Articles

Humanitarianism Transformed
Michael Barnett

The scale, scope, and significance of humanitarian action have expanded significantly since the late 1980s. This article reflects on
two ways in which humanitarianism has been transformed. First, its purpose has been politicized. Whereas once humanitarian
actors attempted to insulate themselves from the world of politics, they now work closely with states and attempt to eliminate the
root causes of conflict that place individuals at risk. Second, a field of humanitarianism has become institutionalized; during the
1990s the field and its agencies became more professionalized and rationalized. Drawing on various strands of organizational theory,
I examine the forces that have contributed to these transformations. I then explore how these transformations have changed the
nature of what humanitarian organizations are and what they do. In the conclusion I consider how the transformation of human-
itarianism links to the relationship between international nongovernmental organizations and world order, including the purpose of
humanitarian action and its distinctive function in global politics.

he global response to the devastation caused by the This global mobilization was made possible by the great

T tsunami of December 26, 2004, was an extraordi-

nary display of humanitarian action. Within hours
of the disaster scores of nongovernmental organizations
expansion of the humanitarian system since the end of the
cold war.1 Many states have developed humanitarian units
within their foreign and defense ministries and have increas-
(NGOs) were providing life-saving medical attention, shel- ingly accepted the legitimacy of humanitarian interven-
ter, and water. Soon thereafter, though, compassion became tion. Official assistance skyrocketed from $2 billion in
a status category. Bristling from accusations that they were 1990 to $6 billion in 2000. A growing number of inter-
not doing enough, states began to outbid one another in national organizations, including the World Bank, pro-
order to avoid censure and gain stature. In addition to an vide some form of assistance. There has been an explosion
unprecedented outpouring of financial support, states tem- of nongovernmental organizations dedicated to some aspect
porarily gave their militaries humanitarian assignments. of humanitarian action. Perhaps more impressive than their
The United States dispatched the U.S.S. Lincoln to the proliferation is their growing sophistication. NGOs once
coast of the Indonesian province of Aceh to perform search- operated with a relatively slow-moving machinery and were
and-rescue missions and deliver relief. Businesses gave staffed by individuals who were expected to learn on the
in-kind and financial contributions, and established links job. Now, however, most prominent agencies have a sys-
on their Web sites where customers could, with a click of tem of global positioning and delivery that allows trained
a button, join the relief effort. professionals to get assistance quickly where it is needed.
Médecins sans frontières (MSF), for example, grew from a
two-room office in the 1970s into an international net-
work of 19 semi-independent branches, with a combined
Michael Barnett is Harold Stassen Chair of International annual budget of $500 million, running programs in over
Relations at the Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and 70 countries, with 2,000 international and 15,000 national
professor of political science at the University of Minnesota staff. Finally, the very meaning of humanitarianism has
(mbarnett@[Link]). In 2004–5 he was a visiting expanded. Humanitarian action was formerly recognized
associate at the Center on International Cooperation at the as a separate sphere of activity, defined by the impartial
Center on International Cooperation. The author thanks relief to victims of manmade and natural disasters; now
Bud Duvall, Kevin Hartigan, Martha Finnemore, Abby the term, according to many, includes human rights, access
Stoddard, Ron Kassimir, Craig Calhoun, Jack Snyder, to medicine, economic development, democracy promo-
Adele Harmer, the participants of the Minnesota Inter- tion, and even building responsible states.
national Relations Colloquium, and three anonymous This article reflects on two defining features of this trans-
reviewers for Perspectives on Politics for their comments formation of humanitarianism: the purpose of humanitar-
and corrections. Special thanks to the Social Sciences Re- ianism is becoming politicized, and the organization of
search Council and the participants in its series on “The humanitarianism is becoming institutionalized. Once upon
Transformation of Humanitarian Action.” a time humanitarian agencies used to define themselves

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Articles | Humanitarianism Transformed

largely in opposition to “politics.” 2 Certainly they recog-

nized that humanitarianism was the offspring of politics,
that their activities had political consequences, and that
they were inextricably part of the political world. Yet the
widely accepted definition of humanitarianism—the impar-
tial, independent, and neutral provision of relief to those
in immediate danger of harm—emerged in opposition to
a particular meaning of politics and helped to depoliticize
relief-oriented activities.3
Many activities might alleviate suffering and improve
life circumstances, including protection of human rights
and economic development; but any actions that aspire to
restructure underlying social relations are inherently polit-
ical. Humanitarianism provides relief; it offers to save indi-
viduals, but not to eliminate the underlying causes that
placed them at risk. Viewed in this way, humanitarianism
plays a distinctive role in the international sacrificial order.4
All international orders have winners and losers and thus
require their quota of victims. Humanitarianism inter-
rupts this selection process by saving lives, thus reducing
the number of sacrifices. However, it does not aspire to
alter that order; that is the job of politics.
Humanitarianism’s original principles were also a reac-
tion to politics and designed to obstruct this “moral pol-

© AP Photo
lutant.” 5 The principle of humanity commands attention
to all humankind and inspires cosmopolitanism. The prin-
ciple of impartiality demands that assistance be based on
need and not discriminate on the basis of nationality, race,
religious belief, gender, political opinions, or other con- tarian agencies and states began to share agendas. States
siderations.6 The principles of neutrality and indepen- became more willing to act in the name of humanitarian-
dence also inoculate humanitarianism from politics. Relief ism, fund relief operations, use their diplomatic and polit-
agencies are best able to perform their life-saving activities ical power to advance humanitarian causes, authorize
only if they are untouched by state interests and partisan military troops to deliver relief, and consider the legiti-
agendas.7 Neutrality involves refraining from taking part macy of humanitarian intervention and the protection of
in hostilities or from any action that benefits or disadvan- civilian populations. Humanitarian organizations were torn
tages either party to a conflict. Neutrality is both an end by the growing presence of states, acknowledging their
and a means to an end because it helps relief agencies gain potential contribution but worrying about the costs to
access to populations at risk. Independence demands that their principles. Because, in their view, there are no human-
assistance should not be connected to any of the parties itarian solutions to humanitarian emergencies, many lob-
directly involved in the conflict or who have a stake in the bied states to apply military and political muscle to stop
outcome. Accordingly, many agencies either refused or the bloodletting. Relief agencies working in war zones had
limited their reliance on government funding if the donors to confront warlords and militias that demanded a king’s
had a stake in the outcome. The principles of humanity, ransom for the assistance that was made necessary by their
impartiality, neutrality, and independence thus served to conflict and their intentional targeting of civilians; agen-
depoliticize humanitarian action and create a “humanitar- cies occasionally sought outside intervention to provide
ian space” insulated from politics. armed protection and to help deliver relief. Yet the grow-
Yet these Maginot line principles defending humani- ing willingness of humanitarian organizations to work
tarianism from politics crumbled during the 1990s as alongside states potentially undermined their neutrality
humanitarianism’s agenda ventured beyond relief and into and independence. Humanitarian principles were com-
the political world, and agencies began working along- pletely shattered in places like Kosovo, Afghanistan, and
side, and with, states. During the 1990s humanitarian Iraq, where many agencies were funded by the very gov-
agencies began to accept the idea that they might try to ernments that were combatants and thus partly responsi-
eliminate the root causes of conflicts that place individu- ble for the emergency. The ever-present fear that fraternizing
als at risk; this vision swept them up into a process of between politics and humanitarianism would corrupt this
transformation and into the world of politics. Humani- sacred idea and undermine agencies’ ability to provide

