Summary of research

Climate change risk

findings assessment 2021
Environment and The world is dangerously off track
Society Programme
to meet the Paris Agreement goals.
Daniel Quiggin, Kris De Meyer,
Lucy Hubble-Rose and The risks are compounding.
Antony Froggatt Without immediate action the impacts
September 2021 will be devastating in the coming decades.
 Introduction and context
This short report summarizes climate risks and Consequences for reaching Less than
their consequences for people, food and water
security, as well as national and international
security, migration, economies and trade,
focusing on impacts that are likely to be locked
the Paris Agreement goals
If emissions follow the trajectory
set by current NDCs, there is a less
than 5 per cent chance of keeping
1%
chance
in for the period 2040–50 unless emissions temperatures well below 2°C, relative to pre-
drastically decline before 2030. industrial levels, and a less than 1 per cent chance
The summary report is intended for heads of of reaching the 1.5°C Paris Agreement target.
government and ministers. It is supported by
Net zero pledges
a full-length Chatham House research paper
Many countries are currently focusing on net
to inform briefing officials, which gives fuller
zero pledges, with an implicit assumption that
detail on all the content. Note that all
these targets will avert climate change. However,
references are provided in the research paper.
net zero pledges lack policy detail and delivery
Current emissions and temperature mechanisms, and the gap between targets and
pathways the global carbon budget is widening every year.
Central estimate Global efforts to reduce CO2 Unless NDCs are dramatically increased,

2.7ºC, emissions are dangerously

off track. Current nationally
and policy and delivery mechanisms are
commensurately revised, many of the impacts
plausibly determined contributions described in this summary report will be locked
higher (NDCs) indicate a 1 per cent in by 2040, and become so severe they go beyond
reduction in emissions by 2030, compared with the limits of what nations can adapt to.
2010. If policy ambition, low-carbon technology
An opportunity and necessity for greater
deployment and investment follow current
mitigation action
trends, 2.7°C of warming by the end of the
The governments of highly emitting countries
century is the central estimate, relative to pre-
have an opportunity to accelerate emissions
industrial levels, but there is a 10 per cent chance
reductions through ambitious revisions of
of warming of 3.5°C. These projections assume
their NDCs, significantly enhancing policy
that countries will meet their NDCs; if they fail to
delivery mechanisms and incentivizing
do so, the probability of extreme temperature
rapid large-scale investment in low-carbon
increases is non-negligible. A global temperature
technologies. This will lead to cheaper energy
increase greater than 5°C should not be ruled out.
and avert the worst climate impacts. For more
information on accelerating the energy
transition, see www.energychallenge.info.

Variation of average global surface temperatures

1950 2020
Credit NASA Scientific Visualization
1960 Studio 2020

2 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 How to read this summary report
Approach to climate risk
This report summarizes the
climate risks and impacts
associated with the current
global emissions trajectory and
existing NDCs. Our descriptions
of these risks focus on the
next 20–30 years, to highlight
the urgent need for emissions
reduction actions to avert them.
Longer-term impacts regarding
flooding and sea level rise are
also provided.

Protests erupt after the wildfires in Greece, 2021.

Copyright © George Panagakis/Pacific Press/LightRocket/Getty Images

Climate impact themes

The report sets out five areas of climate change
Heat, productivity impacts and adverse consequences that will
become severe over the next 20–30 years.
 and health Analysing these impact themes, and based
on the central impact indicator estimate,
we highlight:
Food security • The climate impacts of concern.
  • What is already happening.
• How much worse impacts are likely
to get by 2040–50, if emission trends
continue.
Water security
  • Impacts and consequences at a
regional level and global scale.

For fuller details on how to interpret the

climate risks and impacts described in this
Flooding summary report, see the supporting Chatham
  House research paper for briefing officials,
which includes greater geographic granularity
as well as methodological descriptions.
Tipping points and Read the full research paper at www.

 cascading risks
chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-
risk-assessment-2021

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 3

 Heat, productivity and health

Impact of concern
Too hot to work or even survive outdoors, leading to productivity losses and health crises.

Workability Economic loss

Heat
Survivability Health crisis

What is happening already?

