1. Republic V.

Sandiganbayan

FACTS:

Then President Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). The EO primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of the Marcos family. Accordingly, an AFP Board was created to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel. Based on
its mandate, the AFP Board investigated alleged unexplained wealth of Major General Ramas,
which found unexplained wealth in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano (clerk-typist of his
office. The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were submitted for scrutiny
and analysis. The Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten
and unexplained wealth of P2, 974, 134 and $50,000 USD.

Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and

land titles taken from her house by the Ph Constabulary raiding team. The Sandiganbayan
dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground of illegal search and seizure of the
confiscated items, and thus returned to Dimaano. Petitioner argues that there was no
constitutional right as Bill of Rights was inoperative during this time.

ISSUE:

Whether the Bill of Rights was operative during the interregnum from
February 26, 1986.

Jurisdiction -

Inadmissible evidence – illegal seizure

(interregnum – a period when normal government is suspended, esp. between successive

reigns or regimes)

RULING:

No. A person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because
there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. .However, they
ruled that the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect.

Under Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
insure that "[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy,
family, home or correspondence." As the de jure government, the revolutionary government
could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.

Here, although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.

Notes:

a. A revolution has been described as a “complete overthrow of the established

government in any country by those who were previously subject to it”.
b. violation of RA 3019 – Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA 1379 : Forfeiture of
Ill-Wealth Acquired Properties
c. The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and
corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel being the latter’s
immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of
their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved
in other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to
the PCGG.
d. Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were
"taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino people." 40 Petitioner asserts
that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the 1973
Constitution which guaranteed private respondents’ exclusionary right. Moreover,
petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner
contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic
stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the
monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since
at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.
e. A revolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it" or as
"a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political system,
usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence."
f. 25 March 1986 – Freedom Constitution adopted the 1973 Bill of Rights
PUNO’S CONCURRING OPINION:

“Whether the Filipinos were bereft of fundamental rights during the one-month
interregnum”

From the same natural law, respondent Dimaano has a right against unreasonable search and
seizure and to exclude evidence obtained as a consequence of such illegal search.

According to Aristotle, “Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as everyone to
some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those
who have no association or covenant with each other.”

The unnaturalness of the 1986 EDSA revolution cannot dilute nor defeat the natural rights of
man, rights that antedate constitutions, rights that have been the beacon lights of the law
since the Greek civilization.

Human rights

- each individual person was entitled to an equal degree of respect as a human being. It
is the right which inheres in persons from the fact of their humanity. Similar to
natural rights, human rights is derived from human nature.

natural rights

- rights to life, health, liberty and property.

Natural law is an unwritten code of moral conduct, as it may be ignored if personal interests
of others are involved

social contract

- "The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the
bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in
a secure enjoyment of their properties (used in the broad sense, referring to life,
liberty and property) and a greater security against any, that are not of it.

civil right
 - rights that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or to all inhabitants
- Includes rights to property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom to
contract.

Constitutional Right vs. Natural Right

Natural law is thus to be understood not as a residual source of constitutional rights, rather,
as the reasoning that implied the necessary to sacrifice natural liberty to government in a
written constitution. Natural law and natural rights were concepts that explained and
justified written constitutions.

2. Mijares v. Ranada - NAUR

FACTS:

A complaint was filed with the US District Court against the Estate of former
President Marcos by 10 Filipino citizens who each alleged having suffered human rights
abuses (arbitrary detention, torture and rape) in the hands of police or military forces during
the Marcos regime. The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's
jurisdiction over the complaint, as it involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of
international law. A Final Judgment was awarded to the plaintiff amounting to
$1,964,005,859.90, affirmed by US Court of Appeals. They then filed a Complaint with RTC
Makati to enforce the Final Judgment, as it became final and executory with Marcos Estate’s
failure to appeal.

Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising the shortage of payment of the correct
filing fees. The Marcos Estate cited Supreme Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper
computation and payment of docket fees. Respondent Judge Ranada of RTC Makati
dismissed the complaint sustaining the contention of Marcos Estate. RTC estimated the
proper amount of filing fees was approximately P472,000,000, which was unpaid. After
denial of their MR, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari, submitting that their action is
incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of
damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced.