724 Perspectives on Politics

relief was becoming a daily reality. Reflecting the anxieties needs. Rising concerns with efficiency in getting “deliv-
unleashed by this mixing of politics and principle, com- erables” to “clients” hinted of a growing corporate cul-
mentators spoke of humanitarianism in “crisis” and warned ture; participants increasingly worried about protecting
of the dangers of “supping with the devil,” “drinking from their “brand” and referring to the field as an “industry,” a
the poisoned chalice,” and “sleeping with the enemy.” 8 “business,” a “sector,” and an “enterprise.” There were
Institutionalization represents another aspect of the palpable fears that material and discursive borders that
transformation of humanitarianism. Before the 1990s there distinguished humanitarian agencies from commercial
were relatively few agencies that provided relief; they had firms and even military units were disintegrating. If com-
few sustained interactions; and they hardly considered mercial firms were really more efficient at saving lives,
establishing, revising, or maintaining principles of action, and if nonprofits were acting like corporate entities, then
codes of conduct, or professional standards that would exactly what distinguished the two? Politicization and
define the boundaries of the field. In the field they oper- institutionalization, each in its own way, called into ques-
ated according to very few standard procedures and drew tion the very marks of distinction of humanitarian action.
very little from scientific knowledge as they set up, often Drawing from various strands of organizational theory,
quite literally, soup kitchens. Their operations were fre- I consider the causes behind the expansion and politici-
quently staffed by individuals with little or no experience, zation of the purpose of humanitarianism and the institu-
who jumped into the fray believing that all they needed tionalization of the field. Various global forces created new
was a can-do attitude and good intentions. opportunity structures for humanitarian action: states gave
Over the 1990s humanitarianism became more recog- more generously because it furthered their foreign policy
nized as a field, with more donors, deliverers, and regula- interests; there was a surge of emergencies in the early
tors of a growing sphere of action. Various developments 1990s; and a change in the sovereignty regime reduced
and pressures propelled this institutionalization. The influx the barriers to intervention. Although the general trend
of new agencies, marching to their own drums, created was toward expansion and politicization, humanitarian
confusion on the ground. Donors, who were providing organizations did not respond uniformly to these oppor-
more funds, expected recipients to be accountable and tunities. To understand this variation in response requires
demonstrate effectiveness. Rwanda was a turning point.9 a consideration of, first, the organization’s identity and its
A flood of agencies—many there simply to fly the flag and initial understanding of the relationship between human-
impress prospective donors—were feeding the architects itarianism and politics, and, second, its dependence on
of the genocide in camps in Zaire, fueling their rearma- others for symbolic and material resources. Although there
ment, and potentially causing more harm than good. The were pockets of resistance to this politicization, arguably
Rwandan tragedy and other events caused the entire com- most existing and newly established organizations accepted
munity to undergo painful introspection that raised trou- these changes because they operated with a definition of
bling questions regarding the legitimacy and effectiveness humanitarian action that interfaced easily with politics
of humanitarian action. States raised similar questions, and were dependent on states for their financing. The
leaving aid organizations worried about their funding base. field’s institutionalization was largely triggered by chal-
In response, the field began to institutionalize. It became lenges to its legitimacy and effectiveness, challenges from
increasingly rationalized, standardizing basic codes of con- donors and participants, challenges that threatened its bot-
duct for intervention, developing accountability mecha- tom line, and challenges that were addressed by making
nisms, and calculating the consequences of actions. It the field more rational, bureaucratic, and professional.
became bureaucratized, developing precise rules that ide- I then examine some of the effects of this transforma-
ally could be applied across different situations. It became tion on humanitarian action. Much of the discussion of
professionalized, developing doctrines, specialized areas of the effects focuses on politicization, that is, how the grow-
training, and career paths. ing involvement by states is potentially compromising or
The humanitarian sector welcomed elements of this distorting the essence of humanitarian action, whether
institutionalization because they helped to standardize these changes have been generally desirable, pragmatic, or
expectations, ease coordination in the field, enhance effi- self-destructive, and whether it is possible or even desir-
ciency, and improve the quality of care to more popula- able to put the political genie back in the bottle.10 But the
tions. Yet other features were distressing, potentially possible effects extend beyond what humanitarian agen-
changing not simply the organization of humanitarian cies do to include what they are. Any discussion of effects,
action, but its very character. Many organizations were of course, turns on some baseline understanding of human-
now demonstrating commonplace interests in self- itarian action. Such an analysis does not need to essential-
preservation and survival, at times allowing these inter- ize humanitarianism, to suggest that there was a settled or
ests to overshadow their principled commitments. The fixed meaning that existed for decades until disrupted by
development of standardized templates and guidelines the post–cold war period. Nor does such an analysis pro-
made them less able to recognize and respond to local vide an evaluative judgment as to whether these changes

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Articles | Humanitarianism Transformed

are necessarily good, reasonable under the circumstances, in fact there were more crises or whether great powers were
or reckless. Instead, such an analysis merely needs to ask now willing to recognize populations at risk because their
what was the general understanding of humanitarian action policies were no longer the immediate cause, the emergen-
prior to the 1990s, consider how politicization and insti- cies were on the international agenda.14 As states paid more
tutionalization has shaken that understanding, and, most attention to them, they linked these populations at risk to
importantly, explore whether such changes have poten- an expanding discourse of security. During the cold war the
tially undermined the cornerstone principle of impartial UN Security Council defined threats to peace and security
relief. as disputes between states that had become or might become
Although humanitarianism is now firmly on the global militarized, conflicts involving the great powers, and gen-
agenda, the same cannot be said for academic research. eral threats to global stability.15 After the cold war, and in
Most research directly related to humanitarian action is reaction to the growing perception that domestic conflict
produced by specialized agencies such as the Overseas and civil wars were leaving hundreds of thousands of peo-
Development Institute’s Humanitarian Policy Group; it is ple at risk, creating mass flight, and destabilizing entire
almost always directed at the policy community. Some regions, the Security Council authorized interventions on
social science research is related to humanitarian action, the grounds that these conflicts challenged regional and inter-
including the literatures on humanitarian intervention, national security. Responding to both the post–cold war
civil wars, democracy building, refugee studies, and peace- humanitarian emergencies and the growing prominence of
keeping. However, there has been remarkably little con- the Security Council in this domain, the General Assembly
sideration of humanitarianism as an object of research. passed a watershed resolution in 1992 that made the UN
The body of the essay points to various lines of inquiry, the new coordinating body for humanitarian action.16
and in the conclusion I link my account of the transfor- States also warmed to the idea of humanitarian action.
mation of humanitarianism to a broader research agenda They were increasingly generous. Even more impressive
that concerns the relationship between international non- was their increasing willingness to support operations
governmental organizations and world order, including whose stated function was to protect civilians at risk, and
the purpose of humanitarian action and its functions in even to consider the legitimacy of humanitarian interven-
global politics. tion.17 States also began to treat humanitarian action as
an instrument of their strategic and foreign policy goals.
Causes of Transformation Since 9/11 many states, including the United States, have
viewed counterterrorism and humanitarianism as crime-
Environmental forces played a central role in transform-
fighting partners. In 2001 former Secretary of State Colin
ing humanitarianism. Several important developments
Powell told a gathering of NGOs that “just as surely as
encouraged humanitarian agencies to move away from
our diplomats and military, American NGOs are out
relief alone and toward the transformation of local struc-
there [in Afghanistan] serving and sacrificing on the front-
tures, and to become more willing to work alongside and
lines of freedom. NGOs are such a force multiplier for
with states. Such developments led to its politicization.
us, such an important part of our combat team.” 18 States
Yet not all agencies responded uniformly to these oppor-
also discovered that humanitarian action could help them
tunities; consequently, I examine features of the organiza-
avoid more costly interventions. For instance, the major
tion and its relationship to the environment to help to
powers authorized the United Nations High Commis-
explain this variation. Environmental developments also
sioner on Refugees (UNHCR) to deliver humanitarian
played an important role in shaping the institutionaliza-
relief in Bosnia in part because they wanted to relieve the
tion of humanitarianism. Similarly, although those in the
growing pressure for a military intervention. Regardless
sector had their own reasons for rationalizing, bureaucratiz-
of their motives, states were providing new opportunities
ing, and professionalizing their organizations, pressures
for humanitarian action.
from donors and new international standards of legiti-
The second development that propelled the encounter
macy also played a critical role in institutionalizing human-
between politics and humanitarianism was the emergence
itarianism. Yet not all agencies responded uniformly, and
of “complex humanitarian emergencies,” that is, a “conflict-
we need to understand why.
related humanitarian disaster involving a high degree of
breakdown and social dislocation and, reflecting this con-
Expansion and politicization dition, requiring a system-wide aid response from the inter-
Four global processes created new opportunity structures national community.” 19 These emergencies, which seemed
that foregrounded the “civilian” as an object of concern.11 to be proliferating around the world, are characterized by a
Geopolitical shifts associated with the end of the cold war combustible mixture of state failure, refugee flight, mili-
and the demise of the Soviet Union increased the demand tias, warrior refugees, and populations at risk from vio-
for humanitarian action in several ways.12 There appeared lence, disease, and hunger. Such situations created a demand
to be more humanitarian crises than ever before.13 Whether for new sorts of interventions and conflict management tools.

