Im Chapter 06 7e Lewicki Eon
Im Chapter 06 7e Lewicki Eon
A working knowledge of how humans perceive the world around them, process informa tion, and
experience emotions is important to understanding why people behave the way they do during
negotiations.
We begin the chapter by examining how psychological perception is related to the process of
negotiation, with particular attention to forms of perceptual distortion that can cause problems of
understanding and meaning making for negotiators. We then look at how negotiators use
information to make decisions about tactics and strategy—the process of cognition. Our
discussion here pursues two angles. First, we focus on framing—the strategic use of information
to define and articulate a negotiating issue or situation. Second, we discuss the various kinds of
systematic errors, or cognitive biases, in information processing that negotiators are prone to
make and that may compromise negotiator performance. This section will also consider how
negotiators can manage misperceptions and cognitive biases in order to maximize strategic
advantage and minimize their adverse effects.
Social encounters are, however, more than just occasions for perception and cognition. We
experience and express emotion when we interact with others and negotiating is certainly no
exception. In the final major section of this chapter, we discuss the role of moods and emotions
in negotiation—both as causes of behavior and as consequences of negotiated outcomes.
Learning Objectives
I. Perception
A. Perception Defined
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Perception is a “sense-making” process where people interpret their environment so they
can respond appropriately. See Figure 6.1: The Perceptual Process, reproduced below.
Perception
B. Perceptual Distortion
A perceiver’s own needs, desires, motivation and personal experiences may create a
predisposition about the other party.
• This can lead to biases and errors in perception and subsequent communication.
• Here, we discuss four major perceptual errors: stereotyping, halo effects, selective
perception, and projection.
Stereotyping and halo effects are examples of perceptual distortion by
generalization: small amounts of information are used to draw large conclusions
about individuals.
Selective perception and projection are forms of distortion involving anticipating
certain attributes and qualities in another person—the perceiver filters and distorts
information to arrive at a predictable and consistent view of another person.
Stereotyping
Stereotyping is common and occurs when one individual assigns attributes to another
solely on the basis of the other’s membership in a particular social or demographic
category.
An individual is assigned to a group based on one piece of perceptual information
(the individual is young or old)
Then they assign a broad range of other characteristics of the group to this person
(“old people are conservative; this person is old and therefore conservative”) or
(young people are disrespectful; this person is young and therefore disrespectful”)
Halo effects
Halo effects occur when people generalize about a variety of attributes based on the
knowledge of one attribute of an individual—a smiling person is judged more honest than
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a frowning or scowling person, though there is no consistent relationship between smiling
and honesty.
Halo effects can be positive or negative.
Research shows halo effects are most likely to occur in perception
Where there is very little experience with a person along some dimension
When the other person is well known, and
When the qualities have strong moral implications
Selective perception
Selective perception occurs when the perceiver singles out certain information that
supports or reinforces a prior belief and filters out information that does not confirm that
belief.
Selective perception perpetuates stereotypes or halo effects.
After quick judgment, a person may filter out evidence disconfirming that
judgment.
The negotiator’s own biases may affect how the other party’s behavior is
perceived and interpreted.
Projection
Projection occurs when people assign to others the characteristics or feelings that they
possess themselves.
Projection usually arises out of a need to protect one’s own self-concept— to see
oneself as consistent and good.
Negotiators may assume the other party will respond in the same manner they
would if positions were reversed.
Projection may lead a negotiator to overestimate how much the other party knows
about their preferences or desires.
II. Framing
The importance of framing stems from the fact that two or more people who are involved in
the same situation or in a complex problem often see it or define it in different ways.
• Because people have different backgrounds, experiences, expectations, and needs, they
frame people, events, and processes differently.
• These frames can change depending on perspective, or they can change over time.
A quarterback is a “hero” when throwing a touchdown but a “loser” with an
interception.
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Frames are important in negotiation as disputes are often open to different interpretations.
• Frames emerge and converge as the parties talk about their preferences and priorities;
they allow the parties to begin to develop a common definition of the issues and a process
for resolving them.
Frames are inevitable—we cannot avoid framing, and it occurs without any real intention by
the negotiator.
• Frames can be shaped by the type of information chosen or the setting and context in
which the information is presented.
A. Types of Frames
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Can be shaped by experience with the other party, by information about the other
party’s history or reputation, or by the way the other party comes across early in
the negotiation.
In conflict, identity frames (of self) tend to be positive; characterization frames
(of others) tend to be negative.
