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The state-Moro armed conflict in the Philippines Unresolved national

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 Asian Journal of Political Science • Volume 13 • Number 1 • June 2005

The State-Moro Armed Conflict

in the Philippines
Unresolved national question or question
of governance?
RIZAL G. BUENDIA*

The continuing struggle of the Moro secessionist movement in the Philippines is one
of Southeast Asia’s longest armed conflicts. The tenacity of the conflict lies in two
competing concerns: the assertion of self-determination rights of the Moro separatist
movement; and the affirmation of the Philippines’ sovereign right to territorial integrity.
However, beneath these rights are crucial issues that remain unanswered both by
the contending forces—problems where internecine violence and conflict emanate
from. This article argues that self-determination rights can be adequately exercised
by people who have clearly defined their national identity and concept of a nation.
Unfortunately, the Moro multi-ethnic national identity has yet to be crystallised while
the idea of a Bangsamoro (Bangsa Nation) remains weak. On the other hand, the state
has yet to address the Moros’ legitimate demands of political autonomy, socio-economic
development, and social justice and discrimination. Without underestimating the ethnic
component of secessionism, the article concludes that poor governance has prolonged,
complicated, and further justified the Moros’ quest to secede from the Republic.

Introduction
The Mindanao conflict, expressed in Muslim armed resistance against the Philippine
state, has deep historical roots and resolution is definitely not easy. The armed
conflict which has been fought under two competing banners of national self-
determination on the one hand, and protection of state rights on the other hand,
has taken thousands of lives, destroyed millions worth of properties, and displaced
a magnitude of people who sought refuge in other regions of the country as well as
in neighbouring countries. The territorial question has been disputed more often
in the battlefields than over a negotiating table.
The Muslim secessionists prefer to be called Moros1 rather than Filipinos. They
believe that their people have never been part of the Philippines and their current
struggle is a continuation of their ancestors’ war for independence, which was first
launched against Spanish and American rule, and presently under the post-colonial

* Rizal G. Buendia, PhD, is Associate Professor at the Political Science Department,

De La Salle University-Manila, Philippines.
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 107

“Filipino-run Philippine state.” On the other side, the state contends that the
separatist movement has to acknowledge the existence of a sovereign Philippine state
whose territorial jurisdiction has been defined in accordance with the international
law. Hence, the state views the ongoing armed struggle of the Moros as an act of
secession against a legitimate state while the former declares it an exercise of the
people’s “right to self-determination” against a state which “illegitimately annexed”
the Bangsamoro.2
This article examines two competing perspectives in nation-state building
espoused by the Muslim minorities and Philippine state. It traces both the historical
antecedents and consequences of Moro-state conflict, the relevant and primary actors
involved in the conflict as well as their motives and strategies in realising their
objectives, and the roots of the political violence. Towards the end of the article, a
general assessment of the prospects of resolving the ongoing conflict is made.
The article argues that the Moros self-determination struggle, without
underestimating the ethnic content of the resistance movement, is triggered and
drawn out more by the combined causes of state’s centralism that restrict their self-
governing power, socio-economic grievances and deprivation, and perceived injustices,
discrimination, and alienation of the people from the mainstream of Philippine
political and economic development rather than an overarching movement with a
single concept of a Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation). A Bangsa Moro consciousness and
national unification among Philippine Muslims has yet to be achieved. The article
concludes that the armed conflict between the Moros and the state is more of a
contestation of democratic space where expansive and interactive governance can
function and thrive both for the minorities and majorities rather than a question of
Moro national self-determination.

Ethnogenesis of Moro and the Colonial State

The term Moro was the appellation applied by the Portuguese, who seized Melaka
in 1511, to all Muslim population of Southeast Asia.3 It was the name used by the
Spaniards to refer to Muslim inhabitants in the Philippines alluding to the Muslim
Moorish occupation of the Iberian Peninsula and the northern coast of the African
continent in 711 A.D. When the Spaniards crossed the Pacific Ocean and reached
the Philippines in the sixteenth century, they encountered ferocious resistance from
Muslims inhabiting the Southern Sultanates of the country. This reminded them
of their ancient enemy, who aside from being Islamic, was hostile like the Moors.
Thus the Philippine Muslims were called “Moros.”4
The Muslims’ historical claim on Mindanao and Sulu as their homeland
predates the Spanish colonisation of the Philippines that began with the arrival
of General Legazpi in 1565. About 200 years prior to colonial rule, local Islamic
communities and settlements were already thriving in Sulu and Mindanao. There
108 • Rizal G. Buendia

were three established sultanates Jolo (seat of the first Muslim sultanate), Sulu,
and Maguindanao long before the Spaniards consolidated their control over the
northern part of the Philippines. Trade and commerce by Muslim traders across
the Malay regions and beyond were also flourishing.
According to a 1573 Spanish record, three Muslim settlements in their nascent
stage were found in Luzon.5 This signifies the rising influence of Islam in the
country that could transform the entire archipelago into a Muslim nation similar
to its neighbouring countries. Clearly, Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century
aborted the spread of Islamic proselytisation activities and reversed the trajectory
of Islamic diffusion in the country.
As the Spanish monarchy claimed sovereign rule over most of the lands of the
indios (from the word india, meaning “native”), it failed to claim sovereignty over the
territories of the Moros. The Muslims offered a good fight to check the coloniser’s
attempt to annex the Moro homeland under the Spanish Crown. While the wars
between the Spaniards and indio conscripts on the one hand and the Muslims on
the other hand were religious in character or had religious undertones, opposition
to Spanish rule failed to transcend ethno-linguistic identities of native Muslims to a
national and transcendental Moro identity comparable to the transformation of indio
(Hispanised, subjugated, and Catholicised) into a Filipino national identity years before
the spark of the 1896 Revolution.6 Historical evidence was patchy and insufficient
to conclude that a Moro nation was created as a result of Muslim resistance against
colonial rule. In fact, in spite of the considerable success of Muslims to repel the
incursions of Spanish conquistadores, they were not able to rise above their limited
ethno-linguistic identification.
In a general sense, there was neither a unilateral nor single response to
Spanish colonialism among Muslim communities.7 McKenna challenged the idea
that aggressive Christianisation precipitated a heightened Islamic consciousness
and identity of the Muslims.8 A sense of “Moro-ness” among the Muslim populace
cannot be attributed to the harsh and ruthless governance of the Spanish regime. It
was during the less than half a century of American colonial regime rather than the
more than three centuries of Spanish rule when Moro developed into a transcendent
and self-conscious Philippine Muslim ethnic identify.
Najeeb Saleeby, one of the most influential thinkers in the early American
colonial administration, expressed in his 1913 essay, The Moro Problem, that the various
Muslim ethno-linguistic groups were in no sense united, nor possessed—jointly or
individually—a politically potent oppositional Islamic consciousness.
Acknowledging the value of imparting a sense of collective development
and common “destiny” among the Moros, Saleeby suggests that Moros be allowed
to emulate a “superior” culture analogous to that devised by the Americans for
Christian Filipinos.
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 109

Moved by a natural tendency to imitate superior civilization, he would unconsciously

reform his customs and home life and gradually acquire American ideas and new
ambitions. An enlightened Moro community, wisely guided by efficient American
officials, would undoubtedly work out its own destiny, and following the natural law
of growth and development would gradually rise in wealth and culture to the level
of a democratic municipality.9

Saleeby laid down the colonial genesis of Morohood. Foremost was his campaign for a
datu-led development and unification of the Philippine Muslims through the formation
of a new transcendent Muslim identity—the transformation and fusion of Muslim
ethnic identities into a single Moro identity. Second was to intensify and deepen
people’s understanding as well as appreciation of Islam as their religion. And third, the
precipitation of social osmosis to enable the Moros to acquire the level of economic
and political development the Americans have bequeathed to Christian Filipinos.
In spite of America’s fierce pacification operations in the Muslim south, that
took longer and applied more cruel methods compared to the northern rebels,
benevolence was also pronounced.10 The Muslims and other non-Christianised
groups in the country were treated as “wards” of the nation who needed the state’s
protection and additional tutelage to bring about “their advancement into civilization
and material prosperity.”11 As Abinales assays, a number of Muslims have made their
relationship with Americans intimate and highly personal while more politically
astute datus have established a long relationship with the new colonisers in the hope
of soliciting political benefits.12
Markedly, the promotion of American-type education and institutionalisation
of public school system in the entirety of the Philippines hastened the growth and
formation of Muslim identity as Muslim Filipinos. Apart from the influence of
American system of education that produced new Western-oriented and educated
Muslim elite, the policy of secularisation has led, to a significant degree, the
rationalisation of Muslim political system.
In McKenna’s review of US policies towards the end of American rule, he
says:

… American colonial policies had the effect of ethnicizing Muslim identity in the
Philippines. By “ethnicizing” Islam I mean to say that American colonial rulers
encouraged the development of a self-conscious Philippine Muslim identity among
a generation of educated Muslim elite who were otherwise divided by significant
linguistic, geographic, and, to some extent, cultural barriers. … [a]s the term “Moro”
remained a pejorative among Philippine Christians, the most common alternative
denomination became “Muslim Filipino,” connoting a Muslim citizen of the new (or
soon-to-be) Philippine nation.13

Cognizant of the imminent granting of Philippine independence by the United

States in 1946, Muslim politicians tried to project the image of a unified and
110 • Rizal G. Buendia

revitalised populace in order to gain some power bases in a nation-state that

will be controlled by Christian Filipinos. The amplification of a self-conscious
transcendent identity as Philippine Muslims resulted not from their opposition
to American colonial rule but adherence to the objectives of western-defined
development and ideals of secularism.

