XV.

RULE 19: Intervention (Sections 1-4)

Cases:

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison, 612 SCRA

FACTS:
Isog San Movement filed a letter-complaint addressed to the Ombudsman
accusing public officials of Samar including Sison of Highly Anomalous
Transactions entered into by them amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison
was the Provincial Budget Officer. Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision,
finding Sison, among others, guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from
service. Aggrieved, Sison appealed to CA via a Petition for review under Rule 43.
CA rendered a decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the Office of
the Ombudsman. Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion for
Intervention and to admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by CA.

ISSUE:
Is the CA correct in denying such Motion for Intervention by Office of the
Ombudsman?

RULING:

1. Yes. It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to

Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. To warrant
intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur:

(1) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
(2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being
properly decided in a separate proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation
and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or
lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

The Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene in the

instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be
mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate. It is an established doctrine
that judges should detach themselves from cases where their decisions are
appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d’etre for such a doctrine is the
fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and must leave the
opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate court to
decide the issues without the judges’ active participation. When judges actively
participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in away, cease to be judicial and
have become adversarial instead.

As the CA held correctly:

The Office of the Ombudsman is not a third party who has a legal interest in the
appeal to the Court of Appeals of its own resolution finding respondent Sison
administratively liable. It is not one which would be directly affected by the
judgment of the Court of Appeals. It must be remembered that the legal interest
required for an intervention must be direct and immediate in character. Moreover,
what was brought on appeal before the Court of Appeals was the very Decision
by the Office of the Ombudsman (finding respondent Sison administratively
liable). Plainly, the Office of the Ombudsman, as an adjudicator, and not an
advocate, has no legal interest at stake in the outcome of the appealed case.
2. Petitioner’s motion for intervention was filed out of time. Rule 19 provides
explicitly that a motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In the instant case, the Omnibus Motion for
Intervention was filed only on July 22, 2008, after the Decision of the CA was
promulgated on June 26, 2008. In support of its position, petitioner cites Office of
the Ombudsman v.
Samaniego. That case, however, is not applicable here, since the Office of the
Ombudsman filed the motion for intervention during the pendency of the
proceedings before the CA.
Compare with Ombudsman vs. Chavez, 700 SCRA

FACTS:
BSU-BOR received an order from Deputy Ombudsman directing it to enforce the
Office of the Ombudsman’s Joint Decision and Supplemental Resolution finding
the respondents guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct and imposing the
penalty of dismissal from service. The said decision and ruling of the Office of the
Ombudsman, however, are still pending before the CA. By this reason, a
respondent filed a petition for injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO or
preliminary injunction before the RTC, but was denied. Respondents filed a notice
of appeal with CA. CA granted the prayer for the issuance of TRO enjoining the
BSU-BOR from enforcing the Ombudsman’s Resolution. Thereafter, Office of the
Ombudsman filed a Motion to Intervene and to Admit Attached motion to recall
TRO. CA denied on the ground that the case is a regular appeal impugning the
disposition of RTC (denying the petition for injunction/TRO), the pivotal issue is
only for the appellants and the Board of
Regents of BSU to settle, which may completely adjudicate upon without the
active participation of the Office of the Ombudsman. Further, the administrative
penalty as imposed against Respondents is not yet final and immediately
executory in view of the appeal interposed by the Respondents before CA.

ISSUE:
Is the CA correct?