>50%
COVID-19 lost
In 2019, a potential 300 billion working hours were lost due to
temperature increases globally, 52 per cent more than in 2000.
COVID-19 resulted in around 580 billion lost working hours in 2020;
hence temperature increases are already resulting in the equivalent
working hours of over 50 per cent of COVID-19-induced lost working hours.

Globally, heat-related mortality has increased by nearly 54 per cent

in the over-65s in the past two decades, reaching 296,000 deaths in 2018.
Deaths
Europe: 104,000 deaths China: 62,000 deaths India: 31,000 deaths 54% up
The Australian bushfires in
2019–20 exhibited a heatwave
intensity that is now 10 times
more likely than at the
beginning of the last century.
Property and economic damage
resulting from the disaster
is estimated to have totalled
some US $70 billion.
The 2020 heatwave in Siberia
caused wide-scale wildfires,
loss of permafrost, and an
invasion of pests. Climate
change has already made
this heatwave at least
600 times more likely.
Australian bushfire, 2021. Copyright © Paul Kane/Getty Images

4 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 Heat, productivity and health

How much worse will it get?

3.9 billion exposed to major 400 million unable to work and
heatwaves by 2040 10 million deaths per year
If emissions do not come down drastically Globally, each year in the 2030s:
before 2030, then by 2040 3.9 billion people • More than 400 million people a year are
are likely to experience major heatwaves likely to be exposed to temperatures exceeding
each year. Major heatwaves represent the the workability threshold (unable to work
most extreme historic temperatures, outdoors).
lasting four or more days. Hence they
• More than 10 million people a year are likely
are comparable to the most severe historic
to be exposed to heat stress exceeding the
heatwaves.
survivability threshold (likely to die outside).
Number of people impacted by major heatwaves each year
10,000 Exposure to survivability threshold Exposure to workability threshold
Exposure to survivability threshold (millions)

9,000 50 2,000

Exposure to workability threshold (millions)

1,800

2040

2050
2030
8,000
Millions of people per year

7,000 40 1,600
1,400
6,000
30 1,200
5,000
1,000
4,000
20 800
3,000 600
2,000 10 400
1,000 200
0 0 0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100 0.25 0.5 0.75 1.0 1.25 1.5 1.75 2.0 2.25 2.5 2.75 3.0
Shaded area represents the lower and upper estimates of the given impact. Change in global surface temperature (ºC, relative to pre-industrial temperatures)
Solid line represents the central estimate.

Regional impacts, 2040: proportion of population experiencing major heatwaves each year
(Major heatwaves are comparable to the most extreme historic heatwaves)
No region will be spared.
By 2040, major heatwaves
will be experienced each year
by 50 per cent or more of the
populations in West, Central,
East and Southern Africa, the Middle
East, South and Southeast Asia, as well
as Central America and Brazil.
By 2050, more than 70 per cent of
people in every region will
experience heatwaves each year.
Urban areas will suffer the greatest
challenges of workability and
survivability.

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 5

 Food security

Impact of concern
Agricultural drought and heat extremes reduce crop yields.

Agricultural drought Yield Food

declines and crisis
Heat stress crop failure

What is happening already?

In recent years, regional drought and heatwaves have caused
20–50 per cent crop harvest losses.
Up to 50%
Australia: Severe drought caused a 50 per cent collapse of
crop harvest
wheat harvests two years in a row (2006–07). loss
Europe: The 2018 heatwave led to multiple crop failures and yield losses of up to 50 per cent in
Central and Northern Europe.
China: In Liaoning Province, drought years led to 20–25 per cent reductions in maize harvests.

The global food crisis of 2007–08, caused by depleted grain stores, Australian drought
and regional crop failures, led to a doubling of global food prices, export bans, food insecurity
for importers, social unrest, and mass protests in countries including Cameroon, Egypt, Indonesia,
Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Peru, Senegal and Yemen.

