Remman Enterprises vs.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 125018
April 6, 2000

Facts:
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. (REMMAN), and CRISPIN E. LAT are
adjoining landowners in Barangay Bugtong Na Pulo, Lipa City. The land of Lat is
agricultural and planted mostly with fruit trees while REMMAN occupies a land is
devoted to its piggery business. REMMAN’s land is one and a half (1½) meters
higher in elevation than that of respondent Lat.

Sometime in July 1984 Lat noticed that REMMAN’s waste disposal lagoon
was already overflowing and inundating one-fourth (1/4) of Lat’s plantation. He made
several representations with REMMAN but they fell on deaf ears. On 14 March
1985, after almost one (1) hectare of Lat’s plantation was already inundated with
water containing pig manure, as a result of which the trees growing on the flooded
portion started to wither and die, Lat filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
mandatory injunction against REMMAN. Lat alleged that the acidity of the soil in his
plantation increased because of the overflow of the water heavy with pig manure
from REMMAN’s piggery farm.

REMMAN denied all the allegations of Lat and raised as an affirmative

defense that measures such as the construction of additional lagoons were already
adopted to contain the waste water coming from its piggery to prevent any damage
to the adjoining estates.

After conducting an ocular inspection and evaluating the evidence of both

parties the Regional Trial Court found that indeed REMMAN’s waste disposal lagoon
overflowed with the contaminated water flooding one (1) hectare of Lat’s plantation.
The waste water was ankle-deep and caused death and destruction to one (1)
jackfruit tree, fifteen (15) coconut trees, one hundred twenty-two (122) coffee trees,
and an unspecified number of mango trees, bananas and vegetables. As a
consequence, the trial court ordered REMMAN to indemnify Lat for lost profits and
attorney’s fees. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that, among others, the damages, if
any, were due to a fortuitous event.

Issue:
Whether or not the damages were due to fortuitous event and therefore,
Remman is not directly accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him.

Held:
No, the damages were not due to fortuitous event and therefore,
Remman is directly accountable to Lat for the damages sustained by him.
Even assuming that the heavy rains constituted an act of God, by reason of
their negligence, the fortuitous event became humanized, rendering appellants liable
for the ensuing damages. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 233
SCRA 649 (1993), the Supreme Court held:
 Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private respondents
since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. This event then was not
occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force majeure; a human factor —
negligence or imprudence — had intervened. The effect then of the force majeure in
question may be deemed to have, even if only partly, resulted from the participation
of man. Thus, the whole occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and
removed from the rules applicable to acts of God.

As regards the alleged natural easement imposed upon the property of

appellee, resort to pertinent provisions of applicable law is imperative. Under the
Civil Code, it is provided:

ARTICLE 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which
naturally and without the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as
well as the stones or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
easement; neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will
increase the burden.

A similar provision is found in the Water Code of the Philippines (P.D.

No.1067), which provides:

ARTICLE 50. Lower estates are obliged to receive the water which naturally
and without the intervention of man flow from the higher estates, as well as the stone
or earth which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this
natural flow, unless he provides an alternative method of drainage; neither can the
owner of the higher estate make works which will increase this natural flow.

As worded, the two (2) aforecited provisions impose a natural easement upon
the lower estate to receive the waters which naturally and without the intervention of
man descend from higher states. However, where the waters which flow from a
higher state are those which are artificially collected in man-made lagoons, any
damage occasioned thereby entitles the owner of the lower or servient estate to
compensation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 19 October 1995 Decision of the

Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 16, Lipa City, holding
petitioner Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REMMAN) liable to private respondent Crispin
E. Lat for damages and to indemnify the latter P186,975.00 for lost profits for three
(3) crop years and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

LOVINA v MORENO
G.R. No. L-17821 | November 29, 1963 | Reyes, JBL, J.

DOCTRINE:
 The issuance of Torrens title does not confer title to navigable streams within
the registered property, nor is it conclusive on their non-existence, unless the
boundaries of such stream had been expressly delimited in the registration plan, so
that delimitation of their course may be made even after the decree of registration
has become final.

FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of CFI Manila (Branch X), enjoining the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications from causing the removal of certain
dams and dikes in a fishpond owned by Petitioner Lovina in Pampanga.
The cause started by a petition of the residents to the Respondent Secretary,
complaining that appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a navigable river in
Macabebe, Pampanga, and asking that the obstructions be ordered removed, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the
said Secretary found the constructions to be a public nuisance in navigable waters,
and ordered the spouses Lovina to remove five (5) closures of Sapang Bulati;
otherwise, the Secretary would order their removal at the expense of the respondent.
After receipt of the decision, the petitioner filed an action. The trial court, after due
hearing, granted a permanent injunction, which is now the subject of the present
appeal. Petitioners alleged that R.A. No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained,
final, and unappealable authority to pass upon the issues of whether a river or
stream is public and navigable.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the constructions were a public nuisance in navigable waters.

RULING:
YES. R. A. No. 2056 empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private
person was anyway entitled to make, because the bed of navigable streams is public
property, and ownership, thereof is not acquirable by adverse possession
The Court of First Instance found that "according to the location plan, Exhibit
C", the "Bulati creek, on which the dikes and dams in question were constructed was
a mere estero and could not be considered a navigable stream then". It is not
explained how such fact could appear solely from the plan Exhibit "C" (no other proof
being referred to), unless indeed the court below so concluded from the fact that in
said plan the Bulati creek does not appear to run within the registered lot.
The conclusion of the lower court is not supported by its premises, because
by law, the issuance of a Torrens title does not confer title to navigable
streams (which are fluvial highways) within the registered property, nor is it
conclusive on their non-existence, unless the boundaries of such streams had
been expressly delimited in the registration plan so that delimitation of their
course may be made even after the decree of registration has become final.
northwest, and which the surveyor apparently failed to delimit for some undisclosed
reason
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of
injunction issued therein are annulled and set aside. Costs against appellees Lovina.
Sta. Rosa Realty vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112526 Oct. 12, 2001

DOCTRINE:

The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future

generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause
loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that
needs to be answered now.

Facts:

Petitioner was the registered owner of two parcels of land, MARO issued a
notice of coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a
conference. It was the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the
landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner filed a
“Protest and Objection” to the compulsory acquisition of the property. Secretary of
Agrarian Reform sent two notices of acquisition to petitioner. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform sent two 2 notices of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s
landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and 84891, containing an area of
188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and P1,220,229.93,
respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). petitioner SRRDC in two letters 2 separately addressed to Secretary
Florencio B. Abad and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent
its formal protest, protesting not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for
the property but also the two (2) notices of acquisition. Secretary Abad referred the
case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine just compensation.
Petitioner sent a letter to the Land Bank of the Philippines stating that its property
under the aforesaid land titles were exempt from CARP coverage because they had
been classified as watershed area and were the subject of a pending petition for land
conversion. Office of the Secretary, DAR, through the Undersecretary for Operations
(Assistant Secretary for Luzon Operations) and the Regional Director of Region IV,
submitted a report answering the two issues raised. According to them, firstly, by
virtue of the issuance of the notice of coverage on August 11, 1989, and notice of
acquisition on December 12, 1989, the property is covered under compulsory
acquisition. Secondly, Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1990, Section IV D also
supports the DAR position on the coverage of the said property. During the
consideration of the case by the Board, there was no pending petition for land
conversion specifically concerning the parcels of land in question. The Board sent a
notice of hearing to all the parties interested, setting the hearing for the
administrative valuation of the subject parcels of land. However, SRRDC submitted a
petition to the Board for the latter to resolve SRRDC’s petition for exemption from
CARP coverage before any administrative valuation of their landholding could be
had by the Board. The initial DARAB hearing of the case was held and subsequently,
different dates of hearing were set without objection from counsel of SRRDC.

Issues:
1. Whether the respondents complied with the procedural requirement of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
 2. Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the
fact that the entire property formed part of a watershed area prior to the
enactment of RA 6657

Held:

1. No. SC held that failed to comply with the requirements of the CARP Law.
for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the
government on receipt of the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit
by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is
contemplated either. DAR has executed the taking of the property in question.
However, payment of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural
requirement. The law required payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account
as was done by DAR.

2. YES. Watershed is one of those enumerated by CARP to be exempt from

its coverage. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed parcels of land form a vital
part of an area that need to be protected for watershed purposes. The protection of
watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for future generations and the
control of flashfloods that not only damage property but cause loss of lives.
Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.

DISPOSITIVE: To resolve the issue as to the nature of the parcels of land involved in
the case at bar, the Court directs the DARAB to conduct a re-evaluation of the issue.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 27234.

In lieu thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and
determination of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its
coverage by the Comprehensive Land Reform Program.

