1.

Federalism
Federalism is a system where power is constitutionally divided
between a central government and regional entities, allowing each
to govern independently within their areas while working together
on shared issues.
Federalism in India
India is often considered quasi-federal, combining both federal and
unitary elements. While the country operates with a federal system,
the Constitution does not explicitly use the term "federal."
Instead, Article 1 refers to India as a "Union of States."

Characteristics of the Indian Federal System

 Division of Powers: The Indian Constitution divides legislative
powers between the Centre and States through three lists—
Union, State, and Concurrent. The Union List covers subjects of
national importance, while the State List deals with local issues.
The Concurrent List includes subjects where both the Centre and
States can legislate.
 Constitutional Supremacy: The Constitution is the supreme
law, governing both the Centre and the States. Any violation of
its provisions can be challenged in court, ensuring the rule of
law.
 Written and Rigid Constitution: India has a written
Constitution with 395 Articles, making it one of the most
comprehensive in the world. It is also rigid, meaning changes,
especially those affecting federal relations, require approval
from both Parliament and State legislatures.
 Independent Judiciary: The judiciary in India is independent
and plays a crucial role in upholding the Constitution. The
Supreme Court has the power to declare laws unconstitutional,
ensuring checks and balances.
 Bicameral Legislature: India’s Parliament is bicameral,
consisting of the Lok Sabha (House of the People) and the Rajya
Sabha (Council of States), ensuring representation of both the
people and the states in the legislative process.
India's federal structure differs significantly from that of the USA,
where states came together to form a federation. When drafting
India's Constitution, the primary focus was on ensuring the "unity
and integrity of India." As a result, the Constitution includes
several provisions that give it a unitary character, favoring the
Union over the states. Some of key unitary features are
mentioned below:

 Residuary powers are with the Union Government

 Concept of single citizenship
 States can be created or diminished without their consent
 All India Services officers head important positions in States
 Emergency Provisions, especially Article 356
The Indian Constitution thus created a strong central government
with state autonomy. Despite this centrist approach for unity, the
Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India affirmed
federalism as a basic feature.

Rationale for strong unitary bias in Indian Federalism.

 Historical context and national unity:
o Need to prevent fragmentation after independence
o Aim to forge a unified national identity
 Economic integration and development:
o Centralized planning for balanced regional growth
o Equitable distribution of resources across states
o Coordinated implementation of national economic policies

2. Federal Structure
Being federal in nature, our Constitution divides legislative,
executive and financial powers between the Centre and
States. However judicial powers are exercised by an integrated
judicial system, which enforces both the central and state laws.
Legislative Relations (Art 245 to 255)
As per the Indian Constitution, legislative or law-making powers
are not vested in a single tier of government, rather they have
been distributed between the Centre and the States with respect to
territory and subject
matter.
Territorial Jurisdiction
Parliament can make laws for the whole or any part of the
territory of India as well as extra territorial legislative powers.
Whereas a state can legislate only for their state.
However, there are certain limitations to territorial jurisdiction of
Parliament in certain situations. For example- Scheduled Areas.

Example of Subjects Divided between Union and State

Central State Both Governments
Government Government (Concurrent List)
(Union List) (State List)
Defence, Banking, Police, Education, Forest, Trade,
Currency, Foreign Trade, Marriage,
Affairs, Agriculture, Adoption
Communication Irrigation

