RULE 116

ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA

Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information was filed
or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the judge or clerk by
furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the same in the
language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The
prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or
information.
(b) The accused must be present at the arraignment and must personally enter his plea. Both
arraignment and plea shall be made of record, but failure to do so shall not affect the validity
of the proceedings.
(c) When the accused refuses to plead or makes a conditional plea, a plea of not guilty shall be
entered for him. (1a)
(d) When the accused pleads guilty but presents exculpatory evidence, his plea shall be deemed
withdrawn and a plea of not guilty shall be entered for him. (n)
(e) When the accused is under preventive detention, his case shall be raffled and its records
transmitted to the judge to whom the case was raffled within three (3) days from the filing of
the information or complaint. The accused shall be arraigned within ten (10) days from the
date of the raffle. The pre-trial conference of his case shall be held within ten (10) days after
arraignment. (n)
(f) The private offended party shall be required to appear at the arraignment for purposes of plea
bargaining, determination of civil liability, and other matters requiring his presence. In case of
failure of the offended party to appear despite due notice, the court may allow the accused to
enter a plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged
with the conformity of the trial prosecutor alone. (cir. 1-89)
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court circular, the arraignment
shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. The time of the pendency of a motion to quash or for a bill of
particulars or other causes justifying suspension of the arraignment shall be excluded in
computing the period. (sec. 2, cir. 38-98)

Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. – At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense
which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused
may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, circ. 38-98)

Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty
to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may present evidence in his behalf. (3a)

Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary. — When the
accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to
determine the penalty to be imposed. (4)

Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty. — At any time before the judgment of
conviction becomes final, the court may permit an improvident plea of guilty to be withdrawn and be
substituted by a plea of not guilty. (5)

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Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before arraignment, the court
shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the
accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed a counsel of his choice, the court
must assign a counsel de oficio to defend him. (6a)

Section 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the offense and
the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de oficio only such members of
the bar in good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the
accused. But in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any
person, resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused. (7a)

Section 8. Time for counsel de oficio to prepare for arraignment. — Whenever a counsel de oficio is
appointed by the court to defend the accused at the arraignment, he shall be given a reasonable time to
consult with the accused as to his plea before proceeding with the arraignment. (8)

Section 9. Bill of particulars. — The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars
to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the alleged defects of
the complaint or information and the details desired. (10a)

Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution. — Upon

motion of the accused showing good cause and with notice to the parties, the court, in order to prevent
surprise, suppression, or alteration, may order the prosecution to produce and permit the inspection
and copying or photographing of any written statement given by the complainant and other witnesses
in any investigation of the offense conducted by the prosecution or other investigating officers, as
well as any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things not otherwise privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved
in the case and which are in the possession or under the control of the prosecution, police, or other law
investigating agencies. (11a)

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment. – Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment shall be
suspended in the following cases:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effective
renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
confinement for such purpose;
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the Department of
Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of suspension shall not exceed
sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. (12a)

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Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Its purpose is: 1) to apprise/inform the accused
of the possible loss of freedom (or life), and 2) to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized
against him. Absence of arraignment results in the nullity of the proceedigns before the trial court. (Taglay vs.
Daray, G.R. No. 164258, August 22, 2012)

Section 1: Paragraph a
A copy of the complaint and information is normally asked by lawyers in advance, before the arraignment and not
during.

“reading the same in the language or dialect known to him”

PEOPLE vs. ARNEL ALICANDO (G.R. No. 117487, Dec 12, 1995)
Arnel Alicando was arraigned on June 29, 1994, for rape with homicide, assisted by Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera from
the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). He pleaded guilty. However, during review, the Supreme Court found critical
errors in the arraignment process, including the trial court's failure to read the complaint in a language Alicando
understood and lack of a thorough inquiry to confirm that he fully understood the consequences and
voluntariness of his guilty plea. These procedural lapses led to issues with the validity of the proceedings.

Issue: Whether or not Arnel Alicando's arraignment met procedural requirements, particularly in language used,
due to the trial court's failure to ensure he understood the charges and verify his plea’s voluntariness.

