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Ukraine Crisis: Russia, US Strategies & India

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Ukraine Crisis: Russia, US Strategies & India

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nitish
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
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1

UKRAINE CRISIS – STRATEGY FOLLOWED BY RUSSIA AND US ALONG WITH


THEIR ALLIES, LESSONS FOR INDIA

INTRODUCTION

1. Ukraine was a cornerstone of the Soviet Union, the archrival of the United
States during the Cold War. Behind only Russia, it was the second–most populous
and powerful of the fifteen Soviet republics, home to much of the union’s agricultural
production, defence industries, and military, including the Black Sea Fleet and some of
the Nuclear arsenal. Ukraine was so vital to the union that its decision to sever ties in
1991 proved to be a coup de grâce for the ailing superpower.

2. Ukraine has long played an important, yet sometimes overlooked, role in the
global security order. Today, the country is on the front lines of a renewed great -
power rivalry that many analysts say will dominate international relations in the
decades ahead. In recent elections, Ukrainians have clearly indicated that they see
their future in Europe, but the country continues to grapple with extreme corruption
and deep regional rifts that could impede its path. Meanwhile, Russia’s aggression in
Ukraine has triggered the greatest security crisis in Europe since the Cold War.
Though the US and its allies have taken significant punitive actions against Russia
during the seven-year-old conflict, they have made little headway in helping to restore
Ukraine’s territorial integrity. A buildup of Russian military forces along the border with
Ukraine in late 2021 stoked fears that Moscow is preparing for a large-scale invasion
of its neighbor, although the Russia had denied this.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to bring out the highlights of the conflict between
Russia- Ukraine while analyzing the interests of US and Russia. Thereafter asses its
impact on India.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

4. Ukraine and Russia share hundreds of years of cultural, linguistic and familial
links. For many in Russia and in the ethnically Russian parts of Ukraine, the shared
heritage of the countries is an emotional issue. As part of the Soviet Union, Ukraine
was the second-most powerful Soviet republic after Russia, and was crucial
strategically, economically and culturally.

5. A timeline of major events in the Russia-Ukraine History is given below:

YEAR EVENT
1783 Annexation by Imperial Russia. Mostly non violent.
1917-1921 Soviet-Ukrainian War. Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was
established
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1922 Soviet Union was founded with Russia and Ukraine as
founding members
1954 Crimea handed over to Ukraine SSR by Soviet leader.
1991 Independence of Ukraine from Soviet Union.
1994 Ukraine joined the Non Proliferation of Nuclear weapons and
carried out nuclear disarmament.
2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine against election of pro Russian
President.
2013 Euromaidan protests against Ukrainian government resulting in
ousting of the president and overthrowing of the government.

6. In 2013, Ukraine's then-President Viktor Yanukovich, decided against signing


an association agreement (AA) with the European Union (EU), sparking major pro-
European protests in Ukraine. In Feb 2014, the Ukrainian parliament voted to impeach
Yanukovich, who fled Kyiv. Subsequently, in Mar 2014, Russia annexed Crimea, an
autonomous peninsula in southern Ukraine with strong Russian loyalties, on the
pretext that it was defending its interests and those of Russian-speaking citizens.
Shortly afterwards, pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine's Donetsk and Luhansk
regions declared their independence from Kiev, prompting months of fighting. The EU,
the US and other countries imposed sanctions on Russia. In 2014 & 2015, a peace
plan for Eastern Ukraine (the Minsk Protocol I & II) was signed, named after the
Belarusian capital Minsk where the talks were held.

7. However, efforts to reach a diplomatic settlement and satisfactory resolution


have been unsuccessful. A major blockade has been Russia’s insistence that it is not
a party to the conflict and therefore is not bound by its terms. Since 2014, Ukraine has
been witnessing shelling and skirmishes between the rebels and Ukrainian forces
leading to the loss of over 14,000 lives by most estimates, creating around 1.5 million
registered Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and destruction of the local economy.
In 2021, Russia started a large military buildup on the border with Ukraine. The
buildup continued despite warnings from other western countries. On February 24,
2022, the Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered his troops to invade Ukraine.

CAUSE OF CONFLICT

8. Balance of Power. Ever since Ukraine split from the Soviet Union, both
Russia and the West have vied for greater influence in the country in order to keep the
balance of power in the region in their favour.