The Search for Moro Identity and Nation-State

The quest of Muslims of Mindanao to create their own sovereign state started when
the entire Philippines was still a colony of the United States of America. Beginning
in early 1920s, Muslim leaders of Sulu and Mindanao began a peaceful movement
that asserted their right to establish their own nation-state and form a government
of their choice. Leaders petitioned and offered two options for the US Congress
to consider: join the Federal Government of the United States, or be declared a
separate sovereign state from the would-be Republic of the Philippines.14 Being part
of the Philippine state was not among their alternatives.
The denial of their petition and inevitability of Philippine independence after an
American sponsored 10-year transition period under a Commonwealth Republic led
Muslim leaders to reconfigure their Moro identity in line with forthcoming Philippine
nation-state. Muslim leaders declared themselves as “Filipinos” and considered Moro—
pejoratively associated with piracy, savagery, slavery, treachery, amok (juramentado),
and other negative connotations—as a name that is unacceptable.
In the 1934 Constitutional Convention that framed the 1935 Philippine
Constitution (used as the fundamental law of the Commonwealth and 1946 Republic
of the Philippines), several elected Muslim Constitutional delegates, led by Alauya
Alonto, called upon their fellow delegates not only to cease from calling Muslims
as Moros but also to accept Muslims as part of the Filipino nation. Alonto of Lanao
henceforth declared:

We do not like to be called “Moros” because when we are called “Moros” we feel that
we are not considered as part of the Filipino people… So that I would like to request
the members of this Convention that we prefer to be called “Mohammedan Filipinos”
and not “Moros,” because if we are called “Moros” we will be considered as enemies
[of the state] … 15

The turn of events is a classic case of shifting self-definition, attaching new value
and meaning to one’s identity in the prospect of advancing its political interests and
exigencies of power within the parameters of a newfound state.
The intensification of ethnicised Muslim identity continued after the Americans
left. Although Islamic education from early 1950s until late 1960s was geared towards
the deepening of Muslim consciousness, it underscored the value of “good citizenship”
and emphasised the importance of political participation of Muslims in the affairs
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 111

of the Philippine Republic. Domocao Alonto of Lanao, a Muslim member of the

House of Representatives, proclaimed before the First National Muslim Convention
in 1955: “We need a thorough spiritual rejuvenation … If we are good Muslims,
we are automatically good citizens.”16
What deepened in almost two decades from the 1950s was the ethnic self-
recognition of the masses as Filipino-Muslims (foremost as a Filipino and second,
as a Muslim). The legitimacy of the Philippine state to govern the Muslim areas of
the country was neither questioned nor challenged by any of the Muslim elite.

From unity to disunity

In late 1960s until early 1970s, a string of political events transpired that triggered
the re-invention of Muslim identity. The emergence of new intellectuals and
counter-elite among the Muslims revived the independence movement of the 1920s,
momentarily suspended by the 1946 Philippine independence.
The violence of the state in the infamous Corregidor Jabidah massacre on
18 March 1968,17 almost 50 years after the peaceful clamour for independence,
re-sparked the issue of Muslim sovereignty, this time through war. The massacre,
otherwise known as the “Corregidor Incident,” took place when 28 out of less than
200 Muslim military trainees (called “Jabidah commandos”), mostly Tausug and
Sama from Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, were summarily executed in Corregidor Island.18
Notwithstanding a few Senate and Congressional hearings on the issue, no one was
arrested and held responsible for the ghastly massacre.19
The Jabidah massacre was perceived as the state’s assault against Muslims who
offered their services to the Republic, but had been duped, subjugated, and perfidiously
murdered by Christians acting on behalf of the state. Both Muslim political elite and
traditional leaders have experienced the contradictions in their hyphenated identity
and felt the frustrations in their bid to be integrated in the body politic.
The tragedy gave birth to the Muslim (later renamed Mindanao) Independence
Movement (MIM) led by Datu Udtog Matalam, then Governor of Cotabato province
(the biggest in the country at that time). Matalam’s call for “secession” came in the
wake of political violence in Cotabato that was then beginning to take shape as a
Muslim-Christian conflict.20 However, he relinquished his idea of secession soon
after then President Marcos co-opted him and later became the Presidential Adviser
on Muslim Affairs.
Other Muslim politicians and traditional leaders came together to continue
what Matalam had given up. Then member of the House of Representatives, Raschid
Lucman formed the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organisation (BMLO) in 1971 but
later dropped the name Moro, which remains unacceptable to many of the Muslims,
and adopted Bangsa Muslimin Islamic Liberation Organisation (BMILO) instead in
1984.21 Generally composed of Maranao ethnic group, the BMILO was conceived to
112 • Rizal G. Buendia

be the umbrella organisation of all Muslim liberation forces.22 The BMILO braced
itself for a protracted armed confrontation with the state in pursuit of its goal to
craft a separate Muslim state from the Philippines. Towards this effort, several
batches of Muslims participated in a series of military training conducted in Sabah,
Malaysia Among those who belong to the first batch, known as the “Top 90,” were
Nur Misuari and Salamat Hashim.23
Nevertheless, the BMILO was not able to sustain itself as an alternative to
MIM when some of its key leaders tried to negotiate with then President Marcos
for Muslim Mindanao’s political autonomy. This was perceived by the younger
and more militant BMILO members as a sign of capitulation. The frustration and
disgust caused by the leadership, by and large composed of Muslim politicians and
traditional elite of Muslim society, led Misuari and Hashim together with a number
of young intellectuals of the BMILO to bolt out of the organisation and eventually
established the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).
Gaining lessons from the past Muslim independence movement beginning
in the 1920s, Misuari assessed that the failures of previous movements were not
wholly rooted in the callousness of the state in its treatment of Muslim minorities
and discriminatory policies that favour the Christian majority but also partly caused
by the “collaboration” of their own Muslim leaders with the Manila “politico-
economic elite.” Misuari sets him apart from the rest of the Muslim organisations.
He conceived a rebellion that has two fundamental objectives: to set up a single
independent homeland covering the 13 ethno-linguistic Muslim groupings in the
Philippines;24 and to wage war against Muslim traditional politicians and aristocratic
leaders who cooperated with the state.25
Misuari’s vision of a secessionist war was emphatically secular in orientation
rather than Islamic. It is neither ethnic nor religious. Its goal is to reclaim the
Bangsa Moro (Moro Nation), the Muslims’ homeland, that has been “unjustifiably
annexed by the Philippine state.” He called upon his brethren to renounce their
identities as Filipino-Muslims and declare their identity and nationality as “Moro,” a
reincarnation of the pre-colonial identity as the descendants of the “unsubjugated”
and “uncolonised” peoples. What looked to be the state’s prejudices against the
Muslims had found a national expression. As Ernest Gellner says, it is more
advantageous to set up a “rival nation” when entry into the dominant nation is
difficult if not impossible.26
The maiden issue of MNLF’s clandestine newsletter, Mahardika, stipulates the
meaning of Moro identity and character of Moro struggle. It is national in scope
and covers what it imagines to be the confines of the Bangsa Moro neither ethnic
nor religious.

From this very moment, there shall be no stressing the fact that one is a Tausug, a
Samal, a Yakan, a Subanon, a Kalagan, a Maguindanao, a Maranao or a Badjao. He
is only a Moro. Indeed, even those of other faith [sic] who have long established
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 113

residence in the Bangsa Moro homeland and whose good-will and sympathy are
with the Bangsa Moro Revolution shall, for purposes of national identification, be
considered Moros. In other words, the term Moro is a national concept that must be
understood as all embracing for all Bangsa Moro people within the length and breadth of our
national boundaries.2727

In retrospect, Misuari transformed the epithet “Moro into a positive identity of the
Muslims and symbol of unity and pride in the course of national resistance against
the Philippine state. The ethnicising of Muslim identity was a consequence of the
awakening of Muslim self-consciousness.
The Bangsamoro struggle is an expression of a “reactive nationalism,” articulated
by the new and non-traditional counter-elite on a reactive basis, and resonates with
Muslim society which is undergoing some “crisis of self-confidence.” It demonises
the threats of the state as the enemy and mobilises the masses to take collection
action against such threats. It has to appeal to an educated Muslim middle class and
is invariably populist, intended to induct the masses into politics.
Misuari led the MNLF of about 65,000 armed regulars for 30 years in war
and peace. The Bangsamoro independence movement was nonetheless saddled with
leadership crisis and power struggles. The question of Moro unification has been
the overriding concern both of the Muslims and movement’s sponsors like the
Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC),28 the Muslim World League (MWL),
and the Muslim World Congress (MWC).
In 34 years from the time the MNLF was established in 1971,29 the movement
suffered four organisational fissures, a clash over leadership occurred every over eight
years on the average. Currently, there are four Moro organisations (varying in size
and prominence) advancing the issue of self-determination in different forms and
adopting dissimilar strategies. A fifth organisation just emerged recently, in February
2005, and engaged the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in a running battle
in Sulu group of islands.
The first split took place as early as 1977, a year after the MNLF and the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) forged the GRP-MNLF Tripoli
Agreement.30 Salamat Hashim (a leading member of MNLF Central Committee), a
devout Muslim Maguindanaoan, broke ties with the MNLF and formed the “New
MNLF” which advocated for autonomy rather than independence. Hashim projected
his newfound organisation as a reformist party that can deal with the government
better than the MNLF. When the OIC maintained its backing to the MNLF, the
New MNLF changed its name to Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984,
and made Islam as its official ideology. Hashim challenged Misuari, a secular and
nationalist, as the rightful leader of the Bangsamoro. He chaired the MILF until his
death on 13 July 2003.
The MILF’s armed force, the Bangsa Moro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF),
has about 120,000 fighters (80 percent are armed) and 300,000 militiamen in late
114 • Rizal G. Buendia