Held: The Supreme Court ruled Alicando's arraignment null because the trial court failed to read the complaint in
a language he understood, violating his constitutional rights and Section 1(a) of Rule 116. The Court emphasized
the need for a thorough inquiry into the voluntariness of guilty pleas in capital cases. Compliance with Rule 116 is
mandatory; failure to do so renders the arraignment and subsequent proceedings void, ensuring the accused's
right to be informed and to mount a proper defense.

Note the last sentence: "The prosecution may call on the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint
or information." Can you question that reservation of the fiscal if you are the accused? Yes. As the accused, you
can question this reservation. The issue of whether the prosecution can omit names was addressed in People vs.
De Asis.
PEOPLE vs. DE ASIS (G.R. No. 105581, Dec 7, 1994)
At 1:40 AM on July 29, 1991, taxi drivers Antonio Bautista and Rogelio Miranda were eating at a restaurant in
Quezon City when they heard someone inside a Rocalex taxi shout "hold-up." They rushed to the taxi and saw a
struggle between the driver and two men inside. The men threatened Bautista with a fan knife, leading both
witnesses to retreat. The two accused fled but were chased and caught by Bautista, Miranda, and others.
Mercado was found with a bloodied fan knife, while De Asis was apprehended with a wallet containing cash and
the victim's driver's license. The trial court convicted both Mercado and De Asis of Robbery with Homicide. This
led to the current appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in not recognizing taxi drivers Antonio Bautista and Rogelio Miranda as
"eleventh-hour witnesses," thereby impacting their credibility.

Held: The claim that prosecution witnesses Antonio Bautista and Rogelio Miranda are "eleventh-hour witnesses"
is unfounded, as the prosecution has discretion over which witnesses to present based on necessity. Their
omission from the witness list does not affect their credibility and is often a protective measure. The court may
allow unlisted witnesses unless their omission indicates bad faith. The purpose of listing witnesses is to prevent
surprises and enable the defense to prepare, but once witnesses testify, their credibility can be examined.
Ultimately, the prosecution has the right to present any number of witnesses it deems sufficient.

Section 1: Paragraph b
What happens if a case is tried without arraignment? If a case is tried without arraignment, it is generally
considered irregular because arraignment is mandatory (US vs. Palisoc). However, the Supreme Court upheld
the validity of proceedings in People vs. Cabale when the accused's lawyer did not object to the lack of
arraignment.

PEOPLE vs. CABALE (G.R. No. 73249-50, May 8, 1990)

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On June 7, 1968, Terante, along with Florencio Daniel and two others, went to Rufina Rosello's store in Liloan,
Southern Leyte. Terante and Daniel demanded money, strangled Rosello when she refused, and later assaulted
Ricarido Fernando, stealing his money and wallet. After failing to start Fernando's motorcycle, they fled the
scene, leaving Rosello dead from asphyxia. All four were charged, with Terante, Daniel, and Demetrio Cabale
convicted, while Bonifacio Cualteros was acquitted but required to indemnify the victims. Benito Terante
appealed his conviction for robbery with homicide and robbery with less serious physical injuries. He argues that
his arraignment was irregular because it occurred after the cases were submitted for decision, hindering his
defense preparation.

Issue: Whether or not Benito Terante's conviction should be upheld given the alleged irregularity of his
arraignment.

Held: The appeal lacks merit. Although Benito Terante's arraignment occurred after the cases were submitted for
decision, this non-prejudicial error has been cured. Citing People vs. Atienza, the court noted that the appellant's
counsel did not object to the lack of arraignment and fully cross-examined prosecution witnesses. Additionally,
counsel later adopted all prior proceedings, indicating that there was no violation of the appellant’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

LARRANAGA vs. CA (G.R. No. 130644, Mar 13, 1998)

The case involves Francisco Juan Larranaga, a minor represented by his mother, against the Court of Appeals
and the People of the Philippines. Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention and was held at the Bagong Buhay Rehabilitation Center. On October 1, 1997, he petitioned for
certiorari, claiming he was denied a preliminary investigation and sought to annul the informations and warrant of
arrest, or be released pending the investigation. The Solicitor General supported this, recommending a
preliminary investigation and Larranaga's release. The Supreme Court ruled in his favor on October 27, 1997,
but Judge Martin A. Ocampo deferred his release, citing unresolved issues regarding the Supreme Court's
resolution.