9. Buffer Zone for Western Countries. For the US and the EU, Ukraine is a
crucial buffer between Russia and the West. As tensions with Russia rise, the US and
the EU are increasingly determined to keep Ukraine away from Russia.

10. Russian Interest in Black Sea. The unique geography of the Black Sea
region confers several geopolitical advantages to Russia. Firstly, it is an important
crossroad and strategic intersection for the entire region. Access to the Black Sea is
vital for all littoral and neighboring states, and greatly enhances the projection of
power into several adjacent regions. Secondly, the region is an important transit
corridor for goods and energy.

11. Protests in Ukraine. Two major protests in Ukraine which were pro
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European were widely disagreeable to Russia, namely the Orange revolution of 2004
and the Euromaidan Movement of 2013.

(a) Orange Revolution. In 2004 a series of political protests took


place in Ukraine in response to the elections of Viktor Yanukovych, who also
had the support of Russian President Vladimir Putin. The protesters claimed
that the result of elections were rigged by the authorities in favour of
Yanukovych. Results were annulled and a revote ordered. In the re-election,
Viktor Yushchenko won by securing 52% of the votes.

(b) Euromaidan Protests. On 21 November, 2013, Viktor Yanukovych


suspended signing the EU Association Agreement and instead chose closer
ties with Russia. The decision to not sign the agreement sparked Euromaidan
protests. The protests were aimed at widespread government corruption,
abuse of power, and violation of human rights in Ukraine. Elected President
Viktor Yanukovych was ousted and the Ukrainian government was
overthrown.

12. Separatist Movement. The Donbas region (the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions) of Eastern Ukraine has been facing a pro-Russian separatist movement since
2014. According to the Ukrainian government, the movement is actively supported by
the Russian government and Russian paramilitary forces make up between 15% to
80% of the separatists fighting against the Ukraine government.

13. Invasion of Crimea. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in what was
the first time a European country annexed territory from another country since World
War-ll. The annexation of Crimea from Ukraine followed a Russian military intervention
in Crimea that took place in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and was
part of wider unrest across Southern and Eastern Ukraine. The invasion and
subsequent annexation of Crimea have given Russia a maritime upper hand in the
region.

14. Ukraine’s NATO Membership. Ukraine has urged the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) to speed up their membership process in the alliance.
Russia has declared such a move a “red line”, and is worried about the consequences
of the US-led military alliances expanding right up to its doorstep. Due to this faceoff
between NATO countries and Russia, the Black sea is a region of strategic importance
and a potential maritime flashpoint.

UKRAINE - A GEOPOLITICAL FLASH POINT

15. In its nearly three decades of independence, Ukraine has sought to forge its
own path as a sovereign state while looking to align more closely with Western
institutions, including the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO). However, Kyiv has struggled to balance its foreign relations and to bridge
deep internal divisions. A more nationalist, Ukrainian-speaking population in Western
parts of the country has generally supported greater integration with Europe, while a
mostly Russian-speaking community in the East has favored closer ties with Russia.

16. Ukraine became a battleground in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and
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began arming and abetting separatists in the Donbas region in the country’s
southeast. Russia’s seizure of Crimea was the first time since World War II that a
European state had annexed the territory of another. More than fourteen thousand
people have died in the conflict, the bloodiest in Europe since the Balkan Wars of the
1990s..

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN UKRAINE

17. Lineage. Russia and Ukraine have strong familial bonds that go back
centuries. Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital, is sometimes referred to as “the mother of Russian
cities,” on par in terms of cultural influence with Moscow and St. Petersburg. It was in
Kyiv in the eighth and ninth centuries that Christianity was brought from Byzantium to
the Slavic people and served as the anchor for Kievan Rus, the early Slavic state from
which modern Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians draw their lineage.

18. Historical ties. Russia has deep cultural, economic, and political bonds
with Ukraine, and in many ways Ukraine is central to Russia’s identity and vision for
itself in the world.

19. Russian Diaspora. Among Russia’s top concerns is the welfare of the
approximately eight million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine, according to a 2001
census, mostly in the South and East. Moscow claimed a duty to protect these people
as a pretext for its actions in Ukraine.

20. Crimea Connundrum. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea


from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 to strengthen the “brotherly ties between the Ukrainian
and Russian peoples.” However, since the fall of the union, many Russian nationalists
in both Russia and Crimea have longed for a return of the peninsula. The city of
Sevastopol is home port for Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, the dominant maritime force in
the region.

