PPerkins
PPerkins
infrastructure in
economic growth:
building on experience
Economic infrastructure may be compared to the foundation of a building. It plays a supporting
role, facilitating the multitude of productive economic activities that constitute the bulk of the
economy, or gross domestic product.
The development of economic and social infrastructure in South Africa has a long
Peter Perkins and troubled history. Excellent in parts yet hopelessly inadequate in others, and
holds an MCom riddled with the discriminatory practices and inequalities that were the hallmarks
in economics and of the country’s apartheid past, the South African infrastructural experience does
has worked as an not lend itself to generalisations or easy assessment.
economist at the
Chamber of Mines History aside, if South Africans today perceive there to be infrastructural backlogs
of South Africa, JCI everywhere they look, they are not alone. Lamenting the poor condition of America’s
Ltd, Standard Bank, infrastructure in The New York Times in August and October, economist Paul
and Fleming Martin Krugman described America as being ‘on the unlit, unpaved road to nowhere’1 and
Securities. He lectured its roads, railways and sewer systems as ‘antiquated and increasingly inadequate’2. In
economics at Wits October, The Economist3 had the following to say about infrastructure in Britain:
and currently works for
Statistics South Africa. The dreadfulness of Britain’s infrastructure has become legendary. Visitors to
The views expressed in
continental Europe and elsewhere return with awed tales of cheap, clean trains
this paper are his alone.
that run on time, zippy new roads and properly functioning airports, which are
crossly compared with Britain’s pot-holes, delays and check-in scrums.
Why should there be such concern over the state of economic infrastructure, whether
in South Africa or elsewhere? Apart from the sheer convenience of having enough
electricity at an affordable price, clean water, efficient public transport, free-flowing
traffic, and telephones that work, few would dispute the notion that there are close
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links between economic infrastructure and economic growth. The evidence for such
links is strong, whether in the form of quantitative or qualitative studies, whether
over time or across regions or countries. In the following section I shall confine
myself to just two examples.
The second example is the South African experience between 1960 and 2009.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) (bold line)
and public-sector economic infrastructural investment4 (light line), both measured
per capita and in real terms (i.e. adjusted for inflation). The two series follow similar
trends. Average annual growth rates for selected periods are shown in Table 1.
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40 000 2 500
30 000 1 500
25 000 1 000
20 000 500
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
From the early 1960s to mid-1970s, both series exhibited positive growth. Between
the late 1970s and early 1980s performance was mixed, but then, too, the two series
moved broadly in the same direction, first falling and then rising. Between the early
1980s and early 1990s, a period during which the disastrous economic consequences
of the apartheid system became increasingly clear, both GDP and infrastructural
investment declined in real per capita terms. Happily, between the mid-1990s and
the early 2000s the long-term downward trends in both series were halted. Then
followed a seven-year period of rapid expansion in infrastructural investment, on
average 19.3% per annum (in real per capita terms) during the six years 2003–2008,
with a similar performance in 2009. Real per capita GDP grew by 3.2% per annum
during 2003–2008, but was negative in 2009 largely on account of the global
economic recession.
The extended decline in living standards during the 1980s and early 1990s was
particularly tragic when considering that for many other emerging market
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T h e r ol e of ec onomic inf r a s t r u c t u r e i n e c o n o m i c g r o w t h : b u i ld i n g o n e x p e r i e n c e
economies this was a period of rapid economic growth methods of infrastructure provision, in particular the
and development. South Africa’s investment malaise generation of electricity? How much emphasis should
was by no means confined to economic infrastructure be placed on economic infrastructure compared with
during the 12 years 1982–1993: the level of annual social infrastructure (health and education)? Can the
total investment (as measured by gross fixed capital experiences of one country or region provide easy
formation including the private sector) declined in real lessons or models for other countries or regions? It lies
terms, and as a proportion of GDP averaged 20 per far beyond the scope of this paper to provide answers
cent (25 per cent during 1982–1985 and 18 per cent to these and other tricky questions faced by policy
during 1986–1993). South Africa’s savings rate also makers in the field of infrastructure. Partial answers to
declined over this period. By contrast, high-growth some of them in the South African context may lie in
emerging market economies in Asia maintained high the historical development of South Africa’s economic
rates of savings and investment (Table 2). It was not infrastructure. This is discussed in the following
until 2005/6 (a quarter of a century) that South Africa section. The section following that addresses more
returned to its 1981 high in terms of per capita real explicitly the question of causality between economic
GDP (Figure 2). infrastructure and economic growth in the context of
the South African experience.
