Who Is Aristotle's Citizen?

Author(s): Curtis Johnson

Source: Phronesis , 1984, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1984), pp. 73-90
Published by: Brill

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 Who is Aristotle's Citizen?
CURTIS JOHNSON

Introduction: The Nature of the Problem

When Aristotle confronted the task of defining "citizen" at the beginning

of Book III of the Politics, the difficulties in doing so adequately must have
seemed formidable. There was, first, the simple fact of constitutional
diversity: states differ, and so too, therefore, do citizens in those states.'
Further, there was diversity of usage: people do not always agree who is to
be called a citizen.2 Then there are those anomalous cases of citizens who
acquire or lose the title of citizenship in an "exceptional manner" such as
citizens by adoption, or citizens who have been disfranchised.3 Anomalous
also are those states in which either people not admitted into a share of
office are nevertheless called citizens (the "subject citizen" of 1278a 16-17);
or people who, while they do have access to certain offices, still are denied
the title of citizen, as was the case, for example, of some of the officeholders
at Marseilles (1321a3l).4 Finally there is a fundamental problem concern-
ing what is right or just: regardless of who citizens are in any particular
case, to whom injustice should the title of citizenship be given? Should it be
given to all who are alike and equal, and therefore to the multitude in most
states because in most states the people are equal in nature;5 or should it be
reserved to the few who truly deserve to rule permanently because of their
superior virtue?6
All of these factors present difficulties to the philosopher because the
aim of defining is to find a common, unchanging essence in a world of
enormous diversity. For Aristotle, moreover, since the essence of an object
is to be found within the actual and existent, a good definition is not free to
ignore the variation and diversity of the world; it must be so cast as to fit
every case yet without itself becoming varied and diverse. A definition, in
other words, must itself be one and yet be capable of covering many
different and dissimilar cases. It must, further, be "correct". While it
cannot ignore common usage, which varies from one state to another, it
must nevertheless find whatever is best and universal in the way the title is
used and conferred.7
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 Who, then, is Aristotle's citizen? Does Aristotle succeed in overcoming
the difficulties and providing a definition of citizenship that is everything
that it should be? In particular, does his definition succeed, as he evidently
believed it should, in identifying that "common nature" (to koinon)8 which
enables it to describe who citizens are in all states alike? We believe that it
comes close to realizing this goal, but falls a little short. The nature of the
case, and particularly the different practices of different city-states in
Greece, made complete success impossible.9 We also believe that Aristotle
understood this problem, and accordingly devoted the first five chapters of
Book III to showing the relation of anomalous cases to his own perfected
definition. To understand Aristotle's definition of citizen, therefore, and to
see how he arrived at it, is at the same time to illuminate a number of
obscurities in Book III.

Part I: The Definition of Citizenship

First, let it be observed that Aristotle sets out to define the citizen "in the
complete sense" (ton haplos politen: 1275al9), that is, he who lacks no
qualification for sharing fully in all of the entitlements of citizenship. By
thus limiting the scope of his enquiry Aristotle avoids having to deal with a
number of difficult cases: those who are too young to share in citizenship,
those who are too old, and citizens who have been exiled or disfranchised
either rightly or wrongly (1275al5ff). He thereby is able to get directly at
the question of who a citizen is "pure and simple". But even by excluding
the difficult cases mentioned above, the task is still not free of problems.
Aristotle has still to propose, and then reject, two preliminary definitions
before arriving at the citizen "in the complete sense".
There are three definitions of citizen in Book III, chapter 1. The first is
(III, 1,6 1275a23-24): "a man who shares in the administration of justice
and in the holding of office" (metechein kriseos kai arches). The second is
(III, 1.7-8 1275a33): "those who share in indeterminate office" (politas tous
houto [aoristos arche] metechontas); by "indeterminate office" Aristotle
means, specifically, the offices of judge in the courts and member of the
assembly. The third, final definition is (III, 1.12 1275bl9-20): "he who
enjoys the right of sharing in deliberative and judicial office" (arches
bouleutikes kai kritikPs).10 These three definitions are the core of the
chapter: everything else in it is an attempt to show why each of the earlier
definitions is inadequate. Let us examine Aristotle's account of these in-
adequacies.

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Inadequacy of the First Definition

The first definition had defined the citizen as one who shares in the
administration of justice and holding of office. But in every state there are
different kinds of offices.11 Citizenship requires not participation in all
kinds of offices, but only in certain particular kinds. Those certain kinds,
for want of a better term, Aristotle decides to call "indeterminate office"
(aoristos arche). Hence, the first revised definition of citizen is "one who
shares in indeterminate office".
This distinction between "offices" (archai) on the one hand, and "in-
determinate offices" on the other, is of some importance to understanding
the development of Aristotle's thought in this chapter. It is important
especially to remember that, although he is not here writing a history of
Greek politics, his distinctions are nevertheless often drawn from con-
temporary practice. Here in particular Aristotle is thinking of typical Greek
democracies, as he himself says later.12 In democracies it was possible to
identify, broadly speaking, two kinds of offices. On the one hand were
offices properly so-called, the various magistracies to which the name arche
was normally applied.13 On the other hand were the large popular bodies,
the public juries and the public assemblies characteristic of democracies.
Aristotle's aim, in revising his first definition, is to provide an easy means of
distinguishing between these two kinds of offices. He wished to do this
because he wished to show in his definition that citizenship (in demo-
cracies) depended not upon occupying (or being entitled to occupy) a
magistracy but only upon occupying any type of office, including the office
of assemblyman or juryman.
The difficulty confronting him at this point, then, was how easily and
efficiently to distinguish verbally between magistracies and the large
public bodies. This task was more difficult than it may at first appear, since
magistracies were not always obviously different from these bodies. Both
types of official could be elected by vote or by sortition.'4 Both carried out
many of the same political duties, including deliberation and judging.15
Nor were the functions of the magistrates necessarily more important than
those of the other bodies, a point Aristotle makes expressly (Pol.
1275a29ff). In addition, magistracies could, like the larger public bodies, be
composite bodies, consisting of many citizens16 (although often they would
obviously be held by individual citizens). And for many (though not all) of
the magistracies the requirements for eligibility would be identical to the
requirements for eligibility for the popular bodies.17 So the question for
Aristotle was, on what basis were the two types to be distinguished.

