rd

3 3-5 December 2021 ı Harvard University

Edited by
Aaron SPEVACK
 ***

Mehmet Fatih

Ādāb al-Baḥth Literature: A New Manual for Critical Thinking�

The subject matter of this presentation is to explore possible ways of re-

1 utilization of Ādāb al-Baḥth literature. One of the most

underappreciated ancillary sciences of Islamic Rational tradition,

Ādāb al-Baḥth (The Protocol of Critical Thinking and Research

Methodology) literature remains mostly unexplored due to the scarcity

of the context for the study of Ādāb and obscure nature of its utilization

in the classical texts. Unlike the logical or the rhetorical terms, Ādāb

terms are mostly omitted for sake of simplicity/practicality and

presumed easily recognizable by the reader. Furthermore, the nature of

modern studies on Ādāb al-Baḥth is generally limited to exploring its

utilization in the classical text. However, a closer inspection shows that

due to its in-depth classifications and extended coverage, Ādāb al-Baḥth

literature can indeed be utilized as a manual for critical thinking.

Starting from its meticulous discussion about the definition,

 including the guidelines about how to avoid redundant discussions,

Ādāb al-Baḥth offers a rich and inspiring framework regarding almost

every theme of critical thinking. It is permissible that via a meticulous

study of Ādāb al-Baḥth literature, a student of rational sciences can

easily build the skills of constructing an indisputable argument,

rebutting a counter-argument, and identifying the main defects of

reasoning processes. I, therefore, argue that Ādāb al-Baḥth should be

considered a practical manual for critical thinking in the modern

philosophical context.

***

2
Hamza Karamali

Representing the Modal Logic of Kalam Using Kripke's

Possible-World Semantics

In the kalam tradition, the contingency of the world is evidence for the

existence of a necessary being. Modern analytic philosophers use Kripke's

possible-world semantics to define a necessary being as a being that

"exists in all possible worlds". This paper will argue that this definition

does not capture the intent of the mutakallimun because it does not

distinguish between the necessary existence of God and the necessary

facts of the contingent universe. It will use that as a point of departure to

explore the extent to which the modal logic of kalam can be represented

using modal predicate logic.

 ***

Nazif Muhtaroglu

What do we mean by "God�" A Kalāmic Approach to the

Meaning of "Allah"

�Allah� is the proper name used for God in the Islamic tradition. Since it is

a proper name (not a generic name), it refers to a single individual being.

But what do we mean exactly when we utter the term �Allah�� There are

two competing approaches in contemporary philosophy that attempt to

clarify our intuitions about the meaning of proper names: (1) the

descriptivist approach, and (2) the direct referenceview. According to the

descriptivist approach,a proper nameis synonymous with a description or a

set of descriptions. Thus, the meaning of proper names is given by

3
descriptions. The direct referenceview; however, objects to using

descriptions as the meaning of proper names. Rather, proper names refer

directly to individual beings. Even if we may use some descriptions in

referring to objects, they serve only to fix the reference, but they are not

synonymous with proper names. In my presentation, I will try to expose

the mutakallimūn�s presuppositions about the meaning of �Allah� by

examining the implicit maxims guiding their rational methodology in

arguing for the truth of religious belief. Although some of their maxims

align with the descriptivist approach, I argue that their view could be

understood more coherently in terms of a modified view of direct

reference.
 ***

Safaruk Chowdhury

Abū al-Mu īn al-Nasafī’s Critique of Various Definitions of Knowledge

in Tabṣirat al-Adilla: A Philosophical Analysis

In this paper, I explore the critique of various definitions of knowledge

( ilm) by the theologian and jurist Abū al-Mu īn Maymūn b.

Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d.508/1114) in his magnum opus on systematic

philosophical theology Tabṣirat al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Dīn. Considered one

of the most esteemed and methodical expositors of the doctrines of Abū

Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944), Nasafī was a highly autonomous

4 thinker, and was also unabashedly a polemicist for the doctrines of the

�teachers� (mashāyikh) of the Central Asian Māturīdīs. In the first chapter

of the Tabṣira, Nasafī sets out the contours of his epistemology that

include discussions on (i) the definition, nature and sources of

knowledge, (ii) his epistemic realism, rejection of epistemic subjectivism

and acceptance of testimonial and historical knowledge, (iii) is direct

criticisms of non-discursive sources of knowledge like inspiration (ilhām)

and (iv) extensive discussion on the nature of belief (īmān), especially

regarding whether or not the belief of a conformist (muqallid) is valid.