726 Perspectives on Politics

Relief agencies were attempting to distribute food, water, normative environment greased the tracks for more wide-
and medicine in war zones and were frequently forced to ranging interventions.24
bargain with militias, warlords, and hoodlums for access to A flourishing human rights agenda also left its mark.
populations in need. In situations of extreme violence and The logic of relief and the logic of rights share important
lawlessness they lobbied foreign governments and the United elements: they place the human citizen and humanity at
Nations to consider authorizing a protection force that could the fore; they use the language of empowerment in
double as bodyguard and relief distributor. These emergen- attempting to help the weak; and they reject power.25
cies also attracted a range of NGOs.20 Relief agencies that That said, they also demonstrate divisions; the relief com-
were delivering emergency assistance, human rights orga- munity will nearly always privilege survival over free-
nizations aspiring to protect rights and create a rule of law, dom, while the rights community is sometimes willing
and development organizations keen to sponsor sustain- to use relief as an instrument of rights, that is, make
able growth began to interact and to take responsibility for relief conditional on the observance of human rights—a
the same [Link] growing interaction between dif- move many relief agencies view as nearly incomprehensi-
ferent kinds of agencies that hailed from different sectors ble.26 In any event, the fast-growing human rights move-
encouraged a relief-rights-development linkage within a ment pulled humanitarianism from the margins toward
humanitarian discourse that became tied to the construc- the center of the international policy agenda, and many
tion of modern, legitimate, democratic states.21 As inter- relief agencies, increasingly adopting the language of rights,
national actors began to think about the causes of and were glad to ride its coattails.27
solutions to these emergencies, “humanitarian” came to Growing cosmopolitanism was also a transformative fac-
include a wider range of practices and goals. tor, for it underpins humanitarianism. Cosmopolitanism
A third factor contributing to politicization was the maintains that each person is of equal moral worth and that
political economy of funding. Although private contribu- in the “justification of choices one’s choices one must take
tions increased, they paled in comparison to official assis- the prospects of everyone affected equally into account.” 28
tance. Between 1990 and 2000, aid levels rose from 2.1 to The principle of impartiality presumes that all those at
$5.9 billion. Moreover, as a percentage of official develop- risk, regardless of their identity, deserve equal attention
ment assistance, humanitarian aid rose from an average of and consideration. The desire to help those who are suffer-
5.8 percent between 1989 and 1993 to 10.5 percent in ing regardless of place means that borders do not define
2000.22 A few donors were responsible for much of this the limits of obligations. This cosmopolitan ethos, how-
increase, and they also now comprise an oligopoly. The ever, leads to different schools of thought in humanitarian-
United States is the lead donor by a factor of three. In ism, schools that can be in tension.29 Some humanitarians
1999, for instance, its outlays exceeded the total assistance believe aid should be restricted to the victims of man-made
of twelve large Western donors. Between 1995 and 1997 and natural disasters; this branch emerged in the mid-
it provided 20 percent of total assistance; in the following nineteenth century and is most closely associated with the
three years its contribution rose to 30 percent. The second International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Another
largest donor is the European Community Humanitarian branch of humanitarianism extends assistance to all those
Organization (ECHO), followed by the United King- at risk and imagines eliminating the conditions that are
dom, several European countries, Canada, and Japan. hypothesized to render populations vulnerable.30 As one aid
Although various motives fueled this increase in giving, worker wrote, “[I]n terms of the destruction of human life,
many states expected either something in return or evi- what difference is there between the wartime bombing of a
dence that their money was being well spent. civilian population and the distribution of ineffective med-
Finally, a change in the normative and legal environ- icines during a pandemic that is killing millions of peo-
ment also coaxed humanitarianism into the political world. ple?” 31 If individuals are at risk because of authoritarian and
State sovereignty was no longer sacrosanct; rather, it was repressive policies, then humanitarian organizations must
becoming conditional on states behaving according to par- be prepared to fight for human rights and democratic
ticular codes of conduct, honoring a “responsibility to reforms. If individuals are at risk because of poverty and
protect” their societies, and having attributes such as the deprivation, then they must be prepared to promote devel-
rule of law, markets, and democratic principles.23 Their opment. If regional and domestic conflicts are the source of
legitimacy became tied to their having the rule of law, violence against individuals, then they must try their hand
markets, and democratic principles. These developments at conflict resolution and attempt to eliminate the under-
created a normative space for external intervention and lying causes of conflict.
encouraged a growing range of actors to expand their assis-
tance activities. In some cases aid agencies were supposed
to provide immediate relief during conflict situations, while Variation in response
in others, to eliminate the root causes of conflict and cre- Although these changes in global politics created new open-
ate legitimate states. Regardless of the pretext, the new ings for an expanded meaning of humanitarianism, aid

