INTERNSHIP REPORT
OFFLINE INTERNSHIP BEFORE 12TH OF DECEMBER.
12th of December,2023
Bench: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dipak Misra
Hon’ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 194 OF 2017
Case Title: Joseph Shine vs Union Of India on 27 September, 2018
Facts:
Joseph Shine, a hotelier, challenged the constitutionality of Section 497 of the Indian Penal
Code (IPC), which dealt with the offense of adultery. The petitioner's motivation stemmed
from a personal tragedy where a close friend in Kerala had committed suicide after facing a
malicious rape charge from a female co-worker. Shine argued that Section 497 was a
manifestation of gender bias, lacking provisions for women to file complaints of adultery
against their husbands.
Court Observed:
Chief Justice Deepak Mishra, delivering the judgment, began by asserting that wives are not
the property of their husbands and husbands are not their masters. The court observed that
Section 497 violated women's autonomy, dignity, and privacy, denying them the right to live
with dignity. The traditional framework underlying Section 497 was considered outdated in
the modern societal context.
The court further emphasized that equality was compromised by adopting a gender-based
approach in the penal code, undermining the concept of sexual autonomy, trust, and respect
within marriages. It was noted that Section 497 perpetuated the notion of women as the
sexual property of their spouses and violated constitutional principles.
Held by Court:
The court declared Section 497 of the IPC unconstitutional, citing violations of Articles 14,
15, and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The judgment struck down the provision, asserting that
it failed to uphold substantive equality and perpetuated the subordination of women. The
court concluded that adultery should no longer be considered a criminal offense, as it intruded
into the extreme privacy sphere of marriage. Instead, adultery could be addressed as a civil
wrong and a valid ground for divorce.
Additionally, the court held that Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
outlined the procedure for prosecution under Chapter XX of the IPC, would be
unconstitutional to the extent that it applied to the offense of adultery under Section 497.
This landmark judgment marked a shift in perspective, rejecting patriarchal notions
embedded in the law and affirming the equal status of men and women in marital
relationships.
13th of December, 2023
Bench: Hon’ble Justice Chelameswar, Rohinton
Hon’ble Justice Fali Nariman
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.196 OF 2014
Case Title: Shreya Singhal vs Union of India on 24 March, 2015
Facts:
The case involves the arrest of two girls, Shaheen Dhada and Rinu Shrinivasan, in Mumbai in
2012 under Section 66A of the Information Technology Act for expressing dissent on
Facebook regarding a bandh declared by Shiv Sena following the death of Bal Thackrey. The
arrests led to public protests and scrutiny of Section 66A, triggering a legal challenge.
Court Observed:
The Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental concepts of freedom of expression,
including discussion and advocacy, as vital components protected under Article 19(1)(a) of
the Indian Constitution. The court highlighted the distinction between discussion/advocacy
and incitement, stating that restrictions apply only when incitement is evident. It also noted
the lack of clarity in Section 66A and the potential for limiting various forms of internet
communication.
Held by Court:
The court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, in its
entirety, ruling that it violated the provisions of Article 19(1)(a) and was not saved
under Article 19(2).
Section 69A of the IT Act and the related Information Technology (Procedure &
Safeguards for Blocking for Access of Information by Public) Rules 2009 were
upheld as constitutionally valid.
Section 79 of the IT Act was declared valid but subject to a reading down of Section
79(3)(b) to impose conditions on intermediaries.
The Information Technology "Intermediary Guidelines" Rules, 2011, were held valid
subject to certain conditions, including Rule 3 sub-rule (4).
Section 118(d) of the Kerala Police Act was struck down as unconstitutional, violating the
rights guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and exceeding the reasonable restrictions under
Article 19(2). The court questioned the legislative competence of the Kerala Government to
enact such a provison
15th of December, 2023
Zahira Habibullah H SHeikh and Anr v/s. State of Gujarat and Ors.