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 Two routes lay open. The first was to attempt to distinguish magistracies
from other bodies on the basis of the principle of "specialization", magis-
tracies being, in general, individually limited to "the conscientious perfor-
mance of a set task", with popular bodies, by contrast, having wider scope
and more diverse duties.'8 This division, however, was imperfect; the
judicial function in particular, even in democracies, had by Aristotle's day
become as specialized as most of the magistracies;'9 and conversely, many
of the magistracies (such as the council) had duties as broad and diverse as
those of the assemblies (see note 15). The other principle of division was
more promising: limitation in tenure for membership. In democracies
especially, the magistracies were strictly limited in tenure, both with respect
to the length of terms (commonly one year, but as short as one day in the
case of the Athenian council president);20 and with respect to the number
of times an office could be held (usually only once, although sometimes
twice - not consecutively - and almost never more than twice).21
Such restrictions in point of tenure did not exist for membership in the
large popular bodies, the assemblies and juries. In these bodies citizens
could sit continuously, or at least as often as they were elected or chosen.
And membership for one term did not, as a rule, disqualify one for
membership a second, third, or fourth term.22 That is, while one could hold
a magistracy only once, or, if twice, only after an interval had elapsed, one
could hold membership on juries and assemblies as long as one continued
to be selected; there was for the latter no time restriction.
The difference between the two types of offices thus for Aristotle hinged
principally, at least to this stage of his argument, on the tenure
qualification. This would undoubtedly have been quite obvious to a Greek
citizen living in a large democratic state. Anyone could submit candidacy
for jury duty at any time, and the payment for service (as at Athens)
ensured that the poorer citizens frequently would do so. But candidacy for
the magistracies would have been limited to those only who had not held
those offices previously.23 Once one had served his term in office for the
specified length of time, he would forfeit his eligibility for that office, either
permanently or for some interval. Thus, while strictly speaking all offices -
juries, assemblies, and magistracies - were of limited tenure, the latter
were so in a particular sense. The juries and assemblies, whether convened
on a regular basis or only as the need demanded, and no matter how they
were constituted or what their length of tenure, both alike were open to all
citizens regardless of whether or not they had already served. The magis-
tracies, on the other hand, were more like those modern elective offices
which have fixed tenures. They were held for regular fixed lengths of time,

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after which those who held them became ineligible for subsequent tenure
of them. It was this distinction which led Aristotle to discriminate in his
first revised definition of citizenship between "offlces" on the one hand,
whose tenure was fixed in the way described, and "unlimited offices",
membership in which was not restricted in this way.
To this point, then, Aristotle has attempted to define citizenship in
democracies on the basis of holding office: in brief, citizens are those who
hold office. But in democracies there are many offices, and it would be a
mistake to think that one must hold, or be qualified to hold, all of these
offices to qualify as a citizen. For if this were true, many people would fail
to qualify as citizens because of their ineligibility for the magistracies, or at
least for some of them. But many of these same people would be eligible for
the offices of assemblyman orjuryman, and the definition of citizen should
recognize that fact, for they too count as citizens. In other words, to count
as a citizen in democracies one need not hold or be eligible for the magis-
tracies (although to hold such offices obviously would not disqualify one as
a citizen); one need only serve (or be eligible to serve) as assemblyman or
juryman. To make this point clear, however, a distinction was needed
between offices of the latter sort and magistracies. Such a distinction
Aristotle found in the idea of "unrestricted (in point of tenure) office"
(aoristos arche), jurymen and assemblymen being officials of this sort.
Citizenship in democracy, accordingly, means holding (or eligibility to
hold) unrestricted office.24

Inadequacy of the Second Definition

So much for the first revised definition. But we learn in the next section of
the chapter (1275a 34-1275b 22) that this definition too is open to criticism.
In particular, it is applicable only to democracies.25 But constitutions
differ; and one who may be a citizen under one form, such as democracy,
may not be a citizen under another form, such as oligarchy. What is
needed, therefore, is a definition of citizen which is applicable to all forms
of constitution alike.26
The problem, as Aristotle states it, is this: public juries and popular
assemblies are regular features of democracies. But these institutions are
not present everywhere; they are absent particularly in non-democratic
states. In some states, Aristotle says, there are no popular assemblies, but
only meetings specially summoned; the decision of cases is remitted to
special bodies. Sparta is an illustration: there, the Ephors, the Council of
Elders, or some other magistracy (arche) handles most decisions.27 Much

