U.S.

AIR FORCE AIR ADVISOR REALIGNMENT TO BETTER SUPPORT THE

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ENTERPRISE

A Master’s Capstone Project

Submitted to the Faculty

of

American Public University

by

Christopher Turner

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree

of

Master of Arts in Security Management

September 2023

American Public University

Charles Town, WV
The author hereby grants the American Public University System the right to display these

contents for educational purposes.

The author assumes total responsibility for meeting the requirements set by United States

copyright laws for the inclusion of any materials that are not the author’s creation or in the public

domain.

© Copyright 2022 by Christopher Turner

All Rights Reserved.

i
 ABSTRACT

WHITE PAPER PRESENTED TO AIR MOBILITY COMMAND ON U.S. AIR FORCE

AIR ADVISOR REALIGNMENT TO BETTER SUPPORT THE SECURITY FORCE

ASSISTANCE ENTERPRISE

by

CHRISTOPHER TURNER

American Public University System, September 9, 2023

Charles Town, WV

Professor Frank Trapp, Project Professor

This white paper is intended to highlight how U.S. Air Force air advisors are trained,

equipped, and employed across the globe and to emphasize the need for institutional change. Up

to this point in time, air advisors have been utilized to primarily conduct security cooperation

activities in peacetime and uncontested environments. However, the world stage is rapidly

evolving, and previous operational standards will likely be insufficient. For more than two

decades, the U.S. military has put significant focus on combating terrorist groups and fighting in

asymmetrical warfare. The growing threats that are becoming more of a pressing matter would

put the U.S. squarely in conflict with a much larger, organized, capable, and uniformed enemy.

The U.S. will need to have capable allies and partners to successfully face the conflict. The role

of air advisors is growing in importance, but the operational standards that have been used over

the past ten years or so will be insufficient. The problem is that air advisors are improperly

trained and equipped to handle the conflict of the future. To rectify the problem, significant

ii
investment needs to be made in proper training and equipment, as well as a realignment of how

air advisors and other advisory forces are employed.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………….1

II. LITERATURE REVIEW…………………………………………………….…….4

III. METHODOLOGY…………………………………………………...…………....13

IV. PROJECT PRESENTATION……………………………………………………...15

V. CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………….…...38

VI. REFERENCE LIST………………………………………………………….…....39

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure Explanation

Figure 1 African Military Takeovers and Attempted Takeovers since 2012

(Source: Congressional Research Service)
Figure 2 USAF Air Advisor Combined Aviation Support Team Employment
Structure Concept (Source: Author)
Figure 3 Exercise Advisor Edge Hub-Spoke-Node Deployment Concept
(Source: Author)

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

Abbreviation Explanation

ACE Agile Combat Employment

AMC Air Mobility Command

AOC Area Operations Center
AOR Area of Responsibility
BPC Building Partnership Capacity
CANVAs Combined Access Node Viability Assessment
CAST Combined Aviation Support Team
CATC Combat Advisor Training Course
DoD Department of Defense
GVN South Vietnamese Government
IQC Initial Qualification Course
KLE Key Leader Engagement
MAC-V Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MATA Military Advisor Training Academy
MCA Multi-Capable Airmen
MSAS Mobility Support Advisory Squadron
SFA Security Force Assistance
SFAC Security Force Assistance Command
SOS Special Operations Squadron
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command
USSOUTHCOM United States Southern Command

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 Chapter 1: Introduction

Problem Statement

Throughout history, people and societies around the world have had conflicts with each

other. Stories of conflict and war can be found in literature which dates back thousands of years.

It is even included in religious literature, such as the bible, with stories of Kane and Abel and

David and Goliath. Regardless of whether one believes in any form of religion or not, most

people can likely agree that the stories contained in such works of literature at least tell stories

and provide documentation of conflict between people from thousands of years ago. Conflict

among people has always existed and likely will not be going away anytime soon.

Each nation and military has its strengths and weaknesses, but one thing that is consistent

among them all is that none of them can do everything or fight everyone else on their own.

Developing friends and allies is a critically important aspect of any nation’s survival.

Establishing allies is something else that can be seen and documented throughout history. It can

be seen as far back as 478 BC when the Ionian Greeks allied with the Delian League to protect

themselves from the Persians and other potential threats. (Gulati, n.d) This shows that militaries

throughout history have understood the importance of having allies, friends, and partners.

Several of the service branches of the U.S. military have established commands and units

specifically to support security force assistance (SFA) and security cooperation efforts. The Air

Force created the Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons (MSAS) to fill the need within the

realm. While extremely successful in the environment they operate in, some areas can be

improved to improve their effectiveness and better support the SFA enterprise. The problem lies

within the current construct because it was not built to deploy air advisors into a contested

environment during a conflict.

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 Target Audience

This white paper is intended to identify and recommend changes to the air advisor

construct to Air Mobility Command (AMC) and Headquarters, Air Force (HAF). These levels of

leadership maintain the proper level of influence and advocacy to implement the recommended

changes. Squadron commanders influence within their respective units, but disseminating the

message upwards sometimes has difficulty gaining traction and reaching the right levels. This

project provides a conceptual blueprint that was devised at the squadron level to properly inform

AMC and HAF.

Purpose

The information provided within this project focuses on areas of improvement for air

advisors, such as training requirements, deployment structure, and organizational construct, that

will allow advisors to better support the SFA enterprise and be better prepared to operate in a

contested environment. The research included highlights several areas that could be adjusted to

improve overall operability, but also ensure adequate inclusion of air advisors within strategic

campaign planning. Advisory forces hold a unique position within the military and they can

bring a lot to the table. Their capabilities must be given the appropriate representation and

advocacy at higher levels within the Air Force.

Chapter Summary

This paper provides data and justifications on the importance of supporting the SFA

mission and the impact it has on campaign plans. Chapter two contains a literature review that

discusses several publications and historical events leading to the current state of air advisors.

Chapter three identifies research methodologies to obtain the included data of the project. The

fourth chapter is the white paper to be presented to AMC which paints a clear picture for

2
commanders to gain advocacy of recommended changes within the Air Force and creates a joint

command to house all advisors. Finally, chapter five concludes the project with a recap of

identified recommendations.

3
 Chapter 2: Literature Review

The world is a chaotic place, and the chaos only continues to grow as time moves

forward. History books show that conflict has been a consistent problem of humankind around

the world. With the growing list of terrorist and violent extremist organizations and efforts of

near-peer nations that pose threats to the interests and national security of the United States and

its allies, the nation finds itself at a point of facing a lot of potential conflicts. Thanks to history,

the U.S. has had the forethought to realize it cannot handle all the problems on its own. The

most effective way to take on the problems is utilizing military advisors to strengthen weak

states, building the capacity of partners, and sharing the burden through partners and allies. This

project is intended to highlight missing information regarding the construct of the SFA enterprise

through an examination of various literature pieces that have been written.

Forms of SFA can be traced as far back as the era of the Romans. In the fifteenth century,

European countries made technological advancements in their ability to sail farther distances

across open seas. With the advancement, they developed the desire to start utilizing new and

more efficient trade routes with Asia after the Ottoman Empire took control of Constantinople,

which served as the linchpin of the East-West trade routes between Europe and Asia. European

governments sought to cut out the middle of the process and get goods such as gold, ivory, silk,

and spices directly from their sources. (Brooks, 2019.) Part of these explorations involved the

famous Spanish Conquistador, Hernán Cortés. Around 1520, Cortés was on a conquest

throughout the Caribbean to locate resources for the Spanish government, as well as set the

foothold and foundation for colonization. During the expedition, he and his group of soldiers

sailed to Mexico and landed near modern-day Veracruz as they were about to initiate their effort

to conquer the indigenous civilizations. After a long and trying trip across the Atlantic, Cortés’s

4
soldiers were tired, missing their families, and wanting to return home. Cortés then ordered his

ships to be burned, forcing the troops to have no other option but to move forward and conquer

the natives, or face certain death. Either way, they were stranded with no other option but to be

completely committed to the effort and fight.

