1

PEOPLE VS GA

FACTS

The accused conspired to rob the Gonzaga family, had a meeting at

Ruga’s residence to plan and acquire weapons. On the night of the crime,
they invited household staff for drinks, then executed their plan by hog-
tying the staff and attacking Gonzaga family. Juliana and Julio were killed
but Rogelia, their daughter survived due to timely medical assistance.
They were found guilty of robbery and triple frustrated homicide and
frustrated homicide, imposing death penalty. The case was reviewed by
the Supreme Court following the mandate to reduce the death sentence to
reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

Whether the court erred in not considering the mitigating

circumstances.

HELD

The Court agreed that the trial court erred by not considering the
plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance. However, the Supreme Court
found merit in the appellants argument regarding the aggravating
circumstance of commission of a crime by a band, ruling it was improperly
applied since there were only three perpetrators.

PEOPLE VS. TAC-AN G.R. NOS. 76338-39, FEBRUARY 26, 1990

FACTS

Renato Tac-an, a high school student shot Escano on the head after
firing 4 times during their Math class. The teacher, unaware that Renato
was the killer, asked if he could help Francis who was still alive. Renato
thereupon entered the room and shot the chest of Escano. He proceeded
to the faculty room where he held students and teachers as hostages. His
father and brother pleaded for his surrender and he was arrested. Francis
was declared dead on arrival. Tac-an raised self-defense during the trial.
However, RTC held Tac-an for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition with Murder to suffer the penalty of Death.

ISSUE

Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with

insult to the public authorities?
 2

HELD:

No, the Court held its disagreement that a teacher or professor of a

public or recognized private school may be regarded as a “public
authority” within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the RPC.
Careful reading of Article 152 of the RPC (Persons in authority and
agents of persons in authority) will show that while a teacher of professor
of public or recognized private school is deemed to be a “person in
authority”, such teacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes of
application of Art. 148 and Art. 152 of the RPC, it is not the case in the Art.
14 of the RPC in order to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE VS. AROJADO, G.R. NO. 130492

JANUARY 31, 2001

FACTS

The accused, Salvador Ardoja, and the victim, Mary Anne Ardoja, in
this case, were cousins. The accused-appellants helped the victim by
attending her father who suffered from a stroke, receiving a monthly
[Link] day, in the early morning the accused-appellant reported to
Erlinda Ardoja Magdaluyo that her cousin Mary Anne committed suicide
and saw a knife in her bedroom. The police officers noticed that the
victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened” and no signs of
forcible entry. The postmortem also showed that the victim sustained
stabbed wounds. It was found that the accused-appellant and the victim’s
relationship, before the said incident, was already strained and that the
victim constantly picked on the accused-appellant even for the slightest
mistake which was also corroborated by another relative’s testimony. The
accused was charged beyond a reasonable doubt with heinous crime of
murder there being no aggravating circumstances.
ISSUE
Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence not having been alleged in the information should be
appreciated in this case.
HELD

No. In this case, it was found that there was an abuse of confidence
however the same was not alleged in the information. The murder in this
case on December 31, 1993, Given the presence of the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of confidence and following Art. 63(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of
death on the accused-appellant. However, on December 1, 2000, the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that every
complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances. Therefore, could not be appreciated to raise
the accused-appellant's sentence to death.
 3

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS REYES, 215 S 73/G.R. NO. L-44112

OCTOBER 22, 1992

FACTS

Crispulo de los Reyes, Perfecto Gulo, Cresencio Singue, and Faustino

de los Reyes conspired to commit robbery at the home of Kapi Baotao,
resulting in his death and serious injuries to others. Crispulo and Perfecto
sought to absolve themselves from liability by claiming they acted under
irresistible force from Faustino. During the trial, Cresencio was initially
discharged as a state witness but later reincluded in the information
against the others.

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused could be exempt from criminal liability

due to claims of irresistible force and whether Cresencio's reinclusion in
the information violated due process.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that the act of one conspirator is the act of
all, and mere abandonment of the crime scene does not absolve a
conspirator from liability if the crime has already materialized. The Court
found that Crispulo and Perfecto did not convincingly demonstrate that
they acted involuntarily. Furthermore, Cresencio's discharge as a state
witness was valid, and his subsequent reinclusion was nullified, affirming
his acquittal. Significant provisions of the Revised Penal Code relevant to
conspiracy and criminal liability were applied, specifically referencing the
principles that govern acts committed in concert among conspirators.

PEOPLE VS. MANALO, 99 P 234/G.R. NO. L-8586

May 25, 1956

FACTS

In the case of The People of the Philippines v. Conrado Manalo

y Guanlao (G.R. No. L-8586, May 25, 1956), Conrado Manalo was
charged with theft of a fountain pen valued at P30 and was found to
be a habitual delinquent with eleven previous convictions.
 4

ISSUE

Whether or not the penalties for theft and habitual

delinquency under the Revised Penal Code (RPC) Is appropriate.

HELD

Supreme Court ruled that the penalty for theft should be six
months of arresto mayor, as the value of the stolen item fell
between P5 and P50 according to Article 309 of the RPC.
Additionally, the Court clarified that the plea of guilty was not a
mitigating circumstance since it was made after the prosecution’s
evidence was presented, and recidivism should not be treated as an
aggravating circumstance. The ruling emphasized that for habitual
delinquency, only three prior convictions could be considered,
leading to an additional penalty of eight years of prision mayor. The
decision corrected the lower court's penalties and ordered the
stolen item to be returned or compensated.

PEOPLE VS. DE JESUS, 63 P 760/G.R. NO. 45198

FACTS

De Jesus was convicted of theft for stealing an umbrella and a

hat valued at P2.65. He was sentenced to one month and one day of
arresto mayor and, as a habitual delinquent, an additional penalty of
two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional was
imposed. De Jesus appealed the sentence.

ISSUE

Whether or not the penalties were correctly imposed

HELD

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling,

recognizing that the penalty for theft was appropriate given the
circumstances. The court applied Article 62, Rule 5, paragraph (a) of
the Revised Penal Code regarding habitual delinquency, establishing
that recidivism is a qualifying circumstance, not an aggravating one,
in this context. The court emphasized that the additional penalty
should consider all present circumstances, leading to the conclusion
that the minimum additional penalty was justified.
 5

PEOPLE VS. TORRIBA, 23 P 189/G.R. NOS. 7450, 7451 & 7452

September 18, 1912

FACTS

Florencio Torrida, a municipal councilman in Aparri, Cagayan,

directed owners of large animals to report any deaths to him and
subsequently charged them a fine of five pesos per animal, falsely
claiming that this was mandated by the municipality. The owners
paid him, believing they were complying with a municipal order.

ISSUE

Whether or not Torrida's actions constituted the crime of

estafa

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that Torrida's actions indeed

constituted estafa, as he deceived the owners into paying fines that
had no legal basis. The Court clarified that while he held a public
office, the mere election to that office did not establish a personal
relationship of trust necessary for the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence. The significant provision of the Revised Penal
Code applied was Article 535, which penalizes estafa, alongside
Article 399 concerning public officers taking advantage of their
position. The Court affirmed the lower court's penalties, reducing
one of them to align with the maximum allowed under the law.