1990s.31 Even though the AFP puts the MILF strength to be between 8,000 and
15,000, it does not deny that rebels ranks swelled by 14 percent in the first six
months of 1999 and 11 percent in terms of firearms in the same period. MILF’s
military might has seriously confronted government forces in Mindanao from the
time the MNLF became part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) 32 in 1996 in line with the provisions of the GRP-MNLF Final Peace
Agreement (FPA).33
The second split happened in 1991, two years after the creation of the ARMM
in 1989, with the founding of the Abu Sayyaf (“sword bearer”) Group or ASG by
Abdurajak Janjalani. Like Hashim, Janjalani was a pious leader who studied Islamic
law in Saudi Arabia but more radical compared with Hashim. He received his
military training in Libya and fought in the 1979–1989 Afghanistan war against
the Russian invasion. He was later killed in an encounter with policemen in 1998
and ASG’s leadership was assumed by his brother, Khadaffy Janjalani (thought to be
the titular head). While the ASG shares the same disillusionment with the MILF
with regards to MNLF’s cooperation with the government, it nonetheless differs
with the MILF in its vision of an Islamic state and the manner it can be realised.
The ASG advocates the creation of a “purely Islamic government” through “Jihad
Fi-Sabil-lillah” (Islamic war) to end “oppression, injustice, capricious ambitions, and
arbitrary claims impose on the Muslims.”34
Mainly composed of young and disgruntled elements of MNLF and MILF and
largely composed of Tausug and Sama ethnic groups of the Muslim community, its
military strength is estimated between 300 and 1,000 armed guerrillas with roughly
400 firearms.35 It has been known for its hostage-taking and kidnapping for ransom,
robberies, beheadings, and other ghastly acts that victimised both Muslim and
Christian civilians. The MNLF and MILF view the ASG with consternation and
dismay. The MNLF had given tacit support to the AFP military action against the
ASG while the MILF renounces its activities and calls it a group of bandits that
have given Islam a bad name.36 The U.S. and Philippine governments have classified
the ASG as a “terrorist organisation” and pursue a policy of “search and destroy”
without any inclination of forging a peace agreement.
The third faction was formed in the early months of 1995, prior to the conclusion
of the 1996 peace accord between the GRP and MNLF. Known as the National Islamic
Command Council (NICC), under the leadership of Melham Alam (former chief of
staff of Misuari), it claims to have nearly 90 percent of the original 20,000-25,000
MNLF forces. The military, however, estimates its membership to few hundreds. In
a press conference held in March 2000, it announced that the guerrilla war against
the Philippine government would continue and accused Misuari as a collaborator of
the Christian state and a traitor to the Bangsamoro liberation struggle. The NICC
further pronounced the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao
through “mutual destruction.” Given the relative similarity between NICC’s and
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 115

ASG’s belief and mode of struggle, there is a strong indication that both of them
have been working either collectively or separately in staging terrorist acts against
Christian and Muslim civilians masquerading as political engagements.
The fourth fracture came seven months before the ARMM election in November
2001. Led by his comrade-in-arms in the MNLF and ARMM, calling themselves
as the “Council of 15,” 37 Misuari was declared as “incompetent” to remain as
MNLF’s Chairman and euphemistically elevating him as “Chairman Emeritus”
instead. This effectively rendered him powerless. Through a resolution it issued on
29 April 2001, the Council proclaimed itself as the legitimate Central Committee
of the MNLF.38 This was eventually acknowledged by the Philippine government
and OIC’s 10th Summit Meeting on 15 October 2003 held in Putrajaya, Malaysia
as the sole “representative of Muslim community in the Philippines.”39
Likewise, Misuari was ousted as ARMM Governor and Chair of the Southern
Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD)40 which he jointly held
for five years (1996–2001). Following his expulsion, Misuari was incarcerated on
charges of sedition41 and corruption42 filed against him in court by the government.
The “Council of 15” had consolidated its power with the election of Parouk Hussin,
former Foreign Affairs Committee Chair of Misuari and one of the leaders of the
“Council,” as the new regional governor in November 2001, notwithstanding the
political and financial support of the national government in the electoral campaign.
Hussin serves as governor under the new ARMM’s Organic Act (Republic Act
9054).43
The fifth group surfaced in February 2005. The military named it as “Misuari
Breakaway Group” (MBG) or “MNLF renegades,” to distinguish it from the
“mainstream MNLF” which had been part of government in 1996. It was tagged as
an assemblage of terrorists linked to the ASG. Contrary to what the military claimed
that the group demanded the speedy and fair trial of Misuari who was imprisoned
under charges of treason and corruption, its spokesperson, Ustadz Habier Malik,
cited AFP’s atrocities in Sulu as the main triggering factor for the uprising. The
Misuari factor or loyalty to any individual never figured as the cause in the most
recent violence in Mindanao.44
Factionalism in the Bangsamoro struggle, either among and between traditional
political elite or new intellectual and counter-elite, has not only hobbled the quest
of the Moros towards achieving their goal but more importantly, highlighted the
fundamental and continuing question of Moro identity and Moro national unity.
From Matalam’s MIM to Hashim’s MILF, Muslim minorities find it difficult to
unite under one self-identifying and all-inclusive banner. As a consequence of
constant divisions and splitting up of leaders in the Moro movement, the process
of ethnicising Moro identity as a nationality has been stunted and is a reflection of
a crisis in self-definition.
116 • Rizal G. Buendia

The continuing formation of Moro identity and national unity

Although heads of organisations refer to the same “national past,” the “national
future” is indeterminate and blurred. The internecine debate over the concept of
a Bangsa Moro and strategy in achieving the vision of a separate state is far from
being resolved. The Moros speak of different Bangsas. The erstwhile secessionist
MNLF says the Bangsa covers the 13 provinces and nine cities in Mindano, Palawan,
Sulu, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi, while the MILF declares that it shall comprise the
geographical areas dominated by the Muslims (six provinces [Maguindanao, Lanao
del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Basilan, Tawi-Tawi, Sultan Kudarat] and the city of
Marawi). This shall constitute domain of the future Moro nation-state. The ASG
and other splinter groups have nebulous concept of Bangsa Moro. In other words,
there is no single idea of a Bangsa Moro among the Muslims asserting their right to
self-determination. Apparently, the notion of a Moro Nation is constricted by their
assorted political and organisational agenda.
Moreover, ruptures in the Bangsamoro movement occur whenever the state
accommodates some of the political demands or acquiesces partly to certain grievances
advance by a particular Moro revolutionary organisation. It appears that the shifting
loyalties and interests of leaders as well as their respective organisational strategies
and tactics is more of a response to the vagaries of political priorities and constraints
which the state presents.
It is also instructive to note that the three major rebel fronts that contested
state’s power since the Jabidah massacre of 1968 correspond to the three main
ethnic groups among more than a dozen of Muslim ethno-linguistic groupings.
The BMILO was generally composed of the Maranaos, the MNLF by the Tausugs,
and the MILF by the Maguindanaos. It was also reported that Moro rebels prefer
to fight with their fellow ethnic groups, e.g., Maranaos, Tausugs, and Maguindanaos,
rather than to be with ethnic groups other than their own.45 This does not connote
however that feeling of enmity and hostility exists between ethnic groups.
Similarly, there is no convincing proof that links the organisational split among
rebel groups to inter-ethnic competition or animosity. The fact remains that both
MNLF and MILF to date are composed of Moro multi-ethnic fighters who are
generally united in pursuing their particular organisational objectives rather than
divided by internecine ethnic identities. Nevertheless, there is ample confirmation
to suggest that both organisations shift their strategies and tactics based on the
configuration of state and character of regime that interacts with them.
Indeed, the “national character” of the Moro struggle has yet to be strengthened.
Its weakness is portrayed not only in terms of the Moros historical difficulty to stand
as one people united under a single leadership that effectively engages the state
into a vision of self-governance but also in categorically defining and qualifying the
national identity of people. Moro identity is far from dense and vulnerable to political
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 117

manipulation either by the state or non-state actors as witnessed by the formation

of innumerable groups, some of them involved in criminal activities, using “Islam”
as their protective shield.
In spite of the aforesaid infirmity in Moro’s identity, affinity with Muslims
(regardless of ethno-linguistic grouping) has persisted. Identities have not dissolved
and primordial interests have been sustained. They were seldom surrendered to the
imposing power of the Philippine state. Ethnic ties have emotional, psychological,
and religious depths that are not easily severed. These are human ontological factors
which cannot be subjected to authoritative controls; thus, no amount of coercion
or repression can contain Moros aspirations to self-determination in an extended
period of time.
The dual dimension of Moro identity indicates its strength and weakness.
While Moros have not transcended their innate ethno-linguistic identity, this has not
prevented them to work and relate with other ethnic groups amicably—both Muslim
and Christian. This is attested by the presence of Christians and Muslim converts
in several armed and unarmed Moro organisations. The cultural boundary has been
permeable and spongy. On the other hand, the less than orthodox practice of Islam
among Filipino Muslims,46 in contrast to Muslims of Middle Eastern countries,
gives the Moros the opportunity to deepen their sense of oneness and nationhood
through a more tolerant manner and process of consultation and consensus with
other competing Moro revolutionary organisations.

