1. Tanchanco v. Santos (GR No.

204793)
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:15 PM

Facts: Consuelo Santiago Garcia passed away on April 4, 1997, leaving behind a contested will that
sparked a legal dispute among her heirs. The disputed will favored one daughter, Natividad Garcia
Santos, over the other heirs, leading to claims of forgery, duress, and procedural defects affecting the
will’s validity. The legal proceedings commenced when petitioners Catalino Tanchanco and Ronaldo
Tanchanco (Consuelo’s grandchildren) petitioned the RTC to settle her intestate estate, alleging that
Natividad and her son had misappropriated properties. In response, Natividad filed for probate of
Consuelo’s will, resulting in multiple legal confrontations over the authenticity of the will and Consuelo’s
mental capacity to execute it.

Issues:
1. Was the will duly executed in accordance with legal requirements?
2. Did Consuelo possess the testamentary capacity to create a will?
3. Were the signatures on the will forged?
4. Was the will executed under undue influence or duress?
5. Did the procedural defect in the attestation clause render the will invalid?
6. Was the appointment of Natividad as executrix proper despite objections?

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding that the will
was executed in substantial compliance with legal formalities, including those outlined in the attestation
clause. The Court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support allegations of forgery,
undue influence, or duress. The acknowledgment portion, which correctly indicated the number of
pages of the will, cured any minor procedural defect under the doctrine of substantial compliance. Thus,
the probate of Consuelo’s will was permitted, and Natividad’s appointment as executrix was affirmed.

Doctrine: The Philippine Supreme Court emphasized the doctrine of substantial compliance, as provided
in Article 809 of the Civil Code. This doctrine states that minor errors in the form or language of the
attestation do not invalidate a will if the will was executed in substantial compliance with Article 805.
The Court also reinforced the legal principle that testacy is preferred over intestacy to respect the
decedent's wishes.

Notes:
• Substantial Compliance Rule (Article 809, Civil Code): Minor defects in the attestation form or
language do not nullify a will if substantial compliance with the legal requirements is evident.
• Testamentary Capacity: Refers to the mental ability of a testator to understand the nature of
creating a will, the scope of their assets, and the beneficiaries.
• Due Execution of a Will: Requires proof of compliance with legal formalities, testamentary
capacity, and the absence of forgery, duress, or undue influence (Rules of Court, Rule 76, Section
11).
• Forgery Claims: Must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• Attestation Clause Requirements (Article 805, Civil Code): Details necessary formalities for non-
holographic wills, including the testator and witnesses' signatures and an indication of the number
of pages.
• Executor Appointment: Courts respect the testator’s choice of executor unless the person is
proven to be unfit or unwilling.
Historical Context: This case highlights the complexities of probating wills in the Philippines, particularly
when disputes involve forgery accusations and procedural concerns. It showcases how courts balance
the evidence for proper execution and the testamentary capacity of the deceased against challenges,
reflecting a civil law tradition that honors the decedent’s expressed wishes over procedural

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reflecting a civil law tradition that honors the decedent’s expressed wishes over procedural
technicalities, provided there is substantial compliance with legal formalities. The ruling underscores the
principle that the law prioritizes effectuating the testator's intentions within legal boundaries.

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2. Caneda v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 103554)
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:29 PM

Facts: Mateo Caballero, a widower with no children, executed his last will and testament on December
5, 1978, in Talisay, Cebu. The will was signed by three attesting witnesses and notarized by a lawyer.
Caballero’s will left his properties to non-relatives. On April 4, 1979, he filed a petition for the will’s
probate but passed away on May 29, 1980, before the case was resolved. A special administrator was
subsequently appointed for his estate, valued at P24,000. Petitioners, claiming to be Caballero’s
nephews and nieces, sought intestate proceedings, questioning his capacity and the genuineness of the
will.
The probate and intestate cases were consolidated. The will’s beneficiaries defended its validity and
Caballero’s mental capacity. The probate court upheld the will’s validity, finding it compliant with legal
formalities. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on whether the attestation clause adhered to Article
805 of the Civil Code. The petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing the attestation
clause was defective.

