?

ATTY. FALCIS:

The prayer of the petitions, Your Honor, initially says that to declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as null and
void. However, we also prayed for other just and equitable reliefs which we are of the position that in relation with
(sic) Republic vs. Manalo that there is an alternative option for this Court in the exercise of its expanded power of
judicial review to, in the light that the provisions is (sic) found . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:

Wait a minute. You are saying or claiming that the proper reading of Republic vs. Manalo under the ponen[c]ia of
Justice Peralta is that there is an alternative consequence to a finding that a provision is unconstitutional. Normally,
if a provision is unconstitutional, it is void ab initio. And you are now saying that the Court has created new
jurisprudence in Republic vs. Manalo that when we find a provision to be unconstitutional that it can be valid?

ATTY. FALCIS:

No, Your Honor. What petitioners are saying that our interpretations of this Court's guide in Republic vs. Manalo is
that . . . (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So in essence you are asking the Court to find or to found new jurisprudence in relation to situation (sic) like yours?

ATTY. FALCIS:

No, Your Honors, we are only asking for a statutory interpretation that was applied in Republic vs. Manalo that two
interpretations that would lead to finding (sic) of unconstitutionality the Court adopted a liberal interpretation, did not
declare Article 26 paragraph 2 as unconstitutional. But because the Constitution is deemed written into the Family
Code as well (sic) interpreted it in light of the equal protection clause.396

Petitioner miserably failed to discharge even the most elementary burden to demonstrate that the relief he prays for
is within this Court's power to grant. It is curious, almost negligent, for him as petitioner and counsel not to present
to this Court any other provision of law that will be affected as a consequence of his Petition.

VIII (E)
There is a myriad of laws, rules, and regulations that affect, or are affected by marriage.

Yet, none was ever mentioned in the Petition or the Petition-in-Intervention.

Whether by negligence or sheer ineptitude, petitioner failed to present to this Court even more than a handful of
laws that provide for the benefits and burdens which he claims are being denied from same-sex couples. He
confined himself to a superficial explanation of the symbolic value of marriage as a social institution.

This Court must exercise great caution in this task of making a spectrum of identities and relationships legible in our
marriage laws, paying attention to "who and what is actualized when the LGBT subject is given a voice."397 We
must be wary of oversimplifying the complexity of LGBTQI+ identities and relationships, and even render more
vulnerable "a range of identities and policies that have refused to conform to state-endorsed normative homo- or
heterosexuality."398

Thus, an immediate announcement that the current marriage laws apply in equal and uncalibrated measure to
same-sex relationships may operate to unduly shackle those relationships and cause untold confusions on others.
With the sheer inadequacies of the Petition, this Court cannot arrogate unto itself the task of weighing and adjusting
each of these many circumstances.

VIII (F)

Consequently, the task of devising an arrangement where same-sex relations will earn state recognition is better left
to Congress in order that it may thresh out the many issues that may arise:

Marriage is a legal relationship, entered into through a legal framework, and enforceable according to legal rules.
Law stands at its very core. Due to this inherent "legalness" of marriage, the constitutional right to marry cannot be
secured simply by removing legal barriers to something that exists outside of the law. Rather, the law itself must
create the "thing" to which one has a right. As a result, the right to marry necessarily imposes an affirmative
obligation on the state to establish this legal framework.399 (Emphasis supplied)

During oral arguments, Members of this Court pointed to civil unions that promote more egalitarian partnerships:

JUSTICE LEONEN:

What I'm asking you, Atty. Falcis, is other people, heterosexual couples that go into marriage more second class
than what you can create.

ATTY. FALCIS:

No, Your Honors, . . .

JUSTICE LEONEN:

Because, well, it's a pre-packaged set of law. In fact, if you trace that law it comes from the Spanish Civil Code.
Okay, the Partidas and then the Nueva Recopilacion and coming from the fuer sus fuegos before, correct?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

And in sealed patriarchy, in fact there are still some vestiges of that patriarchy in that particular Civil Code and there
are a lot of limitations, it is not culturally created. It's not indigenous within our system. Can you imagine same-sex
couples now can make their own civil union, correct?
ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:

The idea of some legal scholars which is to challenge even the constitutionality of marriage as a burden into their
freedoms is now available to same sex couples?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor, but that is not by choice, Your Honors. Same-sex couples do not have the choice out of marriage
because we're not even allowed to opt thing (sic)...

JUSTICE LEONEN:

So isn't it accurate to say that you are arguing to get into a situation which is more limited?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Your Honors, there are some situations that would be limited under marriage. But there are other situations that
are . . .

JUSTICE LEONEN:

But you see, Atty. Falcis, that was not clear in your pleadings? And perhaps you can make that clear when you file
your memoranda? What exactly in marriage, that status of marriage? So that status of marriage creates a bundle of
rights and obligations. But the rights and obligations can also be fixed by contractual relations, is that not correct?
And because it can be fixed by contractual relations, you can actually create a little bit more perfect civil union. In
fact, you can even say in your contract that we will stay together for ten years, after ten years, it's renewable,
correct? That cannot be done by heterosexual couples wanting to marry. But if that is your belief then it can be
established in that kind of an arrangement, correct? You may say not conjugal partnership or absolute community,
you will specify the details of the co-ownership or the common ownership that you have of the properties that you
have. You will say everything that I make is mine, everything that you make because you're richer therefore will be
shared by us. That's more [egalitarian], correct? That's not in the Civil Code, right?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor.400 (Emphasis supplied)

In truth, the question before this Court is a matter of what marriage seeks to acknowledge. Not all intimate
relationships are the same and, therefore, fit into the rights and duties afforded by our laws to marital
relationships.401

For this Court to instantly sanction same-sex marriage inevitably confines a class of persons to the rather restrictive
nature of our current marriage laws. The most injurious thing we can do at this point is to constrain the relationships
of those persons who did not even take part or join in this Petition to what our laws may forbiddingly define as the
norm. Ironically, to do so would engender the opposite of loving freely, which petitioner himself consistently raised:

The worst thing we do in a human relationship is to regard the commitment of the other formulaic. That is, that it is
shaped alone by legal duty or what those who are dominant in government regard as romantic. In truth, each
commitment is unique, borne of its own personal history, ennobled by the sacrifices it has gone through, and
defined by the intimacy which only the autonomy of the parties creates.
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will always be different for each couple. It is that
which we should understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as free as possible, bound not by
social expectations but by the care and love each person can bring.402 (Emphasis supplied)

Allowing same-sex marriage based on this Petition alone can delay other more inclusive and egalitarian
arrangements that the State can acknowledge. Many identities comprise the LGBTQI+ community. Prematurely
adjudicating issues in a judicial forum despite a bare absence of facts is presumptuous. It may unwittingly diminish
the LGBTQI+ community's capacity to create a strong movement that ensures lasting recognition, as well as public
understanding, of SOGIESC.

IX

Petitioner has no legal standing to file his Petition.

Legal standing is a party's "personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement."403 Interest in the case "means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental
interest."404

Much like the requirement of an actual case or controversy, legal standing ensures that a party is seeking a
concrete outcome or relief that may be granted by courts:

Legal standing or locus standi is the "right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." To possess legal
standing, parties must show "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have] sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged." The requirement of direct injury
guarantees that the party who brings suit has such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy and, in effect,
assures "that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions."

The requirements of legal standing and the recently discussed actual case and controversy are both "built on the
principle of separation of powers, sparing as it does unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch
of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government." In addition, economic reasons justify the rule.
Thus:

A lesser but not insignificant reason for screening the standing of persons who desire to litigate constitutional issues
is economic in character. Given the sparseness of our resources, the capacity of courts to render efficient judicial
service to our people is severely limited. For courts to indiscriminately open their doors to all types of suits and
suitors is for them to unduly overburden their dockets, and ultimately render themselves ineffective dispensers of
justice. To be sure, this is an evil that clearly confronts our judiciary today.

Standing in private suits requires that actions be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest,
interest being "material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case[,] [not
just] mere curiosity about the question involved." Whether a suit is public or private, the parties must have "a present
substantial interest," not a "mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." Those
who bring the suit must possess their own right to the relief sought.405 (Citations omitted)

Even for exceptional suits filed by taxpayers, legislators, or concerned citizens, this Court has noted that the party
must claim some kind of injury-in-fact. For concerned citizens, it is an allegation that the continuing enforcement of a
law or any government act has denied the party some right or privilege to which they are entitled, or that the party
will be subjected to some burden or penalty because of the law or act being complained of.406 For taxpayers, they
must show "sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation[.]"407 Legislators,
meanwhile, must show that some government act infringes on the prerogatives of their office.408 Third-party suits
must likewise be brought by litigants who have "sufficiently concrete interest"409 in the outcome of the dispute.

Here, petitioner asserts that he, being an "open and self-identified homosexual[,]"410 has standing to question
Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code due to his "personal stake in the outcome of the case":411
30. Petitioner has a personal stake in the outcome of this case. Petitioner is an open and self-identified homosexual.
Petitioner has sustained direct injury as a result of the prohibition against same-sex marriages. Petitioner has grown
up in a society where same-sex relationships are frowned upon because of the law's normative impact. Petitioner's
ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships is impaired because of the absence of a
legal incentive for gay individuals to seek such relationship.412

Petitioner's supposed "personal stake in the outcome of this case" is not the direct injury contemplated by
jurisprudence as that which would endow him with standing. Mere assertions of a "law's normative impact";
"impairment" of his "ability to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships"; as well as injury to
his "plans to settle down and have a companion for life in his beloved country";413 or influence over his "decision to
stay or migrate to a more LGBT friendly country"414 cannot be recognized by this Court as sufficient interest.
Petitioner's desire "to find and enter into long-term monogamous same-sex relationships"415 and "to settle down
and have a companion for life in his beloved country"416 does not constitute legally demandable rights that require
judicial enforcement. This Court will not witlessly indulge petitioner in blaming the Family Code for his admitted
inability to find a partner.

During the oral arguments, petitioner asserted that the very passage of the Family Code itself was the direct injury
that he sustained:

JUSTICE BERNABE:

Now, what direct and actual injury have you sustained as a result of the Family Code provisions assailed in your
Petition?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Your Honors, we are of multiple submissions. The first would be that as an individual I possess the right to marry
because the right to marry is not given to couples alone; it is individual, Your Honors. Second, Your Honors, we are
guided by this Court's pronouncements in the case of Pimentel v. Aguirre that the mere enactment of a law suffices
to give a person either an actual case or standing. Because, Your Honors, we are invoking the expanded power of
judicial review where in the most recent cases especially the one penned by Justice Brion, Association of Medical
Workers v. GSS, this Court said that under the expanded power of judicial review, the mere enactment of a law,
because Article VIII, Your Honors, Section 1 says that "Any instrumentality, the grave abuse of discretion of any
instrumentality may be questioned before the Supreme Court, Your Honor." And, therefore, the direct injury that I
suffer, Your Honor, was the passage of a law that contradicts the Constitution in grave abuse of discretion because
of the disregard of other fundamental provisions such as the equal protection clause, the valuing of human dignity,
the right to liberty and the right to found a family, Your Honors.417 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner presents no proof at all of the immediate, inextricable danger that the Family Code poses to him. His
assertions of injury cannot, without sufficient proof, be directly linked to the imputed cause, the existence of the
Family Code. His fixation on how the Family Code is the definitive cause of his inability to find a partner is
plainly non sequitur.

Similarly, anticipation of harm is not equivalent to direct injury. Petitioner fails to show how the Family Code is the
proximate cause of his alleged deprivations. His mere allegation that this injury comes from "the law's normative
impact"418 is insufficient to establish the connection between the Family Code and his alleged injury.

If the mere passage of a law does not create an actual case or controversy, neither can it be a source of direct injury
to establish legal standing. This Court is not duty bound to find facts419 on petitioner's behalf just so he can support
his claims.

It does not escape this Court's notice that the Family Code was enacted in 1987. This Petition was filed only in
2015. Petitioner, as a member of the Philippine Bar, has been aware of the Family Code and its allegedly repugnant
provisions, since at least his freshman year in law school. It is then extraordinary for him to claim, first, that he has
been continually injured by the existence of the Family Code; and second, that he raised the unconstitutionality of
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code at the earliest possible opportunity.420
Petitioner has neither suffered any direct personal injury nor shown that he is in danger of suffering any injury from
the present implementation of the Family Code. He has neither an actual case nor legal standing.

The Petition-in-Intervention was also authored by petitioner. He only filed it after the Office of the Solicitor General
had filed a Comment (Ad Cautelam) pointing out the procedural flaws in his original Petition. Still, the Petition-in-
Intervention suffers from the same procedural infirmities as the original Petition. Likewise, it cannot cure the plethora
of the original Petition's defects. Thus, it must also be dismissed.

Interventions are allowed under Rule 19, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.

Intervention is not an independent action but is ancillary and supplemental to existing litigation.421

X(A)

Intervention requires: (1) a movant's legal interest in the matter being litigated; (2) a showing that the intervention
will not delay the proceedings; and (3) a claim by the intervenor that is incapable of being properly decided in a
separate proceeding.422 Here, while petitioners-intervenors have legal interest in the issues, their claims are more
adequately decided in a separate proceeding, seeking relief independently from the Petition.

The Petition-in-Intervention suffers from confusion as to its real purpose. A discerning reading of it reveals that the
ultimate remedy to what petitioners-intervenors have averred is a directive that marriage licenses be issued to them.
Yet, it does not actually ask for this: its prayer does not seek this, and it does not identify itself as a petition for
mandamus (or an action for mandatory injunction). Rather, it couches itself as a petition of the same nature and
seeking the same relief as the original Petition. It takes pains to make itself appear inextricable from the original
Petition, at the expense of specifying what would make it viable.

It does not escape this Court's notice that the Petition and Petition-in-Intervention were prepared by the same
counsel, Falcis, the petitioner himself. The Petition-in-Intervention impleaded the same single respondent, the Civil
Registrar General, as the original Petition. It also merely "adopt[ed] by reference as their own all the arguments
raised by Petitioner in his original Petition[.]"423 Notably, a parenthetical argument made by petitioner that barely
occupied two (2) pages424 of his Petition became the Petition-in-Intervention's entire subject: the right to found a
family according to one's religious convictions.

Even though petitioners-intervenors Reverend Agbayani and Felipe, and Ibañez and her partner, all claim that they
have "wish[ed] to be married legally and have applied for a marriage license but were denied[,]"425 they only
echoed the original Petition's prayer, merely seeking that Articles 1, 2, 46(4), and 55(6) of the Family Code be
declared unconstitutional. Despite impleading respondent Civil Registrar General and asserting that they have a
fundamental right to marry their partners, petitioners-intervenors never saw it proper—whether as the principal or a
supplemental relief—to seek a writ of mandamus compelling respondent Civil Registrar General to issue marriage
licenses to them.

X(B)

Given these, this Court can only arrive at the conclusion that the Petition-in-Intervention was a veiled vehicle by
which petitioner sought to cure the glaring procedural defects of his original Petition. It was not a bona fide plea for
relief, but a sly, tardy stratagem. It was not a genuine effort by an independent party to have its cause litigated in the
same proceeding, but more of an ill-conceived attempt to prop up a thin and underdeveloped Petition.
Petitioner, as both party and counsel to petitioners-intervenors, miserably failed in his pretenses. A petition-in-
intervention cannot create an actual case or controversy when the main petition has none. In De Borja v. Pinalakas
na Ugnayan ng Maliliit na Mangingisda ng Luzon, Mindanao at Visayas:426

We stress that neither the OSG's filing of its Comment nor the petition-in-intervention of PUMALU-MV, PKSK, and
TDCI endowed De Borja's petition with an actual case or controversy. The Comment, for one, did not contest the
allegations in De Borja's petition. Its main role was to supply De Borja's petition with the factual antecedents
detailing how the alleged controversy reached the court. It also enlightened the RTC as to the two views, the
mainland principle versus the archipelagic principle, on the definition of municipal waters. Even if the Comment did
oppose the petition, there would still be no justiciable controversy for lack of allegation that any person has ever
contested or threatened to contest De Borja's claim of fishing rights.

The petition-in-intervention, on the other hand, also did not dispute or oppose any of the allegations in De Borja's
petition. While it did espouse the application of the archipelagic principle in contrast to the mainland principle
advocated by the OSG, it must be recalled that De Borja did not advocate for any of these principles at that time. He
only adopted the OSG's position in his Memorandum before the RTC. Thus, the petition-in-intervention did not
create an actual controversy in this case as the cause of action for declaratory relief must be made out by the
allegations of the petition without the aid of any other pleading.427 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

This Court cannot, and should not, sanction underhanded attempts by parties and counsels to unscrupulously
abuse the rules on intervention so that they may cure the glaring defects and missteps in their legal strategies.

X(C)

Even if the Petition-in-Intervention is not a sham foisted by petitioner upon this Court, it still does not satisfy the
requirements of justiciability.

Petitioners-intervenors invoke "third-party standing" as their basis for filing suit. But the requisites of third-party
standing are absent here.

For a successful invocation of third-party standing, three (3) requisites must concur:

Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer
suits, third party standing and, especially in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are
appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of
litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant must
have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third
party's ability to protect his or her own interests."428 (Citations omitted)

Regarding injury-in-fact, petitioner-intervenor LGBTS Christian Church claims that its ability to recruit, evangelize,
and proselytize is impaired by the lack of state recognition of the same-sex marriage ceremonies it conducts429 as
part of its religion. But there is no legally demandable right for a sect or denomination's religious ceremonies to be
given State imprimatur. Likewise, and in a manner similar to petitioner, the Family Code has not been shown to be
the proximate cause of petitioners-intervenors' alleged injury.

As to the requirement of some hindrance to a third party's ability to protect its own interests, petitioners-intervenors
claim that "the relative silence in constitutional litigation of such special interest groups in our nation such as the
American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance[.]"430 This is a direct
quotation from White Light Corporation v. City of Manila431 but was made without any explanation or discussion. In
White Light Corporation, there was an actual, demonstrable dearth of special interest groups involving patrons of
White Light Corporation's businesses. Here, petitioners-intervenors rely on nothing more than a bare allegation.
They presented no proof that there is "relative silence in constitutional litigation" from groups concerned with
LGBTQI+ causes that entitles them to raise arguments on behalf of third parties.
 XI

Petitioner's choice of remedy further emphasizes his ignorance of basic legal procedure.

Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to address constitutional issues. Petitions for certiorari are filed to address
the jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitions for prohibition
are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
functions.432 Rule 65, Sections 1 and 2 state:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. — When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof,
copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. — When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject
thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum
shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

Here, petitioner justifies his resort to Rule 65 on the basis of this Court's prior pronouncements that certiorari and
prohibition are the remedies for assailing the constitutionality of statutes.433 He cites, in
particular, Magallona and Araullo. Petitioner even faults this Court, asserting that its failure to create a "specific
remedial vehicle under its constitutional rule-making powers"434 made his resort to Rule 65 appropriate.

Yet, petitioner's presentation of his case, which is lacking in an actual or imminent breach of his rights, makes it
patently obvious that his proper remedy is not Rule 65, but rather, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

SECTION 1. Who May File Petition. — Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other
governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties,
thereunder.

An action for the reformation of an instrument, to quiet title to real property or remove clouds therefrom, or to
consolidate ownership under Article 1607 of the Civil Code, may be brought under this Rule. (Emphasis supplied)

This Court has been categorical435 that, in certain instances, declaratory relief is proper should there be a question
of the constitutionality of a statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation.
The remedy of declaratory relief acknowledges that there are instances when questions of validity or constitutionality
cannot be resolved in a factual vacuum devoid of substantial evidence on record436 for which trial courts are better
equipped to gather and determine.
Here, considering that there is an abysmal dearth of facts to sustain a finding of an actual case or controversy and
the existence of a direct injury to petitioner, a petition for declaratory relief resolved after full-blown trial in a trial
court would have been the more appropriate remedy.

As discussed, contrary to the basic requirement under Rule 65, petitioner failed to show that respondent Civil
Registrar General exercised any judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial function. From this, no grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction can be appreciated. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition
require the proper allegation not only of a breach of a constitutional provision, but more important, of an actual case
or controversy.437

Not even the weightiest constitutional issues justify a blatant disregard of procedural rules that attempts to bypass or
set aside judicious remedial measures put in place by this Court, under the guise that such remedies would take
more than a modicum of effort and time on the part of a petitioner.438 The requisites of justiciability should not be
so lightly set aside.

XII

An equally compelling and independently sufficient basis for dismissing this Petition is petitioner's violation of the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts.

XII (A)

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts ensures judicial efficiency at all levels of courts. It enables courts at each level to
act in keeping with their peculiar competencies. This is so, even as this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction
with the regional trial courts and the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. In Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections:439

The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of
the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the
facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to determine issues
of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into
branches. Their writs generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-
important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe
a determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope.
There are, however, some cases where resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law
made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions
of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most special civil actions. Unlike the trial
courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues that may not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.

This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new
circumstances or in the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first
instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in
order that it truly performs that role.440 (Citations omitted)

Very recently, in Gios-Samar, Inc. v. Department of Transportation and Communications,441 this Court traced the
jurisdictional history of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus. We noted that while the 1973 Constitution442 conferred on this Court original jurisdiction to issue these
extraordinary writs, the same power was later extended to the Court of Appeals443 and the regional trial
courts444 through Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

This concurrence of jurisdiction persists under the 1987 Constitution445 and the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.446
Time and again, this Court has held that the concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and the regional trial
courts with this Court does not give parties absolute discretion in immediately seeking recourse from the highest
court of the land.447 In Gios-Samar, we emphasized that the power to issue extraordinary writs was extended to
lower courts not only as a means of procedural expediency, but also to fulfill a constitutional imperative as regards:
(1) the structure of our judicial system; and (2) the requirements of due process.448

Considering the structure of our judicial system, this Court explained in Gios-Samar:

In Alonso v. Cebu Country Club, Inc. (Alonso), this Court had occasion to articulate the role of the CA in the judicial
hierarchy, viz.:

The hierarchy of courts is not to be lightly regarded by litigants. The CA stands between the RTC and the Court, and
its establishment has been precisely to take over much of the work that used to be done by the Court. Historically,
the CA has been of the greatest help to the Court in synthesizing the facts, issues, and rulings in an orderly and
intelligible manner and in identifying errors that ordinarily might escape detection. The Court has thus been freed to
better discharge its constitutional duties and perform its most important work, which, in the words of Dean Vicente
G. Sinco, "is less concerned with the decision of cases that begin and end with the transient rights and obligations of
particular individuals but is more intertwined with the direction of national policies, momentous economic and social
problems, the delimitation of governmental authority and its impact upon fundamental rights." . . .

Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the Court, they bypass the judicial structure and open
themselves to the risk of presenting incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers the resolution of
controversies before the Court. Without the necessary facts, the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights
and obligations of the parties. The case would then become another addition to the Court's already congested
dockets.449 (Citations omitted)

Enabling lower courts to grant extraordinary writs has contributed greatly to the practical concern of decongesting
dockets. More important, it facilitates the need to enable factual issues to be fully ventilated in proceedings before
courts that are better equipped at appreciating evidence, and ultimately bringing to this Court only issues of
paramount and pervasive importance. As the final interpreter of the laws of the land, the cases brought before this
Court should more appropriately be raising pure questions of law, with evidentiary matters having been
authoritatively settled by lower courts.

If this Court were to burden itself with settling every factual nuance of every petition filed before it, the entire judicial
machinery would bog down. Cases more deserving of this Court's sublime consideration would be waylaid. In Gios-
Samar, this Court further explained:

The doctrine of hierarchy of courts operates to: (1) prevent inordinate demands upon the Court's time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction; (2) prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket; and (3) prevent the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases
which often have to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or
as the court better equipped to resolve factual questions.450 (Citations omitted)

Likewise, this Court discussed how the doctrine of hierarchy of courts serves the constitutional right of litigants to
due process:

While the term "due process of law" evades exact and concrete definition, this Court, in one of its earliest decisions,
referred to it as a law which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after
trial. It means that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society. Under the present Rules of Court, which governs our judicial proceedings,
warring factual allegations of parties are settled through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the means of
ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a matter of fact. As earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot
accept evidence in the first instance. By directly filing a case before the Court, litigants necessarily deprive
themselves of the op[p]ortunity to completely pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due process is
effectively undermined by their own doing.451 (Citations omitted)
Immediately elevating evidentiary matters to this Court deprives the parties of the chance to properly substantiate
their respective claims and defenses. It is essential for courts to justly resolve controversies. Parties who proceed
headlong to this Court deny themselves their own chance at effective and exhaustive litigation.

Thus, this Court's dismissal of petitions that inextricably entail factual questions and violate the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts does not merely arise out of a strict application of procedural technicalities. Rather, such dismissal is a
necessary consequence of the greater interest of enabling effective litigation, in keeping with the right to due
process. The parties' beseeching for relief inordinately inflates this Court's competence, but we find no consolation
in flattery. In the end, it is never for this Court to arrogate unto itself a task that we are ill-equipped to perform:

In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs), direct recourse to this
Court is proper only to seek resolution of questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of which depends on the determination of questions
of fact cannot be brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts. We are not equipped, either
by structure or rule, to receive and evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions of the
lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison d'être behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates
as a constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to focus on the more fundamental tasks
assigned to it by the Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by an invocation of the
transcendental importance or constitutional dimension of the issue or cause raised.452 (Citations omitted)

XII (B)

The distinction between questions of fact and questions of law is settled. A question of fact exists when doubt arises
as to the truth or falsity of the facts presented; a question of law exists when the issue arises as to what the law is,
given a state of facts.453

That the issues involved are of transcendental importance is an oft-cited justification for failing to comply with the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts and for bringing admittedly factual issues to this Court.