In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued by the DAR to supposed farmer
beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the temporary restraining order issued
on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until final decision on the case.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Tanjay Water District vs. Gabaton
G.R. Nos. L-63742 & 84300, Apr. 17, 1989
Griño-Aquino, J.

Administration of Waters and Enforcement of the Provisions of this Code - (Chap. 7:

Articles 79 - 89)
DOCTRINE:
In cases involving the appropriation, utilization and control of water, the
Supreme Court holds that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the first
instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in PD No. 1067
which is the special law on the subject. The Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case.
FACTS:
G.R. No. 63742: On March 3, 1983, petitioner Tanjay Water District filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Civil Case No. 8144, an
action for injunction with preliminary mandatory injunction and damages, against
respondent Municipality of Pamplona and its officials to prevent them from interfering
in the management of the Tanjay Waterworks System.
When the case was called for hearing on March 16, 1983, respondent Judge
gave the parties five (5) days to submit their respective position papers on the issue
of the court's jurisdiction (or lack of it), over the action. The respondents' position
paper questioned the court's jurisdiction over the case and asked for its dismissal of
the complaint. Instead of a position paper, the petitioner filed a reply with opposition
to the motion to dismiss.
On March 25, 1983, respondent Judge issued an order dismissing the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter (water) and over the parties
(both being government instrumentalities) by virtue of Art. 88 of PD No. 1067 and PD
No. 242. He declared that the petitioner's recourse to the court was premature
because the controversy should have been ventilated first before the National Water
Resources Council pursuant to Arts. 88 and 89 of PD No. 1067. He further ruled that
as the parties are government instrumentalities, the dispute should be
administratively settled in accordance with PD No. 242.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in this Court alleging that respondent
Judge acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the case.
G.R. No. 84300: Josefino Datuin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
Tarlac Water District in the Department of Labor and Employment, which decided in
favor of Datuin. On appeal before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
NLRC reversed the decision and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
holding that Tarlac Water district is a corporation created by special law, its officers
and employees belong to the civil service and their separation should be governed
by Civil Service Rules and Regulations.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent Judge acted without, or in excess of, jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 8144 for alleged lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. - NO

RULING:
No. In G.R. No. 63742, respondent Judge ruled that as the subject matter of
Civil Case No. 8144 was water, the case should have been brought first to the
National Water Resources Council in accordance with Articles 88 and 89 of PD No.
1067, and, as the parties are government instrumentalities (The Tanjay Water
District and the Municipality of Pamplona), the dispute should be administratively
settled in accordance with PD No. 242. Articles 88 and 89 of The Water Code (PD
No. 1067, promulgated on January 25, 1977) provide as follows:
"ART. 88. The [Water Resources] Council shall have original
jurisdiction over all disputes relating to appropriation, utilization,
exploitation, development, control, conservation and protection of
waters within the meaning and context of the provisions of this Code.
"The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies shall be
immediately executory and the enforcement thereof may be suspended
only when a bond, in an amount fixed by the Council to answer for
damages occasioned by the suspension or stay of execution, shall
have been filed by the appealing party, unless the suspension is by
virtue of an order of a competent court.
"All disputes shall be decided within sixty (60) days after the parties
submit the same for decision or resolution.
"The Council shall have the power to issue writs of execution and
enforce its decisions with the assistance of local or national police
agencies."
"ART. 89. The decisions of the Council on water rights controversies
may be appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the subject matter of the controversy is situated within fifteen (15) days
from the date the party appealing receives a copy of the decision, on
any of the following grounds: (1) grave abuse of discretion (2) question
of law; and (3) questions of fact and law." (Italics supplied.)
Inasmuch as Civil Case No. 8144 involves the appropriation, utilization and
control of water, We hold that the jurisdiction to hear and decide the dispute in the
first instance, pertains to the Water Resources Council as provided in PD No. 1067
which is the special law on the subject. The Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) has only appellate jurisdiction over the case.
With regard to G.R. No. 84300, the Court has already ruled that water districts
are quasi public corporations whose employees belong to the civil service, hence,
the dismissal of those employees shall be governed by the civil service law, rules
and regulations. Inasmuch as PD No. 198, as amended, is the original charter of
Tanjay Water District and Tarlac Water District and all water districts in the country,
they come under the coverage of the civil service law, rules and regulations. PD
1067 likewise provided that NWRC has jurisdiction over all disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization, exploitation, development, control, conservation and
protection of waters. Regular courts only have appellate jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, both petitions are dismissed without prejudice to the
petitioners Tanjay filing their complaint in the National Water Resources Council and
the petitioner in G.R. No. 84300 seeking redress in the Civil Service Commission. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Metro Iloilo Water District vs. CA
G.R. No. 122855
March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Petitioner is a water district organized under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 198. It was granted by the Local Water Utilities Administration
Conditional Certificate of Conformance No. 71. Its service areas encompass the
entire territorial areas of Iloilo City and the Municipalities of Ma-asin, Cabatuan,
Santa Barbara and Pavia.