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the same is true of Carthage.28 But if citizenship is defined, as Aristotle had
already claimed, in terms of membership in indeterminate office (i.e.
membership in public juries and assemblies), then it would necessarily
follow that there are no citizens in states like Sparta and Carthage, where
these large popular bodies are not found. This position, obviously, is
untenable. There are citizens in every state, regardless of whether one finds
indeterminate offices in them. The definition advanced earlier applies
particularly to democracies, where indeterminate offices are common.
What is now needed is a broader definition which incorporates citizens of
democracies and non-democracies alike.
Aristotle now finds himself in an interesting dilemma. In order to
describe citizens in non-democracies in such a way as to include all
"holders of office" and no one else, he would seem to be forced to abandon
the idea of "unlimited office", the democratic definition. The reason for
this is simply that "unlimited offices", viz. jurymen and assemblymen, are
not always found in non-democracies. But if a retreat from the democratic
definition is necessary, a retreat to where? If he returns to the idea of "office
holder" pure and simple, he runs the risk of excluding from his definition
those people in democracies who, while ineligible for offlices properly
so-called (the magistracies),29 could still serve as jurors or assemblymen.
But precisely to include this group as citizens was the whole point of the
first revised definition. So, it seems, whether he chooses to define citizens as
"holders of office" or "holders of indeterminate office", Aristotle will
exclude from citizenship some people in some states who nevertheless
ought to be called citizens.
Aristotle eschews the obvious way out of this dilemma, which would
have been to define citizens as those who share in offices of either a limited
or an unlimited tenure.30 We shall shortly speculate as to why this is so.
Instead, he moves to a new position altogether, one scarcely anticipated in
his previous discussion. To find a truly comprehensive definition he now
introduces the idea of "an official determined (or limited) by his sphere of
authority".3' Different officials, he now suggests, have different spheres of
authority. Magistrates (in all states) handle a range of affairs, jurors
typically deal with others, and assemblymen (where they are found) are
responsible for still others. The relevant question, thus, in determining the
nature of citizenship, is not essentially one of the actual offices held by
citizens (since offices vary from state to state; in some non-democracies
there are no popular juries or assemblies at all). Rather, what counts for
citizenship is the sphere of authority occupied by office-holders. Certain
kinds of authority are more important than others in determining citizen

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status. In particular, citizens are those who exercise authority in "deliber-
ation" and in "judging".32 In democracies authority of this sort would be
exercised by "unlimited officials", that is, by assemblymen and jurymen.
But in non-democracies, where these officials are sometimes not found,
this kind of authority would often be exercised by other officials (archai),
such as specially convened councils, or the Ephors at Sparta, or some other
body.33 It does not really matter which kind of official or officials dis-
charges the authority; what matters is the type of authority being dis-
charged. And for citizenship it is the deliberative and judicial authority
that is decisive. So, Aristotle concludes, "what constitutes a citizen is
therefore clear from these considerations: we now say that one who shares
in deliberative and judicial authority is a citizen of the state in which he
holds that authority" (1 275b 12-20).
This definition is obviously superior to the earlier ones, for it succeeds, as
they do not, in making citizenship dependent upon a universal element in
constitutions, a certain kind of authority rather than a certain kind of
office. For deliberation and judging are found everywhere, whereas
assemblies, juries, and other particular political bodies are not. Thus, it
does not matter (for citizenship) if one does not sit on a jury court or
participate in an assembly; there are states, i.e. non-democracies, where to
do so is impossible in any case, since these offices do not even exist. But it
does matter whether one judges and deliberates, for these functions occur
in every state. And these are the functions that make one a citizen "in the
complete sense".
One may well wonder why Aristotle opted to define citizenship in terms
of the possession of a certain kind of authority, rather than to fasten upon
the seemingly simpler expedient of making it depend upon the possession
of office of either unlimited or limited tenure. I believe two considerations
may have influenced his choice here, one of a narrow, technical nature, the
other of a broader, more philosophical kind. The first, technical reason has
to do with his intention in employing the phrase "unlimited office" in the
first place. One may recall that he invoked this term not because of the
intrinsic importance of certain kinds of tenure qualifications for holding
certain types of office. Instead he invoked it only as a kind of convenient
shorthand: what the office ofjuror and assemblyman happened to have in
common (distinguishing them from magistracies) was the absence of ten-
ure qualifications. But this was merely a convenient circumstance; it
permitted one easily to fasten a common title to both offices on the basis of
a shared characteristic. The characteristic itself, however, i.e. the absence of
a tenure qualification, was not the important point. The important point