RULING:
1. No. The CA should have allowed the Office of the Ombudsman to intervene in
the appeal pending with the lower court. The wisdom of this course of action has
been exhaustively explained in Office of the Ombudsman v. Samaniego. In
resolving the issue of whether the Office of the Ombudsman has legal interest to
intervene in the appeal of its Decision, the Court expounded, thus: x x x the
Ombudsman is in a league of its own. It is different from other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because the people under its
jurisdiction are public officials who, through pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations directed
against them. Its function is critical because public interest (in the accountability
of public officers and employees) is at stake. Office of the Ombudsman had a
clear legal interest in the inquiry into whether respondent committed acts
constituting grave misconduct, an offense punishable under the Uniform Rules in
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It was in keeping with its duty to act as
a champion of the people and preserve the integrity of public service that
petitioner had to be given the opportunity to act fully within the parameters of its
authority. It is true that under our rule on intervention, the allowance or
disallowance of a motion to intervene is left to the sound discretion of the court
after a consideration of the appropriate circumstances. However, such discretion
is not without limitations. One of the limits in the exercise of such discretion is
that it must not be exercised in disregard of law and the Constitution. The CA
should have considered the nature of the Ombuds
man’s powers as provided in the Constitution and RA 6770. The Office of the
Ombudsman cannot be detached, disinterested and neutral specially when
defending its decisions. Moreover, in administrative cases against government
personnel, the offense is committed against the government and public interest.

2. Here, since its power to ensure enforcement of its Joint Decision and
Supplemental Resolution is in danger of being impaired, the Office of the
Ombudsman had a clear legal interest in defending its right to have its judgment
carried out. The CA patently erred in denying the Office of the Ombudsman’s
motion for intervention.

Difference with Office of the Ombudsman vs. Sison?

1. In the case of Ombudsman vs. Sison, petitioner’s motion for intervention was
filed out of time. Rule 19 provides explicitly that a motion to intervene may be
filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. In the instant
case, the Omnibus Motion for Intervention was filed after the Decision of the CA
was promulgated.
2. In the case of Ombudsman vs. Chavez, however, Office of the Ombudsman
filed the motion for intervention during the pendency of the proceedings before
the CA.

Anonuevo vs. Intestate Estate of Jalandoni, 636 SCRA

Facts:

Rodolfo G. Jalandoni passed away intestate on December 20, 1966, without issue.

Bernardino G. Jalandoni, Rodolfo's brother, filed for letters of administration on

April 28, 1967, initiating the judicial settlement of Rodolfo's estate (Spec. Proc.
No. 338) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental.
On January 17, 2003, May D. Añonuevo, Alexander Blee Desantis, and John
Desantis Neri (petitioners) claimed to be the children of Sylvia Blee Desantis,
daughter of Isabel Blee and John Desantis.

Petitioners asserted that Isabel was Rodolfo's legal spouse at his death, thus
entitled to a share in his estate, and sought to intervene on Isabel's behalf.

Petitioners presented two marriage certificates of Isabel and Rodolfo, Sylvia's

birth certificate, and their respective birth proofs.

Bernardino, as the Special Administrator, opposed, arguing Isabel's prior

subsisting marriage to John Desantis made her subsequent marriage to Rodolfo
bigamous and void ab initio.

The intestate court allowed the intervention, but the Court of Appeals nullified
this decision, leading to the present appeal.

Issue:

Did the Court of Appeals err in nullifying the orders of the intestate court allowing
the petitioners to intervene in the estate settlement proceedings?

Ruling:

The Supreme Court denied the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision
to nullify the intestate court's orders allowing the petitioners to intervene.

Ratio:

The Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals acted within its jurisdiction
and did not exceed its limits under a writ of certiorari.

The appellate court reassessed evidence to ascertain if the intestate court gravely
abused its discretion.

Intervention in legal proceedings is discretionary but must be based on sound

judicial principles, permitting only those with a legitimate interest to intervene.

Petitioners failed to prove Isabel's status as Rodolfo's legal spouse.

Sylvia's birth certificate indicated a valid marriage between Isabel and John
Desantis, establishing a presumption of a prior marriage.
Petitioners did not rebut the presumption or prove dissolution of Isabel's prior
marriage.

Consequently, Isabel’s marriage to Rodolfo was bigamous and void ab initio,

disqualifying her from any interest in Rodolfo's estate.

Petitioners lacked the legal basis to intervene in the estate settlement

proceedings.

