Interpretation of the statute:
Interpretation meaning
The term has been derived from the Latin term ‘interpretari’, which means to explain, expound,
understand, or translate. Interpretation is the process of explaining, expounding and translating
any text or anything in written form. This basically involves an act of discovering the true
meaning of the language which has been used in the statute. Various sources used are only
limited to explore the written text and clarify what exactly has been indicated by the words
used in the written text or the statutes.
Interpretation of statutes is the correct understanding of the law. This process is commonly
adopted by the courts for determining the exact intention of the legislature. Because the
objective of the court is not only merely to read the law but is also to apply it in a meaningful
manner to suit from case to case. It is also used for ascertaining the actual connotation of any
Act or document with the actual intention of the legislature.
There can be mischief in the statute which is required to be cured, and this can be done by
applying various norms and theories of interpretation which might go against the literal
meaning at times. The purpose behind interpretation is to clarify the meaning of the words
used in the statutes which might not be that clear.
According to Salmond, “Interpretation” is the process by which the court seeks to ascertain
the meaning of the legislature through the medium of authoritative forms in which it is
expressed.
Construction meaning
In simple words, construction is the process of drawing conclusions of the subjects which are
beyond the direct expression of the text. The courts draw findings after analysing the meaning
of the words used in the text or the statutes. This process is known as legal exposition. There
are a certain set of facts pending before the court and construction is the application of the
conclusion of these facts. The objective is to assist the judicial body in determining the real
intention of the legislature. Its aim is also to ascertain the legal effect of the legal text.
Difference between Interpretation and Construction
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Interpretation Construction
1. In law, interpretation refers to exposing 1. Construction, on the other hand, refers to
the true sense of the provisions of the drawing conclusions from the written texts
statutes and to understand the exact which are beyond the outright expression of
meaning of the words used in any text. the legal text.
2. Interpretation refers to the linguistic 2. The purpose of construction is to determine
meaning of the legal text. the legal effect of words and the written text
of the statute.
3. In the case where the simple meaning of
the text is to be adopted then the 3. In the case where the literal meaning of the
concept of interpretation is being legal text results in ambiguity then the
referred to. concept of construction is adopted.
Need of Interpretation
Drafting a law is a complex task, the legislature has to keep in mind thousands of scenarios so
that the legislation drafted is complete in itself. In an ideal world, the meaning of the statute
would be clear and direct. In the real world that we live in, most of the times the law drafted is
complicated and vague.
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher
In this case, the need for interpretation of statutes was highlighted. It was stated that when a
defect appears in a statute, the judge cannot simply wash his hands off the responsibility and
blame the legislature, he should interpret the statute by finding the intent behind it. The judge
should not only focus on the language of the statute but also on the social considerations that
made the parliament draft a particular statute.
Interpretation is needed because,
1. The complicated process of drafting laws leads to a variety of gaps and ambiguity in
the statute.
2. The words, phrases, terms used in the statute can have varying meanings due to the
multifaceted nature of the language.
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3. A law is never drafted by a single person but rather by a group of people, this leads
to incoherence in the language.
4. Some statues use technical language because of their complicated subject matter.
5. The applicability of law changes with new developments.
Introduction
Laws enacted by the legislatures are interpreted by the judiciary. Enacted laws, especially the
modern Acts and Rules, are drafted by legal experts and it could be expected that the language
will leave little room for interpretation or construction. But the experience of all who have to
hear and share the task of application of the law has been different. It is quite often observed
that courts are busy unfolding the meaning of ambiguous words and expressions and resolving
inconsistencies. The age-old process of the application of the enacted laws has led to the
formulation of certain rules of interpretation or construction.
The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention of the legislature
conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. In Santi Swarup Sarkar v. Pradeep
Kumar Sarkar, the Supreme Court held that if two interpretations are possible of the same
statute, the one which validates the statute must be preferred.
Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of interpretation:
1. Literal Interpretation
2. Logical Interpretation
Internal Aids of Interpretation
A. Long Title
It is now settled that Long Title of an Act is a part of the Act and is admissible as an aid to its
construction. The long title which often precedes the preamble must be distinguished with the
short title; the former taken along with the preamble or even in its absence is a good guide
regarding the object, scope or purpose of the Act, whereas the latter 341 being only an
abbreviation for purposes of reference is not a useful aid to construction.
B. Preamble
The preamble of a statute like the long title is a part of the Act and is an admissible aid to
construction. Although not an enacting part, the preamble is expected to express the scope,
object and purpose of the Act more comprehensively than the long title. It may recite the
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ground and cause of making the statute, the evils sought to be remedied or the doubts which
may be intended to be settled.
In the words of Sir John Nicholl:
It is to the preamble more specifically that we are to look for the reason or spirit of every
statute, rehearsing this, as it ordinarily does, the evils sought to be remedied, or the doubts
purported to be removed by the statute, and so evidencing, in the best and most satisfactory
manner, the object or intention of the Legislature in making or passing the statute itself.
C. Preamble to Constitution
The Preamble of the Constitution like the Preamble of any statute furnishes the key to open the
mind of the makers of the Constitution more so because the Constituent Assembly took great
pains in formulating it so that it may reflect the essential features and basic objectives of the
Constitution. The Preamble is a part of the Constitution The Preamble embodies the
fundamentals underlining the structure of the Constitution. It was adopted by the Constituent
Assembly after the entire Constitution has been adopted.
The true functions of the Preamble is to expound the nature and extent and application of the
powers actually confirmed by the Constitution and not substantially to create them. The
Constitution, including the Preamble, must be read as a whole and in case of doubt interpreted
consistent with its basic structure to promote the great objectives stated in the preamble. But
the Preamble can neither be regarded as the source of any substantive power nor as a source
of any prohibition or limitation.
D. Headings
The view is now settled that the Headings or Titles prefixed to sections or group of sections can
be referred to in construing an Act of the Legislature. But conflicting opinions have been
expressed on the question as to what weight should be attached to the headings. A Heading,
according to one view, is to be regarded as giving the key to the interpretation of the clauses
ranged under it unless the wording is inconsistent with such interpretation; and so the headings
might be treated as preambles to the provisions following them.
E. Marginal Notes
In the older statutes, marginal notes were not inserted by the legislature and hence were not
part of the statute and could not be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute. If
they are also enacted by the legislature they can be referred to for the purpose of
interpretation.
In the case of the Indian Constitution, the marginal notes have been enacted by the Constituent
Assembly and hence they may be referred to for interpreting the Articles of the Constitution. If
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the words used in the enactment are clear and unambiguous, the marginal note cannot control
the meaning, but in case of ambiguity or doubt, the marginal note may be referred to.
F. Punctuation
Punctuation means to mark with points and to make points with usual stops. It is the art of
dividing sentences by point or mark. Is the Court entitled to use punctuation also while
interpreting the statutes? Punctuation is considered a minor element in the construction of
statutes.
G. Illustrations
Illustrations appended to a section from part of the statute and although forming no part of the
section, are of relevance and value in the construction of the text of the section and they
should not be readily rejected as repugnant to the section. It would be the very last resort of
construction to make this assumption. The great usefulness of the Illustrations which have,
although not part of the sections, been expressly furnished by the Legislature as helpful in the
working and application of the statute, should not be thus impaired.
H. Definition Section
These do not take away the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, but as used: (i) to
extend the meaning of a word to include or cover something, which would not normally be
covered or included; and (ii) to interpret ambiguous words and words which are not plain or
clear.
I. Proviso
The proper function of a proviso is to except and to deal with a case that would otherwise fall
within the general language of the main enactment and its effect is confined to that case. It is a
qualification of the preceding enactment which is expressed in terms too general to be quite
accurate.
As a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what
is in the enactment and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule.
Normally, a proviso does not travel beyond the provision to which it is a proviso. It carves out
an exception to the main provision to which it has been enacted as a proviso and to no other.