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was the offices themselves. And the offices themselves were important not
because there were no tenure restrictions, but because of the duties per-
formed by them, viz. deliberating and judging (as we learn later).34 Thus,
when Aristotle turned to non-democracies, what he found difficult was not
centrally that there were no "unlimited offices" in them - this was "only
the question of a name" in the first place.35 What was difficult was that in
them there were no popular juries and assemblies. By this time the tenure
issue had probably dropped from his mind. In other words, tenure con-
siderations are absent from the final definition of citizen because they had
never been central to that definition in its earlier stages.
Does this mean, then, that citizens need not hold office of unlimited
tenure? After all, Aristotle had earlier said that they must; and his failure to
return to this point in the final definition, for whatever reasons, may be
regarded as something of a loose end. Even granting that sphere of
authority replaces office as the deciding factor, one is still justified in
asking whether citizens are only those who discharge that authority on an
"unlimited" basis, that is, without tenure restrictions on the offices they
hold, whatever those offices might be. Clearly Aristotle would answer this
question in the negative. Citizens are those who deliberate and judge
whether for unlimited terms or limited ones. Again, the point is that the
tenure question is not the important one for him. It served a convenient use
at one stage of the argument, for one kind of constitution. But when the
argument moves beyond this stage to incorporate all constitutions, the
tenure issue falls out as irrelevant.36
There is a second reason, I believe, why Aristotle shifted his ground from
"'office" to "authority" in the final definition, one determined by his
general philosophical aim. His intention in defining things is one of
comprehensiveness: to include the greatest number of cases within a single
definition. This aim reveals the broad pattern of this chapter: each new
attempt to define citizenship improves upon its predecessor by extending
the comprehensiveness of the concept. "Judging and holding office" is too
narrow because it excludes in certain cases members of juries and
assemblies. "Sharing in unlimited office" (i.e. members of junres and
assemblies) is too narrow because it excludes in some cases citizens in
non-democracies (where such offices do not exist). "Sharing in deliberative
and judicial authority" is the final improvement. Authority of this type is
exercised in every state, and those discharging it can easily be identified.
This is the citizen "in the complete sense" and this is what Aristotle wished
to find.

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Remaining Difficulties Resolved

Important as this definition is for constitutional theory, certain difficulties

remain. It is still necessary to account for divergences from the complete
definition in the actual practices of existing states. By loose analogy one
could say that Aristotle's definition bears the defects of Max Weber's
"ideal types": both presuppose conditions that nowhere perfectly exist. In
a world that is everything that it should be the definition of citizen as one
who shares in deliberation and judging would be perfect. But the world is
less than it should be. Different states have different constitutions, some
nearer, some further removed from the best. And, as constitutions differ, so
too do the citizens within them.37 One must, therefore, not only show who
citizens are "in the absolute sense"; one must also take account of the
variety of practices found in different states and show how the difficulties
raised by these various practices can themselves be resolved by reference to
the ideal definition.38
Four such difficulties are identified by Aristotle. The first concerns how,
given the fact that citizenship in practice is usually determined by descent
from citizen parents, the earliest ancestors (those whose parentage cannot
be traced) will have themselves been citizens.39 The second difficulty
concerns the status of those who are made citizens by means of a revo-
lution.40 The third question is the famous one about the conditions under
which the goodness of a good man is the same as that of a good citizen.41 A
final difficulty centers on the issue of whether the working classes
(banausoi) are ever to be counted citizens.42 All of these issues raise serious
problems both for the student of politics, since fundamental principles of
theory are at stake, and for the statesman, since correct answers to them
could have a great impact upon policy. The "complete" definition of
citizen is the means by which Aristotle is able to resolve them. Indeed, its
usefulness helps explain why Aristotle pondered the question of the abso-
lute definition at such length and with such care.
The question about lineage resolves itself quickly. The practice of states,
according to which citizenship is determined by parentage, is really only a
practical convenience. It stipulates certain concrete operations according
to which admission to citizenship is determined. But it does not affect the
question of who in any given case the citizens are (although obviously it
does affect the question of who becomes a citizen). The definition settles the
question of who citizens are, now or at any previous time, and so settles the
question of who the original citizens were in remote historical times as well.

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Those are (and were) citizens who share (and shared) in the stipulated
political functions.
What about those, though, who become citizens as a result of revo-
lutions? Are they citizens too? This question is no more difficult than the
first - they are, provided that they are admitted to deliberative and judicial
functions - but it does raise a new issue of some importance. The real
question being asked here is, are such people rightly citizens? Using the
definition there is no difficulty in discerning who the citizens are. But does
the definition afford any assistance in assessing the legitimacy of the claims
of citizenship of any particular group?
This question is extremely complex and extremely important. It is
complex because there is no simple answer to it; any answer must be
qualified in certain ways. It is important because it is intimately connected
to the central theme of the whole of Book III: what is a state? This is the
question which opens the book, and which is immediately postponed
because of the need first to define "citizen".43 "Citizen" has now been
defined, so that it is now possible to return to the original question about
the identity of the state. It is thus by means of this "difficulty" about the
rightful claims of citizenship that Aristotle connects the discussion of
citizenship with the rest of Book III.
On one level, it is obvious that a citizen who is not rightly a citizen is still
a citizen, since citizenship is defined as sharing in certain offices. People
who share in these offices are obviously citizens according to the definition,
even if wrongly admitted to those offices (1276a5-7). But this is a rather
superficial answer. The significant question here is not about a word, but is
rather about what constitutes the rightful holding of office. And this is at
bottom a question about the identity of the state. For there is an argument
made by "some persons" that acts discharged by people who are wrongly
citizens are not acts of the state, but acts only of a party (whether of one, a
few, or many), and therefore are not binding. The identity of the state, in
other words, is dependent upon the rightness of political rule by those who
are citizens, or about the rightfulness of the claims to citizenship of those
who rule. A state is only a state, therefore, at least according to this
argument, when the people who are its citizens are rightfully so. In other
cases, although one may speak loosely about actions of "the state", they are
acts of the state only in the same sense as the public acts of a tyrant
(1276a 17). And we know from other passages in the Politics that tyrannies
are not properly called "states" (politeiai) at all.
The identity of the state is thus really a question about the rightfulness of
political rule. It follows from this that citizenship "in the complete sense" is