Rodriguez vs. CA, 698 SCRA 352

FACTS: Purita Landicho filed before the CFI of Rizal an Application for Registration of a
piece of land located in San Mateo, Rizal. The CFI rendered a Decision evaluating the
evidence presented by the parties as follows: It has been established that the parcel of
land under consideration was formerly several smaller parcels owned and possessed by
the several people, all of whom in January 1960, executed instruments of conditional
sale of their respective parcels of land in favor of [Landicho], x x x, and on July 20, 1965
all of them executed jointly a final deed of absolute sale x x x which superseded the
conditional sale. The applicant is entitled to the benefits provided by Section 48, of C.A.
No. 141, as amended. CFI- confirmed the title of the applicant, Purita Landicho to the
parcel of land under consideration and orders the registration thereof in her name and
personal circumstances aforementioned. The opposition of the Director of Lands was
dismissed. Upon finality, a TCT was issued instead of an OCT. After several sales,
respondent Philippine Chinese Charitable Association, Inc. (PCCAI), under TCT No.
482970, became owner on July 15, 1975. Meanwhile, A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc.
(ADRDI) instituted Civil Case entitled A. Doronila Resources Dev., Inc. v. CA, which was
still pending before the RTC of Pasig City as of 2008. ADRDI asserted ownership over
the subject property. While still pending in court, ADRDI subsequently transferred the
subject property to Amado Araneta (Araneta) to whom TCT No. 70589 was issued. On
November 14, 1996, Landicho executed a Deed of Absolute Sales (sic) over the subject
property in favor of herein petitioner Deogenes O. Rodriguez (Rodriguez). Two years
later, on June 1, 1998, Landicho died. On May 18, 2005, Rodriguez filed an Omnibus
Motion alleging therein that the Decision dated November 16, 1965 and Order dated
December 22, 1965 of the CFI in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 which confirmed
Landicho‘s title over the subject property has not been executed alleging that no OCT
had been ever issued by the ROD in Landicho‘s name. As Landicho‘s
successor-in-interest to the subject property, Rodriguez prayed that the Register of
Deeds for Marikina City issue OCT in his name. Concerning the aforementioned
Omnibus Motion, Rodriguez himself submitted TCT No. 482970 of PCCAI but alleged
that said certificate of title was fictitious. Thus, the RTC issued on November 3, 2006 a
subpoena commanding PCCAI to appear at the hearing of Land Reg. Case No. N-5098
and to bring its TCT No. 482970 and Tax Declaration No. SM-02- 0229; and to testify in
connection therewith. On November 17, 2006, PCCAI filed before the RTC a Verified
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Land Reg. Case No. N-5098. PCCAI justified its
intervention by arguing that it was an indispensable party in the case, having substantial
legal interest therein as the registered owner of the subject property under TCT No.
482970. PCCAI likewise pointed out that Rodriguez himself submitted a copy of TCT
No. 482970, only alleging that said certificate was fictitious. PCCAI averred that
Rodriguez maliciously failed to allege in his Omnibus Motion that TCT No. 482970
remains valid and subsisting, there being no direct action or final court decree for its
cancellation. Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion constituted a collateral attack on the title of
PCCAI, which is not sanctioned by law and jurisprudence. Consequently, PCCAI asked
the RTC to allow its intervention in Land Reg. Case No. N- 5098 so it could protect its
vested rights and interests over the subject property; to note and admit its
Answer-in-Intervention; and to deny Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion for utter lack of merit.
The RTC favorably acted on Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion in an Order dated April 10,
2007.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the motion to intervene filed by PCCAI is proper even

though it was filed after rendition of judgment by the trial court.