PEOPLE VS. ATIENZA, G.R. NO. L-38571

March 31, 1980

FACTS

Amador Atienza, a prisoner in New Bilibid Prison, was charged

with the murder of fellow inmate Rodolfo Ibañez, whom he stabbed
multiple times, resulting in Ibañez’s death. Atienza initially pleaded
not guilty but later changed his plea to guilty, admitting he acted
alone. He claimed self-defense, alleging that Ibañez tried to stab
him first.
 6

ISSUE

Whether Atienza acted in self-defense, and whether the crime

committed was murder or homicide.

HELD

The Supreme Court found Atienza guilty of homicide, not

murder, rejecting the self-defense claim as no weapon was found on
the victim. Quasi-recidivism was appreciated, and Atienza was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 12 years to 20 years, and
ordered to pay indemnity to the victim’s heirs. The Court applied
Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code on quasi-recidivism.

PEOPLE VS. LAYSON, G.R. NO. L-25177

October 31, 1969

FACTS

Four inmates of Davao Penal Colony—Nicolas Layson, Cezar

Ragub, Cezar Fugoso, and Joventino Garces—were charged with the
murder of fellow inmate Regino Gasang. They attacked and stabbed
Gasang due to personal grievances, with treachery and evident
premeditation. All four pleaded guilty, and the trial court sentenced
them to death.

ISSUE

Whether the crime committed was murder with aggravating

circumstances and if the death penalty was appropriate.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction for murder, finding

that treachery and evident premeditation qualified the killing. Quasi-
recidivism under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code was also
applied, as the accused were already serving sentences for previous
convictions. The mitigating circumstance of the plea of guilty did not
offset the aggravating factors, and the death penalty was upheld.
The indemnity was increased to ₱12,000.
 7

PEOPLE VS. ABELLA , G.R. NO. 127803

August 28, 2000

FACTS

The case arose from the murder of five individuals following an

altercation during a basketball game. The victims were abducted,
tortured, and subsequently found dead in the Pasig River. The accused, all
members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, were positively identified by witnesses,
who testified to their involvement in the abduction and murder.

ISSUE

Whether or not the validity of the identification of the accused, the

sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the defense of alibi, and the
presence of treachery in the commission of the crime is established
beyond reasonable doubt
HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of the

accused for five counts of murder, ruling that the prosecution had
established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court emphasized
the application of the doctrine of treachery, as the victims were rendered
defenseless before being killed. The significant provision of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) applied was Article 248, which defines murder and its
qualifying circumstances. The court also addressed the failure of the
defense of alibi and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence presented
by the prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. PAREDES, G.R. NO. L-19149

August 16, 1968

FACTS

The case involves Ben Paredes, Protasio Santos, Pascual

Bartolome, and others charged with robbery with homicide after
Chua Nai Su was killed during a robbery at the Insular-Yebana
Tobacco Corporation. The accused were found to have conspired to
commit the crime, with evidence including testimonies from
accomplices and the recovery of incriminating items.
 8

ISSUE

Whether the testimony of accomplices should be trusted; the

existence of a conspiracy among the accused; and the roles of
public officials in the crime.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision

convicting the accused, emphasizing that conspiracy implicates all
involved in the crime, even if some did not participate directly in the
act. The Court applied the doctrine that the act of one is the act of
all in a conspiracy. Additionally, the testimonies of accomplices were
deemed credible when corroborated by other evidence, aligning
with the provisions of the Revised Penal Code related to conspiracy
and the weight of accomplice testimony.

PEOPLE VS. ALINCASTRE, G.R. NO. L-29891

August 30, 1971

FACTS

Nenito Alincastre shot and killed Mayor James L. Gordon of

Olongapo City on February 20, 1967, following a conspiracy
involving co-defendants Mamerto Lorenzo, Pablo Salcedo, and
Rogelio Lorenzo. After entering a guilty plea, Alincastre sought to
testify to mitigate his liability, citing fear for his safety as a reason
for his delayed testimony. The trial court reopened the case to allow
his testimony, which implicated the other defendants.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in reopening the case to allow

Alincastre's testimony and the applicability of conspiracy in
establishing the co-defendants' guilt.

HELD

The Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision, stating

that it did not abuse its discretion in allowing the reopening of the
trial. The testimony of Alincastre was deemed critical in proving the
 9

conspiracy among the defendants, leading to their convictions for

murder qualified by treachery. The significant provisions of the
Revised Penal Code applied included Article 13 on mitigating
circumstances and Article 248 on murder, particularly considering
the aggravating circumstances of price, reward, and evident
premeditation, resulting in the sentence of death for Alincastre,
Mamerto Lorenzo, and Pablo Salcedo, while Rogelio Lorenzo was
sentenced as a principal rather than an accomplice.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. BALTAZAR AMION Y DUGADUGA

FACTS

SPO2 Baltazar Amion y Dugaduga, a member of the Bacolod

City Police Office (BCPO) was charged with the crime of Murder for
the death of PO3 Victor Vaflor, a member of the Escalante Police
Station, under the following Information:"That on or about the 24th
day of January, 1994, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without
any justifiable cause or motive, being then armed with an M16
Armalite Rifle, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot with said firearm one Victor
Vaflor, [Link] prosecution presented: 1) Police Supt. Edmundo
Sanicas of the BCPO; 2) PO3 Richard Dejoras, 34, a member of the
Escalante Police Station; 3) SPO2 Virgilio Pachoro, a member of the
BCPO; 4) Mrs. Antoinietta Vaflor, widow of the late PO3 Victor Vaflor;
5) Dr. Johnnie V. Aritao, City Health Officer, Bacolod City Health
Office; and 6) SPO3 Francisco Castidad, a member of the BCPO and
the officer-in-charge of its Property Division. The defense presented
accused Amion and his companion at the time of the incident,
Ricardo Divino. The trial court 2 found Chief Inspector Sanicas and
PO3 Dejoras to be credible witnesses, and rejected the testimony of
CVO Ricardo Divino.

ISSUE

Whether the Trial Court erred in upholding the testimonies of

Dejoras and Sanicas which are highly improbable

HELD

No. The court does not agree with accused-appellant that the
testimonies of Dejoras and Sanicas were highly improbable.
Accused-Appellant claims that based on their testimonies he could
not have shot Vaflor without harming Sanicas and Dejoras; that
since Dejoras had come out of the gate first, he should have
retreated and closed the gate when he saw Amion since he knew of
 10

the feud existing between him and Vaflor; and that the nature of the
gunshot wounds sustained by Vaflor do not support the testimony of
Sanicas that he shot Vaflor from a distance of one (1) meter. The
objections refer to minor matters and do not detract from the
positive identification of accused-appellant as the assailant.
Moreover, the two (2) witnesses corroborated each other on the
essential points regarding the shooting incident.