Diocese of Bacolod recognized transcendental importance as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. In
cases of transcendental importance, imminent and clear threats to constitutional rights warrant a direct resort to this
Court.454 This was clarified in Gios-Samar. There, this Court emphasized that transcendental importance—
originally cited to relax rules on legal standing and not as an exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts—
applies only to cases with purely legal issues.455 We explained that the decisive factor in whether this Court should
permit the invocation of transcendental importance is not merely the presence of "special and important
reasons[,]"456 but the nature of the question presented by the parties. This Court declared that there must be no
disputed facts, and the issues raised should only be questions of law:457

[W]hen a question before the Court involves determination of a factual issue indispensable to the resolution of the
legal issue, the Court will refuse to resolve the question regardless of the allegation or invocation of compelling
reasons, such as the transcendental or paramount importance of the case. Such question must first be brought
before the proper trial courts or the CA, both of which are specially equipped to try and resolve factual
questions.458

Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to exercise its power of judicial review just because a case is
attended with purely legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from justiciability. Jurisdiction pertains to
competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a case."459 On the other hand,

[d]etermining whether the case, or any of the issues raised, is justiciable is an exercise of the power granted to a
court with jurisdiction over a case that involves constitutional adjudication. Thus, even if this Court has jurisdiction,
the canons of constitutional adjudication in our jurisdiction allow us to disregard the questions raised at our
discretion.460

Appraising justiciability is typified by constitutional avoidance.461 This remains a matter of enabling this Court to act
in keeping with its capabilities. Matters of policy are properly left to government organs that are better equipped at
framing them. Justiciability demands that issues and judicial pronouncements be properly framed in relation to
established facts:

Angara v. Electoral Commission imbues these rules with its libertarian character. Principally, Angara emphasized
the liberal deference to another constitutional department or organ given the majoritarian and representative
character of the political deliberations in their forums. It is not merely a judicial stance dictated by courtesy, but is
rooted on the very nature of this Court. Unless congealed in constitutional or statutory text and imperatively called
for by the actual and non-controversial facts of the case, this Court does not express policy. This Court should
channel democratic deliberation where it should take place.

....

Judicial restraint is also founded on a policy of conscious and deliberate caution. This Court should refrain from
speculating on the facts of a case and should allow parties to shape their case instead. Likewise, this Court should
avoid projecting hypothetical situations where none of the parties can fully argue simply because they have not
established the facts or are not interested in the issues raised by the hypothetical situations. In a way, courts are
mandated to adopt an attitude of judicial skepticism. What we think may be happening may not at all be the case.
Therefore, this Court should always await the proper case to be properly pleaded and proved.462

Thus, concerning the extent to which transcendental importance carves exceptions to the requirements of
justiciability, "[t]he elements supported by the facts of an actual case, and the imperatives of our role as the
Supreme Court within a specific cultural or historic context, must be made clear":463

They should be properly pleaded by the petitioner so that whether there is any transcendental importance to a case
is made an issue. That a case has transcendental importance, as applied, may have been too ambiguous and
subjective that it undermines the structural relationship that this Court has with the sovereign people and other
departments under the Constitution. Our rules on jurisdiction and our interpretation of what is justiciable, refined with
relevant cases, may be enough.464

Otherwise, this Court would cede unfettered prerogative on parties. It would enable the parties to impose their own
determination of what issues are of paramount, national significance, warranting immediate attention by the highest
court of the land.

XII (C)

In an attempt to divert this Court's attention from the glaring fundamental missteps of his Petition, petitioner—almost
predictably—invokes transcendental importance.465 This invocation fails to satisfy this Court of the need to resolve
the Petition on the merits. It fails to alleviate glaring deficiencies, whether as to having violated the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, or the lack of legal standing.

Even if this Court were to go out of its way in relaxing rules and proceed to resolve the substantive issues, it would
ultimately be unable to do so, as petitioner himself failed to present even an iota of evidence substantiating his case.

Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza (Associate Justice Jardeleza)'s interpellation during oral arguments
highlighted this. Citing as an example the experience of then attorney and later Justice Thurgood Marshall when he
attacked the "separate but equal" approach to schools in the segregation era of the United States, Associate Justice
Jardeleza emphasized the need for a contextualization of petitioners' arguments using factual and evidentiary
bases:

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

. . . Now, did Thurgood Marshall go direct to the US Supreme Court?

ATTY. FALCIS:

No, Your Honor.

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

That is the point of Justice Bersamin. And my point, you should read, . . . how the NAACP, . . . plotted/planned that
case and they had a lot of evidence, as in testimonial evidence, on the psychological effect of separate but allegedly
equal schools. So, do you get my point about why you should be better off trying this case before the RTC?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

. . . And I'll give you another good example, that is why I asked questions from Reverend Agbayani. Even if the
church remains as a party with standing, do you know why I asked that series of questions of (sic) him?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Because, Your Honor, what he was saying were factual issues, Your Honor.

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

Yes. And what does Escritor tell you?

ATTY. FALCIS:

In terms of religious freedom, Your Honor?

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

Yes. What does Escritor with respect to hierarchy of courts tell you?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Estrada v. Escritor remanded back the case, Your Honor, to the lower courts for . . .

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

Escritor tells you that you should reread it carefully. The religious claim is based on religious conviction, right?

ATTY. FALCIS:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

Just like a fundamental right, religious conviction. Bago ka dumating sa conviction the first word is religious. That's
why I was asking is there a religion? Is there a religion, to start with? Now, what is the difference between a religion
and a sect? What, how many people need/comprise a religion? Can you have a religion of one? That is described
in Escritor, that's one, is there a religion? No. 2, Escritor says, is the claim/burden being put by the government
something that impinges on a practice or belief of the church that is a central tenet or a central doctrine. You have to
prove that in the RTC, that was I was (sic) asking, that's why I was asking what is the tenet of MCC? What is the
different tenet? And you have to prove that and the question for example a while ago, you were asked by Justice
Leonen, "What is the history of marriage in the Philippines?" You have your view, right? The government has a
different view about the history and if I just listen to you, you will give me your views and if I just listen to the
SOLGEN, he will give me his views. What I'm saying is the Court needs a factual record where experts testify
subject to cross examination. Yun po ang ibig sabihin ng hierarchy of courts. . . .466 (Emphasis supplied)
At another juncture during the oral arguments, when interpellating Gatdula:

JUSTICE JARDELEZA:

. . . Mr. Falcis, for example, adverted to Brown v. Board of Education. And it should interest you and it is a
fascinating history on how a group of people spearheaded by the NAACP effected social change "separate but
equal is not constitutional". . . . And remember, the question there was separate but equal schools for black children
and white children, "Was it causing psychological harm to the black children?" Of course, the whites were saying
"no" because it's equal, they have equal facilities. The famous psychologist that they presented there is named
Kenneth Clark, who had his famous doll test, manika. He was able to prove that to the satisfaction of the trial court
that indeed black children sometimes even think that, you know, when you present them with dolls, that they are
white. That is the type of evidence I think that we need in this case. Now, very quickly and I will segue to Obergefell,
again, five cases four different states. They presented the Chairman of the Department of History of Yale. We heard
a lot, the government is talking of tradition and history. But again, for example, SolGen is citing Blair and Robertson,
that, of course, qualifies as a Learned Treaties, right? But again, for the proposition that the history of this country is
in favor of same sex, I would love first to hear, as an expert, probably the Chairman of History of Ateneo and UP. As
in Obergefell, they also had the Department of Psychology, Head of Washington and Lee University. So, my plea to
both of you, especially to the petitioner, at this point in time, I am not willing to ask you in your memo to discuss the
merits because unless the petitioner convinces me that we have a proper exception to the hierarchy of court rules
then I think, for the first time, this Court should consider that, when we say there is a violation of the hierarchy of
rules, we stop, we don't go to merits. And that's why I'm, I cannot go, for the life of me, to the merits if you have this
question of fact in my mind. "Who, which couples can belter raise a child?" Again I say, "That is a question of fact". I
am not a trier of fact, and my humble opinion is try it first.467 (Emphasis supplied)

The lack of material allegations and substantiation in petitioner's pleadings is glaring. He had nothing but this to say:

25. Lastly, Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises an issue of transcendental importance to the nation
because of the millions of LGBT Filipinos all over the country who are deprived from marrying the one they want or
the one they love. They are discouraged and stigmatized from pursuing same-sex relationships to begin with. Those
who pursue same-sex relationships despite the stigma are deprived of the bundle of rights that flow from a legal
recognition of a couple's relationship - visitation and custody rights, property and successional rights, and other
privileges accorded to opposite-sex relationships.468

Petitioner's cursory invocation of transcendental importance—miserably bereft of proof—cannot possibly impress

this Court. It only reveals petitioner's cavalier foolhardiness. Transcendental importance is not a life buoy designed
to save unprepared petitioners from their own mistakes and missteps. Its mere invocation is not license to do away
with this Court's own rules of procedure.469 In Lozano v. Nograles:470

Moreover, while the Court has taken an increasingly liberal approach to the rule of locus standi, evolving from the
stringent requirements of "personal injury" to the broader "transcendental importance" doctrine, such liberality is not
to be abused. It is not an open invitation for the ignorant and the ignoble to file petitions that prove nothing but their
cerebral deficit.

In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan
faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete injury. When warranted by the presence of
indispensable minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty to resolve the constitutional challenge
that may confront it. (Emphasis in the original)

Lacking even the indispensable minimum required by this Court, the Petition here cannot be resuscitated by an
unthinking parroting of extraordinary doctrines.

XIII

The primordial duty of lawyers to their clients and cause is to act to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and
with all good fidelity.471 Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:
CANON 17 — A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

Competence and diligence should be a lawyer's watchwords:

CANON 18 — A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.01 A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not qualified to
render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating
counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable
time to the client's request for information.

XIII (A)

Lawyers should be mindful that their acts or omissions bind their clients.472 They are bound to zealously defend
their client's cause, diligently and competently, with care and devotion:

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
ℒαwρhi ৷

authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.473 (Citations omitted)

XIII (B)

Here, petitioner wagered in litigation no less than the future of a marginalized and disadvantaged minority group.
With palpable vainglory, he made himself the lead plaintiff and also represented himself, only seeking assistance
from other counsel for oral arguments.474 By deciding to place this burden upon himself, petitioner should have
acted with utmost care and thoughtfulness, drawing upon the limits of his skill and knowledge, to represent the
LGBTQI+ cause.

However, at every stage of these proceedings, petitioner only exposed his utter lack of preparation, recklessness,
and crudeness.

Petitioner had already been previously sanctioned for his negligence and incompetence during the June 5, 2018
preliminary conference. There, this Court underscored his ignorance of basic court procedure. In its July 3, 2018
Resolution,475 this Court already reminded petitioner of the duty and responsibility that counsels have to the cause
they purport to represent:

Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Atty. Falcis' appearance
and behavior during the preliminary conference reveal the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the
Advisory for Oral Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior to the preliminary conference, it was
inexcusably careless for any of them to appear before this Court so barely prepared.
The preliminary conference was not mere make-work. Rather, it was essential to the orderly conduct of proceedings
and, ultimately, to the judicious disposition of this case. Appearance in it by counsels and parties should not be
taken lightly.

Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even uttering a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with
this Court. His bearing and demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human rights advocacy he purports
to represent.476

As a result, petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt of court and admonished. He was sternly warned that any
further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely.

XIII (C)

Undeterred by this Court's stern warning, petitioner, along with co-counsels, Attys. Angeles, Guangko, and Maranan
of Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and Coloma Law Office, failed to comply with this Court's June 26, 2018 Order to submit
the required memorandum of both petitioner and petitioners-intervenors within 30 days, or until July 26,
2018.477 Because of this, the Memorandum was dispensed with. Petitioner and his co-counsels were all ordered to
show cause why they should not be cited in indirect contempt.478

Their explanations479 are patently unsatisfactory. They fault the impulsivity of youth, other supposedly equally
urgent professional work, reliance on Court pronouncements in other cases, and work disruptions caused by floods
and typhoons.480 These were the same bases raised in their prior Motion for Extension, which this Court found to
be utterly lacking in merit and denied. These reasons failed to impress then, and they fail to impress now. As we
observed then, the complexity of issues and other professional work did not delay the filing of memoranda by other
parties.481 There is no compelling reason to treat petitioner and his co-counsels differently. After all, it was
petitioner who set all of these events in motion; the other parties merely responded to what he sought.

Petitioner and his co-counsel's reference to the "impulsivity of youth"482 utterly fails to impress. If at all, this Court
sees this as a deodorized admission of unreadiness and impotence.

In any case, as this Court has already stated in its July 3, 2018 Resolution:

Atty. Falcis is not an uninformed layperson. He has been a member of the Philippine Bar for a number of years. As
an officer of the court, he is duty bound to maintain towards this Court a respectful attitude essential to the proper
administration of justice. He is charged with knowledge of the proper manner by which lawyers are to conduct
themselves during judicial proceedings. His Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility exhort him
to maintain the requisite decency and to afford dignity to this Court.483

Youth and professional inexperience do not excuse the manifest inability of sworn court officers to follow lawful
orders. Like petitioner, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko and Atty. Maranan are members of the Philippine Bar, charged
with basic knowledge of the rules of pleading and practice before the courts, especially this Court. They are not
uninformed laypersons whose ignorance can be excused by inexperience. It bears noting that Atty. Angeles, Atty.
Guangko, and Atty. Maranan are part of the law firm Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and Coloma Law Offices and are, thus,
presumably guided by more experienced litigators who should have been able to competently advise them on what
is expected of those who appear before this Court.

XIV

Diligence is even more important when the cause lawyers take upon themselves to defend involves assertions of
fundamental rights. By voluntarily taking up this case, petitioner and his co-counsels gave their "unqualified
commitment to advance and defend [it.]"484 The bare minimum of this commitment is to observe and comply with
the deadlines set by a court.

Lawyers who wish to practice public interest litigation should be ever mindful that their acts and omissions before
the courts do not only affect themselves. In truth, by thrusting themselves into the limelight to take up the cudgels on
behalf of a minority class, they represent the hopes and aspirations of a greater mass of people, not always with the
consent of all its members. Their errors and mistakes have a ripple effect even on persons who did not agree with or
had no opportunity to consent to the stratagems and tactics they employed.

One who touts himself an advocate for the marginalized must know better than to hijack the cause of those whom
he himself proclaims to be oppressed. Public interest lawyering demands more than the cursory invocation of legal
doctrines, as though they were magical incantations swiftly disengaging obstacles at their mere utterance. Public
interest advocacy is not about fabricating prestige. It is about the discomfort of taking the cudgels for the weak and
the dangers of standing against the powerful. The test of how lawyers truly become worthy of esteem and approval
is in how they are capable of buckling down in silence, anonymity, and utter modesty—doing the spartan work of
research and study, of writing and self-correction. It is by their grit in these unassuming tasks, not by hollow, swift
appeals to fame, that they are seasoned and, in due time, become luminaries, the standard by which all others are
measured.

Petitioner courted disaster for the cause he chose to represent. He must have known what was at stake. Yet, he
came to this Court scandalously unprepared, equipped with nothing more than empty braggadocio. For a shot at
fame, he toyed with the hopes and tribulations of a marginalized class.

By failing to represent his cause with even the barest competence and diligence, petitioner betrayed the standards
of legal practice. His failure to file the required memorandum on time is just the most recent manifestation of this
betrayal. He disrespected not only his cause, but also this Court—an unequivocal act of indirect contempt.

A person adjudged guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment
not exceeding six (6) months, or both.485 To serve as a reminder to the bench and bar, and in light of petitioner's
being earlier adjudged guilty of contempt of court for a similar offense—for which he was specifically warned that
any further contemptuous acts shall be dealt with more severely—this Court, while declining to mete out the penalty
of imprisonment by way of clemency, imposes on petitioner the penalty of a fine.

Similarly, parties who come before this Court to intervene in a proceeding should be prepared to fully participate in
all its stages, whenever this Court requires them to. Records show that after oral arguments, intervenor-oppositor
Perito also never filed a memorandum pursuant to the June 26, 2018 Order. He has not made any manifestation or
explanation for his noncompliance. His failure to comply with this Court's order likewise constitutes indirect
contempt.

What we do in the name of public interest should be the result of a collective decision that comes from well-thought-
out strategies of the movement in whose name we bring a case before this Court. Otherwise, premature petitions
filed by those who seek to see their names in our jurisprudential records may only do more harm than good. Good
intentions are no substitute for deliberate, conscious, and responsible action. Litigation for the public interest of
those who have been marginalized and oppressed deserves much more than the way that it has been handled in
this case.

A Final Note

Our freedom to choose the way we structure our intimate relationships with our chosen significant other in a large
sense defines us as human beings. Even opposite-sex couples continually adjust the day-to-day terms of their
partnership as their relationships mature. It is in the sanctuary of their spaces that we authentically evolve, become
better human beings, and thus contribute meaningfully within our society. After all, the companionship and
understanding that we inevitably discover with the person we choose to spend the rest of our lives with provide the
foundation for an ethic of care that enriches a democracy.

This Court sympathizes with the petitioner with his obvious longing to find a partner. We understand the desire of
same-sex couples to seek, not moral judgment based on discrimination from any of our laws, but rather, a balanced
recognition of their true, authentic, and responsive choices.

Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is not the case that presents the clearest actual
factual backdrop to make the precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires. Perhaps, even before that actual
case arrives, our democratically-elected representatives in Congress will have seen the wisdom of acting with
dispatch to address the suffering of many of those who choose to love distinctively, uniquely, but no less genuinely
and passionately.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and the Petition-in-Intervention are DISMISSED.

This Court finds petitioner Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, his co-counsels Atty. Darwin P. Angeles, Atty. Keisha
Trina M. Guangko, Atty. Christopher Ryan R. Maranan, as well as intervenor-oppositor Atty. Fernando P. Perito,
all GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.

Atty. Falcis is sentenced to pay a fine of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) within thirty (30) days from notice. Atty.
Angeles, Atty. Guangko, Atty. Maranan, and Atty. Perito are REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to be more
circumspect of their duties as counsel. They are STERNLY WARNED that any further contemptuous acts shall be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be included in the personal records of Atty. Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, Atty.
Maranan, and Atty. Perito, and entered in their files in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
 4.) G.R. No. 212719

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO
V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ,
JULITO P. MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE,
JANMARK SARACHO, JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI, JR., Petitioners vs. SECRETARY LEILA
M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Respondents

x-----------------------x

ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., Petitioner-Intervenor

x-----------------------x

WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C. CABANILLA, Petitioners-Intervenors

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 214637

REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V. OMERES, PASCUA B.

GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON, WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO
ELLIOT, and ROMEO R. MACOLBAS, Petitioners vs. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL
CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY,
Respondents

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing
1

Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592, which states:
2

SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new procedures and standards of
behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the
creation of a Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same
Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be prospective in application.

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance for loyalty shall also be
prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to the management, screening and evaluation of
the MSEC. 3

The Case

On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94,
97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC). For reference, the modifications are underscored
4

as follows:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who
have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation
of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner
agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to
abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his sentence
with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30)
years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he shall be
released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this
paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however,
That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu
proprio order the rearrest of the accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees
and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum
penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
imprisonment.

ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:

1. By conditional pardon;

2. By commutation of the sentence; and

3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing preventive imprisonment
or serving his sentence.

ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive
imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal
institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions
from the period of his sentence:

1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month of
good behavior during detention;

2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-
three days for each month of good behavior during detention;

3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction
of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention;

4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for
each month of good behavior during detention; and

5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in
addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time
rendered.

An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct.
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted
to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A
deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in
the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in
Article 158 of this Code.

This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.

ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
(Emphases ours)

Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on
March 26, 2014 and became effective on April 18, 2014. Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section
5

4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time
allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the
ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC. 6

G.R. No. 212719

On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary
Injunction) was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J.
7

Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact of convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio
8

A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito
P. Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran,
and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and as representatives of
their member organizations and the organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf
of all who are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in nature and
beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For
them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements. They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of
Corrections (BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when
the prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the RPC and R.A. No.
10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple standards added by the new law, which are matters
of record, and the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override
the constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the principle that penal laws
beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.

Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition (In Intervention). He
9

incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition, impleads the same respondents, and adds that nowhere from
the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court
resolved to grant the leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment thereon. 10

Another Petition-in-Intervention was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
11

served as counsel for William M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are
also inmates of the NBP. The petition argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being contrary to
the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those
who would have been benefited from the retroactive application of the law; and is also ultra vires, as it was issued
beyond the authority of respondents to promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014, We required the
adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention. 12

On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment to the Petition of
13

Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a
Comment to the Petition-in-Intervention of Montinola et al.
14
G.R. No. 214637

On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by Reynaldo D. Edago, Peter R. Torida,
15

Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M. Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A.
Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security
Compound of the NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director Franklin
Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge) Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the
petition are as follows:

A.

SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF
R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.

a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective application.

b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws
that are beneficial to the accused shall have retroactive application.

c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.

B.

SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.

b. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process. 16

Per Resolution dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their comment to the petition. In
17

compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment on December 10, 2014, while the OSG did the same on
18

February 9, 2015 in behalf of all the respondents.

19

Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit Reply, attaching therein said Reply.
20

On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and noted the Reply. 21

The Court's Ruling

The petition is granted.

Procedural Matters

Actual case or controversy

Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the elements of justiciability as the
requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-vis the requirement of ripeness has not been complied with. For
them, the claimed injury of petitioners has not ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the
MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate and
recommend any applications for time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of petitioners has applied for
the revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third, the prison records annexed
to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting
from alleged extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after obtaining their
prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits for GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.
We disagree.

It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided unless the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. As to the requirement of
22

actual case or controversy, the Court stated in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils.
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.: 23

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or
to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial
review to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power,
to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of
judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety
of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, x x x.

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a
case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of. 24

There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of legal rights that can be
interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective
application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision
violates the Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the challenged
regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and convicted prisoners who are similarly
situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger
of sustaining direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are
languishing in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is
oppressive. With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in resolving the case would cause them great
prejudice. Justice demands that they be released soonest, if not on time.

There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC. Petitioners Edago et al.
correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre. There, We dismissed the novel theory that people
25

should wait for the implementing evil to befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act." Similar
to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in this case is whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4,
Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are not necessary to
render the present controversy ripe. An actual case may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the
26

assailed IRR has actually and adversely affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to the
ripening of a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. If this Court cannot await the adverse
consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention, the same can
27

be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in their
applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised credits, considering that such application would be
an exercise in futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be prospectively applied. If the assailed
provision is indeed unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better time than the present action to settle such question
once and for all.28

Legal standing

We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may claim any injury from the alleged
executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of
respondents have no direct adverse effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no GCTA
granted to them.

It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, who
stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.

Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is meant a
present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or
consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be
prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced."

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The concept has been defined as a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the law is invalid, but also
that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been, or
is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to
some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of. 29

In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they are prisoners currently
serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have a personal stake in the outcome of this case as their stay
in prison will potentially be shortened (if the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their
dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the
questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since there were no GCTAs granted to them. There
is none precisely because of the prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of
rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison records is
immaterial in determining whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat, the
possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to
show that respondents have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby.

Propriety of legal remedy:

Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should be
dismissed because such petitions are proper only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of
their rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.

True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it
was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making or quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has
consistently held that "petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials." In Araullo v. Aquino III, former
30 31

Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the Constitution?

The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both
are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable
only to the judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v.
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or
the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending
before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to
determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The
errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to
whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be
exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to
review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.

The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common
law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying
down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an
inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that
purpose, viz.:

xxxx

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to
warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or
that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from
prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some action of an inferior tribunal,
and is directed to the cause or proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a
preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court expounded on the
nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:

A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative
function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further
proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are
accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against
legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within
the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise
of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed
to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief
can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action
for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case,
petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of
their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary
restraining order.

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and
reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a
tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right,
undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.

Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, the Court
is not at all precluded from making the inquiry provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected
parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or executive action. This
entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and balances. 32

In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised herein so as to finally resolve the
question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is also because of the
public importance of the issues raised, and the interest of substantial justice, not to mention the absence of any
33 34

dispute as to any underlying fact.35

Hierarchy of courts

Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-in-intervention, should
still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction
over actions assailing the validity of administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of Section 5(2)
(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. An action assailing the validity of an administrative issuance is one that is
36

incapable of pecuniary estimation, which, under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the RTC, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy to question the validity of the IRR. 37

Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter incapable of pecuniary
estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to the proper RTC. Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this
38

consolidated case captioned as petition for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and
illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which We
only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. In accordance with
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of
the RTC.

Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, and those of transcendental
importance and of first impression. As the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important reasons
39

therefor, We may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct in asserting that R.A. No. 10592 and
its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the Philippines. Not only the social, economic, and moral well-being of
the convicts and detainees are involved but also their victims and their own families, the jails, and the society at
large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive scope of the subject matter, the upholding of public
policy, and the repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to Us.

Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice on the numerous affected
inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case with a circumspect leniency, granting petitioners the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of their case rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities. It need
40

not be said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended period of detention
or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates the accused person's right to liberty. Hence, We shunt the
41

rigidity of the rules of procedure so as not to deprive such birthright. The Court zealously guards against the
42

curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to liberty. The right to liberty, which stands second
43

only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. At its core, substantive due
44

process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes
provided by law. 45

Substantive Issues

Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law that is favorable or
advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These are the rules,
the exception, and the exception to the exception on the effectivity of laws. 46
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the
accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched. It has been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.
47 48

x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until the 31st of December,
1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that
laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the
Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to the general
rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non
respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for the future, the
judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience
and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda,
odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity,
and accepted by science. 49

According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the
very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards
it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." 50

Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC applies to said Code and its
51

amendments, as well as to special laws, such as Act No. 2126, Presidential Decree No. 603, R.A. No.
52 53 54 55

7636, R.A. No. 8293, R.A. No. 8294, R.A. No. 9344, and R.A. No. 10586, to cite a few.
56 57 58 59 60

But what exactly is a penal law?