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agencies were not uniformly receptive. Many, including mity will not threaten the organization’s identity. MSF and
the IRC and Oxfam, were ready, willing, and able to cap- ICRC, the two best known Dunantist organizations, spent
italize on new openings. They saw virtue in expanding much of the 1990s unsuccessfully attempting to police the
their operations to help the powerless, and instead of being borders between humanitarianism and politics. Wilsonian
satisfied to help the “well-fed dead,” they could eliminate organizations not only capitalized on these openings, they
the root causes of conflict. Other organizations made a frequently lobbied for them. Many humanitarian inter-
pragmatic decision to become more political, though they national organizations such as United Nations High Com-
were cautious about every step and mindful of possible mittee for Reform (UNHCR) exploited these changes in
consequences. Still others clung to their principles and sovereignty to venture carefully into domestic space while
resisted what they viewed as the siren of politics. The claiming that they were not being political because they
ICRC and MSF fought the international currents and shunned any involvement in partisan politics. In fact,
stuck to their “first principles.” 32 UNHCR actively lobbied for these changes by encourag-
Two factors account for much of this variance. One ing states to embrace the humanitarian agenda on the
was the congruence between the organizational culture grounds that this principled position would further inter-
and these new openings. Humanitarian organizations can national peace and security.35
be sorted into two types—Dunantist and Wilsonian— The gap between the moral and organizational man-
according to their understanding of the relationship date also may have contributed to the expanding purpose
between politics and humanitarianism.33 of humanitarian action. Organizations may have felt the
Named after Henry Dunant, the patriarch of modern need to expand in order to resolve the contradiction
humanitarianism,34 Dunantist organizations define human- between their broad aspirational goals and the more nar-
itarianism as the neutral, independent, and impartial pro- rowly circumscribed rules that limit their action.36 Human-
vision of relief to victims of conflict and believe that itarian organizations are empowered by moral claims or
humanitarianism and politics must be segregated. In gen- aspirations. Limited organizational structures make it
eral, Dunantist organizations, which are often accused of impossible to fulfill these mandates, creating a reason for
seeing themselves as the “high priests” of humanitarian- expansion into new areas. In attempting to relieve suffer-
ism, fear that the relaxation of their founding principles ing, it is natural to aim for more than temporary relief,
or expansion of their mandate will open the floodgates to that is, for eliminating the conditions that produce a
politics and endanger humanitarianism. demand for humanitarian services.37 For instance, before
Wilsonian organizations, so named because they follow the 1980s UNHCR leaped into action only after popula-
in the footsteps of Woodrow Wilson’s belief that is was pos- tions crossed an international border. Yet many UNHCR
sible and desirable to transform political, economic, and staff bristled at these restrictions, wanting to take on a
cultural structures so that they liberated individuals and pro- preventive role. In the 1980s UNHCR began trying to
duced peace and progress, desire to attack the root causes prevent refugee flows—to get at their “root causes”—and
that leave populations at risk. Although many of the most to lobby for “state responsibility.” 38 From there it was a
famous members of this camp, including Save the Chil- small step for UNHCR to become involved in eliminat-
dren, Oxfam, and Word Vision International, originated ing the causes of flight and ensuring that repatriated ref-
in wartime and thus concentrated on rescuing populations ugees stayed at home; toward that end, it began promoting
at risk, they expanded into development and other activi- human rights, the rule of law, and economic development.
ties designed to assist marginalized populations. Over time Finally, resource dependence helps to explain organiza-
they also undertook advocacy—like a growing number of tions’ different responses to a broader definition of human-
human rights organizations that also belong to this camp. itarian action.39 Humanitarian organizations do not survive
Agencies involved in restoring and fostering economic live- by good intentions alone. They also need resources to
lihoods also express a Wilsonian orientation. Wilsonian orga- fund their staff and programs; these resources are con-
nizations are certainly political, at least according to the trolled by others. The willingness of others to fund orga-
Dunantist perspective; however, even those who have sub- nizations’ humanitarian activities is contingent, in part,
scribed to a transformational agenda present themselves as on their perceived legitimacy and whether they are viewed
apolitical to the extent that they claim to act according to as acting according to the supporting community’s val-
universal values and avoid partisan politics. ues.40 Existing organizations, especially those that were
Organizations’ understandings of the relationship culturally inclined to expand, thus had every incentive to
between humanitarianism and politics help to explain their move in directions that were directly rewarded by states.
response to the transformations of the 1990s. The greater Development organizations are exemplary here. By the
the discrepancy between organizational culture and envi- end of the 1980s, development as a project had become
ronmental pressures, the more an organization will resist increasingly discredited. Humanitarianism handed these
change for fear of political contamination; the greater the agencies a new function and sense of purpose; they became
congruence, the more it will conform because such confor- necessary for post-conflict reconstruction and structural

728 Perspectives on Politics

prevention—central to humanitarian action and inter- culture for a variety of reasons—though resource require-
national and human security.41 Newly established organi- ments figure centrally. As Scott and Meyer observe, this nor-
zations, some humanitarian and some less so, found it mative environment contains the “rules and requirements
advantageous to present themselves and their activities as to which individual organizations must conform if they
quintessentially humanitarian. Existing agencies also were are to receive support and legitimacy from the environ-
rewarded by expanding their activities. For instance, by ment.” 45 In short, because organizations are rewarded for
becoming the lead humanitarian agency, UNHCR was in conforming to rules and legitimization principles, and pun-
a position not only to expand its responsibilities, but also ished if they do not, they tend to model themselves after
to demonstrate its relevance to the very states who paid organizational forms that have legitimacy.
the bills.42 The environment also helps to explain institutional iso-
morphism, that is, why particular models spread.46 There
are three mechanisms: coercive, mimetic, and normative.
Expansion and institutionalization The first two are most relevant here. Coercive isomor-
Until the 1990s, humanitarianism barely existed as a field. phism occurs when powerful organizations, such as states,
There were only a handful of major relief agencies, includ- impose rules and standards on other organizations. Mimetic
ing the ICRC, International Federation of the Red Cross, isomorphism largely occurs in situations of uncertainty,
MSF, and various organizations such as Save the Children encouraging organizations to model themselves after oth-
and Oxfam that began as relief agencies, moved into devel- ers that they believe are successful. Normative isomor-
opment, and then developed an emergency response capac- phism largely originates from professionalization—the
ity (though generally not adopting the discourse of attempt by members of an occupation “to define the con-
humanitarianism). Although these agencies shared broad ditions and methods of their work, to control the produc-
principles, such as humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and tion of producers,” 47 and to establish the epistemic basis
independence, there was no concerted effort to establish for their authority and the claim to occupational auton-
codes of conduct and standards of behavior to regulate the omy. In general, sociological institutionalism emphasizes
field and define membership. Those who participated in how organizations, desirous of symbolic and material
relief work treated it more as a craft than as a profession resources and exposed to the same environment, will tend
because, in the main, they did not claim that their quali- to adopt the same organizational forms.
fications derived from specialized knowledge, doctrine, or The institutionalization of humanitarianism was largely
training, and did not see this as their life’s work. driven by challenges to the emerging field’s legitimacy and
Yet in the 1990s humanitarianism became a field, with effectiveness—challenges that emanated from donors that
regular interactions among the members, an increase in paid the bills and members who were experiencing a crisis
the information and knowledge that members had to con- of confidence in reaction to new circumstances and short-
sider, a greater reliance on specialized knowledge, and a comings. These challenges were answered by rationaliz-
collective awareness that they were involved in a common ing, bureaucratizing, and professionalizing.
enterprise. The field was becoming rationalized, aspiring A major feature of the field’s rationalization was the
to develop: methodologies for calculating results, abstract attempt to standardize relief activities.48 In response to
rules to guide standardized responses, and procedures to the influx of relief agencies that were operating according
improve efficiency and identify the best means to achieve to varying standards—a situation made doubly dangerous
specified ends. Humanitarian organizations were also for agencies in the context of providing relief during
becoming bureaucratized, developing spheres of compe- conflict—and the growing evidence that different popu-
tence, and rules to standardize responses and to drive lations were being differentially treated, humanitarian orga-
means-ends calculations. Professionalism followed, with nizations attempted to establish professional standards and
demands for actors who had specific knowledge, voca- codes of conduct. Several such initiatives stand out. In
tional qualifications that derived from specialized train- 1992 the ICRC, the International Federation of the Red
ing, and the ability to follow fixed doctrine.43 Cross, and the Red Crescent Society (in consultation with
Sociological institutionalism helps to explain why the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response) began
humanitarianism developed in this manner. This branch work on a ten-point code of conduct. Originally con-
of organizational theory emphasizes the “socially constructed ceived as providing guidance during natural disasters, it
normative worlds in which organizations exist and how was extended to cover conflict situations as well. The first
the social rules, standards of appropriateness, and models four articles reaffirm the basic principles of the ICRC, and
of legitimacy will constitute the organization.” 44 The envi- the last six identify “good practices” and methodology for
ronment in which an organization is embedded is defined relief operations. This document is used by various agen-
by a culture that contains acceptable models, standards of cies guide their actions in war zones.49 Various NGOs also
action, goals, and logics of appropriateness. Organizations assembled what came to be known as the Providence Prin-
are constituted by, and will be compelled to adopt, this ciples, which also aimed to introduce standardized rules