Emerging cascading food insecurity risks

Climate hazard Direct impact Systemic cascading risks
Change in rainfall Crop/harvest Hunger and
levels & patterns failure malnutrition

Drought (over one

Heatwaves cycle or multiple Rise of Selling of Entry of Amplification
Poverty of price Migration Conflict
years) human, animal livestock & land opportunists/
and plant spoilers inflation &
Changes to
disease shortages in
weather patterns developing
Soil erosion
countries
Extreme events
Alteration of Export controls
e.g. wildfires Crop failure
livelihoods in developed
markets

Representation of emerging cascading

Societal
food insecurity risks. Developed in Government
Developed State failures
tensions: unrest,
collaboration with 70 climate and intervention countries
(developed protests, riots
sector risk experts. increasingly
countries) particularly
source from within
See the accompanying research paper developing
for briefing officials for fuller details. vulnerable
markets
populations

Food shortage/ Food price Large-scale

Darker shading indicates greatest insecurity spike hoarding
concern from experts

6 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 Food security

How much worse will it get?

Proportion of global cropland exposed to severe drought of three months or more, each year.
50% more To meet global 80
demand,
food agriculture will
70

Proportion of cropland (%)

60
needed need to produce 50

almost 50 per cent more food by 40

2050. But yields could decline by 30

30 per cent in the absence of 20

dramatic emissions reductions.

10
0
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
Shaded area represents the lower and upper estimates of the given impact.
Solid line represents the central estimate.

By 2040, the proportion of global cropland affected by severe drought –

Droughts equivalent to that experienced in Central Europe in 2018 (50 per cent yield
3 x worse reductions) – will likely rise to 32 per cent each year, more than three times
by 2040 the historic average.
Wheat and rice together make up 37 per cent of global average calorific intake. By 2050, more than
35 per cent of the global cropland used to grow both these crops will likely be exposed to damaging
hot spells each year, causing reductions to yields. South Asia is likely to be the most impacted, with
more than 60 per cent of winter wheat, spring wheat and rice exposed to damaging hot spells.

Regional impacts, 2050: proportion of cropland exposed to severe drought each year
(Severe drought is equivalent to that experienced in Central Europe in 2018)
Farmers in the worst-affected
areas (including the critical
breadbasket regions of
southern Russia and the US)
are likely to experience severe
agricultural drought impacting
40 per cent or more of their
cropland area every year
during the 2050s.

During the 2040s there

is a 50% chance of
synchronous crop failure

A synchronous >10 per cent yield loss in the top four maize producing countries would have
devastating impacts on availability and prices. Currently, there is a near zero chance of this
happening. Over the decade of the 2040s, the risk of this increases to just under 50 per cent.

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 7

 Water security

Impact of concern
Changes in rainfall patterns and water scarcity causing premature mortality, reductions in sanitation
and hygiene, and greater malnutrition.

Premature mortality
Change in Water
rainfall patterns scarcity Poor sanitation and hygiene
Malnutrition

What is happening already?

13.4m Inwerethereported
Sahel in 2020, some 13.4 million people in Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso
as being in need of humanitarian assistance because of drought.
in the Sahel
needing Over twice the global land area was affected by drought in 2019, compared
relief aid with the historic baseline.
Water scarcity during the US drought of 2012 was forecast to reduce GDP growth by
0.5–1 percentage point, with natural disasters declared in 71 per cent of counties. In 2020,
drought in the China’s Yunnan Province affected 1.5 million people. Around 100 rivers
were cut off, 180 reservoirs dried up, and 140 irrigation wells had insufficient water supply.

Emerging cascading water insecurity risks

Climate hazard Direct impact Systemic cascading risks
Crop yield Water
Heatwaves
reductions and insecurity Armed conflict
failures
Loss of food
Shift in rainfall security
patterns Collapse of Social Rise of extremist
Drought instability/ groups
agriculture
Spread of disorder
Wildfires Loss of infectious Loss of Paramilitary/
ecosystems zoonotic shelter
Loss of military
Ecosystem diseases and and
livelihoods State failure intervention
Floods Infrastructure failures and pests housing
failure/loss habitat loss
Organized
Increased violence
Health crises Displacement competition for
Representation of emerging cascading and and migration resources Conflict between
national and international security risks, pandemics of people people and states
arising from drought and other direct Economic (including
impacts. Developed in collaboration with collapse forced
displacement) Resources Use of nuclear
70 climate and sector risk experts.
and climate weapons
See the accompanying research paper for inequality
briefing officials for fuller details. Breakdown of
governance
and Questioning
destabilization legitimacy
of political
of decision-
systems
makers
Darker shading indicates
greatest concern from experts

8 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 Water security

How much worse will it get?