Subject Matter
In the context of subjects of legislation, the constitution divides the
subjects in three lists- Union, State and Concurrent List under
the VIIth Schedule of the Constitution.
Article 248 of the Indian Constitution grants the Centre the
residuary powers, meaning the authority over matters not
specifically enumerated in any of the lists in the 7th Schedule shall
be exclusively handled by the Union Government.
 The Constitution gives precedence to the Union List over the
other two lists and the Concurrent List over the State List in
cases of overlapping jurisdiction.
 Under specific circumstances, such as national interest or
international agreements,
Parliament can legislate on State List subjects.
Additionally, the Centre has control over certain state legislations,
including the power of the Governor to reserve bills for the
President's approval, and the President's authority during
financial emergencies.
Administrative Relations (Art 256 to 263)
The framers of the Indian Constitution included detailed provisions to
manage administrative relations between the Centre and State,
aiming to minimize conflicts between the two. Some key features
are:
 Directives by the Union to the State governments: Article
256 mentions that the executive power of every state shall be so
exercised as to ensure compliance with laws made by
Parliament and any existing laws.
 Delegation of Union functions to the States: The President
may, with the consent of the State government, entrust (either
conditionally or unconditionally) to that government any of the
executive functions of the Centre.
 All India Services: Besides the Central and State services, the
Constitution under Article 312 provides for the creation of an
additional "All-India Services", common to both the Union and
States.
 Inter-State Council: The Constitution includes provisions to
foster intergovernmental cooperation and consultation,
ensuring national policies are shaped through consensus.
One key mechanism is the Inter-State Council (ISC), which has held
10 meetings and made decisions such as time-bound clearance of
bills for the President’s consideration, approval of an alternative
tax devolution scheme to states, and addressing the misuse of
Article 356.
 Inter-State River Water Dispute: The Parliament may by
law, provide for the adjudication of any dispute or complaint with
respect to the use, distribution or control of the waters of, or in,
any inter-state river or river valley.
Financial Relations (Art 268 to 293)
The financial relations between the Union and the States can be
studied under the following heads:
 Taxes and duties levied by the Union, but collected and
appropriated by the States:
 Taxes levied and collected by the Union, but assigned to the
States within which they are leviable.
a) Succession duty in respect of property, other than agricultural
land, Terminal taxes on goods or passengers carried by railways,
sea or air. etc
  Goods and Services Tax.
 Taxes levied and collected by the Union and distributed between
the Union and the States.
 Surcharge on certain taxes, Grants-in-Aid, Loans, Freedom of Inter-
State Trade.
 The Finance Commission (Article 280) recommends on the
distribution of tax revenues between the Union and the States, as
well as among the States themselves.
During emergencies, financial relations between the Centre and
States can change, allowing the President to modify the constitutional
distribution of revenues.

3. Trends in Centre-State Relations

Evolution of India’s federalism since Independence

Phase Description
The First Marked by smooth federalism due to single-
Phase party rule in most states and the Centre.
(Independence
to Mid- 1960s)
Second Non-Congress state governments opposed
Phase (Post- centralization, demanding more state
1967 autonomy and greater financial resources.
Elections)
Confrontation Regional parties like DMK and RJD began
al federalism asserting their interests, leading national
(1967- late parties to give more importance to regional roles
1980s) in governance.
Cooperative The era marked a shift towards collaboration
Federalism between the Centre and states, with more
(1991- 2014) emphasis on working together for national
development.
Competitive & The current phase combines elements of
Cooperative competition and cooperation, where states are
Federalism encouraged to compete in areas like
(2014- development while also cooperating with the
present) Centre

However, still there are many areas of differences between the

Union and States that exist, like:
 Mode of appointment and dismissal of Governor,
 Discriminatory and partisan role of Governors,
 Misuse of Article 356 to dismiss state governments,
 Reservation of State bills by the Governors for Presidential
Assent,
 Revenue sharing between Centre and States
 Encroachment by the Centre on the State list.
The Punchhi Commission analyzed these issues and presented
key recommendations. Some important recommendations include:

Legislative Federalism (Punchhi Commission)

Issues Recommendations
Encroachment by Centre should avoid encroaching upon
Centre on matters in the State list.
subjects in State
List
Centre's The Union should legislate on only those
dominance in subjects in concurrent lists which are
Concurrent List absolutely necessary to achieve
legislation uniformity of policy in national interest.
President's Regarding bills reserved for consideration of
absolute veto on the President by the Governor, a time limit
state legislature should be prescribed for such
bills reserved by consideration.
the Governor
Failure of Rajya Equality of seats to States in the Rajya
Sabha to be Sabha, irrespective of their population size
representative of should be provided.
States
 Executive Federalism (Punchhi Commission)
Issues Recommendations
Deployment of States should be generally consulted
CAPF for before deployment of armed forces.
assistance of
States in
maintaining Law
and Order
Over-centralization The Centre should respect the
in developmental autonomy of states and local bodies in
matters (apart areas like education and health. Its role
from security should focus on setting policies, providing
matters) funds, and facilitating coordination, while
leaving implementation to the states and
local governments.
Ineffectiveness Inter-state council should be made a
of Inter- state permanent body (Also recommended by
council Sarkaria Commission)
Frequent President’s rule (use of article 356) should
resorting to be proclaimed as the
President’s rule last resort.(SR Bommai Vs UoI 1994)
Appointment of The Chief Minister of a state should be
Governor based consulted before appointment of
on political Governor and such Governor should be an
considerations ‘eminent person detached from regular
politics of state’ and be given a security of
tenure ordinarily. The scope of discretionary
powers given to Governors under article 163
should be narrowly constructed