J. Explanation
The object of an Explanation to a statutory provision is –
1. to explanation the meaning and intendment of the Act itself,
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2. where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so
as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve,
3. to provide additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it
meaningful and purposeful,
4. an Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part
thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation,
in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist
the court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and
5. it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person under a statute
has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in
the interpretation of the same.
Introduction
When internal aids are not adequate, the court has to take recourse to external aids. External
Aids may be parliamentary material, historical background, reports of a committee or a
commission, official statement, dictionary meanings, foreign decisions, etc.
In Prabhakar Rao and others v. State of A.P. and others[1], O. Chennappa, Reddy J. has
observed: Where internal aids are not forthcoming, we can always have recourse to external
aids to discover the object of the legislation. External aids are not ruled out. This is now a well-
settled principle of modern statutory construction.
External Aids to Construction
A. Parliamentary History, Historical Facts and Surrounding Circumstances
Historical setting cannot be used as an aid if the words are plain and clear. If the wordings are
ambiguous, the historical setting may be considered in order to arrive at the proper
construction. The historical setting covers parliamentary history, historical facts, statement of
objects and reasons, report of expert committees.
Recently, the Supreme Court in R. Chaudhuri v. State of Punjab and others[2], has stated that
it is a settled position that debates in the Constituent Assembly may be relied upon as an aid to
interpret a constitutional provision because it is the function of the Court to find out the
intention of the framers of the Constitution.
B. Social, Political and Economic Developments and Scientific Inventions
A Statute must be interpreted to include circumstances or situations which were unknown or
did not exist at the time of enactment of the statute. Any relevant changes in the social
conditions and technology should be given due weightage. Courts should take into account all
these developments while construing statutory provisions.
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In P. Gupta v. Union of India[3], it was stated – The interpretation of every statutory provision
must keep pace with changing concepts and values and it must, to the extent to which its
language permits or rather does not prohibit, suffer adjustments through judicial interpretation
so as to accord with the requirement of the fast-changing society which is undergoing a rapid
social and economic transformation
C. Reference to Other Statutes
In the case where two Acts have to be read together, then each part of every act has to be
construed as if contained in one composite Act. However, if there is some clear discrepancy
then the latter Act would modify the earlier. Where a single provision of one Act has to be read
or added in another, then it has to be read in the sense in which it was originally construed in
the first Act. In this way, the whole of the first Act can be mentioned or referred to in the
second Act even though only a provision of the first one was adopted.
In the case where an old Act has been repealed, it loses its operative force. Nevertheless, such a
repealed part may still be taken into account for construing the unrepealed part. For the
purpose of interpretation or construction of a statutory provision, courts can refer to or can
take the help of other statutes. It is also known as statutory aids. The General Clauses Act, 1897
is an example of statutory aid. The application of this rule of construction has the merit of
avoiding any contradiction between a series of statutes dealing with the same subject, it allows
the use of an earlier statute to throw light on the meaning of a phrase used in a later statute in
the same context.
On the same logic when words in an earlier statute have received an authoritative exposition by
a superior court, use of the same words in a similar context in a later statute will give rise to a
presumption that the legislature intends that the same interpretation should be followed for
construction of those words in the later statute.
D. Dictionaries
When a word is not defined in the statute itself, it is permissible to refer to dictionaries to find
out the general sense in which that word is understood in common parlance. However, in the
selection of one out of the various meanings of a word, regard must always be had to the
scheme, context and legislative history.
E. Judicial Decisions
When judicial pronouncements are been taken as a reference it should be taken into note that
the decisions referred are Indian, if they are foreign it should be ensured that such a foreign
country follows the same system of jurisprudence as ours and that these decisions have been
taken in the ground of the same law as ours.
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These foreign decisions have persuasive value only and are not binding on Indian courts and
where guidance is available from binding Indian decisions; reference to foreign decisions is of
no use.
F. Other Materials
Similarly, the Supreme Court used information available on the internet for the purpose of
interpretation of a statutory provision in Ramlal v. State of Rajasthan[4]. Courts also refer to
passages and materials from textbooks and articles and papers published in the journals.