RULING:
 Yes.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the
Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement
thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do
not derive from treaty obligations.

Here, Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State components, to obey the laws of the
land, including generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof,
such as those ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.

Notes:

a. Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject
matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over property or a sum of
money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a
foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and the cause of action arising from
the adjudication of such judgment.
b. Here, notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that
it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to the same amount
required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the
correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave abuse of discretion for respondent
judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.
c. There may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular state, but they
all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for,
however generally, the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. Only the
blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.

3. Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Org. v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc.

FACTS:

Members of the labor union decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang in

protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. Upon knowledge, the Company asked the
union panel to confirm or deny it through a meeting. Pagcu explained that the demonstration
has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management. The Company Personnel Manager stated that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any
demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the
Company.
 Petitioners and their members proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the
respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration. (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969) Respondent Company charged
those who participated with a "violation of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.'
Petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they gave the
respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike because it was not directed against the respondent firm. The Court of
Industrial Relations rendered judgment against the labor union finding them guilty of bargain
in bad faith.

the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management.

ISSUE:

Whether there is a violation to the right to freedom of expression.

RULING:

Yes. The refusal on the part of the respondent firm to permit all its employees and
workers to join the mass demonstration and the separation of the 8 petitioners from the
service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression. (Unfair Labor
Practice)

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil
and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the
sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

Here, the said demonstration was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
of expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances
in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, against the police
officers of Pasig. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property
rights has been sustained.
NOTES:

a. Human rights are imprescriptible. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of

expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally.
b. A violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a
criminal conviction secured at the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of the
judgment. (null ang judgment ng Court of Industrial Relations na magcause ng
damage sa company ang demonstration)
c. Constitution over procedural law
d. a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision
of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and
complete determination of the dispute can be made.

4. People v. Marti

FACTS:

Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the
"Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying 4 gift wrapped packages to be sent to
Switzerland. Appellant, refused the inspection of the packages by Anita Reyes, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves. However, before delivery of
appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes opened the
boxes for final inspection and a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. Opening one of the
bundles, he took several grams of the contents from the opening of the gloves. Job Reyes
brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the
NBI agents, took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves
were found.

Appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office, was invited by the NBI to
shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day NBI
submitted the dried leaves for laboratory examination. It turned out to be marijuana
flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist. Thereafter, an Information was filed
against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of the appellant’s constitutional right against
illegal search and seizure.
RULING:

No.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore

applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the
restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be

extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

Notes:

a. Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide that the right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Sec. 3 states that the privacy
of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of
the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
b. Contention of the appellant: Since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been
modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987 Charter, expressly declaring as
inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against illegal search and seizure, it matters not whether the evidence was procured
by police authorities or private individuals. - The modifications introduced deviate in
no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and
seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with the State and did not shift to
anyone else.

5. Lutz (Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Antonio

Ledesma) v. Araneta (Collector of Internal Revenue) – NAUR

FACTS:
 The CA No. 567, otherwise known as Sugar Adjustment Act provided for an increase
on the existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, and that it levies
owners of lands devoted to the cultivation of sugar; that the amount collected will go to a
special fund in the PH Treasury called “Sugar Adjustment and Stabilization Fund”. Its basis is
the eventual loss of the PH preferential position in the US Market and the imposition of
export taxes therein.

Walter Lutz, administrator of the Estate of Antonio Ledesma, seeks to recover from
the CIR sum paid, alleging that the tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for the aid
and support of the sugar industry only and for him is not public purpose. The CFI denied his
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the contention of Lutz be given merit.

RULING:

No. The act is primarily an exercise of the police power, not of taxing power.

According to jurisprudence, the protection of a large industry constituting one of the

great sources of the state's wealth is within the police power of the sovereign. Taxation may
be validly used in the exercise of police power.

Here, the legislative discretion must be allowed, subject only to the test of
reasonableness. If objective and methods are alike constitutionally valid, no reason is seen
why the state may not levy taxes to raise funds for their prosecution and attainment of its
purpose. Taxation may be made the implement of the state's police power.