Issue: Whether or not Larranaga is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.

Held: Yes, Francisco Juan Larranaga is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation. The Court ruled that
Larranaga was entitled to a regular preliminary investigation because his arrest did not meet the criteria for a
lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. The facts showed that
Larranaga was not arrested by a peace officer or private person, and there was no actual restraint on his person.
The Court emphasized that a waiver of the right to a preliminary investigation must be clear and unequivocal,
which was not the case here. Larranaga had been actively demanding a regular preliminary investigation, and his
failure to appear for an inquest investigation could not be construed as a waiver.

The accused is arraigned when the case is filed in court for trial. Should the accused be arraigned by an MTC
judge? Take note that MTC judges are no longer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations outside
chartered cities, per A.M. 05-88-26-SC.
ALISANGCO vs. TABILIRAN, JR. (A.M. No. MTJ-91-554, Jun 30, 1993)
Respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Manukan-Jose Dalman,
Zamboanga del Norte, was charged with grave abuse of authority, ignorance of the law, and conduct
unbecoming of a Presiding Judge. The complainant, Warlito Alisangco, alleged that after an amended complaint
was filed against him in Criminal Case No. 147, the respondent Judge immediately issued a warrant for his arrest
without determining his participation in the offense charged. The complainant also claimed that the bond set by
the respondent Judge was excessive. The complainant subsequently posted his cash bond with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City and filed a waiver of his right to a preliminary investigation. However, the
respondent Judge issued an order for the complainant's arrest and did not act on the motion to lift the order.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge had the authority to set the case for arraignment instead of PI.

Held: The MCTC of Manukan-Jose Dalman lacked authority to set the case for arraignment, having only
preliminary jurisdiction. It could only calendar the case for preliminary investigation, as no law requires
arraignment during this stage. Under Section 1, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Court, arraignment must be
conducted by the court with jurisdiction to try the case on its merits, which, in this instance, would be the proper

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Regional Trial Court with exclusive original jurisdiction. The respondent Judge either misunderstood the
procedure or chose to ignore it.

Note: The accused must be personally present to enter his plea; arraignment by proxy is not allowed.

Section 1: Paragraph c
If the accused does not enter a plea, a “not guilty” plea will be entered instead, as pleas must be absolute and
unconditional. In a similar case, an accused stated he was "guilty" but claimed self-defense, asserting the
deceased initiated the altercation. This situation still falls under a “not guilty” plea. Thus, if a conditional plea is
entered, it will be recorded as not guilty.

When a plea of guilty is entered, it admits all material facts alleged in the information, including aggravating
circumstances (People vs. Egido; People vs. Santos and Vicente). However, the following are not deemed
admitted:
1. Facts and circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information
2. Conclusions of fact
3. Jurisdiction of the court
4. Sufficiency of the complaint or information

Note: In People vs. Brian, refusal to receive a copy does not invalidate the arraignment or plea.

Section 1: Paragraph d
PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA (G.R. No. 80845, Mar 14, 1994)
The petitioner is the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. The respondents are Judge Ernesto M. Mendoza and Juan Magalop y Salvacion. The case arose
from a January 20, 1987, ransacking of the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries, resulting in a loss of
P15,298.15. Initially, the culprits were unidentified, but later, Magalop, along with Petronilo Fernandez y Cano
and Ricarte Dahilan, was accused. During the June 23, 1987, arraignment, Magalop pleaded guilty, while
Fernandez pleaded not guilty, and Dahilan's arraignment was deferred. Despite Magalop's guilty plea, the trial
court acquitted both men on October 8, 1987, due to insufficient evidence. The Provincial Fiscal's motion for
reconsideration was denied, prompting a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting Juan Magalop despite his
guilty plea and if his acquittal should be reversed with the proper penalty imposed.

Held: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition and upheld the acquittal of Juan Magalop y Salvacion,
emphasizing the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. It noted that a guilty plea must
be made freely and with full knowledge of its consequences. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence
insufficient, lacking crucial testimony, and ruled that convicting Magalop based solely on his plea would be an
abuse of discretion. Although there was a procedural error regarding his plea, the Court maintained his acquittal
due to the lack of evidence.