From a military perspective, Cortés had a very difficult fight ahead of him and his

soldiers. They had a limited number of troops and resources, they were very far from home and

any possible reinforcements, and they were attempting to conquer a resident force in a foreign

land. These factors would typically put the invading force at a disadvantage because they would

be outnumbered in foreign territory with no means of retreat. However, Cortés and his troops

were quickly successful in their endeavors because of the alliance they made with native

Mexicans. The native Mexicans were enemies of the Aztecs, so they were willing to establish an

alliance; a partnership with Cortés to achieve a mutual goal. Given the circumstances Cortés was

facing, he and his army likely would have failed in their attempt to conquer the Aztecs. His

forged partnership highlights the importance of military alliances and proves that armies are

stronger and more capable when they work together toward a common cause.

Approximately 250 years later the colonies of the New World declared their

independence from British rule and the Revolutionary War commenced. Like Cortés, the

colonists were facing a larger enemy force with more resources. At the time, the British Army

could be considered to have been the strongest army in the world. Realizing his army would

need help to win against the British, General George Washington enlisted the assistance of Baron

Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. It was thought that Baron von Steuben could assist with

strengthening the Colonial Army. By doing so, General Washinton employed the assistance of an

experienced individual to train and advise his army, thus building their capacity to conduct

5
warfare. Additionally, Marquis de Lafayette played an integral role in the success of the

Continental Army by brokering a partnership between the French government and the

Continental Army, which resulted in the French providing supplies, weapons, troops, and naval

support. (Department of State, n.d.) Leaning on the advice of von Steuben and their new

relationship with the French, the Continental Army successfully defeated the British. Once

again, this scenario highlights how alliances and partnerships can boost a military’s capabilities

and overcome an enemy.

Since 1776, the United States has relied on military advisors to assist with building

capacity and strengthening weak states. Back then, it was the United States that could have been

considered as the weak state as it was a fledgling nation, struggling to gain and hold its

independence from England. This early version of SFA helped build the Continental Army’s

capacity to fight against the British more effectively, ultimately securing their independence.

Now, the United States is committed to strengthening weak states and enabling others to have

self-sustaining state security, while addressing issues with mutual interest.

Current Construct

Fast forward to today, the United States military conducts SFA activities around the

world. It has historically been a task that has been placed in the hands of Special Operations

Forces, but due to the increased demand around the world, the Department of Defense has had to

shift some of the responsibilities to conventional forces. The conventional forces have taken on

the mission set and run with it. Several of the armed services stood up focused organizations to

take on the new mission. The Army created Security Force Assistance Brigades, the Marine

Corps has Marine Corps Advisor Companies, and the Air Force previously had Combat Aviation

6
Advisors. Their primary job is to support SFA efforts by training, advising, and assisting partner

nations while building relationships and improving access. (Anderson, 2023).

At one time, the Air Force Combat Aviation Advisors were the only standing advisory

organization within the Air Force. These advisors fell under Air Force Special Operations

Command, and they were successful enough in their efforts that the Air Force determined it

needed to create additional units to do similar work but under the ownership of conventional or

general-purpose forces. The new MSASs were established under the AMC to be regionally

aligned with specific combatant commands. The 818 MSAS became the primary force provider

to service U.S. Africa Command, while the 571 MSAS became the primary for U.S. Southern

Command which focuses on Central and South America. Aligning the new units with specific

areas to operate in allows for the desired long-lasting partnerships.

While both the Army and Air Force are equipped with advisor forces that are regionally

aligned to execute security cooperation activities, each organization’s advisor units are

constructed entirely differently. The Army’s Security Force Assistance Battalions are constructed

of approximately 800 soldiers and have a similar structure to typical brigade combat teams,

except for junior enlisted members and company-grade officers. The 800 or so Soldiers that

comprise each of the 4 Brigades contain two infantry battalions (can house 300 or more soldiers

each), a cavalry battalion, a field artillery battalion, an engineer battalion, a supply battalion, a

headquarters company, a military intelligence company, and a signal company. All that

manpower can build up to 61 advisory teams. (Harkrader, 2019)

The Marine Corps Advisor Companies are designed significantly differently than the

Army’s units. The Marines have two active advisor companies that are comprised of four

advisor teams. Even though they are not designed the same as the Army, they do have something

7
in common. All the teams within the companies can provide regionally focused advisors, and

not contain any junior enlisted members. When it comes to manpower, the companies are filled

with approximately 91 members and each of the four teams holds about 21. (Smith, 2020) All

three of these armed services with dedicated advisory units are charged with the same overall

duties to train, advise, assist, equip, and assess partner nation militaries, however, how the

services have been designed is significantly different.

Training

As the advisory mission set was experiencing significant growth, the Air Force created a

training academy to specifically train advisors. The Air Advisor Academy was initiated to

deliver standardized training to airmen who were tasked to train, advise, and assist partner nation

militaries. (Zidalis, 2013). In addition to the 25-day Air Advisor Qualification Course that

provides focused advisor training, airmen receive training in fieldcraft, culture, and language

skills (Finch and Gerretson, 2013) to strengthen their capabilities within their respective theaters.

The air advisors under the AMC are language-coded, which means they are trained in and

required to maintain an elementary level of language proficiency. Advisors in the 818 MSAS are

required to attend French language training and the 571 MSAS have the same requirement for

Spanish.

Similarly, the U.S. Army created a specific training academy for their Security Force

Assistance Battalions to provide their advisors with the necessary, specific skills. The Combat

Advisor Training Course (CATC) within the Military Advisor Training Academy (MATA),

conducts a 42-day training course that provides foundational skills for Advisors to operate in

small teams in austere environments. (SFAC Factbook, 2023) In 2012, the Marine Corps created

its 5-week training course for Marine advisors to expand individual skills and knowledge on

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interpersonal relations and regional cultural, political, and economic influences to better prepare

them to operate with partner nation forces. (Smith, 2020)

Each of the force's advisor training courses contains a similar curriculum regarding cross-

cultural communications to improve the advisor’s ability to engage with partner nation military

members. Some of the components of the curriculum appear to contain aspects of standard

military fieldcraft training, but there seems to be some difference in how each of the services

utilizes foreign language capabilities. AMC trains their air advisors to be language-enabled

beyond simple, common phrases, allowing them to converse to an extent with partner nation

members in their native language. The Marines and Army both have some level of foreign

language training, but the depth and extent of their training cannot be determined without official

documentation from each of those services’ training academies.

Deployments

There are some organizations and individuals that have encouraged a Joint Security Force

Assistance Command that would house advisors from all services. (Jakubowski, 2018)

Establishing such an organization would significantly change how advisor teams are trained and

deployed and, ultimately, allow for the Department of Defense to provide the best service to the

partner nations. However, the system is not currently designed that way. Marine Advisors

deploy in 21-member teams (Smith, 2020), The Army appears to typically deploy an entire

Advisor Battalion to a general area, then dispatch smaller teams to specific locations.

Meanwhile, the Air Force deploys advisors in teams generally comprised of 10 members or less.

Although the service branches deploy their teams in different ways, there is one significant thing

they have in common. The current state of advisory operations is generally designed to take

place in a permissive environment during the competition phase of operations. Overall, the

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intent is to deploy advisors to engage with partner nations during peacetime to build relationships

and partnerships. Part of building solid and long-lasting relationships with partners is

maintaining a consistent presence. Those efforts create friendships between the militaries so

when the time comes and the U.S. asks for help from the partner, they are not starting from

scratch.

Another aspect of maintaining a consistent presence with the partner goes beyond

building a friendship. It carries a very strategic level of effort with it that can potentially shape

the outcome of a conflict before it ever starts. Maintaining a consistent presence allows the U.S.

to maintain or increase influence, while simultaneously trying to reduce influence from near-peer

adversaries such as Russia and China. Both Russia and China have their ways of boosting their

influence in other areas as well, but maintaining a consistent presence with the partner military

through continued engagements helps build a stronger foundation for the U.S. At the moment,

the common term used for this is great power competition. The U.S., Russia, and China (as well

as others) are all competing to boost their influence in many places around the world. Whether it

be through providing military training, infrastructure assistance, or providing financial support, it

is a constant game of chess.