A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:

A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one. 61

Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and prescribing penalties
for their violation. 62

Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state which,
under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In common use, however, this sense has been
enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and
establish penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a
penalty upon their commission. 63

Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. 64

The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not procedural rules. Moreover, the
65

mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature. 66

In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal
law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof.
1âшphi1

Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to
the accused cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter
should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.

We concur.

While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a penalty as it addresses the
67

rehabilitation component of our correctional system, its provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the
68

punishment attached to the crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the
ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of Article
22 of the RPC.
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of
petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached to their respective
crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their sentence
and increasing their punishment. Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article 22 of the RPC.
69

In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL, respondents aver that a careful
scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for "new procedures and standards of behavior" to fully
implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to
accused who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial and of
utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and the BJMP
operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative
mechanism to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must
follow uniform guidelines in managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of prisoners prior to their
recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may be granted time allowances.

Respondents fail to persuade Us.

Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in the place of his
confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions
of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the
issuance of the challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the
grant of time allowances is untenable.

It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was enacted, prisoners have already been
70

entitled to deduct the period of preventive imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In addition, good
conduct time allowance has been in existence since August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No. 1533. Said law 71

provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good conduct and
diligence. Under Act No. 1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time allowance may also apply to
72

detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to them. Such
73

prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.

Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of
Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make
and keep such records and take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No.
1533. When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932, the Director of Prisons was empowered to grant allowances
74 75

for good conduct whenever lawfully justified. With the effectivity of R.A. No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority
76

is now vested on the Director of the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial, district,
municipal or city jail.
77

Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending body for the grant of
GCTA and TASTM. They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of a detention or
78

convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed
mentoring activities. The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No.
79

10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition before its beneficial provisions are
applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be
necessary to implement its provisions. Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal mandate when
80

they provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be enforced.

Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under legislative authority must
be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying the law's general
provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot
amend an act of Congress. 81

The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the assailed IRR and even before the
enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification Board had been handling the functions of the MSEC and
implementing the provisions of the RPC on time allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or
institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should not in any way prejudice the
substantive rights of current detention and convicted prisoners.

Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in granting GCTA remains to be
"good conduct." In essence, the definition of what constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable through the years,
thus:

Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison, and has labored with
diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been assigned to him." 82

BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has no record of breach of
discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations."
83

IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of
active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work activities or
accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations" 84

Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or conduct while in
prison. Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful completion of an educational program or course
85

(i.e., elementary, secondary and college education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record. These
86

considered, the Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex
for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC has to do is to utilize the same
standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records.

WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the prospective application of
the grant of good conduct time allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time
allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable dispatch the time allowances due to
petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from
imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

5.) MASTERPIECE CAKESHOP, LTD., et al., PETITIONERS v. COLORADO CIVIL RIGHTS
COMMISSION, et al.
on writ of certiorari to the court of appeals of colorado
[June 4, 2018]
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.
In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make
inquiries about ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop’s owner told the
couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious
opposition to same-sex marriages—marriages the State of Colorado itself did not
recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the
Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act.
The Commission determined that the shop’s actions violated the Act and ruled in the
couple’s favor. The Colorado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement order,
and this Court now must decide whether the Commission’s order violated the
Constitution.
The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two
principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect
the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face
discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to
exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of
religion. The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a
beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected
speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the application
of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their
meaning.
One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the
baker’s refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words
or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake showing words with religious
meaning—that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining
whether a baker’s creation can be protected, these details might make a difference.
The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free exercise
claim. A baker’s refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right
way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake, or even a
refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain
religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but
endless.
Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise principles might be in some cases,
the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of this case was inconsistent with
the State’s obligation of religious neutrality. The reason and motive for the baker’s
refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court’s
precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving
the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by generally
applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must
yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an
adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a
factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met
here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so
with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires.
Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that whatever the outcome of some
future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission’s actions here
violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside.
I
A
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The
shop offers a variety of baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies to
elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday parties, weddings, and other events.
Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and operated the shop for 24 years.
Phillips is a devout Christian. He has explained that his “main goal in life is to be
obedient to” Jesus Christ and Christ’s “teachings in all aspects of his life.” App. 148. And
he seeks to “honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.” Ibid. One of Phillips’
religious beliefs is that “God’s intention for marriage from the beginning of history is that
it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.” Id., at 149. To Phillips,
creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in
a celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs.
Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they entered his shop in the summer of
2012. Craig and Mullins were planning to marry. At that time, Colorado did not recognize
same-sex marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and
afterwards to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver. To prepare for their
celebration, Craig and Mullins visited the shop and told Phillips that they were interested
in ordering a cake for “our wedding.” Id., at 152 (emphasis de- leted). They did not
mention the design of the cake they envisioned.
Phillips informed the couple that he does not “create” wedding cakes for same-sex
weddings. Ibid. He explained, “I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you
cookies and brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same sex weddings.” Ibid. The couple
left the shop without further discussion.
The following day, Craig’s mother, who had accompanied the couple to the cakeshop and
been present for their interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why he had
declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes for
same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, and also
because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages. Id., at 153. He
later explained his belief that “to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates
something that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would have been a
personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they were
entering into.” Ibid. (emphasis deleted).
B
For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrimination in places of public
accommodation. In 1885, less than a decade after Colorado achieved statehood, the
General Assembly passed “An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil Rights,” which
guaranteed “full and equal enjoyment” of certain public facilities to “all citizens,”
“regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude.” 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp.
132–133. A decade later, the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply to
“all other places of public accommodation.” 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139.
Today, the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) carries forward the state’s tradition
of prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation. Amended in 2007 and
2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as other
protected characteristics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows:
“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse,
withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed,
color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and
equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of a place of public accommodation.” Colo. Rev. Stat. §24–34–601(2)(a)
(2017).
The Act defines “public accommodation” broadly to include any “place of business
engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services . . . to the public,” but
excludes “a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for
religious purposes.” §24–34–601(1).
CADA establishes an administrative system for the resolution of discrimination claims.
Complaints of discrimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first instance by
the Colorado Civil Rights Division. The Division investigates each claim; and if it finds
probable cause that CADA has been violated, it will refer the matter to the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission. The Commission, in turn, decides whether to initiate a formal
hearing before a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who will hear evidence and
argument before issuing a written decision. See §§24–34–306, 24–4–105(14). The
decision of the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-member appointed
body. The Commission holds a public hearing and deliberative session before voting on
the case. If the Commission determines that the evidence proves a CADA violation, it
may impose remedial measures as provided by statute. See §24–34–306(9). Available
remedies include, among other things, orders to cease-and-desist a discriminatory
policy, to file regular compliance reports with the Commission, and “to take affirmative
action, including the posting of notices setting forth the substantive rights of the public.”
§24–34–605. Colorado law does not permit the Commission to assess money damages or
fines. §§24–34–306(9), 24–34–605.
C
Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and
Phillips in August 2012, shortly after the couple’s visit to the shop. App. 31. The
complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been denied “full and equal service” at the
bakery because of their sexual orientation, id., at 35, 48, and that it was Phillips’
“standard business practice” not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings, id., at 43.
The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation. The investigator found that “on
multiple occasions,” Phillips “turned away potential customers on the basis of their
sexual orientation, stating that he could not create a cake for a same-sex wedding
ceremony or reception” because his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the
potential customers “were doing something illegal” at that time. Id., at 76. The
investigation found that Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six
other same-sex couples on this basis. Id., at 72. The investigator also recounted that,
according to affidavits submitted by Craig and Mullins, Phillips’ shop had refused to sell
cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment celebration because the shop “had a
policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.” Id., at 73.
Based on these findings, the Division found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA
and referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission. Id., at 69.
The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal hearing, and it sent the case to a
State ALJ. Finding no dispute as to material facts, the ALJ entertained cross-motions for
summary judgment and ruled in the couple’s favor. The ALJ first rejected Phillips’
argument that declining to make or create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins did not
violate Colorado law. It was undisputed that the shop is subject to state public
accommodations laws. And the ALJ determined that Phillips’ actions constituted
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex- ual orientation, not simply opposition to
same-sex marriage as Phillips contended. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a–72a.
Phillips raised two constitutional claims before the ALJ. He first asserted that applying
CADA in a way that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would
violate his First Amendment right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his
artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed. The ALJ rejected the
contention that preparing a wedding cake is a form of protected speech and did not
agree that creating Craig and Mullins’ cake would force Phillips to adhere to “an
ideological point of view.” Id., at 75a. Applying CADA to the facts at hand, in the ALJ’s
view, did not interfere with Phillips’ freedom of speech.
Phillips also contended that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex weddings would
violate his right to the free exercise of religion, also protected by the First Amendment.
Citing this Court’s precedent in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of
Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a “valid and neutral
law of general applicability” and therefore that applying it to Phillips in this case did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 879; App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a–83a. The ALJ thus
ruled against Phillips and the cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both
constitutional claims.
The Commission affirmed the ALJ’s decision in full. Id., at 57a. The Commission ordered
Phillips to “cease and desist from discriminating against . . . same-sex couples by
refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to heterosexual
couples.” Ibid. It also ordered additional remedial measures, including “comprehensive
staff training on the Public Accommodations section” of CADA “and changes to any and
all company policies to comply with . . . this Order.” Id., at 58a. The Commission
additionally required Phillips to prepare “quarterly compliance reports” for a period of
two years documenting “the number of patrons denied service” and why, along with “a
statement describing the remedial actions taken.” Ibid.
Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission’s
legal determinations and remedial order. The court rejected the argument that the
“Commission’s order unconstitutionally compels” Phillips and the shop “to convey a
celebratory message about same sex marriage.” Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc.,
370 P. 3d 272, 283 (2015). The court also rejected the argument that the Commission’s
order violated the Free Exercise Clause. Relying on this Court’s precedent
in Smith, supra, at 879, the court stated that the Free Exercise Clause “does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general
applicability” on the ground that following the law would interfere with religious practice
or belief. 370 P. 3d, at 289. The court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the
statute did not violate his free exercise rights. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to
hear the case.
Phillips sought review here, and this Court granted certiorari. 582 U. S. ___ (2017). He
now renews his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment.
II
A
Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be
treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and
the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their
civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great
weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical
objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of
expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U. S. ___ (2015), “[t]he
First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper
protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their
lives and faiths.” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 27). Nevertheless, while those religious and
philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not
allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected
persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable
public accommodations law. See Newman v. Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U. S. 400,
402, n. 5 (1968) (per curiam); see also Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 572 (1995) (“Provisions like these are well
within the State’s usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a
given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate
the First or Fourteenth Amendments”).
When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy who objects
to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could not be compelled to perform the
ceremony without denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion. This refusal
would be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an
exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to
their own dignity and worth. Yet if that exception were not confined, then a long list of
persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do
so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the
history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and
public accommodations.
It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other
classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the
same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public. And there are
no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one could argue implicate the First
Amendment. Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods or
any cakes for gay weddings, that would be a different matter and the State would have a
strong case under this Court’s precedents that this would be a denial of goods and
services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services
to the general public and is subject to a neutrally applied and generally applicable public
accommodations law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4–7, 10.
Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is presented. He argues that he had to
use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his
own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a
significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere
religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line where the
customers’ rights to goods and services became a demand for him to exercise the right
of his own personal expression for their message, a message he could not express in a
way consistent with his religious beliefs.
Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable given the background of legal
principles and administration of the law in Colorado at that time. His decision and his
actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in the year 2012. At that point,
Colorado did not recognize the validity of gay marriages performed in its own State. See
Colo. Const., Art. II, §31 (2012); 370 P. 3d, at 277. At the time of the events in question,
this Court had not issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. 744
(2013), or Obergefell. Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be
performed in Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not
unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he understood to be
an expression of support for their validity when that expression was contrary to his
sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to
create and express a message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take
place in another State.
At the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create
specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive. Indeed, while enforcement
proceedings against Phillips were ongoing, the Colorado Civil Rights Division itself
endorsed this proposition in cases involving other bakers’ creation of cakes, concluding
on at least three occasions that a baker acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with
decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd.,
Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No.
P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24,
2015).
There were, to be sure, responses to these arguments that the State could make when it
contended for a different result in seeking the enforcement of its generally applicable
state regulations of businesses that serve the public. And any decision in favor of the
baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services
who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in effect be allowed to put
up signs saying “no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,”
something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips
was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the
circumstances of the case.
B
The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised
here, however. The Civil Rights Commission’s treatment of his case has some elements
of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated
his objection.
That hostility surfaced at the Commission’s formal, public hearings, as shown by the
record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider
Phillips’ case. At several points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view
that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial
domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in
Colorado’s business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe
“what he wants to believe,” but cannot act on his religious beliefs “if he decides to do
business in the state.” Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same
position: “[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he’s got an issue with
the—the law’s impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to
compromise.” Id., at 30. Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different
interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a business cannot refuse
to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor’s personal
views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments
showing lack of due consideration for Phillips’ free exercise rights and the dilemma he
faced. In view of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely.
On July 25, 2014, the Commission met again. This meeting, too, was conducted in public
and on the record. On this occasion another commissioner made specific reference to
the previous meeting’s discussion but said far more to disparage Phillips’ beliefs. The
commissioner stated:
“I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of
religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout
history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be—I mean, we—
we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify
discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people
can use to—to use their religion to hurt others.” Tr. 11–12.
To describe a man’s faith as “one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people
can use” is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as
despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical—something insubstantial
and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to compare Phillips’
invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust.
This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility
of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado’s antidiscrimination law—a law that protects
discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation.
The record shows no objection to these comments from other commissioners. And the
later state-court ruling reviewing the Commission’s decision did not mention those
comments, much less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the
commissioners disavowed in the briefs filed in this Court. For these reasons, the Court
cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and
impartiality of the Commission’s adjudication of Phillips’ case. Members of the Court
have disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly
be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the
basis of religion. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 540–
542 (1993); id., at 558 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In this
case, however, the remarks were made in a very different context—by an adjudicatory
body deciding a particular case.
Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment between Phillips’ case and
the cases of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience
and prevailed before the Commission.
As noted above, on at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the
refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex
marriage, along with religious text. Each time, the Division found that the baker acted
lawfully in refusing service. It made these determinations because, in the words of the
Division, the requested cake included “wording and images [the baker] deemed
derogatory,” Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4; featured “language
and images [the baker] deemed hateful,” Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No.
P20140070X, at 4; or displayed a message the baker “deemed as
discriminatory, Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4.
The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in these three cases contrasts
with the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ objection. The Commission ruled against
Phillips in part on the theory that any message the requested wedding cake would carry
would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address
this point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti-gay marriage
symbolism. Additionally, the Division found no violation of CADA in the other cases in
part because each bakery was willing to sell other products, including those depicting
Christian themes, to the prospective customers. But the Commission dismissed Phillips’
willingness to sell “birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies,” App. 152,
to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant. The treatment of the other cases and Phillips’
case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether
speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be
distinguished. In short, the Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ religious objection did
not accord with its treatment of these other objections.
Before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Phillips protested that this disparity in treatment
reflected hostility on the part of the Commission toward his beliefs. He argued that the
Commission had treated the other bakers’ conscience-based objections as legitimate,
but treated his as illegitimate—thus sitting in judgment of his religious beliefs
themselves. The Court of Appeals addressed the disparity only in passing and relegated
its complete analysis of the issue to a footnote. There, the court stated that “[t]his case
is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division’s recent findings that [the other
bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian patron on the basis of his
creed” when they refused to create the requested cakes. 370 P. 3d, at 282, n. 8. In those
cases, the court continued, there was no impermissible discrimination because “the
Division found that the bakeries . . . refuse[d] the patron’s request . . . because of the
offensive nature of the requested message.” Ibid.
A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances cannot be
based on the government’s own assessment of offensiveness. Just as “no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion,” West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U. S. 624, 642 (1943), it is
not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to prescribe
what shall be offensive. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (opinion of Alito,
J.) (slip op., at 22–23). The Colorado court’s attempt to account for the difference in
treatment elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of
official disapproval of Phillips’ religious beliefs. The court’s footnote does not, therefore,
answer the baker’s concern that the State’s practice was to disfavor the religious basis
of his objection.
C
For the reasons just described, the Commission’s treatment of Phillips’ case violated the
State’s duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a
religion or religious viewpoint.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, supra, the Court made clear that the government, if it is
to respect the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that
are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that
passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices.
The Free Exercise Clause bars even “subtle departures from neutrality” on matters of
religion. Id., at 534. Here, that means the Commission was obliged under the Free
Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips’ religious
beliefs. The Constitution “commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon
even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to
religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high
duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.” Id., at 547.
Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include “the historical
background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the
enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history,
including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking
body.” Id., at 540. In view of these factors the record here demonstrates that the
Commission’s consideration of Phillips’ case was neither tolerant nor respectful of
Phillips’ religious beliefs. The Commission gave “every appearance,” id., at 545, of
adjudicating Phillips’ religious objection based on a negative normative “evaluation of
the particular justification” for his objection and the religious grounds for it. Id., at 537. It
hardly requires restating that government has no role in deciding or even suggesting
whether the religious ground for Phillips’ conscience-based objection is legitimate or
illegitimate. On these facts, the Court must draw the inference that Phillips’ religious
objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires.
While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the State’s
interest could have been weighed against Phillips’ sincere religious objections in a way
consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. The
official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’ comments—
comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in
the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the
Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission’s disparate consideration of Phillips’ case
compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these reasons, the
order must be set aside.
III
The Commission’s hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that
our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a
neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious
objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was
presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context
that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later
cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the
rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission’s order
must be invalidated.
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in
the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with
tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting
gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.
The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed
 6.) EN BANC

May 11, 2018

G.R. No. 237428

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES, represented by SOLICITOR GENERAL JOSE C. CALIDA, Petitioner

vs
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

Whoever walks in integrity and with moral character walks securely, but he who takes a crooked way will be
discovered and punished.

-The Holy Bible, Proverbs 10:9 (AMP)

Integrity has, at all times, been stressed to be one of the required qualifications of a judge. It is not a new concept in
the vocation of administering and dispensing justice. In the early l 600's, Francis Bacon, a philosopher, statesman,
and jurist, in his "Essay L VI: Of Judicature" said - "'[a]bove all things, integrity is the Judge's portion and proper
virtue." Neither is integrity a complex concept necessitating esoteric philosophical disquisitions to be understood.
Simply, it is a qualification of being honest, truthful, and having steadfast adherence to moral and ethical
principles. Integrity connotes being consistent - doing the right thing in accordance with the law and ethical
1

standards everytime. Hence, every judicial officer in any society is required to comply, not only with the laws and
legislations, but with codes and canons of conduct and ethical standards as well, without derogation. As Thomas
Jefferson remarked, "it is of great importance to set a resolution, never not to be shaken, never to tell an untruth.
There is no vice so mean, so pitiful, so contemptible and he who permits himself to tell a lie once, finds it much
easier to do it a second and third time, till at length it becomes habitual, he tells lies without attending to it, and truths
without the world's believing him. This falsehood of the tongue leads to that of the heart and in time depraves all its
good dispositions." Mental dishonesty and moral mischief breed all that integrity is not.

In our jurisdiction, one cannot be qualified to be a member of the Judiciary, lacking such mandatory requirement of
"proven integrity". Inevitably, an appointee to the position of Chief Justice of the Supreme Court must be the
exemplar of honesty, probity and integrity. The purpose of this requirement is self-evident as the Chief Justice heads
the Judiciary and adjudicates cases as a member of the Court that "has the last word on what the law is." Together 2

with other Justices, the Chief Justice also disciplines members of the Bar for misconduct. The significance of probity
and integrity as a requirement for appointment to the Judiciary is underscored by the fact that such qualifications are
not explicitly required of the President, the Vice-President or the Members of Congress under the Constitution. The
Constitution, thus, demands in no uncertain terms that the Chief Justice be the embodiment of moral and ethical
principles. He or she must be of unquestionable character, possessed of moral authority to demand obedience to
the law and to impose a rule of conduct. Indeed, one who exacts compliance with the law and ethical standards
should be their foremost adherent.

No one is above the law and the Constitution, not even a Chief Justice who took an oath to protect and defend the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. The Court in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, says it3

tritely - "the Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any other member of this Court." All public officers
4

whether in the Executive, Legislative or Judicial departments are bound to follow the law. If a public officer violates
the law, he or she shall suffer punishment, sanctions and adverse consequences. The obligatory force of the law is
necessary because once we allow exceptions, concessions, waiver, suspension or non-application to those who do
not want to follow the law, nobody else will obey the law.

In this unprecedented case for quo warranto against the incumbent Chief Justice, the Republic entreats this Court to
declare Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (respondent) ineligible to hold the highest post in the Judiciary for failing to
regularly disclose her assets, liabilities and net worth as a member of the career service prior to her appointment as
an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the Supreme Court, in violation of the Constitution, the Anti-Graft
Law, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Republic accordingly
seeks the nullification of respondent's appointment, asserting that her failure to file the required disclosures and her
failure to submit the same to the Judicial and Bar Council show that she is not possessed of "proven integrity"
demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.

The Case

Invoking the Court's original jurisdiction under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special
civil action under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) filed the present Petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to
5

declare as void respondent's appointment as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and to oust and altogether exclude
respondent therefrom.

The Antecedents

From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning a period of 20 years, respondent served as a member of the
faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of Law (U.P. or U.P. College of Law), initially as a temporary
faculty member (from November 1986 to December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until
her resignation therefrom on June 1, 2006. As a regular faculty member, respondent was paid by the month by
6

U.P. 7

Based on the records of the U.P. Human Resources Development Office (U.P. HRD0), respondent was on official
8

leave from the U.P. College of Law for the following periods:

June 1, 2000 - May 31, 2001

June 1, 2001 - May 31, 2002

November 1, 2003 - May 31, 2004

June 1, 2004 - October 31, 2004

November 1, 2004 - February 10, 2005

February 11, 2005 - October 31, 2005

November 15, 2005 - May 31, 2006

While being employed at the U.P. College of Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, respondent was concurrently
employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the
Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines
(PIATCO cases). 9

The Personal Data Sheet (PDS) accomplished under oath by respondent further details, among others, the
following engagements/services rendered by her for various government agencies: 10

Position From To No. of Department/ Nature of work Supervisor

Years Agency

Legal Counsel 1994 2008 14 yrs. Various agencies Legal – various Executive
of government – international Secretaries
Office of the trade and Alberto
President, Office of investment law Romulo,
the Solicitor in WTO Eduardo
General, Manila (Geneva), Ermita and
International ICSID Leandro
 Airport Authority, (Washington, Mendoza,
Department of DC). ICC-ICA Chief
Agriculture, (Singapore, Presidential
Department of Paris) and in Legal Counsel
Trade and bilateral dispute Avelino Cruz
Industry, WTO- resolution and Merceditas
AFTA Commission, mechanisms Gutierrez;
Philippine Coconut Solicitor
Authority Generals
Alfredo
Benipayo,
Antonio
Nachura and
Agnes
Devanadera,
MIAA General
Manager
Alfonso Cusi,
Sen. Edgardo
Angara, Sec.
Salvador
Escudero,
Undersecretary
Thomas
Aquino, Amb.
Lilia Bautista

Deputy Commission on Legal and Acting

Commissioner Human Rights (UP Administrative Chairman&
Diliman, Comm.
Commonwealth Abelardo
Ave., QC, Aportadera
TEL:928-7098) (TEL: 687-
7571)

Incidentally, the U.P. HRDO certified that there was no record on respondent's 201 file of any permission to engage
in limited practice of profession. Her engagement as legal counsel for the Republic continued until 2009.
11 12

Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from November 1986 to June 1, 2006, the record of the
U.P. HRDO only contains the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for
1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, and 2002, filed by respondent. On the other hand, the
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

records of the Central Records Division of the Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by
respondent for calendar years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was subscribed
only in August 2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003. Belatedly, 22

in respondent's Ad Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, she attached a copy of her SALN for 1989 which she23

supposedly sourced from the "filing cabinets" or "drawers of U.P." Similarly, despite having been employed as
24 25

legal counsel of various government agencies from 2003 to 2009, there is likewise no showing that she filed her
SALNs for these years, except for the SALN ending December 31, 2009 which was unsubscribed and filed before
the Office of the Clerk of Court only on June 22, 2012.

After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, and thereafter as practitioner in various
outfits including as legal counsel for the Republic until 2009, the respondent submitted her application for the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010.

In support of her application as Associate Justice, respondent submitted to the Office of Recruitment Selection and
Nomination (ORSN) of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) her SALN for the year 2006. This SALN for 2006 bears
26

no stamp received by the U.P. HRDO and was signed on July 27, 2010. According to respondent, the JBC
27

considered her nomination for the position of Associate Justice as that of a private practitioner and not as a
government employee. Only recently, in a letter to the ORSN dated February 2, 2018, likewise attached to her Ad
28 29

Cautelam Manifestation/Submission, respondent would explain that such SALN was really intended to be her SALN
as of July 27, 2010. Respondent further explained during the Oral Arguments that she merely downloaded the
30

SALN form and forgot to erase the year "2006" printed thereon and that she was not required by the ORSN to
submit a subscribed SALN. 31

Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC stand, the only
SALNs available on record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years 1985, 1989, 1990, 1991,
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her 20-year government service in
U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as legal counsel for the Republic. Neither
was there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly
re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010.

In tabular form, respondent's inclusive years in government employment vis-a-vis the SALNs filed by her and
available on record are as follows:

As faculty member of the U.P. College of Law:

Year SALN ought to be filed SALN actually filed by

respondent

November 1986 SALN as of November 1986 (entry SALN ending December 31, 1985
SALN)

-no record of SALN as of

November 1986 (entry SALN

1987 SALN ending December 31, 1986 -no record-

1988 SALN ending December 31, 1987 -no record-

1989 SALN ending December 31, 1988 -no record-

1990 SALN ending December 31, 1989 SALN ending December 31, 1989
(sourced by respondent from one
of the "filing cabinets" or "drawers"
of U.P.)