PEOPLE VS. JAURIGUE, C.A. NO. 384

February 21, 1946

FACTS

Avelina Jaurige, the defendant-appellant, and the deceased

Amado Capina lived in the same barrio, and that Capina was
courting Jaurige. One month before the stabbing incident, there
were numerous provocation instances created by Capina with the
intent to abuse her, which tested Jaurige’s patience. She then
decided to always carry a long fan knife to protect herself. One
evening at 8 P.M., Jaurige went to the chapel to attend the service,
and seated in the last row, Capina saw her and sat beside her and
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh. Because of this
highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina
Jaurigue, conscious of her dignity and honor, pulled out with her
right hand the fan knife to punish Capina’s hand but she stabbed
him at the base of the left side of the neck causing him to die.
Jaurigue was prosecuted for the crime of murder but was found
guilty of homicide. Jaurige appealed the court’s decision contending
that the court erred in holding that the commission of the alleged
offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of having
been committed in a sacred place.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in considering the aggravating

circumstances in the alleged offense

HELD

Yes. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in

a place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained
as there is no evidence to show that the Jaurigue had murdered in
her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. She
happened to kill under the greatest provocation. Hence, there is no
aggravating circumstance whatsoever, but with at least three
mitigating circumstances of a qualified character to be considered in
her favor; and, under the provisions of article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code
 11

PEOPLE VS NOCE

PEOPLE VS. SAYLAN, 130 S 159/G.R. NO. L-36941

FACTS

Rafael Saylan was accused of raping Eutropia Agno on January

23, 1972, using a dagger to force her into submission. The trial court
found him guilty of rape, imposing the death penalty, citing multiple
aggravating circumstances including abuse of superior strength and
ignominy.
ISSUE

Whether or not the sexual intercourse was consensual and

whether the aggravating circumstances were correctly applied.

HELD

The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings,

emphasizing the lack of credible evidence supporting the accused's
claim of consent. The Court modified the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua, citing the absence of the required number of
votes for the death penalty. The ruling applied Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which pertains to the crime of rape, affirming
the presence of aggravating circumstances that justified the
conviction. Significant Provision of the RPC: Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which defines rape and prescribes its penalties.

PEOPLE VS. SAYLAN, 130 S 159/G.R. NO. L-36941

FACTS

Rafael Saylan was accused of raping Eutropia Agno on January

23, 1972, using a dagger to force her into submission. The trial court
found him guilty of rape, imposing the death penalty, citing multiple
aggravating circumstances including abuse of superior strength and
ignominy.
 12

ISSUE

Whether or not the sexual intercourse was consensual and

whether the aggravating circumstances were correctly applied.
HELD

The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's findings,

emphasizing the lack of credible evidence supporting the accused's
claim of consent. The Court modified the penalty from death to
reclusion perpetua, citing the absence of the required number of
votes for the death penalty. The ruling applied Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which pertains to the crime of rape, affirming
the presence of aggravating circumstances that justified the
conviction. Significant Provision of the RPC: Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, which defines rape and prescribes its penalties.

PEOPLE VS. ABELLA , G.R. NO. 127803

August 28, 2000

FACTS

The case arose from the murder of five individuals following

an altercation during a basketball game. The victims were abducted,
tortured, and subsequently found dead in the Pasig River. The
accused, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo, were positively
identified by witnesses, who testified to their involvement in the
abduction and murder.

ISSUE

Whether or not the validity of the identification of the

accused, the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the defense of
alibi, and the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime
is established beyond reasonable doubt
HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conviction of the

accused for five counts of murder, ruling that the prosecution had
established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Court
emphasized the application of the doctrine of treachery, as the
victims were rendered defenseless before being killed. The
significant provision of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) applied was
 13

Article 248, which defines murder and its qualifying circumstances.

The court also addressed the failure of the defense of alibi and the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution.

PEOPLE VS. SAYSON, 30 S 92/G.R. NO. 249289

September 28, 2020

FACTS

Joseph Sayson y Parocha was charged with violations of

Sections 5 (Illegal Sale) and 11 (Illegal Possession) of Republic Act
No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. In a
buy-bust operation, he was found in possession of five sachets of
methamphetamine (shabu). The trial court acquitted him of the
illegal sale charge but convicted him of illegal possession. The Court
of Appeals affirmed this conviction.

ISSUE

Whether Sayson's conviction for illegal possession of

dangerous drugs was valid despite non-compliance with the chain of
custody rules.
HELD

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court held

that the integrity of the seized drugs was compromised due to the
failure of the police officers to follow the required chain of custody
procedure. Specifically, the mandatory presence of witnesses during
the marking and inventory was not sufficiently justified. This non-
compliance raised doubts about the identity of the drugs as
evidence. Hence, Sayson was acquitted of illegal possession.

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, 121 P 13/G.R. NO. 109279-80

January 18, 1999

FACTS

The court a quo found that defendant was guilty of killing his
wife by inflicting upon her serious and mortal gunshot wounds which
directly caused her death. In another case defendant was still found
guilty of having in possession an unlicensed .38 revolver and 4 live
ammunitions which was used in the crime of parricide.
 14

ISSUE

Whether or not the accused be prosecuted by two separate

charges.
HELD

No. Although the prosecution duly established that the crime

of illegal possession of firearm under PD 1866 was committed, RA
8294 which took effect on July 7, 1997 amended the said decdree
and the law now merely considers the use of an unlicensed firearm
as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not as a
separate offense. Accused may be held liable only for parricide with
the special aggravating circumstance of use of an unlicensed
firearm.

PEOPLE VS. LEE, G.R. NO. L-66848

December 20, 1991

FACTS

On June 22, 1981, in Manila, Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino

Viray, Jr. y Collado, and Juan Larosa y Gonzales were charged with
robbery in band with homicide and multiple physical injuries. They,
armed with firearms and bladed weapons, robbed passengers of a
jeepney while pretending to be bona fide passengers. During the
robbery, they shot and killed one passenger, Leopoldo Espellego,
and injured others.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court erred in convicting Juan Larosa based

on insufficient identification and the failure to consider his alibi and
voluntary surrender.
HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision finding

Larosa guilty of robbery with homicide and physical injuries under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. The conviction was supported
by credible witness testimony, and Larosa's alibi was deemed weak.
The court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, as the death
penalty was abolished under the 1987 Constitution. The significant
 15

provision of the RPC applied was Article 294, which addresses

robbery resulting in homicide and injuries.

PEOPLE VS. LAPAN

July 6, 1992

FACTS

On September 23, 1987, Ernie Lapan entered the house of

Violeta Sayaman Parnala and, by means of violence and
intimidation, stole jewelry valued at P1,100. On the occasion of the
robbery, Lapan fatally attacked Jay Vee Parnala Custodio and
Teresita Minorca Rosalinas, stabbing them multiple times. Lapan
was positively identified by two prosecution witnesses as fleeing the
crime scene. The trial court convicted Lapan, but he appealed,
claiming an alibi.

ISSUE

Whether or not Lapan's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD

The Supreme Court upheld Lapan's conviction, rejecting his

alibi as a weak and unreliable defense, which failed to overcome the
positive identification by witnesses. The Court applied Section 4,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, establishing that circumstantial
evidence can lead to conviction if multiple proven facts point to guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the charge of robbery was not
adequately proven, the Court modified the conviction to homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, considering two
aggravating circumstances: morada (crime committed in the
victim's residence) and disregard of age (the victim, Jay Vee
Custodio, was six years old).

PEOPLE VS. LUCAS, 181 S 315

FACTS
 16

Chanda Lucas y Austria, at seventeen years old, accused her

father, Conrado Lucas, of attempted rape and previously revealed
that he had raped her multiple times since she was nine. The
accusations led to two criminal complaints filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. During the trial, Chanda testified about the
assaults, supported by her sister and medical evidence indicating
prior sexual abuse.