The State and Moro Right to Self-Determination

In spite of the inability of Muslims to transcend their ethnic identities in peace and
war, the quest towards building a Moro nation-state continues. Saleeby’s observation
on the issue of Muslim unity in the early years of American colonisation and
Misuari’s effort to ethnicise Moro identity in the late 1960s and early 1970s have
not been translated into reality. Nonetheless, as the stringent objective conditions
of nationhood have yet to be met, the vision and subjective notion of creating a
Bangsa Moro kindles in the minds and hearts of Philippine Muslims.
In the process of realising the so-called Bangsa Moro Republik, amidst the
arduous task of surmounting and raising ethnic identities and loyalties to a level of
Moro national consciousness, the MILF continuous to be and now the most potent
armed organisation in carrying out the Moro secessionist movement. The government
has acknowledged the armed capability of its forces to threaten the territorial
integrity of the state after the MNLF acceded to political autonomy as defined in
the Philippine 1987 Constitution (Sections 15–21, Article X). Such recognition
prompted it to initiate and commence the process of forging a peace accord with
the MILF, beginning with informal negotiations, even before the conclusion of the
1996 GRP-MNLF FPA.
118 • Rizal G. Buendia

On 18 July 1997, then President Ramos was successful enough to bring the
MILF to the negotiation table. The GRP-MILF Agreement for the General Cessation
of Hostilities (AGCH) was signed but failed to yield any substantial results. Armed
hostilities between government and MILF forces intensified under then President
Estrada’s “All Out War” policy against the MILF in April 2000 and completely
disregarded even the 1998 General Framework of the Agreement of Intent (GFAI)47
between GRP and MILF peace panels inked under his own administration.
Seven years after the signing of the AGCH, now under President Arroyo, the
GRP-MILF negotiations, though resumed in 2001 through the signing of the General
Framework for the Resumption of Peace in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, have yet to
be concluded. The Tripoli Agreement of Peace of 200148 that defined three major
agenda items of security, rehabilitation, and ancestral domain has been limited to
exploratory talks rather than on the discussion on the aforesaid agenda.49 Likewise,
the GRP-MILF Peace Talks in 2003 have not been too fruitful. Negotiations
have been entirely focused on making ceasefire agreements more respectable and
implementable as these have oftentimes been breached rather than applied. Generally,
the peace talks have been highly volatile, tenuous, and insubstantial; limited to
ceasefire agreements and presently the process had run longer than the 1992–1996
GRP-MNLF talks.
In 2004, attempts were again made to contain armed clashes between the GRP
and MILF forces to enable both panels to commence the discussion on the more
substantive issues behind the 26 years of MILF secessionist struggle. In spite of
the pronouncement of government in late August 2004 that the GRP-MILF peace
negotiations are on track,50 armed conflict has yet to cease considerably.
On the part of the Philippine state, the defence and preservation of its territorial
integrity at all costs (armed and unarmed) persists as its primordial interest. Gaining
the support of the OIC, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and
presumably, the United Nations, the Philippines maintained that any attempts that
will alter the country’s political and geographical jurisdiction will have to be done
within the constitutional framework and processes of the country. Hence, MILF’s
ultimate agenda to secede, as what the MNLF began in 1971, is a non-negotiable
subject in the GRP-MILF peace talks.
On the other hand, while the MILF recognises peace negotiations as the only
“peaceful, civilized, and democratic way of solving the Bangsamoro problem,”51 it
repeatedly emphasises that independence should be the main agenda and framework
for the formal talks. “There is no point to proceed if the negotiations will not
lead to independence,” declared the MILF negotiators. The late MILF Chairman
Hashim believed that what the GRP-MNLF FPA resolved was the government’s
problem and not the Bangsamoro problem, “the agreement never touched the core
of the Bangsamoro problem which is the illegal and immoral usurpation of their
(referring to the Moros) ancestral homeland and legitimate rights to freedom and
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 119

self-determination.”52 Hashim’s successor, Al Haj Murad, also expressed in a message

on the occasion of the fasting month of Ramadhan in November 2003, that “there
can be no genuine peace and development unless the right of the Bangsamoro people
to self-determination is adequately addressed.”53
What makes the right of self-determination so difficult to clarify is that its
exercise involves a clash of fundamental world order principles. On the one side is
the principle of upholding the territorial sanctity of existing states. On the other
side is the sense that peoples have the right to statehood. Articles 1 (2) and 55 of
the United Nations Charter have embodied the principle of self-determination
as one of its guiding philosophies. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) pursued the issue further by stating that self-determination is not simply
a principle but a right of everyone to “liberty.” The International Covenants on
Human Rights—The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR)—specifically provide in Article 1 of each that “All peoples have the right
of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”54
However the adoption of the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples (DGICCP) in the form of a General Assembly
Resolution is instructive. It confirms the right of self-determination in relation
to colonialism and denies some forms of the right’s wider application. Evidently,
it appreciates the inevitable tension between the exercise of the right to self-
determination and the parallel set of rights associated with territorial integrity of
existing and emerging sovereign states. Thus, it reiterates Article 1 of the ICESCR
and ICCPR in its Operative Provision 2 but at the same time qualifies such right
in its Provision 6 which reads: “Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the
national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.”55
Provision 6 of the DGICCP culminated in the adoption of the influential
Declaration of Principles Concerning Friendly Relations Among States (DPFRS) in
1970 as United Nation’s General Assembly Resolution 2625. The resolution accepted
the principle of the right of self-determination that is linked to the notion of “equal
rights of peoples” but cautioned that the right shall not be construed as

authorising or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally

or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent
States conducting themselves in compliance wit the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples … and thus possessed of a government representing the whole
people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour.56

The assurance of territorial unity is now made contingent on the government being
representative of the whole people and non-discriminatory in relation to “race,
120 • Rizal G. Buendia

creed, or colour” and full right of self-determination (including secession) pertains

only in colonial situations.
In the international law literature on self-determination, two main views are
pulling in opposite directions. The first tendency is the more restrictive view which
limits the exercise of the right of self-determination within the confines of the
territorial jurisdiction of existing states; the right cannot be invoked if the territorial
unity of the state will be transgressed. The second view is expansionary which
acknowledges and, to varying degrees, validates recent state-busting practice in a
reformulated legal approach that admits that the character and scope of the right
are more unsettled than ever. This latter view takes due note of the degree to which
non-sovereign territories of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia were
given diplomatic recognition and admitted to the UN as sovereign states.
The controversy on the principle and right of self-determination has led
peoples and states to armed conflict. Struggles for autonomy and secession on the
defence of peoples’ national rights are politically and militarily confronted by the
state, invoking its right to protect the inviolability of its territory. Peoples of the
world are told they have the right to self-determination. Nevertheless, if this right
is suppressed by a sovereign state, the international community supports territorial
integrity until a war of independence is successful. As in the past, the entire problem
is settled on the battlefield. The conflict has been the source of tremendous human
suffering and destruction in Asia, Africa, and Europe
By and large, the conflict behind self-determination struggles is fundamentally
a question of territorial rights. In war and peace, the issue of one’s control over a
physical space has been the persistent bone of contention between the Philippine
state and the Bangsamo independence movement. In an effort to pursue the “self-
determination” agenda in the GRP-MILF peace talks, the MILF pushes its concern
over ancestral domain. It hopes that government’s recognition of the right of the
Bangsamoro over their ancestral domain will eventually result to the acknowledgement
of Moros’ territory. “We just want a physical space where we can freely practice our
religion and apply our ways of life. There is no need to seize power,” says MILF
Information Chief, Mohagher Iqbal.57
Indeed, the linkage between Moro identity and territory is intricately
intertwined. Poulantzas, emphasising the importance of territory to the notion of
group selfidentity, refers to the “historicity of a territory and territorialization of a
history”—a territorial tradition concretized in the homeland.58 Therefore, a territory
by itself is a human construct which serves as the material basis in defining and
redefining human, group, ethnic, and social relations. It is the source of one’s social
security, assistance, dependency, sociability, and intimacy. It assures the continuity
of culture and endurance of collective memory of peoples. As such, the concepts
of space and territory are of extreme importance in ensuring the tenacity of one’s
identity and survival as a people.
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 121

The absence of or restriction to such control may invariably threaten the

fulfilment of the peoples’ rights and imperil their identity to a particular territory.
In this respect, the anxiety of the Bangsamoro over the future of their homeland
simply infers their lack of full control over their lives. The right of a group with a
distinctive politicoterritorial identity to determine its own destiny is the political
translation of aspirations in the demands for selfdetermination. Judge Hardy Dillard
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), writing in a separate opinion on the
Western Sahara Case, says that: “It is for the people to determine the destiny of
the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people.”59
One of the most vital reasons in exercising control over a piece of territory is
that it reifies power. Tillich points out:

Being means having space or, more exactly, providing space for oneself. This is the
reason for the tremendous importance of geographical space and the fight for its
possession by power groups. The struggle is not simply an attempt to remove another
group from a given space. The real purpose is to draw this space into a larger power
field, to deprive it of a centre of its own.60

In as much as ethnic identity is, above all other things, territorial identity, the issue
of Bangsamoro homeland has been the crux of the MILF’s self-determination struggle.
In fact, the subject of ancestral domain will be the main agenda in the next round
of discussion in late 2005 between the GRP and MILF negotiating panels. This
would likely be a thorny issue and could lead to another stalemate.
At the onset, the government perceives the question of ancestral domain within
the bounds of the 1997 law: the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic
Act 8371. IPRA seeks to recognize, protect and promote the right of indigenous
peoples and cultural communities including Muslims, to claim ownership over their
ancestral domain pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. It hinges on the concept of
stewardship or the right of indigenous peoples to be the guardians and custodians
of the earth. The law further sustains the Regalian Doctrine—affirmation of the
state’s ultimate right to own, develop, and utilise all lands and resources under its
political jurisdiction as enshrined in Section 2, Article 12 of the Constitution. By
invoking the inherent power of the state to eminent domain, it reserves its right to
have the last word on ancestral domains.
In contrast, the MILF works within the notion that the right over their ancestral
domain is none other than the right to their homeland—the Bangsamoro territory,
believed to have been “illegally annexed by the state.” It is not only about claims
and rights to obtain ancestral domain titles as what the IPRA promises, but the right
to self-determination and a correction of historical injustices.
The MILF regards ancestral domain as the issue, which could give substance to
the self-determination struggle. The government, on the other hand, considers it a
question that can be answered within the bounds of the state’s power and authority.
122 • Rizal G. Buendia

The differences of perspectives and frameworks of mind in viewing the issue of

ancestral domain could be a tough concern in the upcoming negotiations but not
necessarily insurmountable.

Beyond National Self-Determination: Examining the Moro-

State Conflict
The contradiction between the state’s nation-building project and the secessionist
movement’s state-creation venture has not only led to armed conflict but also tested
the viability and competency of the current Philippine political system in unifying the
country given the diversity of its people. Thus, beyond the issue of self-determination,
a crucial element that contributes to the mitigation or exacerbation of the current
conflict is the manner the state governs.
In Kofi Annan’s address to the UN General Assembly in 1999, the Secretary-
General probed on the right of any state to hide behind sovereignty while committing
flagrant violations of human rights. He argued that “the state is now widely understood
to be the servant of its people—and not vice versa.” Invoking the UN Charter,
Annan called upon states to protect and safeguard human rights and fundamental
freedoms of each and every citizen.61 Interestingly, in 1997, Prince Hans Adam
II of Liechtenstein presented a similar standpoint in his exposé “Democracy and
Self-Determination,” where he made the case that the state should principally offer
services to its citizens; they in turn should have the right to “choose their states and
citizenship freely—in self-determination.”62
Against this backdrop, it is worth examining self-determination from the
perspective of individual or group quests for human rights and better governance
rather than a collective struggle for national independence. In other words, the
search for a nation-state that is more responsive and relevant to the needs of people
who are culturally distinct from the others, oftentimes the majority, is contingent
more importantly on the character, ability, and capacity of the state to make itself
a “servant of its people” rather than simply a ruler of its people. The so-called
“internal’ dimension of self-determination, as what Prince Hans Adam II alludes
to, is as essential as to the right to one’s statehood.
In as much as peoples’ right to “internal” self-determination is hinged on the
legitimate claim of the minorities to cultural and political autonomy, it becomes
imperative that the grounds and sources where such demand springs from be
analysed. This part of the article is thus intended to assess the deep-seated causes
of the Moros’ self-determination struggle.
Without underrating the ethno-religious grounds of secessionism, it is contended
that the separatist movement in Mindanao has been prolonged because of three major
causes. First, the low degree of political autonomy which would enable Muslims
to protect, safeguard, and defend their culture, identity, language, ways of life, and
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 123

religion. Second, the inability of the state to adequately meet the basic socio-economic
needs of the Muslim community. Third, the widespread belief among Muslims that
they have been victims of the state’s systematic socio-cultural discrimination and
politico-economic exploitation, an impression that has been reflected in the present-
day economic, political, and social marginalisation of the people.

Low degree of political autonomy

Under the unitary governmental structure, the so-called “autonomy” enjoyed by the
ARMM has been historically an illusion. Devolution of powers manifests itself in
the formal powers or administrative arrangements that are purportedly decentralised
but politically controlled or influenced by the central government. In spite of the
pronouncement that the government promotes “unity through diversity,” policies
have been centrally formulated and conceived with less regard to the heterogeneous
requirements, needs, and demands of local communities especially the minority
peoples. They have been historically discriminated partially or totally in terms of
the quality public services and goods received, degree of affinity to the country, and
the amount the concern manifested by the national government to their plight.
The present political governance structure has not only rendered the Moros
and other minority groups powerless but also excluded them as part of the Filipino
nation. The lack of power sharing due to the concentration of political powers on
the few ruling elite either from the central government in Manila or Mindanao’s
regional administrative centres has been a constant source of discontentment and
frustration of people in the periphery. The increased despair, misery, and frustration
especially for those people in the most marginalised communities and regions in
Mindanao have fuelled armed uprisings.
The assimilationist policy has been manifested through the centralism exercised
by the state in the postcolonial period by means of its strategies such as: the emphasis
on centreoriented allocation of resources; centreoriented administrative system
whereby the government exerts control over all other parts of the country, including
the peripheral areas inhabited by ethnic groups; and provision of regional and local
autonomy which allows peripheral areas to govern themselves and participate in the
decisionmaking at the centre in accordance with the government’s predefined rules
and procedures. Such policy, however, has been seen as inappropriate and resisted by
those groups who do not see themselves as part of the nation thereby felt strongly
against the erosion of their selfidentity and sensed it as a gross violation of their
political and economic rights.
Democracies, as well as governmental structures have to tolerate the widest
possible diversity so long as the political system remains in equilibrium. In a similar
vein, constitutional framework and development strategies apropos of fostering cultural
pluralism have to be discovered sui generis in each case. In all respects, it becomes
124 • Rizal G. Buendia

evident that building a nation in a multiethnic society through the centralized

power of the state will simply result to internecine conflicts. Nationbuilding thus
requires the empowerment of diverse ethnic communities and recognition of their
right to nurture their own development as defined by their culture rather than by
the state.
The failures of the ARMM and previous “autonomous regions” created in
1977 to empower and uplift the living conditions of the Muslims have made
63

MILF less optimistic. Arroyo’s proposal for a more “enhanced, expanded, and
strengthened autonomy” under the draft GRP-MILF Final Peace Agreement was
shrugged off. It is a “tired phrase” states Michael Mastura, one of the members of
the MILF negotiating panel.64 Aquilino Pimentel, a senator from Mindanao says
that the “proposed peace pact tries to deal with the effects, not the causes, of the
war in Mindanao.”65 He then suggests a federal structure of government to address
the problem of the BangsaMoro rebellion and bring a lasting peace in Mindanao.
As a consequence of the top-down approach in development, Mindanao’s
economic growth path has been altered minimally throughout the post-colonial
years. Its economic performance since the country’s independence has always
been relegated to the role of being an agricultural products supplier, typifying the
classic dependency function of being the satellite of the country’s major urban and
metropolitan centres. It has the least access to basic services and infrastructure and
has the highest and constant incidence of poverty as the following section shows.

Socio-economic deprivation
The centralising power of the state also failed to uplift the socio-economic and health
conditions of the Muslims. While Mindanao is rich in natural and human resources,66
the people languish in destitution and suffer from the quagmire of poverty.
After more than a quarter of a century of Philippine government claims to be
“developing” Mindanao, national statistics illustrate the sad reality. Among the 16
administrative regions, ARMM registered the poorest. In 1991, 1994, 1997, and
2000, poverty incidence (proportion of individuals whose annual income fall below
the annual per capita) was registered at 56, 65, 64, and 63 percent respectively
while national average was placed at 41 percent covering the years 1991 and 1994;
33 percent in 1997 and 34 percent in 2000.67 Likewise, out of 81 provinces in the
country, Muslim dominated provinces of Sulu, Tawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del,
Sur, and Sultan Kudarat were among the poorest in 1997 and 2000 with poverty
incidence at 67.1 and 63.2 percent, 35.0 and 56.5 percent; 41.6 and 55.1 percent;
55.6 and 55.0 percent; and 36.6 and 54.3 percent respectively.68
In terms of indicators in living conditions and provision of social infrastructure,
ARMM and western Mindanao need special attention. They have the lowest
access to safe drinking water, electricity, and toilet and health facilities. Moreover,
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 125