Notes:

a. it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of
taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequalities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation"

6. Manila Memorial Park, Inc. v. Secretary of DSWD

FACTS:
 Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA 7432 issued by DSWD which
calls for funeral and burial services to give 20% discount to senior citizens and claim it as tax
deduction or as tax credit. Petitioners posits that the deductions scheme constitutes a taking
of property or eminent domain, thus, should be given just compensation. The previous
Revenue Regulation issued provides that the tax deduction shall be deducted by the
establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales
for VAT and Other Percentage Tax. However, the contrived definition was held improper as
it would mean that the tax credit will be deducted twice, from gross income and gross sales.
When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means
that the amount — when claimed — shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain
and simple or more specifically, the gross income of the taxable year. The RA was later
amended by RA 9257 include funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. IRRs
was issued by the DSWD and DOF to implement the tax provisions of RA 9257.

ISSUE:

Whether the grant of 20% discount to senior citizens is an exercise of police power or
eminent domain.

RULING:

It is a police power exercise of the state.

When the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights

must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.

Here, it merely regulates the pricing of the goods and services relative , and the
amount of profits or income that the establishments, imbued with public interest, may
derive from senior citizens. The establishments can still adjust the level of their prices and
that the discounts are availed only by senior citizens. The petitioners also failed to provide
evidence that the grant of discount would have a detrimental effect to their business
operations, hence the 20% rate is not arbitrary, oppressive, or confiscatory.

NOTES:

a. Tax credit - represents the amount of such discount

b. Discount - an "abatement or reduction made from the gross amount or value of
anything"
c. the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation. A regulation that "operates to
create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;" it cannot prevail.
 d. A "regulation adopted pursuant to law is law." Conversely, a regulation or any portion
thereof not adopted pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect
of law.

e. The 20% discount is a regulation affecting the ability of private establishments to

price their products and services relative to a special class of individuals, senior
citizens, for which the Constitution affords preferential concern. While it is true that
it affects the income generation of the establishments, however, this does not
purport to appropriate or burden specific properties, used in the operation or conduct
of the business of private establishments, for the use or benefit of the public or
senior citizens.
f. Pursuant to Article XV, Section 4 of the Constitution, it is the duty of the family to
take care of its elderly members while the State may design programs of social
security for them. validity of the tax deduction scheme as a reimbursement
mechanism for the twenty percent (20%) discount that they extend to senior citizens.
g. The law does not impose at what specific price the product shall be sold, only that a
20% discount shall be given to senior citizens based on the price set by the business
establishment. A business establishment is, thus, free to adjust the prices of the
goods or services it provides to the general public . Business establishments have the
capacity to adjust their prices so that they may remain profitable even under the
operation of the assailed law.
h. 20% is not private property, only potential fruits

7. Cruz and dela Cruz v. Pandacan Hiker’s Club, Inc. (group of basketball courts owners-
donated the basketball ring for the Pandacan community.)

FACTS:

Natividad Cruz was the Punong Barangay of Barangay 848, Zone 92, City of Manila.
Within the vicinity of her barangay, she allegedly confronted persons playing basketball and
ordered Barangay Tanod Dela Cruz to destroy the basketball ring, rendering the said
basketball court unusable. A Complaint (for Malicious Mischief, Grave Misconduct, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and Abuse of Authority) before the
Prosecutor's Office and the Office of the Ombudsman by Pandacan Hiker's Club, Inc. and its
president Priscila Ilao was filed.

Cruz alleged that the basketball court affected the peace in the barangay and was the
subject of many complaints from residents asking for its closure. Cruz maintained that the
court's users never heeded the barangay officials' efforts to pacify them and when the
basketball ring was once padlocked, such was just removed at will while members of the
complainants' club continued playing. When Cruz asked for the PHC to return the steel bar
and padlock, the request was simply ignored, thus, prompting her to order Dela Cruz to
destroy the basketball ring. The Ombudsman found that the act of destroying the basketball
ring was only motivated by Cruz and Dela Cruz performing their sworn duty, as defined in
Section 16 of LGC. CA reversed the decision, suspending Cruz and reprimanded dela Cruz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners validly exercised their official powers as stated in
Section 16 of LGC?