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for delivering relief. The same desire led various NGOs to strategies. Prior to the 1990s few humanitarian organiza-
launch the SPHERE project to establish minimal stan- tions even thought to measure the consequences of their
dards in the areas of water, sanitation, nutrition, shelter, actions, assuming that the mere provision of assistance
site planning, and health.50 This development, in turn, was evidence of their good results. Two developments shat-
led to the Humanitarian Charter, which endeavors to tered this blissful assumption. The first was mounting evi-
“achieve defined levels of service for people affected by dence that some humanitarian interventions might be
calamity or armed conflict, and to promote the obser- causing more harm than good. Rwanda, in particular, burst
vance of Dunantist humanitarian principles.” The sheer the confidence of the humanitarian community.56 In addi-
proliferation of principles and exercises to establish codes tion, donors began demanding results-based evaluations.
of conduct represented an attempt to standardize the rules Measuring impact and demonstrating that humanitar-
governing humanitarian action.51 ian organizations are responsible for success (or failure) is a
Another feature of rationalization was the introduction demanding methodological task. Humanitarian organiza-
of systems of accountability.52 This development was tions must define “impact,” specify their goals and trans-
pushed by donors, who began to apply “new public man- late them into measurable indicators, gather data in highly
agement” principles as they expected humanitarian orga- fluid emergency settings, establish baseline data in order to
nizations to provide evidence that their money was being generate a “before and after” snapshot, control for alterna-
well spent. These principles originated with the neoliberal tive explanations and variables, and construct reasonable
orthodoxy of the 1980s. One of neoliberalism’s goals was counterfactual scenarios.57 Nevertheless, they made con-
to reduce the state’s role in the delivery of public services siderable headway. Humanitarian organizations began to
and, instead, to rely on commercial and voluntary orga- draw on epidemiological models in the health sciences and
nizations, which were viewed as more efficient. Because program evaluation tools of the development field. The
government agencies justified the shift from the public to United States pushed for creation of the Standardized Mon-
the private and voluntary sectors on the grounds that the itoring and Assessment of Relief and Nutrition (SMART).
latter were more efficient, they introduced monitoring Care International’s Benefits-Harms analysis, which bor-
mechanisms to reduce the possibility of either slack or rows methodologies developed in the human rights field,
shirking.53 Until the 1990s, humanitarian organizations helps relief and development organizations measure the
largely escaped this public management ideology. Because impact of their programs on people’s human rights.58
humanitarian assistance was a minor part of the foreign Humanitarian organizations also moved to profession-
aid budget, states did not view humanitarianism as central alize. Although relief workers still learn on the job, orga-
to their foreign policy goals, and states trusted that human- nizations increasingly draw on the health sciences and
itarian agencies were efficient and effective; there was little engineering, extant manuals, and specialized training pro-
reason for states to absorb the monitoring costs. However, grams run by private firms, NGOs, states, and academic
once funding increased, humanitarianism became more institutions. Agencies increasingly recruit relief workers
central to security goals, and states began to question the who have training in specialized fields. Although relief
effectiveness of humanitarian organizations, they were will- workers still have a high burnout rate, and most organi-
ing to do so.54 Toward that end, states introduced new zations have an impressive degree of staff turnover, many
reporting requirements, developed new kinds of con- agencies now have full-time staff, who draw salaries with
tracts, and demanded greater evidence of results. benefits packages and treat the field as a career. In addi-
The drive toward accountability was not completely tion, many premier agencies underwent a major change in
donor-driven, for those within the sector increasingly their bureaucratic structure. Although operational divi-
sought greater accountability—to recipients. It was not sions still carry tremendous prestige and influence, they
enough to be accountable to donors for how their money increasingly compete with newly established offices dedi-
was spent; it shows it also was important to be account- cated to fund-raising and donor relations, staffed by those
able to the supposed beneficiaries of their activities. whose primary field experience derives not from refugee
Accountability, therefore, increasingly meant identifying camps, but from marketing campaigns and pledge drives.
ways to improve agencies’ policies. These developments
led to various system-wide initiatives, including the Active
Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Consequences of Transformation
Humanitarian Action (ALNAP).55 In addition, in 1999 The transformation of humanitarianism has left its mark,
various NGOs initiated the Ombudsman for Humanitar- and humanitarian organizations hotly debate whether it is
ian Assistance to address their accountability to “clients.” a mark of Cain. At times this debate appears to devolve
Emblematic of bureaucratization was the effort by into two equally stylized camps: one waxing sentimental
humanitarian organizations to develop technologies and about some quasi-mythical golden age of humanitarian
methodologies to calculate the effects of their policies in action in which relief agencies enjoyed a space of infinite
order to demonstrate effectiveness and identify optimal expanse, and another suggesting that the golden age is

730 Perspectives on Politics

around the corner because humanitarian agencies have with being televised delivering food to, and building shel-
never been better funded or better positioned to help more ters for, displaced populations. It also would help them
people at risk. Without getting pulled into this debate, I win the “hearts and minds” campaign, integral to the
want to explore how the politicization and institutional- war effort.64 Humanitarian organizations, though, were
ization of humanitarianism has left organizations more now being coordinated by one of the parties to the con-
vulnerable to external control. States are now able to use flict, compromising their neutrality and independence.65
direct and indirect means to constrain and guide the actions The bilateralization of aid and the earmarking of funds
of humanitarian agencies in ways that agencies believe also potentially steers individual agencies, and has pro-
potentially violate their principles. The external environ- duced disturbing trends in the allocation of aid. Multilat-
ment more generally affects the organizational culture of eral aid is technically defined as aid given to multilateral
humanitarian agencies—their identity, internal organiza- organizations and not earmarked; these organizations,
tion, practices, principles, and calculations. The discus- therefore, have complete discretion over how the money is
sion of the transformation of humanitarianism, in other spent. Bilateral aid can mean the state either dictates to
words, forces us to consider the effects of power in terms the multilateral organization how the money is spent or
of what humanitarian organizations do and what they are. gives the money to a nonmultilateral organization such as
an NGO. Earmarking means that the donor dictates where
and how the assistance will be used, frequently identifying
Power over humanitarian action regions, countries, operations, or even projects; this is espe-
States and international institutions can now compel cially useful if governments have geopolitical interests or
humanitarian agencies to act in ways counter to their inter- pet projects. Since the 1980s there has been a dramatic
ests and principles. Although states have historically vac- shift away from multilateral aid and toward bilateral aid
illated in their desire to use humanitarian action to serve and earmarking. In 1988 states directed roughly 45 per-
their interests, the 1990s were unprecedented to the extent cent of humanitarian assistance to UN agencies in the
that states attempted to impose their agendas on agen- form of multilateral assistance. After 1994, however, the
cies.59 Toward that end, states began introducing mecha- average dropped to 25 percent (and even lower in 1999
nisms that were intended to control their “implementing because of Kosovo).66 Accordingly, state interests, rather
partners.” Although such control mechanisms did not nec- than the humanitarian principle of relief based on need,
essarily compel agencies to act in ways that they believed increasingly drives funding decisions. For instance, of the
were antagonistic to their interests or principles, fre- top 50 recipients of bilateral assistance between 1996 and
quently they did. 1999, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Israel/Palestine,
The most important control mechanism came from and Iraq received 50 percent of the available assistance.67
the power of the purse. Sometimes donors make transpar- In 2002 nearly half of all funds given by donor govern-
ent threats. In 2003 U.S. AID administrator Andrew Nat- ments to the UN’s 25 appeals for assistance went to Afghan-
sios told humanitarian organizations operating in Iraq that istan.68 If funding decisions were based solely on need,
they were obliged to show the American flag if they took then places like Sudan, Congo, northern Uganda, and
U.S. funding. If not, he warned, they could be replaced.60 Angola would leapfrog to the top of the list.69 In general,
One NGO official captured the U.S. message in the fol- while there is more aid than ever before, it is controlled by
lowing terms: “play the tune or ‘they’ll take you out of the fewer donors, who are more inclined to impose condi-
band.’” 61 tions and direct aid toward their priorities, undermining
Sometimes donors use more subtle, indirect, methods, the principle of impartiality. Funding is now a several-
for example, by insisting that agencies submit to coordi- tiered system, with the least fortunate getting the least
nation mechanisms. Coordination can appear to be a attention.70
technical exercise whose function is to improve the divi- Humanitarian organizations bristled at these control
sion of labor, increase specialization, and heighten effi- mechanisms. Any organization will object to encroach-
ciencies. Yet this coordination, like all governance activities, ments on its autonomy. Yet humanitarian organizations
is a highly political exercise, defined by power. The power feared not only less autonomy, but also having to compro-
behind coordination has not been lost on humanitarian mise their humanitarian principles. The language of
organizations, especially when the donors are parties to principal-agent theory helps explain why. States see them-
the conflict or have a vested interest in the outcome.62 selves as principals that provide a temporary transfer of
Most famously, NATO in Kosovo and the United States authority to their agents, humanitarian organizations. Yet
in Afghanistan insisted on coordinating humanitarian humanitarian organizations do not see themselves as agents
action.63 Although they justified their role on the grounds of states or operating with delegated authority; they see
that it would improve the relief effort, they had more themselves as agents of humanity that operate with moral
self-interested reasons: in order to sell the war at home, authority. The very association with states and its presump-
the combatants wanted the favorable publicity that came tion of delegated authority, then, potentially undermines

