[ G.R. No.

197582, June 29, 2015 ]

JULIE S. SUMBILLA, PETITIONER, VS. MATRIX FINANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
petitioner Julie S. Sumbilla seeks the liberal application of procedural rules to correct the penalty imposed in the
Decision[1] dated January 14, 2009 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati City, Branch 67, in
Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 which had already attained finality in view of petitioner’s failure to
timely file an appeal.

The antecedent facts are not disputed.

Petitioner obtained a cash loan from respondent Matrix Finance Corporation. As partial payment for her loan,
petitioner issued Philippine Business Bank Check Nos. 0032863 to 0032868. The six checks have a uniform
face value of P6,667.00 each.

Upon maturity, the six checks were presented by respondent to the drawee bank for payment. However, all the
checks were dishonored on the ground that they were drawn against a closed account.

Petitioner’s refusal to heed the demand letter of respondent for the payment of the face value of the dishonored
checks culminated in her indictment for six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22). The cases
were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174, and were raffled off to Branch 67, MeTC of Makati.

In a Decision dated January 14, 2009, the MeTC found petitioner criminally and civilly liable for the issuance of
the six rubber checks. For each count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of P6,667.00,
the MeTC meted petitioner a penalty of fine amounting to P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment. Her civil
liability for the six consolidated cases was computed in the total amount of P40,002.00. The fallo of the decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment finding accused Julie S. Sumbilla GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of six counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. For each count, she is sentenced to pay a fine of
P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment.

She is likewise ORDERED to indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of
P40,002.00 plus 12% annual legal interest from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.[2] (Emphasis and underscoring added.)

Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioner opted to file a Motion for Reconsideration [3] before the MeTC.
The Motion was denied in the Order [4] dated April 17, 2009 being a pleading barred under the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure. The MeTC further noted that the prohibited motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner will not suspend the running of the period to perfect an appeal.

Subsequently, the Notice of Appeal filed by petitioner was also denied for having been filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period.

With the denial[5] of her Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying her appeal, petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari[6] under Rule 65 of the Rules which was docketed as SCA No. 09-1125 and raffled off to Branch
61, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.

Ruling that the MeTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
petitioner, the RTC dismissed[7] the petition for certiorari. The Motion for Reconsideration [8] filed by petitioner
met the same fate of dismissal.[9]

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) via a petition for review [10] under Rule 42 of the Rules
of Court. The CA, however, ruled that an ordinary appeal under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is
the correct remedy under the circumstances because the RTC rendered the decision in the petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. [11]

On July 27, 2011, after she received a copy of the June 28, 2011 Resolution [12] of the CA denying her Motion for
Reconsideration,[13] petitioner filed a motion for extension of time to file the instant petition. [14]

On August 11, 2011, petitioner filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari [15] within the period of extension
granted in our Resolution[16] dated September 7, 2011. She ascribed to the CA a sole error:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI ON
TECHNICALITY AND NOT EXERCISING ITS POSITIVE DUTY OF GIVING DUE IMPORTANCE ON
THE SUBSTANTIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER DESPITE A CLEAR
PRESENCE OF SUCH VIOLATION OF LAW AS DEFINED BY PETITIONER IN HER PETITION WHICH
COULD HAVE MERIT A FULL DECISION BY A HIGHER COURT.[17]
Petitioner acknowledged[18] the procedural lapse of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court instead of an ordinary appeal before the CA. She also fully grasped [19] the effects of her erroneous filing of
the Motion for Reconsideration to challenge the MeTC Decision finding her guilty of six counts of violation of
BP 22. Knowing that her conviction had already attained finality, petitioner seeks the relaxation of the rules of
procedure so that the alleged erroneous penalty imposed by the MeTC can be modified to make it in accord with
existing law and jurisprudence.

Respondent countered that the right to appeal being a mere statutory privilege can only be exercised in
accordance with the rules, and the lost appeal cannot be resurrected through the present remedial recourse of a
petition for review on certiorari.