Table 2 – Rates of investment and economic growth
during 1982–1993 Historical development of economic
infrastructure in South Africa
GDP (real) % Investment as a
Country The building of South Africa’s economic infrastructure
p.a. % of GDP
during the 19th and 20th centuries was dominated by
South Africa 0.7 20.3
the state. Not exclusively, but certainly for the most
Malaysia 6.8 31.8 part, it was the state that owned and operated railway
Singapore 7.3 38.0 lines, roads, harbours, airports, water systems, power
South Korea 8.4 32.1 stations and communication networks.5 As with social
infrastructure, access to economic infrastructural
Thailand 8.2 32.6
services was in most cases determined along racial
Data source: International Financial Statistics lines, heavily skewed in favour of the minority
white population and away from the majority black
Whereas the correlation between infrastructural population. The damage so done is incalculable, except
investment and economic growth may be to say that it must have been enormous; no assessment
demonstrated with ease, causality between the two of it will be attempted here.
is more difficult to show. Is there any causality at all,
or is their correlation merely coincidental? If there The history of rail in South Africa began in the 1860s,
is causality, does infrastructural investment lead when the Natal Railway Company and the Cape Town
economic growth, or does economic growth lead Railway and Dock Company opened the first railway
infrastructural investment, or does the causality run lines in and around Durban and Cape Town. It was
in both directions depending on circumstances? not long before these developments were purchased
by the Natal and Cape governments, and thereafter
These are not the only difficult questions that the growth of rail in South Africa became largely a
arise regarding the provision of infrastructure and government affair. By the late 1870s, four main lines
infrastructural services. If infrastructure does promote were reaching inland from Cape Town, Durban,
economic growth and development, just how much Port Elizabeth and East London, whose seaport
infrastructure is optimal? Do different types of infrastructure predated rail by many years.
infrastructure have different effects on the economy?
Should infrastructure be provided exclusively by The discoveries of diamonds in 1867 and gold in 1886
the public sector, or is there a role for the private provided considerable impetus to the development of
sector as well? To the extent that infrastructure is rail. Following the discovery of diamonds, Kimberley
or should be provided by the public sector, is it best grew rapidly in wealth and population, and yet remained
funded through general tax revenues, user charges, constrained by poor transport and communication
foreign direct investment, or borrowing? What are services. Diamonds generated both the need and the
the implications for the environment of different resources for a railway link to Cape Town, a venture
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that was achieved in 1885. Gold played an equivalent role in the case of Johannesburg, which by 1896 was
connected to the four main ports in the Cape and Natal as well as Lourenço Marques (now Maputo). In the
Transvaal Republic, the construction and operation of railway infrastructure was undertaken by the Netherlands
Railway Company until the government took over this role in 1902.
South Africa’s network of railway lines was largely in place by 1930, and the growth in railway infrastructure
thereafter was mainly in the form of rolling stock. Locomotives, coaching stock and goods stock continued to
increase in number quite steadily between 1930 and 1980, after which they fell victim to South Africa’s sharp
fall-off in infrastructural investment (Figure 2). Not only did they fall in number, but their remaining lifespan as
productive assets continued to fall as well, with negative consequences for reliability. The rise and decline of rail
in South Africa is summarised in Table 3.
South Africa’s ports and airports handled ever-growing volumes of cargo and passengers during the 20th century.
A summary is provided in Table 5. The sharp increase in cargo handled by the ports in the 1970s resulted in large
measure from the opening of Richards Bay and Saldanha.
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Telegraphic and telephonic communications were introduced in the 1870s and 1880s.
Twentieth-century progress in the number of fixed (land) telephone lines is shown
in Table 6. Prior to 1991 telephone infrastructure and services were provided by the
Just as the early
Department of Posts and Telecommunications, which then became Telkom, initially development of rail
still wholly owned by the South African government but subsequently listed on the was closely associated
Johannesburg and New York stock exchanges in 2003. Cellular phones appeared in with mining, so too
South Africa in the 1990s, and rapidly overtook the number of fixed phone lines.
The cellular phone market was driven in large measure by private enterprise, though
was the expansion
with Telkom also owning a substantial share of the market. of electricity
generation capacity.
Table 6 – Fixed phone lines and electricity generation (South Africa)
Not only did the
Fixed phone lines Electricity generated
(Telkom) (Eskom and other producers)
mines require
million gigawatt hours large quantities of
1920 0.030 1 277 electricity to operate,
1930 0.070 2 454 but South Africa
1940 0.142 7 168 had vast reserves of
1950 0.277 11 187
1960 0.633 22 561
coal with which to
1970 0.879 50 791 produce electricity at
1980 1.508 98 951 a relatively low cost.
1990 3.080 165 384
2000 5.493 210 577
Data sources: Statistics South Africa; Official Year Book of the Union; Union Statistics for Fifty
Years; Telkom
The bulk of South Africa’s electricity is provided by Eskom (Table 6). Just as the early
development of rail was closely associated with mining, so too was the expansion
of electricity generation capacity. Not only did the mines require large quantities
of electricity to operate, but South Africa had vast reserves of coal with which to
produce electricity at a relatively low cost. Industry and households alike benefited
from a cheap and reliable supply of electricity for decades, and Eskom came to be
regarded by many as a model of what any successful state-owned enterprise should
be (apart, that is, from the lopsided provision of services along racial lines). However,
as we entered the 21st century, there were growing concerns about future generation
capacity, concerns that were compounded by a lack of clarity over the respective
roles of Eskom, various government departments and the private sector in building
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capacity to meet future demand. By early 2008, Eskom’s ability to meet demand had
become severely stretched and the country was subjected to a series of blackouts, a
repeat of which has thus far been averted through demand-side management and a
slowdown in the economy.