The epistemological chapter of the Tabṣira reveals intricate assumptions

and assertions within Māturīdī theology about what kind of knowers we

are, what we can know and what kind of inferential processes and
 resources are available for us to draw on for the project of natural

theology that Nasafī embarks on subsequent to this chapter. This

makes the Tabṣira a highly valuable and significant source for classical

kalām deliberations on epistemological themes. After sketching

Nasafī�s theory of knowledge, I move to the focus of my paper which

is a philosophical analysis of Nasafī�s objections to the various

definitions of knowledge given by his scholastic predecessors from the

Mu tazilīs and Ash arīs as well as contemporaries within his own

theological School until he reaches al-Māturīdī�s definition, which he

argues is ultimately the most accurate. Although in many parts the

Tabṣira is terse, my analysis will involve logical and philosophical

5
reconstruction but will also be descriptive and comparative in

approach.

***

Kenan Tekin (Yalova University)

Beginnings or Principles: Commentaries and Glosses on the Notion

of Mabādi in Ibn Ḥājib�s Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā

In this paper, I look at some debates on the concept of mabādi in the

commentaries and glosses on the prolegomenon of Ibn Ḥājib's

Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, a summa of Islamic legal theory. Ibn Ḥājib

used this word to designate the first chapter of his book. The word

could be understood literally as beginnings or terminologically as

 principles. The latter sense was in reference to its conception in the
Aristotelian theory of science. According to that theory, each science

consists of subject matter, principles, and inquiries. This theory of

science was well received in Islamic intellectual history. Hence, the

nascent Islamic religious sciences including legal theory,were put into the

framework of that theory after the eleventh century. The theory of

science was treated in the books of demonstration, a part of the logical

corpus,up until the turn of thirteenth century. After that

time,however,the core of the theory was either briefly treated in the

concluding section of logic books or inthe commentaries and glosses on

the prolegomena of handbooks in various fields. The set of commentaries

and glosses on Ibn Ḥājib�s Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, provide an example of

6 the latter. These commentaries and glosses particularly debated the

concept of mabādi due to a discrepancy between Ibn Ḥājib�s usage of that

word and its terminological meaning. The paper closely follows the first

and second generation of commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar, and then

looks at glosses of Taftazani and Jurjani on Ījī's commentary.

 ***

Dustin Klinger

Where Did ilm al-waḍ Come From? Aristotelian Logic and Arabic
Literary Criticism: An Attempt at a Genetic Story

The science of imposition ( ilm al-waḍ )—or perhaps better: semantics ,

even though it has little in common with what we understand by that term

today—is a branch of knowledge peculiar to the Arabo-Islamic intellectual

tradition. It seemingly emerged out of the blue to take its place in the

scientific canon in the 8th/14th century and became an integral part of the

madrasa curriculum. For centuries to come it was a primary locus for the

inquiry into the workings of language. Yet since the pioneering work of

Weiss decades ago our understanding of this science has not advanced
7
greatly.1 Where did this new branch of knowledge come from� What was

its purpose�

It is an oft-remarked topos in the scholarship of the Islamicate world that

the Arabic intellectual tradition is particularly obsessed with the ambiguity

of language.2 This phenomenon is usually explained, even for arguably

remote disciplines, by the centrality of the Quranic text as a contained body

of Divine (Arabic) Language that stands in need of exegesis.3 However,
there are a variety of sources that might have spurred interest in ambiguity

and promoted independent reflections on the nature of language. Besides

the Arabic Aristotelian tradition on logic (manṭiq), one such case is the

tradition of classical Arabic literary criticism, which in seeking to establish

aesthetic philosophy of language, paying particular attention to semantics
 and criteria for the evaluation of literary and poetic language engages in

what we today would classify as the phenomenon of linguistic

ambiguity.4 I suggest that a scientific approach to linguistic ambiguity

was the central purpose for the new science ilm al-waḍ , and that—

besides the Quranic text—Aristotelian logic and Arabic literary criticism

were two intellectual traditions from which the need for this new science

arose.