Facts:
The 'Best Bakery' case unfolded against the backdrop of the Godhra tragedy in Gujarat in
2002, where communal tensions led to the arson of the Best Bakery. The incident resulted in
the tragic death of 14 individuals, including 11 members of Zahira Habibullah's family and
three bakery employees. Zahira, the prime witness, initially cooperated during the
investigation, but during the trial, witnesses, including Zahira, retracted their statements. This
shift in testimony led to the acquittal of all 21 accused by the trial court, citing insufficient
evidence.
Issues:
The primary issues in this case revolved around witness protection, the credibility of
evidence, the conduct of the public prosecutor, the role of the investigating agency, and the
demand for retrials. Witnesses turning hostile during the trial raised concerns about the
quality of evidence, and allegations surfaced that witnesses may have been coerced or lured.
The case questioned the fairness of the trial, shedding light on the challenges of balancing the
rights of the accused, the interests of the victim, and the responsibilities of the state in
ensuring a just legal process.
Rules:
The legal framework guiding the court's analysis included constitutional articles and legal
sections. Notably, Article 139A(2), Article 14, and Article 21 of the Constitution were
referenced. Additionally, Section 409(1), Section 173(8), Section 311 of the Criminal
Procedure Code (CrPC), and Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act formed the statutory
basis for the court's deliberation.
Analysis:
The court critically examined the conduct of the public prosecutor, highlighting failures in
witness protection, ensuring anonymity, and dropping key witnesses without proper
verification. The investigating agency faced scrutiny for a perfunctory and partial
investigation, deviating from procedures outlined in the Indian Evidence Act. The court
emphasized the principles of natural justice, Articles 14 and 21, outlining the basics of a fair
hearing and trial, including the need for an impartial judge, fair prosecutor, and an
atmosphere of judicial calm.
The analysis brought to the forefront the importance of witnesses as the "eyes and ears of
justice" and underscored the necessity of witness protection. The court granted liberty to
victims to participate in appointing the public prosecutor, deviating from standard practice.
Recognizing systemic failures, the court ordered the transfer of the case to the Bombay High
Court under Section 409(1) of the CrPC, emphasizing the need for a free and fair trial.
16th of December
Sudhakar v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 6 SCC 671
Bench: G.B. Pattanaik, J. R.P. Sethi, J., Shivaraj V. Patil, J
Facts:
Ms. Rakhi, a 20-year-old teacher at Zila Parishad Primary School in Banegaon,
Maharashtra, faced a horrifying incident on July 9, 1994. Appellant 1, the
headmaster, and Appellant 2, a co-teacher, forcibly subjected her to sexual
intercourse, resulting in a distressing gang rape. The assault occurred after the
school closed, when the appellants entered the room where Ms. Rakhi was,
closed the door and windows, and perpetrated the crime. Tragically, unable to
cope with the humiliation, Ms. Rakhi took her own life on December 22, 1994,
at her sister's house.
Despite the gravity of the situation, the prosecutrix reported the incident to
Police Station Pathri on July 20, 1994, approximately 11 days after the
occurrence. The legal proceedings hinged on the admissibility of Ms. Rakhi's
statement recorded on July 20, 1994, as a dying declaration under Section 32 of
the Evidence Act.
Court Observations:
Section 32 of the Evidence Act lays the foundation for the admissibility of
statements made by a person as to the cause of their death or the circumstances
of the transaction leading to their demise, commonly known as a dying
declaration. Admissibility under this section necessitates proof that the
statement was made by a person who is deceased, untraceable, or incapable of
giving evidence.
The court clarified that, unlike English law, Section 32 doesn't mandate that the
statement should have been made in anticipation of death. The statement must,
however, be closely connected to the cause of death or the circumstances of the
transaction leading to death. The phrase "circumstances of the transaction" was
dissected to emphasize its proximate relation to the actual occurrence, requiring
some connection to the incident.
The court referred to legal precedents, including Pakala Narayana Swami v.