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more than simply a matter of sharing in certain political functions; it is also
a matter of ruling by right, possessing the kind of virtue which entitles one
to rule. This is the means by which Aristotle finally connects the discussion
about citizenship with the discussion about constitution (state): not by
showing simply that citizens are uniquely "parts" which constitute the
whole (had there been no more to the problem than this, chapters 2-5
would not have been necessary); but rather by showing that the identity of
the whole (state) is also ultimately a question about the rightness of those
who are the parts. The identity of the state, in short, is a question about
citizen virtue, about the rightness of the rule of those who discharge
political functions of a certain type.
By this route Aristotle returns to the difficulties associated with his
definition of citizen. Since the identity of the state hinges upon a question
about citizen virtue, it is impossible to say what a state (polis orpoliteia)44 is
without an account of citizen virtue. This is the question which follows: is
the goodness of a good man the same as that of a good citizen? This
difficulty, like the others, depends for its solution upon a proper under-
standing of citizenship "in the complete sense". One may abbreviate
considerably a complex subject by saying that the virtue of a good man is
identical to the virtue of a good citizen only in the case of the complete
citizen, that is, for the citizen who rightly shares in political office, and only
when he is ruling (actually holding office) in a good (right) state. The
complete citizen, in other words, entails the rightness of his holding office;
and the rightness of his holding office, in turn, entails a "right" state. So,
again, while it is possible to speak loosely about a "&citizen" or even a
"good" citizen even in deviant states, such as democracies and oligarchies,
to speak properly of citizenship "in the absolute sense", one must speak of
those who deserve to rule, the good man who holds certain offices in a good
state.
Of course one must not forget that the citizen "in the complete sense" is,
like Weber's ideal types, a limiting case. It is that towards which citizenship
tends without necessarily ever reaching that point in practice.45 To be sure,
there are people in every state who discharge the political functions of
deliberating and judging, and who therefore are pronounced citizens in
those states. As Aristotle says himself, "it is clear that even persons wrongly
admitted to citizenship are pronounced to be citizens" (1276a5-6). And
further, since the goodness of a good man is one, whereas the goodness of
the good citizen is relative to the constitution, "it is manifestly possible to
be a good citizen without possessing the goodness that constitutes a good
man" (1276b34). In short, variations in the meaning and quality of

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citizenship in different states do exist. On this point Aristotle could hardly
be more clear than when he says "the citizen corresponding to each form of
constitution will also necessarily be different" (1275b4-5).
But it must also be remembered that there is a "primary" and "secon-
dary" nature of things. "Now we see", he writes, "that constitutions differ
from one another in kind, and that some are subsequent and others prior;
for erroneous and divergent forms are necessarily subsequent to correct
forms" (1275a35-1275bl). It follows that the nature of citizenship,
dependent as it is on the type of constitution, will also have a "prior" and a
"subsequent" form. The "complete" definition is prior; it will have no
defect, belonging to the best constitution. It, therefore, entails one who
holds office "rightly", possessing the necessary wisdom and virtue.
Aristotle is clear on this point also: "And although the goodness of one who
rules and that of one who is ruled are different, the good citizen must have
the knowledge and the ability to be ruled and to rule, and the merit of the
good citizen consists in having a knowledge of the government of free men
on both sides. And therefore both these virtues are characteristic of a good
man" (1277bl3-18).
The question of citizenship is thus complex. On the one hand there is
common practice and usage. One comes closest to capturing the universal
practice of states by associating citizenship with the political functions of
deliberating and judging. But on a different level one must not dissociate
citizenship from questions about the rightness of political rule.46 When this
factor is taken into account, citizenship is confined to those who are rightly
admitted to office. The idea of citizenship from this point of view entails
possessing the virtue requisite to ruling rightly. Not every state, obviously,
will follow this model: indeed, few if any will. Yet all states will be said to
be "states" and to have "citizens". And when these conditions are con-
fronted by the student of politics, he will not refuse to call them "states"
and "citizens", but will understand in doing so that they are "states" and
"citizens" in a secondary and "divergent" sense from the "complete" sense.
The true citizen is the man capable of governing rightly.47
There is only one remaining difficulty to be overcome: the question of
whether the working classes (banausoi) are ever to be counted as citizens.
This is a difficulty for the following reason. These people either share in
offices or they do not. If they do not, then they are not properly called
citizens, since citizens are those who share in offices of the state. The
difficulty in this case is, if they are not in the class of citizens, in what class
are they, since neither are they aliens (metoikoi) or foreigners (xenoi). This
is not a serious difficulty for in this case it is really only a question of a