In my paper I attempt to bring to the fore the development and

continuity of scholarly engagement with questions of linguistic

ambiguity from within logical tradition and the aesthetics of literary

criticism. In diachronically—and perforce eclectically—tracing

discussions on paronomasia in the specific cases of two figures of speech,

8
tajnīs (roughly: pun or figura etymologica) and its cousin tawriya

(roughly: double entendre), the aim of this paper is to bring to light the

authors� underlying assumptions about the mechanics of homonymy

(ishtirāk), and thereby about broader questions of semantics that are

much discussed in contemporary philosophy. The analysis of the

linguistic structure of the laf /ma nā dichotomy as it came to be

established by logicians and literary critics as a framework to

conceptualize semantic questions specifically with regard to polysemy

will serve as a stepping-stone for a tentative historical argument about

the genealogical connections not only between classical Arabic literary

criticism and the formation of the distinct sub-disciplines of Rhetoric

(balāgha), ilm al-ma ānī/ ilm albayān/badī, but also to the relatively late
formation of ilm al-waḍ in the 9th/15th century.
 1 Weiss, 1966, 1976, 1985, 1987.
2 See for example, Alexandre & Charney, 1967; Frank, 1978, Bauer, 2015,
Ahmed, 2016.
3 Montgomery, 2009, 46.
4 On this point, Street remarked: �Whereas there is an Arabic term
(manṭiq) that equates to �logic�, there is no such term or phrase for
�philosophy of language�. As it happens, philosophers tried to solve
problems, which are now taken to be the concern of a philosophy of
language, but this they generally did in the midst of either a logic treatise
or a treatise on grammar. […] It is a sad fact of modern scholarship that
those who study the Greek-derived traditions of philosophy of logic in
Arabic are unlikely to have the competence to deal with parallel traditions
within the Islamic sciences, and vice versa”, Street, 2008.

Ahmed, Shahab. (2016). What is Islam? The Importance of Being Islamic.

Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Alexandre, Pierre, & Charney, Jean-Paul. (1967). L' ambivalence dans la
culture arabe. Paris: Éd. Anthropos.
Bauer, Thomas. (2015). Die Kultur der Ambiguität: eine andere
Geschichte des Islams (4. Aufl. ed.). Berlin: Verl. der
Weltreligionen.
Frank, Richard M. (1978). Beings and their attributes: the teaching of the
Basrian School of the Mu'tazila in the classical period. Albany,
9 NY: State Univ. of New York Press.
Montgomery, James E. (2009). Speech and Nature: al-Jāḥi , Kitāb al-Bayān
wa-l-tabyīn , 2.175–207, Part 2. Middle Eastern Literatures, 12(1),
1-25.
Street, Tony. (2008). Arabic and Islamic Philosophy of Language and
Logic. In (Zalta, N. ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
Weiss, Bernard G. (1966). Language in Orthodox Muslim Thought: a
Study of �waḍ al-lugha� and Its Development. (PhD), Princeton
University, unpublished.
———. (1976). A Theory of the Parts of Speech in Arabic (Noun, Verb
and Particle): a Study in ilm al-waḍ . Arabica, 23(1), 23-36.
———. (1985). Subject and Predicate in the Thinking of the Arabic
Philologists. Journal of the American Oriental Society, 105(4),
605-622. doi:10.2307/602723
———. (1987). Ilm al-waḍ : An Introductory Account of a Later Muslim
Philological Science. Arabica, 34(3), 339-356.
 ***

Jaleel Fotovat-Ahmadi

Mulla Sadra, True Felicity, and the Intellect

Perhaps most importantly in Mulla Sadra’s organically unified philosophical

system is the pursuit of happiness, or felicity, as both a fundamental aspect

and the ultimate aim of his work. William Chittick’s translation of Mulla

Sadra’s The Elixir of the Gnostics, provides us with Mulla Sadra’s take on

true felicity, its source, and how it can be obtained. Seyyed Hossein Nasr

briefly discusses Mulla Sadra’s account of happiness in his “Happiness and

the Attainment of Happiness: an Islamic Perspective.” These writings show

10 that much like the other aspects of his philosophy, Mulla Sadra’s view of

felicity is very intellect-dependent. Given that Mulla Sadra’s most

prominent work, The Four Journeys, is not yet available entirely in English,

the relevant primary or secondary literature lacks extensive work on Mulla

Sadra’s account of felicity. In this paper, I wish to address this gap in the

secondary literature: that is, I look to highlight the powers of the intellect in
order to shed further light on Mulla Sadra’s intellect-based account of