• Loss or gain—how the parties define the risk or reward associated with particular
outcomes.
A buyer in a sales negotiation can view the transaction in loss terms (the monetary
cost of the purchase) or in gain terms (the value of the item).
It is difficult to know what frame a party is using unless the party tells you or unless you
make inferences from the party’s behavior.
• Frames of those who hear or interpret communication may create biases of their own.
• Here are some insights drawn from studies of framing effects:
Negotiators can use more than one frame.
A land developer discussing a proposed golf course that will fill in a wetland
can speak about:
▪ The golf course—the substantive issue
▪ Their preferences for how the land should be filled in—an outcome frame
▪ How much input neighbors and environmental groups should have in
determining what happens to that wetland—a procedural frame
▪ And whether he views these groups favorably or unfavorably—a
characterization frame
Mismatches in frames between parties are sources of conflict.
Mismatches cause ambiguity, which may create misunderstanding, lead to
conflict escalation and even stalemate
Or one or both parties may reframe the conflict into frames more compatible
▪ For highly polarized disputes, mutual reframing may require a third party
Parties negotiate differently depending on the frame.
For example, when parties frame a negotiation in emotional terms, they tend
to be more highly involved and behave competitively, leading to impasse
Specific frames may be likely to be used with certain types of issues.
Parties discussing salary may be likely to use outcome frames, while parties
discussing relationship issues may use characterization frames.
Particular types of frames may lead to particular types of agreements.
For example, parties striving for integrative agreements will benefit from
using aspiration frames and discussing a large number of issues
In contrast, parties who use outcome or negative characterization frames may
be likely to hold negative views of the other party and a strong preference for
specific outcomes, which may lead to intensified conflict and distributive
outcomes—or not agreement at all.
Parties are likely to assume a particular frame because of various factors.
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Differences in values, personality, power, or background and social context
may lead parties to adopt different frames.
▪ As an example, see Box 6.1 on Chinese negotiation frames
An influential approach to framing disputes suggests that parties in conflict use one of
three frames:
• Interests
People are often concerned about what they need, desire, or want.
People talk about their “positions,” but often what is at stake is their underlying
interests.
• Rights
People may also be concerned about who is “right”—that is, who has legitimacy,
who is correct, or what is fair.
Disputes over rights are sometimes referred to formal or informal arbitrators to
decide whose standards or rights are more appropriate.
• Power
Negotiations resolved by power are sometimes based on who is physically
stronger or is able to coerce the other, but more often, it is about imposing other
types of costs – economic pressures, expertise, legitimate authority, and so on.
Different frames are likely to lead to very different discussions between parties.
• The way a party approaches the problem will likely influence how the other party
responds.
The example in the text is of a student feeling they were overcharged for car
repairs and their response within each of the three frames.
A classic study of legal disputes suggested that disputes tend to transform through a
process of “naming, blaming, and claiming.”
• Naming occurs when parties in a dispute label or identify a problem and characterize
what it is about.
• Blaming occurs next, as the parties try to determine who or what caused the problem.
• Finally, claiming occurs when the individual who has the problem decides to
confront, file charges, or take some other action against the individual or organization
that caused the problem.
Frames are shaped by conversations about the issues in the bargaining mix .
• Several factors can affect how conversations and frames are shaped:
Negotiators tend to argue for stock issues, or concerns that are raised every time
the parties negotiate.
Wage issues or working conditions may always be discussed in a labor
negotiation—the union always raises them, and management is ready.
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Each party attempts to make the best possible case for his or her preferred
position or perspective.
It is not uncommon for both sides to “talk past each other” at the start of
negotiations—each trying to control the conversation with a certain frame.
Eventually, arguments and frames begin to shift.
In a more “macro” sense, frames may also define major shifts and transitions in
the overall negotiation.
Diplomatic negotiations use a two-stage process called “formula/detail” which
has three stages:
▪ Diagnosis—the parties recognize the need for change, review history, and
prepare positions.
▪ Formula—the parties attempt to develop a shared perception of the
conflict, including common terms, referents, and fairness criteria.
▪ Detail—the parties work out operational details consistent with the basic
formula.
Finally, multiple agenda items operate to shape issue development.
When secondary concerns are brought into the negotiation they can transform
the conversation about the primary issues.
Section Summary
Framing is about focusing, shaping, and organizing the world around us. Remember:
• Frames shape what the parties define as the key issues and how they talk about them.
• Both parties have frames.
• Frames are controllable, at least to some degree.
• Conversations transform frames in ways negotiators may not be able to predict but
may be able to manage.