ISSUE

Whether or not the complainant's testimony is credible; the

timeline of the alleged crimes; and the legal qualification of the
offenses charged are present.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision,

convicting Conrado Lucas of two counts of rape and one count of
attempted rape. The Court applied Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, which defines rape, particularly emphasizing that carnal
knowledge of a female under twelve years old qualifies as statutory
rape regardless of other factors. The ruling highlighted the
psychological and emotional complexities surrounding the victim's
delayed reporting and the nature of familial authority in cases of
incest.

PEOPLE VS. LUCAS, G.R. NO. 108172-73

May 25, 1994

FACTS

Chanda, a 9-year-old girl, was sexually assaulted by her

father, Conrado Lucas, multiple times from 1983 until 1991. The
assaults began when Chanda's mother was away, and Conrado
threatened to kill her to prevent resistance. After a medical
examination in 1992 revealed healed lacerations, Chanda, along
with her mother, filed complaints for rape and attempted rape
against Conrado. The trial court found Conrado guilty of two counts
of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
ISSUE
 17

Whether or not Conrado's argument valid that he cannot be

convicted of consummated rape under a complaint for attempted
rape.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that Conrado's contention is correct;

he can only be convicted of attempted rape as it is included in the
charge. The appropriate penalty for attempted rape is prision
mayor, which is lesser than that for consummated rape.
Additionally, reclusion perpetua is indivisible and does not change
despite the amendment to its duration; thus, it remains a single
penalty regardless of circumstances. The significant provision
applied is Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code.

PEOPLE VS. REYES, 212 S 402

FACTS

Accused-appellant Reyes was charged with murder for killing

Danilo Estrella y Sanchez by shooting him with an Armalite rifle
while Danilo was walking home. Reyes invoked self-defense,
claiming that he had been warned of a plot by Danilo and others to
kill him. When a witness, Celia, saw Danilo approaching Reyes with
a gun, she shouted, prompting Reyes to fire first, killing Danilo.

ISSUE

Whether Reyes can validly claim self-defense.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that Reyes could not validly claim
self-defense. Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, self-
defense requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression by the victim, (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the
aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation by the accused. In
this case, the Court found no evidence of unlawful aggression from
Danilo, as merely approaching with a gun was not sufficient to prove
an immediate threat. Thus, Reyes was held guilty of murder,
rejecting his defense of self-defense.
 18

PEOPLE VS. TORREFIEL, G.R. NO. 115431

April 18, 1996

FACTS

Jose Torrefiel and co-accused were charged with murder and

robbery after a violent incident on May 26, 1989, where they killed
Leopoldo and Reynaldo Mangilog in their home in Aklan and stole
various items. The trial focused on Torrefiel, who claimed an alibi,
asserting he was elsewhere at the time of the crime.
ISSUE

Whether or not Torrefiel was present during the commission of

the crimes and if the defense of alibi could prevail against positive
identification by witnesses.

HELD

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, ruling

that Torrefiel was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and
robbery. The Court applied the doctrine that conspiracy can be
inferred from the actions of the accused and that the defense of
alibi cannot prevail over positive identification. The significant
provision of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) applied was Article 248,
which prescribes penalties for murder, leading to a sentence of
reclusion perpetua for each murder charge.

PEOPLE VS SUBIDO

FACTS

Abelardo Subido is the defendant-appellant in this case. He

was charged with libre in the Court of First Instance of Manila. On
September 5, 1975, the court convicted Subido, sentencing him to
three months of arresto mayor, a fine of P500 and P10,000
indemnity to Mayor Lacson. The judgment included a provision of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Subido appealed to
the CA, which modified the sentence by removing imprisonment and
reducing indemnity to P5000 while affirming the fine. The trial court
also denied his motion to cancel his appeal bond.

ISSUE
 19

Whether the trial court is correct in denying the motion.

HELD
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts order denying
Subido’s motion to cancel his appeal bond and imposing subsidiary
imprisonment for the fine in case of insolvency. The Supreme Court
noted that the Court of Appeals did not remove the subsidiary
imprisonment clause for the fine and indemnity. The language in the
appellate decision indicated that subsidiary imprisonment remained
applicable for non-payment of both obligation.

PEOPLE VS VILLAVER

FACTS
Narciso Villaver was convicted of parricide by the Court of
First Instance of Davao. The incident occurred on September 24
1965, when Villaver, his daughter Francisca, and a group of eight
individuals went to the beach. After lunch, Villaver took Francisca to
a mangrove swamps, where she later returned distressed and
confided to Genara Sordillo that her father attempted to abuse her.
That evening, Villaver forced Francisca to ingest “Endrin” a toxic
substance, witnessed by her younger sister Remedios Villaver.
Francisca died shortly after due to chemical poisoning despite being
rushed to the hospital. Villaver denied the charges claiming
Francisca consumed the poison on her own after he tried to stop
her. Villaver appealed, contesting the credibility of witness.

ISSUE
Whether Remedios Villaver a credible witness

HELD

The Supreme Court upheld the credibility of Remedios

Villavers testimony, noting its consistency and reliability given her
presence during the incident. The court found it unlikely for a minor
to false accuse a parent of such serious crime without just cause.

PEOPLE VS MARLON, G.R. NO. 142773

January 28, 2023

FACTS
 20

One evening, the accused-appellants armed with short

firearms barged in and entered the house of Modesto. Allegedly
conspiring with one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill Modesto, hogtied the latter,
gagged with a piece of cloth brought out, and abducted Modesto
who had been missing for few days. A few days later, his relatives
found Modesto already dead under thick bushes in a grassy area.
His body sustained several wounds from stabbings and a gunshot to
the deceased’s head. The RTC convicted Marlon, Ronald, and Leon
of murder. Accused-appellants appealed and contented SC erred in
penalizing them with murder. SC held thatreachery the felony
committed instead of murder was. In meeting upon appellants the
supreme penalty of death, the trial court has appreciated a few
aggravating circumstances such as treachery, abuse of superior
strength, and treachery.

ISSUE

Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery and

premeditation may be appreciated in this case of kidnapping

HELD

No. Treachery and superior strength, however, only pertain to

crimes against persons. The crime of kidnapping falls within the
classification of crimes against liberty and is aggravatetd neither by
treachery nor superior strength. The aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation can be appreciated when it is proven that the
culprits have planned the whereabouts of the execution of the
crime, or prepared appropriate means to execute it. Here, the
evidence is insufficient, with no evidence as to the particulars of
how he was assaulted and killed. Hence treachery and
premeditation may not be appreciated against the accused.

PEOPLE VS. DELIM, G.R. NO. 142773

JANUARY 28, 2003

FACTS

Modesto and family were preparing to eat dinner when

Marlon, Robert and Ronald arrived. Marlon poked gun, other two
grabbed, hog-tied and gagged Modesto. They herded him outside
the house. Leon and Manuel guarded Rita & Randy until 7 am and
told them to stay put. They searched for him for 3 days and
reported to police three days after the incident. Randy and his
 21

relatives found Modesto in the bushes at the Paldit housing project,

four days after he was taken. He was dead due to gunshot wound on
head. The trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellants
guilty of murder.

ISSUE

Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in finding the

accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder.