1991 SALN ending December 31, 1990 SALN ending December 31, 1990

1992 SALN ending December 31, 1991 SALN ending December 31, 1991

1993 SALN ending December 31, 1992 -no record-

1994 SALN ending December 31, 1993 SALN ending December 31, 1993

1995 SALN ending December 31, 1994 SALN ending December 31, 1994

1996 SALN ending December 31, 1995 SALN ending December 31, 1995

1997 SALN ending December 31, 1996 SALN ending December SALN
ending December 31, 1996 31,
1996

1998 SALN ending December 31, 1997 SALN ending December 31, 1997

1999 SALN ending December 31, 1998 SALN ending December 31, 1998
(filed with the Ombudsman on
December 16, 2003)

2000 SALN ending December 31, 1999 -no record-

 2001 SALN ending December 31,2000 -no record-

2002 SALN ending December 31,2001 -no record-

2003 SALN ending December 31,2002 SALN ending December 31,2002

2004 SALN ending December 3l,2003 -no record-

2005 SALN ending December 31, 2004 -no record-

2006 SALN ending December 3l,2005 -no record-

June 1, 2006 SALN as of June 1, 2006 (exit -no record of SALN as of June 1,
SALN) 2006 (exit SALN)-

Alleged break in government service from June 2, 2006 until August 15, 2009 but was engaged
as legal counsel for the Republic from June 2, 2006 to 2009.

As Associate Justice of the Supreme Court:

August 16, 2010 SALN as of August 16, 2010 (re- SALN ending December 31, 2009
entry SALN) but filed with the Office of the
Clerk of Court En Banc only on
June 22, 2012 and unsubscribed -
no record of SALN as of August
16, 2010 (re-entry SALN)-

2011 SALN ending December 31, 2010 SALN ending December 31, 2010
but unsubscribed

2012 SALN ending December 31, 2011 SALN ending December 31, 2011

A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by then President Benigno C. Aquino III (President
Aquino III) as Associate Justice, and on August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office as such.

When the position of the Chief Justice was declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for
32

application and recommendation of the position of Chief Justice. During the 2012 deliberations for the position of the
Chief Justice, the members of the JBC En Banc were Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta) as
Acting ex officio Chairman; Undersecretary Michael Frederick L. Musngi as ex officio member vice Leila M. De Lima;
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Representative Niel Tupas as ex officio members representing the
Congress; Justice Regino C. Hermosisima Jr. as regular member representing the retired Supreme Court Justices;
Justice Aurora Santiago Lagman as regular member representing the Private Sector; Atty. Maria Milagros N.
Fernan-Cayosa as regular member representing the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and Atty. Jose V. Mejia as
regular member representing the academe. The JBC Executive Committee (Execom) was composed of the JBC
Regular Members and assisted by the Office of the Executive Officer (OEO) headed by Atty. Annaliza S. Ty-
Capacite (Atty. Capacite).

The JBC announcement was preceded by an En Banc meeting held on June 4, 2012 wherein the JBC agreed to
require the applicants for the Chief Justice position to submit, instead of the usual submission of the SALNs for the
last two years of public service, all previous SALNs up to December 31, 2011 for those in government
service. However, for the other judicial vacancies, the JBC required the submission of only two
33

SALNs. Accordingly, in the Announcement published on June 5, 2012, the JBC specifically directed the
34 35

candidates for the Chief Justice post to submit, in addition to the usual documentary requirements, the following:

(1) Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Networth (SALN):

a. for those in the government: all previous SALNs (up to 31 December 2011)
b. for those from the private sector: SALN as of 31 December 2011

(2) Waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank accounts under the Bank Secrecy Law
and Foreign Currency Deposits Act. (Emphasis ours)
36

The JBC announcement further provided that "applicants with incomplete or out-of-date documentary requirements
will not be interviewed or considered for nomination."37

Nevertheless, the JBC En Banc subsequently agreed to extend the deadline for the filing of applications or
recommendations to July 2, 2012 and the submission of the other documentary requirements to July 17, 2012. 38

On June 25, 2012, the JBC En Banc resolved not to require the incumbent Supreme Court Justices who are
candidates for the Chief Justice position to submit other documentary requirements, particularly the required
clearances. Instead, the JBC En Banc required the incumbent Justices to submit only the SALNs, bank waiver,
medical certificate, laboratory results and the PDS.

On July 2, 2012, respondent accepted several nominations from the legal and the evangelical community for the
position of Chief Justice and in support of her nomination, respondent submitted to the ORSN her SALNs for the
years 2009, 2010, and 2011. Respondent also executed a waiver of confidentiality of her local and foreign bank
39 40 41 42

accounts.43

On July 6, 2012, or even before the deadline of the submission of the documentary requirements on July 17, 2012,
the JBC En Banc came up with a long list of the candidates totaling twenty-two (22), respondent included, and
scheduled the public interview of said candidates on July 24-27, 2012. 44

On July 20, 2012, the JBC in its Special En Banc Meeting, deliberated on the candidates for the position of Chief
45

Justice with incomplete documentary requirements. In particular, the JBC examined the list of candidates and their
compliance with the required submission of SALNs. The minutes of the JBC deliberation reveal as follows:

xxxx

The Executive Officer asked for clarification, particularly with respect to SALNs, whether five (5) SALNs would
constitute a substantial compliance if the candidate has been in the government service for twenty (20) years.

The Council examined the list with regard to the SALNs, particularly the candidates coming from the government,
and identified who among them would be considered to have substantially complied:

1. Justice Arturo D. Brion - has substantially complied

2. Justice Antonio T. Carpio - has substantially complied

3. Secretary Leila M. De Lima- has substantially complied

4. Chairperson Teresita J. Herbosa- has complied

5. Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza - has complied

6. Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro - has sµbstantially complied

7. Dean Raul C. Pangalangan

The Executive Officer informed the Council that Dean Pangalangan lacks five (5) SALNs. She was informed that he
could not obtain them from the U.P., but he is trying to get from the Civil Service Commission.

Justice Lagman moved that the SALNs of Dean Pangalangan be considered as substantial compliance.
8. Congressman Rufus B. Rodriguez

Justice Peralta said that as per the report, Congressman Rodriguez did not submit even one SALN. He commented
that he may not be interested although he accepted his nomination.

The Executive Officer informed the Council that he is abroad. He was notified through email, as his secretary would
not give his contact number.

9. Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento-has lacking SALNs

10. Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno

The Executive Officer informed the Council that she had not submitted her SALNs for a period of ten (10)
years, that is, from 1986 to 2006.

Senator Escudero mentioned that Justice Sereno was his professor at U.P. and that they were required to
submit SALNs during those years

11. Judge Manuel DJ Siayngco - has complied

Atty. Cayosa mentioned that Judge Siayngco has to submit a certificate of exemption because judges are also
required to comply with that requirement.

12. Dean Amado D. Valdez - has lacking requirements

13. Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. - has complied

14. Atty. Vicente R. Velasquez - has lacking requirements

15. Dean Cesar L. Villanueva - has lacking requirements

16. Atty. Ronaldo B. Zamora - has lacking SALNs and MCLE cert.

x x x x. (Emphasis ours)
46

Because there were several candidates with incomplete documentary requirements, the JBC En Banc agreed to
again extend the deadline for the submission of the lacking requirements to July 23, 2012 and that the determination
of whether a candidate has substantially complied with the requirements be delegated to the Execom. It also
appears that the JBC En Banc further agreed that the candidates who fail to complete the requirements on said date
are to be excluded from the list of candidates to be interviewed and considered for nomination, unless they would be
included if in the determination of the Execom he or she has substantially complied. 47

Thus, on July 20, 2012, the ORSN, through its then Chief Atty. Richard Pascual (Atty. Pascual), inquired as to
respondent's SALNs for the years 1995, 1996, 1997 and 1999. During the Congressional hearings on
48

impeachment, Atty. Pascual would later on testify that he asked respondent to submit her SALNs from 1996 to
2006, or spanning a period of 10 years. During the Oral Arguments, respondent would maintain that Atty. Pascual
49

only required her to submit her SALN s from 1995-1999 and did not ask for her more recent SALN s. Either way, the
years requested from respondent are within the period (1986 to 2006) covered by her employment with the U.P.
College of Law.

In response, the respondent, in the afternoon of July 23, 2012, transmitted a letter of even date to the JBC, which
50

stated:

xxxx
As I had noted in my Personal Data Sheet, after my resignation from government service in 2006, as a professor at
the University of the Philippines, I became a full-time private practitioner. Hence, when I was nominated for the
position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in 2010, my nomination was considered as that of a private
practitioner, and not as a government employee. Thus, the requirements imposed on me in connection with the
consideration of my name, were those imposed on nominees from the private sector, and my earlier-terminated
government service, did not control nor dominate the kind of requirements imposed on me.

Considering that most of my government records in the academe are more than fifteen years old, it is reasonable to
consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files.

In any case, the University of the Philippines has already cleared me of all academic/administrative responsibilities,
money and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of 01 June 2006. Since it is the ministerial
duty of the Head of the Office to ensure that the SALNs of its personnel are properly filed and accomplished (CSC
Resolution No. 060231 dated 01 February 2006 and CSC Memorandum Circular No. 10-2006 dated 17 April 2006),
this clearance can be taken as an assurance that my previous government employer considered the SALN
requirements to have been met. A copy of the Clearance dated 19 September 2011 issued by the University of the
Philippine is hereby attached.

In the 05 June 2012 Announcement, the Judicial and Bar Council imposed the requirement of submitting all
previous SALNs for those in the government. As I pointed out earlier, my service in government is not continuous.
The period of my private practice between my service in the University of the Philippines ending in 2006 and my
appointment to the Supreme Court in 2010 presents a break in government service. Hence, in compliance with the
documentary requirements for my candidacy as Chief Justice, I submitted only the SALN s from end of 2009 up to
31 December 2011, since I am considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government service
anew from the time of my appointment as Associate Justice on 16 August 2010.

Considering that I have been previously cleared from all administrative responsibilities and accountabilities from my
entire earlier truncated government service, may I kindly request that the requirements that I need to comply with,
be similarly viewed as that from a private sector, before my appointment to the Government again m 2010 as
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.

xxxx 51

The letter dated July 23, 2012 was received by the Office of the Administrative and Financial Services (OAFS) and
copies thereof were received by the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and the OE0. The letter,
52

however, was neither examined by the JBC regular members nor was it deliberated upon either by the JBC En
Banc or the Execom. Although the determination of whether a candidate has substantially complied with the
53

documentary requirements was delegated to the Execom, the latter could not produce any minutes of the meeting
or record that the members thereof deliberated on the July 23, 2012 letter of respondent. 54

On the scheduled date of the interview on July 24, 2012, despite respondent's submission of only 3 SALNs, Atty.
Pascual prepared a Report Re: Documentary Requirements and SALN of candidates for the Position of Chief
Justice of the Philippines wherein respondent was listed as applicant No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she
55

had "COMPLETE REQUIREMENTS" and a note stating "Letter 7/23/12 - considering that her government records
in the academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files."

The JBC then proceeded to interview the candidates, including respondent who was interviewed on July 27, 2012.
On August 6, 2012, the ORSN prepared a list of the 20 candidates, respondent included, vis-a-vis their SALN
submissions. Opposite respondent's name was an enumeration of the SALNs she submitted, i.e., 2009, 2010 and
2011 and an excerpt from her July 23, 2012 letter that "considering that [respondent's] government records in the
academe are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files." On August
13, 2012, the JBC voted on who would be included in the short list and on the same day, transmitted to the
President its nominations for the position of Chief Justice, as follows:
56

1. Carpio, Antonio T.

2. Abad, Roberto A.
3. Brion, Arturo D.

4. Jardeleza, Francis H.

5. Sereno, Maria Lourdes P.A.

6. Zamora, Ronaldo B.

7. Leonardo-De Castro, Teresita J.

8. Villanueva, Cesar L

A month after respondent's acceptance of her nomination, or on August 24, 2012, respondent was appointed by
then President Aquino III as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.

On August 30, 2017, or five years after respondent's appointment as Chief Justice, an impeachment complaint was
filed by Atty. Larry Gadon (Atty. Gadon) against respondent with the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives (House Committee on Justice) for culpable violation of the Constitution, corruption, high crimes,
and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that respondent failed to make truthful declarations in her
SALNs.

The impeachment complaint was endorsed by several members of the House and, thereafter, was found to be
sufficient in form and substance. The respondent filed her answer to the impeachment complaint. After the filing of
1âwphi1

the reply and the rejoinder, the House Committee on Justice conducted several hearings on the determination of
probable cause, the last of which was held on February 27, 2018. 57

During these hearings, it was revealed that respondent purportedly failed to file her SALNs while she was a member
of the faculty of the U.P. College of Law and that she filed her SALN only for the years 1998, 2002 and 2006. During
the hearing on February 7, 2018 of the House Committee on Justice, Justice Peralta, as a resource person being
then the acting ex- officio Chairman of the JBC, further claimed that during the JBC deliberations in 2012, he was
not made aware that respondent submitted incomplete SALNs nor that respondent's letter dated July 23, 2012 to
the JBC was ever deliberated upon. This was confirmed by Atty. FernanCayosa; by Atty. Capacite, who
58 59

emphasized that based on the rubber stamp received, only the offices of the JBC regular members, the ORSN and
the OEO were furnished copies of the letter; and by Atty. Pascual on the basis of the transmittal letter.
60 61

The foregoing sworn declarations made during the hearings before the House Committee on Justice spawned two
relevant incidents: one, the proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the
JBC relative to the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-
12 and A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG
62

requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against respondent.

Thus, the present petition.

The Case for the Republic

The Republic, through the OSG, claims that an action for quo warranto is the proper remedy to question the validity
of respondent's appointment. It alleges that the instant petition is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary
period under Section 11, Rule 66, of the Rules of Court since respondent's transgressions only came to light
63

during the proceedings of the House Committee on Justice on the allegations of the impeachment complaint filed
against her. Alternatively, the Republic claims that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition
under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi.

In justifying resort to a petition for quo warranto, the Republic argues that quo warranto is available as a remedy
even as against impeachable officers, like respondent. The Republic argues that a petition for quo warranto is
different from the impeachment proceedings because the writ of quo warranto is being sought to question the
validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of the
Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office. Citing the 2010 Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
64
(PET) and the cases of Funa v. Chairman Villar and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Republic argues that quo
65 66

warranto may be resorted to even against impeachable officers and that the respondent's assumption of the position
as Chief Justice under the color of an executive appointment is a public wrong correctible by quo warranto.

The Republic seeks to oust respondent from her position as Chief Justice on the ground that the latter failed to show
that she is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under
Section 7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the Republic, because respondent failed to fulfill the JBC
67

requirement of filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The Republic posits that the JBC's
ostensible nomination of respondent does not extinguish the fact that the latter failed to comply with the SALN
requirement as the filing thereof remains to be a constitutional and statutory reg uirement. 68

In sum, the Republic contends that respondent's failure to submit her SALN s as required by the JBC disqualifies
her, at the outset, from being a candidate for the position of Chief Justice. Lacking her SALNs, respondent has not
proven her integrity which is a requirement under the Constitution. The Republic thus concludes that since
respondent is ineligible for the position of Chief Justice for lack of proven integrity, she has no right to hold office
and may therefore be ousted via quo warranto.

The Case for the Respondent

Being circumspect in the examination of every pleading and document on record, this Court observes that, initially,
the Comment Ad Cautelam dated March 16, 2018 filed before Us was neither signed by the respondent herself nor
verified to have been read by her and attested by her that the allegations therein are true and correct of her
personal knowledge or based on authentic records. This Court is not unaware that under the Rules of Court,
specifically Section 4, Rule 7, not all pleadings need to be under oath, verified, or accompanied by an affidavit. In
fact, the rules on quo warranto do not require the filing of such comment, but pursuant to the dictates of the
fundamental right of due process and also the desire of this Court to dispose of this case judiciously, impartially, and
objectively, this Court gave the respondent the opportunity to be heard and oppose the allegations in the petition by
requiring her to file a comment thereto. Thus, this Court anticipated a response from the respondent to take such
opportunity to settle the uncertainty of her nomination and appointment through her comment to the petition. What
was received by this Court, however, was an unverified Comment repudiating the Court's jurisdiction, merely signed
by counsel, who appeared to be representing the respondent.

Wary of the legal implications of such unverified pleading, i.e. possible refutation of the allegations stated therein
and repudiation of the signing counsel's authority to represent, this Court in its April 3, 2018 Resolution set as a
69

condition for the conduct of Oral Arguments prayed for by respondent, that the latter affirm and verify under oath the
truth and veracity of the allegations in the Comment Ad Cautelam filed by counsel supposedly on her behalf.

In an Ad Cautelam Partial Compliance/Manifestatio dated April 5, 2018, respondent affirmed and verified under oath
the truth and veracity of the allegations in the said Comment Ad Cautelam through a Verification dated April 6, 2018
attached therein.

In the said Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent argues that, on the strength of Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
70

Constitution and the cases of Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
71 72

lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against Senior Associate Justice
73

Antonio T. Carpio, the Chief Justice may be ousted from office only by impeachment. Respondent contends that
74

the use of the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not signify that
Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment. According to
respondent, the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category of public
officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise.

It is likewise the argument of respondent that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such
would result to a conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and 11,
Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the Supreme Court disciplinary and administrative power over all
courts and the personnel thereof. She theorizes that if a Member of the Supreme Court can be ousted through quo
warranto initiated by the OSG, the Congress' "check" on the Supreme Court through impeachment would be
rendered inutile.
Respondent argues that the present petition is time-barred as Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one ( 1) year from the "cause of ouster" and not from the "discovery" of the
disqualification. Respondent contends that the supposed "failure" to file the required SALNs allegedly took place for
several years from 1986 to 2006, thus, the "cause of ouster" existed even before the respondent was appointed as
Chief Justice on August 24, 2012. Therefore, as early as her appointment, the Republic, through the OSG, already
had a cause of action to seek her ouster. Even assuming that the one-year prescriptive period may be counted from
the Republic's "discovery" of the disqualification, the petition would still be time-barred since the Republic would
have made such a "discovery" through U.P., considering that the U.P. HRDO is required to submit a list of
employees who failed to file their SALNs.

Respondent avers that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public officer, she
enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. According to respondent, the Republic failed to
overcome this presumption as the documents relied upon by it, i.e., certifications from the U.P. HRDO and the
Ombudsman, do not categorically state that respondent failed to file her SALNs. On the contrary, respondent points
out that the U.P. HRDO had certified that she had been cleared of all administrative responsibilities and charges as
of June 1, 2006 and that there was no pending administrative charge against her.

It is likewise the contention of respondent that public officers without pay or those who do not receive compensation
are not required to file a SALN. Thus, respondent argues that for the periods that she was on official leave without
pay, she was actually not required to file any SALN for the inclusive years. She adds that to require the submission
of SALNs as an absolute requirement is to expand the qualifications provided for under the Constitution.

Nonetheless, respondent represents that she continues to recover and retrieve her missing SALNs and will present
them before the Senate sitting as the Impeachment Tribunal and not to this Court considering her objections to the
latter's exercise of jurisdiction.

Respondent also stresses that the failure to file SALNs or to submit the same to the JBC has no bearing on one's
integrity. The submission of SALNs was simply among the additional documents which the JBC had required of the
applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It is respondent's position that the non-filing of SALN is not a ground for
disqualification unless the same was already the subject of a pending criminal or administrative case or if the
applicant had already been finally convicted for a criminal offense involving said failure to file SALNs. In this case,
respondent points out that the JBC was made aware as early as July 20, 2012 that respondent had not submitted to
the JBC her SALNs as a U.P. professor and yet none of them invoked Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 or the
"integrity rule."

Respondent likewise contends that the issue of whether an applicant for the position of Chief Justice is a person of
"proven integrity" is a question "constitutionally committed to the JBC" and is therefore a political question which
only the JBC could answer, and it did so in the affirmative when it included respondent's name in the shortlist of
nominees for the position of Chief Justice.

The Republic's Reply

In refuting respondent's arguments, the Republic justifies its resort to the unconventional method of quo
warranto. The Republic cites the cases of Estrada v. Desierto and Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or
75

Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et al. where this Court tool cognizance of a petition for quo warranto to
76

oust an impeachable official. It reiterates its argument that it seeks respondent's ouster, not on account of
commission of impeachable offenses, but because of her ineligibility to assume the position of Chief Justice.

The Republic maintains that the phrase "may be removed from office" in Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution
means that Members of the Supreme Court may be removed through modes other than impeachment and
disagrees with respondent's interpretation that the word "may" qualifies only the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. The Republic claims that respondent's interpretation would lead to an
absurd situation in the event that the Senate imposes a lesser penalty, like suspension of the President, which
would result in a vacancy in the position not intended by the Constitution. This is because vacancy in the Office of
the President occurs only in case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation, in which event
the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
Invoking the verba legis principle in statutory construction, the Republic claims that Section 2, Article XI of the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit resort to other means to remove impeachable officers in position.

Contrary to respondent's claim that this Court has no disciplinary authority over its incumbent members, the
Republic cites Section 13 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent Committee on Ethics and Ethical
Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and ethical violations against members of
the Supreme Court. The Republic points out that such Ethics Committee conducted the investigation in A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC and A.M. No. 09-2-19-SC.
77 78

Meanwhile, in support of its claim that the petition is not time-barred, the Republic explains that the State has a
continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. It argues that the one-
year period provided under Section 11 of Rule 66 merely applies to individuals who are claiming rights to a public
office, and not to the State. To consider the instant petition as time-barred, the Republic argues, is to force the State
to spend its resources in favor of an unqualified person.

Further, the Republic claims that even if it be assumed that the one-year period applies against the State, it cannot
be deemed to have been notified of respondent's failure to file her SALNs. It argues that it has no statutory
obligation to monitor compliance of government employees other than its own. It alleges that SALNs are not
published, hence it has no feasible way of taking cognizance of respondent's failure to file SALN.

In any case, the Republic claims that the unique circumstances of the instant case behoove this Court to be liberal
in interpreting the one-year reglementary period.

As to the question on jurisdiction, the Republic contends that the Supreme Court is clothed with the authority to
determine respondent's qualifications and eligibility to hold the position of the Chief Justice. It argues that the
determination of this issue is not a political question because such issue may be resolved through the interpretation
of the pertinent prov1s1ons of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Going to the fundamental issue of respondent's eligibility to hold the position of Chief Justice, the Republic reiterates
that respondent failed to comply with the requirement of submitting SALNs and thus has failed to prove her integrity.
Further, the Republic cites respondent's gross misrepresentation in stating that her reason for non-submission of
SALNs was because she could no longer retrieve all of such SALN s. According to the Republic, respondent's
allegation seems to imply that she did file her SALNs when the Certifications from the U.P. and the Ombudsman
state otherwise.

The Republic posits that respondent's lack of integrity is further bolstered by her failure to disclose to the JBC that
she failed to file her SALN 11 times during her tenure as U .P. Law Professor.

Integrity, the Republic claims, is simply faithful adherence to the law, and the filing of SALN is a qualification implied
from the. requirement of integrity. The filing of SALN is not an additional requirement unduly imposed on applicants
to positions in the Judiciary. When respondent failed to file her SALN, she did not comply with the Constitution, laws
and appropriate codes of conduct. There is no need to allege or prove graft and corruption in order to prove an
aspiring magistrate's lack of integrity.

Finally, the Republic contends that the presumption of regularity cannot be applied in respondent's favor. The
Republic claims that such presumption attaches only to official acts and not to all acts of officials. The presumption,
according to the Republic, applies only to official acts specified by law as an official duty or to a function attached to
a public position. In this case, the filing of SALN is neither an official duty nor a function attached to a position of a
U.P. College of Law Professor. In any case, the Republic claims that it has successfully disputed such presumption
through the Certifications it presented from U.P. and the Ombudsman.

The Republic's Memorandum

In addition to the arguments put forth by the Republic in the Petition and the Reply, the Republic further justified its
non-inclusion of the JBC in the instant petition. It contends that since the petition only disputes the respondent's
eligibility to become the Chief Justice, the Solicitor General correctly instituted the quo warranto petition only against
respondent.
Insisting on respondent's lack of integrity, the Republic argues that respondent had the legal obligation to disclose to
the JBC that she failed to file her SALNs at least 11 times, citing the case of OCA v. Judge Estacion Jr. 79

The Republic also argues that respondent's claim of good faith is not a defense. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 and 80

R.A. No. 6713 are special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or
81

criminal intent is completely immaterial. Thus, her act of blaming the Review and Compliance Committee of U.P. for
its failure to inform her that she had no SALNs on file does not exonerate her. The Republic further notes that
respondent resorted to the fallacy of tu quoque - a diversionary tactic by using the fault of others to justify one's own
fault.

Believing in the strength of its case, the Republic underscores its contention that the respondent was not able to
dispute the evidence put forth by the Republic that she failed to religiously file her SALNs throughout her entire stint
in the government. The Republic claims that it is futile for respondent to merely allege during the Oral Arguments
that she filed her SALNs and wi11 produce them before the Senate. Respondent's admissions during the Oral
Arguments, together with the U.P. HRDO's certification, prove that she did not religiously file her SALNs as required
by law.

As to the applicability of this Court's ruling in Concerned Taxpayer v. Doblada, Jr., the Republic argues that the
82

case is not on all fours with the instant petition. The Doblada ruling, according to the OSG, did not involve issues on
qualifications to public office unlike the present petition. Second, unlike in Doblada, respondent in this case failed to
offer any countervailing evidence to disprove the Certifications by the U.P. HRDO and the Ombudsman. Lastly, the
statement in Doblada relied upon by the respondent is a mere dictum. The issue therein is centered
on Doblada's unexplained wealth. Furthermore, Doblada was decided only in 2005 or after respondent violated the
legal requirement on the filing of SALNs.