• Certain frames are more likely than others to lead to certain types of processes and
outcomes.
So far, we have examined how information is perceived, filtered, distorted, and framed. Now
we examine how negotiators use information to make decisions during negotiation.
• Negotiators make systematic errors when processing information—labeled cognitive
biases, and the following section discusses a dozen such biases.
• Table 6.1 summarizes the biases and definitions.
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A. Irrational Escalation of Commitment
One way to combat this is to have an adviser serve as a reality checkpoint to warn
negotiators who begin to behave irrationally.
• There may be less desire to escalate if regret is felt following a previous escalation
situation.
Many negotiators assume that all negotiations involve a fixed pie and approach
integrative negotiation opportunities as zero-sum situations or win-lose exchanges.
• Negotiators focusing on personal gain are most likely to come under the influence of
fixed-pie beliefs while those focusing on values are less likely to see a fixed-pie.
Chapter 3 provided advice on minimizing this fixed-pie belief through procedures for
inventing options—we mention two additional approaches now.
• First, by focusing on underlying interests rather than merely on the issues being
negotiated, negotiators are more likely to see their fixed-pie perception is misguided.
• Second, fixed-pie perceptions can be diminished by holding negotiators accountable
for the way they negotiate.
Cognitive biases in anchoring and adjustment are related to the effect of the standard (or
anchor) against which subsequent adjustments are made during negotiation.
• Anchors can be a trap for the negotiator as the choice of an anchor may be based on
faulty or incomplete information and therefore misleading in and of itself.
• Once the anchor is defined, parties tend to treat it as a real, valid benchmark by which
to adjust other judgments, such as the size of one side’s opening offer.
• Goals—whether realistic or not—can serve as anchors and may be public or private,
as well as conscious or unconscious.
Thorough preparation, along with the use of a devil’s advocate or reality check,
can help prevent errors of anchoring and adjustment.
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As discussed earlier, a frame is a perspective or point of view that people use when they
gather information and solve problems.
• For instance, people respond quite differently when they are negotiating to “gain”
something than when negotiating to “not lose” something.
“Prospect theory” holds that people are more risk-averse when a problem is framed as a
possible gain, and risk-seeking when framed as a loss.
• When negotiators are risk-averse, they are more likely to accept any viable offer
simply because they are afraid of losing.
• In contrast, when negotiators are risk-seeking, they are apt to wait for a better offer or
for further concessions.
This positive/negative framing process is important as the same offer can elicit markedly
different courses of action depending on how it is framed in gain-loss terms.
• Remedies—awareness of the bias, sufficient information, thorough analysis, and
reality checks—but can be difficult to achieve as frames are often tied to deeply held
values and beliefs or to other anchors that are hard to detect.
E. Availability of Information
Negotiators must also be concerned with the potential bias caused by the availability of
information or how easy information is to retrieve—check for accuracy.
• The availability of information also affects negotiation through the use of established
search patterns and overvaluation of information resulting from those searches.
G. Overconfidence
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• Study results are mixed, so negotiators should not always suppress confidence or
optimism.
In decision theory, the law of small numbers refers to the tendency to draw conclusions
from small sample sizes.
• In negotiation, the law of small numbers applies to the way negotiators learn and
extrapolate from their own experience.
• If experience is limited in time or scope, the tendency is to extrapolate prior
experience onto future negotiations—such as, all negotiations are distributive.
This tendency may lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy – people who expect to be treated in
a distributive manner will:
• Be more likely to perceive the other party’s behaviors as distributive, and
• Treat the other party in a more distributive manner.
• Likely be reciprocated with the same distributive treatment by the other party.
To prevent, just remember the less experience, the greater the possibility that past lessons
will be erroneously used in the future.
• Styles and strategies that worked in the past may not work in the future, especially if
the negotiations differ, which they will.
I. Self-Serving Biases
People often explain another person’s behavior by making attributions, either to the
person (internal factors: ability, mood, effort) or the situation (external factors: task, other
people, fate).
• In explaining other’s behavior, the tendency is to overestimate the role of personal or
internal factors and underestimate the role of situational or external factors.
• Perceptual biases are often exacerbated by the actor-observer effect in which people
tend to attribute their own behavior to situational factors but attribute other's
behaviors to personal factors.
• Perceptual error of a self-serving nature may also involve distortions in the evaluation
of information.
For instance, the false-consensus effect is a tendency to overestimate the degree of
support and consensus that exists for one’s own position, opinions, or behaviors.