HELD

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that it is evident on the face of

the Information that the specific intent of the malefactors in
barging into the house of the victim was to kill him and that he
was seized precisely to kill him. The act of the malefactors of
abducting the victim was merely incidental to their primary
purpose of killing him. Moreover, there is no specific allegation
in the Information that the primary intent of the malefactors was to
deprive the victim of his freedom or liberty and that killing him
was merely incidental to kidnapping. Therefore, the crime charged
in the Information is murder, and not kidnapping.

PEOPLE VS BALDERAMA, G.R. NOS. 89597-98

SEPTEMBER 17, 1993

FACTS

The Balderama brothers, Ernesto and Oscar, were charged

with killing Nestor Duran in Tondo, Manila, on September 3, 1983.
The incident followed a heated argument between Ernesto and
Nestor during a wake. As Nestor backed away from Ernesto, Oscar,
who was behind Nestor, stabbed him in the back, leading to Nestor's
death. Initially, separate charges of homicide and murder were filed
but later amended to a joint murder charge. Issues of double
jeopardy arose when Oscar's arraignment for homicide was initially
set aside. The trial court convicted Ernesto of murder, sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), and Oscar of
homicide, sentencing him to 8 years and 1 day to 17 years, 4
months, and 1 day of imprisonment. Both were also ordered to pay
damages to the victim’s heirs. Ernesto appealed, while Oscar
 22

withdrew his appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed Ernesto’s

conviction based on evidence of conspiracy and treachery.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court err in its evaluation of witness

credibility and in finding the accused guilty of homicide instead of
murder based on the testimonies and physical evidence presented.

HELD

No, the trial court did not err in its judgment. The Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's findings, noting that the trial judge is best
positioned to assess witness credibility due to their observation of
demeanor during testimony. The prosecution's witnesses were
deemed credible, while the defense witnesses, particularly Ernesto,
lacked spontaneity and reliability. The Court found no valid reason
to disturb the trial court’s findings, which were consistent with the
physical evidence. The Supreme Court determined that treachery
was not present since there was no clear indication that the attack
was carried out with a conscious mode to ensure execution without
risk. Conspiracy was not established beyond a reasonable doubt due
to insufficient evidence of a common purpose. Consequently, the
trial court’s decision to convict Ernesto of homicide rather than
murder was upheld.

PEOPLE VS AGAPINAY, 188 S 812/G.R. No. 77776

June 27, 1990

FACTS
On April 13, 1981, Virgilio Paino was fatally stabbed in
Gonzaga, Cagayan. The Agapinay brothers—Romeo, Alex,
Fortunato, Dante, Delfin, and Cirilo—along with Virgilio Paino, were
workers of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. The incident
occurred after Virgilio took a portable shed without permission. An
argument ensued between Virgilio and Romeo Agapinay, during
which Romeo stabbed Virgilio. Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay then
held Virgilio while Romeo stabbed him again. As Virgilio fled, Delfin,
Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo threw stones at him. Virgilio
eventually collapsed and died from his injuries. The prosecution
argued that the Agapinays acted with conspiracy, treachery, and
 23

abuse of superior strength. The trial court convicted all six

Agapinays of murder, sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE

Whether or not Agapinays are guilty beyond reasonable doubt

of the crime of murder qualified by treachery.

HELD

No. The Supreme Court held that there is further no doubt that
murder has been committed, but not because of treachery, as ruled
by the trial court. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the
attack, by which the victim is rendered hors d'combat, as in an
ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all
defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to
himself. The manner of attack must be shown. There is no such
showing here. The fact that Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held
Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not demonstrate
treachery. Rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed
plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato
had taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who,
at that time, was already injured. Abuse of superiority qualifies the
taking of the life of another into murder.

PEOPLE VS MADALI, 188 S 69/G.R. Nos. L-67803-04

July 30, 1990

FACTS

The incident stemmed from a conflict involving the Madalis’

son, Ramon, and Felix Gasang. On October 31, 1979, Felix and his
cousin Agustin were walking home when Madali accosted Agustin,
dragged him to his house, and, along with Annie, attacked him. As
Agustin fled, Madali shot him. Shortly after, Felix arrived and was
shot twice by Madali. Cipriano and Merlinda, who came to
investigate the commotion, were also shot by Madali after Annie
illuminated them with a flashlight. Cipriano died from his wounds,
while Merlinda survived but sustained serious injuries. The court
found that Madali's actions were motivated by anger from an earlier
altercation involving his son. Despite Madali’s claim of self-defense
and Annie’s denial of direct involvement, the prosecution's
 24

evidence, including testimonies from survivors Agustin and

Merlinda, demonstrated a conspiracy between the spouses.

ISSUE
Whether or not the claim of self-defense by the accused,
Ricarte Madali, can be upheld given the conflicting testimonies of
the eyewitnesses and the lack of credible evidence supporting the
alleged unlawful aggression against him.

HELD

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Patrolman Ricarte

Madali and Annie Mortel Madali for the murder of Cipriano and Felix
Gasang and the frustrated murders of Agustin Reloj and Merlinda
Gasang. Ricarte’s intent to kill was evident from his actions and
statements, and despite his defense of self-defense and Annie’s
alibi, the victims’ testimonies proved their guilt. While conspiracy
was not definitively established, Annie was found liable as an
accomplice for facilitating the crimes. Ricarte received reclusion
perpetua and varying penalties, considering mitigating factors like
voluntary surrender, while Annie’s penalties were lower due to her
role as an accomplice. Both were ordered to pay damages to the
victims' heirs.

TAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 134298

AUGUST 26, 1999

FACTS

Ramon C. Tan was charged with fencing, which means buying

or handling stolen goods. Rosita Lim, who owns a company, found
that some spare parts worth P48,000 were missing after one of her
employees, Manuelito Mendez, left. Mendez later admitted he stole
these parts and sold them to Tan for P13,000. Even though Lim
forgave Mendez and didn’t report the theft to the police, Tan was
convicted based on testimonies from Lim, Mendez, and another
person, Victor Sy, who said the stolen goods were sold to Tan. Tan
argued that he didn’t buy the stolen parts and that the receipts
shown were not valid.

ISSUE
 25

Whether or not the prosecution successfully proved the

essential elements of fencing against Ramon C. Tan, given the
absence of proof of theft and insufficient evidence of Tan’s
knowledge that the items were stolen.

HELD

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, acquitting Ramon

C. Tan. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the
essential elements of fencing. Specifically, it was not established
that a crime of theft had occurred, as Rosita Lim did not report the
theft to the police and the confession of Mendez was inadmissible
against Tan. Additionally, there was no evidence showing Tan knew
or should have known that the items were stolen. Consequently, Tan
could not be convicted of fencing.

CAPILI VS. CA, G.R. NO. 139250

AUGUST 15, 2000

FACTS

Gabriel Capili and his wife, Ferma Capili, were charged with
violating Presidential Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) for
receiving and possessing jewelry and old coins they knew or should
have known were stolen. The prosecution presented evidence
showing that Christine Diokno's home was robbed, and her jewelry
and coins, valued at around PHP 3 million, were taken. Michael
Manzo, the accused thief, testified that he sold the stolen items to
Gabriel Capili and his wife for PHP 50,000. Manzo later identified
items found with the Capilis as stolen from Diokno. Police recovered
some items from Capili and his wife, including coins and jewelry.
Gabriel Capili denied knowing the items were stolen and claimed the
evidence against him was fabricated. He argued that he was
implicated due to a dispute with Manzo and police coercion. The trial
court acquitted Ferma Capili but found Gabriel Capili guilty of
violating the Anti-Fencing Law. Capili was sentenced to 8 to 10
years in prison and ordered to indemnify the complainant PHP
50,000, less the value of recovered items. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE
 26

Whether or not the Court of Appeals err in affirming the

decision of the trial court without remanding the case for further
proceedings, despite the Office of the Solicitor General's
recommendation that the actual value of the fenced articles was not
correctly established by the prosecution.