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proper name for them. Like children who are not yet complete citizens, this
group too might conveniently be called "incomplete (atelks) citizens"
(1278a 1 -6).
The other alternative presents greater difficulties: when the banausoi are
admitted into political offices. This is a problem because in one sense they
are citizens (those who share in certain political functions), but in another
sense they are not, because citizens in the complete sense also possess the
citizen's virtue, yet the banausoi (and hired laborers too, for that matter) do
not possess this virtue. They cannot possess this virtue because they are
occupied with menial occupations, and people living this kind of life
"cannot practice the pursuits in which goodness is exercised" (1278a2 1-22).
Yet the fact remains that in some states these classes are admitted into
citizenship. In some oligarchies, for example, where holding office depends
upon a high property assessment, rich artisans can and do become citizens
(1278a25). And some democracies, owing to a lack of citizens, even admit
foreigners (xenoi) into office (1278a28).
Two solutions to these difficulties lie to hand, depending upon the
situation. In those cases where artisans (and other classes) are actually
admitted into office (such as, for example, in oligarchies where artisans
succeed in fulfilling the property qualifications), one acknowledges that
they are citizens, but in a deviant sense. They are citizens in a deviant sense
because the constitution in which they are citizens is itself deviant. In the
right forms of constitution these classes would not be admitted, and
therefore they would not be citizens. For in the right forms "honors are
bestowed according to goodness and merit" (1278a20-21); and these
classes are incapable of goodness in the sense that qualifies one rightly to
rule.
In those cases, on the other hand, where the working classes are allowed
the title of citizen without being allowed to share in office, the solution is to
count them as citizens, but only as "citizens who are ruled".48 Aristotle
evidently has in mind here those states, like Athens before the Cleisthenic
reforms, in which the classes of the lowest property assessment (the
Athenian Thetes) were barred from political office but still had certain
civic privileges which were not available to metics, foreigners, and slaves.49
These people were not citizens even in the imperfect sense of "holders of
office in a deviant constitution", since they were not admitted to any
offices. But they were, in terms of civic status, somewhat above the level of
manual laborers and slaves. Because of their intermediate status, it would
be inappropriate to exclude the name of citizen from them altogether;
surely they were regarded in popular usage as citizens. But one must also

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qualify their description as citizens by saying that they are citizens only in
the sense of those who are ruled. If the full citizen is one who rules and is
ruled in turn, these partial citizens fill half of the equation (the less
important half at that): they learn the virtue of being ruled but lack the
ability to rule in turn. And, of course, they could not be fully virtuous even
in being ruled in any but a right constitution. In a deviant state one could
say that this class of citizen is at two removes from the complete citizen: he
is incomplete in the sense of lacking access to political office, and he is
incomplete in lacking the virtue appropriate to ruling and being ruled
rightly.
Aristotle identifies no further difficulties associated with the definition
of citizenship. It could be contested perhaps that other difficulties remain;
for example, how is it possible that there are citizens even in monarchies
and tyrannies (in which, by definition, offices are held by a single
person)?50 But it is doubtful, in view of what has already been said, that any
additional difficulties would present great problems.51 On the whole
Aristotle's definition is as much as it can be. It provides a universal stan-
dard for identifying not only who in any given case actually is a citizen, but
who rightfully deserves to be one. It is thus useful in resolving a number of
theoretical disputes about the true nature of citizenship as well as a number
of practical disputes arising from conflicting claims to citizenship. And, of
course, the idea of citizen "in the complete sense" provides a significant
clue, if not the key, to the central question of Book 111, and perhaps of the
Politics as a whole: what is the state?

Lewis and Clark College, Portland

NOTES

Pol. 1275b4-5: "Hence the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also
necessarily be different".
2 Pol. 1275a2-3: "For there is often a difference of opinion as to this: people do not a
agree that the same person is a citizen". This difficulty may well have been connected to
the first, the diversity among states being the factor responsible for the variety in usage,
although either difficulty may have existed independently of the other.
3 Pol. 1275a6.
4 On the basis of 1278al6-17, Claude Mosse has distinguished between "le citoyen
complet" (haplos poliits) and "le citoyen passif' (archomenos polites) in "La Conception
du Citoyen dans la Politique d'Aristote", Eirene 6 (1967), pp. 16ff. Similar distinctions are
found in E. Barker, Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1946), pp. 69-70 (for whom "active
citizenship" means eligibility to elect magistrates, and "passive citizenship" means
eligibility to hold magistracies); and in H. Kelsen, "Aristotle and Hellenic-Macedonian

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Policy" in J. Barnes et al., Articles on Aristotle, vol. 2 (London, 1977), p. 176, whose view
is the same as that of Mosse.
5 Pol. 1261a38ff., where the scheme of Plato's Republic of one class holding office
permanently is criticized as being unjust; and often.
6 Pol. 1332bl7ff.
7 W. L. Newman, The Politics of Aristotle (Oxford, 1887-1902), Vol. 3, p. xxxiv, writes:
"His wish evidently is not to deny the names of citizen and constitution to any type of
citizen and constitution to which these names were given in the ordinary use of language,
and yet to point to the type of citizen and constitution which best deserve the name". In
his note to 1275a5 Newman adds that the contrast in Book III ch. I is between citizens "in
the proper sense (kurios)" and those who are called citizens "in some other sense than the
proper one".
8 Pol. 1275a38.
9 The first five chapters of Book III afford the student of political theory an excellent
opportunity to make use of the knowledge of the historian to shed light on a number of
theoretical difficulties. The nature of the question, as well as Aristotle's own continual
reference to contemporary Greek practice, make the insights of the historian indispens-
able to sorting out the difficulties confronting the theorist.
10 In Athens in the fourth century B.C. there were a large number of magistrates.
Aristotle gives a full account of the archai at 1299a2ff., and again at 132 1b 1ff.
I The council (boule) and precouncil (proboule) in democracies, though the former often
and the latter sometimes existed, were considered magistracies. Cf. below, n. 16.
12 Pol. 1275b6.