If evidence proves the accused's innocence after a guilty plea is entered, the plea is automatically withdrawn,
and the court will substitute it with a plea of "not guilty." Presenting evidence to prove innocence after pleading
guilty is inconsistent, but if it occurs, the court will promptly change the plea to not guilty.

Section 1: Paragraph e, f, and g

These new paragraphs include an important amendment in paragraph f, requiring the private offended party to
appear at arraignment for plea bargaining. If offended party will not appear during the arraignment, the consent
of the prosecutor would be enough.

Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense

Plea bargaining – there is a compromise or a negotiation. You are charged with murder, but it was bargained to
homicide. Since it is homicide, the accused will plead “guilty” for lesser penalty.

Requisites
1. It must be before trial (People vs. Martin Villarama)

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 2. The prosecutor and the offended party must consent except if the offended party fails to appear during
arraignment despite notice in which case the consent of the prosecutor alone is sufficient.
3. The plea of guilt must be to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged.

PEOPLE vs. VILLARAMA (G.R. No. 99287, June 23, 1992)

Jaime Manuel was charged with violating Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 for possessing 0.08 grams of
shabu without a license on August 21, 1990, in San Juan, Metro Manila. The penalty ranged from six to twelve
years' imprisonment and a fine of six to twelve thousand pesos. Manuel pleaded not guilty, but on January 9,
1991, he expressed willingness to plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 17. Despite the prosecutor’s
objection, the court granted his motion, sentencing him to two years and one day with a two thousand peso fine.
The prosecutor’s appeal led to a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in granting the accused’s request to plead guilty to a lesser offense
without the prosecutor’s consent.

Held: The trial court erred by allowing the accused to plead guilty to a lesser offense without the prosecutor's
consent. The Supreme Court highlighted that plea bargaining requires mutual consent from both the accused
and the prosecutor, per Rule 116, Section 2 of the Rules of Court. This ensures the prosecutor’s control over the
prosecution based on evidence. Since drug-related cases involve the state as the offended party, represented by
the prosecutor, the lack of consent invalidated the plea. Double jeopardy didn’t apply, leading the Supreme Court
to reverse the trial court's decision and remand the case for trial on the original charge.

Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval (see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It
usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a
multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-
bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law still permits the
accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter.

Under the law, both the prosecutor and the offended party (or the deceased’s family) must consent for a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense. If the offended party doesn’t appear at arraignment, the court may allow a plea to a
lesser included offense with the prosecutor’s consent alone.

The 2000 Rules reverted to the 1964 requirement that the lesser offense must be included in the offense charged
(e.g., murder to homicide). The 1985 Rules controversially allowed pleas to unrelated lesser offenses (e.g.,
murder to slander), which created issues, but the Supreme Court restored the original requirement.

After arraignment but before trial, the accused may change a not-guilty plea to a guilty plea for a lesser offense if
no evidence has yet been presented, without amending the complaint.

AMATAN vs. JUDGE AUJERO (A.M. No. RTJ-93-956, Sep 27, 1995)
Panfilo S. Amatan filed a complaint against Judge Vicente Aujero on October 16, 1992, for alleged incompetence
and ignorance of the law. The complaint arose from a murder case against Rodrigo Umpad, who was allowed to
plead guilty to attempted homicide with the prosecutor’s and offended party’s consent. Judge Aujero accepted
this plea and sentenced Umpad accordingly. Amatan argued that accepting the plea to attempted homicide
showed ignorance, as it conflicted with the fatal outcome of the crime. The Deputy Court Administrator initially
recommended dismissing the complaint, noting confusion over the judge's decision and the liberal plea
bargaining rule.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Aujero committed gross ignorance of the law by accepting the plea bargain for
attempted homicide when the victim was deceased.

Held: The Supreme Court found Judge Vicente Aujero guilty of gross ignorance of the law, fining him P1,000 and
issuing a reprimand. The Court ruled that accepting a plea to attempted homicide was inappropriate, as the
victim’s death ruled out such a charge. It emphasized that judges must apply the law logically, and Aujero’s
failure to recognize this inconsistency showed a lack of prudence. Although his long service and lack of malice
were considered, the Court found his decision unacceptable, warranting the penalty.