Issue: Whether the attestation clause in Mateo Caballero’s will complied with Article 805 of the Civil
Code.

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, declaring the will invalid. It held
that the attestation clause was defective for failing to expressly state that the witnesses signed the will
in the presence of the testator and each other, a requirement mandated by Article 805. The Court
emphasized that mere signatures could not imply compliance with this requirement, and deficiencies in
the attestation clause that cannot be corrected by reviewing the will itself are fatal to its validity.

Doctrine: An attestation clause must explicitly confirm compliance with all formal requirements under
Article 805 of the Civil Code, including the stipulation that witnesses signed the will in each other’s and
the testator’s presence. Any omission in the attestation clause that cannot be remedied by examining
the will is fatal, rendering the will invalid.

Class Notes:
1. Strict Formality: The law mandates strict compliance with formalities for the execution of wills to
ensure the testator’s true intentions are honored.
2. Attestation Clause: This serves as a certification by witnesses and must explicitly confirm
adherence to Article 805’s requirements.
3. Substantial Compliance: Under Article 809, minor defects in form may be excused if they do not
compromise the acts of attestation and can be verified from the will itself.
4. Judicial Interpretation: The Supreme Court enforces a strict interpretation of testamentary
formalities to preserve the integrity of wills.

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3. Austria v. Reyes (GR No. L-23079)
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:19 PM

Facts: On July 7, 1956, Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Special Proceedings No. 2457) for the ante-mortem probate of her last will and testament. Her
nephews and nieces, including Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta, and Lauro Austria Mozo, opposed
the probate. However, after a hearing, the court dismissed the opposition and approved the will for
probate.
The primary beneficiaries of Basilia’s will were Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto
Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, whom she had declared as her legally adopted children. When Basilia passed
away on April 23, 1959, Perfecto Cruz was appointed as the executor, in accordance with the provisions
of her will, despite opposition from Ruben Austria.
On November 5, 1959, the petitioners filed for intervention, asserting that the respondents were not
legally adopted and were thus mere strangers to Basilia, challenging their right to inherit. Despite the
respondents' objection, the court allowed the petition for intervention.
Subsequently, questions arose concerning the authenticity of the adoption documents. While an NBI
report supported the documents' genuineness, a constabulary expert suggested otherwise. The
petitioners also presented affidavits from former court staff denying knowledge of the alleged adoption
proceedings. Despite this, the lower court, on June 4, 1963, limited the petitioners' intervention to
properties not covered by the will. Motions for reconsideration were filed but were denied.

Issues:
1. Whether the intervention of Basilia’s nephews and nieces should be limited to properties not
disposed of in the will.

2. Whether the institution of heirs could be annulled if the alleged adoption was proven false.

Court’s Decision: The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari, affirming the lower court’s
orders restricting the intervention to properties outside the will’s testamentary dispositions. The Court
emphasized that the institution of heirs could only be annulled if the will explicitly stated the false cause
for the heirs' institution and if it was clear that the testator would not have made such an institution had
they known of the falsity. Since Basilia’s will did not explicitly tie the institution of heirs to the adoption's
validity, the testamentary provisions stood.
The Court further ruled that allegations regarding the legality of the adoption could not be raised
through a collateral attack in probate proceedings but required a separate action. Moreover, the
principle favoring testacy over intestacy was upheld to give effect to the decedent’s intentions.
Doctrines and Legal Principles:
• Article 842, Civil Code: A person with no compulsory heirs may freely dispose of their estate by
will.
• Article 850, Civil Code: A false cause for the institution of heirs is disregarded unless it is clear
from the will that the testator would not have made the institution if aware of the falsity.
• Testacy Favored: Courts should prefer interpretations that avoid intestacy and honor the
testator's intentions.
• Prohibition on Collateral Attacks: Adoption legitimacy can only be challenged in a direct
proceeding, not collaterally in probate.
Rationale: The Supreme Court found no clear evidence within the will suggesting that Basilia’s decision
to designate the respondents as heirs depended on the validity of their adoption. The language used,
though adopting terms from succession law, did not unequivocally express a condition or false
assumption. Additionally, the decedent’s intent to favor the respondents was evident through
substantial bequests even outside any purported legal obligation. Thus, the will was upheld in favor of
testacy.