Cooperative Federalism and Competitive Federalism

Aspect Cooperative Competitive Federalism

Federalism
Definitio Horizontal relationship Relationship between Centre
n between Centre, states, and states or among states
and local governments. based on
 competition.
Key  Encourages  Promotes competition
Features collaboration and among states for better
shared governance.
responsibilities.  Focuses on innovation
 Focuses on mutual and economic
trust and respect. competitiveness.
 Examples: NITI  Examples: Vibrant Gujarat,
Aayog, 73rd and Ease of Doing Business
74th Amendments. reforms.
Significa  Ensures holistic  Drives states to improve
nce national public services and
development. governance through
 Helps in resolving competition.
common issues  Encourages states to
collectively. attract investment and
implement
 reforms.
Challeng  Potential for unequal  Risk of "Race to the
es resource allocation. Bottom" where weaker
 Requires strong states may struggle.
mutual trust.  Can lead to inter-state
rivalries and political
blockages.
Impacts  Strengthens national  Improves economic
integration. efficiency.
 Fosters inclusive  Enhances state-level
growth. governance and
accountability.
1.2. Assessment of the Working of the Inter State Council
The Inter-State Council, created under Article 263 of the
Constitution, helps coordinate between states. While not a
permanent body yet, it plays a key role in resolving federal
disputes and fostering cooperation between the Centre and States. It
has the potential to strengthen both vertical (Centre-State)
and horizontal (inter-State) relations. Various issues faced by
the ISC and recommendations to improve upon the working are as
follows:
 Issues Recommendations
Non- The Punchhi Commission recommended that the
permanent ISC should be made a permanent body under the
body Constitution.
Advisory in The Punchhi Commission recommended
nature strengthening consensus-building and
voluntary settlement of disputes.
Lack of The Punchhi Commission also recommended that
technical the ISC should have expert advisory bodies or
expertise administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial
authority to give recommendations to the ISC as
and when needed.
The Sarkaria Commission had suggested that
the ISC and its Standing Committee should be
given the power to set up ad hoc Sub-
Committees to investigate special matters.
Infrequent Giving constitutional or statutory status to the ISC
meetings may ensure that the ISC meets regularly and is
given sufficient resources.

Assessment of the Working of the Inter-State Water Dispute

(ISWD) Tribunals
The Inter-State Water Tribunals often face long delays, sometimes
taking decades to reach a decision. These delays are due to the
process itself and further extended by challenges in the
Supreme Court, leading to inefficiencies in the system. Some key
issues here are:
 Constitutional Ambiguity: While the Union List mentions
“interstate water,” the State List simply uses the term
“water” to signify what is essentially “surface water” confined
within the boundaries of the state.
 Institutional Ambiguity: Tribunals struggle to enforce their
decisions effectively. The Supreme Court, empowered by Article
136 to take up any case, often hears appeals from these
tribunals. This undermines the tribunals' role as final adjudicators,
despite Article 262 aiming to keep the judiciary out of inter-
state water disputes, creating uncertainty about their ultimate
 authority.
Other Issues with Water Disputes Tribunal:
o Operational Irregularities: Tribunals lack a regular system,
with irregular sittings and operating outside the usual
court framework.
o Poor Technical Expertise: Most of the members in the tribunal
for interstate water disputes are from the Judiciary, lacking
diverse and technical expertise. This has resulted in a lack of a
multi-disciplinary approach to dispute settlement.
o Lack of Scientific Data: There is insufficient data on water
flows, seasonal changes, and availability, leading to
uncertainties regarding availability and sharing of water.
Monsoonal rainfall variations can also cause water
shortages.
Hence, historically extraordinary delays in constituting tribunals,
like the Godavari water dispute (request in 1962, tribunal in 1968,
award in 1979), led to prolonged disputes. The Cauvery Water
Dispute saw a similar delay, prompting intervention in 1990 after the
Tamil Nadu government's 1970 request.
Following efforts were taken by the Central Government
through 2002 amendment to the ISWD act, 1956 to
overcome these issues:
 Time-bound Constitution: It mandated tribunal constitution
within a year of the request.
 Timeframe: The tribunal was required to issue awards
within three years, extendable by two years,
establishing a maximum five-year timeframe.
 The Tribunal Awards will have the same force as the order or
decree of the Supreme Court.