felicity. First, I examine what Mulla Sadra writes about true felicity—

understood to be associated with the teleological end of any determined

thing. Mulla Sadra holds that we (in our constant state of motion) should

move from sense-based pleasure to the happiness associated with the

intellect, and finally to the ultimate happiness which is the “virtuous soul’s

meeting with God.” This highlights the body-soul distinction for Mulla
 Sadra, in which the purpose of the soul is to reach true felicity through an

intellective process of obtaining knowledge, and the body is designed to be

instrumentally valuable. Then, I provide translations of some passages in The Four

Journeys that demonstrate Mulla Sadra’s understanding of the powers of the

intellect. In doing so, I show that, for Mulla Sadra, we need not obtain knowledge
merely for the sake of obtaining knowledge. Rather, we need to obtain the
knowledge necessary for the proper use of our intellect. That is, we need to obtain
knowledge with the aim of being virtuous and abstaining from evil. Mulla Sadra
maintains it is through this means that humans can perfect their knowledge, as a
way of perfecting themselves overall. Insofar as we are properly exercising our
intellect by obtaining knowledge, then we are nearing ourselves to God. Mulla Sadra

contends it is through approaching God that we not only come to know ourselves,
but also approach perfection. Since true felicity is the “complete perfection,” the
11 means to pursue it would be to eliminate all possible impairments (ignorance) by

exercising perfection (gaining knowledge) and thus increasing certainty in the

knowledge of God. Ultimately, by doing this, we can “return to” or form a union
with God; it is when we do this, that we can attain true felicity.

***

Walter Edward Young

Juristic Jadal’s New-Old Fallacies and How to Distill Them:

An Untapped Treasury of Forms for Modern Critical
Argumentation Theory

The detailed dialectic (jadal) of premodern Muslim jurists offers a tantalizing

treasure trove of argument types, culled from rigorous analyses and centuries
of intense debates. This premodern argumentative wealth—replete with

insights, novel forms, and, on occasion, solutions to ongoing problems—

 should be of profound interest to modern theorists of critical argumentation.

One particularly fruitful domain of contribution is in the identification and

rectification of fallacies. Although Muslim jurists, in the main, did not occupy

themselves with long lists of fallacies (mughālaṭāt), they did produce

systematic hierarchies of dialectical justifications (istidlālāt), accompanied by

meticulously detailed sets of objections (iʿtirāḍāt) and responses (ajwiba).

These, I will argue, provide the rich material from which a broad range of

fallacies and solutions can be distilled and added to the world catalogue of

erroneous reasoning and illegitimate moves.

In fact this talk begins with the premise that credible, dialectical

objections relate to fallacies in that they are accusations of having committed

one. The simple aim here is to demonstrate how prescribed objections and
12
responses of medieval Islamic jadal can yield up distinct, “new-old” fallacy

types and solutions. “Old” in that the theories selected for this demonstration

date to the 11th century CE, but “new” in that none of the derived fallacies

and solutions appear, to my knowledge, in any modern compendia of fallacies

or critical argumentation texts.

As an experiment preliminary to a much larger endeavor, the subject

material for this talk has been hastily (if not randomly) selected from only

three treatises by two authors—namely, the Ma ūna fī l-jadal and Sharḥ al-

Luma of the Shāfi ī Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE), and the Minhāj fī

Tartīb al-Ḥijāj of the Mālikī Abū alWalīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). This is a very

limited sample indeed, considering the scores of relevant dialectical theory

works, but even so the potential contribution of these three texts is

exceedingly rich, and, for our purposes, illustrative.
 Following a crash-course in our authors� hierarchies of sources for

deriving law, the talk will proceed to a selection of objections and responses

drawn from the full evidentiary spectrum. Fallacies and solutions will be

distilled from these, and provided tentative names. We will then dwell longer

on a particular category of qiyāsoriented objection called kasr, or �breaking,�

considering the best way to assess such �fallacies in action.� With this

illustrative bundle of new-old fallacy types, relatively easily retrieved, the talk

will conclude with a tentative typology for categorizing distilled fallacies

based on who errs, where in the flow of dialectic they do, and whether or not

they can defend or rescue their move.