13 In Book IV (1297b35ff.) where Aristotle classifies states according to the three parts or
sections (moria) constituting the political offices, he reserves the term archai to designate
the magistracies. For the other offices he refers only to "the deliberative function" (to
bouleuomenon) and "the judicial function" (to dikazon or to dikastikon) without using the
word office (arche). In his note to 1275a26ff (vol. 3, p. 136) Newman notes that assem-
blymen in democracies would be unlikely to claim to be magistrates, and that jurors and
magistrates would also often be distinguished. Ehrenberg notes that in democracies, "the
member of a court of law was not an official; he was no archon.. ." (The Greek State
[London, 19691, p. 72).
14 At Athens, for example, all magistracies except those of strategoi and treasurers were
elected by sortition, as were jurymen and assemblymen. Cf. V. Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp.
65-71; and C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitution (Oxford, 1952), pp. 221ff.
15 Aristotle's own description of the functions of the magistrates (1299a25ff) shows that
they were not, like our modern executive, legislative, and judicial institutions, easily
distinguishable in purely functional terms. For the magistrates, in addition to "issuing
orders" (their "most characteristic authority") were also responsible for "deliberating"
and "judging" (as were, obviously, the "deliberative" and "judicial" parts of the con-
stitution).
16 The boule (council) in democratic states was often called an arche, for example, and
hence was only quantitatively different in composition from the assembly. Cf. Ehrenberg,
op. cit., pp. 53, 65. Aristotle himself lists the boul in certain constitutions as an arche (e.g.,
1299b30ff.).
17 Well before Aristotle's own time many of the magistracies had been open to all
property classes, including the lowest (Hignett, op. cit., p. 157, where Thetes are said to
have not been excluded even from the Council under Cleisthenes; and p. 224).

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18 Ehrenberg, op. cit., p. 65.
19 R. J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (New York, 1933), chapter II; and
Hignett, op. cit., pp. 216-2 1.
20 In addition to the discussions in Bonner, Ehrenberg, and Hignett, see also A. H. M.
Jones, Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957), pp. 100ff.
21 Such, at least, was the case at Athens (Hignett, p. 152, etc.). Other democracies were
similar (cf. R. Sealey, A. History ofthe Greek City States ca. 700-338 B. C. (Berkeley, 1976],
pp. 155-156; and Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 65-66 and pp. 72-3; and Aristotle Ath. Pot., ch.
62).
22 Hignett, op. cit., pp. 232ff; Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 55ff. In a sense, of course, these large
popular bodies, especially the juries, did have limited tenures, since any given juror
would have been unlikely to serve on a particular jury beyond the time required to try the
case for which he was selected. The lottery would determine the set of jurors for the next
case, and, considering the size of the citizen pool from which jurors were selected, the
chances would have been remote for the same juror to be selected twice. But the point is
that citizens were not prohibited by law from serving consecutive terms, as was the case
with the magistracies. And in the case of the assemblies, one assumes regular repeated
attendance by the same citizens. Cf. Aristotle, Ath. Pot., chs. 63-69.
23 There were, to be sure, certain exceptions to this rule. At Athens, for example, the
more important military magistracies could be (and often were) held more than once,
undoubtedly because of the strategic importance of these offices. But Aristotle was here
thinking of the regular magistrates, such as the archons, and these all had limited tenures.
24 We have a case here of a definition being selected for its comprehensiveness. Those
eligible for the magistracies would have also been eligible for the assemblies and juries,
since the requirements for membership in the former were either greater than or equal to
requirements for membership in the latter. The reverse was not necessarily true: there
were some magistracies which were not open to all classes. Thus, while every magistrate
could have been a juror or assemblyman, not every juror or assemblyman could have
been any magistrate. And since Aristotle wants to define citizen as broadly as possible he
naturally chose juror and assemblyman ("unlimited office") as the standard.
25 pol. 1II, 1. 10 1275b5ff. "We may thus conclude that the citizen of our definition is
particularly and especially the citizen of a democracy. Citizens living under other kinds of
constitution may possibly, but do not necessarily, correspond to the definition".
26 Here Aristotle encounters a major obstacle: as constitutions differ in form, so too do
definitions of citizen, each constitution having its own definition. This problem is taken
up below.
27 Pol. Ili, 1. 10 1275b9-1 1.
28 Pol. III, 1. 11 1275bl2-13.
29 Recall that arche generally connotes magistracies in Aristotle (and generally in Greek
usage). See above, n. 13.
30 E. Barker, in his translation of the Politics (The Politics ofA ristolle, Oxford, 1946) tries
to accomodate just this reading in his translation; but in doing so, he is forced to supply
words that Aristotle did not print, and most other translators do not follow the substance
of Barker's reading.
31 Pol. 1275b 16: "ho archbn . . . ho kata ten archen horismenos". My reading of this whole
sentence is: "For in the other [viz., non-democratic] constitutions the unlimited oflicial is
not the juryman and assemblyman [since these officials are often not present in non-
democracies); but rather these officials [i.e. the ones in non-democracies corresponding to