The Respondent's Memorandum

Respondent insists that she can be removed from office only through impeachment. In addition to the arguments
raised in her Comment Ad Cautelam, respondent asserts that impeachment was chosen as the method of removing
certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will prevent them from
performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Such purpose, according to
respondent, would be defeated if Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution would not be construed as providing an
exclusive means for the removal of impeachable officers. Respondent argues that it would be absurd for the framers
of the Constitution to provide a very cumbersome process for removing said officers only to allow a less difficult
means to achieve the same purpose.

Respondent contends that the Republic, in citing the 2010 PET Rules and the cases of Estrada v.
Desierto and Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver Lozano v. President Corazon Aquino et
83

al., erroneously lumps together the Chief Justice, the President and the Vice-President, simply because they are
84

all impeachable officers. Respondent argues that there are substantial distinctions between the President and
VicePresident on the one hand, and Members of the Supreme Court on the other: first, unlike Section 4, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the
qualifications of the President and the Vice-President, there is no similar provision with respect to the other
impeachable officials, i.e., the Members of this Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commission or the
Ombudsman; and second, the President and Vice-President are elected officials while the other impeachable
officers are appointive officials.

Respondent also argues that there is not a single pronouncement in Funa v. Chairman Villar and Nacionalista
85

Party v. De Vera (by way of a ruling or obiter dictum) to the effect that an impeachable officer may be ousted
86

through a writ of quo warranto, and that both cases were not even for quo warranto.

Respondent maintains that whether respondent was a person of ''proven integrity" when she applied for the position
of Chief Justice is a political question outside the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, which only the JBC and the
President as the appointing authority could determine. She avers that the application of the political question
doctrine is not confined to the President or Congress, as the Republic supposedly argues, but extends to other
government departments or officers exercising discretionary powers, such as the JBC which uses its wisdom and
discretion in determining whether an applicant to the Judiciary is a person of "proven" integrity.
Respondent also contends that absent any challenge to her nomination and appointment on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the JBC and the President, her appointment can no longer be questioned.

Respondent reiterates that the instant petition is time-barred. She argues that the Republic cannot rely on Agcaoili
v. Suguitan because it mentioned the principle nullum temus occurit regi or "no time runs against the king" only in
87

passing, as the "general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings." She avers that Agcaoili is
in fact authority for the principle that prescription will definitely run against the State if the rule or statute clearly so
provides.

Respondent avers that she complied with the SALN laws as Professor of the U.P. College of Law and that the law
presumes regularity in the filing of SALNs. According to respondent, that at least 11 of her SALNs have been found
tends to prove a pattern of filing, rather than non-filing.

Respondent argues that the burden of proof in quo warranto proceedings falls on the party who brings the action
and that based on Doblada, the Republic failed to discharge this burden. Respondent claims that the records of the
U.P. HRDO are incomplete and unreliable and there was no categorical statement in its Certification that she failed
to file her SALNs for the years 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, and 2006.
Further, she avers that the records of the Office of the Ombudsman are even more incomplete and unreliable, thus,
any certification from said office would likewise be insufficient to prove that she failed to file 11 of her SALNs while
she was a U.P. Professor.

Respondent contends that she has actually presented preponderant evidence that she filed her SALNs. She avers
that she has recovered 11 of her U.P. SALNs and she has direct proof that she executed at least 12 SALNs as a
U.P. Professor. She stresses that the U.P. HRDO has thrice "cleared" her of all administrative responsibilities and
administrative charges.

Respondent also claims that she was not even required to file a SALN from 1986 to 1991 because her status and
appointment then was merely temporary. According to her, the fact that she served as counsel for the Republic for
the PIATCO cases in 2004, 2005 and 2006 does not negate her defense that under the law, she was not required to
file her SALNs for the years when she was on leave and ·was not receiving compensation arising from public office
(i.e., 2001, 2004, 2005 and 2006).

Respondent's Memorandum also sought to address certain matters raised during the Oral Arguments.

As to where her SALNs are, respondent avers that some of her SALNs were in fact found in the records of the U.P.
HRDO, and she was able to retrieve copies of some of her SALNs from the U.P. Law Center. Without prejudice to
her jurisdictional objections, she attached them to the Memorandum. She argues that the fact that the SALN s for
certain years are missing cannot give rise to the inference that they were not filed. She points out that U.P. was only
required to keep the SALNs for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement, after which the SALN may
be destroyed.

In explaining her statement before the JBC that her SALNs were irretrievable, respondent avers that she honestly
could not retrieve copies from U.P. over the course of a weekend given to her to complete her missing documentary
requirements. She declares that she did not keep copies of her SALN s and she was not required to do so by law.

Respondent asserts that her 2009 SALN was not belatedly filed. She explains that her 2009 SALN is an entry SALN
which she originally filed on September 16, 2010 within thirty (30) days after her assumption of office as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. According to her, the revised 2009 SALN which has the annotation
"revised as of 22 June 2012," is a revised version executed in June 2012 to more accurately reflect the acquisition
cost of certain assets declared in 2010.

With respect to the purported 2006 SALN, respondent avers that it was not the SALN required by RA 6713, but a
mere statement of her assets which the JBC requested as a tool to determine her assets for comparison with her
income tax returns. She explains that she merely happened to use a downloadable SALN form which she filled up
and dated as of the time of its writing, i.e., July 27, 2010. She claims that she never misrepresented the same to be
her 2006 exit SALN from U.P. According to her, she in fact considers her 2006 SALN as one of the missing SALNs
she is still trying to locate.
Respondent claims that she could not recall all the circumstances why her 1998 SALN was executed only in 2003
which, according to her, was reasonable since it happened l 5 years ago. She claims that there is no law prohibiting
her from submitting the same, and the fact that the SALN was filed serves the purpose of the law and negates any
intention to hide unexplained wealth.

It is also respondent's position that the omission of her husband's signature on her 2011 SALN was inadvertent and
was not an offense. According to her, it could not adversely impact on her integrity absent any allegation or finding
that she acquired ill-gotten wealth. She argues that the Civil Service Commission's Guidelines which require the
signature of the spouse who is not a public officer, was promulgated only in January 2013.

With regard to the jewelry she acquired from 1986 to 1991 which were supposedly declared in her 1991 SALN but
were undeclared in her 1990 SALN, respondent avers that these assets were actually declared in her 1985 and
1989 SALNs, and they were consistently declared in all her subsequent SALNs beginning 1991. According to
respondent, she should not be faulted for her inadvertent omission to declare such assets in her 1990 SALN as her
declaration of the same thereafter is consistent with good faith and cured whatever error there may have been in her
1990 SALN. She argues that said assets were not manifestly disproportionate to her lawful income and even as a
U.P. Professor, she could have afforded to purchase jewelry worth Php15,000.00 over a span of six (6) years.

Finally, respondent argues that it is an "unreasonable and oppressive" interpretation of the law to reckon her entry
SALN as Associate Justice of the Court from the date of her appointment (August 16, 2010) and not from December
31, 2009 when it was actually filed. Respondent contends that R.A. No. 6713 only requires that the SALN be filed
"within thirty days after assumption of office" - a directive she supposedly complied with. She argues that while the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 state that the SALN should be reckoned from the first day of
service, the law provides for a review and compliance procedure which requires that a reporting individual first be
informed and provided an opportunity to take necessary corrective action should there be any error in her SALN.
Respondent avers that she did not receive any notice or compliance order informing her that her entry SALN was
erroneous, and she was not directed to take the necessary corrective action.

The Respondent's Reply/Supplement to Memorandum

At the close of the Oral Argument, granted upon respondent's Ad Cautelam motion, the Court specifically required
the parties to submit their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days, after which, the
petition shall be submitted for decision. Notwithstanding such clear directive from the Court, and even without being
required to, respondent moves (again Ad Cautelam) for the inclusion of her Reply/Supplement to her memorandum
filed beyond the period granted by the Court to the parties. The belated filing of said Reply/Supplement in disregard
of the Court's directive merits its non-admission. Nevertheless, as the Court remains circumspect of the pleadings
submitted by the parties and in accordance with the dictates of due process and fair play, respondent's
Reply/Supplement to her Memorandum, albeit filed Ad Cautelam, is admitted.

Respondent raises two points in her Reply/Supplement: first, the new matter of tax fraud allegedly committed by her;
and second, the forum-shopping allegedly committed by the Republic.

Respondent sought to address the inclusion of the charge of tax fraud allegedly committed by her relative to the
fees she received in the PIATCO cases which respondent argues to have been raised by the Republic only in its
memorandum. Respondent denies having concealed or under declared her income in the PIATCO cases. She
further points out that the Summary and the Powerpoint presentation prepared by BIR Deputy Commissioner
Gtiballa and which were attached to the Republic's memorandum were incomplete, inaccurate and merely
preliminary. In any case, respondent avers that BIR Deputy Commissioner Guballa himself found that respondent
had "substantially declared all income (legal fees) from the PIATCO case in her ITRs from years 2004 to 2009 BUT
there were certain discrepancies."88

Respondent also accuses the Republic of having committed deliberate forum-shopping in filing the action for quo
warranto even when the impeachment proceeding was already pending before the. House of Representatives.
Contending that all the elements of forum-shopping are present, respondent points to the (1) identity of parties
between the quo warranto action and the impeachment case inasmuch as the House Committee on Justice is also
part of the Government; (2) identity of causes of action considering that the quo warranto case is based on
respondent's alleged lack of proven integrity for failure to file all her SALNs when she was teaching at the U.P.
College of Law and for concealing her true income and evasion of taxes which were the same attacks on her
eligibility and qualifications as enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment; and (3) identity in the relief sought as
both the quo warranto and the impeachment sought her removal from the Office of the Chief Justice.

The Motions for Intervention

Through a Joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Comment-In-Intervention, movant-intervenors
composed of (1) former CEO of PAG-IBIG Fund, Zorayda Amelia Capistrano Alonzo, (2) peace & human rights
advocate Remedios Mapa Suplido, (3) urban poor advocate Alicia Gentolia Murphy, ( 4) Chairperson of
Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka (PAKISAMA) Noland Merida Penas, (5) Fr. Roberto Reyes,
and (6) poet, feminist & youth advocate Reyanne Joy P. Librado (Capistrano, et al.,) seek to intervene in the present
petition as citizens and taxpayers.

The comment-in-intervention is a virtual echo of the arguments raised in respondent's comment that quo warranto is
an improper remedy against impeachable officials who may be removed only by impeachment and that the
application of the PET rules are limited only to the President and Vice-President who are elective, and not
appointive, officials. Movant-intervenors similarly argue that the petition is already time-barred as the cause of action
arose upon respondent's appointment as Chief Justice on August 24, 2012 or almost six (6) years ago.

Capistrano et al. argue that it is not incumbent upon respondent to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity
required by the Constitution for members of the Judiciary; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she
qualified for the post fell upon the JBC. They also posit that nowhere in the Constitution is the submission of all prior
SALNs required; instead, what is required is that all aspiring justices of the Court must have the imprimatur of the
JBC, the best proof of which is a person's inclusion in the shortlist.

Capistrano et al. persuade that respondent's explanation that her government records in the academe for 15 years
are irretrievable is reasonable and that respondent did not mislead the JBC. On the contrary, they claim that the
JBC accepted her explanation when it deemed respondent as qualified. In doing so, they conclude, that the JBC
determined that she possessed the integrity as required by the Constitution.

A few hours after the filing of the Capistrano et. al., 's Comment-inIntervention, another set of intervenors composed
of: (1) BAYAN MUNA Representative (Rep.) Carlos Isagani Zarate; (2) ACT Teachers Partylist Rep. Antonio Tinio &
Francisca Castro; (3) GABRIELA Women's Party Rep. Emerenciana De Jesus & Arlene Brosas; (3) ANAKPAWIS
Partylist Rep. Ariel Casilao; (5) KABATAAN Partylist Rep. Sarah Jane Elago; (6) Convenors and members of
Movement Against Tyranny (MAT), namely: Francisco A. Alcuaz, Bonifacio P. Ilagan, & Col. George A. Rabusa
(Ret. ); (7) Former Senator Rene A.V. Saguisag; (8) Bishop Broderick S. Pabillo, D.D.; (9) Secretary Gen. of Bagong
Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN) Renato M. Reyes, Jr.; (10) Member of MDD Youth (an Affiliate of Aksyon
Demokratiko) Kaye Ann Legaspi; and (11) Secretary General of National Union of People's Lawyers Atty. Ephraim
B. Cortez (Zarate, et al.,) filed a Motion for Leave to File Motion to Intervene and Opposition-in-Intervention,
pursuant to Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. They claim that as citizens and taxpayers, they have a legal interest in the
matter of respondent's ouster or removal.

Zarate et al. raise the similar argument that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may only be removed from office
on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust and that it is only the Congress who has the power to remove the Chief
Justice through the exclusive mode of impeachment.

They further argue that the issue of respondent's non-submission of complete SALNs, without more, does not have
the effect of putting to question her integrity as she did not conceal her SALNs. They argue that the qualification of
having a "proven integrity" is a standard subject to the discretion of, first, the JBC who submits the list of qualified
candidates; and second, of the President, who will select among the shortlist whom to appoint as Chief Justice.

Movant-Intervenor Rene A.V. Saguisag subsequently filed a Supplement to Motion for Leave to File Motion to
Intervene and Opposition-in-Intervention Cum Petition to Recuse seeking the inhibition of unnamed Members of this
Court who "may have prematurely thrown their weight on the other side, actually or perceptually" on the ground that
respondent is entitled to an impartial arbiter.
As well, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed its Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached
Opposition-in-Intervention as an organization of all Philippine lawyers, having the fundamental duty to uphold the
Constitution and an interest in ensuring the validity of the appointments to the Judiciary. The IBP's arguments reflect
the arguments of the respondent and the other movant-intervenors that the quo warranto petition is time-barred and
is unavailable against an impeachable officer. The IBP further argues that the determination of whether respondent
is of "proven integrity" belongs to the JBC and which question the Court cannot inquire into without violating the
separation of powers. It is likewise the contention of the IBP that the petition is fatally flawed since the JBC never
required the submission of respondent's SALNs from 2001 to 2006.

Also seeking to intervene in the instant petition, Senators Leila M. De Lima (Senator De Lima) and Antonio F.
Trillanes IV (Senator Trillanes) as citizens, taxpayers, and senators of the Republic, filed a Motion to Intervene and
Admit Attached Opposition-In-Intervention (Ad Cautelam) on April 4, 2018.

In the said Motion, Senators De Lima and Trillanes assert that they possess a clear legal interest, both personal and
official, in the subject matter of the Republic's petition to oust the Chief justice on the ground that she does not
possess the constitutional requirement of integrity. According to Senators De Lima and Trillanes, they have the right
and duty to uphold the Constitution and to oppose government actions that are clearly and patently unconstitutional.
It is also Senators De Lima and Trillanes' theory that the instant quo warranto case is aimed to deprive the Senate
of its jurisdiction as the impeachment tribunal. They argue that their mandated duty as judges in the possible
impeachment trial of the Chief Justice will be pre-empted and negated if the quo warranto petition will be granted.
Their claimed legal interest in their intervention in and opposition to the petition for quo warranto is mainly anchored
upon their duty and prerogatives as Senators-judges in an impeachment trial and to protect the institution of
impeachment as a mode of enforcing accountability.

Senators De Lima and Trillanes' Opposition-In-Intervention is a mere reiteration of the respondent's argument that
this Court has no jurisdiction over a petition for quo warranto against an impeachable officer. They argue that the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is, by express provision of the Consitution, removable from office exclusively by
impeachment. They also aver that the ground raised in the petition for quo warranto - lack of integrity for failing to
submit one's SALN - is part of the allegations in the impeachment case being heard in the House of
Representatives. Thus, they argue that the use of an identical ground in a quo warranto proceeding directly
undermines the jurisdiction of the Senate to hear and decide impeachment cases and the prerogative of the
senators to try the same.

Senators De Lima and Trillanes also advance the argument that the Constitution identifies and enumerates only
three qualifications for appointment to the Supreme Court: (1) natural born citizenship; (2) age, i.e., at least forty
years; and (3) an experience of at least 15 years either as judge of a lower court or in the practice of law in the
Philippines. They assert that the filing of a SALN, taking of psychological or physical examination, and similar
requirements, are merely discretionary administrative requirements for consideration of the JBC, not Constitutional
requirements, hence, can be waived, removed entirely, or adjusted by the JBC in the exercise of its discretion.
According to the said movant-intervenors, Section 7(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which states that,"[ a]
Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence", does not
speak of objective constitutional qualifications, but only of subjective characteristics of a judge. They, therefore,
contend that "qualifications" such as citizenship, age, and experience are enforceable while "characteristics" such
as competence, integrity, probity, and independence are mere subjective considerations.

Corollarily, Senators De Lima and Trillanes argue that the subjective considerations are not susceptible to analysis
with tools of legal doctrine. Hence, questions on this matter are for the consideration of political institutions under the
Constitution, i.e., the JBC and the President (prior to appointment) and the House of Representatives and the
Senate (after appointment).

The Motions for Inhibition

By way of separately filed motions, respondent seeks affirmative relief, in the form of the inhibition of five (5)
Justices of the Court, the jurisdiction of which she questions and assails. Respondent prays for the inhibition of
Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez Tijam, and
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro from hearing and deciding the present petition
In common, respondent imputes actual bias on said Justices for having testified before the House Committee on
Justice on the impeachment complaint. In particular, respondent considered Justice Bersamin's allusion to
respondent as a "dictator" and his personal resentment about the supposed withdrawal of the privilege previously
enjoyed by the members of the Court to recommend nominees to vacant positions in the Judiciary, as evidence of
actual bias.

Justice Peralta's inhibition, on the other hand, is being sought because as then Acting ex officio Chairperson of the
JBC when respondent was nominated for appointment as Chief Justice, he would have personal knowledge of
disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings and for having served as a material witness in the matter in
controversy.

Justice Jardeleza's inhibition is sought on the ground that his testimony before the House Committee on Justice
reveals that he harbors ill feelings towards respondent on account of the latter's challenge to his integrity during the
nomination process for the Associate Justice position vice Justice Roberto A. Abad which he characterized as
"inhumane".

Respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's statement as quoted in a Manila Times article
to the effect that if respondent continues to ignore and to refuse to participate in the impeachment process, she is
clearly liable for culpable violation of the Constitution.

Respondent likewise made mention that Justice Tijam and Justice Bersamin wore a touch of red during the "Red
Monday" protest on March 12, 2018 wherein judges and court employees reportedly called on respondent to make
the supreme sacrifice and resign.

Respondent also calls for the inhibition of Justice De Castro for having allegedly prejudged the issue as regards the
validity of respondent's nomination and appointment in 2012 when Justice De Castro testified under oath during the
House Committee on Justice hearings that respondent should have been disqualified from the shortlist on account
of the SALNs she allegedly failed to submit.

At the last minute, respondent also seeks to disqualify Justice Samuel R. Martires for his purported insinuations
during the Oral Arguments questioning her "mental" or "psychological" fitness on the basis of her belief that God is
"the source of everything in (her) life."
89

Respondent also prays that the Ad Cautelam Respectful Motions for Inhibitions of Associate Justices Peralta,
Leonardo-De Castro, Jardeleza, Tijam, Bersamin and Martires be resolved by the Court En Banc, without the
participation of the Justices she seeks to disqualify.·

The Issues

From the arguments raised by the parties and the issues as delineated in the Advisory governing the special Oral
Arguments by way of accommodation to respondent, the paramount issues to be resolved by the Court are:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto against respondent who is an impeachable officer and against whom an impeachment
complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives;

2. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription;

3. Whether respondent is eligible for the position of Chief Justice:

a. Whether the determination of a candidate's eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court's supervisory and review powers;

b. Whether respondent failed to file her SALN s as mandated by the Constitution and required by the
law and its implementing rules and regulations; and if so, whether the failure to file SALNs voids the
nomination and appointment of respondent as Chief Justice;
 c. Whether respondent failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC; and if
so, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the JBC voids the nomination and appointment of
respondent as Chief Justice;

d. In case of a finding that respondent is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.

4. Whether respondent is a de Jure or de facto officer.

The Ruling of the Court

Preliminary Issues

Intervention is an ancillary remedy

restricted in purpose and in time

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be affected
by those proceedings. 90

Nevertheless, the remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound discretion of the court upon
compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement that no delay and prejudice
should result as spelled out under Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, as follows:

Sec. 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.

Each of the movant-intervenors in this case seek to intervene as citizens and taxpayers, whose claimed interest to
justify their intervention is their "sense of patriotism and their common desire to protect and uphold the Philippine
Constitution". The movant-intervenors further assert a "public right" to intervene in the instant case by virtue of its
"transcendental importance for the Filipino people as a whole". Apart from such naked allegations, movant-
intervenors failed to establish to the Court's satisfaction the required legal interest. Our jurisprudence is well-settled
on the matter:

Intervention is not a matter of absolute right but may be permitted by the court when the applicant shows facts
which satisfy the requirements of the statute authorizing intervention. Under our Rules of Court, what qualifies
a person to intervene is his possession of a legal interest in the matter in litigation or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both; or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. As regards the legal interest as
qualifying factor, this Court has ruled that such interest must be of a direct and immediate character so that the
intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of the judgment. The interest must be actual
and material, a concern which is more than mere curiosity, or academic or sentimental desire; it must not
be indirect and contingent, indirect and remote, conjectural, consequential or collateral.x x x. (Emphasis91

ours)

Clearly, herein movant-intervenors' sentiments, no matter how noble, do not, in any way, come within the purview of
the concept of "legal interest" contemplated under the Rules to justify the allowance of intervention. Movant-
intervenors failed to show any legal interest of such nature that they will "either gain or lose by the direct legal
operation of the judgment". Even the IBP's assertion of their "fundamental duty to uphold the Constitution, advocate
for the rule of law, and safeguard the administration of justice", being the official organization of all Philippine
lawyers, will not suffice. Admittedly, their interest is merely out of "sentimental desire" to uphold the rule of law.
Meanwhile, Senators De Lima and Trillanes' claimed legal interest is mainly grounded upon their would-be
participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will be filed before the
Senate as the impeachment court. Nevertheless, the fact remains that as of the moment, such interest is still
contingent on the filing of the articles of impeachment before the Senate. It bears stressing that the interest
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. 92

Indeed, if every person, not parties to the action but assert their desire to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution,
were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive, and interminable. 93

Emphatically, a quo warranto proceeding 1s an action by the government against individuals unlawfully holding an
office. Section 1, Rule 66 provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.

The remedy of quo warranto is vested in the people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes
over title to public office are viewed as a public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel
among rival claimants. 94

Newman v. United States ex Rel. Frizzell, historically traced the nature of quo warranto proceedings as a crime
95

which could only be prosecuted in the name of the King by his duly authorized law officers. In .time, the criminal
features of quo warranto proceedings were modified and as such, the writ came to be used as a means to
determine which of two claimants was entitled to an office and to order the ouster and the payment of a fine against
the usurper. This quasi-criminal nature of quo warranto proceedings was adopted in some American states.
Nonetheless, Newman explains that the Code of the District of Colombia, which was the venue of the case,
continues to treat usurpation of office as a public wrong which can be corrected only by proceeding in the name of
the government itself. Thus:

In a sense - in a very important sense - every citizen and every taxpayer is interested in the enforcement of law, in
the administration of law, and in having only qualified officers execute the law. But that general interest is not a
private, but a public interest. Being such, it is to be represented by the Attorney General or the District Attorney, who
are expected by themselves or those they authorize to institute quo warranto proceedings against usurpers in the
same way that they are expected to institute proceedings against any other violator of the law. That general public
interest is not sufficient to authorize a private citizen to institute such proceedings, for, if it was, then every citizen
and every taxpayer would have the same interest and the same right to institute such proceedings, and a public
officer might, from the beginning to the end of his term, be harassed with proceedings to try his title.

The only time that an individual, in his own name, may bring an action for quo warranto is when such individual has
a claim over the position in question. Section 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action. -A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another may bring an action therefor in his own name.

In this case, the movants-intervenors are neither individuals claiming to be entitled to the questioned position nor
are they the ones charged with the usurpation thereof.

Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the movants-intervenors, in their respective Motions, presented nothing
more than a mere reiteration of respondent's allegations and arguments in her Comment.
For these reasons, the Court, in its Resolution dated April 3, 2018, resolved to deny the motions for intervention
96

respectively filed by Capistrano et al., and Zarate et al., and to note the IBP's intervention. For similar reasons, the
Court resolves to deny the motion for intervention of Senators De Lima and Trillanes.

No basis for the Associate Justices

of the Supreme Court to inhibit in
the case

The instant petit10n comes at the heels of the recently-concluded hearings on the determination of probable cause
in the impeachment complaint against respondent before the House Committee on Justice. Several Members of the
Court, both incumbent and retired, were invited, under pain of contempt, to serve as resource persons. Those
Members who were present at the Committee hearings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En
Banc, given that the Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge and insofar as material
and relevant to the issues being heard. For lack of particularity, the Court supposes that the attendance of some of
its Members in the House Committee hearings is the basis of movant-intervenor Saguisag's motion to recuse.

On the other hand, respondent was more emphatic when she sought affirmative relief, in the form of the inhibition of
six ( 6) Justices, of the Court, whose jurisdiction she questions and assails. Specifically, respondent prays for· the
inhibition of Associate Justices Lucas P. Bersamin, Diosdado M. Peralta, Francis H. Jardeleza, Noel Gimenez
Tijam, Teresita J. LeonardoDe Castro and Samuel R. Martires fundamentally on the ground of actual bias for having
commonly testified before the House Committee on Justice on the impeachment case.

As for Justice Samuel R. Martires, respondent concludes Justice Martires' manifested actual bias based on his
statements during the Oral Arguments which purportedly tended to question respondent's mental and psychological
fitness.

In particular, respondent seeks the inhibition of Justice Tijam based on the latter's statement as quoted in a Manila
Times article to the effect that if respondent continues to ignore and to refuse to participate in the impeachment
process, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the Constitution.