Up to this point, all the advisory efforts have focused on the competition phase. None of

the material talks about the use of advisors once conflict occurs. The Army Advisory Command

states they play an important role in competition but are built for conflict. Any other reference to

advisors in a combat or conflict environment is minimal and largely revolves around operations

in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Vietnam. All 3 of these theaters are precursors to the future of advising

and much can be learned from them. Vietnam advisory operations were a significant effort under

the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) and the current SFABs are likely able to

10
trace their lineage back to them. Part of MACV’s job was to advise the South Vietnamese

Government (GVN) on all things related to the security of South Vietnam, which included

organizing counterinsurgency and other paramilitary forces. (Felt, 1962) While MACV was

given a lot of responsibility with its creation, part of it was being approved to organize local

forces to work by, with, and through the partner nation and operate as a force multiplier. That is

the part of the current system construct that is missing.

If one were to look at the current status of the world stage, it is easy to see China and

Russia have started throwing their weight around more and are openly trying to spread their

influence, while undermining the U.S. Approximately 18 months ago, Russia was massing

forces at the border of Ukraine and China indicated they were going to take over Taiwan. A short

time later, Russia invaded Ukraine which caused an outpouring of international support to the

Ukrainian military. China may have decided to hold off on its forceful overtaking of Taiwan

because they would expect the same support from Taiwan. These recent incidents highlight that

the operational future of air advisors is going to change, and the enterprise needs to adjust course

before it is too late. As previously stated, the current construct is based on the 'competition'

phase, not combat or conflict. What happens when conflict starts and advisors are in a

strategically located partner nation, or in the country that is attacked? Were the air advisors fully

trained and prepared to operate under such conditions? At least for the Air Force, the answer is

most likely ‘no’. That is why the Air Force needs to reevaluate and change how it trains, equips,

and organizes its advisory force.

Literature Review Conclusion

Air advisors are a great asset to the Air Force, Department of Defense, Department of

State, and the Partner Nations they service. As the state of global security is changing, air

11
advisors must adapt. The Air Force needs to recognize that being proactive, rather than reactive,

in this area will save lives. The way the advisor forces are currently designed within the Air

Force needs to change to accommodate the global shifts. The U.S. will not be able to fight the

next major war alone and it will need to rely on allied and partner nations. To achieve victory

during the conflict, the U.S. will have to work by, with, and through their partners and the air

advisor corps is not quite ready to do so. This research is intended to identify how a

reorganization of the air advisor establishment will result in a more prepared and capable force to

operate appropriately in a contested environment.

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 Chapter 3: Methodology

Air advisors are brought into the MSAS after proceeding through a selective hiring

process. Once they arrive, they are required to attend many months of training to make them a

qualified air advisor. The training they attend was deliberately designed for them and has largely

met the needs of the job. However, times have changed, and environments have evolved.

Because of that, the security cooperation and SFA enterprise is a hot topic within the Department

of Defense, and air advisor units are under a microscope. After many first-hand experiences

from MSAS engagements and watching the state of the world, some individuals in the 818

MSAS started trying to think ahead of the curve and asking themselves bigger questions.

Questions such as: “Air advisors are currently employed in a ‘left-of-bang’ setting, but what

happens when the ‘bang’ occurs?”, and “What can be done to better prepare air advisors to

operate effectively in the changing environment?” These questions provided the fuel for this

project and the development of the new deployment concept, as well as identified specific

training improvements to adjust the antiquated training regimen in existence.

As with any other industry, history provides significant lessons learned for future

planning. The wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq documented a vast number of stories of

success and failures within the military advisor community. When looking even further back,

many historical events indicate the existence of advising operations and the effect it has had on

shaping the outcomes of a conflict, a military, and a nation. Much of the literature discovered

about the collective military advisor enterprise during research efforts touches many areas of the

subject, but none appear to address the specific questions relating to ‘what comes next?’ The

desire is to institute changes in how air advisors are equipped, organized, trained, and utilized

within the Air Force and the Department of Defense. A variety of information collection

13
methodologies have taken place to support the objective of driving an institutional change and

the effort has spanned across the past eight months, approximately. Many internal conversations,

planning sessions, and qualitative research have been conducted to devise an employment theory,

acquire appropriate resources, create a conceptual plan, and build a program to test the concept.

Since it is impossible to predict the future, air advisors writ large can only prepare

themselves for a potential conflict that no one wants. Preparedness is the best way to be

successful when faced with a problematic situation. Air advisor teams can play a critical role in

a conflict if they are used properly. To ensure they can contribute to theater campaign plans

safely and successfully, an effort to modernize the enterprise through already available training

and methods of employment is needed.

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 Chapter 4: Project Presentation

Over the past ten to fifteen years, the U.S. military has established several advisory units

across several of the services with the specific objective of conducting SFA activities. Although

all branches of the military can be and are tasked with conducting these operations, the Army, Air

Force, and Marine Corps have created dedicated forces. Advisory operations have historically

been a task that was executed by Special Operations Forces, but that has all changed due to the

limited number of Special Forces personnel and the increase in demand. The Army created the

Security Force Assistance Command which houses Security Force Assistance Battalions, the

Marine Corps established Marine Corps Advisor Companies, and the Air Force has the two

MSASs. For many years, the Air Force had the 6th Special Operations Squadron (SOS) that

conducted most of the Security Cooperation efforts for the Air Force, but they were disbanded in

recent years. Now that the MSASs are the primary SFA arm of the Air Force, significant focus

will be put on how they function.

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 White Paper for Air Mobility Command of the U.S. Air Force

U.S. Air Force Air Advisor Realignment to Better Support the Security Force Assistance

Enterprise

Christopher Turner

September 2023

16
 Executive Summary

This white paper was completed to advocate for the implementation of changes to air advisor
training requirements and how teams are deployed to improve their support to the security force
assistance enterprise. In addition, it proposes the establishment of a Joint Security Force
Assistance Command that alleviates the responsibility of owning service branches owning
advisory units and places all advisory units within the same command.

All of the training requirements currently in place for air advisors are efficient and effective for
the needs of the mission they conduct as it exists in an uncontested environment where building
partnership capacity is the primary objective. However, an uncontested environment is unlikely
to exist forever and air advisors may find themselves in a combat or contested environment,
while the mission changes to working by, with, and through a partner nation. To remain effective
in this new environment, additional training will be required to properly prepare air advisors.

In addition to training, the deployment method of building a team to suit the needs of the mission
that is currently being utilized by air advisor units will not suffice in a wartime environment.
These uniquely trained airmen are capable of playing a significant role in strategic theater
campaign plans if utilized appropriately. A new team construct and a hub-spoke-node
deployment concept have been devised to support operations during a conflict.

Furthermore, the creation of a Joint Security Force Assistance Command that maintains
ownership and tasking authority over all military advisory forces, would foster better joint force
integration and reduce inter-command and interagency bureaucracy when advisors are tasked.
Air Force leadership within Air Mobility Command and Headquarters, Air Force are properly
positioned to advocate for this construct.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Purpose

This paper is intended to provide detailed information about desired changes within the air
advisor units to various layers of Air Force leadership, Air Mobility Command, and
Headquarters, Air Force. With proper adjustments to training, air advisors will be better
positioned to face the pacing threats of near-peer adversaries and operate effectively in a conflict
environment.

Air Force leaders will have a consolidated product that highlights proposed changes that
deliberately address the shifting global security environment. Reactive changes put air advisors
behind the curve in the event they need to be utilized during a conflict. A proactive effort to
make the adjustments early will reduce the lag time of deployment and mission execution.

Recommended changes to training, organizational structure, and deployment method are

identified as follows:

• Recommended Training Improvements

• Foreign Weapons
• Landing Zone and Drop Zone
• Air Assault and Pathfinder
• Ground Combat Skills
• Psychological Preparedness
• Air Advisor Team Construct
• Current Deployment Structure
• Combined Aviation Support Team
• New Deployment Concept
• Air Advisors in Conflict
• Hub-Spoke-Node
• Joint Security Force Assistance Command

1.2 Background

Since 2011, the Air Force has relied on the two Mobility Support Advisory Squadrons to be the
execution arm of its security force assistance and security cooperation efforts. Dating back to
1776, the U.S. has relied on allies and partnerships to be successful in war. Although the world
has changed significantly since then, the basic concept of having allies and building partnerships
has not. Air advisors are charged with building partnerships and assisting with building their
capacity to address common interests that align with national security objectives.