The Inter-state River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill, 2019

The Inter-State River Water Disputes (Amendment) Bill,
2019 was introduced to address the prolonged delays and
inefficiencies in resolving inter-state water disputes. By proposing a
permanent tribunal with multiple benches and a dispute resolution
committee, the bill aimed to create a more streamlined and
effective mechanism for settling such disputes across states.

Key Provisions of The Bill:

  Disputes Resolution Committee (DRC): Government-
mandated committee for amicable resolution within one year,
extendable by six months.
 DRC Members: Experts from relevant fields appointed by the
central government.
 Permanent Tribunal: Standalone tribunal creation with
multiple benches, dissolving existing ones and transferring
pending disputes.
 Data Bank and Information Maintenance: Transparent data
collection nationally for each river basin, managed by a single
agency.

Suggestions to Improve the functioning of ISWTs

Following measures can be taken to strengthen the mechanism and
resolve the disputes in efficient manner:
 Integrated Approach: Rather than acting as a dispute resolution
authority, the Union government should play a proactive role of a
basin-wide authority.
 Role of Inter-State Council: Bringing inter-state water disputes
under the purview of the Interstate Council can be an effective
political mechanism for fostering a consensus-based decision-
making approach.
 Incentivize Water Efficiency: The states should be incentivized
to enhance water use efficiency across various sectors,
integrating water harvesting and recharging practices to
alleviate pressure on river water and local water sources.
 Unified Water Management Agency: The establishment of a
unified water management agency, grounded in scientific
principles, is essential for both ground and surface water.
 Central Repository for Water Data: The creation of a central
repository for water data is vital to facilitate well-informed
decision-making.
Lastly, the central government needs to play a more proactive role
in addressing and resolving inter-state water disputes to ensure
efficient and equitable water resource management.
1.3. GST Council and Issues of Central Supremacy
GST is a destination-based indirect tax reform aimed at creating
a ‘One Nation, One Tax’ system with uniform tax rates across the
country. It is levied on interstate commerce/trade by the Centre
and shared between the Union and states as per Article 269A,
following recommendations from the GST Council.
Challenges related to GST Council and Supremacy of
Centre:
 The Union Finance Minister is its chair.
 The Centre holds 1/3rd voting power in the GST Council, while
states share the remaining 2/3rd equally. Decisions require a
75% majority, effectively giving the Centre veto power.
 Substantial part of the IGST not shared: IGST constitutes
around 55 % of collection. However, Rs 2.4 Lakh crore remained
undistributed in 2021-22, impacting fund-starved states.
 Issues related to GST Compensation fund: Many states urged
the Centre to extend it for another five years However, the Centre
said that no more compensation will be required by the states as
the GST revenue collection for states has been very robust.
 Disparities among states: It harms producer states and rewards
consumer states. Southern states accounting for over 25% of
direct tax and 26% of the GST collection, get the lowest amount
(16%) from the divisible pool.
A more open and robust consultative approach between the
Centre and the states, especially on issues of resource distribution
and decision-making can tackle the issues related to fiscal
federalism.