The main issue to be resolved is whether the penalty imposed in the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009,
which is already final and executory, may still be modified.

The petition is meritorious.

Petitioner does not dispute the finality of the Decision dated January 14, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 rendered by the MeTC, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation of BP 22.
For every count of violation of BP 22 involving a check with a face value of P6,667.00, petitioner was meted a
penalty of fine of P80,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment. She assails the penalty for
being out of the range of the penalty prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22, and the subsidiary imprisonment to be
violative of Administrative Circular Nos. 12-2000 and 13-2001, and the holdings in Vaca v. Court of Appeals.
[20]
Petitioner asserted that the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed against her in each count of
violation of BP 22 is double the amount of the face value of the dishonored check only or P13,334.00. The fine
of P80,000.00 for each count is thus excessive. She further implied that the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment contravened Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes imprisonment as a
punishment for not paying a debt.

Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos,
or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The court may thus impose any of the following alternative penalties against an accused found criminally liable
for violating BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; or (2) a fine of not
less or more than double the amount of the check, and shall in no case exceed P200,000.00; or (3) both such fine
and imprisonment. The discretion to impose a single (imprisonment or fine) or conjunctive (fine and
imprisonment) penalty pertains to the court.
If fine alone is the penalty imposed, the maximum shall be double the amount of the face value of the rubber
check which in no case should exceed P200,000.00.

Here, the face value of each of the six checks that bounced is P6,667.00. Under Section 1 of BP 22,
the maximum penalty of fine that can be imposed on petitioner is only P13,334.00, or the amount double the
face value of each check. Indubitably, the MeTC meted the petitioner a penalty of fine way beyond the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. The fine of P80,000.00 is more than 11 times the amount
of the face value of each check that was dishonored.

Instead of using as basis the face value of each check (P6,667.00), the MeTC incorrectly computed the amount
of fine using the total face value of the six checks (P40,002.00). The same error occurred in Abarquez v. Court
of Appeals,[21] where we modified the penalty of fine imposed in one of the consolidated cases therein (Criminal
Case No. D-8137) to only double the amount of the face value of the subject check.

Unfortunately, in the present case, the MeTC Decision is already final and executory after petitioner failed to
timely file a Notice of Appeal. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that has
acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law, and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. [22] Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its
jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. [23]

Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule. The Court has the power and
prerogative to suspend its own rules and to exempt a case from their operation if and when justice requires it.
[24]
After all, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the
rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter, [25] as
specifically mandated under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 2. Construction. – These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.
Consequently final and executory judgments were reversed when the interest of substantial justice is at stake
and where special and compelling reasons called for such actions. [26] In Barnes v. Judge Padilla,[27] we declared
as follows:
x x x a final and executory judgment can no longer be attacked by any of the parties or be modified, directly or
indirectly, even by the highest court of the land.

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case,
(d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules,
(e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not
be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself
had already declared to be final.
The judgment of conviction was already final in Rigor v. The Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison [28] when the
Court corrected the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence imposed on the accused
which exceeded the period of the imposable penalty. The correction was made in the interest of justice and only
for the penalty imposed against petitioner to be in accordance with law and nothing else. [29]

Both People v. Gatward,[30] and People v. Barro[31] cited the duty and inherent power of the Court to correct the
erroneous penalties meted on the accused in a final and executory judgments, and make it conform to the
penalty prescribed by law.