The MSASs are fortunate to be equipped with various specialties and backgrounds, but it poses a
problem when faced with a combat environment. The way air advisors were trained and
equipped over the past twelve years has worked well for conducting their primary mission set of
BPC. As the SFA enterprise is faced with a greater risk of operating under combat conditions, it
drives the need for an institutional change in the training and equipping of air advisors. The air

18
advisor program is effective at building partnerships and building partnership capacity but needs
improvement to address the growing changes around the world.

1.3 Current Training Pipeline

The current training program for air advisors effectively enables them to work with partner
nations and assist with building partner capacity. Without the focused training pipeline required
for air advisors, they would be much less effective at carrying out their mission set. AMC
designed a mandatory training pipeline for air advisors that aims to make them the most capable
advisors in the Department of Defense (DoD). Although the 818 and 571 have some differences
in their respective training programs, they have similar criteria to meet to satisfy AMC
requirements. Each air advisor is required to attend the 25-day Initial Qualification Course
(IQC) which is designed to train them to operate in uncertain environments and with a partner
nation. In addition, they are trained in foreign language skills and are required to maintain an
elementary-level proficiency. For example, air advisors in the 818th MSAS are required to
attend a 14-week French school that is conducted by the Defense Language Institute, and then
attend 80 hours of instructor-led sustainment training throughout the year. The last part of the
qualification pipeline consists of completing an approved instructor course.

1.4 Current Operational Structure

From an operational standpoint, the MSASs contain about 65-70 air advisors that come from
about 30 different Air Force specialties in each squadron. Air advisor teams commonly consist
of 5-10 members, and they deploy for short periods that range from three days to six weeks. It is
not uncommon for an MSAS air advisor to deploy up to four times a year because of the
relatively short duration of the engagements for which they deploy. In most locations the air
advisors travel to, they are isolated from most U.S. support infrastructure like large military
bases. The teams coordinate necessary support through the respective U.S. Embassy and stay in
hotels in the area near where they will be working.

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2 Recommended Training Improvements

All businesses, processes, or products always have areas that can be improved. Military units are
no different. In this case, several areas of training could be improved for air advisors. Since air
advisors are primarily designed to operate in an environment that is uncontested by another
enemy of force. In this type of environment, communications systems like radios or cellular
phones work without outside interference, global positioning systems can send and retrieve data,
and the team has freedom of movement with minimal restrictions. When a conflict occurs, those
luxuries are going to quickly be taken away because attacking an adversary’s communication
system is strategically valuable.

Within the past twenty years, the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq showcased the importance of
joint force integration within the U.S. military services. The wars also highlighted the
importance of troops being capable of doing tasks that were traditionally outside of the scope of
their job. For example, training and utilizing administrative or supply troops to supplement air
base security manpower or training heavy equipment operators to fuel aircraft. The Air Force
calls this the Multi-Capable Airmen (MCA) concept. As the name of the concept indicates, it
provides training and equipment to troops so they can perform a multitude of tasks, including
those that may be non-traditional.

The MCA concept is of strategic importance to the Air Force and the other military branches. It
is no secret that the U.S. military is struggling to obtain the appropriate number of recruits into
the service to maintain their desired readiness levels. With a lower number of recruits and a
growing risk of large-scale conflict, military services need to be able to execute the same
responsibilities with fewer resources. On a smaller scale, this is an important concept for air
advisors as well. While air advisor teams are comprised of a small number of advisors, they are
often constructed of mixed specialties. It is not uncommon for a team to be comprised of six
members and four different job specialties. In some cases, this creates the opportunity for the
different specialties to complement each other but also creates gaps in skills and capabilities. To
meet a level of versatility that allows air advisors to be functional in the uncontested and
permissive environment, as well as the contested and non-permissive environment, they need to
improve the established training regimen.

To meet the demands of the changing environment, additional training would need to be
implemented. Specifically, training in the following areas will greatly improve an air advisor’s
capabilities in conflict.

Ideal training improvements are:

• Foreign Weapons Training

• Landing Zone and Drop Zone Controller
• Air Assault and Pathfinder Schools
• Ground Combat Skills
• Psychological Preparation

2.1 Foreign Weapons Training

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Air advisors have a robust training program established, but it was not designed to properly
prepare them for a conflict or fill the gaps created by the different specialties being on a team
together. For air advisors to be truly versatile and effective MCA, there is a need for additional
training to be standardized. One piece of training that should be implemented into the program
as a requirement across the enterprise is foreign weapons.

Most job specialties in the Air Force are not trained to operate foreign weapon systems, such as
the AK-47 or G3 assault rifles. The AK-47, among other Soviet-Bloc weapon systems, is a
highly proliferated and re-manufactured weapon system that is available and present in many
locations around the world. It is not uncommon for air advisors to be in a partner nation and for
AK-47s and other Soviet-Bloc arms to be the primary weapon systems used by the local forces.
Since air advisors work closely with the partner nation forces and do not have support
infrastructure from the U.S. readily available, they should know how to operate the weapon
systems used by the partner force.

If conflict were to occur and the advisor team needed to be able to defend themselves, they
should be equipped with the knowledge to do so. Ultimately, the goal of this aspect of training is
to create a more capable force, regardless of their specialty. Air advisors are in the profession of
arms and need to be capable and ready to employ weapons against hostile forces if necessary.
Without knowledge of the readily available weapons, air advisors would be left defenseless.

The 818th MSAS has found an ideal training solution that it has implemented within its training
program for air advisors. This organization established a relationship with the John F. Kennedy
Special Warfare Center and arranged for air advisors to attend their Security Force Assistance
Foreign Weapons Course. This course instructs air advisors and other students to operate and
maintain a variety of non-standard weapon systems. Not only does the training educate air
advisors on weapon systems they are not familiar with, but they may also need to assist the
partner nation forces with their equipment. Being equipped with the knowledge also adds
credibility to their position as an advisor, as well as providing the basic knowledge foundation
for a member of the armed forces to be able to utilize a weapon if needed.

Implementing this type of training as a standardized requirement significantly increases the air
advisor’s capabilities and works toward the Air Force’s MCA concept.

2.2 Landing Zone and Drop Zone Controller

The next aspect of training that should be implemented and required for the air advisor enterprise
is certifying at least fifty percent of each unit as a landing zone or a drop zone controller. This
type of training is available through various channels but is often only given to a select handful
of specialties within the Air Force. Receiving this type of training is extremely valuable to air
advisors, the Air Force, and other service branches because it contributes directly to strategic
operational plans.

As previously mentioned, part of an air advisor’s job is to build partnerships with the partner
nation, which leads to securing strategic access to additional airfields in a particular theater.

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Strategically, this is important because it increases the number of locations that U.S. aircraft can
utilize to project airpower, insert ground forces, or establish a foothold. Air advisors work as the
link between the partner nation and U.S. forces.

When thinking about a small team of air advisors being deployed to a partner nation's air base in
a remote location, they are strategically positioned to assist with the projection of U.S. military
power. To land an aircraft and unload all its cargo is time-consuming. Furthermore, if the
airfield cannot support a U.S. mobility aircraft landing there, conducting an airdrop is likely the
best way to insert ground forces, weapons, or supplies.

When a conflict initiates, air advisor teams could be deployed to the partner nations they have
built a relationship with over many engagements. As they are at those locations, they may be
required to determine the suitability of an airfield. It is because of this potential of leveraging
strategic relationships and identifying viable locations to project U.S. military power that it is
recommended that the air advisor program have adequate advocacy and representation during
theater campaign planning.

Being able to open an aerial port in the form of a landing or drop zone for cargo aircraft to make
drops opens critical supply lines and an avenue for troop insertion and reinforcement.
Regardless of the existence of an airfield that could support an aircraft like a C-130, an air
advisor on the ground with the partner nation can leverage their relationship to utilize the space
to advance U.S. objectives. In conflict, the aircraft could easily drop in artillery or air defense
systems to launch indirect fire attacks on enemy positions, defend a space like an airfield, or
deny airspace activity for the enemy.

For air advisors operating within a partner nation’s airfield and other locations, such as the
deserts of Southwest Asia, jungles of South America, or small islands in the Pacific, this
capability is very valuable. It supports strategic theater plans because it assists the Air Force
with being agile, forces the enemy to keep working to determine where aircraft are being
launched from, and broadens the enemy’s battlefield by creating more targets.