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juryman and assemblyman in democracies] are ones determined by their spheres of
authority". In other words, one can find the official in non-democracies corresponding to
the citizen in democracies by first determining the sphere of authority occupied by the
latter (viz. deliberating and judging), and then finding those discharging this same
authority in the former.
32 Pol. 1275b19: arches bouleutikes e (or kai) kritikes.
33 Pol. 1275b9-12. Cf. also Sealey, op. cit., pp. 73-78.
34 That Aristotle is here thinking primarily of the duties (powers) and not of the absence
of tenure qualifications of these two bodies is shown by the fact that he refers to them as
holding "the greatest power in the state" (1275a29). And it scarcely requires saying that
"deliberation" and "judging" are not names of certain kinds of offices but of certain types
of authority.
35 Pol. 1275a30.
36 A related question is whether the final definition restricts citizens to those who actually
hold deliberative and judicial authority, or whether it extends to those who, while not
actually holding power today, are nevertheless eligible to hold it on a future occasion.
Does Aristotle, in short, distinguish between eligibility and actual possession? I believe
that he does not. His aim is one of comprehensiveness (see below), and so his mind is
always on the eligible as well as the actual citizen. Though this may be a distinction of
some importance in political theory, there is nothing in his language in this chapter to
suggest that his mind was concerned with this question in defining citizenship.
37 "People do not all agree that the same person is a citizen; often somebody who would
be a citizen in a democracy is not a citizen under an oligarchy" (1275a2-3). Also, "Hence
the citizen corresponding to each form of constitution will also necessarily be different"
(1275b4-5).
38 Indeed, it is no exaggeration, I think, to suggest that the reason Aristotle begins with
the complete definition is precisely to show how many common difficulties can be
resolved by reference to it.
39 Pot. 1275b23-26. Cf. especially Ehrenberg, op. cit., pp. 38-43, for a discussion of
admission to civic rights in the polis and restrictions upon it. Hignett describes the
processes used for checking lineage in the Athenian case, especially pp. 280-97. Under the
radical democracy, with the admission of the Thetes to office, birth became less
important than wealth in determining political rights (cf. pp. 394-95).
40 Pol. 1275b34ff. Aristotle has here in mind the admission of the Thetes to citizenship
carried out by Cleisthenes after the expulsion of the tyrants, and similar cases.
41 Pol. 1276b 17ff. For a full discussion of this vexing (if not vexed) issue, see R. Develin,
"The Good Man and the Good Citizen in Aristotle's Politics", Phronesis, 18 (1973), pp.
71-79.
42 Pol. 1277b33ff.
43 Pol. 1274b35; returned to at 1276a7ff.
44 Although these terms sometimes are distinguishable, Aristotle sometimes (as here)
uses them almost synonymously, much as one might do with the terms "state" and
"constitution".
4 The comments of Ehrenberg (op. cit., esp. pp. 88ff.) about the nature of the polis are
very illuminating in this connection. He shows conclusively, I think, that the polis tended
by the nature of polis society to be a partnership among all adult males in rule and
equality, and that, therefore, its rational extension (and perfection) was pure democracy.
This, of course, did not guarantee that actual states fulfilled this ideal, nor that in

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democracies all people governed equally well. But these were nevertheless the ideal ends
of typical polis society.
46 Newman's note is very useful (vol. 1, pp. 569-70): Aristotle's aim here is to distinguish
a narrower view of citizen (those capable of ruling well, those equipped with phronesis)
and a wider one (all citizens including neo5teroi and those not fit to rule).
47 Pol. 1277b37. The basic point being made here, that the complete citizen is one who
has the virtue to govern, remains the same whether one reads polites as subject ("the
citizen is the one with the capacity to govern") orpolitPs as predicate and houtos as subject
("not all the citizens will have the capacity to govern"). In the latter case the meaning
would be that since the banausoi are admitted to office, and thus are called citizens, not all
citizens will possess the capacity to govern because the banausoi lack this capacity. See
Rackham, p. 275 n. 2.
48 This is Mosse's so-called "passive citizen", discussed above (note 4).
49 See the discussion in Hignett, op. cit., pp. 281ff., of the distinction in the radical
democracy at Athens between those who enjoyed "full citizen rights" and those who, for
various reasons, were limited to "partial" rights. This distinction recalls an earlier time
when access to political office was restricted to those who fulfilled a property require-
ment, but when citizenship in a more limited sense was still open to the Thetes (pp.
117-119, where Hignett uses the term "half-citizens"). In describing the constitution of
the five thousand in Athens Aristotle distinguished between the astoi and Four Hundred
politai, possibly on the grounds that "unlike politai, [astoil does not necessarily imply
active participation in the administration of the state" (A th. Pol. ch. 31; and the note in
K. von Fritz and E. Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of Athens and Related Texts [New
York, 1950], p. 179).
50 Cf. Pol. 1311a6-7; 1314bl2; 1315a40; and Newman's notes on 1275blO-20 and
1285a26-7.
51 We have already noted the "citizen in a subject position", and this idea may easily
extend to monarchies.

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