Respondent cites the article entitled, "Appear in Congress or violate Constitution," dated December 4, 2017, where
Justice Tijam was purportedly quoted to have said:

Impeachment is a constitutional process and a mandate enshrined in the Constitution. Justices took an oath to
defend, preserve, protect the Constitution. If Chief Justice Sereno continues to ignore and continues to refuse
to participate in the impeachment process, ergo, she is clearly liable for culpable violation of the
Constitution. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent claims that the aforesaid statements of Justice Tijam are indicative of his stance that there may be a
ground to impeach and remove respondent from office, which is also the objective of the quo warranto petition
against her.

Ultimately, the cause for inhibition simmers to the question of whether, in so appearing and testifying before the
House Committee on Justice, the Members of the Court are precluded from hearing and deciding the instant petition
for quo warranto. To this, the Court answers in the negative.

Jurisprudence recognizes the right of litigants to seek disqualification of judges. Indeed, elementary due process
requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. "A judge has both the duty of rendering a just
decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his
integrity."
97

However, the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter's sacred duty to
decide cases without fear of repression. The movant must therefore prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear
and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial. "[W]hile it is settled principle that
opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, based on the evidence presented and conduct observed by
the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the part of the judge." 98
A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the manifest intent of
the statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect the constitutional process of impeachment, and
to exemplify the ideals of public accountability, thus:

He added that he wanted to encourage Sereno to show up at the Congress hearings "to respect and
participate in the impeachment (process), and to defend herself and protect the institution."

Sereno, he said, should be a role model when it comes to respecting the Constitution.

"Impeachment is not an invention of politicians. It was drafted by the framers of the Constitution. Media, which
propagates the myth that impeachment is a numbers game, hence, is political and arbitrary, fails to emphasize the
fact that the rule of the majority is the essence of democracy," the magistrate stressed.

Tijam believes that the impeachment process against Sereno is not an attack on the high court or the Judiciary
because the Supreme Court does not consist of the chief justice alone.

"Impeachment is [neither] an assault on the Judiciary nor an infringement on the independence of the Judiciary,
because it is enshrined in the Constitution. Parenthetically, when the SC strikes down acts of Congress and acts of
the President and the Executive Department for being unlawful and unconstitutional, the SC is not assaulting the
independence of Congress and the Executive Department because the expanded power of judicial review is
enshrined in the Constitution," Tijam pointed out.

Sereno, he said, should be a role model when it comes to respecting the Constitution. (Emphasis ours)
99

Notably, respondent conveniently and casually invoked only a portion of the article which suited her objective of
imputing bias against Justice Tijam.

As· to the act of wearing a red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and Bersamin's prejudice against
her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no basis, whether in logic or in law, to establish a connection
1âwphi1

between a piece of clothing and a magistrate's performance of adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to
the contrary, the red piece of clothing was merely coincidental and should not be deemed a sufficient ground to
disqualify them.

In Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Sps. Dy Hong Pi, et al., 100

this Court explained that:

[T]he second paragraph of Rule 13 7, Section 1, does not give judges unfettered discretion to decide whether to
101

desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes, and in this regard, We have noted that
the mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without
basis. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand
them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice
or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only
exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice. (Citations omitted)
102

In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary inhibition, the mere
fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the Committee on Justice determining
probable cause for the impeachment of respondent does not make them disqualified to hear the instant petition.
Their appearance thereat was in deference to the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate
the impeachment complaint filed against respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior
consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court set for the
purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed within this context, and should not be hastily
interpreted as an adverse attack against respondent.

In fact, Justice Tijam, in his Sworn Statement submitted to the House Committee on Justice, clearly identified the
103

purpose of his attendance thereat:

2. In reply, I sent a letter to Representative Umali on November 24, 2017, informing him that inasmuch as the issue
involved actions of the Supreme Court En Banc, I deemed it proper to first secure its approval before
participating in the House Committee hearing.

3. On November 28, 2017, the Supreme Court En Banc gave clearance for Justices who have been invited by the
House Committee on Justice to testify in connection with the impeachment complaint, to give testimony on
administrative matters if they so wish. The Court's Resolution in this regard states that the authority was
granted "only because the proceedings before the Committee on Justice of the House of Representatives
constitute part of the impeachment process under Section 3, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution."

A copy of the Court's Resolution is hereto attached as Annex "A."

4. I am submitting this Sworn Statement to the House Committee on Justice as my testimony in relation to A.M. No.
17-06-02- SC, based on my best recollection of events relating to said matter and available records. I shall,
however, be willing to give further testimony should the House Committee find it appropriate to propound questions
thereon at the December 11, 2017 Committee hearing, subject to applicable limitations under law and relevant
rules.

5. I will appear and give testimony before the House Committee on Justice not as a witness for the
complainant, but to honor the Committee's invitation to shed light on A.M. No. 17-06-02- SC and to accord
due respect to the Constitutionally established process of impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

Likewise, the Justices, including Justice Tijam, who appeared during the House Committee on Justice hearings,
refused to form any conclusion or to answer the uniform query as to whether respondent's acts constitute
impeachable offenses, as it was not theirs to decide but a function properly belonging to the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court. Evidently, no bias and prejudice on the part of the Justices could be inferred therein.
104

A judge may decide, "in the exercise of his sound discretion," to recuse himself from a case for just or valid
reasons. The phrase just or valid reasons, as the second requisite for voluntary inhibition, must be taken to mean-

x x x causes which, though not strictly falling within those enumerated in the first paragraph, are akin or analogous
thereto. In determining what causes are just, judges must keep in mind that next to importance to the duty of
rendering a righteous judgment is that of doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and
integrity of the judge. For it is an accepted axiom that every litigant, including the state, in criminal cases, is entitled
to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, and the law intends that no judge shall preside in any
case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial, and independent. 105

Respondent's call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and
meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings of the House
Committee on Justice.

Justice Bersamin 's statement that "Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag function kung isa ay diktador, " is
clearly a hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court be if any of its Members were to act
dictatorially.

Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice Bersamin's remark that he was offended by respondent's attitude
in ignoring the collegiality of the Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices' "privilege" to recommend
nominees to fill vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this statement to a personal
resentment as respondent regards it. There has always been a high degree of professionalism among the Members
of the Court in both their personal and official dealings with each other. It cannot also be denied that the statement
reflected a natural sentiment towards a decision reached and imposed by a member of a collegial body without
consultation or consensus.

Meanwhile, respondent's allegation of actual bias and partiality against Justice Peralta is negated by his testimony
during the January 15, 2018 hearing of the House Committee on Justice, where he stated that he has been very
supportive of the Judiciary reforms introduced by respondent as the Chief Justice, even if she suspects that he is
one of those behind her impeachment.
Justice Peralta's testimony before the House Committee on Justice also contradicts respondent's allegation that
Justice Peralta's apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent caused the exclusion of his wife, Court of
Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from the list of applications for the position of CA
Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta has made it clear during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has
already moved on from said issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to protect prospective
applicants to the Judiciary.

Justice Peralta's testimony during the Congressional hearing that "had (he) been informed of (the) letter dated July
23, 2012 and a certificate of clearance, (he) could have immediately objected to the selection of the Chief Justice for
voting because this is a very clear deviation from existing rules that if a member of the Judiciary would like ... or. .. a
candidate would like to apply for Chief Justice, then she or he is mandated to submit the SALNs," is clearly a'
hypothetical statement, which will not necessarily result in the disqualification of respondent from nomination. It was
also expressed in line with his functions as then Acting Chairperson of the JBC, tasked with determining the
constitutional and statutory eligibility of applicants for the position of Chief Justice. It bears stressing, too, that at the
time said statement was made, the petition for quo warranto has not been filed; thus, such statement cannot amount
to a prejudgment of the case.

Furthermore, according to Justice Peralta, while he was then the Acting Ex Officio Chairperson of the JBC at the
time of respondent's application for the position of Chief Justice, he had no personal knowledge of the disputed facts
concerning the proceedings, specifically the matters considered by the members of the JBC in preparing the
shortlist of nominees. He explained that it was the ORSN of the JBC which was tasked to determine completeness
of the applicants' documentary requirements, including the SALNs.

As for Justice Martires' statements during the Oral Arguments, this Court does not view them as indication of actual
bias or prejudice against respondent. Our review of the record reveals that Justice Martires' did not refer to
respondent as the object of his statements, as follows:

JUSTICE MARTIRES :

Solicitor Calida, would you agree with me na lahat ng taong may dibdib ay may kaba sa dibdib? At lahat ng taong
may ulo ay may katok sa ulo.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:

Yes, Your Honor, I agree.

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

Now would you consider it a mental illness (sic) when a person always invokes God as the source of his strength?
The source of his inspiration? The source of happiness? The source of everything in life? Is that a mental illness.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CALIDA:

Not necessarily, Your Honor

JUSTICE MARTIRES:

So, I'm just making a follow-up to the question that Justice Velasco earlier asked. So, would you agree with me that
the psychiatrist made a wrong evaluation with respect to the psychiatric report of the Chief Justice? 106

Neither are We prepared to conclude that Justice Martires' statements were based on an extraneous source, other
than what what he has learned or encountered over the course of the instant proceedings. There is nothing in the
interpellation, nor in Justice Martires' statements that he has read the psychiatric report, nor has read newspaper
accounts tackling the same. He merely asked the OSG if he has read the same, and his opinion regarding it.

Contrary to respondent's contentions, Justice Martires has not suggested that she suffers from some mental or
psychological illness. At most, his questions and statements were merely hypothetical in nature, which do not even
constitute as an opinion against respondent. Certainly, to impute actual bias based on such a brief discourse with
respect to hypothetical matters is conjectural and highly speculative. "Allegations and perceptions of bias from the
mere tenor and language of a judge is insufficient to show prejudgment." 107

In the same vein, insinuations that the Justices of the Supreme Court are towing the line of President Rodrigo Roa
Duterte in entertaining the quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of
mistrust and discordance between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one,
except to the sovereign Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to
misrepresent that the Solicitor General who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the Supreme
Court shall likewise automatically and positively be received in the present quo warranto action. That the Court
spares the Solicitor General the rod is easily dispelled by the Court's firm orders in G.R. Nos. 234359 and 234484
concerning alleged extra legal killings - a case directly concerning the actuations of the executive department - to
provide the Court with documents relative to the Oplan Tokhang operations and by a uninamous vote, rebuked the
Solicitor General's plea for reconsideration. Suffice to say that the Court decides based on the merits of a case and
not on the actors or the supposed benefactors involved.

Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing actual bias and partiality on the part of the Justices whose
recusal was sought, respondent's motions for inhibition must perforce fail. Mere conjectures and speculations
cannot justify the inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor,.
should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

In Dimo Realty & Development, Inc. v. Dimaculangan, 108

We held:

"[B]ias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear
and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed,
especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice
without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich." (Citation omitted)
109

The Court has pointedly observed in Pimentel v. Hon. Salanga:'' 110

Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed
to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approach to this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar
and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to
complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides
partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his
would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not
otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case
that a charge made before trial that a party "will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing" is
"premature." Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge's legal obligation under
his oath to administer justice "without respect to person and do equal right to the poor and the rich." To
disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of
conscience. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours)
111

The Court has consequently counseled that no Judge or Justice who is not legally disqualified should evade the
duty and responsibility to sit in the adjudication of any controversy without committing a dereliction of duty for which
he or she may be held accountable. Towards that end, the Court has aptly reminded:

To take or not to take cognizance of a case, does not depend upon the discretion of a judge not legally disqualified
to sit in a given case. It is his duty not to sit in its trial and decision if legally disqualified; but if the judge is not
disqualified, it is a matter of official duty for him to proceed with the trial and decision of the case. He cannot shirk
the responsibility without the risk of being called upon to account for his dereliction. 112

It is timely to be reminded, too, that the Supreme Court is a collegial judicial body whose every Member has
solemnly and individually sworn to dispense and administer justice to every litigant. As a collegial body, the
Supreme Court adjudicates without fear or favor. The only things that the Supreme Court collectively focuses its
attention to in every case are the merits thereof, and the arguments of the parties on the issues submitted for
consideration and deliberation. Only thereby may the solemn individual oath of the Members to do justice be
obeyed.

In line with the foregoing, We deem it baseless, not to mention problematic, the respondent's prayer that the matter
of inhibition of the six Associate Justices be decided by the remaining members of the Court En Banc. The
respondent herself was cognizant that the prevailing rule allows challenged Justices to participate in the
deliberations on the matter of their disqualification. Moreover, exclusion from the deliberations due to delicadeza or
sense of decency, partakes of a ground apt for a voluntary inhibition. It bears to be reminded that voluntary
inhibition, leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for other just and valid
reasons, with only their conscience as guide. Indeed, the best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a
113

case rests with the magistrate sought to be disqualified. Moreover, to compel the remaining members to decide on
the challenged member's fitness to resolve the case is to give them authority to review the propriety of acts of their
colleagues, a scenario which can undermine the independence of each of the members of the High Court.

In the En Banc case of Jurado & Co. v. Hongkong Bank, the Court elucidated that a challenge to the competency
114

of a judge may admit two constructions: first, the magistrate decides for himself the question of his competency and
when he does so, his decision therein is conclusive and the other Members of the Court have no voice in it;
and second, the challenged magistrate sits with the Court and decides the challenge as a collegial body. It was in
Jurado that the Court adopted the second view as the proper approach when a challenge is poised on the
competency of a sitting magistrate, that is, the Court, together with the challenged magistrate, decides. Jurado
further expressly excluded a possible third construction wherein the Court decides the challenge but without the
participation of the challenged member on the ground that such construction would place power on a party to halt
the proceedings by the simple expedient of challenging a majority of the Justices. The Court sees no reason to
deviate from its standing practice of resolving competency challenges as a collegial body without excluding the
challenged Member from participating therein.

Accordingly, the Court resolves to DENY respondent's motion to exclude Associate Justices Peralta, Leonardo-De
Castro, Jardeleza, Tijam, Bersamin, and Martires in the resolution of the separate motions· for inhibition against the
said Associate Justices. Likewise, the Court resolves to DENY the said separate motions for inhibition.

Substantive Issues

I.

The Court has Jurisdiction over the instant

Petition for Quo Warranto

The petition challenges respondent's right and title to the position of Chief Justice. The Republic avers that
respondent unlawfully holds her office because in failing to regularly declare her assets, liabilities and net worth as a
member of the career service prior to her appointment as an Associate Justice, and later as Chief Justice, of the
Court, she cannot be said to possess the requirement of proven integrity demanded of every aspiring member of the
Judiciary. The Republic thus prays that respondent's appointment as Chief Justice be declared void. Respondent
counters that, as an impeachable officer, she may only be removed through impeachment by the Senate sitting as
an impeachment court

Supreme Court has original

jurisdiction over an action for quo
warranto

Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, in part, provides that the Supreme Court shall exercise original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. This Court, the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto.

Relatedly, Section 7, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides that the venue of an action for quo warranto, when
commenced by the Solicitor General, is either the Regional Trial Court in the City of Manila, in the Court of Appeals,
or in the Supreme Court.
While the hierarchy of courts serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs, a direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In the instant
115

case, direct resort to the Court is justified considering that the action for quo warranto questions the qualification of
no less than a Member of the Court. The issue of whether a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office is a matter of public concern over which the government takes special interest as it
obviously cannot allow an intruder or impostor to occupy a public position. 116

The instant petition is a case of

transcendental importance

While traditionally, the principle of transcendental importance applies as an exception to the rule requiring locus
standi before the Courts can exercise its judicial power of review, the same principle nevertheless, finds application
in this case as it is without doubt that the State maintains an interest on the issue of the legality of the Chief Justice's
appointment.

Further, it is apparent that the instant petition is one of first impression and of paramount importance to the public in
the sense that the qualification, eligibility and appointment of an incumbent Chief Justice, the highest official of the
Judiciary, are being scrutinized through an action for quo warranto. The Court's action on the present petition has
far-reaching implications, and it is paramount that the Court make definitive pronouncements on the issues herein
presented for the guidance of the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. Thus, the questions herein
presented merit serious consideration from the Court and should not be trifled on.

Policy and ethical considerations likewise behoove this Court to rule on the issues put forth by the parties. This
Court has always been a vigilant advocate in ensuring that its members and employees continuously possess the
highest ideals of integrity, honesty, and uprightness. More than professional competence, this Court is cognizant of
the reality that the strength of Our institution depends on the confidence reposed on Us by the public. As can be
gleaned from Our recent decisions, this Court has not hesitated from disciplining its members whether they be
judges, Justices or regular court employees. This case should not therefore be treated merely with kid gloves
because it involves the highest official of the judicial branch of the government. On the contrary, this is an opportune
time for this Court to exact accountability by examining whether there has been strict compliance with the legal and
procedural requirements in the appointment of its Members.

Respondent, however, pounds on the fact that as a member of the Supreme Court, she is an impeachable officer.
As such, respondent argues that a quo warranto proceeding, which may result in her ouster, cannot be lodged
against her, especially when there is an impending impeachment case against her.

This argument is misplaced.

The origin, nature and purpose of

impeachment and quo warranto
are materially different

While both impeachment and quo warranto may result in the ouster of the public official, the two proceedings
materially differ. At its most basic, impeachment proceedings are political in nature, while an action for quo
warranto is judicial or a proceeding traditionally lodged in the courts.

To lend proper context, We briefly recount the origin and nature of impeachment proceedings and a quo
warranto petition:

Impeachment

Historians trace the origin of impeachment as far as the 5th century in ancient Greece in a process called
eisangelia. The grounds for impeachment include treason, conspiracy against the democracy, betrayal of strategic
117

posts or expeditionary forces and corruption and deception. 118

Its, modern form, however, appears to be inspired by the British parliamentary system of impeachment. Though
both public and private officials can be the subject of the process, the British system of impeachment is largely
similar to the current procedure in that it is undertaken in both Houses of the Parliament. The House of Commons
determines when an impeachment should be instituted. If the grounds, normally for treason and other high crimes
and misdemeanor, are deemed sufficient, the House of Commons prosecutes the individual before the House of
Lords. 119

While impeachment was availed for "high crimes and misdemeanors", it would appear that the phrase was applied
to a variety of acts which can arguably amount to a breach of the public's confidence, such as advising the King to
grant liberties and privileges to certain persons to the hindrance of the due execution of the laws, procuring offices
for persons who were unfit, and unworthy of them and squandering away the public treasure, browbeating
witnesses and commenting on their credibility, cursing and drinking to excess, thereby bringing the highest scandal
on the public justice of the kingdom, and failure to conduct himself on the most distinguished principles of good faith,
equity, moderation, and mildness. 120

While heavily influenced by the British concept of impeachment, the United States of America made significant
modifications from its British counterpart. Fundamentally, the framers of the United States visualized the process as
a means to hold accountable its public officials, as can be gleaned from their basic law:

The President, Vice-President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors. 121

Other noted differences from the British process of impeachment include limiting and specifying the grounds to
"treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and Misdemeanors", and punishing the offender with removal and
disqualification to hold public office instead of death, forfeiture of property and corruption of blood. 122

In the Philippines, the earliest record of impeachment in our laws is from the 1935 Constitution. Compared to the
123

US Constitution, it would appear that the drafters of the 1935 Constitution further modified the process by making
impeachment applicable only to the highest officials of the country; providing "culpable violation of the Constitution"
as an additional ground, and requiring a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives to impeach and three-
fourths vote of the Senate to convict.

As currently worded, our 1987 Constitution, in addition to those stated in the 1935 basic law, provided another
additional ground to impeach high-ranking public officials: "betrayal of public trust". Commissioner Rustico De los
Reyes of the 1986 Constitutional Commission explained this ground as a "catch-all phrase to include all acts which
are not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue in office. It
includes betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty
by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, favoritism, etc. to the prejudice of public interest and which tend to bring
the office into disrepute."
124

From the foregoing, it is apparent that although the concept of impeachment has undergone various modifications to
suit different jurisdictions and government forms, the consensus seems to be that it is essentially a political process
meant to vindicate the violation of the public's trust. Buckner Melton, in his book The First Impeachment: The
Constitution’s Framers and the Case of Senator William Blount, succinctly opined:

Practically all who have written on the subject agree that impeachment involves a protection of a public interest,
incorporating a public law element, much like a criminal proceeding .... [I]mpeachment is a process instigated by the
government, or some branch thereof, against a person who has somehow harmed the government or the
community. The process, moreover, is adversarial in nature and resembles, to that extent, a judicial trial. 125

Quo warranto

The oft-cited origin of quo warranto was the reign of King Edward I of England who questioned the local barons and
lords who held lands or title under questionable authority. After his return from his crusade in Palestine, he
discovered that England had fallen because of ineffective central administration by his predecessor, King Henry
111. The inevitable result was that the barons, whose relations with the King were governed on paper by Magna
126

Carta, assumed to themselves whatever power the King's officers had neglected. Thus, King Edward I deemed it
wise to inquire as to what right the barons exercised any power that deviated in the slightest from a normal type of
feudalism that the King had in mind. The theory is that certain rights are regalia and can be exercised only upon
showing of actual grants from the King or his predecessor. Verily, King Edward's purpose was to catalogue the
rights, properties and possessions of the kingdom in his efforts to restore the same.

In the Philippines, the remedies against usurpers of public office appeared in the 1900s, through Act No.
190. Section 197 of the Act provides for a provision comparable to Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court:
127

Sec. 197. Usurpation of an Office or Franchise- A civil action may be brought in the name of the Government of the
Philippine Islands:

1. Against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public civil office or a franchise
within the Philippine Islands, or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the Government of the
Philippine Islands;

2. Against a public civil officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provisions of law, works a forfeiture of his
office;

3. Against an association of persons who act as a corporation within the Philippine Islands, without being legally
incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.

Based from the foregoing, it appears that impeachment is a proceeding exercised by the legislative, as
representatives of the sovereign, to vindicate the breach of the trust reposed by the people in the hands of
the public officer by determining the public officer's fitness to stay in the office. Meanwhile, an action
for quo warranto, involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the election or appointment
of a public official based on predetermined rules.

Quo warranto and impeachment can

proceed independently and
simultaneously

Aside from the difference in their origin and nature, quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of
each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to
initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.

The term "quo warranto" is Latin for "by what authority." Therefore, as the name suggests, quo warranto is a writ
128

of inquiry. It [quo warranto] determines whether an individual has the legal right to hold the public office he
129

or she occupies. 130

In review, Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:

Action by Government against individuals. - An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may
be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority so to act.

Thus, a quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested
public office or to oust the holder from its enjoyment. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled
by election, what is to be determined is the eligibility of the candidates elected, while in quo
warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment.
The title to a public office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. In the
past, the Court held that title to public office cannot be assailed even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set
aside order. That quo warranto is the proper legal vehicle to directly attack title to public office likewise precludes
131

the filing of a petition for prohibition for purposes of inquiring into the validity of the appointment of a public officer.
Thus, in Nacionalista Party v. De Vera, the Court held:
132

"[T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be
treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there
is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an
intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of
prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature
prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office." 133

As earlier discussed, an action for quo warranto may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor,
or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. 134

That usurpation of a public office is treated as a public wrong and carries with it public interest in our jurisdiction is
clear when Section 1, Rule 66 provides that where the action is for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines
through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. 135

Nonetheless, the Solicitor General, in the exercise of sound discretion, may suspend or turn down the institution of
an action for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the
Solicitor General may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may choose not
to file the case at all. The Solicitor General is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo
warranto, circumscribed only by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand. 136

The instance when an individual is allowed to commence an, action for quo warranto in his own name is when such
person is claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by
another. Feliciano v. Villasin reiterates the basic principle enunciated in Acosta v. Flor that for a quo
137 138 139

warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show no less than a clear right to the contested
office.

In case of usurpation of a public office, when the respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully
holding or exercising a public office, position or franchise, the judgment shall include the following:

(a) the respondent shall be ousted and excluded from the office;

(b) the petitioner or relator, as the case may be, shall recover his costs; and

(c) such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the public office, position or franchise of all the
parties to the action as justice requires. 140

The remedies available in a quo warranto judgment do not include correction or reversal of acts taken under the
ostensible authority of an office or franchise. Judgment is limited to ouster or forfeiture and may not be imposed
retroactively upon prior exercise of official or corporate duties. 141

Quo warranto and impeachment are, thus, not mutually exclusive remedies and may even proceed simultaneously.
The existence of other remedies against the usurper does not prevent the State from commencing a quo
warranto proceeding. 142

Respondent's Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam specifically tackled the objection to the petition
on the ground of forum shopping,. Essentially, respondent points out that the inclusion of the matter on tax fraud,
which will further be discussed below, is already covered by Article I of the Articles of Impeachment. Hence,
respondent argues, among others, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground of forum shopping.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved adversely by
some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in
another. Forum shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are
143

given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a
more friendly venue. At present, our jurisdiction has recognized several ways to commit forum shopping, to wit:
144

( 1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having
been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same
cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for
dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with different prayers
(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). 145

We have already settled that the test for determining existence of forum shopping is as follows:

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is whether
the elements of litis peridentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending,
there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. (Emphasis ours)
146

Litis pendentia is a Latin term, which literally means "a pending suit" and is variously referred to in some decisions
as lis pendens and auter action pendant. As a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, it refers to the situation
where two actions are pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them
becomes unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Litis pendentia requires
the concurrence of the following requisites: ( 1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the
same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the
same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in
the other case. 147

On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are
satisfied: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; ( 4) there is - between the first and the second actions -
identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.148

Ultimately, what is critical is the vexation brought upon the courts and the litigants by a party who asks different
courts to rule on the same or related causes and grant the same or substantially the same reliefs and in the process
creates the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same issues. 149

Guided by the foregoing, there can be no forum shopping in this case despite the pendency of the impeachment
proceedings before the House of Representatives, contrary to respondent's position.