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the moral authority cherished by most humanitarian orga- critical but very unglamourous work.76 In the camps in
nization. Indeed, if states fund humanitarian organiza- Zaire following the Rwandan genocide, humanitarian
tions in order to further their foreign policy goals, then groups rushed to the scene in order to show the flag and
humanitarian organizations are justifiably concerned. States’ impress funders back home. Working in an orphanage
attempt to monitor and regulate humanitarian organiza- photographs well and brings in revenue, but building clean
tions almost by definition compromises their guiding latrines and sanitation systems does not—even though it
principles. is equally if not more essential for saving lives. Such a set
of incentives might create market failures. De Waal posits
a Gresham’s Law for humanitarianism: bad humanitarian
Humanitarian action redefined action can crowd out good action because humanitarian
The new environment and the transformation of human- organizations are rewarded for being seen rather than for
itarianism is also leaving its imprint on the organizational saving lives.77
culture of humanitarian agencies, producing changes that Evidence also points to agencies’ shifting what they con-
potentially undermine the core principle of impartial relief. sider to be appropriate action, thus redefining their prin-
The transformation of humanitarianism, as already noted, ciples and practices. Relaxation or redefinition of neutrality
includes an expansion of the practices and goals associated and independence can introduce new rule-governed behav-
with humanitarian action. This logically means that many ior that can compromise impartiality. For example, one
humanitarian organizations are, in other words, articulat- former Oxfam official reflected that his organization had
ing an expanding set of goals. Goal expansion has several become so supportive of NATO intervention in Kosovo
possible consequences. It can lead to traditional goals being that it forgot that genuine impartiality demanded that
displaced. Relief was formerly an end in itself, but agen- Oxfam and other relief organizations should have been on
cies are increasingly considering its relationship to other both sides of the border—helping Kosovar refugees and
goals. For instance, rights-based agencies have demon- Serbian victims of NATO bombing.78 Humanitarian orga-
strated a greater willingness to use relief in order to pro- nizations also might develop new rules that potentially
mote basic human rights. Not only does need cease to be undermine the safety of populations. As it attempted to
unconditional, but aid organizations might now also be navigate state pressures, UNHCR altered its underlying
attempting to determine who is worthy of aid, thus acting rules and principles of action in a way that increased its
much like the nineteenth-century relief workers inter- propensity to put the lives of refugees at risk.79
ested in helping the “deserving poor.” 71 There is growing This transformation also can subtly alter the ethical
anecdotal evidence, moreover, that as many agencies have principles and calculations used by agencies to guide
increasingly emphasized advocacy, rights, and peace build- their policies. Humanitarian agencies are demonstrating a
ing, they have not maintained their capacity for emer- shift from deontological, or duty-based, ethics to conse-
gency relief, harming their response capacity to situations quentialist ethics. This development is driven partly by a
like Darfur.72 growing concern with the negative consequences of human-
Bureaucratization is associated with the growing prior- itarian action and the related desire to measure effective-
ity of base organizational interests such as survival and ness and impact.80 Previously humanitarian organizations
funding.73 Reflecting on the emergence of the “Humani- were instinctively guided by deontological ethics: some
tarian International,” Alex de Waal argues that in the com- actions are simply good in and of themselves regardless
petition between “soft interests” such as performing relief of their consequences. Ethical action consists of identify-
well and “hard interests” such as organizational survival ing these intrinsically good actions and then performing
and prosperity, noble ideals increasingly lose.74 Ideals are one’s moral duty. The growing concern with unintended
particularly threatened when agencies need to interact with consequences, however, has contributed to an ethic of
new donor environments to fund their activities. States’ consequentialism: whether or not an action is ethical
new contract mechanisms, including short-term con- depends on the outcome. The issue for humanitarian orga-
tracts, competitive bidding, and reporting rules, have intro- nizations is becoming not whether aid has negative and
duced perverse incentives for agencies that care about unintended consequences—for it almost always does—
funding as much as they do about protecting populations but whether, on balance, it does more harm than good.81
at risk. Humanitarian organizations might doctor their Consequentialist reasoning requires agencies to identify
performance indicators in order to transform failure into the outcomes of concern—and as their goals expand, the
success, compete in areas in which they do not have a outcome variables that must be considered expand, too.
comparative advantage in order to secure funding, or fail Accordingly, agencies have an incentive to consider how
to report shortcomings or the misuse of funds by subcon- relief might affect development, human rights, and peace
tractors in order to avoid jeopardizing their contracts.75 building—potentially eroding the idea that agencies should
Furthermore, because visibility can be a prerequisite for give on the basis of need and not on the basis of other
getting funding, many organizations prefer publicity to goals.

732 Perspectives on Politics

 The desire to measure impact and effectiveness also can action created new opportunities for agencies to help more
abrade a central element of the humanitarian ethic: a desire people than ever before. A practice that was once restricted
to demonstrate solidarity with victims and to restore their to relief and emergency assistance has become—like com-
dignity. Relief workers, in Rony Brauman’s words, aspire munism, nationalism, liberalism—an ism, not part of this
to “remain close to people in distress and to try and relieve world but a project designed to transform it.
their suffering.” 82 They do so by providing not only relief, These changes in humanitarian action suggest that it has
but also compassion and caring. The ethic of humanitar- a new function in international politics. Originally its dis-
ianism, in this respect, includes both consequentialist and tinctive function in the international sacrificial order was
duty-based ethics—it seeks to provide life-saving relief and to interrupt the selection process by saving those at imme-
holds that the motives matter for assuring benevolence. diate risk. It did not pretend to be anything but palliative.
Yet can such nonquantifiable values as compassion be oper- Yet this temperance movement also served an ideological
ationalized when attempting to determine the effective- function, helping to reproduce the geopolitical order because
ness of humanitarian action? Is it possible to quantify, for it reduced pressures that might have demanded its trans-
instance, the reuniting of families, the provision of burial formation. Consider modern humanitarianism’s origins. By
shrouds, or the reduction of fear and anxiety among peo- the mid-nineteenth century, changes in military technol-
ple in desperate situations? 83 If they are omitted from the ogy were making war more brutal; there was little tradition
model, the model might redefine how humanitarian agen- of medical relief; and the emerging profession of war report-
cies think about impact, downgrading basic ethical motives ing was transmitting gruesome pictures and accounts of sol-
in favor of measurable outcomes. If the measurable vari- diers left to languish and die on the battlefield. Publics were
ables are no longer dependent on the subjective needs of beginning to rebel at these sights and to express pacifist sen-
the “beneficiaries,” will they even be consulted? timents. In response, state and military elites co-opted Dun-
Measures of effectiveness, then, and the growing reli- ant’s platform, removed its more radical proposals, accepted
ance of agencies on rational-legal principles to generate new rules governing how to tend wounded soldiers on the
their legitimacy, might undermine the moral authority of battlefield, and thus demonstrated to their publics their com-
humanitarian organizations. If the legitimacy and value of mitment to humanize war. Humanitarianism, in other
humanitarian action is based strictly on deliverables and words, helped to rescue those on the battlefield—and the
producing measurable outcomes—saving lives at the cheap- system of war. In fact, decades after founding the ICRC,
est price—then why not hire a private agency, if avail- Dunant concluded that humanitarianism had been co-opted
able? 84 After all, the victim probably does not care if the by the states-system; he walked away from reformism and
blankets are delivered by a commercial firm or a nonprofit embraced pacifism.86 Recent developments in international
agency. If aid agencies are increasingly drifting toward humanitarian law can be interpreted as serving a similar func-
rational-legal principles as a way of defending their legit- tion for the war machine as they lessen the demand for more
imacy, they might not only have difficulty competing with radical change in the global-military order.
commercial firms but also might undermine their moral The drift of humanitarian action from relief to root
authority. The presumed difference between the Wal- causes indicates a shift in its role in the international sac-
Marts and the World Visions is that the former does not rificial order. No longer satisfied with saving individuals
have moral authority while the latter does. What happens, today so that they can be at risk tomorrow, humanitari-
though, when humanitarian agencies increasingly base their anism now aspires to transform the structural conditions
legitimacy on their ability to measure up to standards set that make populations vulnerable. Toward that end, aid
by modern, commercial firms? Such a development might agencies desire to spread development, democracy, and
very well undermine what makes humanitarian action human rights, and to join a peace-building agenda that
distinctive. aspires to create stable, effective, and legitimate states. They
are carriers of liberal values as they help spin into existence
a global liberal order.87 Although their transcendental, uni-
Conclusion: Humanitarianism and versal, and cosmopolitan commitments might appear to
World Order threaten an international society organized around the
Humanitarianism can only be understood in relationship nation-state, in fact most of their activities do not chal-
to the world order that constitutes it. Although much schol- lenge the states-system, but instead are designed to create
arship has focused on how principled actors have changed a more stable, legitimate state organized around these sup-
world politics by pressuring states to take the high road posedly universal principles.88 Humanitarian organiza-
and redefine their interests, I have inverted this claim in tions may or may not be part of a neoliberal agenda, and
examining how global politics has reshaped the nature of they may or may not resemble the missionaries of the
humanitarian action.85 The environment that surrounded nineteenth century. But by their own admission, they view
humanitarianism changed in profound ways during the their social purpose as promoting liberal values in order to
1990s. The expanding scope and scale of humanitarian make the world safer, more humane, and more just.