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PEOPLE vs. VILLARAMA, JR. (G.R. No. 99287, Jun 23, 1992)
Jaime Manuel was charged with drug possession but sought to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Despite the
prosecutor’s objection, the trial court allowed the plea change and sentenced him to a lighter penalty. The
prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration was denied, leading to a certiorari petition before the Supreme Court. (In
book: The case was tried and the prosecution rested. Afterwards, the accused argued, “You have not proved any
qualifying circumstance, so I will not present any evidence anymore. I will just plead to a lesser offense…”

Issue: Can plea bargaining still be allowed at that stage, even though it's normally done before trial?

Held: Under Rule 116, Section 2, the accused may plead guilty to a lesser offense only with the consent of both
the offended party and the prosecutor. The trial court's acceptance of a plea change without this consent was
improper, as it disregarded the prosecution's evidence and the prosecutor's role as the state's representative,
invalidating the plea. (In book: Yes. There is nothing wrong with that, provided the prosecution does not have
sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused for the crime charged. The only basis for allowing a plea
of guilty to a lesser offense is nothing more and nothing less than the evidence already in the record. There is
nothing wrong with that procedure.)

Under Section 1(f), the private offended party must appear at arraignment for a possible plea to a lesser offense
requiring their consent. If they do not appear, only the prosecutor's consent is needed for plea bargaining.

If an accused pleads guilty, there is generally no trial or evidence presentation, as this admission acknowledges
the crime's essential elements and aggravating circumstances. However, certain facts in the information are not
deemed admitted, including:
1. Facts not in the complaint or information.
2. Mere conclusions of facts.
3. The court's jurisdiction (can be challenged).
4. The sufficiency of the complaint or information.

If you plead guilty but no crime exists, there can be no conviction, as a guilty plea does not admit the sufficiency
of the complaint. Conversely, a not guilty plea joins the issues and prepares the case for trial, serving as the
equivalent of an answer in civil procedure. Entering a not guilty plea waives any prior defects, like lack of
preliminary investigation or validity of arrest. Those are deemed cured by entering a plea of not guilty.

Generally, a guilty plea means no trial and a possible conviction, except in capital offenses.

Section 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence

So, when a person pleads guilty to a capital offense, can the court sentence him to death based on his plea of
guilty? No. The correct procedure is:
1. The court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full consequences of his plea.
The court must determine whether he really understood it and its effects.
2. Even if the accused pleads guilty, the court will still require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused. Thus, the plea of guilty is not accepted anymore in capital offense. That is only corroborative
because the prosecution is still required to present evidence.
3. The accused may still present evidence in his behalf. (People vs. Lakindanum, G.R. No. 127123, Mar
10, 1999; People vs. Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 reiterated in People vs. Besonia, G.R. Nos. 151284-85, Feb
5, 2004)

“the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequence of
his plea”
PEOPLE vs. ALBERT (G.R. No. 114001, Dec 11, 1995)
Rolly Albert was convicted of murder on January 17, 1994, after pleading guilty. He was sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the victim's heirs, Alfonso Quimen, P50,000. The trial court's decision was
brief, only two and a half pages long. Albert, an impoverished young man with a fourth-grade education, had
moved to Cabangan, Zambales, for work and was employed at a bakery owned by Alicia Tingho. On December
24, 1990, he stabbed Quimen to death and wounded two co-workers. Initially pleading not guilty, Albert later
changed his plea to guilty while being represented by various counsel de oficio. The proceedings involved
multiple judges and exhibited procedural irregularities, including insufficient inquiry into Albert's understanding of
his plea and mental state.

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Issue: Whether or not the trial court failed to ensure that Albert fully understood the import and consequences of
his guilty plea to the capital offense charged.

Held: The Supreme Court overturned the RTC's judgment and remanded the case for re-arraignment, finding
that the trial court failed to properly inquire into Rolly Albert's understanding of his guilty plea and its
consequences. Emphasizing the necessity of a "searching inquiry" for guilty pleas in capital cases, the Court
noted that the trial court improperly delegated this responsibility to Albert's counsel and did not ensure he fully
understood the offense and plea implications. Given Albert's low education and mental instability, the Court
stressed the need for caution in accepting guilty pleas to protect the accused's rights. The Court also found the
trial court's decision lacking a clear statement of facts and law, warranting remand for further proceedings to
correct these errors and ensure justice.