The causes of action in the two proceedings are unequivocally different. In quo warranto, the cause of action lies on
the usurping, intruding, or unlawfully holding or exercising of a public office, while in impeachment, it is the
commission of an impeachable offense. Stated in a different manner, the crux of the controversy in this quo
warranto proceedings is the determination of whether or not respondent legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent's
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. To be sure, respondent is not being prosecuted herein for such
impeachable offenses enumerated in the Articles of Impeachment. Instead, the resolution of this case shall be
based on established facts and related laws. Simply put, while respondent's title to hold a public office is the issue
in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that respondent legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to
warrant her removal from office.

Likewise, the reliefs sought in the two proceedings are different. Under the Rules on quo warranto, "when the
respondent is found guilty of usurping, intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising a public office, x x x,
judgment shall be rendered that such respondent be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, x x x. " In short,
150
respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a public office, which he/she is
ineligible to hold. On the other hand, in impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses shall
result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible
151

to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place, does not and cannot legally hold or
occupy.

In the said Reply/Supplement to the Memorandum Ad Cautelam, respondent advanced the argument that the
"impeachment proceeding" is different from the "impeachment case", the former refers to the filing of the complaint
before the Committee on Justice while the latter refers to the proceedings before the Senate. Citing Francisco v.
House of Representatives, respondent posits that the "impeachment proceeding" against her is already pending
upon the filing of the verified complaint before the House Committee on Justice albeit the "impeachment case" has
not yet started as the Articles of Impeachment has not yet been filed with the Senate. Hence, in view of such
proceeding before the Committee on Justice, the filing of the instant petition constitutes forum shopping.

The difference between the "impeachment proceeding" and the "impeachment case" correctly cited by the
respondent, bolsters the conclusion that there can be no forum shopping. Indeed, the "impeachment proceeding"
before the House Committee on Justice is not the "impeachment case" proper. The impeachment case is yet to be
initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no pending
impeachment case against the respondent.

The House Committee on Justice's determination of probable cause on whether the impeachment against the
respondent should go on trial before the Senate is akin to the prosecutor's determination of probable cause during
the preliminary investigation in a criminal case. In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused; he does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. The process is
merely inquisitorial and is merely a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime. It is
not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. As such, during the
152

preliminary investigation before the prosecutor, there is no pending case to speak of yet. In fact, jurisprudence
states that the preliminary investigation stage is not part of the trial.
153

Thus, at the time of the filing of this petition, there is no pending impeachment case that would bar the quo
warrranto petition on the ground of forum shopping.

In fine, forum shopping and litis pendentia are not present and a final decision in one will not strictly constitute as
res judicata to the other. A judgment in a quo warranto case determines the respondent's constitutional or legal
authority to perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim; meanwhile a judgment
154

in an impeachment proceeding pertain to a respondent's "fitness for public office." 155

Considering the legal basis and nature of an action for quo waranto, this Court cannot shirk from resolving the
instant controversy in view of the fact that· respondent is an impeachable officer and/or in view of the possibility of
an impeachment trial against respondent.

Impeachment is not an exclusive

remedy by which an invalidly
appointed or invalidly elected
impeachable official may be removed
from office

Respondent anchors her position that she can be removed from office only by impeachment on the Court's ruling
in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Fernan, In Re Gonzales, Jarque v. Desierto and Marcoleta v.
156 157 158 159

Borra. It should be stressed, however, that none of these cases concerned the validity of an impeachable officer's
160

appointment. Lecaroz involved a criminal charge against a mayor before the Sandiganbayan, while the rest were
disbarment cases filed against impeachable officers principally for acts done during their tenure in public office.
Whether the impeachable officer unlawfully held his office or whether his appointment was void was not an issue
raised before the Court. The principle laid down in said cases is to the effect that during their incumbency,
impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if
they are required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with
disbarment. The proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public officer's title or right to the office he or
she occupies. The ruling therefore cannot serve as authority to hold that a quo warranto action can never be filed
against an impeachable officer. In issuing such pronouncement, the Court is presumed to have been aware of its
power to issue writs of quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Even the PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to
question the eligibility of the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers. Following
respondent's theory that an impeachable officer can be removed only through impeachment means that a President
or Vice-President against whom an election protest has been filed can demand for the dismissal of the protest on
the ground that it can potentially cause his/her removal from office through a mode other than by impeachment. To
sustain respondent's position is to render election protests under the PET Rules nugatory. The Constitution could
not have intended such absurdity since fraud and irregularities in elections cannot be countenanced, and the will of
the people as reflected in their votes must be determined and respected. The Court could not, therefore, have
unwittingly curtailed its own judicial power by prohibiting quo warranto proceedings against impeachable officers.

Further, the PET Rules provide that a petition for quo warranto, contesting the election of the President or Vice-
President on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines, may be filed by any registered
voter who has voted in the election concerned within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. Despite
161

disloyalty to the Republic being a crime against public order defined and penalized under the penal code, and thus
162

may likewise be treated as "other high crimes," constituting an impeachable offense, quo warranto as a remedy to
163

remove the erring President or Vice-President is nevertheless made expressly available.

In fact, this would not be the first time the Court shall take cognizance of a quo warranto petition against an
impeachable officer. In the consolidated cases of Estrada v. Desierto, et al. and Estrada v. Macapagal-Arroyo, the 164

Court took cognizance and assumed jurisdiction over the quo warranto petition filed against respondent therein who,
at the time of the filing of the petition, had taken an oath and assumed the Office of the President. Petitioner therein
prayed for judgment confirming him to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity. In fact, in the said cases, there was not even a claim that respondent
therein was disqualified from holding office and accordingly challenged respondent's status as de jure 14th
President of the Republic. By entertaining the quo warranto petition, the Court in fact determined whether then
President Estrada has put an end to his official status by his alleged act of resignation.

Furthermore, the language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo
warranto action against impeachable officers. The provision reads:

Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but
not by impeachment. (Emphasis ours)

It is a settled rule of legal hermeneutics that if the language under consideration is plain, it is neither necessary nor
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records of the constitutional convention, for its interpretation.165

The provision uses the permissive term "may" which, in statutory construction, denotes discretion
and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. We have consistently held that the term
166

"may" is indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity or an option. The grantee of that opportunity
is vested with a right or faculty which he has the option to exercise. An option to remove by
167

impeachment admits of an alternative mode of effecting the removal.

On this score, Burke Shartel in his work Federal Judges: Appointment, Supervision, and Removal: Some
Possibilities under the Constitution, makes an interesting and valid observation on a parallel provision on
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impeachment under the U.S. Constitution from which ours was heavily patterned:

x x x it is not reasonable to spell out of the express provision for impeachment, an intention or purpose of the
framers to create an exclusive remedy. The common canon for interpreting legislation, - expresio unius excusio est
alterius - has no proper application to an express provision for one of several common-law remedies. The express
provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when
there are other adequate reasons to account for this express provision. The main purpose of the framers of the
Constitution in providing for impeachment was to supply a legislative check on the other departments of our
government, and particularly on the chief executive. Without an express provision, impeachment would have been
impliedly prohibited by the doctrine of separation of powers. If this legislative check was desired, a reservation in
express words was essential. Another reason for the express provisions on this subject was that the framers of the
Constitution did not wish to make the executive and judicial officers of our government completely dependent on
Congress. They wanted to confer only a limited power of removal, and the desired limitations on the power to
impeach had to be explicitly stated. These two reasons explain the presence in the Constitution of the express
provisions for impeachment; it is not necessary to resort to any supposed intent to establish an exclusive method of
removal in order to account for them. On the contrary, logic and sound policy demand that the Congressional power
be construed to be a concurrent, not an exclusive, power of removal.

We hold, therefore, that by its tenor, Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution allows the institution of a quo
warranto action against an impeachable officer. After all, a quo warranto petition is predicated on grounds
distinct from those of impeachment. The former questions the validity of a public officer's appointment
while the latter indicts him for the so-called impeachable offenses without questioning his title to the office
he holds.

Further, that the enumeration of "impeachable offenses" is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses
are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise purport to be a
complete statement of the causes of removal from office. Shartel, above cited, eloquently incites as follows:

x x x. There is no indication in the debates of the Convention that the framers of the Constitution intended at this
point to make a complete statement of causes of removal from office. The emphasis was on the causes for which
Congress might remove executive and judicial officers, not on causes of removal as such. x x x How then can the
causes of removal by impeachment be construed as a recital of the causes for which judges may be removed? It is
especially hard to see why the express provision for impeachment - a limited legislative method of removing all civil
officers ·for serious misconduct - should be construed to forbid removal of judges by judicial action on account of
disability or any reasonable cause not a proper ground for action by the Houses of Congress.

Neither can the Court accept respondent's argument that the term "may" in Section 2, Article XI qualifies only the
penalty imposable at the conclusion of the impeachment trial, such that conviction may result in lesser penalties like
censure or reprimand. Section 3(7), Article XI of the Constitution specifies the penalty of "removal from office" and
"disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines" in impeachment cases. There is nothing
169

in the said provision that deliberately vests authority on the impeachment court to impose penalties lower than those
expressly mentioned. Also, respondent has not shown that such was authority was intended by the framers of the
1987 Constitution. The ultimate penalty of removal is imposed owing to the serious nature of the impeachable
offenses. This Court had occasion to rule:

The task of the Court is rendered lighter by the existence of relatively clear provisions in the Constitution. In cases
like this, we follow what the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice (later, Chief Justice) Jose Abad Santos stated
in Gold Creek Mining Corp. v. Rodriguez, that:

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that which is embodied and
expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. (Emphasis supplied)
170

To subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to
cleanse their appointments or election of any possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed
qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in an impeachment proceeding.

The courts should be able to inquire into the validity of appointments even of impeachable officers. To hold
otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an impeachable officer cannot be questioned
even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar
membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar. Unless such an
officer commits any of the grounds for impeachment and is actually impeached, he can continue discharging the
functions of his office even when he is clearly disqualified from holding it. Such would result in permitting unqualified
and ineligible public officials to continue occupying key positions, exercising sensitive sovereign functions until they
are successfully removed from office through impeachment. This could not have been the intent of the framers of
the Constitution.

We must always put in mind that public office is a public trust. Thus, the people have the right to have only
171

qualified individuals appointed to public office. To construe Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution as
proscribing a quo warranto petition is to deprive the State of a remedy to correct a "public wrong" arising
from defective or void appointments. Equity will not suffer a wrong to be without remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium. Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. 172

As respondent herself previously opined in one case: "Reason is the foundation of all legal interpretation, including
that of constitutional interpretation. And the most powerful tool of reason is reflecting on the essence of things."173

The essence of quo warranto is to protect the body politic from the usurpation of public office and to ensure that
government authority is entrusted only to qualified individuals. Reason therefore dictates that quo warranto should
be an available remedy to question the legality of appointments especially of impeachable officers considering that
they occupy some of the highest-ranking offices in the land and are capable of wielding vast power and influence on
matters of law and policy.

At this juncture, it would be apt to dissuade and allay the fear that a ruling on the availability of quo warranto would
allow the Solicitor General to "wield a sword over our collective heads, over all our individual heads, and on that
basis, impair the integrity of the Court as a court."
174

Such view, while not improbable, betrays a fallacious and cynical view of the competence and professionalism of the
Solicitor General and the members of this Court. It presupposes that members of this Court are law offenders. It
also proceeds from the premise that the Solicitor General is the Executive's pawn in its perceived quest for a "more
friendly" Court. Verily, fear, particularly if unfounded, should not override settled presumptions of good faith and
regularity in the performance of official duties. This Court, absent a compelling proof to the contrary, has no basis to
doubt the independence and autonomy of the Solicitor General. It is worthwhile to note that while the Solicitor
175

General has a prerogative in the institution of an action for quo warranto, its exercise of such discretion is
nevertheless subject to the Court's review. In Topacio v. Ong, this Court explained:
176

In the exercise of sound discretion, the Solicitor General may suspend or turn down the institution of an action
for quo warranto where there are just and valid reasons. Thus, in Gonzales v. Chavez, the Court ruled:

Like the Attorney-General of the United States who has absolute discretion in choosing whether to prosecute or not
to prosecute or to abandon a prosecution already started, our own Solicitor General may even dismiss, abandon,
discontinue or compromise suits either with or without stipulation with the other party. Abandonment of a case,
however, does not mean that the Solicitor General may just drop it without any legal and valid reasons, for
the discretion given him is not unlimited. Its exercise must be, not only within the parameters set by law but
with the best interest of the State as the ultimate goal.

Upon receipt of a case certified to him, the Solicitor General exercises his discretion in the management of the case.
He may start the prosecution of the case by filing the appropriate action in court or he may opt not to file the case at
all. He may do everything within his legal authority but always conformably with the national interest and the
policy of the government on the matter at hand. (Emphasis ours)

Neither should it be forgotten that the Solicitor General is an officer of the Court, tasked "to share in the task and
responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes;" therefore, he may be enjoined in the same manner that a
special prosecutor was sought enjoined by this Court from committing any act which may tend to "obstruct, pervert
or impede and degrade the administration of justice." Either way, in the event that quo warranto cases against
177

members of the Judiciary inundate the courts' dockets, it does not follow that the courts are powerless to shield its
members against suits which are obviously lacking in merit, or those merely intended to harass the respondent.

The Supreme Court's exercise of its

jurisdiction over a quo warranto
petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers
Section 3(1) and 3(6), Article XI, of the Constitution respectively provides that the House of Representatives shall
have the exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment while the Senate shall have the sole power to try and
decide all cases of impeachment. Thus, there is no argument that the constitutionally-defined instrumentality which
is given the power to try impeachment cases is the Senate.

Nevertheless, the Court's assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would
otherwise be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate.

Again, an action for quo warranto tests the right of a person to occupy a public position. It is a direct proceeding
assailing the title to a public office. The issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the defendant is legally
178

occupying a public position which goes into the questions of whether defendant was legally appointed, was legally
qualified and has complete legal title to the office. If defendant is found to be not qualified and without any authority,
the relief that the Court grants is the ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office. In other words, while
179

impeachment concerns actions that make the officer unfit to continue exercising his or her office, quo
warranto involves matters that render him or her ineligible to hold the position to begin with.

Given the nature and effect of an action for quo warranto, such remedy is unavailing to determine whether or not an
official has committed misconduct in office nor is it the proper legal vehicle to evaluate the person's performance in
the office. Apropos, an action for quo warranto does not try a person's culpability of an impeachment offense,
neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability.

In Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc., the Court further explained the court's authority to
180

issue a writ of quo warranto, as complementary to, and not violative of, the doctrine of separation of powers, as
follows:

And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements the traditional
separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are entrusted with the adjudication of
the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their rights and obligations under law. The question of
whether a franchisee is in breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently
suited to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over laws does not preclude
Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo
warranto in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating
the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees' violation of the
franchises extended to them. (Emphasis ours)

Applying the ratio in Divinagracia, the Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings
does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for
impeachment, to craft and transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising
its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

Indeed, respondent's case is peculiar in that her omission to file her SALN also formed part of the allegations
against her in the Verified Complaint for Impeachment. Verily, the filing of the SALN is a Constituional requirement,
and the transgression of which may, in the wisdom of the impeachment court, be interpreted as constituting culpable
violation ·of the Constitution. But then, respondent, unlike the President, the Vice-President, Members of the
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman, apart from having to comply with the Constitutional SALN
requirement, also answers to the unique Constitutional qualification of having to be a person of proven competence,
integrity, probity, and independence - qualifications not expressly required by the fundamental law for the other
impeachable officers. And as will be extensively demonstrated hereunder, respondent's failure to file her SALNs
181

and to submit the same to the JBC go into the very qualification of integrity. In other words, when a Member of the
Supreme Court transgresses the SALN requirement prior to his or her appointment as such, he or she commits a
violation of the Constitution and belies his or her qualification to hold the office. It is not therefore accurate to place
Members of the Supreme Court, such as · respondent, on absolutely equal plane as that of the other impeachable
officers, when more stringent and burdensome requirements for qualification and holding of office are expressly
placed upon them.
In the same vein, the fact that the violation of the SALN requirement formed part of the impeachment complaint
does not justify shifting responsibility to the Congress, no matter how noble the respondent and the intervenors
portray such act to be. The fact remains that the Republic raised an issue as to respondent's eligibility to occupy the
position of Chief Justice, an obviously legal question, which can be resolved through review of jurisprudence and
pertinent laws. Logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy
simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the
initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the
Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case law.
Evidently, this scenario would involve waste of time, not to mention unnecessary disbursement of public funds.

Further, as an impeachment court, the Senate is a tribunal composed of politicians who are indubitably versed in
pragmatic decision making and cognizant of political repercussions of acts purported to have been committed by
impeachable officials. As representatives of the Filipino people, they determine whether the purported acts of
182

highest ranking officials of the country constitute as an offense to the citizenry. Following this premise, the
impeachment tribunal cannot be expected to rule on the validity or constitutionality of the Chief Justice's
appointment, nor can their ruling be of jurisprudential binding effect to this Court. To authorize Congress. to rule on
public officials' eligibility would disturb the system of checks and balances as it would dilute the judicial power of
courts, upon which jurisdiction is exclusively vested to rule on actions for quo warranto.

Nevertheless, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, and to obliviate confusion in the· future as to when quo
warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of, and in keeping with the Court's function
of harmonizing the laws and the rules with the Constitution, the Court herein demarcates that an act or omission
committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official's qualifications to hold
office as to render such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo warranto petition,
provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions,
even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed
during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of a quo
warranto proceeding, but of something else, which may either be impeachment if the public official
concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

Judicial power versus Judicial

restraint and fear of a
constitutional crisis

Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 183

In the presence of all the requisites for the Court's exercise of judicial review, there can be no doubt that the
184

exercise thereof is not discretionary upon the Court, nor dependent upon the whims and caprices of any of its
Members nor any of the parties. Even in cases rendered moot and academic by supervening events, the Court
nevertheless exercised its power of review on the basis of certain recognized exceptions. Neither is its exercise
185

circumscribed by fear of displeasing a co-equal branch of the government. Instead, the Constitution makes it crystal
clear that the exercise of judicial power is a duty of the Court.

As such, the exercise of judicial power could never be made dependent upon the action or inaction of another
branch of the government. The exercise of judicial restraint on the ground that the Senate, sitting as an
impeachment court, has the sole power to try and decide all cases of impeachment, is thus misplaced.

For one, at the time of the filing of, and even during the pendency of the resolution of the instant petition, no
impeachment trial has been commenced by the Senate. In fact, it will be purely skeptical, nay lackadaisical, on the
part of the Court to assume, at the time the petition was filed, that the House of Representatives will affirm a
favorable resolution with the Articles of Impeachment and that trial will eventually carry on.
For another, and as extensively discussed, the question of whether or not respondent usurped a public office is
undoubtedly justiciable. Recall Francisco, Jr., v. House of Representatives: 186

The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an option before this Court. Adjudication may not be
declined, because this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced as there is no other
tribunal to which the controversy may be referred. Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty vested under
Art. VIII, Sec. 1 (2) of the Constitution. More than being clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions. In the august words of amicus curiae Father Bernas, jurisdiction is not just a
power; it is a solemn duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is vexatious, would be a dereliction
of duty.

Thus, to exercise restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer's appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial
duty. We have held that:

While an appointment is an essentially discretionary executive power, it is subject to the limitation that the appointee
should possess none of the disqualifications but all the qualifications required by law. Where the law prescribes
certain qualifications for a given office or position, courts may determine whether the appointee has the
requisite qualifications, absent which, his right or title thereto may be declared void. (Emphasis ours)
187

Clearly, an outright dismissal of the petition based on speculation that respondent will eventually be tried on
impeachment is a clear abdication of the Court's duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it.
Indeed, the easiest way to lose power is to abdicate it.

Neither does the possibility of the occurrence of a constitutional crisis a reason for the Court to abandon its positive
constitutional duty to take cognizance of a case over which it enjoys jurisdiction and is not otherwise legally
disqualified. A constitutional crisis may arise from a conflict over the determination by the independent branches of
government of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional powers. Thus, there can be no
constitutional crisis where the Constitution itself provides the means and bases for the resolution of the "conflict." To
reiterate, the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto falls within the ambit of its judicial power
to settle justiciable issues or actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. In
so doing, the Court is not arrogating upon itself the Congress' power to determine whether an impeachable officer
may be removed by impeachment or not, which is a political, rather than a judicial, exercise. 188

In fine, it is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law. It cannot be waived by stipulation, by abdication or by
estoppel. Quo warranto proceedings are essentially judicial in character - it calls for the exercise of the Supreme
Court's constitutional duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot
be abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the
Congress, even as it acts as an impeachment court through the Senate. As an impeachment court, the Senate's
jurisdiction and the effect of its pronouncement is as limited under the Constitution - it cannot rule on the
constitutionality of an appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court with .jurisprudential binding effect because
rulings of the impeachment court, being a political rather than a judicial body, do not form part of the laws of the
land. Any attempt to derogate or usurp judicial power in the determination of whether the respondent's appointment
is constitutional or not will, in point of fact, amount to culpable violation of the Constitution.

In the same breath, the Supreme Court cannot renege on its avowed constitutional duty and abdicate its judicial
power. To do so would similarly amount to culpable violation of the Constitution. Instead, this Court asserts its
judicial independence and equanimity to decide cases without fear or favor; without regard as to a party's power or
weakness; without regard to personalities; all to the ultimate end that Our sacrosanct oaths as magistrates of this
Court, which We voluntarily imposed upon ourselves without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, to
support and defend the Constitution and to obey the laws of the land, are strongly and faithfully realized.

Seeking affirmative relief from the

Court is tantamount to voluntary
appearance

In repudiating the Court's jurisdiction over her person and over the subject matter, respondent harps on the fact that
as Chief Justice, she is an impeachable officer who may be removed only by impeachment by the Senate
constituted as an impeachment court. As extensively discussed, the Court maintains jurisdiction over the
present quo warranto proceedings despite respondent's occupation of an impeachable office, as it is the legality or
illegality of such occupation that is the subject matter of the instant petition. Further, respondent cannot now be
heard to deny the Court's jurisdiction over her person even as she claims to be an impeachable official because
respondent in fact invoked and sought affirmative relief from the Court by praying for the inhibition of several
Members of this Court and by moving that the case be heard on Oral Arguments, albeit ad cautelam.

While mindful of Our ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals, which pronounced that a party may
189

file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over its person, and at the same time raise affirmative
defenses and pray for affirmative relief without waiving its objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person,
as well as Section 20, Rule 15, this Court, in several cases, ruled that seeking affirmative relief in a court is
190

tantamount to voluntary appearance therein. 191

Thus, in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, cited in NM Rotchschild & Sons (Australia)
192

Limited v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company, wherein defendants filed a Motion for Inhibition without
193

submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of this Court, We held:

Besides, any lingering doubts on the issue of voluntary appearance dissipate when the respondents' motion for
inhibition is considered. This motion seeks a sole relief: inhibition of Judge Napoleon Inoturan from further hearing
the case. Evidently, by seeking affirmative relief other than dismissal of the case, respondents manifested
their voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. It is well-settled that the active participation of a party in
the proceedings is tantamount to an invocation of the court's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case, and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's jurisdiction. (Emphasis in the original)

Accordingly, We rule that respondent, by seeking affirmative relief, is deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the Court. Following settled principles, respondent cannot invoke the Court's jurisdiction on one hand
to secure affirmative relief, and then repudiate that same jurisdiction after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief.

II.

The Petition is Not Dismissible

on the Ground of Prescription

Prescription does not lie against the State

The rules on quo warranto, specifically Section 11, Rule 66, provides:

Limitations. - Nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a public officer or
employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for
damages in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding section unless the same be commenced within
one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the petitioner's right to the office in question. (Emphasis
supplied)

Since the 1960's the Court had explained in ample jurisprudence the application of the one-year prescriptive period
for filing an action for quo warranto.

In Bumanlag v. Fernandez and Sec. of Justice, the Court held that the one-year period fixed in then Section 16,
194

Rule 68 of the Rules of Court is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action for quo warranto and
that the inaction of an officer for one year could be validly considered a waiver of his right to file the same.

In Madrid v. Auditor General and Republic, We held that a person claiming to a position in the civil service must
195

institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within the one-year period, otherwise, not only will he be
considered to have waived his right to bring action therefor but worse, he will be considered to have acquiesced or
consented to the very matter that he is questioning.

The Court explained in Madrid that the reason for setting a prescriptive period is the urgency of the matter to be
resolved. The government must be immediately informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office
or position in the civil service, as against another actually holding it, so that the government may not be faced with
the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one for the person actually holding the office although illegally, and
another for one not actually rendering service although entitled to do so. 196

In Torres v. Quintas, the Court further explained that public interest requires that the rights of public office should
197

be determined as speedily as practicable. We have also explained in Cristobal v. Melchor and Arcala that there are
198

weighty reasons of public policy and convenience that demand the adoption of such limitation as there must be
stability in the service so that public business may not be unduly retarded. 199

Distinctively, the petitioners in these cited cases were private individuals asserting their right of office, unlike the
instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government
itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the qualification of the person
holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Thµs, the question is whether the one-year limitation is equally applicable when the petitioner is not a mere private
individual pursuing a private interest, but the government itself seeking relief for a public wrong and suing for public
interest? The answer is no.

Reference must necessarily be had to Section 2, Rule 66 which makes it compulsory for the Solicitor General to
commence a quo warranto action:

SEC. 2. When Solicitor General or public prosecutor must commence action. - The Solicitor General or a public
prosecutor, when directed by the President of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence
such action. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, when the Solicitor General himself commences the quo warranto action either (1) upon the
President's directive, (2) upon complaint or (3) when the Solicitor General has good reason to believe that there is
proof that (a) a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises· a public office, position or franchise;
(b) a public officer does or suffers an act which is a ground for the forfeiture of his office; or (c) an association acts
as a corporation without being legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act, he does so in the discharge
of his task and mandate to see to it that the best interest of the public and the government are upheld. In these three
instances, the Solicitor General is mandated under the Rules to commence the necessary quo warranto petition.