State Involvement: Key to Equitable Finance Commission

Terms
The 15th Finance Commission (2020-2025) faced criticism from some
states for using 2011 population data in its Terms of Reference (ToR)
for tax devolution. This controversy highlights the importance of
including state participation in the formulation of the Finance
Commission's ToR. Need for participation of the states in this domain
is explored below:
Fiscal Federalism:
 Key Stakeholders: States are vital in India's federal structure,
with distinct financial needs.
 Balanced Allocation: Involving states ensures fair resource
distribution, considering diverse challenges.
Addressing Regional Disparities:
 Equitable Distribution: States can highlight specific
developmental issues, ensuring a fair approach to varying
economic conditions.
 Diverse Conditions: Participation allows for tailored solutions to
regional differences.
Promoting Cooperative Federalism:
 Encourages Dialogue: Facilitates communication between
Centre and States, fostering a collaborative spirit.
 Shared Ownership: Engages states in the fiscal process,
aligning national and state-level policies.
Enhancing Transparency and Accountability:
 Performance Metrics: States contribute to setting realistic
performance standards and fiscal goals.
 State-Specific Needs: Ensures that unique state responsibilities
are factored in.
Addressing Emerging Challenges:
 Adapting to Change: States can bring attention to new
economic issues, enabling the adaptation of fiscal policies to
evolving needs.
 Demographic Considerations: Participation helps address
shifting population dynamics effectively.
Involving states in the Finance Commission's ToR is crucial for
ensuring a fair, transparent, and cooperative approach to fiscal
federalism in India.
Impact of Central Investigative Agencies on India's Federal
Harmony
The role of India's central investigative agencies such as the National
Investigation Agency (NIA), Enforcement Directorate (ED), and
Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) has been a subject of
considerable debate, especially in the context of its impact on
federalism in India.
These agencies operate under the jurisdiction of the central
government and are pivotal in investigating a wide range of crimes,
from terrorism and financial fraud to corruption and other
high-profile cases. Key areas of concern regarding the role of these
agencies in federalism are:
 Erosion of State Autonomy: The increasing involvement of
central agencies in state-level investigations can undermine the
 sovereignty of individual states.
 Misuse for Political Gains: There are allegations that the
investigations are sometimes initiated or prolonged to target
opposition parties or state governments.
 Specific issues with Agencies:
o The requirement for “general consent” from states for CBI
investigations has become contentious.
o The Enforcement Directorate has faced criticism for
targeting scholars, activists and opposition leaders,
leading to concerns about the misuse of its powers for political
benefits.
 Impact on State Police: When central agencies take over cases,
it often sidelines state police forces.
 Resource Allocation and Priorities: The focus on high-profile
cases diverts resources from state-level investigations.
 Public Perception and Trust: Citizens may perceive state
governments as powerless or ineffective.
While investigative agencies play a crucial role in maintaining law
and order, their impact on federalism in India is complex. Balancing
their powers and ensuring cooperation between central and state
agencies is essential for a robust federal system.
Aggressive Regionalism and Impact on Federalism
Aggressive regionalism in India refers to the intense loyalty to a
specific region, often prioritizing local interests, culture, and identity
over national unity. This sentiment can lead to demands for greater
autonomy, protection of local jobs against outsiders, and even
calls for the creation of new states.
Examples of aggressive regionalism include movements for separate
statehood, like the demand for Telangana, the ongoing agitation for
Gorkhaland in West Bengal.
The challenges posed by aggressive regionalism includes:
 Strained relations between the central and state governments,
 Hindered economic integration,
 Increased administrative complexity,
 A situation where states assert more autonomy than what is
constitutionally provided,
 Fueling inter-state disputes, particularly over natural
resources, and exacerbate regional inequalities.
To address these issues, solutions could involve promoting
inclusive development policies that ensure equitable growth across
all regions, fostering intercultural dialogue to build mutual
understanding, and creating mechanisms for more effective dispute
resolution between states.
Need for Revisiting the 7th Schedule
The 15th Finance Commission (FFC), led by Chairman NK Singh,
has suggested that the government should revisit the 7th Schedule
(Article 246) highlighting the need to update and clean up the 7th
Schedule.
Arguments for Revisiting
 Outdated Structure from Colonial Past
o The 7th Schedule is inherited from the GoI Act, 1935, and does
not reflect the complexities of modern governance.
o While it emphasized a Strong Centre for unity and integrity,
there is now a need to incorporate principles of decentralized
federalism to address cultural diversity and promote
responsive governance.
 Lessons from Recent Crises
o Pandemic Crises: The COVID-19 pandemic exposed significant
gaps in states' capacity to manage health emergencies.
Including Health in the Concurrent List could lead to better
coordination and policy implementation nationwide.
o Water Crises: National-level water issues, highlighted by the
Mihir Shah Committee, suggest the need to include Water in
the Concurrent List to ensure equitable distribution and
management.
o Law & Order Issues: States often request Central forces to
enforce law and order, indicating a need to revisit the scope of
state powers.
 Countering Centralizing Tendencies
o There has been a gradual Creeping Encroachment by the
Centre into the State List via centrally sponsored schemes (CSS)
and laws such as MGNREGA, RTE, and National Food Security
Act.
o Subjects like education and forest management have been
shifted from the State to Concurrent List, which goes against the
trend toward decentralization.
 Inappropriately Placed Entries and Missing Items
o The automatic transfer of residuary powers to the Union
 under Article 248 should be re- evaluated, especially for items
not suitable for the Union List.
o Missing Entries: The 7th Schedule does not include crucial
contemporary issues like Disaster Management, Emerging
Technologies (AI, Blockchain, Gene Editing), Consumer
Protection, and Environment Protection.
Way Forward
 Periodic Review: The lists should be reviewed every 10 years to
remove outdated entries, add new ones, and appropriately
reclassify existing items.
 High-Powered Commission: Constituting a commission of
experts to examine and suggest redistributions in the 7th
Schedule.
 Institutionalized Mechanisms:
o Establish a Consultative Forum for Centre-State policy
dialogue.
o Revitalize the Inter-State Council to give constitutional
weight to the consultative process.
 Consideration of Commission Recommendations:
o Sarkaria Commission: Advocates transferring residuary
powers to the Concurrent List, with tax-related powers retained
by the Union.
o Punchhi Commission: Suggests limiting the transfer of
subjects to the Concurrent List to those necessary for national
policy uniformity.