Mindanao has the lowest share of the country’s health practitioners and visit rates
of health personnel. Such deplorable state is reflected in the island’s high crude
death rates with ARMM having the highest at 9.8 deaths per 1000 people.69 In the
simple literacy index, ARMM had the lowest in 1994 at 73.5 percent when national
average is 94 percent.70 Although participation rate71 for public and private schools
at the secondary level showed modest improvements for school years covering
1997–2000, cohort survival72 rates are lowest in ARMM and other conflict-ridden
areas of Mindanao. The state of human conditions is thus summarised in Philippines’
Human Development Index. The 1997 and 2000 figures reveal that eight out of
10 provinces which registered lowest are in Mindanao with six of them largely
inhabited by Muslims: Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, and
Lanao del Norte.73
In virtually all measures of physical and socio-economic well-being, the ARMM
is found at or near the bottom of the national rankings. The Mindanaoans, relative
to their counterparts in Luzon and Visayas, have the lowest per capita incomes,
largest poverty incidence, and least access to physical and social infrastructure as
well as basic services despite the teeming resources of their lands and seas. The
people, most especially the minority Muslims and other non-Muslim/non-Christian
peoples, have yet to benefit from their natural and human wealth.
The marginalisation of Mindanaoans in general and Muslims in particular from
the orbit of Philippine development is historically rooted in the colonial and post-
colonial land settlement and migration policy which gradually dispossessed Muslims
and other indigenous peoples of Mindanao of their traditional and ancestral lands.
The accelerated influx of Christians from Luzon and Visayas in the “land of promise”
particularly in the post-colonial period did not only change the demographics of
Mindanao but also altered the concept of land ownership.
The institutionalisation of the state’s Torrens titling system, which recognises
individual land ownership, contradicted the traditional concept of communal
ownership observed and practised by Muslim and other indigenous communities.
The state’s recognition of individual land ownership, evidenced by one’s possession
of a Torrens Land Title, thus tended to favour Christian settlers who were more
literate and adept in using the law to their advantage compared to Muslim and non-
Christian/non-Muslim who were ignorant of the laws and incapable of using the
legal processes involved in land titling apart from the exorbitant cost it required.74
Moreover, it is an anathema to people’s culture to have an ancestral land, owned
collectively, to be parcelled and titled individually to members of the tribe.
The inability of most Muslims and other ethnic groups to claim individual
ownership over lands they held since time immemorial through the Torrens Land
Title virtually rendered them “squatters” in their own domain. More enterprising
Christian settlers and business corporations exploited Muslim and other indigenous
peoples’ ignorance of the law by collaborating with officials of government engaged
126 • Rizal G. Buendia

in land titling by declaring individual or corporate land ownership of ancestral

lands by way of “manufactured” Torrens land titles. While some wealthy migrants
and private corporations (both local and multinational) took advantage of people’s
financial difficulties by pressuring them to sell their lands to the former at extremely
low prices compared to the current market price, others simply confiscated lands
traditionally held by people either by force or display of a “land title” of dubious
origin. The corporate intrusions in Mindanao contributed to the massive dislocation
and displacement of Muslims and indigenous peoples alike.75
Muslims of southern Philippines have been victims of economic development.
The wealth of their lands and seas has not been transformed in peoples’ material
development and progress. These were simply siphoned out of their homelands
that served the economic interests not only of Christian settlers but also of foreign
multinational corporations. The political order seen as the structure that breeds
economic deprivation and social discrimination became one of the rallying causes
of some Muslim leaders to undertake the process of self-governance outside of the
Philippine system of political administration.
The socio-economic conditions certainly continue to worsen as population
increase naturally exerts more pressures on the capacity of traditional sources of
revenue and livelihood such as the land, rivers, lakes, and seas within reach of the
inadequate local technologies and crafts. As with separatist movements elsewhere,
ordinary Philippine Muslims are most likely to fight for or support an armed separatist
organisation when they are faced with no alternative means to survive the persisting
discrimination and worsening living conditions.

Perceived discrimination, injustice, and alienation

Finally, beyond economic and political grievances, the issue of separatism is one of
subjective feelings, of perceptions, and of language—that Muslim minorities are being
“summarily discriminated and exploited by the Christian majorities”—reminiscent
of the Spanish period when the former coloniser drove the wedge between the
Christianised indios and “non-believers” (Moros and other tribal groups). Christian
prejudices against Muslims were created by the Spanish colonial state as part of
its “divide-and-rule” policy. Biases against Muslims were then widespread and
accentuated with the regular performances of “Moro-Moro,” a theatrical play that
enacts the defeat of Muslim “villains” in the hands of Christian “heroes,”76 during
Christians’ celebration of fiestas.77 This folk-theatre survived until the 1950s whose
repercussions reverberate until now.
The dominant Christian community has not really obliterated the lingering
anti-Muslim preconception in their consciousness as the name “Moro” designates the
shared identity for Philippine Muslims that categorically and pejoratively associated
with piracy, savagery, treachery, and other negative connotations. On the other hand,
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 127

Muslims have kept in their collective memory the innumerable cases when native
converts were conscripted to fight the Moros in the interest of the Spanish Crown
and the Church. The same policy continued during the American colonial regime,
though to a limited extent.
On the other hand, the MNLF and MILF, notwithstanding their ideological
differences—the former as more secular while the latter being more Islamic—see
themselves as “one people” bound collectively on the basis of a common ancestry,
history, society, institutions, territory, and more importantly, religion. As the
minority people in a predominantly Christian nation, they perceive themselves as
the marginalised, persecuted, and powerless people both politically and economically.
Regardless of organisational affiliation, independence remains the underlying essence
of political autonomy for Muslim socio-politico movements.
In the recent conflict, historical and predetermined mutual feeling of bigotry and
prejudice of Christians and Muslims has oftentimes been used by political leaders to
engender or strengthen people’s identity in the competition for power and resources.
And when conflicts escalate, perceptions and languages are distorted within the
warring parties. The distortions are partly spontaneous and partly organised to rally
the people to engage in warfare, bear the economic burdens, and face the human
misery of war. Conceivably, when war breaks out, truth is its first victim.
For instance, the alienation of Muslims and other ethnics (non-Muslim and
non-Christian tribes) from their homelands due to acts of outright land grabbing of
Christian migrants and private corporations has embedded upon their consciousness
the inability of government not only in protecting their economic well-being but also
in acting on behalf of the Christians in gradually eroding their identity by allowing
them to be driven away from their lands, considered as the repository of their
culture. This notion subsequently precipitated and crystallised into the secessionist
movement as a cause against Christian aggression.78
Moreover, the conflictual situation arises when state’s nationalist policies
exercised through the institutionalisation undue political centralism and unitary
policies are perceived to be discriminatory and threatening to minority groups’ socio-
cultural, economic, and political interests. The violent reaction of ethnic minorities
against these policies is comprehensible as they endanger their collective survival.
Accordingly, the undertaking to secede from the state becomes an inescapable
recourse on the contention that separatists do not see a fair chance that their
fundamental aspiration and interest, i.e., to be a part of the nation, would be hitherto
accommodated under the state’s political system.
Given the aforesaid politico-administrative, economic, and cultural causes of the
Bangsamoro self-determination movement, it is apparent that the crucial immediate
issue is one of participatory rather than secessionist rights.
128 • Rizal G. Buendia

Conclusion
This article has argued that the state-Moro conflict is sparked and protracted more
by the centralism of the state and inadequate democratic space that limits the self-
governing power of the minorities, particularly the Muslims in southern Philippines.
The tenacity and seriousness of the conflict remains complicated with the unremitting
inability of the state to substantially and decisively address, over a long period,
its core causes insubstantial political autonomy; socio-economic grievances and
deprivation; and perceived injustice, discrimination, and alienation of the people
from the mainstream of Philippine political and economic development. The issue
boils down to political and economic equity and social justice, the crux of the state’s
responsibility and kernel of nation’s spirit.
It is essential therefore that Moros be drawn within the domain of the state
and make them feel that they are part and foremost stakeholder of the Philippine
nation. Although ethnic identities and affinities can serve as one’s refuge when the
primordial culture of Moros is threatened by the state’s domineering power, the
sense of Moros’ separateness as a people can be altered or modified. Perceptions are
neither fixed nor permanent. They change as material conditions change; identities
and communal interests also change and are equally malleable and pliant as they
interact with the power of the state. A dialectical relationship exists between one’s
perceptions and the actual situation or socio-economic and political setting where
one belongs. Perceptions and conditions do influence and transform each other.
As discussed earlier in the article, the multi-ethnic character of the Moro struggle
for political autonomy indicates that national identity of the Moros will be primarily
contingent on the ability of Moro leaders to transcend the limits of organisational and
ethno-linguistic loyalties. The less than orthodox practice of Islam among Moros in
the Philippines signifies the high probability of creating a Bangsa Moro in a consensual
and harmonious manner between and among contending Moro organisations.
Yet, the process of reversing such outlooks and feelings of alienation and
transcending ethnic boundaries also demand a strategic approach of sustained
and indefatigable efforts and commitment on the part of the state towards
greater democratisation, meeting the new challenges of mosaic democracy and
heterogeneous development. It requires the state to redefine itself and adopt an
institutional framework of governance that would allow the expression of democracy
in kaleidoscopic forms.
State’s nationbuilding and centralisation of power to the nationstate, indeed,
resulted in the deprivation of ethnic communities to decide for themselves and the
power to govern in accordance with their ideals and aspirations. Obviously, the
meaning of democracy is violated when minority groups79 lack any reasonable chance
to take part in the policymaking process in government on a more or less permanent
basis without suffering from the “tyranny of the majority.” In other words, the rule
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 129

of the majority or “majoritarian democracy” in deeply divided societies is likely to