13 ***

Ashraf Ponnchethil

Function of ‘Ilm al-jadal wal-khilāf (Dielectics) in Uṣūli Discourses; Tāj

al-Subki’s Jam al-jawāmi is delineated

The significance of �Ilm al-jadal wal-khilāf (Dialectics) in Islamic scholastic

tradition in general, and in Sunnī legal tradition in particular, cannot be

overlooked. In Islamic intellectual circles the dialectic theories are discussed

under the terms of munā ara (Dialectical investigation), baḥth (Dialectical

inquiry), khilāf (Disagreement), and jadal (Disputation). In between Hijri

sixth and eighth centuries �Ilm al-jadal wal-khilāf was systematized in to a

dialectical theory infusing the theorie of logic, and it moved into question of

Istidlāl. Jam al-jawāmi of Tāj al-Dīn al-Subki� is one of the widely accepted
 works in past and present scholarly discourses within the field of Uṣūl al-

Fiqh irrespective of Madhāhib. The text became popular since it discusses all

issues of Uṣūl al-fiqh along with other topics in a logical way by which the

reader can examine and better understand the historic development of

Muslim jurists� justifications and critiques. This paper will discuss the

function and form of genre of �Ilm al-jadal wal-khilāf (juristic dialectics) in

Uṣūli discourses with an elaboration on dialectical juristic argumentation

theories which are widely used in Jam al-jawāmi of Taj al-Subki.

***

14 Nuruddin Al Akbar

Positioning Islamic Sciences as Instrumental Sciences: Study of the

thoughts of Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi

This study attempts to position Islamic science as one of the instrumental

sciences in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This study is essential

considering that there is an impression that the study of Islamic

philosophy touches only on the discussion of metaphysics and theological

issues but forgets the discussion of physics. The study of physics is considered

not the realm of Islamic philosophy but becomes the "right" of a separate

discipline known as modern science. Whereas in medieval Islamic

civilization, we can easily find Muslim philosophers in the past such as Ibn

Sina, ar-Razi, Nasir al-Din Tusi, Ibn-Nafis, and Ibn Tufayl, who were also

great scientists. This separation between metaphysics and physics also gives
 the impression of Islamic philosophy as a philosophy that is not grounded

and only dwells on speculative matters. This study attempts to reconnect

the metaphysical tradition,Islamic philosophy's "traditional study"with

physics. This study seeks to examine Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi's thoughts.

Ibn Rushd represents the peripatetic tradition in the medieval era,while

Said Nursi represents the Irfani(Sufism/Gnosis) tradition in the early

modern century. This study argues that a common thread connects the

thoughts of the two figures regarding a distinctive methodology in building

Islamic science,so it is crucial to study it simultaneously. This study places

Ibn Rushd as a vital philosopher who provides the theological

justification for the development of Islamic science. For Ibn Rushd,as the

science of ushul fiqh,which is positioned as an instrumental science to

15
understand Islamic law in the Quran and hadith, Islamic science is the

instrument needed to understand the book of the Universe (proof of God's

masterpiece). For Ibn Rushd, the command to meditate and contemplate the

Universe is a commandment of the Quran. So, formulating Islamic science as

an instrument to ensure this Quranic commandment can be realized is

also mandatory. Concerning the connection between the study of physics

and metaphysics in Islamic science, it is interestingly explained by Ibn

Rushd that the function of science is to provide knowledge about entities by

their causes. At the same time,philosophy offers knowledge about hidden

causes. In other words, Ibn Rushd believes that our in-depth understanding

of physical entities will give us knowledge about unseen entities (in this

case,God and His attributes).If Ibn Rushd justifies the existence of Islamic

science, this study argues that Said Nursi was a philosopher who tried to
 reconnect the metaphysic with physics in science. In his time, science

experienced a reduction due to the influence of positivism,which rejected the

discussion of metaphysics. For Nursi, materialism as a methodology is an

attack on science because science should reveal what is in nature, not

"manipulate" data to conform to the will of materialism.