RULING:

No.

Jurisprudence defines police power as the plenary power vested in the legislature to
make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety and general welfare of the people. Police power is vested primarily with the national
legislature, which may delegate the same to local governments through the enactment of
ordinances through their legislative bodies.

In the case at bar, petitioners could cite no barangay nor city ordinance that would
have justified their summary abatement through the exercise of police powers found in the
said clause. No barangay nor city ordinance was violated; neither was there one which
specifically declared the said basketball ring as a nuisance per se that may be summarily
abated.

Notes:

a. There is a nuisance when there is "any act, omission, establishment, business,

condition of property, or anything else which: (1) injures or endangers the health or
safety of others; or (2) annoys or offends the senses; or (3) shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality; or (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage
of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the
use of property."

b. Petitioners were required to justify their abatement via such an ordinance because
the power they claim to have exercised – the police power under the general welfare
clause – is a power exercised by the government mainly through its legislative, and
not the executive branch.

8. Calleja v. Executive Secretary

FACTS:
 Thirty-seven separate petitions assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
11479 or the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020. In this consolidated petition, petitioners primarily
assail the validity of Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA due to their perceived facial vagueness and
overbreadth that purportedly repress protected speech. They argued that the
unconstitutionality of the definition of terrorism and its variants will render the law void in
its entirety or will leave the ATA “nothing to sustain its existence.”

The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)’s constitutionality was questioned, specifically Section

29, which authorizes the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) to order an arrest without judicial
warrant, and to extend detention without judicial charge beyond the reglementary 3-day
period under RPC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 29 of ATA is constitutional.

RULING:

Yes, Section 29 of the Anti-terrorism Act is constitutional.

Under the provision, a person may be arrested without warrant by law enforcers or
military personnel for acts defined or penalized under Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA but only in
arrest in flagrante delicto, arrest in hot pursuit, and arrest of escapees, which mirrors Rule
113 of the Rules of Court. Once arrested without warrant under those instances, a person
may be detained for up to 14 days, provided that the ATC issues a written authority in favor
of the arresting officer, upon submission of a sworn statement stating the details of the
person suspected of committing acts of terrorism and the relevant circumstances as basis
for taking custody of said person. If the ATC does not issue the written authority, the
prevailing general rule on detention shall apply.

Here, the extended detention period is therefore deemed an exception to Article 125
of the RPC, as three days is too short to gather enough evidence and to prevent the
occurrence of another terrorist act.

Note:

a. Petitioners include members of party-list, former and incumbent members of

Congress, members of socio-civic and non-governmentals organizations, members of
Indigenous People’s groups, Moros, journalists, taxpayers, registered voters,
members of Integrated Bar of the Philippines, students and members of the academe.
 9. City of Manila v. Laguio

FACTS:

Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is engaged in the business of

operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. MTDC filed a petition impleading City
Mayor of Manila, that Ordinance 7783 includes motels and inns among its prohibited
establishments, be declared as invalid and unconstitutional. The Ordinance provides that the
City Mayor is prohibited from issuing permits and disallows persons or entity to engage
business involving amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used
as tools in entertainment in the Ermita-Malate area, which adversely affects the social and
moral welfare of the community (such as sauna parlors, massage parlors, clubs, cabarets,
motels and inns).

MDTC alleges that the City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels
provided under the LGC which grants only the power to regulate the establishment and
maintenance of such. Petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council had
the power to "prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and
moral welfare of the community" as provided in SEC 458 of LGC as an act of Police Power.
RTC ruled that the ordinance was null and void. Hence, petitioners appealed to the SC.
Respondents maintain that the ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power, that it
results to a violation of the due process clause, confiscatory and amounts to arbitrary
interference with its lawful business and equal protection clause. (n/a to pension houses, or
outside Ermita-Manila areas)

ISSUE:

Whether or not due process is violated.

RULING:

Yes. The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised
with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of
the law.