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Humanitarianism is now more firmly part of politics. politics. Humanitarianism is now precariously situated
Certainly it always was part of politics to the extent that between the politics of solidarity and the politics of gov-
its actions had political effects and relief workers saw them- ernance. Humanitarian workers traditionally saw them-
selves as standing with the weak and against the mighty. selves as apolitical as they defied systems of power and
Yet humanitarian agencies restricted their ambition to sav- were in solidarity with the victims of a sacrificial order. As
ing lives at immediate risk in part to keep states at bay and they become increasingly implicated in governance struc-
preserve their goal for relief. They are now firmly, and in tures, they find themselves in growing collaboration with
many ways self-consciously, part of politics. Humanitari- those whom they once resisted. Whether they will be suc-
anism no longer clings to principles of neutrality, inde- cessful at this more ambitious agenda remains to be seen.
pendence, and impartiality as method of depoliticization, Whether they are or not, though, humanitarian action
but increasingly views the former two principles as a might very well be an effect of the very circuits of power
(unnecessary) luxury. Humanitarianism and politics are that they once viewed as part of the international sacrifi-
no longer discursively constructed in binary, oppositional cial order.
terms; instead, their points of intersection are many, and
humanitarianism’s meanings increasingly are defined by
the sort of politics once viewed as its bête noire. Human- Notes
itarianism, in short, is self-consciously part of politics. It is 1 On the recent expansion of the humanitarian sys-
increasingly an ism that is no longer satisfied with reform- tem, see Blondel 2000; de Waal 1997, 68–72; Mac-
ing the world, but now has ambitions about its very rae 2002; Minear 2002, chap. 1; Roberts 1999. For
transformation. an account of the growth of humanitarian organiza-
This transformation is forcing humanitarian organiza- tions that focuses on external forces, see Lindenberg
tions to critically reexamine two defining self-images. One and Bryant 2001.
is the belief that they operate strictly on behalf of others, are 2 In this way, humanitarianism is a logocentric, which
devoid of power,89 and are as weak as the individuals they Jacques Derrida observes is in play whenever “one
were trying to save. Many humanitarian organizations now privileged term (logos) provides the orientation for
have annual budgets that rival those of the states that are interpreting the meaning of the subordinate term”
the objects of their intervention, and they are no longer con- (Nyers 1999, 21). See also Cutts 1998, 3; Malkki
tent to stand outside of politics but are increasingly part of 1995; Warner 1999; Minear 2002, 76
governance structures that are intended to transform states 3 This definition draws from Stockton 2004a, 15.
and societies. Humanitarian organizations can no longer 4 Bradol 2004.
pretend that they lack power—including power over those 5 Douglas 2002.
with whom they stand in solidarity.90 6 Pictet 1979.
These developments also challenge their self-image as 7 The ICRC’s principles are largely the industry stan-
representatives of humanity. As a recent report regarding dard, though there are debates about the priorities of
the current and future challenges to humanitarianism puts these principles, their operational meaning, and even
it, “Many in the South do not recognize what the inter- their relevance. Forsythe 2005; Terry 2002; Weiss
national community calls the universality of humanitar- 1999; Duffield 2001a; Minear 2002; Ramsbotham
ian values as such. . . . Humanitarian action is viewed as and Woodhouse 1996, 14–18.
the latest in a series of imposition of alien values, prac- 8 Rieff 2002; Minear 2002; Donini 2004; Duffield
tices, and lifestyles. Northern incursions into the South— 2001a, Slim 2004a, Leader 2000.
from the Crusades to colonialism and beyond—have 9 Terry 2002.
historically been perceived very differently depending on 10 De Torrente 2004, Anderson 2004.
the vantage point.” 91 Indeed, if humanitarianism increas- 11 Slim 2004a.
ingly reflects globalization and Westernization, then there 12 De Waal 1997, 133–34.
are good reasons why those in the Southern hemisphere 13 On the epistemology of “humanitarian crisis,” see
view these agencies as the “mendicant orders of Empire.” 92 Stockton 2004a.
Although such observations are nearly as speculative as 14 Slim 2004a, 155–56.
the claims to universality they are meant to replace, there 15 White 1993, 34–38; Howard 1993, 69–70.
has been little research into how the recipients view West- 16 General Assembly Resolution A/RES/46/182, 19
ern alms and whether other traditions of relief and charity December 1991, Strengthening of the Coordination
also share values associated with the Western tradition of of Humanitarian Emergency Assistance of the
humanitarian action. United Nations.
Humanitarianism is now balanced on the knife’s edge 17 Lang 2003; International Commission on Interven-
of various tensions, tensions that have become more pro- tion and State Sovereignty 2001; Holzgrefe and
nounced as it has become (more self-consciously) part of Keohane 2003; Wheeler 2000; Slim 2002c.