21. Trade. Russia was, for a long time, Ukraine’s largest trading partner,
although this link has withered dramatically in recent years. China now tops Russia in
its trade with Ukraine. Prior to its invasion of Crimea, Russia had hoped to pull Ukraine
into its single market, the Eurasian Economic Union, which today includes Armenia,
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

22. Energy. Russia has relied on Ukrainian pipelines to pump its gas to
customers in Central and Eastern Europe for decades, and it continues to pay billions
of dollars per year in transit fees to Kyiv. However, in mid-2021, Russia completed
construction of its Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which runs under the Baltic Sea to
Germany. Although Russia is contracted to keep moving gas through Ukraine for
several more years, some critics in the United States and Europe warn that Nord
Stream 2 will allow Russia to bypass Ukrainian pipelines if it wants and gain greater
geopolitical leverage in the region.

23. Political Influence. Russia has been intent on preserving its political
influence in Ukraine and throughout the former Soviet Union, particularly after its
preferred candidate for Ukrainian president in 2004, Viktor Yanukovych, lost to a
reformist competitor due to the Orange Revolution movement. The shock in Ukraine
came after a similar electoral defeat for the Pro Russian candidate in Georgia in 2003,
5
known as the Rose Revolution, and was followed by another, the Tulip Revolution, in
Kyrgyzstan in 2005.

24. NATO Calling Ukraine. Russia is unhappy with efforts by the US and EU to
induct Ukraine into the US-led military alliance of NATO. Ukraine acts a crucial buffer
between Russia and NATO countries of Europe. Russia views the growing presence
in Ukraine from NATO - in terms of weaponry, training and personnel - as a threat to
its own security.

25. Superpower image. After the Soviet collapse, many Russian politicians
viewed the divorce with Ukraine as a mistake of history and a threat to Russia’s
standing as a great power. Losing a permanent hold on Ukraine, and letting it fall into
the Western orbit, was seen by many as a major blow to Russia’s international
prestige. Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014 proved to be immensely popular at
home, pushing Putin’s approval ratings above 80 percent following a steady decline.

INTERESTS OF USA

26. United States of America has been one of the important catalysts of the Russia-
Ukraine crisis since the beginning. It has been trying to get Ukraine towards the Western
sphere of influence so as to have leverage on Russia, one of its major rivals. The United
States provided political assurances to Ukraine with the signing of the 1994 Budapest
Memorandum. Twenty years later, after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine, U.S. officials
came to express more emphatically and frequently U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty
and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders.

27. Security. U.S. has maintained that U.S. support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity is unwavering. This applies to both Crimea and Russia-controlled areas
in eastern Ukraine. In July 2018, USA issued the “Crimea Declaration,” which reaffirmed
the United States’ refusal to recognize Russia’s claims of sovereignty over Crimea until
Ukraine’s territorial integrity is restored. Through the Countering Russian Influence in
Europe and Eurasia Act of 2017 (CRIEEA), United States has declared never to recognize
the annexation of Crimea by Russia. It has also prohibited foreign assistance to countries
that support Russia’s annexation of Crimea. U.S. also criticizes Russia for failing to fulfill its
commitments under the Minsk agreements and condemns Russia’s aggressive actions in
and around Ukraine. In April 2021, US voiced it’s concerns to Russia over the sudden
military build-up in Crimea and on Ukraine’s borders, and called on Russia to de-escalate
tensions.

28. Energy security to EU. The United States opposes the Nord Stream 2 pipeline
as it assesses that it would have detrimental impacts on the EU’s energy security, gas
market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine it also
issued joint statement with Germany in July 2021 that pledges to bolster Ukraine’s energy
security and to support sanctions in response to further acts of Russian aggression
towards Ukraine.

29. Foreign and Military Aid. Ukraine has been a leading recipient of U.S.
foreign and military aid in Europe and Eurasia. In the 1990s, the U.S. government provided
almost $2.6 billion in total aid to Ukraine. In the 2000s, total aid to Ukraine amounted to
almost $1.8 billion. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the United States began to provide
higher levels of annual assistance to Ukraine across multiple accounts. In all, the United
6
States has allocated more than $2.5 billion in security assistance to Ukraine since Russia’s
2014 invasion. In addition, the U.S. government has also provided more than $351 million
in humanitarian assistance since 2014 to assist internally displaced persons (IDPs) and
other victims of conflict. The United States has also provided three $1 billion loan
guarantees to Ukraine.

