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Understanding Face-Saving Language

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
164 views4 pages

Understanding Face-Saving Language

Uploaded by

oufridmarwane
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

In everyday communication, Language users are not always interested in the

effective transfer of information or relevance of an utterance. In the following


examples the speaker wants the addressee to close the door.
1a. Close the door.
1b. There’s a draft.
1c. Would you close the door?
1d. Would you be so kind as to close the door?
According to the maxims of the cooperative principle, (1a) is sufficient.
Language is, however, often used more indirectly, as in (1b). Sometimes certain
politeness forms such as in (1c) and (1d) are applied as well.
An important source of inspiration in the study of politeness phenomena is the
work done by the Canadian-American social psychologist Erving Goffman (1956),
who introduced the concept of face. By this he meant the self-image that people
project in their social contacts with others. Face has the meaning as in the saying “to
lose face”. In Goffman’s opinion, every participant in the social process has the need
to be appreciated by others and the need to be free and not interfered with.
Goffman calls the need to be appreciated “positive face” and the need not to be
disturbed “negative face”.
Goffman wanted social interaction, which includes verbal communication, to be
studied from the perspective that participants are striving for stability in their
relationships with others. For the sake of successful interaction, participants in
conversations usually avoid damaging one another’s face. Refusing a request or
reproaching someone is an action that can form a threat to the other’s positive or
negative face. In the case of these “face threatening acts” (FTAS), something is
needed which will reduce the violation of face to a minimum and, therefore,
preserve stability as much as possible. This can be achieved by using “face work
techniques”. Examples are broad circumspect formulations of refusals, which make it
clear that the request made is impossible to grant.
How does politeness fit into this approach? Politeness prevents or repairs the
damage caused by FTAS. The greater the threat to stability, the more politeness, face
work technique, is necessary. Just as there are two types of face, there are two types
of politeness. Face work that is aimed at positive face is called “solidarity politeness”;
this kind of politeness is, for example, achieved by giving compliments. Face work
that deals with negative face is known as “respect politeness”, and can be achieved
by not infringing another’s “domain” in the communication. Below are a few
examples. When a personnel manager has to turn down a job applicant who should
not have applied in the first place owing to lack of education, this is an FTA that
threatens the positive face of the applicant, and that of the manager. For this reason
the personnel manager will be more apt to write (2b) than (2a).
2a. We do not understand why you bothered to apply.
2b. We have some doubts concerning your prior education.
Inspired by Goffman’s work, Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson
(1978/1987) developed a theory on explaining human interactions that revolved
around being polite. Brown and Levinson (1978) conceptualize face as something
that we want or desire from others. They define face as “the want to be unimpeded
and the want to be approved of in certain respects.” They expanded and added to
face theory by arguing that we have two faces; one based on a desire for approval
and acceptance by others (positive face), and the other based on a desire to proceed
without being impeded upon (negative face).
For positive face, our wants include everything from the values we want to
maintain (love, good education, loyalty), to the things we want to do (go to the
movies, go home, or study). These wants are elements of our face that are present
when we interact with others. So, if you want to play the role of leader on a group
project, you hope that others will support your positive face—your “want”. While
negative face sounds like it should be just the opposite of positive face, it isn’t.
Negative face is “the want of every ‘competent adult member’ that his actions be
unimpeded by others”. If are sitting in the library studying, your negative face is that
you be left alone to study. If someone comes over and starts a conversation, they are
interfering in your effort to maintain that want for privacy--your negative face.
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory deals extensively with face-threatening acts,
which they define as “those acts that by their very nature run contrary to the face
wants of the addressee and/or speaker”. Face-threatening acts (FTAS) can be toward
our positive face and/or negative face, and caused by acts we engage in ourselves or
the acts of others toward us. Their analyses indicate that there are five strategies
relating to FTAS, as you can see in below.