PEOPLE vs. BESONIA (G.R. No. 151284-85, Feb 5, 2004)

Jonathan Besonia was charged with two counts of murder for the deaths of Ernesto Mospa Nieles and Jerry
Sampiano, stemming from a June 27, 2000, incident in Iloilo City where he used an unlicensed .38 caliber
firearm. Initially pleading not guilty on August 22, 2000, Besonia later sought to plead guilty to a lesser offense of
homicide after a medical operation. He ultimately changed his plea to guilty on June 5, 2001, but the Regional
Trial Court sentenced him to death for each murder charge, citing premeditation and the use of an unlicensed
firearm as aggravating factors. Besonia appealed, claiming violations of his constitutional rights and inadequate
representation by his counsel.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court’s reliance on Besonia’s plea of guilty and his admissions during the
searching inquiry are sufficient to convict him of murder.

Held: The Court emphasized that a guilty plea in a capital offense requires a thorough inquiry to ensure the
accused understands the consequences and is making the plea voluntarily. Although the trial court conducted
such an inquiry, it did not require sufficient evidence from the prosecution to establish Besonia's guilt.

To comply with Section 3 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the trial court must:

1. Conduct a thorough inquiry into the voluntariness and understanding of the plea.
2. Require the prosecution to present evidence of the accused's guilt and degree of culpability.
3. Allow the accused to present evidence if desired.

The inquiry should focus on confirming that the plea is based on a free and informed judgment. Judges should
also:

1. Assess the conditions of the accused's detention and interrogation.

2. Ensure competent legal counsel was provided.
3. Evaluate the accused's background, including age, socio-economic status, and education.
4. Clarify the potential sentence to prevent misunderstandings.
5. Confirm that the accused accurately narrates the incident.

Additionally, the Court has ruled that judges should explain the essential elements of the charged crime, along
with associated penalties and liabilities.

In summary, if an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, a regular trial must still be conducted as if no plea
had been entered. The only effect of the guilty plea is to serve as a mitigating circumstance if the penalty is less
than the mandatory minimum and if the plea is entered before the prosecution presents evidence.

PEOPLE vs. GUMIMBA (G.R. No. 174056, Feb 27, 2007)

Rogelio Gumimba y Moradant was charged with the rape and homicide of an eight-year-old girl, AAA, on April 8,
1997, in Ozamiz City. Both he and co-accused Ronte Abapo initially plead not guilty, but Gumimba later pleaded
guilty. The Regional Trial Court found him guilty on March 10, 1999, sentencing him to death and ordering him to
pay damages to the victim's heirs, while Abapo was acquitted due to insufficient evidence. The case was
elevated to the Supreme Court for automatic review, and on April 26, 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
RTC's decision but modified the damages awarded.

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Issue: Whether or not the court conducted a searching inquiry as prescribed by Rule 116, Section 3.

Held: The Supreme Court found Gumimba's guilty plea to be improvident due to the RTC's failure to conduct a
proper "searching inquiry" into its voluntariness and understanding. A mere warning that the accused faces the
supreme penalty of death is insufficient. However, there was sufficient evidence, including Gumimba's detailed
confession, to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court clarified that even an improvident plea
can lead to a conviction if credible evidence supports it. Additionally, due to R.A. No. 9346, which prohibits the
death penalty in the Philippines, the penalty was modified to reclusion perpetua, and the civil indemnity was
adjusted according to current jurisprudence.

Section 4. Plea of guilty to non-capital offense; reception of evidence, discretionary

If the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital offense, the court can choose to receive evidence, although it is not
required. The reception of evidence is discretionary and may be used to determine the appropriate penalty.