2.3 Air Assault and Pathfinder Schools

Much like the MCA concept, another concept the Air Force has started working into strategy is
Agile Combat Employment (ACE). The idea of ACE is that it allows U.S. forces to travel lightly
and to have the ability to move from one location to another easily. The intent is that by the time
the enemy determines the location of the force, they can move on to another airfield to conduct
operations. The agility of the force leads to their lethality and causes the enemy to expend more
time and resources to locate and attack a location.

An effective way to remain agile is with rotary-wing aircraft to move personnel and materials
from place to place. One way this skill set can easily be achieved for air advisors is through the
Army’s Air Assault and Pathfinder schools. Air Assault School instructs students on rotary-wing
operations, their troop and cargo transport capabilities, establishing basic helicopter landing
zones, troop insertion and extraction techniques, and sling-load operations where students learn
to rig up cargo loads and safely hook them up to a helicopter. Pathfinder is somewhat of a

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follow-on training to air assault that focuses largely on sling-load operations and creating
helicopter landing zones for multiple aircraft at once. These are training courses that would be
extremely valuable for air advisors to have because of their isolated and dispersed location.

The right training already exists, so the Air Force would not have to create anything new to fill
the void. Instead, better integration between the Air Force and Army for these training courses
needs to occur. Air advisors and other Air Force members typically contact the respective school
directly to try and obtain allocations for whatever course they want to attend. Most airmen do
not get priority to attend unless it is a requirement for them and that is where another change
needs to occur to ensure they can easily get the training they need. The solution lies within the
coordination between the two services to make attendance easier.

2.4 Ground Combat Skills

The next area of focus regarding training shortfalls is the Air Advisor IQC. While this training
covers topics of basic ground combat skills and cross-cultural communications, it could use
significant improvement as the potential for operations in a contested environment is on the rise.
Ground combat skills and training are foundational for some specialties like Security Forces in
the Air Force, but not for others. When faced with operating in austere and contested
environments, they will be better prepared to handle such a scenario due to their professional
background and more extensive training. For the other specialties that are far less experienced
with ground combat training, IQC may not be enough. The training that IQC provides lightly
scratches the surface and allows for a basic familiarization of combat skills, but it is not allocated
enough time to be very thorough. However, the training is not intended to make individual air
advisors an expert in combat operations. Given the time that IQC has allotted for training, the
course facilitates a basic level of training for air advisors, and it meets the needs of those who are
less experienced in the subject.

Considering the potential environment that air advisors could potentially find themselves
working in, the IQC could afford to have some changes injected into the material. This is
another situation where the Air Force could pull another lesson from the Army and implement
some of the same aspects of training. The Army’s CATC is their version of the Air Advisor IQC,
and all Army personnel must attend and graduate from the course to be certified as an advisor.
The Army’s training is longer and seems to put more emphasis on the fieldcraft of ground
combat than the Air Advisor IQC does. Comparatively, these differences can likely be aligned
with each of the service’s traditional roles where the Army is out in the field conducting ground
combat operations and the Air Force is in the rear support areas to support airbase operations.
With the push toward joint force integration and each of the military branches working outside of
their traditional roles and stepping into the lanes of others, the training the members receive for
similar positions should be relatively the same. It is recommended that more air advisors attend
CATC to strengthen their fieldcraft and combat skills.

This is an effort that has recently broken ground. During the time of this project being
developed, the 818th MSAS sent one of their air advisors to CATC to become the first airman to
ever attend. The objective of their attendance is to compare training courses, foster Joint Force
interoperability, strengthen the overall SFA enterprise, and exchange practices with their Army

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counterparts. In addition to the MSAS advisor attending, a member from the unit that is the host
of IQC will be in attendance to compare curriculums and see where improvements can be made
for the Air Force. The plan is to send additional air advisors to CATC throughout the coming
years. The initiative for this is a big step forward for the two services and will hopefully lead to
a future of strong interoperability and, potentially, lay the foundation for a Joint Security Force
Assistance Command. It is recommended that air advisors continue to attend this type of course,
as well as other ground combat skills training because it greatly aids in the individual’s ability to
operate under hostile conditions.

2.5 Psychological Preparation

Additional focus and training needs to be put in place to address the psychological conditioning
of air advisors who derive from specialties with little combat experience to create a paradigm
shift and adjust their mindset to mentally prepare them for operations in austere and contested
environments for extended periods and potentially engage with an armed enemy. The path to
adjusting their mindset lies with attending additional combat readiness training and scenario-
based exercises.

This aspect is extremely important to ensure an individual’s readiness, resolve, and resiliency to
face such conditions. It is easy for someone to point a finger at a training regimen and place
blame on it for not properly preparing a trainee. This is not restricted to the military but travels
across all spectrum of duty. Whether it is police or fire services, warehouse operations, or an
office setting. Sometimes, the training itself is not the problem but it is the individual.
Ultimately, it goes beyond the trained skills and dives further into the psychological aspects of
the human brain. A person could have one million dollars of training invested into them, but if
they do not take it seriously and simply run through the motions, they will not be properly
prepared for the event horizon to occur. Airmen, just like soldiers, sailors, and marines, are in
the profession of arms and their first and foremost duty is to defend the United States from all
enemies. If they are not properly trained or psychologically prepared, they will struggle, or even
fail, to uphold their duties and win the fight.

Regardless of what specialty or position a member of the armed forces is in, they must be
prepared to answer the nation’s call to go into combat with an armed enemy and be capable of
utilizing standard small arms weapon systems. While the military is comprised of people who
come from all types of different backgrounds, ethical values, and religious beliefs, each branch
of the military has historically been effective at reforming individuals by building them up from
a standardized foundation. Much of the formative training takes place in basic training where
members learn a multitude of initial skills that will prepare them for service. One of the things
basic training does for everyone is teach them how to conduct basic weapon cleaning and
maintenance and a rifle qualification. Anyone can look at this training on the surface and simply
think that it makes sense because it is the military. This seemingly basic task goes much deeper
than the surface-level optics. While it is a foundational skill of any military member, it is also
used to start injecting small changes into the member’s psychology by preparing them to utilize a
firearm and shoot at an enemy. The standard targets used by the military are silhouettes shaped
like adult humans. Psychologically, this dehumanizes the enemy and forces the shooter to see
the enemy as a target, rather than another human life. Some people refuse to even take the life of

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an animal, but most people are naturally averse to taking the life of another human being. This
type of psychological change has developed a name known as killology. The term was devised
by former Army Ranger Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman as a scientific exploration into
understanding the psychological and physiological effects of killing in war. (Hastings, n.d.)

During the Second World War, General Samuel (S.L.A.) Marshall noted in his book “Men
Against Fire” in 1947 that between approximately fifteen and twenty-five percent of infantrymen
fired their weapons at the enemy in combat. (F.D.G. Williams, 1999) It is assumed the quite low
number demonstrated is not due to cowardice, but rather due to troops not wanting to kill another
human. Despite the negative attention his insinuation that only a quarter of troops fired their
weapons in combat has received in the decades since the war ended, it appears to have been
influential in how the U.S. military trains troops over time. As the Army found itself engaged in
combat during the Korean War, the changes that occurred in how troops were trained and
advancements in weaponry caused the estimated number of troops that fired their weapons to
increase to approximately fifty percent. As changes continued, years later in Vietnam, it is
estimated that approximately ninety percent of soldiers were firing their weapons.

Some of the increase in trigger-pulling can be attributed to the advancements in weapons, tactics,
and communication systems. Other areas of the increase are likely the result of the training
provided to troops. War is an unfortunate feature of humanity. The beneficial side-effect of
conflict is the data and experience gained by the militaries and personnel involved. As lessons
were learned in war, the military took that information in and reshaped how they trained troops
to fight. Built like a mathematical equation, the objective was to increase the efficiency and
effectiveness of those engaged in combat, and ultimately, kill the enemy and win. Part of that
training is through forms of psychological conditioning that desensitizes troops to the horrid
violence required to willfully take another human’s life.