RULING: YES, intervention is governed by Rule 19 of the Rules of Court,

pertinent provisions of which read: Section 1. Who may intervene; A person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the
custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be
allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor‘s rights may be
fully protected in a separate proceeding. Section 2. Time to intervene; The
motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to
the motion and served on the original parties. Although Rule 19 is explicit
on the period when a motion to intervene may be filed, the Court allowed
exceptions in several cases, viz: This rule, however, is not inflexible.
Interventions have been allowed even beyond the period prescribed in the
Rule, when demanded by the higher interest of justice. Interventions have
also been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not been
impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered
by the trial court, when the petition for review of the judgment has already
been submitted for decision before the Supreme Court, and even where the
assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim v. Pacquing,
the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines was
allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once
and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In fine, the
allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound
discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.
We stress again that Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely
available for justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay, but to facilitate
and promote the administration of justice. The particular circumstances of
this case similarly justify the relaxation of the rules of procedure on
intervention. First, the interests of both PCCAI and Rodriguez in the subject
property arose only after the CFI Decision dated November 16, 1965 in
Land Reg. Case No. N-5098 became final and executory. Second, as
previously discussed herein, both PCCAI and Rodriguez trace their titles
back to Landicho. Hence, the intervention of PCCAI could not unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of Landicho who prayed for the
execution of the November 16, 1965 Decision of the CFI. PCCAI moved to
intervene in the case only to oppose Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion on the
ground that the subject property is already registered in its name under
TCT No. 482970, which originated from Landicho‘s TCT No. 167681. And
fourth, after learning of Rodriguez‘s Omnibus Motion in Land Reg. Case
No. N-5098 via the November 3, 2006 subpoena issued by the RTC,
PCCAI was reasonably expected to oppose the same. Such action was the
most opportune and expedient remedy available to PCCAI to prevent the
RTC from ordering the issuance of a decree of registration and OCT in
Rodriguez‘s name. For this reason, the RTC should have allowed the
intervention of PCCAI.
Fernandez vs. CA, 691 SCRA 167
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO A. HENSON and ANGEL S. ONG, complainants , v. COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES RAMON M. BATO, JR., ISAIAS P. DICDICAN and EDUARDO B. PERALTA,
JR., respondents

AM OCA IPI 12-201-CA-J 19 February 2013

Administrative Matter

Reyes, J.

1. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action.
Conversely, a person who is not a party in the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary
writ, such as a preliminary injunction.
Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.
2. A person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to the
petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay the
injurious writ. Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the
Court of Appeals cannot maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have
the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed
by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the
assailed order.

FACTS:

Complainants Ethelwoldo Fernandez and Antonio Henson were elected to the board of directors
of NADECOR. In a regular stockholder's meeting where two groups were vying for control over
the company, Calalang, De Jesus, Romulo, Ayala, Lazatin. Femandez, Nitorreda, Engle were
Elected. Gatmaitan was also elected as Corporate Secretary.

Thereafter, Ricafort/s, claiming to be stockholders of record, sought to annul the said meeting
held. They filed a complaint before the RTC of PASIG Ricaforts alleged that they were not given
due notice of the said meeting thus they were not present and were not able to exercise their
right RTC agreed with the Ricaforts Four separate Petitions for Certiorari were filed by the
members of the board with the CA, all with application for a TRO and/or preliminary injunction.
The CA denied such applications, but on the same day nevertheless, the 11th division issued a
TRO.

During the effectivity of the TRO the old Board of Directors assumed the functions of the new
one in order to prevent any hiatus and not to prejudice the corporation All the CA petitions were
consolidated as well as the other cases.
On February 17, 2012 the respondents Ricafort filed their Comment Ad Cautelam to the petition
in CA-G.R. No. 122784, the petitioners therein thereafter filed three (3) Urgent motions to
resolve their application for writ of preliminary injunction, on March 8, on May 22 and again on
June 6, 2012.

The Writ of Preliminary Injunction was granted by the CA 14th Division, which not for long was
questioned. Complainants filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
seeking to annul the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA's Special 14th Division
Complainants also filed an Administrative case against the Justices of the 14th Division
of the CA.

Alleged in this administrative complaint that the respondent Justices are guilty of grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service, gross ignorance of the law. Gross
incompetence, and manifest partiality.

ISSUE:

Whether the Ricaforts have a legal personality to assail the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CA 14th division.

RULING:

No. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest
against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave
of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. Conversely, a person who is not a party in
the main suit cannot be bound by an ancillary writ, such as a preliminary injunction.
Indeed, he cannot be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger.