Emperor, to elucidate that the circumstances must be directly related to the
occasion of death, and general expressions of fear or suspicion not directly
linked to the event are inadmissible. Furthermore, the court expanded on the
interpretation of the phrase "circumstances of the transaction," stating that even
distant circumstances could be admissible if they had a nexus with the
transaction leading to death.
In the case at hand, the statement of the deceased, Ms. Rakhi, as recorded in
Exhibit P-59, did not explicitly state facts regarding the cause of her death. The
court scrutinized the statement and questioned its admissibility, highlighting the
absence of evidence disclosing Ms. Rakhi's intention to commit suicide due to
the alleged rape. Additionally, the circumstances mentioned in Exhibit P-59 did
not suggest a direct link between the statement and Ms. Rakhi's suicide after
more than five-and-a-half months.
Court Held:
The court held that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
the appellants committed the alleged rape on July 9, 1994, based on the
circumstances narrated in Exhibit P-59. The court emphasized that the
appellants could not be convicted and sentenced merely on suspicion. It
concluded that the High Court erred in relying on Exhibit P-59 as a dying
declaration, as the circumstances stated did not sufficiently establish a series
leading to Ms. Rakhi's death on December 22, 1994. The appellants were
acquitted, highlighting the importance of stringent evidentiary standards in
cases of this nature.
18th of December,2023
Management of Chandramalai Estate v. Its Workmen, AIR 1960 SC 902
Bench: K Dasgupta, K Wanchoo, P Gajendragadkar
Facts:
On August 9, 1955, the Workmen's Union of Chandramalai estate submitted
demands to the management, with only a few being agreed upon. The matter
was forwarded to the conciliation officer by the labour officer. On November
30, 1955, the union issued a strike notice, leading to a strike from December 9,
1955, to January 5, 1956. On October 17, 1957, the Industrial Tribunal in
Ernakulam granted the workmen's demands, prompting the management of
Chandramalai Estate to appeal against the Tribunal's award.
Issues:
Was the price realized by the management for the rice sold excessive, and if so,
are the workers entitled to a refund?
Are the workers entitled to cumbly allowance with retrospective effect, and
what should be the rate?
Are the workers entitled to wages for the strike period?
Tribunal's Decision:
The Tribunal found that the management had charged more than the cost price
for rice and ordered a refund. Regarding cumbly allowance, the Tribunal
awarded Rs 39 per workman. As for the strike, the Tribunal held that it occurred
due to both parties, and the management was directed to pay workmen 50% of
their total emoluments for the strike period.
Key Legal Points Established by the Court:
1. Wages for the Strike Period:
The court observed that workmen were aware on November 30, 1955, that
conciliation attempts had failed.
The hasty strike notice given on December 1, 1955, and the subsequent strike
from December 9, 1955, were deemed unjustified.
The court emphasized the legitimacy of strikes as a labor weapon but cautioned
against indiscriminate and hasty use.
It highlighted the importance of exhausting reasonable avenues for peaceful
resolution before resorting to a strike.
Judgement:
The court discarded the Tribunal's half-justification formula and declared the
strike as unjustified. The workmen's expectation that a strike could commence
for any demand without exhausting reasonable avenues was deemed incorrect.
The court concluded that, in this case, the strike was not of an urgent and
serious nature that justified bypassing the usual procedures. Therefore, the court
held in favor of the management in declaring the strike as unjustified.
19th of December,2023
The State (Cyber Cell) ...Complainant v. Yogisha @ Yogesh Pandurang Prabhu,
Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 37th court, Esplanade, Mumbai C.C. No.
3700686/ps/2009 decided on 3/07/2015
Facts:
The case of State Cyber Cell v Yogesh Pandurang Prabhu (2009) revolves
around cyberstalking, a significant cybercrime involving the harassment or
threat of individuals through electronic communication. Yogesh Prabhu was
accused of cyberstalking for sending obscene emails to a reporter, Sonali Asoka
Sawai, which led to legal action under Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code
(IPC) and Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. The
case sheds light on the complexities of prosecuting cybercrimes, especially
those related to online harassment and privacy violations.