***

Moiz Hasan

The Forging of Realism in Post-classical Islam: Jurjānī against the

Skeptics

Considered as one of the most influential of the late Asharite textbooks, the

Mawāqif fī ilm alkalām of al-Ījī (d. 1355), together with its indispensable
16
commentary by al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), remained relatively unknown among
historians of Islamic science until recently. In a seminal article written more

than twenty-five years ago, the Harvard historian of science, A. I. Sabra, drew

attention to its relevance as an important source for the study of Islamic

science and philosophy in the postclassical period. In particular, he brought

to light two interesting passages which offer strikingly opposing views of the

mathematical astronomy of the time. In the first, Ījī offered a seemingly

skeptical characterization of astronomical models, arguing that the orbs are

�mere imaginings� and �more tenuous than a spider�s web.� He held that

since the astronomers use mathematical constructions without ascribing any

reality to it, there is no need for one to feel religiously insecure due to their

conclusions. Ījī�s seemingly �instrumentalist� view of astronomy was met

with a forceful rejoinder by Jurjānī, who countered that the astronomical

 models, despite having no existence in the world, are nonetheless “imagined

correctly in accordance with the things themselves” and are not like “ruby

mountains” or “ghoul’s fangs.”

Two subsequent articles that discuss these passages have viewed

Jurjānī �s response as evidence of the epistemological confidence of some

astronomersin their discipline providing a correct picture of the world as

well as insight into God�s creation. But, perhaps because so little is known

about Jurjānī�s intellectual output since it is mostly in the form of

commentaries and glosses that are still to be critically evaluated, the task to

understand the passages from within his larger context has received little

attention among historians or philosophers.

In this paper, I aim to reconstruct, assess, and contextualize the

17 philosophical arguments that Jurjānī deploys against Ījī, thereby extending

previous discussions. My larger goal is to situate Jurjānī�s remarks within his

broader understanding of the mathematical sciences, gleaned from his own

philosophical-theological works. I show that in addition to his response

against Ījī, he offers another significant defense of the mathematical sciences

against a skepticism evinced by an Avicennan philosopher – a defense

which, to my knowledge, has not received attention. I argue that it is

ultimately Jurjānī�s distinctive vision of truth and reality that separates him

from those skeptical of mathematics. It is precisely this vision that provides

the crucial context for his more positive conception of the mathematical

sciences, the status of mathematical objects, and the epistemological

confidence in its conclusions.

All individuals to the discussion agreed that mathematical notions

 are conjectural and abstract. Unlike the skeptics, Jurjānī, however, possesses
and employs the conceptual wherewithal and analysis to demonstrate that

they are nonetheless true and real. The interest of the arguments lies in the

epistemic and ontological theses Jurjānī formulates marking a radical break

from the traditional forms of realism.

***

Mahmood Zeraatpisheh

The Development of the Conception of Predication in

the Islamic World

It is known in the Islamic philosophy that the subject of philosophy is

18 �existents�. By this it is meant external existence. This is why sometimes

they use the word a�yān instead. But the problem is that we see them

discussing mental entities, like �ilm (knowledge), too, classifying it under

quality as one of their ten cosmological categories. Completely aware of this

problem some Islamic thinkers declare that �ilm is an external existence

since it occurs in the mind which is itself a mental existent. Here I want to

explain how this view could, and indeed did, affect Islamic philosophers�

conception of the logical notion of predication. Natural propositions are

born in this context and considerations of this kind has led to the emergence

of a new predication named essential primary predication, which in turn

leads to a much more complex conception of the predication in a late

Islamic philosopher like Mullā Ṣadrā.

 ***

Muhammad Shafeeq Vayalpeediyekka

Epistemology as a Primary Tool of Investigation: The Kitābu�l-

Uqūl Traditin in Indian Islamic Philosophy after Mollā Mahmūd
Juānpūrī.

Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī(1606-1651) is believed as the most prolific Muslim

Philosopher from Indian Subcontinent since the emergence of Mughal

Empire in India. As a reformer in Ptolemy�s Moon Spot Theory and Mīr

Dāmad�s philosophical doctrines,Juānpūrī�s philosophical work entitled as

�Shamsu�l-Bāzigha, was seemed the fundamental source of 17thto 21st

Centuries�Indian Islamic Philosophy. In Scholastic Theology, Mollā

Mahmūd Juānpūrī was a follower of Maturidite School of theology and

19 one of his rarest manuscripts produced in theology, which I found last

year during my research in the manuscript collection of Dāru�l-Ulūm Library

Deoband, was a pure and independent scholium in the classification of

knowledge and the theoretical explanation of epistemology and wisdom.

After Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī, the independent Islamic Philosophical

works written in India, have given much more priority to

epistemological discussions along with the independent Urdu, Arabic

and Persian epistles prepared about the wisdom and knowledge regarding

the ancient Indian-Vedic thoughts and philosophy. Known as �Kithābu�l-

Uqūl Tradition�, most ofthe works were also an investigative instrument in

finding the obscure human thinking process, observation of different human

capabilities and they could also elaborate the human thinking capacity from

other living beings. More inclusively, even the traditional definitions of

epistemology from both Islamic theology and philosophy were, most

 probably, dependable in all epistemological works, the texts of Mollā

Mahmūd Juānpūrī and the generations came after him introduced the new
methodologies in epistemological discussions and its classifications. The

works of Deoband scholars and other Muslim philosophers including

Ashraf AliTānewī, Rashīd Aḥmed Gangōhī, Muḥammed Qāsim Nānewtewī,

H̱alīl Aḥmed Ambetewī es-Sehārenpūrī, Muḥammed Anwar Shāh el-

Kashmīrī, Shabbīr Aḥmad Osmānī, Ḥāfiz Muḥammad Ayyūb ed-Dehlewī,

Sūfi Nazir Aḥmad Kashmīrī, Maulwī Maḥmūd Ali, Muḥammad Idrīs

Kāndhelewī, Muḥibb Aḥmed Badāyūnī, Muḥammad Muḥibbullah,

Ḥakim Najību Rahmān, Maulawī Karīmuddīn, Hojā Kamāludhīn,

Muḥammad Bādusha Lucknowī, Nawāb Gulam Aḥmad, Ḥakim Sayyid Ali,

Maulawī Anwārullah H̱ān, Muḥammad Anwārullah and Maulawī

20
Muḥammad Ali, were considered as the highly authoritative in epistemology

and human [Link] traditional classification of Islamic epistemology

was widely seen in Indian scholars annotations and super commentaries

upon the classical Islamic Philosophical texts. Among these, there are

plenty of works on the Shamsu l-Bāzigha of Mollā Mahmūd

Juānpūrīand other Mughal Muslim Philosophers. Kithābu l-Aql/ Uqūl

traditionwas followed in 18thCentury Indian Urdu philosophical texts

along with Persian works, and they were later known as the Kithāb-e

Dānish . Contextually, it is worth to be noted thateven Indian

philosophers, who are mighty Scholastic theologians simultaneously,

pedagogically trained in Iranian Islamic Philosophical schools, they were

somehow wholly or partially differentiated from Iranian influx of thoughts

in epistemology and human wisdom. Some of Indian Muslim philosophers

 academically refuted the arguments of both traditional Avicennian

Peripatetic/Mashāī and Farabian Noe Platonist methodologies in

epistemology. Particularly, the epistles written by Muḥammed Anwar Shāh

el-Kashmīrīin Kalam cosmology, was also a pure example in epistemology in

means of its contents and methodology.

* **

Ibrahim Safri

The use of logic in Maghribī tradition in the early

modern period

Primary, Aristotle thought that logic is not a formal science but only an

instrument used in every science. In this paper, I will try to distinguish

21 among logic as a formal science and as an instrument in North Africa

(Maghribī tradition). Some scholars in this side mentioned in the preamble

of their works that logic is only an instrument of a number of sciences with

an emphasis on philosophical theology, however, they cited some matters

which are purely for logic and excluded in e.g., theology, metaphysics, and

so on. Moreover, it seems an impact from the permissibility of logic to use it

as an instrumental science, because the instrument excludes several matters

related to al-Sharī�a as al-Ghazālī�s (d.1111) view. In the case of al-Sanūsī

(d.1489) who confirmed using logic as an instrumental science �ilm al-āla�,

he wrote his Mukhtaṣar and its commentary, believing that logical rules are

just rational rules as instruments – not formal science – to other sciences,

especially philosophical and rational theology. In other words, it provided

the most general truths upon which other truths are based which is

obviously in their theological works. On contrarily, some commentators on

 alSanūsī�s compendium added several matters beyond what al-Sanūsī was

limited, so how can we explain that? It appears two way to interpret this
methodology. It is either instrumental science was in the same value of

major science, or they have a specific definition of instrumental science.