Moreover, a person not an aggrieved party in the original proceedings that gave rise to
the petition for certiorari, will not be permitted to bring the said action to annul or stay
the injurious writ. Such is the clear import of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.

Thus, a person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot
maintain an action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed.
Stated differently, if a petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a
party in the lower court, he has no standing to question the assailed order.
The complainants, who at various times served as elected members of the Board of
NADECOR, did not bother to intervene in the CA petitions, hence, they are not entitled
to the service of pleadings and motions therein. Complainant Fernandez was himself a
defendant in SEC Case No. 11-164 in the RTC, but he chose not to join any of the four
CA petitions.
In this Court‘s Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in G.R. No. 202218- 21, entitled "Jose G.
Ricafort, et al. v. Court of Appeals [Special 14th Division], et al.," involving a petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by JG Ricafort, De Jesus, Paolo A. Villar, and Ma. Nalen
Rosero-Galang, also questioning the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the Special 14th Division of the CA, we ruled that persons who are not parties to any
of the consolidated petitions have no personality to assail the said injunctive writ.
In another Resolution, also promulgated on July 18, 2012, in G.R. No. 202257-60, a
petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein complainants to assail the validity of
the writ of preliminary injunction in the aforesaid consolidated CA petitions, we likewise
dismissed the petition due to lack of personality of the petitioners, since they were
non-parties and strangers to the consolidated CA petitions. We pointed out that they
should first have intervened below, and then filed a motion for reconsideration from the
questioned CA order. On September 19, 2012, we denied their motion for
reconsideration from the dismissal of their petition.
Having established that the herein complainants have no personality to assail the writ of
preliminary injunction issued by the CA‘s former Special 14th Division, we cannot now
permit them to harass the CA Justices who issued the same. For even granting that the
issuance of the writ was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a magistrate cannot be
held administratively liable for every discretionary but erroneous order he issues. The
settled rule is that "a Judge cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by him in good faith."

WHEREFORE, premises considered, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Yao vs. Perello, 414 SCRA

LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner , v. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, THE EX- OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. VILLARIN, respondents
GR 153828 24 October 2003 Certiorari
Corona, J.

“Consequently, petitioner‘s claim that he had the right to intervene is without basis.
Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of a private party as respondent in
petitions for prohibition. On the other hand, to allow interven tion, it must be shown that :
(a) the movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or otherwise qualified,
and
(b) consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, o r whether the intervenor‘s rights may be
protected in a separate proceeding or not.
Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the second. x x x
As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at an y time
before rendition of judgment by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April
25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in the rules.”

FACTS:

The present controversy stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioner before the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) against a certain corporation, PR
Builders, Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private
respondent's/Bernadine Villarin‘s husband.

On September 17 1999, the HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell
between petitioner and PR Builders. Refund was ordered, amounting to 2,116,103.31,
and damages as well, amounting to 250,000. HLURB issued a writ of execution.
Pursuant to that, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land in Canlubang, Calamba,
Laguna, registered in the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent,
Bernadine Villarin. The property was scheduled for public auction on March 20, 2002.

On March 19, 2002, private respondent filed before the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition
for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from proceeding with the public
auction. Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the
execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent and her
husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in the
HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer for the
separate liability of her husband.

Public respondent Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining

order and set the case for raffle and conference on March 22, 2002. The case was
eventually raffled to RTC, Branch 276, presided by public respondent judge. A
conference was then conducted, after which public respondent judge issued the
assailed resolution of March 22, 2002 granting private respondents petition for
prohibition and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

April 25, 2002, or more than a month after public respondent judge issued the
resolution of March 22, 2002, petitioner filed a motion for intervention. However,
public respondent judge denied the motion in her assailed order of May 10, 2002.
The order stated that the case has been long decided and that the intervention
was too late.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of
discretion to public respondent judge in: (a) declaring the subject property exempt from
execution and therefore could not be sold to satisfy the obligation of private
respondent‘s husband, and (b) denying petitioners motion for intervention on the ground
that the same was filed late.