be profoundly undemocratic.
Since the post-colonial years the unitary state has worked towards the integration,
assimilation, and transformation of multiple ethnic identities into a single national
identity—a downward exertion of state nationalism. The nationalism of the state is
materialised through the assimilation and integration of minorities into the majority’s
culture, system of governance, and socio-economic structure. This tends to destroy
minority rights and cultures even when there is no conscious intent to do so. State
nationalism is henceforth resisted by those groups who do not see themselves as part
of the Philippine nation. They feel strongly against the erosion of their selfidentity
and see it as a gross violation of their political, economic, and cultural rights.
It is the contention of this article that the threat of national disintegration will
continue until an appropriate institutional framework for political governance which
can accommodate Mindanao’s social and ethnic diversity is ensconced. Apart from
re-engineering political institutions in Mindanao, there is a need to lay emphasis,
at least at the local level, on good governance, the rule of law, improved civil-
military relations, accountability of public officials for corruption, and human rights
protection. These efforts would, to a large extent, facilitate the early conclusion of
conflict, accelerate the process of peace, and find a respectable and honourable final
peace agreement between contending forces. More importantly, steps toward this
direction would not only strengthen the Philippine nation-state but also considerably
extirpate the cause of secessionism.
Whether or not the state would be able to meet the challenges of nation-building
and national unity is difficult to surmise at this point. Definitely, there will be no
quick fixes and no shortcuts. Wounds that have festered for a long time cannot be
healed overnight, nor can confidence be built or dialogue developed while fresh
wounds are being inflicted. It is a process that requires special and extra effort on
the part of the state to guarantee human rights and uphold the rights of people to
their own development.
In as much as conflict is created in one’s mind, peace can likewise be a product
of one’s mind. One of the critical elements therefore in conflict resolution is the
conscious construction of a positive outlook towards building a new and better
relationship to an erstwhile archenemy. The courage in seeking to come to terms
with the past is an essential part of the search for a new way forward.
130 • Rizal G. Buendia

NOTES
1� “Moro” denotes a non-Hispanised Muslim inhabitant in the “unsubjugated” southern islands,
in contrast to “Filipino” (collectively referred to as “indio” until 1872) which symbolises the
Christianised, Hispanised, and subjugated people of the Philippines. For an account of
the historical development of the Moro identity, see J. L. Phelan, The Hispanization of the
Philippines (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959) and O. D. Corpuz, The Roots
of the Filipino Nation, vol. 1 (Quezon City: AKLAHI Foundation, Inc., 1989).
2� The term “bangsa” or “bansa” is a Malay word that usually refers to nations, castes, descent
groups or lines, races or estates. The composite term “Bangsa Moro,” refers to the “Moro
Nation.” MNLF and MILF prefer to use it as one word, “Bangsamoro.” For the purpose of
this paper, “Bangsa Moro” shall mean the “Moro Nation” and “Bangsamoro” as the “people”
who embrace Islam as a religion and way of life especially those inhabiting southern Mindanao
and Palawan provinces and Sulu archipelago.
3� A. Reid, “Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce: 1450–1680,” The Lands below the Winds,
vol. 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
4� Phelan, The Hispanization of the Philippines, 4–8; Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, 46;
and R. D. McAmis, Malay Muslims: The History and Challenge of Resurgent Islam in Southeast
Asia (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co. 2002), 7–31.
5� Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, 48.
6� Ibid., 111–134.
7� R. Laarhoven, Truimph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17th Century
(Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1989), 147; J. S. Arcilla, S. J. “Jesuit Missionary Letters
from Mindanao,” in The Rio Grande Mission vol. 1, ed. J. S. Arcilla, S. J., (Quezon City: Archives
of the Philippine Province of the Society of Jesus, 1990); R. Ileto, Magindanao: 1860–1888: The
Career of Datu Uto of Buayan. (Ithaca: Cornell University Southeast Asia Program, 1971).
8� T. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern
Philippines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
9� N. Saleeby, The Moro Problem (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1913), 30, cited in McKenna,
Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 105.
10� S. Tan, The Filipino Muslim Armed Struggle, 1900–1972 (Manila: Filipinas Foundation,
1977), 21–22; P. Gowing, Muslim Filipinos—Heritage and Horizon (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1979), 77–106.
11� Philippine Commission Act No. 253, Oct. 2, 1901, cited in R. B. Thomas, “Muslim but
Filipino: The Integration of Philippine Muslims, 1917–1946” (PhD dissertation, Department
of History, University of Pennsylvania, 1971), 9.
12� P. N. Abinales, “The ‘Muslim-Filipino’ and the State,” Public Policy: A University of the
Philippines Quarterly, vol. 2, no. 2 (April–June 1998), 37–69.
13� McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels, 132.
14� For a detailed account of the Moro pre-Philippine independence struggle see Gowing, Muslim
Filipinos, and S. Tan, Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle (Quezon City: The Centre
for Integrative and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 1993).
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 131

15� Quoted in Abinales, “The ‘Muslim-Filipino’ and the State,” 49.

16� Muslim Association of the Philippines (MAP), Proceedings of the First National Muslim
Convention, Cotabato, 8–12 June 1955 (Cotabato: Muslim Association of the Philippines,
1956), 31, emphasis added.
17� The case was uncovered by then opposition senator Benigno Aquino Jr. Ferdinand Marcos,
serving as President (1965–1986), charged that the exposé was politically motivated and
meant to discredit him.
18� A tadpole-shaped island guarding the mouth of Manila Bay. It is part of Cavite Province,
off south of Manila.
19� For a detailed account, see M. D. Vitug and Glenda Gloria, Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion
in Mindanao (Quezon City: Ateneo Centre for Social Policy and Public Affairs and Institute
for Popular Democracy, 1999), 1–23.
20� Violence involving Muslims and Christians escalated and plunged Mindanao into a virtual
war in the decades of 1960s and 1970s. Some analysts believe that this violence between
Muslims and Christians has given rise to the mistaken notion that the so-called Mindanao
conflict is a religious war.
21� S. Jubair, Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin, 1999),
152.
22� R. Canoy, The Counterfeit Revolution: Martial Law in the Philippines (Manila: Philippine
Editions Publishing, 1980), 27.
23� Nuraladji Misuari and Salamat Hashim are the two key figures of the Muslim secessionist
movement. The former led the secular Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in war and
peace in 30 years while the latter led the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) after MNLF
settled for Muslim political autonomy under the 1987 Philippine Constitution and the GRP
(Government of the Republic of the Philippines)-MNLF1996 Final Peace Agreement.
24� The 13 Muslim ethnolinguistic groupings are the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Sama,
Yakan, Sangil, Badjao, Kalibugan, Jama Mapun, Iranun, Palawani, Molbog, and Kalagan.
Three of these are major groups occupying identifiable territories: Maranao in Marawi;
Maguindanao in Cotabato; and Tausug-Sama in Tawi-Tawi and the Sulu group of islands.
25� E. Mercado, “Culture, Economics and Revolt in Mindanao: The Origins of the MNLF and
the Politics of Moro Separatism,” in Armed Separatism in Southeast Asia, ed. Lim Joo-Jock
and Vani S. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984), 160.
26� J. Hutchinson, and A. Smith (eds.), Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994),
60.
27� P. Gowing, “Moros and Khaek: The Position of Muslim Minorities in the Philippines and
Thailand,” in Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia, compiled by A. Ibrahim, S. Siddique, and Y.
Hussain (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 184–185, emphasis added.
28� The Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), founded in 1971, comprises 54 countries
(including the non-state, Palestine). One of its major activities is to settle conflicts by
peaceful means, mainly through mediation, negotiation, and arbitration. The OIC had
been instrumental in forging the 1976 and 1996 GRP-MNLF Tripoli Agreement and Final
Peace Agreement respectively.
132 • Rizal G. Buendia

29� There are conflicting versions on the founding of the MNLF. Jubair said that the MNLF
was founded in 1969 while Mercado noted that its founding was in mid-1971. See Jubair,
Bangsamoro, 150; and Mercado, “Culture, economics and revolt in Mindanao,” 159. Interviews
conducted by the author in 2000 among former MNLF leaders who were then government
officials of the ARMM declare it on 28 March 1968, as MNLF’s Foundation Day. Obviously,
28 March was symbolically used by the MNLF as its Founding Day since it was the day
of the Jabidah massacre. Mercado’s version is closer to reality as it was in mid-1971 when
Misuari convened the “Top 90” guerrillas in Zamboanga City to repudiate the reformist
tendencies of MIM and BMLO leaders. This eventually led to the birth of the MNLF.
Hence, 1971 is used in this article as the year of MNLF’s formation.
30� The Tripoli Agreement was the first peace accord between the GRP and the MNLF. It directs
the government to create a Muslim provisional government in the “areas of autonomy” in
13 provinces of southern Philippines where Muslims enjoy political autonomy.
31� “Moro National Liberation Front,” http://www.ict.org.il/inter_ter/orgdet.cfm?orgid=92
(accessed on 24 August 2004); “The Moro Struggle for Self-Determination and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front,” http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.
nsf/AllDocWeb/4F62C40ACE5A0370C12568F70058401C/$file/MILF_self-determination.
PDF (accessed 2 August 2004).
32� ARMM was created on 1 August 1989 under Republic Act 6734 as a fulfilment of Article
10, Sections 15–21 of the 1987 Constitution. It was initially composed of four provinces
(Lanao del Sur; Maguindanao; Sulu; and Tawi-Tawi) and increased to six provinces when
the province of Basilan and city of Marawi joined ARMM after a plebiscite was conducted
on 14 August 2001.
33� The GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA), signed on 2 September 1996, laid down
the process and framework for achieving peace and development in Southern Philippines.
See GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (Manila: Malacanang Palace Press, 2 September
1996).
34� S. Tan, “The Juma’a Abu Sayyap: A Brief Assessment of its Origin, Objectives, Ideology and
Method of Struggle,” (paper presented at the National Defence College of the Philippines
Strategic Studies Group meeting, 2 May 2000).
35� S. A. Gutoc, “Causes of Terrorism: The Philippines Amid Southeast Asia,” May 2003
(unpublished manuscript).
36� Interview with Mohagher Iqbal, Chairman of the Committee on Information of MILF’s
Central Committee, conducted by the author on 24 January 2000.
37� The formation of the “Council of 15” was engineered by the MNLF’s senior leaders.
Misuari’s Deputy Chairman, Hatamil Hassan was elected as the Council’s Chair while
MNLF’s Foreign Affairs Committee Chair, Parouk Hussin, was elected new regional
governor in November 2001.
38� A. B. Corvera, “Nur Misuari: Has the ‘good warrior’s’ long struggle come to a disgraceful
end?” 16 January 2002, http://www.philstar.com/philstar/misua.htm (accessed 12 October
2003).
39� A. Nawal and J. Javellana, “OIC rejects anew RP application for observer status, Gloria in
KL,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila), 16 October 2003.
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 133