The interest of justice and the duty and inherent power of the Court were the reasons anchored upon in Estrada
v. People[32] in ruling that it is befitting to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner even though the notice of
appeal was belatedly filed.
In Almuete v. People,[33] the penalty imposed upon the petitioner which is outside the range of the penalty
prescribed by law was duly corrected even if it was already final on the ground of substantial justice, thus:
In this case, it cannot be gainsaid that what is involved is the life and liberty of petitioner. If his penalty of
imprisonment remains uncorrected, it would be not conformable with law and he would be made to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 40 years
of reclusion perpetua, as maximum, which is outside the range of the penalty prescribed by law. Contrast this to
the proper imposable penalty the minimum of which should only be within the range of 2 years, 4 months and 1
day to 6 years of prision correccional, while the maximum should only be anywhere between 11 years, 8
months and 1 day of prision mayor to 13 years of reclusion temporal. Substantial justice demands that we
suspend our Rules in this case. “It is always within the power of the court to suspend its own [R]ules or except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require. x x x Indeed, when there is a strong
showing that a grave miscarriage of justice would result from the strict application of the Rules, this Court will
not hesitate to relax the same in the interest of substantial justice.” Suspending the Rules is justified “where
there exist strong compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a miscarriage thereof.”
After all, the Court’s “primordial and most important duty is to render justice x x x.” [34]
All the accused in Almuete v. People,[35] People v. Barro,[36] Estrada v. People,[37] and Rigor v. The
Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison,[38] failed to perfect their appeal on their respective judgments of conviction,
but the Court corrected the penalties imposed, notwithstanding the finality of the decisions because they were
outside the range of penalty prescribed by law. There is, thus, no reason to deprive the petitioner in the present
case of the relief afforded the accused in the cited cases. Verily, a sentence which imposes upon the defendant in
a criminal prosecution a penalty in excess of the maximum which the court is authorized by law to impose for
the offense for which the defendant was convicted, is void for want or excess of jurisdiction as to the excess. [39]

Here, the penalty imposed is obviously out of range of that prescribed in Section 1 of BP 22. Moreover, since
the term of the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the total amount of the fine or one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of the rendition of
judgment of conviction by the trial court, [40] if petitioner is insolvent, she will suffer a longer prison sentence.
Substantial justice dictates that the penalty of fine meted on the petitioner be accordingly corrected within the
maximum limits prescribed under Section 1 of BP 22. Hence, the penalty of fine of P80,000.00 meted on
petitioner in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 for each count of violation of BP 22 is corrected to double
the face value of each rubber check involved or P13,334.00 only.

Anent the alleged violation of Vaca v. Court of Appeals,[41] and Administrative Circular No. 12-2000[42] that
supposedly limited to fine the imposable penalty for violation of BP 22, and without any subsidiary
imprisonment, suffice it to quote the clarifications in Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, issued on February
14, 2001:
x x x queries have been made regarding the authority of Judges to

1. Impose the penalty of imprisonment for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and

2. Impose subsidiary imprisonment in the event that the accused, who is found guilty of violating
the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22, is unable to pay the fine which he is sentenced to pay

considering that Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 adopted the rulings in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of
Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16 November 1998, 298 SCRA 656) and Rosa Lim v. People of the
Philippines (G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000) as a policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the
imposition of penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, without mentioning whether subsidiary imprisonment
could be resorted to in case of the accused’s inability to pay the fine.

The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an
alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in
B.P. Blg. 22.

The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg.
22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.

Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal
provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly
indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be
considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances
warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is
the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not be deemed a hindrance.

It is, therefore, understood that

1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative

penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;

xxx xxx xxx

3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.

xxx xxx x x x[43]

(Italics in the original; emphasis added)
In like manner, the issue of whether BP 22 violates Section 20 of Article III of the Constitution which proscribes
imprisonment as a punishment for not paying a debt was already settled in the negative in Lozano v. Martinez.
[44]
Pertinent portions of the Decision in the Lozano case read:
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? x x x

The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check
that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The
law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

xxx xxx xxx

In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.[45] (Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. In the interest of justice, the Decision dated January 14, 2009 of
Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to 321174 is MODIFIED.

Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of six counts of violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is sentenced to pay a FINE of THIRTEEN THOUSAND AND THREE
HUNDRED THIRTY-FOUR PESOS (P13,334.00) for each count, and to indemnify private complainant
Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus 6% interest per annum from September 21,
2002 until full payment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.