ISSUE/s: Whether or not respondent judge erred in denying the motion for
intervention

RULING:
To answer the first issue raised wherein petitioner insists that, in a petition for
prohibition, it is essential that the party who is interested in sustaining the act or acts
sought to be prohibited or enjoined be impleaded as private respondent. The claim that
he had the right to intervene is without basis. Nothing in the codal provision requires the
inclusion of a private party as respondent in petitions for prohibition. On the other hand,
to allow intervention, it must be shown that (a) the movant has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation or otherwise qualified, and (b) consideration must be given as to
whether the adjudication of the rights of the original parties may be delayed or
prejudiced, or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate proceeding
or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not more important than the
second.

In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor was
adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records reveal
that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in the
HLURB case that can be levied upon.

UNDER THE CURRENT TOPIC IN THE SYLLABUS: As provided in the Rules of

Court, the motion for intervention may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment
by the trial court. Petitioner filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the
period set forth in the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition
for prohibition and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002.
By April 6, 2002,
after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and executory.

Besides, the mere fact that the petitioner failed to move for the reconsideration of the
trial court's resolution is sufficient cause for the outright dismissal of the instant petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first
filed before the respondent court to allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Pinlac vs. CA, 410 SCRA

FACTS:

Pinlac, et al. filed a Petition for Quieting of Title over 3 vast parcels of land
known as Lot Nos. 1, 2 & 3, covered by TCT No. 5690, OCT No. 614 and
OCT No. 333, respectively.

The trial court rendered a Partial Decision in favor of Pinlac, et al. and
against the defendants including respondent owners of Vilmar-Maloles
Subdivision whose properties were within Lot No. 2. The CA granted the
Petition to Annul the Partial Decision of the defaulted title owners of Vilmar.

Pinlac, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration contending that the

disposition of the trial court with respect to Lot No. 3 should not have been
annulled by the CA because the petition for annulment of judgment filed by
the respondents concerned only Lot No. 2.

The SC issued a Resolution partially granting petitioner’s motion.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land Registration

Authority (LRA), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for intervention and a Petition-In-Intervention claiming that
Proclamation No. 1826 reserves for national government center site a
parcel of land within the area covered by OCT-333.

Issue:

Whether or not the intervention by the Republic proper.

Ruling:

YES.

The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure is intended to

make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is
aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding
technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof. Indeed, in exceptional
cases, the Court has allowed intervention notwithstanding the rendition of
judgment by the trial court. In one case, intervention was allowed even
when the petition for review of the assailed judgment was already
submitted for decision in the Supreme Court.

In a letter, the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council

certified that within the Project site/jurisdiction of the National Government
Center Housing Project (NGCHP), situated are various government
buildings, offices and complexes.

Clearly, the intervention of the Republic is necessary to protect public

interest as well as government properties located and projects undertaken
on Lot No. 3. The Constitutional mandate that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law can certainly be
invoked by the Republic which is an indispensable party to the case at bar.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, while the provision is
intended as a protection of individuals against arbitrary action of the State,
it may also be invoked by the Republic to protect its properties.

Chipongian vs. Benitez-Lirio -768 SCRA 204

Facts:

Vicente Benitez was married to Isabel Chipongian and they had no

offspring. After the death of Isabel, her brother Nilo Chipongian
(PETITIONER) and Vicente executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement
whereby Nilo waived all his rights to the estate of Isabel in favor of Vicente.
According to Nilo, Vicente executed an affidavit simultaneously with the
deed of extra –judicial settlement of Isabel Chipongian’s estate. In the
affidavit it is alleged that Vicente affirmed that the waiver did not extend to
the paraphernal properties of Isabel. Upon the death of Vicente, his sister
and nephew, Victoria and Feodor (RESPONDENTS’), respectively, initiated
the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Vicente with the RTC
and it appointed Feodor as the administrator of Vicente’s estate. Nilo
intervened in the proceedings of the settlement of estate of Vicente, he
moved for the partial revocation to exclude the paraphernal properties of
Isabel from inclusion in the estate of Vicente. He cited the affidavit of
Vicente in support of the partial revocation. However, he withdrew the
motion even before the RTC could rule on it. Instead, he filed a Motion for
leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.