Under the law, a valid due process is attained when a reasonable relation exists
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights
and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause. – LAWFUL
SUBJECTS + LAWFUL MEANS
 Here, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and
promote the social and moral welfare of the community. The aim of fostering public morals
and the eradication of the community's social ills can be achieved through means less
restrictive of private rights such as by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute
prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses
"allowed" under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. (The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of
the Ordinance.)

Notes:

A. Ermita-Manila as commercial zone.

B. There existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and
other places in the City of Manila. – did not violate EPC
C. Substantive Requisites of a Valid Ordinance:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but
may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6)
must not be unreasonable.
c. Procedural due process, as the phrase implies, refers to the procedures that the
government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property.
Classic procedural due process issues are concerned with what kind of notice and what
form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a particular action.53
d. Substantive due process, as that phrase connotes, asks whether the government has
an adequate reason for taking away a person's life, liberty, or property. In other
words, substantive due process looks to whether there is a sufficient justification for
the government's action.
e. If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other
social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the
establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may
exercise its authority to suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; 67 and it
may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other means to
reasonably accomplish the desired end.
f. The right to be let alone is the beginning of all freedom.
g. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used
for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a
taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the
private property rights of individuals.
 h. A "possessory" taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically occupies
property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the government's regulation leaves no
reasonable economically viable use of the property
i. Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
j. the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is
therefore ultra vires, null and void.

10. People v. Fajardo

FACTS:

Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, passed Ordinance
No. 7, Series of 1950 stating that (Sec1) Any person or persons who will construct or repair a
building should obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. If said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the
expense of the owner of the building or house.

After the term of appellant Fajardo had expired, he and his son in-law, appellant
Babilonia, filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building. The request was denied because the proposed building would destroy
the view or beauty of the public plaza. Even the subsequent request was also refused.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence as their former house was destroyed by a typhoon
and they had been living on leased property. Subsequently, appellants were charged and
convicted for violation of the ordinance in question at justice of the peace court. This was
affirmed by CFI and sentenced appellants to pay a fine of P35 each, as well as to demolish
the building because it destroys the view of the public plaza of Baao.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid.

RULING:

No.

The ordinance fails to state any policy, or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action. The ordinance thus confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power
to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, and it is a settled rule that such an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity, per se lawful, is
invalid.
 Here, the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners
of the beneficial use of their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or
assure the aesthetic appearance of the community. The appellants would, in effect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must
give appellants just compensation and an opportunity to be heard.

11. Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operator v. City of Manila

FACTS:

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed by Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Hotel del Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, against City Mayor
of Manila. It was alleged that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and
void for being unreasonable and violative of due process. The provision states the filling up of
the prescribed form with personal information would be open for inspection either by the
City Mayor, or the Chief of Police is not only for arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination. The City of Manila maintains
that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. The lower court decided the
unconstitutionality of the ordinance.

ISSUE:

Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause.

RULING:

No. The presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance
set aside.

Under the law, particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically
aimed to safeguard public morals is immune from such imputation of nullity when
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and
narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most
essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers.
 Here, the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals, more specifically the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution,
adultery and fornication in Manila, traceable in the existence of motels, which “provides a
necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence, and exit” and thus ideal place for
those thrill seekers.

12. Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court

FACTS:

EO 626 was promulgated by former President Marcos prohibiting the interprovincial

movement and slaughtering of carabaos not complying with stated requirements. If violated,
the carabao or carabeef transported in violation of the EO as amended shall be subject to
confiscation and forfeiture by the government.

Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when they
were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of the said EO. The petitioner
sued for recovery at RTC Iloilo and was issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a bond of
P12,000.00. However, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and the
confiscated the bond. The court ruled on the constitutionality of the executive order for its
presumed validity. CA sustained the decision. Ynot’s petition for certiorari is based on
alleged unconstitutionally of the outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial
court as guaranteed by due process.

ISSUE:

Whether or not EO 626, as amended, violates due process.