Global population experiencing drought of at least six months
By 2040, almost
By 2040 1,200

700 million people

700 million each year will likely be

Millions of people per year

1,000

exposed exposed to prolonged 800

to drought severe droughts of at
least six months’ duration. The severity 600

and length of these future droughts are at 400

least as bad as the first wave (1934) of the 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100

US Midwest ‘dust bowl’ drought of the 1930s. Shaded area represents the lower and upper estimates of the given impact.
Solid line represents the central estimate.

Regional impacts, 2040: proportion of population experiencing prolonged severe drought each year

By 2040, North Africa,

the Middle East, Western
and Central Europe, and
Central America will all
see more than 10 per cent
of their populations
impacted by prolonged
severe drought.

Regions of increasing water stress (demand relative to supply) in 2040, relative to 2019

North Africa and the

Middle East are likely
to have the greatest
proportion of their
populations
experiencing extreme
water stress (<500m3
per head per year):
17 per cent and
14 per cent in 2050,
respectively.

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 9

 Flooding

Impact of concern
Coastal and river flooding, leading to population displacement

Increased rainfall River flooding

Displaced
populations
Sea level rise Coastal flooding

What is happening already?

23%
more floods
One billion people now occupy land less than 10 metres above current
high tide lines, including 230 million below 1 metre.
In 2020 there were 23 per cent more floods than the annual average
of 163 events in 2000–19, and 18 per cent more flood deaths than the
in 2020 annual average of 5,233 deaths.

Flood devastation in Germany, 2021. Copyright © Ina Fassbender/AFP/Getty Images

10 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 Flooding

How much worse will it get?

200 million people at risk of frequent, devastating ‘100-year’ floods
Coastal flooding is likely to occur over a longer time frame. The long-term central estimate of
committed sea level rise is around 12 metres, if temperatures are held at 2°C. This could occur
over 500 years or 10,000 years: the time frames are extremely uncertain.
By 2100, nearly 200 million
people worldwide will be living Committed sea level rise as a function of long-term global temperature increase
below the 100-year flood level.
20
However, if the rate of Antarctic
ice melt continues at the rate of
15
recent years, this is likely to be
an underestimate.
Sea level (m)

10
A 1 metre rise in relative sea
level increases the probability 5
of current 100-year flood
events by around 40 times for 0
Shanghai, around 200 times 0 1 2 3 4

for New York, and around Temperature (ºC)

1,000 times for Kolkata.

River flooding greater than the reference 50-year flood (assumes no

60 million people per additional flood defences)
120
year will be impacted
by river flooding
100
Millions of people per year

80

60
River flooding will likely
impact nearly 60 million people 40

a year globally by 2100. The 20

impacts are concentrated in
0
South Asia, where 33 million a 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2070 2080 2090 2100
year are likely to be affected. Shaded area represents the lower and upper estimates of the given impact.
Solid line represents the central estimate.

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 11

 Tipping points and cascading risks

Instability and tipping points

Abrupt changes – or tipping points – are difficult Examples of tipping points include:
to characterize and predict. There are growing
concerns that climate models may under- • Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheet
disintegration: Melting of ice reduces
represent the influence of tipping points.
reflection of sunlight back out into space,
One such example is the melting of the resulting in accelerated warming and
permafrost in the Arctic leading to the release increased sea level rise.
of methane. The latest IPCC climate models
show a cluster of such abrupt shifts between • Permafrost loss: Abrupt increase in
emissions of CO2 and methane through
1.5 °C and 2 °C. If tipping points are reached
the thawing of frozen carbon-rich soils.
at lower temperatures, the impacts presented
Methane is a more potent greenhouse gas
in the previous sections are likely to be
than CO2, resulting in accelerated warming.
an underestimate, occurring with a higher
probability, sooner in time. Moreover, • AMOC breakdown: Caused by an increased
the severity and frequency of the impacts influx of freshwater into the North Atlantic,
will be far more extreme, which in turn will reducing the ability of oceans to disperse
hugely reduce the capacity of societies the heat around the globe.
world over to adapt, compounding the impacts.
• Boreal forest shift: Dieback of boreal
Global temperatures can rise significantly beyond forests, potentially turning some regions
those characterized in the previous sections. to carbon sources as pests and wildfires
Current atmospheric CO2 concentration is around create large-scale disturbances.
420 parts per million. Around 50 million years
• Amazon rainforest dieback: A shift towards
ago, atmospheric CO2 exceeded 1,000 parts per savannah, resulting in large release of CO2.
million, while global mean surface temperatures
were 9° to 14°C.