HELD

The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's
decision without remanding the case for further proceedings,
despite the Office of the Solicitor General's recommendation that
the actual value of the fenced articles was not correctly established.
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s judgment was
supported by sufficient evidence and that remanding the case was
not necessary, as the existing record was adequate to support a fair
resolution. The appellate court exercised its discretion to uphold the
trial court's decision, concluding that there were no significant
errors affecting the outcome that would require additional
proceedings.

TAER VS. CA, G.R. NO. 85204

JUNE 18, 1990

FACTS

Jorge Taer was visited by Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago,

who brought two male carabaos to Taer’s house in Garcia-
Hernandez, Bohol. The carabaos were later found to belong to Tirso
Dalde and Eladio Palaca, who reported them missing. Taer was
accused of cattle rustling along with Namocatcat, Cago, and Cirilo
Saludes. Saludes and Cago were acquitted, but Taer and
Namocatcat were convicted. Taer appealed, arguing that the only
evidence of conspiracy was hearsay.

ISSUE

Whether or not Jorge Taer should be convicted for the crime of

cattle rustling.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that the evidence did not establish
conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt, as Taer’s mere possession
 27

of the carabaos and the surrounding circumstances were insufficient

to prove a deliberate agreement to commit the crime. Taer was
found to be an accessory after the fact, as he did not participate in
the theft but benefited from the carabaos afterward. Consequently,
his penalty was reduced to 4 months imprisonment for the minimum
and 2 years imprisonment for the maximum, in accordance with the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

ENRILE VS. AMIN, G.R. NO. 93335

SEPTEMBER 13, 1990

FACTS

Together with the filing of an information charging Senator

Juan Ponce Enrile with rebellion complexed with murder before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, the government prosecutors
also filed a separate information against him for violating
Presidential Decree No. 1829 before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The charge alleged that on December 1, 1989, Enrile
harbored and concealed ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, a
fugitive, in his house, thereby obstructing his arrest. Enrile filed a
motion to dismiss the case, arguing that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense and that the alleged acts were absorbed in the
rebellion charge. The motion was denied, prompting Enrile to seek
relief from the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Senator Juan Ponce Enrile could be separately

charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding the rebellion
case earlier filed against him.

HELD

The petition is granted. The Supreme Court held that the

alleged act of harboring or concealing Col. Honasan, which was
based on Enrile’s acts of conspiring with Honasan, was committed in
connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be
deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code. The Court ruled that Enrile cannot be tried separately under
PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case.
Consequently, the information in Criminal Case No. 90-777 was
 28

quashed, and the injunction against further proceedings was made

permanent.

PEOPLE VS. VERZOLA, G.R. NO. L-35022

DECEMBER 21, 1977

FACTS

On the night of September 28, 1969, Ricardo Verzola clubbed

Bernardo Molina to death inside Molina's house in Barrio Lipcan,
Bangued, Abra, in the presence of Josefina Molina, the wife of the
victim. After the incident, Verzola and Josefina moved the body to
the foot of the stairs. Verzola then disposed of his bloodstained
clothes and the weapon used, and reported to the authorities,
falsely claiming that Bernardo had died in an accident. Both Verzola
and Josefina made extrajudicial statements to the police. Verzola
admitted to the killing, stating that he did so because Josefina had
told him that her husband was planning to kill him. Josefina’s
statement detailed how Verzola had carnal knowledge of her before
attacking her husband.
Verzola later attempted to claim self-defense, arguing that he
intervened to protect Josefina during a violent altercation between
her and Bernardo. However, his actions after the crime, including
attempting to hide evidence, contradicted this claim. Josefina,
meanwhile, argued that she only helped move the body out of fear
and had no prior knowledge of Verzola’s intent.

ISSUE

Whether or not Josefina could be held criminally liable as an

accessory after the fact for assisting Verzola in moving the body of
the victim.

HELD

The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and

acquitted Josefina. The Court found no evidence that she had
knowledge of Verzola’s criminal plan or that she cooperated in the
crime by prior or simultaneous acts. Her assistance in moving the
body was not deemed an attempt to conceal the crime, as the body
was left in a visible location. There was no proof that her actions
were intended to destroy evidence or prevent discovery of the
crime, which is necessary to hold her liable as an accessory.
 29

US VS MENDOZA, 23 P 194/G.R. No. 7540

September 23, 1912

FACTS

Bernabe Mangunay accidentally set fire to the house of Mateo

del Rosario in Apulid, Paniqui, Tarlac, while carrying a papaya
firebrand. The fire partially burned the nipa roof, but it was quickly
extinguished thanks to the efforts of del Rosario, his wife, and their
neighbors. The next day, del Rosario reported the incident to
Vicente Mendoza, the barrio lieutenant, accusing Mangunay of
arson. Mendoza summoned Mangunay but took no further action
and did not report the incident to higher authorities. As a result, the
provincial fiscal charged Mendoza as an accessory after the fact to
arson. Mendoza was convicted and sentenced to prison but
appealed the decision.

ISSUE
Whether or not Vicente Mendoza, the lieutenant of the
barrio, could be held criminally liable as an accessory.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that Mendoza could not be held

liable as an accessory after the fact because the primary offense
(arson) was not proven, and the alleged principal offender,
Mangunay, was acquitted due to lack of evidence. The Court
emphasized that the responsibility of an accessory after the fact is
dependent on the guilt of the principal offender. Since Mangunay
was acquitted, there was no legal basis to convict Mendoza as an
accessory.

YINO VS PEOPLE, G.R. No. 84163

October 19, 1989

FACTS
 30

On March 21, 1985, at around 11:00 P.M., Roberto Tejada was

shot near his home in Balungao, Pangasinan. His father, Ernesto,
heard the gunshots and saw Roberto nearby, injured and crying for
help. As Ernesto and his family rushed to aid Roberto, they saw Lito
Vino and Jessie Salazar on a bicycle; Vino was driving while Salazar,
armed with an armalite rifle, pointed the weapon at Ernesto and his
family before riding away. Roberto later identified Salazar as the
shooter in an ante-mortem statement. Vino and Salazar were
charged with murder, but Vino was tried separately and convicted
as an accessory, while Salazar, tried later, was acquitted due to
insufficient evidence.
ISSUE

Whether or not Vino can be convicted as an accessory to

murder despite the acquittal of the alleged principal, Salazar, in a
separate trial?

HELD

Yes, Vino’s conviction as an accessory to murder can stand

despite Salazar's acquittal. The Supreme Court ruled that the
conviction of an accessory does not necessarily depend on the
conviction of the principal, as long as the commission of the crime is
established. In this case, Vino's role in aiding the escape of the
assailant was sufficiently proven, and his liability as an accessory
was independent of Salazar’s acquittal. The identity of the assailant
is immaterial to the accessory's liability once the crime itself is
established. Thus, Vino's conviction as an accessory was upheld.