Sometime between April and May of 1993, petitioner filed nine (9) individual
yet identical petitions for injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining orders against herein private respondents. The petitioner
alleged that the unauthorized extraction or withdrawal of ground water by the
respondent without the necessary permit therefor is in violation of the rules and
regulations prescribed by the Board of Directors of the petitioner as above
mentioned duly approved by the National Water Resources Council and constitutes
interference with or deterioration of water quality or the natural flow of surface or
groundwater supply which may be used or useful for any purpose of the petitioner for
which the petitioner as a Water District may commence, maintain, intervene in,
defend and compromise actions or proceedings under Section 31 (a) of P.D. 198,
thus the act of the respondent in continuing to extract or withdraw groundwater
without a Water Permit therefor, is in violation of Art. XIII of P.D. 1067 of the Water
Code of the Philippines, and unless such act is restrained, will definitely cause great
loss upon the petitioner as a Water District.

Private respondents uniformly invoked the lack of jurisdiction of the trial court,
contending that the cases were within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Water Resources Council (Water Council) under Presidential Decree No.
1067. The private respondents claims are as follows:
● Emma Nava and Rebeca Berlin: having extracted or withdrawn water from
the ground
● Carmen Pangantihon: having constructed any waterworks system in her area
but admitted that she had constructed her own deep well, unaware that she
needed to get a permit to do the same
● Rufino Sitaca: their source of water are reservoirs from rivers and are thus not
affected by his well and was granted an application to do so
● Benito Go: extracted water from the ground, which he claimed to be his
private property, and used the water for his lumberyard and domestic
purposes
● Charles Kana-an: complied with the requirements for the approval of his water
permit application and claimed that he was extracting and selling water with
petitioner's knowledge, and without damage and injury
● Gerry Luzuriaga: claimed that he was not the real party in interest, but
Shoemart, Inc. which has the control and possession of the property where
the alleged withdrawal of groundwater was taking place

RTC dismissed the petitions ruling that the controversy was within the original
jurisdiction of the Water Council, the appropriation, exploitation and utilization of
water, and factual issues which were within the Water Council's competence.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies under the doctrine
of "primary administrative jurisdiction." Thus, petitioner sought the eview of the order
of the trial court dismissing the petitions and denying its motion for reconsideration.

CA denied the petition, holding that the trial court did not err in dismissing the
case for want of jurisdiction as it was the Water Council which had jurisdiction over
the case. NWRC has jurisdiction to hear and decide disputes relating to
appropriation, utilization and control of water while the Regional Trial Court only has
appellate jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC Iloilo has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
petition?

HELD:
YES. We find merit in the petition.

The petitions filed before the trial court were for the issuance of an injunction
order for respondents to cease and desist from extracting or withdrawing water from
petitioner's well and from selling the same within its service areas.

The instant case certainly calls for the application and interpretation of
pertinent laws and jurisprudence in order to determine whether private respondents'
actions violate petitioner's rights as a water district and justify an injunction. This
issue does not so much provide occasion to invoke the special knowledge and
expertise of the Water Council as it necessitates judicial intervention. While initially it
may appear that there is a dimension to the petitions which pertains to the sphere of
the Water Council, i.e., the appropriation of water which the Water Code defines as
"the acquisition of rights over the use of waters or the taking or diverting of waters
from a natural source in the manner and for any purpose allowed by law," in reality
the matter is at most merely collateral to the main thrust of the petitions.

We declared that the trial court's jurisdiction must be upheld where the
issue involved is not the settlement of a water rights dispute, but the
enjoyment of a right to water use for which a permit was already granted.

In like manner, the present petition calls for the issuance of an injunction order
to prevent private respondents from extracting and selling groundwater within the
petitioner's service area in violation of the latter's water permit. There is no dispute
regarding petitioner's right to ground water within its service area. It is petitioner's
enjoyment of its rights as a water district which it seeks to assert against private
respondents.