The general Army infantryman is far different than the general airman. Even for the larger
number of airmen who work in supporting roles and do not fly, their roles within the military
come with vast differences in training and duties during a war than those in the Army infantry.
Those facts are not under question or contest. The role of an air advisor is unique, however, and
it sits in somewhat of a gray area of the Air Force on the fringes of existence. Air advisors are
somewhat treated like the odd thing in the corner that the Air Force does not quite know how to
utilize in the most effective way possible. Each air advisor derives from a core specialty, such as
a Civil Engineer, medic, or aircraft mechanic. The diverse professional backgrounds are what
contribute to one of the greatest aspects of air advisors, but they also contribute to one of the
biggest shortcomings.

The difference in professional background comes with different types and levels of training, as
well as various levels of psychological conditioning to engage in combat and kill an enemy. For
example, Security Forces airmen are organized, trained, and equipped much like the Army.
Security Forces is derived from the old U.S. Army Air Force Military Police. They are trained to
work as a police and security element for Air Force bases and assets, so they have always been
provided training in line with policing and law enforcement. During the Vietnam War, Air Force
Security Police (former title of Security Forces) found themselves in need of better training for
the wartime environment since they were being faced with ground combat against the Vietcong

25
and North Vietnamese Army. It was determined that they would receive training in light infantry
tactics from the Army. Since then, light infantry training has been institutional in the Security
Forces training programs. Because of this, they come from a background that is flush with
training airmen to engage in combat and be mentally prepared for it. This background differs
significantly from other specialties, such as logistics, where their profession focuses its training
on material acquisitions, warehouse operations, issuing equipment, and supply chain
management. They generally receive a basic level of ground combat training through basic
training and pre-deployment training requirements, but it is not institutionally foundational to
their specialty as it is with Security Forces troops.

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3 Air Advisor Team Construct

How air advisor teams are constructed and deployed has been effective at handling current signal
demand and type of operations, however, it is unlikely it will be successful in the future. A
significant overhaul to this area will be required to meet the operational needs of air advisors in a
contested environment.

3.1 Current Deployment Structure

It was previously mentioned that air advisor teams currently deploy in a build-to-suit manner. In
this format, the request for training or support is made from the partner nation to the respective
U.S. Embassy. The Embassy compares requests to determine what the U.S. will be able to
support. Once the determination is made regarding what training or support the U.S. will
provide, the Embassy submits the requests to the respective U.S. military branch in search of a
force provider. After the Air Force receives the requests, they disseminate taskings to specific
units, such as the MSAS. The individual unit receives the requirements of the service request
and then builds the team based on the information they are presented with. There are times when
the partner nation does not know what it needs. For example, if the partner nation requests
aircraft maintenance training, the team will be comprised of aircraft maintenance technicians, but
might also have a logistics member who would be responsible for conducting an additional
assessment to determine how the partner nation receives parts and equipment to service the
aircraft appropriately. There are times when the team conducts maintenance training but
determines there are other problems that need to be addressed as well. This deployment
construct works well for operations in uncontested environments when the mission is largely
BPC.

The difference in specialties that air advisors bring to units like the MSASs allows for them to
build teams specifically suited for each mission they are tasked with. Being able to construct a
team in a ‘build-to-suit’ type of methodology provides the opportunity to target the specific
needs of a partner nation and provide training and assistance in the most effective way possible.
The advisor team can reduce unnecessary training and white space in an engagement by focusing
on the exact support request from the partner nation. It is an efficient way to conduct business in
a steady-state, uncontested environment with a partner nation military supported by a relatively
stable government. Since creating the MSASs in 2011 and the air advisor teams in Germany and
Guam, they have postured themselves around that operational construct.

Looking ahead, the build-to-suit construct should still be utilized when tasked to conduct
standard BPC engagements. However, the respective air advisor units should be able to adjust
how they deploy their forces for operations that are approaching the contested environment. In
that type of setting, the build-to-suit aspect would not necessarily be the best option for force
deployment. Instead, that construct should be pre-determined to allow the air advisor team to
deploy specific capability packages to a partner nation where BPC engagements have been
conducted for years and the Air Force has built an enduring relationship. When looking at large-
scale conventional warfare, air dominance is one of the most important aspects of warfare. If a
force can achieve air dominance, they are provided freedom of movement for troop
reinforcements, resupply, and air support to drop munitions on enemy positions.

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Wars and past conflicts provide great examples and lessons about the importance of air
superiority. During the Gulf War, the U.S. quickly achieved air superiority over Iraq. Some of
the speed was likely due to having more advanced weaponry than what the Iraqi military had at
its disposal. Once the U.S. owned the sky, they could attack Iraq’s defenses to incapacitate them
before the ground forces reached them. Air superiority also provides ample opportunity for
aircraft to conduct reconnaissance at will and provide the most up-to-date information to military
leaders as they plan operations.

As air advisor units look toward being better prepared to be successful in a contested area,
having established advisor ‘packages’ will be more effective. The packages should be
preemptively designed to deliver specific capabilities. The Air Force already does something
similar with how they deploy other forces for any other deployment. Depending on what the
required task is, the Air Force will send specific specialties to support it. As an example, if the
U.S. wanted to posture advisors at various airfields within partner nations across a region in
anticipation of a conflict, they could utilize collected data from previous after-action reports
regarding those airfields to determine what capabilities the partner nation has and what type of
aircraft the airfield could support. If the partner nation has a robust security force and a refueling
capability but cannot load or unload cargo from an aircraft, the Air Force could deploy a team of
air advisors that can help train and assist the partner in acquiring that capability.

3.2 Combined Aviation Support Team

How air advisors are tasked and deployed needs to be changed to offer capability sets, rather than
solely a build-to-suit option. This concept of package development is where there is room for
significant change to allow air advisor teams to be postured appropriately to handle a new
deployment method. In addition to how the teams are constructed, the command and control of
the teams will require a change to meet the demands of the environment. The new concept is
built so that instead of the entire air advisor team deploying together to only operate out of one
location, the teams could break apart and operate in separate locations if needed.

To meet the demands of a new deployment method, it is suggested to implement the Combined
Aviation Support Team (CAST) construct. The CAST comes in several different variations, and
they are designated as Alpha, Bravo, Mike, and Juliet with a Leadership Element. The naming
convention of each team would go as CAST-A, CAST-B, CAST-LE, etc. Each CAST is
designed with a different capability set that enables them to better support the partner nation
forces, especially as the team may be split up and dispersed to multiple locations. Ideally, the
dispersion is going to complement the capability of the partner nation force at the individual
locations and enable other U.S. forces to work by, with, and through the partner nation.

3.2.1 CAST-D

Although there is mostly an order to the naming convention, they are out of order when looking
at the entire construct from the top down. When viewed in a way that evaluates the designed
capability, the CAST-Director (CAST-D) element is at the top. In this new deployment
capability, the CAST-D will be an air advisor liaison who is an experienced air advisor in the
grade of a Major or Lieutenant Colonel. Their trade specialty in the Air Force is not necessarily

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critical to this position, but their expertise as an advisor is. The purpose of this position is
slightly different than the other CAST elements in the sense that they are not attached to the rest
of the team during the deployment. When the team deploys to the partner nation, the designated
CAST-D will deploy to the respective Area Operations Center (AOC) that is responsible for all
command-and-control efforts within the theater and provide direction to the staff regarding air
advisor operations.

The CAST-D will be responsible for keeping track of what partner nation airfields are available
for use and what capabilities the partner can offer at each of the locations. They would be
responsible for collecting the information sent up from the advisor teams and communicating the
data with strategic planners so they can have a better operational picture. This could function
similarly to something like a stoplight chart. If the airfield is marked as green, U.S. and allied
aircraft could land there and possibly use partner nation services if needed. If it is yellow, there
is limited support and red would mean it is completely unavailable. The airfield could be
unavailable because it is in disrepair or has been struck by enemy forces. The data collected
from each location that is sent up will also include additional information about the available
assets, support, and services the partner nation can provide and what they would be willing to use
in support of U.S. efforts. It becomes an integral role in planning because the advisor teams
create access points and unlock additional resources through the partner nation.