40� The SPCPD was established through Executive Order 371 issued on 2 October 1996. It
acts as a transitory administrative arm under the Office of the President tasked to promote
development in 14 provinces and 9 cities (as of 1996) in Mindanao and Sulu archipelago.
The covered area is known as the Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). In
the 2001 plebiscite, SZOPAD’s coverage increased from 14 to 15 provinces and 9 to 14 cities
as a result of the conversion of capital towns to cities and creation of new provinces by the
central government between 1996 and 2001. The dissolution of the SPCPD under Executive
Order 80 of 11 March 2002 transferred all its on functions, duties, and responsibilities to
the new ARMM under Republic Act 9054. For details of the provisions, see EOs 371 and
80 and RA 9054 for details.
41� In November 2001, while still serving as ARMM Governor and Chair of SPCPD, Misuari
convened the 5th National Bangsamoro Assembly in Parang, Sulu and resurrected his call
for an independent Muslim Mindanao. He led some armed MNLF guerrillas to attack the
Army headquarters in Jolo, Sulu on 19 November 2001. This prompted the government to
charge Misuari of sedition. He is now languishing in jail on charges of rebellion. If found
guilty, he could face up to 20 years of imprisonment.
42� It was also reported that Misuari pocketed funds allotted for the poverty alleviation programme
and allegedly spent some P42 million (US$840,000) to buy high-powered weapons.
43� Republic Act 9054 was passed by the Philippine Congress on 7 February 2001. It became
law on 31 March 2001. RA 9054 created the new ARMM and replaced RA 6734 of 1989. As
provided under the law and in compliance with the provisions of the 1996 GRP-MNLF FPA,
a plebiscite was conducted on 14 August 2001 to determine possible new local governments
that may want to join the new ARMM aside from the four existing ones. In the said plebiscite,
Basilan and Marawi City were added. See RAs 6734 and 9054 and EO 80 for details.
44� “Sulu fighting exposes Filipino government claims to want peace in Mindanao,” http://www.
muslimedia.com/phil-sulufight.htm (accessed 2 April 2005).
45� E. Gutierrez, “The Reimagination of the Bangsa Moro: 30 Years Hence,” in Rebels, Warlords
and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in Southern Philippines, ed. Kristina
Gaerlan and Mara Stankovitch (Quezon City: Institute of Popular Democracy, 2000).
46� McAmis, Malay Muslims, p.53.
47� The GFAI, signed by the GRP and MILF panels on 27 August 1998 in Sultan Kudarat,
Maguindanao, enjoins both parties to reach a pacific settlement of the conflict and requires
them to implement the joint agreements/arrangements previously signed, and to protect
and respect human rights.
48� Also known as the “Agreement on Peace Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front,” signed in Tripoli, Libya between 19 to
22 June 2001. It was the first comprehensive peace agreement signed by GRP and MILF
panels after negotiations were severed in April 2000.
49� R. G. Buendia, “The GRP-MILF Peace Talks: Quo Vadis?” in Southeast Asian Affairs 2004,
ed. D. Singh and Chin Kin Wah (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004),
205–221.
50� “MILF peace talks on track, clashes contained, says gov’t,” Philippine Daily Inquirer (Manila),
30 August 2004.
134 • Rizal G. Buendia

51� “Murad extends greetings of peace and solidarity to Muslim believers,” http://www.luwaran.
com, 10 November 2003 (accessed 29 August 2004).
52� “The Moro Struggle for Self-Determination and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front.” http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/AllDocWeb/
4F62C40ACE5A0370C12568F70058401C/$file/MILF_self-determination.PDF (accessed
2 August 2004).
53� “Murad extends greetings,” http://www.luwaran.com.
54� The United Nations and Human Rights (New York: United Nations, 1978).
55� The United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, New York: 14 December 1960,
emphasis added.
56� The United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV), Declaration of Principles
Concerning Friendly Relations among States, New York: 24 October 1970.
57� R. Elusfa, “Is there hope for a GRP-MILF peace pact?” MindaNews, 12 December 2002.
58� N. Poulantzas, Nicos. State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978), 114.
59� International Court of Justice Reports (New York: ICJ Report, 1975), 122.
60� Quoted in C. H. Williams, “Minority Nationalist Historiography,” in Nationalism,
Self‑Determination and Political Geography, ed. R. J. Johnston, D. B. Knight, and E. Kofman
(New York: Croom Helm, 1988), 217.
61� K. Annan, Address to the United Nations General Assembly, New York, 20 September
1999.
62� H. Adam II, “Democracy and Self-Determination” (speech delivered at the International
Institute for Strategic Studies on 5 May 1996). The transcript of this speech was released by
the Institute of Self Determination at Schloss Vadus, Liechenstein on 10 December 1997.
The quotation is taken from page 12 of the transcript.
63� In 1977, Marcos created two “autonomous regions” rather than one consolidated “provisional
government” as contemplated under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. Marcos effectively divided
and diluted the quest of Muslims to be governed under one Muslim-defined government.
64� “MILF peace negotiator: Autonomy option, ‘tired phrase,’” http://www.luwaran.com/ 29
November 2003 (accessed 29 August 2004).
65� Ibid.
66� E. Tadem, J. Reyes, and L. S. Magno, Showcases of Underdevelopment in Mindanao: Fishes,
Forests, and Fruits (Davao City: Alternative Resource Center, 1984); L. S. Adriano,
“Mindanao’s Industry and Trade: Trends, Prospects and Agenda for Action Under the
Estrada Administration” (paper presented at the NGO-PO Summit Conference on Policy
Agenda: Fulfilling the Mindanao Promise: Onward to a Sustainable and Equitable Future
for its People, in Davao City, 24–26 June 1998); PSY [Philippine Statistical Yearbook] 1995
(Manila: National Statistics Office, 1996); and M. Macapado, The Moro Armed Struggle
in the Philippines: The Non-Violent Autonomy Alternative (Marawi City: Mindanao State
University, 1994).
 The State-Moro Armed Conflict in the Philippines • 135

67� Annual Per Capita Poverty Thresholds and Poverty Incidence, by Province: 1997 and 2000,
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2000/povertyprov.asp (accessed 24 September 2004).
68� 2000 Poverty Estimates—Poverty Incidence: 1997 and 2000, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/
poverty/2000/00povin1.asp (accessed 24 September 2004).
69� F. Adriano, L. Adriano, E. Buctuanon, A. Tanada-Medina and R. Amorado, “Mindanao’s
Agenda for Peace and Development,” Focus Asien Nr. 3: Peaceful Conflict Transformation: Civil
Society’s Responses to the Conflict in Mindanao (Essen: Asien-Stiftung, 2001), 38.
70� Statistics: Education, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/secstat/d_educ.asp (accessed 24 September
2004).
71� Participation rate refers to the number of enrolees over the population of the age bracket
eligible for the grade or year level.
72� Cohort survival refers to the number of students who survive grades 1 to 6 or first to fourth
year high school.
73� 2000 Human Development Index, http://www.nscb.gov.ph/hdi/hdi2000.asp (accessed 24
September 2004).
74� S. Tan, The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro Secessionism, (Quezon City: Centre for Integrative
and Development Studies, University of the Philippines, 1995), 5.
75� E. Gutierrez and S. Borras Jr., The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies
(Washington: East-West Centre, 2004).
76� F. Magdalena, Ethnicity, Identity, and Conflict: The Case of the Philippine Moros (Singapore:
ISEAS Working Papers, Social and Cultural Issues 1 [96], 1996), 26.
77� Fiesta is a socio-religious affair celebrated annually by the community led by the Parish
priest to pay homage and thanks to the parish’s patron saint. It was introduced by the
Spanish Catholic clergymen in the colonial period and continues to be observed in Christian
communities in the Philippines.
78� Tan, The Socioeconomic Dimension of Moro Secessionism, 9; and Gutierrez and Borras Jr., The
Moro Conflict.
79� The Philippines has 110 ethno-linguistic and cultural groups spread over 80 provinces.

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