In this study, I will start from 13th century with al-Kātibī (d.1284) who is

considered a turning point in the development of Arabic logic, especially

by interpreting additional matters in his works, for reaching to the history

of logic as an instrumental science in Islamic tradition with a focus on

latter Maghribī tradition since the early modern age (1600-1800) was
known by several works in logic.

***
22
Lilian Abou-Tabickh

What Does Ibn Khaldūn Mean by the Term Mādda� On

Human Association and Political-Economic Organization

In this presentation I offer a new interpretation of the term

mādda (lit. matter) in al-Muqaddima by Ibn Khaldūn based on his

philosophy of language, rhetorical style, and historical method. I argue

that in the context of Ilm al-Umrān, Ibn Khaldūn does not use the term

�matter� in a philosophical-metaphysical sense of the four causes of

natural philosophy as claimed in the scholarly literature, but in an

economic sense to mean money. The examination of the different textual

circumstances shows that in his study of human association and political-

economic organization, Ibn Khaldūn constructs his rational arguments

using worldly and demonstrative reasons, one of which is money. Money

is one of the two foundations of the polity.

 First, I present Ibn Khaldūn's complete argument on the necessity of human

association and show how he only appears to be restating the philosophers'

account on the necessity of political organization. Next, I show that the core

of Ibn Khaldūn's disagreement with the philosophers is their philosophical

concept of the �Intellects� and their system of emanation. These differences

in their systems are reflected in their understanding of the human intellect

and the process of knowledge acquisition, which underlie their arguments

about the legitimate ruler and the knowledge required for the organisation of

society. In the third part, I show how Ibn Khaldūn's critique of the

philosophers' concept of �Intellects� dissociates him from their philosophical

system and reveals his particular understanding of the universe. His

23 statement that the questions that fall within the scope of Aristotle's natural

philosophy are irrelevant to his intellectual project, paves the way toward

exploring the meaning of the term �matter�. Most importantly, this part

shows that in the context of Ilm al-Umrān, Ibn Khaldūn uses the term

�matter� to mean money. The significance of this reading is that it has the

capacity to show the role that choice and agency play in his political

philosophy, largely overlooked in the scholarly literature, and promises to

offer an alternative view to the popular interpretation of what's been termed

as Ibn Khaldūn's cyclical concept of royal authority and history.

This interpretation is guided by the way Ibn Khaldūn uses the

language to communicate his ideas. Therefore, unlike preeminent

interpreters of Al-Muqaddima, it does not interpret the text using categories

established in realism, dialectical materialism, historical anthropology, or
 world-systems theory, nor does it situate his thought within ancient Greek

philosophy, Islamic theology, or modern sociology. To support their decision

to situate Ibn Khaldūn in a particular intellectual tradition, those scholars rely

on specific terms and statements in the text, which they associate with those

intellectual schools, such as �goal�, �matter�, �form�, �there is no agent but

God�, and �the conditions of people depend on their ways of making a living�.

Instead, I attempt to understand the particular meaning that he gives to the

term mādda by examining the different textual and contextual circumstances.

***

Mukhtar Ali
24 Philosophical Sufism: The Mutually
Providential Relationship between Philosophy
and Mysticism
Having just published my latest book, Philosophical Sufism: An

Introduction to the School of Ibn al-ʿArabī, this paper telescopes my

research on the mutually providential relationship between philosophy and

mysticism. While philosophy uses deductive reasoning (burhān)to discover

the fundamental nature of existence and Sufism relies on experiential

knowledge (ʿirfān), it was not until the school of Ibn al-ʿArabī that

philosophy and Sufism converged into a single framework, elaborating

spiritual doctrines in precise philosophical language. In philosophical

Sufism, philosophy is the instrument of mysticism and not its antithesis;

the aim of both is to ultimately comprehend reality.I ndependently though,

philosophy cannot attain ultimate realities, but it can serve as the sieve
 through which diverse and arcane mystical experience is demonstrated and

verified. Even if mysticism relies on unveilings (mukāshifāt) to attain

true knowledge, philosophy along with other �instrumental sciences�

strengthen the intellect, enabling it to express the verities of the heart. Thus,

it is said that the intellect is the �tongue� of the heart, and that faculty whose

language is reason and deduction.

25