RULING:

Yes. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and
immediately imposed punishment, without giving him a chance to be heard. (May lawful
subject, pero walay lawful means)

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may
be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum
guarantees of due process. In the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a
justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, the immediacy of the
problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.
 Here, the properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant
destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense prohibited by the executive
order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded
all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been
pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.

Notes:

a. Amended – EO 626-A (inclusion of carabeef)

b. present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm
at the outset the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy
crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of
burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps
to protect and preserve them.
c. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill
them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply
killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for
the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow
that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead
meat.
d. the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the
method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Executive Order No. 626-A is
hereby declared unconstitutional, bond is recovered.

13. Lucena Grand Terminal (grantee of the exclusive franchise) v. JAC Liner, Inc.

FACTS:

JAC Liner, Inc. is a common carrier operating buses with various routes to and from
Lucena City. It assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the Mayor of
Lucena and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the RTC Ordinance Nos. 1631 and
1778 as unconstitutional on the ground that the same constituted an invalid exercise of police
power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition
against monopolies.

These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty-five years,

renewable for another twenty-five years, to one entity for the construction and operation
of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the
city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to
have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
Respondent, who had maintained a terminal within the city, was one of those affected by the
ordinances. RTC upheld the validity of Ordinance 1632 (except Sec 4c thereof, yung bawal ang
third party magkaterminal), having been issued in the exercise of the police power of the
City Government of Lucena but declared Ordinance No. 1778 as null and void for being an
invalid, oppressive and unreasonable exercise of the police power. A Writ of Prohibition
and/or Injunction was directed to the respondents public officials to cease and desist from
implementing Ordinance No. 1778, affirmed by CA.

ISSUE:

Whether the City of Lucena violated due process when it enacted the subject
ordinances.

RULING:

Yes.

Unless a thing is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance,
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects
the immediate safety of persons and property and may be summarily abated under the
undefined law of necessity.

Here, bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the
outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to
petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court
has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are
compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then
reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to
operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications.

Notes:
 a. Ordinance No. 1631 – GRANTING THE LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., A
FRANCHISE TO CONSTRUCT, FINANCE, ESTABLISH, OPERATE AND MAINTAIN A
COMMON BUS-JEEPNEY TERMINAL FACILITY IN THE CITY OF LUCENA

b. Ordinance No. 1778 - REGULATING THE ENTRANCE TO THE CITY OF LUCENA OF ALL
BUSES, MINI-BUSES AND OUT-OF-TOWN PASSENGER JEEPNEYS

c. As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly
exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful
subject and lawful method.

d. overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the problem

14. White Light v. City of Manila – wash up rates

FACTS:

City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law the Ordinance prohibiting short time
admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the
City of Manila. Violators of the said ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a
fine of ₱5,000.00 or imprisonment of not exceeding 1 year or both at the discretion of the
court. (for juridical person: Pres, Manager or person-in-charge).

Subsequently, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a

complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order with RTC Manila. MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it
includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. White Light Corporation and other operators of drive-in-hotels and motels
in Manila was granted to intervene on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their
business interests. MTDC withdrew as plaintiff. The RTC granted the TRO and declared the
ordinance as null and void, reversed by CA stating that it was a legitimate exercise of the
State’s police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the assailed Ordinance violates due process clause.

RULING:

Yes/no.
 The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or
seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the guaranty insofar as their
property is concerned. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government
must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Procedural due process
concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an
intrusion into the private sphere.

Here, less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and
drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the situation. So
would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and
drug use. These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners
and other legitimate merchants. The Ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the
businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without
sufficient justification.

Notes:

a. Short-time admission – less than 12 hours, more than 2x a day

b. Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the
right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

c. The lawful objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral
activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general. – CA RULING

d. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to

raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to statutes infringing on the
freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly
restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights.

e. The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash
rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the
Local Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.

f. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law,
it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3)
 must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.

g. Using the rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally
further a legitimate governmental interest. Under intermediate review, governmental
interest is extensively examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is
considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling,
rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
means for achieving that interest.

h. Strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of
governmental interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms.
Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its
earlier applications to equal protection.

i. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include

"the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. – not
just physical restraint but freedom to enjoy his property

15. Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc.