734 Perspectives on Politics

18 Secretary of State Colin Powell, remarks to the consequently, they used sovereignty to fence in what
National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders of these international organizations could do and these
Nongovernmental Organizations, October 26, 2001. organizations, in turn, cleaved to the principles of
19 Duffield 2001a, 12; also see Edkins 1996; Weiss consent, neutrality, and impartiality in order to
1999, 20; White 2000. signal to states that they knew their place. The
20 Kelly 1998, 174–75. changing meaning of sovereignty, particularly no-
21 Duffield 2001a. ticeable after the Cold War, though, opened up
22 Macrae et al. 2002, 15. For a good overview, see space for many international organizations to use a
Randel and German 2002. more expansive understanding of humanitarianism
23 International Commission on Intervention and State as they became more deeply involved in domestic
Sovereignty 2001. space. See Barnett 2001 for a discussion.
24 Macrae 1999, 6–7. 34 Appalled by the carnage wrought by a fierce battle
25 Chandler 2002, chap. 1. between French and Austrian forces in Solferino,
26 See Bouchet-Saulnier 2000. See also Leader and Italy, in June 1859, Dunant, a Swiss citizen, ap-
Macrae 2000; Chandler 2002; Minear 2002, chap. 3. pealed to the local population to tend to the thou-
27 Chandler 2002, 21. sands of suffering soldiers. Based on his personal
28 Beitz 1994, 124. See also Linklater 1998, chap. 2. experiences, Dunant wrote an account that became a
29 Calhoun 2004. bestseller in Europe and stirred European elites to
30 Cosmopolitanism and the discourse of humanity consider his proposals for regulating war and admin-
have not always led to impartiality as understood istering to the wounded. These discussions produced
today, because those who claimed to be “humanitar- both the Geneva Conventions, which established
ian” and act in the name of humanity also could international humanitarian law, and the ICRC,
reflect a discourse in which some peoples were more which was to be an impartial, neutral and indepen-
human than others and thus more deserving of dent organization whose exclusive humanitarian
assistance. See Finnemore 1996. mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims
31 Bradol 2004, 9. of war.
32 Sommaruga 1999; Tanguy and Terry 1999; Rieff 35 UNHCR 1990.
1999. 36 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, chap. 6.
33 This classification derives from other taxonomies, 37 Another factor potentially influencing this expansion
including Minear 2002, 78; Stoddard 2002; Weiss is psychological, deriving from personal strain of
1999; Donini 2005. Feinstein International Famine relief work. Relief workers migrate from one night-
Center 2004, 54, argues that how agencies position mare to another, comforted only by the fact that, at
themselves around these categories is determined by best, they provide temporary relief. This sort of
various factors, such as management and leadership, existence takes a very high emotional toll. Wanting
institutional culture, networks, and geographical and to believe that they are helping to build a better
programmatic scope. Solidarist organizations are world, relief workers began to treat human rights,
another branch; they openly identify with one party conflict resolution, and nation building as extensions
to a conflict and thus do not care about neutrality. of humanitarianism. See Rieff 2002.
Although I (and others) focus largely on inter- 38 Chimni 1993, 444; Coles 1989, 203.
national nongovernmental organizations, there are 39 The heart of the resource dependence approach is
various international organizations whose principal that “organizations survive to the extent that they
mandate is humanitarian (and ICRC, the patriarch are effective. Their effectiveness derives from the
of the humanitarian community, is neither a non- management of demands, particularly demands of
governmental or a international organization). Be- interest groups upon which the organizations de-
ginning after World War I and then increasing after pend for resources and support. . . . There are a
World War Two, states established various inter- variety of ways of managing demands, including the
national organizations, including the UNHCR and obvious one of giving in to them” (Pfeffer and
the World Food Program, to help them carry out Salancik 2003, 2).
their humanitarian obligations. State sovereignty, 40 Meyer and Scott 1983, 140.
though, significantly shaped their working definition 41 Duffield 2001a; Donini 2004; Duffield, Macrae,
of humanitarianism and its relationship to politics. and Curtis 2001.
At the beginning of the last century states cautiously 42 Loescher 2001.
evoked the language of humanitarianism for fear 43 For definitions of rationalization, see Weber 1947;
that such transcendental concerns might swamp for bureaucratization, see Beetham 1985, 69; for
their core interests and undermine their sovereignty; professionalization, see Ritzer 1975.

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44 Orru, Biggart, and Hamilton 1991, 361. See also 65 A major controversy in this regard concerns whether
Scott 1987; Scott 1995; DiMaggio and Powell the willingness of aid agencies to align themselves
1991; Meyer and Rowan 1977. with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq is
45 DiMaggio and Powell 1983, 140. one cause behind the growing perception that aid
46 Ibid., 150–54. workers are no longer given immunity during war.
47 Larson 1977, 49–52; cited from DiMaggio and 66 Randel and German 2002, 21.
Powell 1983, 152. 67 Ibid.
48 Leader 1999. 68 Smillie and Minear 2004, 145. See also Macrae
49 International Conference of the Red Cross and Red et al. 2002, Jeffreys 2002, Porter 2002.
Crescent 1995. 69 Many in the humanitarian sector agree that while
50 Gostelow 1999. the global response to the tsunami was impressive, it
51 Another innovation was the Consolidated Appeals was disproportionate in relationship to need. In fact,
Process, established in 1991 by the UN General because MSF believed that it had more than
Assembly in response to the growing perception that enough, it asked donors to unrestrict the funds so
there were too many agencies appealing to too many that they could be channeled to another region in
donors for too many different sectors in too many greater need; if they refused, MSF attempted to
situations. In order to improve joint planning and return the donations.
quickly mobilize funds and target them for high 70 In response to the politicization of priorities, hu-
priority areas, the UN decided to act as a coordinat- manitarian organizations entered into a dialogue
ing mechanism. By 2002 there had been 165 differ- with the principal donors to try to establish more
ent appeals. See Porter 2002 for a review. impartial standards. The result was the Good
52 Smillie and Minear 2004, 215–24; Slim 2002a; Donorship Initiative. See Harmer, Cotterrell, and
Mitchell, 2003. Stoddard 2004.
53 Macrae et al. 2002, 18–21. 71 Rieff 2002.
54 De Waal 1997, 78–79. 72 Interview with official from the UN Office for the
55 Slim 2002a. Coordinator of Humanitarian Assistance, New York,
56 Anderson 1996; Terry 2002; Slim 1997; Vaux 2001, March 8, 2005.
chap. 3. 73 Harrell-Bond 2002; Barnett and Finnemore 2004.
57 Humanitarian Policy Group 2004; Fearon 2004; 74 De Waal 1997, 65–66.
Darcy 2005. 75 Cooley and Ron 2002; Darcy 2005.
58 O’Brien 2002. 76 Smillie and Minear 2004, 143.
59 Feinstein International Famine Center 2004; Donini 77 De Waal 1997, 138–39.
2005. Smillie and Minear 2004, chap. 9. These 78 Vaux 2001.
claims are consistent with principal-agent analysis. 79 Barnett and Finnemore 2004, chap. 4.
See Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, 20. For 80 There also were growing calls to measure “need”—to
applications to international relations, see Thatcher replace subjective and emotional assessments with
and Sweet 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003; Haw- more objective criteria as a way to reinforce the
kins et al. 2005. impartiality principle and bring more attention to
60 Natsios 2003. forgotten emergencies. In short, objective indicators
61 Quoted in Smillie and Minear 2004, 143. are the best way to reestablish values and principles.
62 Minear 2002, chap. 2; Macrae et al. 2002, chap. 3; See Oxley 2001.
Donini 2004. 81 Slim 1997; Duffield 2001a, 90–95; Gasper 1999.
63 Rieff 2002, chap. 6. Because it is nearly impossible, if not slightly macabre,
64 States also wanted to see for themselves what was to try to calculate whether aid saves more lives than it
occurring in the field. Toward that end, they began takes, some organizations have reasserted the impor-
sending representatives to relay firsthand accounts of tance of the principles of independence, neutral-
assistance activities and began developing the capac- ity, and impartiality for determining whether they
ity for independent needs assessments and strategic should provide aid. See Weissman 2004.
analyses. An immediate consequence was that hu- 82 Brauman 2004, 400.
manitarian organizations no longer benefited from 83 Darcy 2005, 8.
having privileged and highly authoritative informa- 84 Hopgood (forthcoming).
tion. Because the authority of NGOs comes from 85 Keck and Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink
their practical experience from “the field” (Slim 1999.
2002b, 4), this development might undermine their 86 Hutchinson 1996.
discretion. 87 Boli and Thomas 1999.

736 Perspectives on Politics

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91 Feinstein International Famine Center 2004, 55. of UNHCR in voluntary repatriation. International
92 Hardt and Negri 200, cited in Donini 2005, 2. Journal of Refugee Law 5 (3): 442–60.
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