Take an example of asking a friend to help you move into your new apartment.
One, we can choose to “not do the face-threatening act” by not raising the issue.
Here, you don’t even bother asking for help to move, but just do it yourself.
Two, we can raise the issue knowing we’ll threaten the other person’s face but
do it indirectly “off record” by making hints, joking around about it, etc. Off record
approaches seek to minimize the degree to which the face is threatened but still
communicate the issue. You mention to your friend that you’re moving into a new
apartment on Saturday and aren’t sure how you can do it all yourself. Hopefully, your
friend will offer without you directly asking.
Third, we can go “on-record with redressive action, ” which involves directly
raising the issue/threatening the face, but doing so with messages that minimize or
restore face. You ask your friend to help you move, expressing how grateful you’d be
and what a great friend he or she is (boosting positive face).
Fourth, we can directly raise the issue/threaten face but without making an
effort to offset the face threat/loss by using “on-record without redressive action,
baldly”. You tell your friend you need his or her help moving on Saturday, period.
The Goffman approach and Brown and Levinson’s theory provide an adequate
research framework for determining gradations of politeness and for analyzing
indirect language.
Although Brown and Levinson’s face-based model has remained the most
influential pragmatic approach to politeness, it has met with criticism (Eelen, 2001).
In particular, it has been shown that the claim of universality is not tenable, since
politeness is ultimately a highly culture-dependent construct. Moreover, it is not
reasonable to assume that specific expressions are inherently face-threatening
irrespective of their context of use. For instance, direct orders in cases of emergency
do not require any mitigation (e.g. Fire! Get out!). Finally, positive and negative
politeness are by no means mutually exclusive. They may both work together in one
utterance, if, for example, familiar address forms (e.g. daddy, sweetheart) are
combined with the indirectness of modal verbs (e.g. would you mind …, could
you …).

An alternative model of linguistic politeness was proposed by Geoffrey Leech


(1983). Since Grice’s cooperative principle largely neglects the social aspects of
interaction, Leech proposes a complementary “politeness principle”, which can be
used to explain some cases in which speakers do not observe the conversational
maxims. For example, in order to be polite, interlocutors may disregard the maxims
“be brief ” or “do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”.
Leech’s politeness principle is further divided into the six maxims of tact,
generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement and sympathy.
1. Tact Maxim (in impositives and commissives)
a) Minimize cost to other
b) Maximize benefit to other
The pivotal tact maxim, for instance can be illustrated by the following example.
3a. Have another cookie.
3b. Give me a cookie.
Accordingly, although both sentences are imperative clauses, (3a) can be judged
as polite, as it expresses benefit to the hearer, while (3b) is impolite, as it imposes
cost on the hearer.
2. Generosity Maxim (in impositives and commissives)
a) Minimize benefit to self
b) Maximize cost to self
Let us consider the following sentences: Could I have some more X? and Is there
some more X? (X refers to certain actions, e.g. X = You will peel these potatoes).
Leech observes that greater politeness is achieved in the second sentence, because
reference to the Speaker as beneficiary is omitted.
3. Approbation Maxim (in expressives and assertives)
a) Minimize dispraise of other
b) Maximize praise of other
Leech analyses two following comments, claiming that “What a wonderful meal
you cooked!” is highly valued, whilst “What an awful meal you cooked!” is not. This
maxim states: “avoid saying unpleasant things about others, and more particularly,
about hearers”.
4. Modesty Maxim (in expressives and assertives)
a) Minimize praise of self
b) Maximize dispraise of self
Leech provides here the following examples:
4a. Please accept this small gift as a token of our esteem.
4b. Please accept this large gift as a token of our esteem.
The understatement of one’s generosity (e.g. 4a) is normal and conventional, in
contrast to exaggeration of one’s generosity (e.g. 4b).
5. Agreement Maxim (in assertives)
a) Minimize disagreement between self and other
b) Maximize agreement between self and other
Leech remarks that “there is a tendency to exaggerate agreement with other
people, and mitigate disagreement by expressing regret, partial agreement, etc.” The
following examples illustrate this statement:
5a. It was an interesting exhibition, wasn’t it?
5b. No, it was very uninteresting.
Example (5b) is a complete disagreement of Example (5a), disobeying the
Maxim of Agreement.
6. Sympathy Maxim (in assertives)
a) Minimize antipathy between self and other
b) Maximize sympathy between self and other
This maxim “explains why congratulations and condolences are courteous
speech acts, even though (...) express beliefs which are negative with regard to the
hearer”.
For example:
6a. I’m terribly sorry to hear that your dog died.
6b. I’m terribly pleased to hear that your dog died.
Example (6a) is an appropriate expression of sympathy for misfortune, especially
compared to example (6b).

Since, however, in Leech’s approach the number of maxims is expanded and


flouts of the maxims do not lead to implicatures as with the cooperative principle,
the theory has not gained a large following.

References:
Schubert, C., & Renkema, J. (2018). Introduction to discourse studies. 1-469.
Bełza, A. (2008). A questionnaire-based comparative study of Irish English and Polish
speech act of requesting, 52-58.
Redmond, M. (2015). Face and Politeness Theories, 3-37.

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