30. Lethal and Nonlethal Security Assistance. US has provided nonlethal security
assistance to Ukraine, such as body armor, helmets, vehicles, night and thermal vision
devices, heavy engineering equipment, advanced radios, patrol boats, rations, tents,
counter-mortar radars, uniforms, first aid equipment and supplies, and other related items
upto 2017. From 2017 to 2021, security assistance has included capabilities to enhance
the lethality, command and control, and situational awareness of Ukraine’s forces through
the provision of counter-artillery radars, counter-unmanned aerial systems, secure
communications gear, electronic warfare and military medical evacuation equipment, and
training and equipment to improve the operational safety and capacity of Ukrainian Air
Force bases. Since 2015, U.S. forces from the U.S. Army and National Guard, together
with military trainers from U.S. allied states, have provided training and mentoring to
members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as part of a Joint Multinational Training Group-
Ukraine. The United States and Ukraine host regular joint military exercises in Ukraine with
the participation of NATO allies and partners such as Ex. Sea Breeze, a maritime exercise.
Ukraine has also been a part Ex Rapid Trident which is historically a NATO exercise. The
United States also provides cyber security assistance to Ukraine.

31. Bilateral Trade. The United States granted Ukraine permanent normal trade
relations status in 2006. From 2014 to 2016, bilateral trade declined in line with an overall
decline in Ukraine’s trade after Russia’s invasion. U.S.-Ukraine trade began to recover in
2017. In 2020, the United States was Ukraine’s 5th-largest source of merchandise imports
and 14th-largest destination for exports. The value of U.S. merchandise exports to
Ukraine—mostly motor vehicles, coal, and industrial machinery—was $1.9 billion in 2020.
The value of U.S. merchandise imports from Ukraine—primarily iron and steel—was $1.3
billion in 2020.

32. Other Legislative Initiatives. US has also passed many legislations since 2017
which favour Ukraine and target Russia such as Ukraine Cyber security Cooperation Act
2017, Crimea Annexation Non-recognition Act 2019, Ukraine Security Partnership Act
2021, Ukraine Religious Freedom Support Act etc.

33. Economic Sanctions on Russia. The US imposed sanctions on Russia after


the seizure of Crimea. Subsequently, it has imposed Ukraine-related sanctions on about
735 individuals and entities, such as preventing Russia from pumping Russian gas through
the newly built Nord Stream 2 pipeline to Germany. Nord Stream 2 is one of two pipelines
that Russia has laid underwater in the Baltic Sea.

ROLE OF MEDIA IN THE CRISIS

34. Media has played a key role in terms of perception management in the ongoing
crisis. In Western and Ukrainian media, the armed build-up at the border is a sign of
Russian imperialist aggression, of Moscow trying to bully its smaller neighbour. In Russia,
however, the situation is viewed rather differently. It has been painted as Russia’s efforts to
nullify ts security concerns rather than invasion.
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35. Effect of Social Media. Since Russian President Vladimir Putin officially declared
what he calls a “special military operation" in Ukraine, most social media feeds have been
filled with posts about the conflict between the two countries. Ukraine is utilising social
media to mobilise support, with new content being produced on sites namely Twitter and
TikTok regularly. On the other hand, Russia has been successful in driving out or closing
down some of the most popular internet services like Facebook. Ukraine has dominated
social media in the days following the Russian invasion, in an expanding information war
with Moscow that Kyiv appears to be winning so far. Even, Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelensky’s daily video speeches, which are normally provided with English subtitles, have
become viral sensations. But social media’s role also includes some challenges. Many
online posts may have some truth, but they should be viewed with caution, as false claims
and misinformation about the two countries have proliferated on social media.

DOCTRINAL PRECEPTS PREVALENT IN THE CRISIS

37. Morale. According to US intelligence inputs, the Russian military has already
lost more than 7000 troops. The number is greater than the number of American troops
killed over 20 years in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. It is a staggering number amassed
in just three weeks of fighting with implications for the combat effectiveness of Russian
troops. This will have a demoralizing effect on the Russian troops.