Revisiting the 7th Schedule is essential to adapt India's federal

structure to current and future challenges, ensuring a more balanced
and effective distribution of powers between the Centre and the
States.

Analysis of Article 356: Misuse of envisaged ‘Dead Letter’

The misuse of Article 356 to topple state governments has been
a heavily debated issue in India. Dr. Ambedkar believed that
Articles 355 and 356 should remain unused, invoked only as a
last resort. He stressed that the President must exercise caution
before suspending a state's administration. However, the article has
been far from a "dead letter."
 Few Examples of Improper use of Article 356
Cases Ground
Kerala Case - Allegations of corruption or maladministration
July 1959 against a ministry
Punjab, Wholesale dissolution of Legislative Assemblies
Haryana, H.P., of 9 States on the sole ground that in the
U.P., Bihar, election to Lok Sabha, the ruling party in the
W.B., Orissa, State has suffered massive defeat.
M.P. and
Rajasthan—April
1977
Karnataka Case Without providing opportunity to duly
- April 1989 constituted ministry to demonstrate majority
support through the floor test, the Governor
recommended President’s rule on the basis of
subjective assessment that the ministry no longer commands
confidence of the House.

Karnataka Case To sort out internal differences or intra-party

– October 1990 problems of the ruling party

Tamil Nadu Case Breakdown of law and order.