These external aids are very useful tools not only for the proper and correct interpretation or
construction of the statutory provision but also for understanding the object of the statute, the
mischief sought to be remedied by it, circumstances in which it was enacted and many other
relevant matters. In the absence of the admissibility of these external aids, sometimes the court
may not be in a position to do justice in a case.
Maxim of interpretation:
1. Ejusdem Generis
According to the Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edition, 2004) the principle of Ejusdem Generis is
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and
specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to
be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those
specifically mentioned. It is a canon of statutory construction, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of things, the general words will be construed as applying
only to things of the same general class as those enumerated.
The expression Ejusdem Generis means of the same kind. Normally, general words should be
given their natural meaning like all other words unless the context requires otherwise. But
when a general word follows specific words of a distinct category, the general word may be
given a restricted meaning of the same category. The general expression takes its meaning
from the preceding particular expressions because the legislature by using the particular
words of a distinct genus has shown its intention to that effect.
This principle is limited in its application to the general word following less general words only.
If the specific words do not belong to a distinct. Genus, this rule is inapplicable. Consequently, if
a general word follows only one particular word, that single particular word does not constitute
a distinct genus and, therefore, the Ejusdem Generis rule cannot be applied in such a case.
Exceptional stray instances are, however, available where othe ne-word genus has been
created by the courts and the general word following such a genus given a restricted meaning.
If the particular words exhaust the whole genus, the general word following these particular
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words is construed as embracing a larger genus. The principle of Ejusdem Generis is not a
universal application. If the context of legislation rules out the applicability of this rule, it has
no part to play in the interpretation of general words. The basis of the principle of Ejusdem
Generis is that if the legislature intended general words to be used in an unrestricted sense, it
would not have bothered to use particular words at all.
2. Noscitur a Sociis
The principle of Noscitur a Sociis is a rule of construction. It is one of the rules of the language
used by the court to interpret legislation. This means that the meaning of an unclear word or
phrase should be determined by the words immediately surrounding it. In other words, the
meaning of a word is to be judged by the company it keeps. The questionable meaning of a
doubtful word can be derived from its association with other words. It can be used wherever a
statutory provision contains a word or phrase that is capable of bearing more than one
meaning.
This rule is explained in Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes (12th edition ) in the
following words “ When two or more words susceptible of analogous meaning are coupled
together, they are understood to be used in their cognate sense.” The words take their color
from and are quantified by each other, the meaning of the general words being restricted to a
sense analogous to that of the less general.
5. Reddendo Singula Singulis
“Reddendo singula singulis” is a Latin term that means by referring each to each; referring each
phrase or expression to its corresponding object. In simple words “reddendo singula singulis”
means that when a list of words has a modifying phase at the end, the phrase refers only to
the last. It is a rule of construction used usually in distributing property.
Where there are general words of description, following a record of particular things, such
general words are to be construed distributively, and if the general words will apply to some
things and not to others, the general words are to be applied to those things to which they will,
and not to those to which they will not apply; that is to say, each phrase, word or expression is
to be referred to its suitable objects.
The best example of reddendo singula singulis is quoted from Wharton’s Law Lexicon, “If
anyone shall draw or load any sword or gun, the word draw is applied to sword only and the
word load to gun only, the former verb to former noun and latter to latter, because it is
impossible to load a sword or to draw a gun, and so of other applications of different sets of
words to one another.”
The “reddendo singula singulis” principle concerns the use of words distributively. Where a
complex sentence has more than one subject and more than one object, it may be the right
construction to provide each to each, by reading the provision distributively and applying each
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object to its appropriate subject. A similar principle applies to verbs and their subjects, and to
other parts of speech.
6. Expresssio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
“Expressio unius est exclusio alterius” is a Latin phrase that means express mention of one thing
excludes all others. This is one of the rules used in the interpretation of statutes. The phrase
indicates that items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the statute. When
something is mentioned expressly in a statute it leads to the presumption that the things not
mentioned are excluded. This is an aid to the construction of statutes.
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