PEOPLE vs. MENDOZA (G.R. No. 80845, Mar 14, 1994)

The petitioner, represented by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, challenged Judge
Ernesto M. Mendoza and Juan Magalop y Salvacion. The case arose from a January 20, 1987, burglary at the
Bukidnon National School of Home Industries, resulting in a loss of P15,298.15. Initially, no suspects were
identified, but later, Magalop, Petronilo Fernandez, and Ricarte Dahilan were accused. During the arraignment
on June 23, 1987, Magalop pleaded guilty while Fernandez pleaded not guilty, and Dahilan's arraignment was
postponed. Despite Magalop's plea, the trial court acquitted both Magalop and Fernandez on October 8, 1987,
due to insufficient evidence. The Provincial Fiscal's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting a petition
for certiorari and mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether or not the acquittal of the accused is proper.

Held: Yes, under the Rules, the court may receive evidence when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital
offense to determine the penalty. This rule is mostly directory. If the evidence suggests acquittal, the judge
cannot automatically convict based solely on the guilty plea. In this case, since the records show a guilty plea but
the accused was acquitted, the correct procedure, as per the Supreme Court, is for the judge to allow the
withdrawal of the guilty plea and substitute it with a plea of not guilty.

This principle has been embodied in Section 1(d) – “When the acused pleads gulity but presents exculpatory
evidence, his plea shall be deemed withdrawn and a plea of guitly shall be entered for him. (n)”

Section 5. Withdrawal of improvident plea of guilty

A plea of guilty can be withdrawn, even after a judgment of conviction, as long as the judgment has not yet
become final.

Section 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel

Section 6, in line with the SC ruling in People vs. Holgado (85 Phil. 752), enumerates the duties of the court
when the accused appears before it without a lawyer. The following are the duties of the court:
1. The court must inform the accused that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned.
2. After giving him such information, the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney.
3. If he desires but is unable to employ an attorney, the court must assign an attorney de oficio to defend
him.
4. If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own, the court must grant him a reasonable time
therefor.

PEOPLE vs. HOLGADO (G.R. No. L-2809, March 22, 1950)

In People vs. Holgado, Frisco Holgado was charged with slight illegal detention for kidnapping Artemia Fabreag
on December 11, 1947, in Romblon. During his trial on May 8, 1948, Holgado, without an attorney, pleaded guilty
but stated he was advised by Mr. Ocampo, who was later found to have no connection to the case. On May 10,
1948, the court sentenced him to ten years and one day to twenty years of imprisonment. The trial was irregular
as the court did not inform Holgado of his right to an attorney, did not assign one, and did not allow him time to
find legal representation, violating his right to due process.

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Issue: Whether or not the trial court violated Frisco Holgado's right to due process by failing to inform him of his
right to have an attorney before arraignment.

Held: Yes, the trial court violated Holgado's right to due process by failing to inform him of his right to an attorney
before arraignment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, emphasizing that Rule 112, Section 3 requires
courts to inform defendants of their right to counsel, assign one if necessary, or allow time to secure one. The
trial court’s question, “Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?” was misleading, suggesting he
plead guilty if unrepresented. The Court highlighted that the right to counsel is essential for a fair trial, especially
for uneducated defendants or those ignorant of legal procedures, and ordered a new arraignment and trial to
ensure Holgado receives proper legal assistance.

Section 9. Bill of particulars

Section 9, like Rule 12 on bills of particulars in civil cases, allows an accused in a criminal case to request
clarification of vague or ambiguous information before arraignment, to prepare adequately for trial. The accused
must specify the unclear parts.

Section 10. Production or inspection of material evidence in possession of prosecution

Section 10 allows the accused to request access to all evidence held by the prosecution, police, and other
investigating agencies. Following Lim vs. Felix, Jr., if the fiscal refuses, the accused can file a motion to compel
disclosure. Rule 112, Section 8(b) states that records of the preliminary investigation are not part of the court
record unless ordered by the court for case resolution or as evidence, either on its own initiative or by a motion
from any party.

WEBB vs. DE LEON (G.R. No. 121234, August 23, 1995)

Petitioners Hubert J.P. Webb, Michael A. Gatchalian, and Antonio L. Lejano were charged with rape and
homicide related to the 1991 murders of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita, and sister Anne Marie in
Parañaque, Metro Manila. The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed a complaint with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) in 1994, which led to a preliminary investigation. The NBI presented evidence, including testimony
from their main witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro. The petitioners countered with alibis and documents claiming
innocence, but the DOJ found probable cause and filed formal charges. Subsequently, the petitioners challenged
the arrest warrants, arguing a lack of probable cause and constitutional rights violations in the preliminary
investigation.