PEOPLE VS BILLION, C.A., 48 O.G. 1391

FACTS

Edward Gary Billon was charged with three offenses: (1)

assault with a deadly weapon, (2) burglary, and (3) possession of a
firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony involving the
use of a firearm (Penal Code section 12560). At trial, he was
acquitted of the assault and burglary charges but convicted of
possessing a firearm after a prior felony conviction. The prosecution
presented evidence of Billon’s prior 1963 conviction for assault with
a deadly weapon, but no evidence was provided to prove that a
firearm was used in the commission of that prior felony. The
essential facts of the case occurred when Billon threatened his
girlfriend's companion with a rifle but did not fire the weapon after
being persuaded by his girlfriend.
 31

ISSUE

Whether the conviction for possession of a firearm by a person

previously convicted of a felony involving the use of a firearm (Penal
Code section 12560) was valid, given that no evidence was
presented at trial to show that Billon's prior felony conviction
involved the use of a firearm.

HELD

The California Court of Appeal reversed the conviction. The

court held that the prosecution failed to prove an essential element
of the crime—specifically, that Billon's prior felony involved the use
of a firearm. Although the prosecution argued that the appellate
court could take judicial notice of a transcript from Billon’s prior
case to prove the use of a firearm, the court declined to do so, as
this would violate Billon’s right to a trial by jury on all essential
elements of the offense. Thus, without evidence of the firearm’s use
in the prior felony, the conviction under section 12560 could not
stand.

PEOPLE VS BAYOT, G.R. No. 200030

April 18, 2012

FACTS

Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with the crime of rape

committed against AAA on September 17, 1997. The trial court
found him guilty and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordering
him to pay ₱40,000.00 in indemnity. The conviction was based on
AAA's straightforward testimony and medical evidence showing
physical trauma consistent with rape. Bayot denied the charges,
claiming he and AAA were in a relationship, but his "sweetheart
defense" was rejected as unsubstantiated. The Court of Appeals
later affirmed the conviction, increasing the indemnity to
 32

₱50,000.00 and awarding ₱50,000.00 in moral damages. However,

during the pendency of the appeal, Bayot died on December 4,
2004, at the New Bilibid Prison.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the legal effect of the appellant's death on his

criminal liability and civil liability.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that the death of Nelson Bayot

during the appeal process extinguished both his criminal liability
and civil liability arising solely from the crime (civil liability ex
delicto). Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco
and People v. Paniterce, it is already unnecessary to rule on
appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final
judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death.
Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had
become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur
criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were totally
extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of
the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas.

BAGTAS VS DOP, 84 P 692/G.R. No. L-3215

October 6, 1949

FACTS

Alonzo Bagtas y Alejandrino was convicted of estafa in 17

cases between February 18 and May 14, 1948, and was sentenced
to a total of 6 years, 4 months, and 26 days in prison, along with
indemnities amounting to P43,436.45 and subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. The most severe penalty among these
sentences was 6 months and 1 day of prisión correccional plus an
indemnity of P8,000. Bagtas filed a petition for habeas corpus,
arguing that, under Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, his
 33

maximum imprisonment should be reduced to three times the most

severe penalty (18 months and 3 days). He also claimed entitlement
to good conduct time allowances and contended that subsidiary
imprisonment for failing to pay indemnities should be eliminated
under the same article.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon

the petitioner should be eliminated under the threefold rule of
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

HELD

The Supreme Court ruled that, according to Article 70 of the

Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of Bagtas's
imprisonment could be no more than three times the most severe
penalty imposed, which amounted to 18 months and 3 days, and
that good conduct time allowances could apply. However, subsidiary
imprisonment could not be eliminated under Article 70 as long as
the principal penalty was less than 6 years. Therefore, Bagtas’s total
imprisonment, including subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, was correctly calculated as 18 months and 3 days of
principal penalty plus 6 months and 1 day of subsidiary
imprisonment, totaling 2 years and 4 days. Since Bagtas had not
served this reduced sentence, his petition for habeas corpus was
denied.

PEOPLE VS BAYOTAS, G.R. No. 102007

September 2, 1994

FACTS

Rogelio Bayotas was convicted of rape on June 19, 1991. He

died on February 4, 1992, while his appeal was pending. The
Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. The
Solicitor General argued that Bayotas’s civil liability remained,
relying on People v. Sendaydiego. Counsel for Bayotas contended
 34

that both criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished by his death,
citing People v. Castillo and Ocfemia.

ISSUE

Whether or not Bayotas’s death extinguished both his criminal

and civil liabilities.

HELD

Yes. The death of appellant Bayotas extinguished both his

criminal and civil liability for the crime of rape. Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability is completely
extinguished by the convict’s death, and pecuniary penalties are
extinguished if death occurs before final judgment. This aligns with
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which links civil liability to
criminal liability. The Solicitor General’s reliance on the Sendaydiego
case was misplaced, as that case involved civil liability from sources
other than delicts. Here, with no separate civil action reserved, the
civil liability depends on the criminal case, which is extinguished by
death. Thus, the criminal action’s extinction due to the accused's
death also extinguishes the civil liability. Civil claims arising from
crimes require a determination of criminal liability, so when the
criminal case ends with the accused’s death, the civil action cannot
continue. This is different from separate civil actions under Article
30 of the Civil Code.

MANSION BISCUIT CORP CASE, G.R. NO. 94713

NOVEMBER 23, 1995
 35

FACTS
In 1981, Ty Teck Suan, president of Edward Ty Brothers
Corporation, ordered nutri-wafer biscuits from Mansion Biscuit
Corporation. Before the goods were delivered, Suan issued four
postdated checks totaling P404,980.00 to Ang Cho Hong, president
of Mansion Biscuit Corp. Suan, along with co-signor Siy Gui, later
issued four additional checks worth P100,000.00 each. After
delivery, the first batch of checks was dishonored due to insufficient
funds, and Suan failed to replace them. He made partial payment
with Australian flour and a cash advance. Despite a demand to
settle the remaining amount, Suan issued another set of checks,
which were again dishonored. Mansion Biscuit filed a case against
Suan and Gui for violating the Bouncing Checks Law (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22).

ISSUE

Whether or not the contention of Ty Teck Suan that the

subject checks were issued merely to guarantee or secure
fulfillment of the agreement with the complaint.

HELD

The Supreme Court concludes of the above-mentioned checks

by the accused subject to these two criminal cases, and their
subsequent dishonor, cannot be considered in violation of the
Batasang Pambansa Blg.22 because one important element of the
offense is missing: that the check is made or drawn and issued to
apply on account or for value and because these were issued to
guarantee the fulfillment of an agreement to deliver biscuits by
complaint when accused Suan would place orders. Accused are
hereby declared not guilty of the offense charged.

PEOPLE VS FACTORAN, 170 S 191/G.R. No. 78239

February 9, 1989

FACTS

Salvacion A. Monsanto, formerly assistant treasurer of

Calbayog City, was convicted on March 25, 1983, of estafa through
falsification of public documents by the Sandiganbayan, sentenced
to imprisonment and a fine, and ordered to indemnify the
government. While her appeal was pending, she was granted an
absolute pardon by President Marcos on December 17, 1984, which
 36

she accepted on December 21, 1984. Monsanto requested

reinstatement to her former position, arguing the pardon should
allow her to return without a new appointment and that she should
be exempt from paying the indemnity. The Ministry of Finance ruled
that she could be reinstated only from the date of the pardon and
must settle the indemnity. The Office of the President agreed,
stating that Monsanto needed a new appointment and remained
liable for the civil indemnity despite the pardon.