Court Observed:
The court, presided over by Justice Shri M.R. Natu, Chief Metropolitan
Magistrate, Court of Mumbai, delved into the details of the case. Sonali Sawai,
the victim, filed a complaint with the Cyber Cell, Mumbai, reporting the receipt
of vulgar and offensive emails containing nude photographs and pornographic
material. The accused, Yogesh Prabhu, had a prior connection with the reporter,
having met through a website, but the relationship soured, leading to a breakup.
The accused resorted to cyberstalking by creating a fake email ID and sending
explicit content to the victim, causing emotional distress.
The court considered the evidence provided by investigating officers, including
Cyber Cell Investigating Officer Mukund Gopal Pawar and Forensic Expert
Sonali Mistry. The accused's actions were meticulously examined, and the court
acknowledged the use of circumstantial evidence in establishing guilt. The court
underscored the need to satisfy three conditions for considering circumstantial
evidence: establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, having a definite
tendency to prove guilt, and forming a conclusive chain of circumstances.
Notably, the court observed that the accused's actions violated the privacy of the
victim, which fell under Section 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
Court Held:
After a detailed analysis of the case, the court held Yogesh Prabhu guilty under
Section 509 of the IPC and Section 66E of the IT Act. The court imposed a
punishment of one month of simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000 under
Section 509 of the IPC. Additionally, Yogesh Prabhu received a three-month
simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 10,000 under Section 66E of the IT Act.
Both sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The court emphasized the
gravity of cyberstalking and the violation of privacy, leading to a precedent-
setting conviction in the realm of cybercrimes.
Conclusion:
The State Cyber Cell v Yogesh Pandurang Prabhu case serves as a significant
precedent in addressing cyberstalking and online harassment. The court's
emphasis on circumstantial evidence and the recognition of the impact on
privacy contributes to the evolving jurisprudence in the field of cybercrimes.
The conviction highlights the need for a robust legal framework to tackle
cybercrimes effectively, safeguarding individuals from digital threats and
ensuring justice in the virtual realm.
20th of December, 2023
Telu Ram v. Om Parkash Garg, P & H 1971 RCJ 1
Factual Background:
The tenant-respondent obtained a lease for a shop owned by Jatinder Kishore,
and in 1953, executed a rent note specifying the use of the shop mainly for a
general store. Later, Telu Ram became the owner through a sale deed. The
landlord sought ejectment, alleging unauthorized use for a printing press, while
the tenant argued that he had the previous landlord's consent.
Issues Before the Court:
The pivotal issues in the case were:
Whether the printing press was installed with the consent of the previous owner
and landlord?
Whether the printing press was installed in only a small portion of the rented
shop?
Observations and Findings:
The Rent Controller found that the printing press lacked the previous owner's
consent but occupied only a small portion, thus not warranting ejectment under
the relevant Act. The Appellate Authority upheld this decision. During the
proceedings, efforts were made to establish the consent through a Line
Superintendent's testimony, but the original documents were not presented.
Court's Analysis and Judgment:
The court analyzed the evidence, specifically focusing on the consent issue.
Despite attempts to summon relevant documents, they were deemed unhelpful.
The court found that the tenant failed to discharge the burden of proving
consent. On the second issue, the court determined that a significant part of the
premises was exclusively used for the printing press, constituting a violation of
the lease terms.
21st of December,2023
Hotel Priya v. State of Maharashtra, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 204
FACTS
The case of Hotel Priya vs. State of Maharashtra (2022) revolves around the
imposition of a gender cap on the number of performers in Orchestra Bars in
Mumbai. The appellants, who owned or operated these bars, challenged two
conditions under the Licensing and Performance for Public Amusement,
including Cabaret Performance, Melas and Tamashas Rule, 1960. These
conditions limited the number of male and female performers to four each and
set a maximum of eight artists on the stage. The appellants argued that these
restrictions violated their fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of
the Constitution of India. The Bombay High Court upheld these conditions,
prompting the appellants to appeal to the Supreme Court.