- January 1991

Uttarakhand Outgoing Chief Minister is denied opportunity to

Case- March prove his majority in the House
2016

The safeguards built in by our constituent assembly against the

misuse of article 356 are as follows:
1. Requirement of Parliamentary approval,
2. The President may send back such advice by council of ministers
once for reconsideration,
3. Judicial review of Proclamation.
Yet, the excessive use of this article, against the intended “Dead
Letter” spirit led to its study by various committees. Some key
recommendations given by these committees are:
Sarkaria Commission:
The Sarkaria Commission reviewed instances where Article 356
was improperly invoked, categorizing them into groups like not
issuing warnings to states, denying chances to form
alternative governments, and dissolving assemblies without
cause. The Commission identified specific situations where
constitutional machinery truly breaks down, such as political crises
where no party can form a government or internal subversion where
the government misuses its powers.
The Commission recommended that Article 356 should only be
used in severe cases like political crises, internal subversion,
or physical breakdowns due to emergencies. It highlighted that
minor issues like mismanagement or corruption allegations
should not justify invoking this article. For instance, it pointed out
that while Manipur and Tripura were placed under Presidential rule
when they became states, the mere creation of a new state isn't
always a valid reason for such action.
Punchhi Commission:
The Punchhi Commission closely examined the use of Article 356 and
its impact on Centre-State relations. It identified concerns about
the misuse of this article to dismiss state governments, often
without valid reasons. The Commission highlighted the need for
stricter guidelines and safeguards to prevent arbitrary use. Some key
recommendations are:
 In day-to-day administration, every breach or infraction of a
constitutional provision can’t be taken as ‘failure of constitutional
machinery’.
 Ultimately, the proper use of Article 356 can only be governed by
the inherent decency and honesty of the political process.
 All alternative courses available to the Union for discharging its
paramount responsibility
under Article 355 should be 1st exhausted to contain the
situation.
 Exercise of the power under Article 356 should be limited
strictly to rectifying a "failure of the Constitutional
machinery in the State”.
 It also recommended a constitutional or legal framework to
deal with the situations which require Central intervention without
invoking the extreme steps under articles 352 and 356.
Further, it recommended suitable amendments in the Constitution
to incorporate the guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court
in S.R. Bommai Case.
The National Commission to Review The Working Of The
Constitution (NCRWC)
 In the event of a political crisis necessitating the application of
Article 356, the concerned state should have an opportunity
to present its case and resolve the situation before a
proclamation is issued. However, in cases where the situation
poses a threat to state security, national defense, or other
compelling reasons requiring urgent action, this process may not
be followed.
 The determination of whether a state ministry has lost the
confidence of the legislative assembly should be made solely on
the assembly floor and nowhere else.
Since the formation of key committees and the shift towards coalition
politics, the use of Article 356 has significantly decreased,
reflecting a more cautious and balanced approach by the Union
Government. Some key reasons for reduced use of Article 356
since Mid-1990s are:
 Bommai Judgment (1994): The Supreme Court's ruling set strict
guidelines for invoking Article 356, limiting its use to genuine
constitutional breakdowns and allowing judicial review.
 Rise of Coalition Governments: The emergence of coalition
governments at the Centre promoted consensus-building, reducing
the likelihood of arbitrary dismissals of state governments.
 Increased Scrutiny and Criticism: Growing awareness and
public criticism of the misuse of Article 356 have discouraged its
frequent invocation by Union Governments.
Governor and Centre-state Relations
The role of Governors in India's federal structure has been a source of
ongoing debate and tension between the Centre and States. This
issue highlights the delicate balance of power in India's federal
system and the potential for political conflicts.

According to a report by PRS Legislative Research, between 2011

and 2021, there were over 50 instances of Governors
returning bills passed by state legislatures, highlighting the
frequency of such conflicts.
Issues:
 Discretionary powers: Governors have significant discretionary
powers, including in government formation and dismissal, which
can be controversial.
 Appointment and removal: Governors are
appointed by the President on the advice of the Central
government, leading to concerns about their neutrality.
 Interference in state affairs: Allegations of Governors
overstepping their constitutional role and interfering in day-to-day
governance.
 Delay in decision-making: Instances of Governors delaying
assent to bills passed by state legislatures or withholding
nominations to legislative councils.
Recent Examples:
 Maharashtra (2022): The Governor's role in the formation of
government after a split in the ruling alliance was heavily
criticized.
 Tamil Nadu (2023): Controversy over the Governor's delay in
forwarding bills passed by the state assembly to the President for
assent.
 Kerala (2023): Ongoing tension between the Governor and
state government over university appointments and policy
decisions.

Causes Impact
Political appointments: Political instability: Controversial
Governors are often former decisions by Governors can lead to
politicians, raising questions governmental crises and legal
about their impartiality. battles.
Lack of clear guidelines: Erosion of federal principles:
The Constitution provides Perceived misuse of Governor's
broad discretionary powers office can weaken the federal
without specific guidelines structure.
for their exercise. Delayed governance: Conflicts
Centre-State power between Governors and state
dynamics: Governors governments can hinder policy
sometimes seen as tools for implementation and legislative
the Central government to processes.
exert control over
 opposition- ruled states.

Judicial Perspective: The Supreme Court, in S.R. Bommai v.

Union of India (1994), emphasized that Governors should act
impartially and not according to the wishes of the Central
government.
 More recently, in Nabam Rebia v. Deputy Speaker (2016), the
Court limited the Governor's discretionary powers in summoning
the assembly.
Way Forward:
 Clear guidelines: Develop comprehensive guidelines for the
exercise of Governor's discretionary powers.
 Transparency in appointments: Implement a more transparent
and consultative process for Governor appointments.
 Fixed tenure: Consider a fixed tenure for Governors to ensure
greater independence.
 Constitutional reforms: Explore amendments to clearly define
and limit the Governor's role in state affairs.
 Strengthening federal institutions: Enhance the role of the
Inter-State Council to address Centre-State conflicts.
By addressing these issues, India can strengthen its federal structure,
ensuring a balance between national unity and state autonomy while
preserving the constitutional spirit of cooperative federalism.