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309 to impose a
ban against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao
City. The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development
Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality
of the ordinance, and to seek a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police
power, violated the equal protection clause and amounted to the confiscation of property
without due process of law. RTC upheld the validity and constitutionality of the ordinance, as
LGU’s valid exercise of police power as aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk
caused by aerial drift (may valid classification under EPC). The decision was reversed by CA,
deciding that Section 5 of the ordinance was unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive. (30m buffer zone)

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process.

RULING:

Yes. There is a violation of the due process clause.

Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient
justification for the Government's action. So long as the ordinance realistically serves a
legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably necessary to achieve
that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance must survive
a due process challenge.

In this case, it was physically impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a

carefully planned configuration of vast hectares of banana plantations and be able to actually
adopt "truck-mounted boom spraying" within three (3) months. The proviso in Section 5,
however, compels petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying without affording them
enough time to convert and adopt other spraying practices. Such an apparent eventuality
would prejudice the operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions thereof
would just be akin to shutting down the venture.

Notes:

a. CA RULING - It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone within and
around the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07
constituted taking of property without due process because the landowners were
thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without just compensation; that
the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was invalid because there was
no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was obnoxious to the public welfare
b. there was no scientific evidence to support the ban;60 that for four decades since the
adoption of aerial spraying, there has been no reported outbreak or any predisposition
to ailment connected with the pesticides applied. (Sigatoka disease – leaf disease of
bananas)
c. the active ingredients of the fungicide are so diluted that no harm may be posed to
public health or to the environment through aerial application
d. the acts of the local government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its
constituents and to promote a balanced and healthful ecology are well within the
corporate powers vested in the local government unit.
e. A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers
only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference
of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The
 first requirement refers to the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the
second, to the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
f. The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the
effects of aerial spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of
the ordinance requires the planting of diversified trees within the identified buffer
zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as confiscatory requiring
payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation if
the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive
uses of the land.
g. In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) equally applicable to all members of the class.
h. The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial,
truck-mounted boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying. However,
Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes the prohibition only against aerial spraying. – though
lahat ito makacause man ng aerial drift No substantial distinction.
i. We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the
equal protection clause because it does not classify which substances are prohibited
from being applied aerially – OVERINCLUSIVE
j. the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack
of full scientific certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and
environmental effect. – n/a as there is no scientific study.

FOR MARCH 4

16. Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 P 635 (due process in administrative proceedings) - IVAN
17. CB v. CA 220 SCRA 536 (prior notice and hearing) - NADINE
18. Shu v. Dee 723 SCRA 512 (NBI without judicial or quasi-judicial power) - JAY
19. Corona v. UHPAP 283 SCRA 31 (pilot) – CHRISTINE
20. ADMU v. Capulong 222 SCRA - IVAN
21. Tua v. Mangrobang 714 SCRA 248 (TPO) - IVAN
22. Calleja v. Executive Secretary - Anti-Terrorism Law (G.R. No. 252578, et al. December 7, 2021) -
CHRISTINE
23. Garcia v. Drilon, GR 179267, June 25, 2013 - NADINE
24. People v. Vera 65 Phil 56 - JAY
25. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City - L-23794 February 17, 1968 - CHRISTINE
26. People v. Cayat – 68 Phil, 12, 18 - CHRISTINE
27. Central Bank Employees Ass’n v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299 - JAY
28. People v. Siton – 600 SCRA 476 (constitutionality of vagrancy) - NADINE
29. Mosqueda v. Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. G.R. No. 189185,
16 August 2016 ( Aerial Spraying) - Equal protection - NADINE
30. International School v. Quisumbing – GR 128845 June 1, 2000 (salary for foreign hires) - JAY
31. People v. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689 - JAY
32. Biraogo v. PTC – 637 SCRA 78 (truth commission) - NADINE
33. 1-United v. COMELEC – 755 SCRA 441 - IVAN
34. Sparks v. Quezon City, et al, August 8, 2017, G.R. No. 225442 - IVAN