We also tend to assume our personal beliefs or opinions are based on credible
information, while opposing beliefs are based on misinformation.
Negotiators subject to this bias may make faulty judgments regarding tactics or
outcome probabilities.
J. Endowment Effect
The endowment effect is the tendency to overvalue something you own or believe you
possess.
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• In negotiation, the endowment effect can lead to inflated estimations of value that
interfere with reaching a good deal.
• Negotiators are fine with using the status quo as an anchor, making concessions
difficult.
Failure to consider the other party’s cognitions allows negotiators to simplify their
thinking about otherwise complex processes;
• This usually leads to a more distributive strategy and causes a failure to recognize the
contingent nature of both sides’ behaviors and responses.
In contrast, when negotiators are able to consider things from the other party’s viewpoint
(a cognitive capacity known as “perspective taking”),
• The risk of impasse is reduced and the chances for integrative outcomes via logrolling
is enhanced.
Research suggests this is a result of making a complex task of decision making under
conditions of risk and uncertainty more manageable.
• Training and awareness reduce the effects modestly.
• This deep-seated drive to ignore the others’ cognitions can be avoided only if
negotiators explicitly focus on putting in the effort needed to form an accurate
understanding of the other party’s interests, goals, and perspectives.
L. Reactive Devaluation
Reactive devaluation is the process of devaluing the other party’s concessions simply
because the other party made them—leads negotiators to:
• Minimize the magnitude of a concession made by a disliked other;
• To reduce their willingness to respond with a concession of equal size; or
• To seek even more from the other party once a concession has been made.
Misperceptions and cognitive biases typically arise out of conscious awareness as negotiators
gather and process information.
• The first level of managing such distortions is to be aware that they can occur.
• Awareness may not be enough—simply knowing about them does little to counteract
their effects.
• More research is needed to provide effective advice, but until then:
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Be aware of the existence of these biases,
Understand their negative effects, and
Be prepared to discuss them when appropriate with your own team and with
counterparts.
Historically, research portrays negotiators as rational beings who seem calculating, calm, and
in control, but this overlooks the roles played by emotions in the negotiating process.
• The role of mood and emotion in negotiation has been an increasing body of theory and
research during the last two decades.
The distinction between mood and emotion is based on three characteristics:
specificity, intensity, and duration
Mood states are more diffuse, less intense, and more enduring than emotion states,
which tend to be more intense and directed at more specific targets.
Emotions play important roles at various stages of negotiation.
The following are selected research findings in the study of mood, emotion, and
negotiation.
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See Box 6.2—Responding to Negative Emotion—for advice on how to deal with
an opponent who brings negative emotion to the table (and provided briefly in the
following bullets).
▪ Separate the emotion from its expression.
▪ Turn the table.
▪ Reflect the emotion being expressed back to the other party.
▪ Ask questions to uncover the issue or interest behind the emotion.
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Also, negative emotion has information value—it can serve as a danger signal that
motivates both parties to confront the problem directly and search for a resolution.
Anger may also signal a person is tough or ambitious and research findings indicate
negotiators concede more often to an angry opponent than a happy one—but not
always.
Negotiators in one study made lower demands and more concessions when they
perceived their opponent’s anger as appropriate for the situation.
Though anger may be appropriate at times in competitive negotiations, it can
backfire and be less likely to elicit concessions when the other party either
▪ Has the opportunity to respond with deception or
▪ Has little at stake, so little fear from hearing “No” to an offer.
There is also evidence that negative emotion can benefit the negotiator who
experiences the emotion.
Negotiators with relative power by virtue of a good BATNA benefited from being
angry—they were more focused and assertive, and claimed more value in the
deal.
For low-power negotiators, those without a good alternative, being angry made
them less focused, leading to poorer outcomes.
Chapter Summary
In this chapter we have taken a multifaceted look at the role of perception, cognition, and
emotion in negotiation. The first portion of the chapter presented a brief overview of the
perceptual process and discussed four types of perceptual distortions: stereotyping, halo effects,
selective perception, and projection. We then turned to a discussion of how framing influences
perceptions in negotiation and how reframing and issue development both change negotiator
perceptions during negotiations.
The chapter then discussed one of the most important recent areas of inquiry in negotiation, that
of cognitive biases in negotiation. This was followed by consideration of ways to manage
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misperception and cognitive biases in negotiation. In a final section we considered mood and
emotion in negotiation, which provides an important alternative to cognitive and perceptual
processes for understanding negotiation behavior.
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