ISSUE

Whether a public officer who has been granted an absolute

pardon is entitled to reinstatement to their former position without a
new appointment, and whether they are exempt from paying civil
indemnity imposed by their conviction?

HELD

The Court ruled that Salvacion A. Monsanto was not entitled to

automatic reinstatement to her former position solely based on the
absolute pardon granted to her. Although the pardon removed the
disqualifications from holding public office, it did not automatically
restore her to her previous job; she needed to reapply and undergo
the usual appointment procedures. Furthermore, the pardon did not
exempt her from the civil liability imposed by her conviction. The
Court affirmed the resolution of the Office of the President, which
required Monsanto to secure a new appointment and settle the civil
indemnity.

PEOPLE VS TUPAL, G.R. Nos. 137982-85

January 13, 2003

FACTS

Saturnino Tuppal and his accomplices attacked the Solito

family as they left a wedding reception in Reina Mercedes, Isabela.
During the incident, Tuppal and his group stole Florfina Solito's
handbag containing P2,500, and Tuppal shot Florfina, causing
severe injuries. Bartolo Atuan, Jr. was shot and killed by Marcelo
Tuppal, while Bonifacio Solito was threatened with a gun that
jammed. Tuppal, who had been a fugitive for nearly nine years, was
arrested in 1998 and subsequently charged with murder, frustrated
murder, attempted murder, and robbery. He denied involvement,
 37

claiming he was in Taytay, Rizal, working as a jeepney driver. The

trial court found him guilty of robbery with homicide.

ISSUE
Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to convict
Saturnino Tuppal of robbery with homicide and if the trial court
properly imposed the penalty and damages.

HELD

The Court upheld Tuppal’s conviction for robbery with

homicide, affirming the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award for
Bartolo Atuan, Jr.'s heirs was modified to P50,000 for civil indemnity,
P50,000 for moral damages, and P10,000 for exemplary damages,
with the additional P20,000 in actual and compensatory damages
being deleted. For Florfina Solito, the Court adjusted the damages to
P2,500 for the stolen amount, P20,000 for temperate damages, and
P10,000 for exemplary damages, deleting the P60,000 in actual and
compensatory damages due to lack of evidence.

SALGADO VS CA, G.R. NO. 89606

August 30, 1990

FACTS

Salgado was found guilty with the crime of serious physical

injuries. He was sentenced of imprisonment for four months and
twenty days, with the accessories provided by law, and to indemnify
the victim. He filed application for probation which was granted with
a condition to indemnify the victim in a monthly installment of
P2,000.00 every month during the entire period of his probation, he
complied for six months. The victim filed a motion for the issuance
of writ of execution for the enforcement of civil liability but Salgado
contended that the condition in the probation order modifying or
altering the civil liability of the offender is unauthorized and not
sanctioned by law.

ISSUE
 38

Whether or not the contention that the condition attached to

the probation is not sanctioned by law is tenable.

RULING

No. The court does not believe that the order granting the
application for probation and imposing some conditions therein
altered or modified the decision but merely provided for the manner
of payment by the accused of his civil liability during the period of
probation. Under Article 113 of the RPC, the offender shall continue
to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability resulting from the crime
committed by him, notwithstanding the fact that he has served his
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or other rights, or has
not been required to serve the same by reason of amnesty, pardon,
commutation of sentence, or any other reason.

PEOPLE v. JARANILLA

FACTS

Heman Gorriceta had just come from Ford San Pedro in Iloilo
City and was driving a Ford pickup truck belonging to his sister. In
front of the Elizalde Building on J.M. Basa Street, he saw defendants
Ricardo Suyo, Elias Jaranilla and Franco Brillantes. They asked
Gorriceta to bring them to Mandurriao, a district in the city, as
Jaranilla told Gorriceta that he had to get something from his uncle’s
place. Gorriceta initially demurred but the appellants eventually
prevailed. Upon reaching Mandurriao, they parked the pickup truck
at a distance 50 – 70 meters away from the provincial hospital and
Gorriceta was instructed to wait for the defendants as they alighted.
After twenty minutes, the three accused arrived carrying two
roosters each. They ran to the truck and instructed Gorriceta to
drive immediately as they were being chased. Gorriceta then drove
the truck to Jaro, another city district. The four of them were on the
front seat of the truck. Gorriceta, as the driver, was on the extreme
left and to his right was Suyo. Next to Suyo was Brillantes and on
the extreme right was Jaranilla. In the middle of the road, they were
intercepted by Policemen Ramonito Jabatan and Benjamin Castro.
Gorriceta stopped the truck near the policemn after Jabatan fired a
warning shot. Jabatan went to the right side of the truck near
Jaranilla and ordered all of them to step out which they did not
heed. Brillantes pulled his revolver but did not fire it while Suyo did
nothing. Jaranilla, all of a sudden, shot Patrolman Jabatan. The
shooting frightened Gorriceta who immediately started the truck
and drove straight home while Jaranilla kept on firing towards
Jabatan. Jaranilla, Suyo and Brillantes alighted in front of Gorriceta’s
house where the latter was instructed not to tell anybody about the
 39

inicident. Gorriceta went to his room and after a while, he heard

policemen calling his name asking him to come down. He initially
hid in the ceiling of his house and it wasn’t until 8am the following
day that he decided to come down and was brought to police
headquarters.

ISSUE

Whether or not defendants Suyo and Brillantes are liable as

co principal in the crime of Homicide.

HELD:

The killing of the peace officer is characterized as homicide

because the act was made during the spur of the moment and the
treacherous mode of attack was not consciously or deliberately
adopted by the offender. In addition, only persons who perpetrated
the killing is responsible for such action. Furthermore, mere
presence in the crime scene does not necessarily make a person co-
principal thereof. Hence, only the accused, Elias Jaranilla, who
perpetrated the killing is responsible and liable for robbery and
homicide. The co-accused, Suyo and Brillantes, are convicted of
[Link], the decision of the lower court is reversed and
sentenced the accused, Ricardo Suyo and Franco Brillantes, as co-
principals in the crime of theft. The crime was theft and not
[Link] was no evidence that violence or intimidation was
employed in the taking of the roosters hence, Art. 298 of the RPC
(Robbery with violence against or intimidation) could not be
invoked. It also could not fall under Art. 299 (which penalizes
robbery in an inhabited house, public building or edifice devoted to
worship) as the chicken coop was outside Baylon’s house. Nor was it
a dependency thereof as contemplated under Art. 301.

PEOPLE VS CEMPRON G.R. No. L-66324, July 6, 1990

FACTS

Gregorio Gudelusao was inside the cockpit and in a squatting

position counting the bettors‘ money when suddenly, accused-
appellant, holding a knife which was concealed under a cock‘s wing,
and while passing behind the deceased, stabbed the latter on
different parts of the body which caused his death.

ISSUE

Whether or not treachery is present in the commission of the

crime?
HELD
 40

Yes. The foregoing appears that the mode of attack adopted

by appellant insured the accomplishment of his purpose without risk
to himself. The trial court therefore correctly applied the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.