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investment would have ever more favourable effects on the economy? Most certainly
not. In the Barro model, starting from a relatively low level of productive services
provided by the public sector, economic growth increases as the level of public-
sector productive services increases. However, the improvement in economic growth
is moderated by two effects, namely an ever-decreasing marginal product of public-
sector expenditure, and a tax effect that is growth-negative. Thus there exists an
optimal level of public-sector expenditure on productive services at which the rate
of economic growth is optimised, beyond which the negative tax effect dominates
the productivity effect and the rate of economic growth declines (eventually turning
negative).9
The same data set was investigated in Fedderke et al.13 The main results to emerge
from a variety of specifications were that electricity generation had a positive and
direct impact on GDP and that public-sector infrastructural investment had the
effect of promoting private-sector investment in physical capital, which in turn had a
positive impact on GDP. ‘The empirical results are generally supportive of the South
African fiscal authorities’ renewed interest in public-sector investment since 2002’14.
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Conclusion
Over the long term, namely the half century 1960–2009 shown in Figure 2, public-
sector investment in economic infrastructure averaged approximately four per
cent of South Africa’s GDP. Considering the amount of economic activity which
that four per cent facilitated and supported, and apart from investment in social
infrastructure such as health and education, it would be difficult to find another
category of expenditure of comparable size that is of equal importance in promoting
economic growth.
Much remains to be done. In electricity alone the demands are enormous. Eskom
plans to double its generation capacity from approximately 40 000 MW in 2010 to
80 000 MW in 2026. Considering that a substantial portion of the existing 40 000
MW capacity will expire before then (power stations depreciate), this is a daunting
prospect.
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term decisions in the presence of enormous uncertainty, this is easier said than
done. But it cannot be avoided. Beyond recognition of the importance of economic
infrastructure for economic growth, crucial to the continued renewal and expansion
of our economic infrastructure will be careful assessment based on a number of
issues. These include cost-benefit analysis; efficient spending of available funds and
effective implementation of projects from beginning to end; finding sustainable
solutions to funding shortfalls; public consultation and debate; building partnerships
between the private and public sectors; co-ordination between all participants and
other stakeholders, all of whose roles should be made clear; and above all, clear
planning and strong leadership. The objective for policy makers across all levels of
government must be to plan for and provide economic infrastructure that is not too
much, not too little, but just the right amount, just the right type, and at just the
right time and just the right price. It is a difficult challenge indeed.
notes
1 2010a
2 2010b
3 2010
4 Gross fixed capital formation.
5 An important, or rather crucial, private-sector contribution to South Africa’s infrastructural development that ought to be
acknowledged is that of the private-sector civil engineering and construction firms contracted by the state to undertake the
work of putting infrastructure in place.
6 Van Lingen et al., 1960: 141
7 Barro, 1990
8 See Fedderke et al. (2006) for a detailed explanation of the Barro model.
9 In a Cobb-Douglas representation of the Barro model with constant returns to scale, the optimal point is reached when the
marginal product of public-sector expenditure falls to one.
10 Perkins et al. (2005) and Fedderke et al. (2006)
11 (2005). PSS (Pesaran, Shin and Smith) F-tests were used to identify directions of association between economic infrastructure
and GDP.
12 2005: 223
13 (2006) using a vector error-correction mechanism framework.
14 Fedderke et al., 2006: 1052
References
Barro, RJ. 1990. ‘Government spending in a simple model of endogenous growth.’ Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):
S102–S125.
Fedderke, JW, Perkins, P and Luiz, JM. 2006. ‘Infrastructural investment in long-run economic growth: South Africa 1875-2001.’
World Development, 34(6): 1037-1059.
Krugman, P. 2010a. ‘America Goes Dark.’ The New York Times, 8 August. [Link]
opinion/[Link]?ref=paulkrugman, accessed 20 December 2010.
Krugman, P. 2010b. ‘The End of the Tunnel.’ The New York Times, 7 October. [Link]
opinion/[Link]?_r=1&ref=paulkrugman, accessed 20 December 2010.
Perkins, P, Fedderke, JW and Luiz, JM. 2005. ‘An analysis of economic infrastructure investment in South Africa.’ South African
Journal of Economics, 73(2): 211-228.
The Economist, 2010. ‘And now for the good news.’ 30 October: 37.
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harbour services. Johannesburg: Da Gama Publications.
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