COURT OBSERVED
The Supreme Court, comprising Justices K.M. Joseph and S. Ravindra Bhat,
heard the case and considered the constitutional aspects involved. The
appellants contended that the restrictions were arbitrary and discriminatory,
impacting the freedom to carry on business. The respondents argued that these
conditions aimed to protect women from exploitation in orchestra bars. The
Court observed that historically, issues of bans and restrictions on women's
participation in performances in Maharashtra establishments were not new.
The Court rejected the respondents' arguments, stating that the gender cap was
imposed arbitrarily and did not genuinely protect women. It noted that these
conditions exploited women by unreasonably restricting their numerical
participation. The Court emphasized that the State's interference should be
proportionate to its aims of protection and that the imposed conditions were not
reasonable in a modern democratic society. The Court declared the gender cap
null and void but upheld the overall limit of performers to eight.
HELD
The Supreme Court held that the conditions imposing a gender cap on the
number of male and female performers in orchestra bars, under the Rules, 1960,
were invalid. The Court clarified that the restriction on the overall number of
performers (eight) was valid. Additionally, the Court highlighted that
performances promoting obscenity would be punishable under Section 294 of
the Indian Penal Code, and bars allowing such performances risked losing their
licenses. Consequently, the Court granted the appeal, overturning the Bombay
High Court's decision.
22nd of December,2023
Om Kumar & Others v. Union of India, AIR 2000 SC 3689
Bench: S R Pandian, M F Beevi, K J Reddy
FACTS
The case of Om Kumar v. Union of India revolves around disciplinary
proceedings initiated against officers involved in a matter related to possession
of flats by Skipper Construction from Delhi Development Authority.
Disciplinary actions were taken against five officers, and the final order resulted
in different penalties for the individuals involved. The counsel for Om Kumar
and Virendra Nath raised concerns about the varying quantum of punishment
imposed.
COURT OBSERVED
The article critically analyzes the core issues of the judgment, focusing on the
Doctrine of Proportionality. It questions the use of different scales for reviewing
administrative action under the same Article, highlights the misalignment
between the doctrines of proportionality and strict scrutiny, criticizes the
retrograde approach of applying the principle of Wednesbury unreasonableness,
and suggests adopting principles from an international model to strengthen the
doctrine.
HELD
The Supreme Court refused to interfere in the punishment, reiterating the
limited scope of judicial review of administrative actions. The court applied the
principles of the Wednesbury case and expressly accepted the Doctrine of
Proportionality. The judgment emphasized that proportionality applies when
administrative action is challenged on the grounds of being discriminatory
under Article 14. For actions challenged as arbitrary, the court retained the
Wednesbury principle.
23rd of December, 2023
Jarnail Singh & Others v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta & Others [2018] 10 SCR 663
FACTS
The case of Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta, also known as the
'Reservation in Promotion Case,' was decided by a five-judge bench of the
Supreme Court on September 26, 2018. The bench consisted of Former Chief
Justice of India Dipak Misra, Justice Kurian Joseph, Justice RF Nariman,
Justice SK Kaul, and Justice Indu Malhotra. The case primarily dealt with the
reservation for Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) in promotions
to government jobs and public services, addressing the application of the
creamy layer concept among SCs and STs concerning reservation in
promotions.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The case originated from the M. Nagraj and Others vs. Union of India and
Others decision in 2006, which was challenged by various states and the Centre.
The petitioners argued that the Nagraj judgment made it unjustly difficult to
grant reservations in promotion for government jobs and public services. The
case delved into the conditions established in the Nagraj case, which dealt with
the reservation for SCs and STs in promotions, and the requirement to collect
quantifiable data to prove backwardness and inadequacy of representation.