That the present Rule 66 on quo warranto takes root from Act No. 160, which is a legislative act, does not give the
one-year rule on prescription absolute application. Agcaoili v. Suguitan, squarely addressed this non-absolute
200

character of the one-year prescriptive period as follows:

x x x in re prescription or limitation of the action, it may be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription
of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the
Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient writ of
quo warranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one who usurped or
claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the usurper supported his claim, in
order to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of the civilized countries of the world the action is still
regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation or prescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general principle
it may be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto
proceeding brought to enforce a public right.

xxxx

In our opinion, even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription had not begun
to run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement
of his action until an answer to his protest had been made. He had a right to await the answer to his protest, in
the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favor and that action would be unnecessary. (Citations omitted
201

and emphasis ours)

Continuing, Agcaoili cites People ex rel. Moloney v. Pullmans Palace Car Co., to emphasize that the State is not
202

bound by statute of limitations nor by the laches, acquiescence or unreasonable delay on the part of its officers:

It is conceded, the state, acting in its character as a sovereign, is not bound by any statute of limitations or technical
estoppel. It is urged, however, that in quo warranto, under the common-law rule, the courts, in the exercise of their
discretion to grant the writ or not, or upon final hearing, refused aid when the conditions complained of had existed
for a number of years with knowledge on the part of the sovereign, and that the provisions of § 1 of chapter 112 of
the Revised Statutes, entitled Quo Warranto, that leave to file the information shall be given if the court or judge to
whom the petition is presented shall be satisfied there is probable cause for the proceeding, leave the court still
possessed of power to consider upon the hearing, and then apply the same doctrine of waiver and acquiescence. It
is the general rule that laches, acquiescence, or unreasonable delay in the performance of duty on the part
of the officers of the state, is not imputable to the state when acting in its character as a sovereign. There
are exceptions to this general rule, but we are unable to see that the allegations of the plea bring the case within the
principles of any such exceptions.

Jurisprudence across the United States likewise richly reflect that when the Solicitor General files a quo
warranto petition in behalf of the people and where the interests of the public is involved, the lapse of time presents
no effective bar:

An information in the nature of a quo warranto cannot be filed by a private individual without leave, which the court
may, at its discretion, either grant or ·refuse. To regulate their discretion as affected by the lapse of time, the English
courts adopted the rule which we have stated. But the Attorney General, representing the Crown in England and
the State in this country, may file an information in the nature of a quo warranto, without leave, according to
his own discretion; and we find no English law which holds that an information, so filed, can be barred by the lapse
of six years independently of any statute to that effect. x x x

The Attorney General being a public officer, may be presumed to be capable of a salutary and reasonable
discretion, as well as the court, and when, acting in behalf of the State, he deems it his duty to prosecute for a
forfeiture, it is not for the court, in the absence of any statutory limitation, to say he is too late. Indeed this court has
itself decided that, after the information has once been filed, its discretion ceases, and it has then nothing to do but
administer the law the same as in any other case. (Citations omitted)
203

In People v. Bailey: 204

Appellant claims that the action is barred by the provisions of the statute of limitations, x x x x We are of the opinion
that the established rule of law, as to the statute of limitations and its bearing upon cases of this character, is
correctly stated in the quotations above made and "that the attorney general may file the information on behalf
of the people at any time, and that lapse of time constitutes no bar to the proceeding." The law, in thus
permitting the attorney-general, either upon his own information or upon the information of a private party, to file an
information at any time against one who has unlawfully intruded into and is holding a public office, does not place
the courts or private parties in much danger of having to deal with stale claims. The action can only be brought
with the consent and permission of the attorney-general of the state, and, it is to be assumed, he will not
permit the institution of such a suit, if by reason of a great lapse of time the claim has become stale, or for
any other reason the state has ceased to have a present interest in it. (Citations omitted)

People v. Bailey quotes McPhail v. People ex rel. Lambert, as follows:

205

We do not consider this quo warranto proceeding, prosecuted by the state's attorney, for the purpose of ousting one
charged with wrongfully and without authority of law exercising the office, jurisdiction and powers of a police
magistrate, as simply a civil remedy, for the protection of private rights only. Police magistrates are public officers,
that are provided for in the constitution of the state; and by that instrument the judicial powers of the state are, in
part, vested in them. The office of police magistrate is one in which the state and the general public have a deep
interest, and the jurisdiction attached to it is uniform with that belonging to the office of justice of the peace. It is a
matter of public concern to the people of the state, and against their peace and dignity, that any one should
unlawfully, and without authority of right, exercise the jurisdiction, powers and functions of such office, and also a
matter of interest to the state and to the general public that more persons than the law authorizes are acting as
police magistrates. In this country the rule is that the attorney general or state's attorney may file the
information in behalf of the people, where the interests of the general public are involved, at any time, and
that, in conformity with the maxim, 'Nullum tempus occurrit regi,' lapse of time constitutes no bar to the
proceeding. (Citations omitted)

Aptly, in State ex rel Stovall v. Meneley, it was held that a quo warranto action is a governmental function and not
206

a propriety function, and therefore the doctrine of laches does not apply:

Governmental functions are those performed for the general public with respect to the common welfare for which no
compensation or particular benefit is received. x x x Quo warranto proceedings seeking ouster of a public
official are a governmental function. (Citations and annotations omitted) No statute of limitations is, therefore,
applicable. The district court did not err in denying Meneley's motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. x
xxx

The doctrine of laches, furthermore, does not apply when a cause of action is brought by the State seeking to
protect the public. (Citations and annotations omitted) x x x Having already noted that the quo warranto action is a
governmental function and not a propriety function, we hold the district court did not err in denying Meneley's motion
to dismiss on the basis of laches.

In fact, liberal interpretation to quo warranto provisions is sanctioned given that its primary purpose is to ascertain
whether one is constitutionally authorized to hold office. State ex rel Anaya v. McBride elucidates:
207

Since the Constitution provides for separate and equal branches of government in New Mexico, any legislative
measure which affects pleading, practice or procedure in relation to a power expressly vested by the Constitution in
the judiciary, such as quo warranto, cannot be deemed binding. We cannot render inoperative a clause in the
Constitution on so slender a reed. One of the primary purposes of quo warranto is to ascertain whether one is
constitutionally authorized to hold the office he claims, whether by election or appointment, and we must
liberally interpret the quo warranto statutes to effectuate that purpose.

Indeed, when the government is the real party in interest, and is proceeding mainly to assert its rights, there can be
no defense on the ground of laches or prescription. Indubitably, the basic principle that "prescription does not lie
208

against the State" which finds textual basis under Article 1108 (4) of the Civil Code, applies in this case.
209

Circumstances obtaining in this

case preclude the application of the
prescriptive period

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. People v. City Whittier, explains that the remedy of quo warranto is intended to prevent a continuing
210

exercise of an authority unlawfully asserted. Indeed, on point is People v. Bailey, when it ruled that because quo
211

warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no
prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much more the highest position in the
Judiciary.

In fact, in Cristobal, the Court considered certain exceptional circumstances which took the case out of the statute of
limitations, to wit: ( 1) there was no acquiescence to or inaction on the part of the petitioner, amounting to the
abandonment of his right to the position; (2) it was an act of the government through its responsible officials which
contributed to the delay in the filing of the action; and (3) the petition was grounded upon the assertion that
petitioner's removal from the questioned position was contrary to law.

In this case, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning respondent's qualification· for office only upon discovery
of the cause of ouster.

As will be demonstrated hereunder, respondent was never forthright as to whether or not she filed her SALNs
covering the period of her employment in U.P. Recall that during her application for the Chief Justice position, the
JBC required the submission of her previous SALNs. In response to the JBC, respondent never categorically stated
that she filed the required SALNs. Instead, she cleverly hid the fact of non-filing by stating that she should not be
required to submit the said documents as she was considered to be coming from private practice; that it was not
feasible to retrieve most of her records in the academe considering that the same are more than fifteen years old;
and that U.P. already cleared her of "all academic/administrative responsibilities, money and property
accountabilities and from administrative charges as of June 1, 2006" in a Clearance dated September 19, 2011.
212 213

Even up to the present, respondent has not been candid on whether she filed the required SALN s or not. While
respondent stated in her Comment that she filed the required SALNs when she was still connected with the U.P.
College of Law, she again offered as support the U.P. Clearance above-cited; that she was considered as coming
214

from private practice when she was nominated as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, hence, should not be
required to submit those SALNs; and that it was not feasible for her to retrieve said SALNs from U.P. as her records
therein are more than 15 years old. Notably, these are mere reiterations of her representations before the JBC.

Hence, until recently when respondent's qualification for office was questioned during the hearings conducted by the
House Committee on Justice on the impeachment complaint against the respondent, there was no indication that
would have prompted the Republic to assail respondent's appointment, much less question the wisdom or reason
behind the said recommending and appointing authorities' actions. The defect on respondent's appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

Given the foregoing, there can be no acquiescence or inaction, in this case, on the part of the Republic as would
amount to an abandonment of its right to seek redress against a public wrong and vindicate public interest. Neither
can delay be attributed to the Republic in commencing the action since respondent deliberately concealed the fact
of her disqualification to the position. Prescription, therefore, cannot be pleaded against the Republic.

Neither can respondent successfully invoke Act No. 3326 as mentioned in her Table of Authorities. Respondent
215 216

refers to Section 1 thereof which provides for the prescriptive periods for violations penalized by special acts and
217

municipal ordinances. Plainly, Act No. 3326 is inapplicable to the instant petition as respondent is not being sought
to be penalized for violation of the laws relating to the non-filing or incomplete, irregular or untruthful filing of SALNs.
At any rate, even the theorized applicability of Act No. 3326 will not work to respondent's advantage given that
Section 2 thereof provides that the prescriptive period shall be reckoned either from the day of the commission of
218

the violation of the law, or if such be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of the
judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment.

Finally, it bears to stress that this Court finds it more important to rule on the merits of the novel issues imbued with
public interest presented before Us than to dismiss the case outright merely on technicality. The Court cannot
compromise on the importance of settling the controversy surrounding the highest position in the Judiciary only to
yield to the unacceptable plea of technicality. It is but more prudent to afford the Republic, as well as the
respondent, ample opportunities to present their cases for a proper and just disposition of the case instead of
dismissing the petition outright on the ground of prescription. Inasmuch as the ultimate consideration in providing for
a one-year prescriptive period was public interest, so is it the same consideration which prompts this Court not to act
nonchalantly and idly watch title to the public office in question be continuously subjected to uncertainty. Indeed,
dismissal of cases on technicality is frowned upon especially where public interest is at the other end of the
spectrum.

III.

Respondent is Ineligible as a Candidate and

Nominee for the Position of Chief Justice

To arrive at a judicious appreciation of the parties' respective contentions as to respondent's qualification for the
position of Chief Justice, the Court first reviews the supervisory authority exercised by it over the JBC, and visits the
JBC's rules and procedure relating to the acceptance and nomination of respondent as Chief Justice.

A.

The Court Exercises Supervisory Authority Over the JBC

The Court's supervisory authority

over the JBC includes ensuring
that the JBC complies with its own
rules

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides:

A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court, composed of the
Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law" a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector. (Emphasis ours)

Ambil, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al. , 219

elucidates on the power of supervision in general:

On the other hand, the power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the
subordinate officers perform their duties." If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official
may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Essentially, the power of
supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers
act within the law. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he does not lay
down the rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them. 220

Reflective of the above and similar pronouncements, the seminal case of Jardeleza v. Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes P
221

A. Sereno, et al., explains that the power of supervision being a power of oversight does not authorize the holder
222

of the supervisory power to lay down the rules nor to modify or replace the rules of its subordinate. If the rules are,
however, not or improperly observed, then the supervising authority may order the work be done or redone, but only
for the purpose of conforming to such rules.

Thus, in interpreting the power of the Court vis-a-vis the power of the JBC, it is consistently held that the Court's
supervisory power consists of seeing to it that the JBC complies with its own rules and procedures. As when the
policies of the JBC are being attacked, the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to
inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC is compliant with its own rules. 223

The JBC occupies a unique position in the body of government. While the JBC is created by the Constitution, the
Constitution itself prescribes that it exists as an office subordinate to the Supreme Court. Thus, under the
Constitution, the JBC is chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and it is the Supreme Court that
determines the emoluments of the regular JBC members and provides for the appropriations of the JBC in its annual
budget. 224

The Constitution also vests upon the JBC the principal function of recommending appointees to the Judiciary
and such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it. On this, Justice Arturo Brion, in his
225

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion in De Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al., offers a succinct point:
226

Under this definition, the Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or
what standards to use to determine who to recommend. It cannot even direct the JBC on how and when to do
its duty, but it can, under its power of supervision, direct the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being performed because of JBC's fault or
inaction, or because of extraneous factors affecting performance. Note in this regard that, constitutionally,
the Court can also assign the JBC other functions and duties - a power that suggests authority beyond
what is purely supervisory. (Emphasis ours)s
227

JBC's absolute autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter's reach is
therefore not what the Constitution contemplates.

What is more, the JBC's duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of discretion, is neither
absolute nor unlimited.

In Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, this Court explained that while a certain leeway must be given to the
228

JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and
legal requirements:
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function of
choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the Judiciary for appointment by the President. However,
the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining applicants'
qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria in
choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the Judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications
required by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily
requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has
sufficient but not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an
effective and efficient administration of justice. (Emphasis ours)
229

So too, the JBC's exercise of discretion is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to place,
in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court's supervisory and corrective powers. The primary
limitation to the JBC's exercise of discretion is that the nominee must possess the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and the laws relative to the position. While the resolution of who to nominate as between .two
candidates of equal qualification cannot be dictated by this Court upon the JBC, such surrender of choice
presupposes that whosoever is nominated is not otherwise disqualified. The question of whether or not a nominee
possesses the requisite qualifications is determined based on facts and therefore does not depend on, nor call for,
the exercise of discretion on the part of the nominating body.

Thus, along this line, the nomination by the JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the
JBC's actions in the same category as political questions that the Court is barred from resolving. Questions of policy
or wisdom refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of government." 230

Baker v. Carr gives the classic definition of a political question:

231

x x x [p ]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on the one question.

Obviously, the exercise of the JBC's discretion in the nomination process is not full as it is limited by the
requirements prescribed by the Constitution and the laws for every position. It does not involve a question of policy
but simply a determination, based on facts, of whether a candidate possesses the requisite qualifications or not. The
JBC neither assumes an existence separate from the Judiciary as it is not intended to be an independent
Constitutional body but merely a Constitutional office created and expressly subjected to the Court's supervision.
Judicial encroachment upon the .exercise of wisdom of a co-equal branch of the government, which is the very
basis of the political question doctrine, is therefore not attendant when the Court supervises and reviews the action
of the JBC which is neither an executive nor a legislative branch enjoying independent political prerogatives.

In fine, the Court has authority, as an incident of its power of supervision over the JBC, to insure that the JBC
faithfully executes its duties as the Constitution requires of it. Wearing its hat of supervision, the Court is thus
empowered to inquire into the processes leading to respondent's nomination for the position of Chief Justice on the
face of the Republic's contention that respondent was ineligible to be a candidate to the position to begin with.

Qualifications under the Constitution

cannot be waived or bargained
away by the JBC

As emphasized, the JBC's exercise of discretion is limited by the Constitution itself when it prescribed the
qualifications absolutely required of a person to be eligible for appointment as a Member of the Court.
The qualifications of an aspiring Member of the Supreme Court are enshrined in Section 7, Article VIII of the
Constitution:

SECTION 7. (1) No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-horn citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years of age, and
must have been for fifteen years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
Philippines.

(2) The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be appointed judge
thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

(3) A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
(Emphasis ours)

Evidently, more than age, citizenship and professional qualifications, Our fundamental law is clear that a member of
the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. The inclusion of
subsection 3 is explained in this wise:

xxxx

MR. NOLLEDO. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.

My amendment is to add a new subsection (3) on Section 4 which

reads: A MEMBER OF THE Judiciary MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY,
AND INDEPENDENCE.

Before the Committee decides on whether or not to accept the amendment, I would like to explain it first.

Mr. Presiding Officer, this is a moral prov1s10n lifted with modifications from the "Canons of Judicial Ethics." The
reputation of our justices and judges has been unsavory. I hate to say this, but it seems that it has become the
general rule that the members of the Judiciary are corrupt and the few honest ones are the exceptions. We hear of
justices and judges who would issue injunctive relief to the highest bidder and would decide cases based on
hundreds of thousands, and even millions, mercenary reasons.

The members of the deposed Supreme Court, with a few exceptions, catered to the political likings and personal
convenience of Mr. Marcos by despicably surrendering their judicial independence. Why should we resist
incorporating worthy moral principles in our fundamental law? Why should we canalize our conservative thoughts
within the narrow confines of pure legalism?

I plead to the members of the Committee and to my colleagues in this Constitutional Commission to support my
amendment in order to strengthen the moral fiber of our Judiciary. Let not our Constitution be merely a legal or
political document. Let it be a moral document as well.

xxxx 232

Requirement of these traits stems from the need to ensure the strength and sustainability of the third branch of the
government. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., sufficiently explains the state interest involved in
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safeguarding judicial integrity:

Courts, in our system, elaborate principles of law in the course of resolving disputes. The power and the prerogative
of a court to perform this function rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments. The citizen's respect
for judgments depends in turn upon the issuing court's absolute probity. Judicial integrity is, in consequence, a state
interest of the highest order.

An approximation of what defines the term "integrity" was made by the Court in Jardeleza, as follows:
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that
qualifications such as "competence, integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are
developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to
determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given
this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC's guiding precepts and principles."
A set of uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications 'and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of him" and his office. Likewise for
the sake of transparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of competence," "probity and independence,"
"soundness of physical and mental condition, and "integrity."

As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity"
is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant's good reputation for honesty,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof
of an applicant's reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and
non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police,
among others. In fact, the JBC may even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the
public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be verified and checked.
As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person's
character." (Emphasis ours)
234

The case of Jardeleza, however, is not the first time this Court interpreted the requirement of integrity. In Samson v.
Judge Caballero, this Court dismissed a judge for "obvious lack of integrity" in making a false statement in his
235

Personal Data Sheet (PDS). Meanwhile, in Re: Judge Jaime V Quitain, this Court declared Judge Quitain to be
236

dishonest and lacking in integrity when he failed to disclose in his PDS that he was imposed a penalty of dismissal
from service in an administrative case filed against him.

Emphatically, integrity is not only a prerequisite for an aspiring Member of the Court but is likewise a continuing
requirement common to judges and lawyers alike. Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct provides:
237

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of
judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in
the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary. Justice
must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.

SEC. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for
unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.

The Code of Professional Responsibility, equally applicable to respondent being first and foremost a lawyer, mince
no words in requiring that a lawyer shall perform his profession in a manner compatible with the integrity of the
profession, thus:

CANON 2 - A LA WYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT
MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
PROFESSION.

Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal advice to
the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.

Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless the circumstances so
warrant.

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CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in
connection with his application for admission to the bar.

Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person known by him to be
unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.

Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

It is also important to note that the Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the
litigants in the Judiciary. In Edano v. Judge Asdala, this Court stated that:
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The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary mandates that judges must not only maintain their
independence, integrity and impartiality; but they must also avoid any appearance of impropriety or partiality, which
may erode the peoples faith in the Judiciary. Integrity and impartiality, as well as the appearance thereof, are
deemed essential not just in the proper discharge of judicial office, but also to the personal demeanor of judges.
This standard applies not only to the decision itself, but also to the process by which the decision is made. Section
1, Canon 2, specifically mandates judges to ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is
perceived to be so in the view of reasonable observers. Clearly, it is of vital importance not only that
independence, integrity and impartiality have been observed by judges and reflected in their decisions, but
that these must also appear to have been so observed in the eyes of the people, so as to avoid any erosion
of faith in the justice system. Thus, judges must be circumspect in their actions in order to avoid doubt and
suspicion in the dispensation of justice. (Emphasis ours)
239

To make sure that applicants to judicial positions possess these constitutionally-prescribed character requirement,
the JBC was created. Jardeleza captures the purpose of the JBC which it finds to be rooted in the categorical
constitutional declaration that "[a] member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence.s "To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC
has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted
to the President are all qualified and suitably best for appointment. Jardeleza continues that, in this manner, the
appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.

Thus, in compliance with their mandate, the JBC provided for Rule 4 on Integrity in JBC-009 Rules, as follows:
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RULE 4

INTEGRITY

Section 1. Evidence of Integrity - The council shall take every possible step to verify the applicants records and of
reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the council certifications or testimonials thereof from
reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the court National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the council may require.
Section 2. Background Check - The Council may order a discrete [sic] background check on the integrity,
reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or
verify to validate the means thereof.

Section 3. Testimonies of Parties - The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on ground of his
moral fitness and its discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for
the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to be [sic] cross-examine the opposite and to
offer countervailing evidence.

Section 4. Anonymous Complaints - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course,
unless there appears on its face probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the
latter case the Council may either direct a discrete [sic] investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in
writing or during the interview.

Section 5. Disqualification - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post
or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:

1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;

2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and

3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at
least a fine or more than P10,000, unless has been granted judicial clemency.

Section 6. Other instances of disqualification - Incumbent judges, officials or personnel of the Judiciary who are
facing administrative complaints under informal preliminary investigation (IPI) by the Office of the Court of
Administrator may likewise be disqualified from being nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges
are serious or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant for nomination.

For purpose of this Section and of the preceding Section 5 in so far as pending regular administrative cases are
concerned, the Secretary of the Council shall, from time to time, furnish the Office of the Court of Administrator the
name of an applicant upon receipt of the application/recommendation and completion of the required papers; and
within ten days from the receipt thereof the Court Administrator shall report in writing to the Council whether or not
the applicant is facing a regular administrative case or an IPI case and the status thereof. In regard to the IPI case,
the Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the complaint and the comment of the respondent.

B.

Compliance with the Constitutional and

statutory requirement of filing of SALN
intimately relates to a person's integrity.

Respondent postulates that the filing of SALNs bear no relation to the Constitutional qualification of integrity. In so
arguing, respondent loses sight of the fact that the SALN requirement is imposed no less than by the Constitution
and made more emphatic by its accompanying laws and its implementing rules and regulations. In other words, one
who fails to file his or her SALN violates the Constitution and the laws; and one who violates the
Constitution and the laws cannot rightfully claim to be a person of integrity as such equation is theoretically
and practically antithetical.

We elaborate:

The filing of SALN is a

Constitutional and statutory
requirement

The filing a SALN is an essential requirement to one's assumption of a public post. It has Constitutional, legal and
jurisprudential bases.
Of paramount significance, Section 1 7, Article XI of the Constitution on the Accountability of Public Officers states:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often .thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional
Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the
declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. (Emphasis ours)

However, even prior to the 1987 Constitution, and as early as 1960, our laws through R.A. No. 3019, required from
every public officer a detailed and sworn statement of their assets and liabilities, thus:

SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. - Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office,
thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office
of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of department or Chief of an independent office,
with the Office of the President, a true, detailed sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two
months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of April
following the close of the said calendar year.

SECTION 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth. If in accordance with the provisions
of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have
acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or
money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for
dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the
name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of wealth including
frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently
out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section,
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute
valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the
investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.

Respondent herself, in her Dissenting Opinion in Phil. Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court interprets that
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"failure to comply" with the law is "prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal
from service of the public officer."

In 1961, R.A. No. 3019 was amended by R.A. No. 3047 by specifying the period within which a public official
242

should make the disclosure and enumerating certain public officials who are exempt from the requirement.

Even during the martial law years, under then President Marcos, the obligation imposed upon public officers and
employees to declare their assets and liabilities was maintained under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 3 79 but with
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the curious addition that the filing and submission of SALN are now to be required from all citizens, subject to few
exceptions. P.D. No. 379 was later on amended by P.D. No. 417 which amended the contents of the statement
244

and the manner of providing the acquisition cost of the properties. Yet still, P.D. No. 379 was further amended by
P.D. No. 555, which prescribed stiffer penalties for violation thereof.
245

Two years after the birth of the 1987 Constitution, R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees was enacted and thereby expanded the obligation to disclose by enumerating the
246

information required to be disclosed as regards the assets, liabilities, business interests and financial connections;
requiring the identification and disclosure of relatives in government; making the statements and disclosures
available and accessible to the public; and prohibiting certain acts.

In particular, Sections 8 and 11 of R.A. No. 6713 provide:

Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and
submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and
financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees, except
those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath
their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in
their households.

The two documents shall contain information on the following:

(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;

(b) personal property and acquisition cost;

(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;

(d) liabilities, and; ( e) all business interests and financial connections.

The documents must be filed:

(a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;

(b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

(c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.

All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also
execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in favor of
the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business interests
and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first assumed any
office in the Government.

Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or
separately.

The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections shall be filed by:

(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;

(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with
the Court Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.

(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective
regions;

(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the
President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and

(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the
Civil Service Commission.
 (B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to
identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in the
form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.

(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available for
inspection at reasonable hours.

(2) [Link] shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days
from the time they are filed as required by law.

(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to • pay a reasonable fee to cover
the cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.

(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years
after receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in
an ongoing investigation.

(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this Act
for:

(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or

(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the
general public.

xxxx

Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or
employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation of this Act
shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or suspension not exceeding one
(1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or
agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter
statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5)
years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent
jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.

(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

xxxx

The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with
such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 9 of
R.A. No. 3019, as amended provides:

Section 9. Penalties for violations. - x x x x

(b) Any public officer violating any of the provisions of Section 7 of this Act shall be punished by a fine of not less
than one thousand pesos nor more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year and six
months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the Court.

The violation of said section proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for removal or
dismissal of a public officer, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.

Both Section 8 of R.A. No. 6713 and Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 require the accomplishment and submission of a
true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities. Further, under Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, non-
247
compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result
in disqualification to hold public office. As the Court explained in Hon. Casimiro, et a