3.2.2 CAST-LE

The next team in the lineup is the CAST Leadership Element (CAST-LE, pronounced as
‘castle’). The CAST-LE is the mission commander and team leader assigned to the air advisor
team. The mission commander or team leader is an air advisor with a significant amount of

29
experience from having already completed several missions. They have the responsibility of
coordinating and planning all aspects of the mission for the team with the U.S. Embassy and
theater command organizations and overseeing the day-to-day mission operations. Additionally,
this element is tasked with being the primary member that conducts Key Leader Engagements
(KLE) with the partner nation leadership. The partner nation leaders this member communicates
with is often a base commander or the equivalent to a Wing commander, but sometimes includes
generals who are regional forces commanders, or even their Air Force Chief of Staff. The air
advisor mission commander or team leader carries with them the aptitude and astuteness to
engage with leadership at all levels as they work to help shape the future of the partner nation’s
Air Force and their contributions to the security of their state and region. The mission
commander and team leader have always held a critical position in the air advisor team for BPC
engagements because of their responsibilities which means they are generally less involved in
the hands-on training with the partner nation’s forces, and they operate in more of a leadership
role.

In this construct, there is not much of a significant change to that aspect of the position.
However, their role becomes more important because they are now the linchpin to unlocking
access to the partner nation. Since they have the unique position to frequently engage with the
leadership of the partner nation, they leverage they will work through their established
relationship to determine what, if any, resources and assets they will support the U.S. efforts
with. This does not necessarily mean they are asking the partner nation's military leader to
commit ground troops or fighter jets to the conflict. It could be a much smaller scale of allowing
a U.S. aircraft to land and use an airfield, store some supplies, or do maintenance on an aircraft
that was damaged. Even small contributions are important for the U.S. to project its airpower
more efficiently. Once the CAST-LE has determined the amount of accessibility the U.S. has
and understands any airfield viabilities, they would communicate that information back to the
CAST-D so they can provide accurate information to the operations planning.

Up until this point, the CAST-D and LE positions have been filled with air advisors who are
experienced, but their core Air Force specialty has not mattered. The positions could be
interchangeable with other certified team leaders or mission commanders with comparable
experience. When looking at the rest of the teams below the CAST-LE, each package will be
constructed with specific specialties that are built to advise and assist a partner nation’s
comparable capabilities. As an example, if the partner nation has a robust personnel recovery
program, the air advisor team would not need to bring a recovery specialist with them. Instead, a
team would be deployed to help build up the partner’s capabilities while simultaneously being on
the ground to oversee any specialty-related activities with U.S. operations.

3.2.3 CAST-A

The first team is designated as CAST-A, and it is designed to support airfield operations. A large
part of their duties will be to assess the capabilities of existing partner nation airfields, support
services, and foreign security forces. After the CAST-A and CAST-LE arrive at the initial
location in the partner nation, the CAST-A would be dispersed to additional locations to assess
local capabilities. The team is composed of six Air Force specialties that are required to conduct
basic operations on an air base. A typical CAST-A would be comprised of Aerial Port

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Operations, Air Traffic Control, Tactical Communications, Security Forces, Civil Engineering,
and Airfield Management specialties. With these specialties deliberately assigned to the team,
they can work by, with, and through a partner nation’s forces and expand the number of viable
airfields for the U.S. to utilize in conflict. These specialties can work with the local forces to
conduct basic air base operations while simultaneously training and advising the partners and
strengthening their skills.

3.2.4 CAST-B

Next, the CAST-B is designed with operational support specialties that are often working behind
the scenes to support air operations from the ground. Although they do not exactly put their
hands on aircraft to generate sorties, their specialties are no less important. CAST-B is
constructed with an Aeromedical Evacuation technician, Command and Control Specialist,
Tactical Communications, Intelligence support, Survival specialists, Supply and Logistics, and a
Weather technician. This team is designed to integrate the partner nation’s aviation support
functions into bilateral and combined air strategies. For example, if the partner nation has a
robust aircraft maintenance program, but struggles with obtaining the equipment, parts, pieces,
and tools to effectively do their job, the Supply and Logistics specialist air advisor could assist
with helping to identify the problems of the partner’s supply chain and materiel management and
help make improvements to allow improved maintenance operations. It is a basic concept that if
the aircraft maintenance team cannot acquire the materials necessary to conduct repairs, the
aircraft will not be able to continue flying.

3.2.5 CAST-M

Next is a mobility aviation team known as a CAST-M. A CAST-M is specifically designed to

assess the capability and capacity of the partner nation’s aviation program and advise their
counterparts from the partner nation. The team specialties included in the CAST-M are a
Mobility Pilot, an Aircraft Systems Operator, a Loadmaster, and an Aircraft Maintenance
technician. This team will be used to integrate with the partner nation’s forces to plan and
conduct mobility air operations, complete airworthiness assessments of partner nation aircraft,
and conduct flight training as necessary. Just as with any other CAST element, the demand and
need to deploy this capability package is dependent on the current capabilities of the partner
nation and the members of the team could be reassigned to support other elements such as
CAST-A or B.

3.2.6 Custom CAST

Additional CAST elements may be created to build specific packages. For example, a CAST-C
could be quickly constructed to accommodate a communications-centric package or a CAST-I to
generate an intelligence support capability. To some extent, this mimics the current build-to-suit
construct. The CAST element will be comprised of mixed specialties based on the needs of the
specific location.

3.2.7 Combined Access Node Viability Assessment

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The airfield assessment checklist each of the teams would use at a location is called the
Combined Access Node Viability Assessment (CANVAs). This is how the air advisor teams
would collect data about the partner nation’s airfield, available assets, capabilities, and location
viability to communicate to the CAST-D for influencing strategic planning operations within the
theater. The CANVAs is an important tool for the CAST element because they contain a variety
of criteria that record data about the runway and aircraft parking areas, base and airfield security,
base infrastructure, medical support, etc. It is intended to paint a picture for the operational
planners to help them make informed decisions so they are aware of what any other U.S. forces
would have at their disposal upon arrival.

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4 New Deployment Concept

Since 2011, AMC air advisors have generally been deployed to partner nations that are in an
uncontested environment in a build-to-suit format. It is unrealistic for anyone to think that the
operational environment will remain the same in the coming years. At some point, the U.S. will
be drawn into another war. In the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military was
primarily engaged in conflict with a hostile guerilla force rather than a state-run uniformed force.
The next conflict could very likely consist of traditional warfare The current deployment
structure of air advisors is not equipped properly to support theater campaign objectives in an
environment of conflict.

4.1 Air Advisors in Conflict

As the global environment is shifting and near-peer competitors are challenging the United States
as the dominant world power, the U.S. is at a critical moment. The near-peer nations of China
and Russia are testing the boundaries of U.S. military prowess and the commitment to its allies
and partners. In places like Africa, they intentionally work to undermine American relationships
and efforts by providing African governments with economic assistance, infrastructure, and
military training. The U.S. strives to be the partner of choice for most nations, including those in
Africa. However, being the partner of choice becomes difficult when military equipment,
training, and economic aid are difficult or too expensive to obtain promptly. Another aspect that
makes it easy for China and Russia to undermine the U.S. in these types of places is that they are
less restrictive regarding societal ethical problems, such as human rights violations. The U.S.
will limit what it offers to a partner nation in such scenarios, but China and Russia may not.

With where things stand now, it likely will not take much provocation for conflict to arise
between the U.S. and China or Russia. The U.S. is actively providing support to the country
Russia invaded and is in an ongoing war with, as well as persistently working through the
positive relationship with the Philippines and Taiwan to provide various forms of aid and
support. Air advisors are often deployed to various locations around the world and oftentimes,
they are in non-traditional deployment locations where they are isolated from most U.S. support
infrastructure. Air advisors from the 818th MSAS are frequently on the continent of Africa,
which is a place that often experiences coups. Since 2008, there have been military coups in
Burkina Faso, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Sudan. The
problem with the African coups is they undermine the U.S. efforts to support and fortify
democracy and civil stability. (Arieff and Blanchard, 2022) In addition, it interferes with the
cooperation of counterterrorism activities that the U.S. has invested an exorbitant number of
resources into. Unfortunately, sometimes those resources that are used to build the capacity of
the African country’s military enable a military to initiate a coup. It is a disappointing side effect
of the security cooperation business.

33
Most recently, Niger underwent another military coup in late July 2023 and Gabon in August
2023. The General that is claiming to be the new leader of Niger has requested security
assistance from Russia’s mercenary company, The Wagner Group. This is the perfect type of
situation that allows Russia to undermine the efforts of the U.S. in Africa. These types of events
also highlight the fact that the U.S. does not necessarily have to be engaged in direct conflict
with one of these adversaries for air advisors to find themselves in a conflict environment. A
situation like a coup could happen or they could attack another nation where air advisors are
working. The other option is that the U.S. could be drawn into a direct war with China or
Russia. Once war breaks out, any location being used to stage aircraft or equipment would be a
potential target. That is how air advisors would generally find themselves in a conflict setting.