Issue: Were the petitioners denied their constitutional right to due process during the preliminary investigation, or
not?

Held: The Court ruled that the petitioners were not denied due process during the preliminary investigation. It
found that the petitioners had sufficient opportunity to present evidence and respond to the charges. The DOJ
Panel permitted them to submit additional evidence and considered their motions for document production. Filing
the Information in court complied with DOJ Order No. 223. This order allows filing even if the accused can still
request a review of the prosecutor’s recommendation.

Prosecutors must prioritize justice over convictions and should not conceal evidence. If there is insufficient
evidence in court, they should personally move to dismiss the case rather than insist on prosecution. The
Supreme Court emphasized that a prosecutor's greatest achievement is not a conviction, but rather seeking
dismissal of a case due to lack of evidence, as this fulfills their duty to ensure justice.

Section 11. Suspension of arraignment

Three grounds for suspension of arraignment
1. Paragraph A

If the accused is mentally unstable, arraignment is suspended until recovery.

Bar question: What are the legal effects of insanity? It depends to when was he insane.
a. Insane at crime time, now stable: Arraignment proceeds, not grounds to quash, unless the information
states insanity as a defense (Rule 117, Sec. 3(h)).
b. Insane at arraignment: Move to suspend arraignment (Rule 116, Sec. 11).
c. Insane after arraignment: Postpone trial as they cannot defend themselves.

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 d. Insane after conviction: Under Penal Code Art. 86, move to suspend sentence execution.

2. Paragraph B

A prejudicial question arises when a civil case issue must be resolved first because it will affect the outcome
of a related criminal case. Under Rule 111, Section 6, the elements of a prejudicial question include a close
connection between the civil and criminal cases, where the decision in the civil case will determine the
criminal case's result. When raised, the court suspends the trial or arraignment of the criminal case until the
civil case is resolved.

3. Paragraph C

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Supreme Court clarified that, despite the Mogul doctrine, an accused can technically
appeal a prosecutor's decision to file a case. The court upheld its authority to proceed with arraignments,
even against the Provincial Fiscal's recommendation to dismiss due to insufficient evidence. The ruling
emphasized that the court, not the DOJ, decides case outcomes, reinforcing the accused's rights.

New rules state that if a petition for review is pending with the DOJ, the arraignment can be suspended for a
maximum of 60 days. This change aims to expedite DOJ resolutions, shifting pressure onto the accused to
ensure timely decisions rather than delaying the case indefinitely while awaiting DOJ action.

DINO vs. OLIVAREZ (G.R. No. 170447, June 23, 2009)

In Diño v. Olivarez, Bienvenido Diño and Renato Comparativo filed a complaint against Pablo Olivarez for vote
buying, based on probable cause determined by Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta Pablo-Medina. Two
Informations were filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque on September 29, 2004, charging
Olivarez with violations of the Omnibus Election Code for allegedly distributing gift certificates to influence voters.
Olivarez appealed to the COMELEC, leading to a directive to suspend the implementation of the Joint
Resolution. Judge Fortunito Madrona denied Olivarez’s Motion to Quash the Informations, but the COMELEC
eventually revoked the prosecutor’s deputation and took over the case. The Court of Appeals later nullified Judge
Madrona's orders, affirming that COMELEC had authority to revoke its prosecutorial delegation and that the
prosecutor overstepped by filing the Amended Informations.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Madrona acted in accordance with the law when he issued the warrant for the arrest
of the respondent and ordered the confiscation of his cash bond due to the respondent’s failure to appear for
arraignment.

Held: The Court found no abuse of discretion in Judge Madrona’s orders for the respondent’s arrest and the
confiscation of his cash bond, as the trial court had jurisdiction over the case and the accused. The Court
clarified that an appeal pending before the COMELEC does not indefinitely suspend arraignment, with a 60-day
limit for the reviewing authority to decide on such appeals. Here, the respondent’s arraignment had been delayed
beyond this period, justifying the trial court's actions. The Supreme Court stressed that continuing the
proceedings was essential to uphold judicial integrity and ensure justice.

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