ISSUES
Whether the Nagraj Judgment needed reconsideration by a seven-judge bench.
Whether the States had to collect quantifiable data to prove the backwardness
and inadequacy of the class while being promoted.
Whether the creamy layer among SCs and STs should be barred from obtaining
promotions through reservation.
ARGUMENTS
The Supreme Court refused to reconsider the Nagraj judgment by a seven-judge
bench and reviewed it with a five-judge bench.
The argument centered on whether states needed to collect quantifiable data to
prove the backwardness and inadequacy of the SCs and STs. The court
concluded that this provision was contrary to the nine-judge bench decision in
the Indra Sawhney case, making it invalid.
The application of the creamy layer concept to promotions for SCs and STs was
discussed. Arguments were made for and against excluding the creamy layer,
considering its impact on equality and representation.
JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court held that the judgment in the Nagraj case did not need to be
referred to a seven-judge bench. The requirement for states to collect
quantifiable data was deemed invalid as it contradicted the Indra Sawhney case.
The application of the creamy layer to promotions for SCs and STs, as held in
the Nagraj judgment, was confirmed. The court viewed the creamy layer
principle as a means of identification rather than a matter of equality.
25th of December,2023
Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla, AIR 1998 SC 1406
FACTS:
In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation v. V.C. Shukla [1998 SC], the
central issue pertains to the admissibility of entries in account books as
'admissions' under the Evidence Act. The case involves the interpretation of
Sections 3, 17, 18, 21, and 30 of the Evidence Act, emphasizing the distinction
between 'admission' and 'confession.'
COURT OBSERVED:
The court observed that Section 3 of the Evidence Act deems a fact relevant
when connected with another in ways outlined in the Act. Sections 17 and 18
define 'admission' as a statement suggesting an inference about a fact in issue,
made by a party to the proceeding or an authorized agent. The court clarified the
crucial difference between 'admission' and 'confession,' stating that a confession
must admit the offense, while an admission falls short but can still be used as
evidence under Section 21.
HELD:
The court held that statements in account books, being 'admissions,' are
admissible against the person who made them, even if not communicated to
others. However, the admissibility of such statements hinges on whether they
relate to any fact in issue or relevant fact. The court emphasized the importance
of the distinction between admission and confession, particularly in criminal
trials. In the specific context of the charges against J.K. Jain, the court
concluded that the statements in the entries could be proved as admissions under
Section 18 read with Section 21 of the Evidence Act. Notably, the entries could
not be used as admissions against other individuals, such as Shri Advani or Shri
Shukla, due to the prosecution's failure to establish a prima facie case against
them.
26th of December
Overseas Tankship [UK] Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. [The Wagon
Mound] (1961) 1 All ER 404
Facts:
In the legal case of Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & Engineering
Co (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388, the incident involved the crew
members of Overseas Tankship neglecting to turn off a furnace tap on their ship,
resulting in oil leakage into Sydney Harbour. Morts Dock & Engineering Co
(The Wagon Mound) owned a wharf where they conducted ship repairs. The
leaked oil drifted towards Morts' site, where welding activities were taking
place. Despite inquiries about the oil's flammability, a spark from welding
ignited the spilled oil and debris, causing a rapid spread of fire and substantial
damage to Mort’s wharf.
Issues:
The central issue revolved around determining whether the crew could be held
responsible for the damage inflicted on the wharf due to the ensuing fire.
Additionally, the question arose as to whether liability would still apply even if
the damage was unforeseeable but a consequence of a negligent act.
Decision/Outcome:
The court ruled that Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd was not liable to compensate
for the damage incurred by the wharf. This case marked a departure from the
direct consequence test established in Re Polemis and introduced the test of
remoteness of damage. The new criterion evaluates whether the damage is
reasonably foreseeable. In this instance, the court found that a reasonable person
could not have foreseen the damage caused to the wharf by the fire resulting
from the ignition of furnace oil.