Generally, air advisors are deployed to remote locations and isolated from most U.S. support
infrastructure. Since their primary job is to train, advise, and assist partner nation forces, their
role during a full-scale war likely would not change much because they are uniquely trained and
are more valuable in that position. Their value lies within their ability to build partnerships and
establish relationships with the partner nation. There is a saying that has come out of the 818th

34
MSAS that is “you cannot build partnership capacity without building partnerships”. The saying
indicates that without establishing and nurturing a relationship with the partner, they will not be
able to help build them up. A benefit of the two MSAS units being regionally aligned to
USSOUTHCOM and USAFRICOM, respectively, is that they can build long-standing
relationships with the partners because they have the propensity to visit the same countries and
bases multiple times. Multiple visits allow for the individual air advisor to develop friends
within the partner nation and provide the opportunity for the MSAS and the teams to get to know
the Security Cooperation Officer who works out of the respective Embassy. Starting a new
relationship can be difficult, but when a particular organization has already established that
connection and has built a reputation for itself, it makes everything else easier.

In conflict, air advisors should find themselves on the outer edges of the battlefield, not
intentionally in a space primed for direct conflict, and connect with partners to leverage
established relationships to work by, with, and through the partner. While the goal is not
necessarily to drag a partner nation into a war alongside the U.S., air advisors will be putting in
the work to gain support from the partner nation as a force multiplier that can supply some fuel,
lend an airfield to stage and launch air operations from or utilize their Navy to recover a downed
pilot in the water. Through continued engagements with the partner nation and the U.S.
Embassy’s Security Cooperation Officer, the air advisor will be able to identify what assets and
resources the partner has available. This is where working by, with, and through the partner
comes in. The U.S. would need to lean on those relationships and use its force multiplier to
allow U.S. troops to focus on the high-end fight.

4.2 Hub-Spoke-Node

As the Air Force is looking at being better prepared for a large-scale conflict, the teams will have
to operate and deploy differently. Building on top of the ACE and MCA concepts that are
currently in use, air advisor teams can deploy under the new construct to unlock additional
resources. The new concept would require teams to deploy through a hub-spoke-node concept.
In this concept, the hub is where the AOC is located which is most often geographically
separated from the area it oversees. The spoke is the primary deployed location of the air advisor
team, and the node is a satellite operating location for the team. The node is expected to only be
used when the team needs to disperse to other locations to conduct a CANVAs for an airfield or
work with partner nation forces.

The 818 and 571 MSASs recently partnered up with the Puerto Rico Air National Guard to
demonstrate this concept. Exercise Advisor Edge was created to test this theory and utilized the
Puerto Rico Air National Guard, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and other state entities
to play the role of the partner nation. The air advisor teams were deployed to Puerto Rico, which
was portrayed as a fictitious nation, and the advisors had to build relationships with several
partner entities, conduct a CANVAs and communicate the data back to the spoke, determine
partner nation capabilities, then leverage those relationships and capabilities when a conflict
occurred. The air advisor teams were able to coordinate the logistics and services they needed to
function by asking the right questions to the right people after they had established relationships
with various partner nation members. The result of the exercise surpassed the expectations of the
MSAS leadership and the planning team that designed the event.

35
While Advisor Edge was a significant success, the individuals playing the role of the partner
nation are other U.S. service members and state government entities within Puerto Rico. A true
demonstration of the capability would require utilizing a capable partner nation such as The
Philippines, Rwanda, Poland, or El Salvador. To effectively execute an exercise of such scale,
the organizational realignment of air advisor forces would need to be done at a much higher level
than the few squadrons involved. It is recommended that an exercise with similar objectives be
hosted from an AMC level and include a partner nation. However, this concept would gain the
most advocacy, benefit, and freedom of movement with an entirely new command that is strictly
designed to oversee the U.S. military’s Security Cooperation and SFA efforts.

36
5 Joint Security Force Assistance Command

Not only do the Air Force, Army, and Marines each have their designated advisory units, but they
each have separate command structures with separate tasking methods. Unfortunately, this can
lead to teams deploying to a partner nation and having overlapping training requirements with
another service’s advisors, or training with the partner nation being missed because it was
improperly assigned. Being isolated in separate entities also drives different training
requirements across the services. To alleviate and prevent many of these issues, it could be
beneficial for a Joint Security Force Assistance Command.

Military advisors within each of the respective military branches hold a niche position within the
military community. The U.S. military has developed a significant need for advisors as an
important tool at their disposal. The U.S. strives to be the partner of choice for partner nations,
but many factors play a role in maintaining the position as the partner of choice. One of those
factors is the tasking process for the engagements. The Army’s Security Force Assistance
Command has a good construct in the sense that it is commanded by a 2-star general. This level
of leadership provides the appropriate type of advocacy for higher headquarters and allows top
levels of the U.S. military and government to understand the tools they have at their disposal,
thus informing theater plans effectively to use the right tool at the right time. In a sense, the Air
Force needs to mimic this model and realign air advisors under a 2-star command with tasking
authority. It would alleviate many of the hurdles in the middle of the process. While that could
be extremely beneficial, something that would be more appropriate would be the creation of a
Joint Security Force Assistance Command.

Under this hypothetical, yet ideal, command, military advisors of all branches would be assigned
there specifically to conduct advisory operations around the globe. This command should still
have a 2-Star Commander who goes to a different branch every two years, along with the Deputy
Commander being a 1-Star who comes from a different branch. As an example, the Commander
would be a Navy Rear Admiral Upper Half (2-Star equivalent) and the Deputy Commander is an
Air Force Brigadier General. The Commander and Deputy are offset one year from each other to
allow for operational continuity as each position rotates out. The next cycle could be an Army
Brigadier General and the Deputy a Coast Guard Rear Admiral Lower Half (1-Star equivalent).
The alternating service branch of the leadership would be in line with a true joint service
organization, as well as keep a solid balance to prevent operational bias toward one branch’s
mission set.

Having all military advisors under one roof would greatly assist with tasking and deploying
mixed advisor teams. During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military got very good
at joint force integration and interoperability. However, there is always room for improvement.
In the advisory world, each of the services generally sticks to their area of expertise. Developing
a Joint Security Force Assistance Command would streamline the ability to deploy mixed
advisor teams to a partner nation and allow the advisors to better assist the partner nations with
joint force interoperability as well. This type of change could also benefit maintaining the
position as the partner of choice with many partner nations because the U.S. can operate with
more versatility.

37
 Chapter 5: Conclusion

Over the past twelve years, the general-purpose air advisors have been primarily focused

on BPC. The current trend of global activities and rhetoric being messaged indicates air advisors

need to be tasked, equipped, trained, and organized better to meet the emerging needs of the

environment. The BPC efforts that are currently taking place need to continue, but air advisors

need to be postured to respond and operate in crisis and across the full spectrum of conflict. This

creates a difficult situation because of funding and available manpower assigned to the MSAS

units. To effectively maintain the current mission set and meet the need that is growing on the

horizon, the MSASs will have to grow and adjust the manpower assigned to the units. The

specialties that are underutilized or not utilized at all could be removed to make room for high-

demand specialties. Moreover, additional funding will be needed to support better training and

equipment that is more suited for the potential environment.

Ultimately, a complete realignment of the forces into a combined or Joint Security Force

Assistance Command would be the ideal setting. This type of change would surely come with its

form of challenges, but it would allow the DoD’s SFA enterprise to be funded and trained more

appropriately to face the growing problem. In addition to better preparedness, funding, and

standardized training, the joint command environment improves operational planning for all

military advisors by placing them all in the same house and strengthening their interoperability.

air advisor teams are effective at what they do, but they can be better. They can do more when

provided with the right equipment, training, and support. A total realignment to place them

under a Major General’s command and authority, or ideally, a joint command will allow them to

be better. To reach that objective, air advisors need advocacy and support from all levels of

leadership between the MSAS Commanders, all the way up to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

38
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