Respondents’ opposed the complaint-in-intervention. The RTC granted the

Motion for leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-Intervention.The
RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the respondents and dismissed the
complaint in intervention. The RTC ruled that the intervenor took part and
had knowledge of the extra-judicial settlement of the estate and is therefore
bound thereby.

Petitioner filed MR, however it was denied. He filed a notice of appeal and
paid the appellate court docket fees, initially the RTC denied the notice of
appeal on the ground that it had been filed beyond the reglementary period.
Petitioner filed again MR, the RTC issued order and ruled that the petitioner
had timely filed the notice of appeal but still denied the MR because such
appeal had not perfected for failure to pay the appellate court docket fees.
Hence, petitioner filed a Motion to Set Aside Order, to which he appended
the copies of the official receipts of the payment of the appellate court
docket fees, however, it was denied by the RTC.

CA affirmed the RTC’s Order. Therefore, Petitioner filed a petition for

review under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Respondents seek the denial
of the petition for review by the CA because petitioner did not file a record
on appeal, as mandated under Section 2(a) of the Rules of Court. On the
other hand, petitioner submits that the appeal was from the decision of the
RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention and not “the final
order to judgment rendered in the intestate estate case.” Since the
intervention was not an independent proceeding but only ancillary or
supplemental to the main case, the rule on multiple appeals does not apply
and the filing of a record on appeal is not pre-requisite to the acceptance
and consideration of the appeal by the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing complaint –in-intervention

Ruling:

Yes. Intervention is “a remedy by which a third party, not originally

impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her
or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such
proceeding. If an intervention makes a third party a litigant in the main
proceedings, his pleading-intervention should form part of the main case.
Accordingly, when the petitioner intervened in the proceedings of intestate
estate of Isabel, his complaint-in-intervention, once admitted by the RTC,
became part of the main case, rendering any final disposition thereof
subject to the rules specifically applicable to special proceedings, including
Rule 109 of the Rules of Court, which deals with appeals in special
proceeding.

Section 1 of Rule 41 enunciates the final judgment rule by providing that an

appeal “may be taken from a judgment or final order that completely
disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by
these Rules to be appealable.” While in the context of the final judgment
rule in Section 1 of Rule 109 does not limit the appealable orders and
judgments in special proceedings to the final order or judgment rendered in
the main case, but extends the remedy of appeal to other orders or
dispositions that completely determine a particular matter in the case.

Here, the dismissal of the petitioner’s intervention constituted “a final

determination in the lower court o the rights of the party appealing,” that is,
his right in the paraphernal properties of his deceased sister. As such, it fell
under paragraph (c) of Section 1, of Rule 109 supra because it had the
effect of disallowing his claim against the estate of Vicente, as well as
under paragraph (e) of Section 1, of Rule 109 supra, because it was a final
determination in the trial court of his intervention.

Conformably with either or both paragraphs, the dismissal was the proper
subject of an appeal in due course by virtue of its nature of completely
disposing of his intervention. Pursuant to section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules
of Court, the proper mode of appealing a judgment or final order in special
proceedings is by notice of appeal and record on appeal. Under Section 3
of Rule 41, a party who wants to appeal a judgment or final order in special
proceedings has 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order within
which to perfect an appeal because he will be filing not only a notice of
appeal but also a record on appeal that will require the approval of the trial
court with notice to the adverse party.

Thus, for petitioner the period for perfecting the appeal by record on appeal
was 30 days from notice of the final order dismissing the intervention.
Considering that the petitioner did not submit a record on appeal in
accordance with Section 3 of Rule 41, he did not perfect his appeal of the
judgment dismissing his intervention. As a result, the dismissal became
final and immutable.