Ice sheets are crucial for the stability of the

climate system as a whole, and are already at
risk of transgressing their temperature thresholds
within the Paris Agreement range of 1.5°–2°C.
A domino-like effect has recently been identified
between various tipping points, with the
potential to lead to abrupt non-linear responses.
Tipping point cascades (two or more tipping
points being initiated for a given temperature
level) have been identified in more than 60 per
cent of simulations, with the initial trigger likely
to be polar ice sheet melting, and the Atlantic
Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC)
acting as a mediator transmitting cascades.

Glacial ice sheet, Greenland, 2013.

Copyright © Joe Raedle/Getty Images

12 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 Tipping points and cascading risks

Cascading risks: economic, national and

international security
Systemic risks arise from the consequence The cascading risks that most concern the
of direct impacts – materializing as a chain, contributing experts are the interconnections
or cascade, of impacts – compounding to between shifting weather patterns, resulting
produce even more severe impacts for people in changes to ecosystems, and the rise of pests
and societies. Due to their complex nature, and diseases, which combined with heatwaves
it is not possible to quantify the probability and drought will likely drive unprecedented
and severity of systemic risks. Instead, levels of crop failure, food insecurity and
70 experts from a broad range of disciplines migration. In turn, all will likely result
contributed to an exercise to identify the major in increased infectious diseases, and a
systemic risk dynamics and impacts that negative feedback loop that compounds
climate scientists and sector risk experts are each of these impacts.
concerned will occur as direct impacts increase
Extreme weather events often initiate
in prevalence. Their insights are captured in
compounding cascading impacts across
the six diagrams and associated descriptions
borders and disrupt global supply chains.
included in the research paper for briefing
The American Meteorological Society has
officials. The figure on this page summarizes
found a substantial link between climate
the detailed risk cascades.
change and extreme weather in 70 per cent
Cascading climate impacts can be expected of instances studied (146 research findings)
to cause higher mortality rates, drive political between 2011 and 2018.
instability and greater national insecurity,
and fuel regional and international conflict.

Climate hazard Impacts of concern Consequences

Changes in Pests and Migration and displacement of people

Social unrest Populism
rainfall patterns diseases • Rural to urban
• Refugee crisis
Drought • Forced/unsafe migration
2040: 700 million Water scarcity Health crises Migration
people/yr • Forced immobility (trapped populations)

Agri drought Armed conflict

Unemployment
2040: Crop failure State failure • Regional conflicts
and poverty
32% cropland/yr
• Rise of extremist groups
Major heatwaves • Police/military intervention
Too hot to
2040: 3.9 billion Deaths Armed conflict • Organized crime and violence
work outside
people/yr
• Conflict between people and states
Storms and Loss of Market
• Civil war and war
cyclones Food crises
infrastructure destabilization
Destabilization of markets
• Commodity price spikes
Loss of Reduced global • Fall of asset prices
Wildfires GDP loss
livelihoods trade
• Large-scale asset sell-off
• Falling stock markets
River and coastal Loss/shifts in Business
flooding ecosystems interruption Protectionism • Underfunded pension funds
2040: 47 million • Financial market collapse
people/yr