38. Intelligence. Russian armed forces which attempted a lightning fast invasion and
subjugation of Kyiv were in the face of far stronger Ukranian resistance than expected.
Western defence officials say that there have been apparent Russian intelligence failure,
citing a badly informed and overconfident Russian military led by a President whose
attitude towards the invasion may have been distorted by a closed circle of pliant advisers.
According to various intelligence reports, the Russian armed forces’ performance so far
suggested that Moscow had either failed to collect the correct information on Ukraine’s
defences or that it had been ignored by Putin and his most senior generals – or both.

39. Analysts point to Russia’s botched attempt to seize Kyiv’s Hostomel airport in the
first day of invasion as an example of the intelligence failures in practice: the airborne
forces sent to take and hold the crucial runway were not large or well equipped enough to
repel a successful counter attack by Ukranian special forces.

40. Deception and Surprise. Ahead of Russian invasion of Ukraine President Putin
had repeatedly said he had no plans to invade Kyiv. Experts say the Russian president
used the age-old Russian military technique called ‘maskirovka’ or ‘masking something’.

41. Days before the invasion, the Kremlin had said some Russian troops were going
back to the barracks after their exercise with Belarusian forces and then a few days later it
added the soldiers involved in the Crimean exercise would be returning to their bases. US
secretary of state had warned that Russia would be using ‘false flag’ technique in order to
justify its attack on Ukraine.

42. Synergy and Synchronization. When the invasion of Russian forces began it was
a simultaneous action by land, air and sea shortly after the address by the Russian
President. This highlights the fact that the operations were highly co-ordinated and
synchronized between various arms in the Russian forces.
8

IMPACT ON INDIA

36. India did not join the Western powers’ condemnation of Russia’s intervention
in Crimea and kept a low profile on the issue. In Nov 2020, India voted against a
Ukraine-sponsored resolution in the United Nations (UN) that condemned alleged
human rights violations in Crimea thereby backing old ally Russia on the issue. In Feb
22, India also suggested at the UN Security Council that quiet and constructive
diplomacy is the need of the hour and any step that could escalate the tension should
be avoided. India’s stand has been welcomed by Russia.

37. To maintain balance between Russia and US. India has good relations
with both Russia and the US and siding with one of these countries could cost India its
relationship with the other. However, India has maintained its neutrality in this conflict.
India has abstained from the procedure vote on Ukraine at the UNSC. India’s position
on the ongoing Ukraine crisis undergirded by the desire to keep clear of the crosshairs
of big power rivalry is reminiscent of its quintessential ‘strategic autonomy’.

38. S-400 delivery and US waiver. The crisis comes precisely as India’s
purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system is under way- and India hopes for a
waiver of U.S. sanctions on this. This conflict will complicate both the delivery of the
system, and the possibility of a presidential waiver.

39. Brings Russia China closer. The Crisis will make Moscow more
dependent on friends like China and build a regional bloc of sorts that India is not a
part of. Russia is already averse to the Indo-Pacific concept and the Quad as a revival
of Cold War bloc politics and views them as being against its Asia-Pacific interests.
Any Ukraine conflict and a resulting breakdown of Russia-West ties will strengthen
Russian opposition to these concepts and forums which are binding us to the US.

40. India’s Investment in Russia. India’s plans in Russia’s energy sector and in
the development of its Far East, in general, would become problematic, especially by
the reluctance of the private sector to fall afoul of the complex US sanctions. The new
sanctions excludes Russia from the Swift payments system.

WAY FORWARD

41. A practical solution for the situation is to revive the Minsk peace process. Therefore,
the West (US and Other western Countries) should push both sides to resume talks and
live up to their commitments as per the Minsk agreement to restore relative peace on the
border.

42. While the Minsk agreement is far from ideal, it could be a baseline from which a
diplomatic solution to the current crisis could be found and reviving it could be the ‘only
path on which peace can be built’ as French President Emmanuel Macron has said.

43. For Ukraine, it could help it gain control over its borders and end the threat of a
Russian invasion for the time being, while for Russia it could be a way to ensure that
Ukraine never becomes a part of NATO and ensure that Russian language and culture are
9
protected under a new federal Constitution in Ukraine.

CONCLUSION

48. For many analysts, the conflict marked a clear shift in the global security
environment from a unipolar period of U.S dominance to one defined by renewed
competition between great powers. However, a solution to the conflict is at hand, in
the form of the Minsk II agreement of 2015 calling for autonomy for a demilitarized
Donbas within Ukraine, under international guarantees.

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