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 13

 Tipping points and cascading risks

Recent examples of cascading impacts, due to extreme weather

• Globally, every year since 2008, an average shutdown of semiconductor chip factories that
of 21.8 million people have been internally contributed to a global shortage. Evidence
displaced by weather-related disasters points to the warming of the Arctic, and the
(extreme heat, drought, floods, storms or resultant weakening of the polar vortex,
wildfires). In 2015, as the number of refugees pushing cold air far further south than
and migrants entering Europe, having fled normal, and bringing about the coldest period
conflict in the Middle East and Africa, Texas has experienced in more than 30 years.
reached its highest point, at more than
• The Yangtze river flooding of 2020, caused
1 million, an equivalent number of people
by the highest rainfall in 60 years, forced
– some 1.1 million – were displaced by
authorities to destroy a dam at risk of collapse,
extreme weather events in sub-Saharan Africa
and disrupted cargo ships down the river and
alone. In 2020, some 30 million people in
within Shanghai port itself. The floods caused
143 countries worldwide were displaced
hundreds of deaths and other casualties in
by weather-related disasters, 4.3 million
affected areas, as well as heavy financial
of whom in sub-Saharan Africa.
losses for China, and disrupted global supply
• An abnormally cold spell in Texas in February chains, including exports of personal
2021 brought rolling power outages, resulting protective equipment intended for health
in a lack of safe drinking water, and forcing a workers battling COVID-19.

Flooded crossroad in Zhengzhou, Henan Province, China, 2021. Copyright © Jiao Xiaoxiang/VCG/Getty Images

14 Climate change risk assessment 2021

 About the authors

Dr Daniel Quiggin is a senior research fellow with the Environment and Society Programme
at Chatham House. He has expertise in the modelling, analysis and forecasting of national
and global energy systems, having modelled various UK and global energy scenarios.
As a senior policy adviser at the UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy in
2018–20, Daniel led work on the post-Brexit policy implications for the energy sector’s trade
of goods and services, and helped shape effective strategies for the energy and climate package
of the UK–EU FTA negotiations. He also previously worked as an analyst at Investec Asset
Management within a commodities and resources investment team.
Daniel holds master’s degrees in particle physics and climate science, and a PhD in energy
system modelling.

Dr Kris De Meyer is a research fellow in neuroscience at King’s College London, and a senior
honorary research fellow in earth sciences at University College London. He leads the UCL
Climate Action Unit, where he is responsible for grounding climate risk and climate communication
projects in insights from neuroscience and psychology.

Kris has a PhD in cybernetics from the University of Reading, and a master’s in systems engineering
from KU Leuven.

Dr Lucy Hubble-Rose is an honorary research fellow in earth sciences at University College London.
In her role as strategy expert for the UCL Climate Action Unit, she is responsible for developing
the structure and strategy of the unit’s programmes. Lucy is an expert facilitator who specializes
in helping people and organizations to deliver action on climate change.

Lucy has a PhD in climate change engagement from the University of Exeter, and a master’s in
climate change from the University of East Anglia.

Antony Froggatt joined Chatham House in 2007, and is deputy director and a senior research
fellow in the Environment and Society Programme.

He has worked as an independent consultant for 20 years with environmental groups, academics
and public bodies in Europe and Asia. His most recent research projects are concerned with
understanding the energy and climate policy implications of Brexit, and the technological and
policy transformation of the power sector.
Since 1992 Antony has been the co-author of the World Nuclear Industry Status Report,
a now annual independent review of the nuclear sector.

Read the full research paper at www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/climate-change-risk-assessment-2021 15

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Acknowledgments
Particular thanks are due to Professor Nigel Arnell and team at the University of Reading,
whose 2019 paper and associated data are heavily drawn on throughout the research paper
on which this summary report for heads of government is based. Furthermore, the research paper
builds on phases one and two of the UK-China Cooperation on Climate Change Risk Assessment
projects; all those who contributed to these phases have done much to inform the work captured
in the paper and accompanying summary report. Thanks also to the various project partners;
to Patrick Morrison at Brand Temple, and Autumn Forecast and Sarah Bunney at Soapbox,
for design and typesetting work; to Chris Aylett of the Environment and Society Programme
at Chatham House for skilful coordination of the many elements of this project; and to Jo Maher
and the Chatham House publications team for editorial support.

We are very grateful to the Foreign, Commonwealth and

Development Office for funding the research that has informed
the research paper and summary report, through its prosperity
programming.

Chatham House does not express opinions of its own.

Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is a world-leading policy
The opinions expressed in this publication are the
institute based in London. Our mission is to help governments and societies build a
responsibility of the author(s).
sustainably secure, prosperous and just world.
Copyright © The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2021
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any
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copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. Copyright © Wang Fuxiao/VCG/Getty Images