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4. Morales v. Olondriz (GR No. 198994
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:27 PM

Facts: Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. died on June 9, 2003, leaving behind his widow and children. His
family believed he had died intestate and filed for partition of his estate and the appointment of a
special administrator. The court appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as the special administrator.
Subsequently, Iris Morales presented a will allegedly signed by the decedent, which appointed her as
executor and distributed the estate among specified heirs, excluding the decedent’s illegitimate son,
Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz.
The respondent heirs opposed the probate of the will, arguing that Francisco’s omission constituted
preterition, which would annul the institution of heirs and lead to intestate succession. Despite several
delays and Morales’ failure to present evidence, the court ruled that Francisco had indeed been
preterited, warranting the annulment of the will’s institution of heirs. The court ordered the
proceedings to continue intestate and reinstated Alfonso Jr. as the administrator.
Morales challenged this ruling, but both the RTC and the Court of Appeals (CA) found no grave abuse of
discretion. The CA upheld that Francisco’s preterition rendered the will void, justifying intestate
proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the case to proceed intestate
despite the existence of a will.
2. Whether the RTC could address the intrinsic validity of the will during probate proceedings.
Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed Morales’ petition.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. The Court reiterated that preterition occurs when a compulsory heir is totally omitted from the
will without express disinheritance. Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, such preterition annuls the
institution of heirs, leading to intestate succession.
2. Despite the general rule limiting probate courts to addressing extrinsic validity, the RTC can
consider the intrinsic validity of a will when necessary, especially if it avoids impractical, redundant
proceedings.
3. Morales failed to prove that Francisco was not preterited, having waived her opportunity to
present evidence. Consequently, the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding
with intestate administration.
4. Interlocutory orders, like setting a case for probate, are not final and can be modified, negating
any claim of res judicata.
Disposition: Petition dismissed. Costs against the petitioner.

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5. Heirs of Policronio M. Ureta Sr. v. Heirs of Liberato M.
Ureta (GR No. 165748)
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 4:49 PM

URETA v. URETA G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011 Mendoza, J.:

FACTS In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso,
Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, Facts:
and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonso’s Alfonso Ureta, a wealthy landowner, had fourteen children, including his eldest, Policronio. Alfonso,
children and their descendants. Alfonso was financially well -off during his lifetime. He owned with some of his children, executed deeds of sale for taxation purposes, transferring parcels of land to
several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying various heirs, including Policronio, though no monetary consideration was paid. After Alfonso’s death,
and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish his estate continued to manage and possess the lands. Policronio passed away shortly after Alfonso, and
schooling and instead worked on his father’s lands. Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and his heirs found that lands in his name had been partitioned in the 1989 Deed of Extra -Judicial Partition
four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of among Alfonso’s heirs, including the lands transferred to him. Conrado, Policronio's eldest son, signed
Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the the partition deed on behalf of his co-heirs without their express authorization. The heirs later
inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his questioned the partition deed upon discovering it through a newspaper publication.
children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in Issues:
favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common -law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The 1. Was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition valid?
Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, 2. Could Conrado legally sign the Deed of Partition on behalf of his co -heirs without their explicit
which are the properties in dispute in this case. Since the sales were only made for taxation authority?
purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and Ruling:
enjoy the lands and their produce. When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as The Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Deed of Extra -Judicial Partition.
the administrator of his father’s estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and 1. Validity of Partition: The Court ruled that a partition among heirs does not constitute a transfer or
then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels conveyance of property but rather a segregation and designation of portions that already belong
transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned to each heir. It serves as confirmation of ownership rights, not a conveyance changing ownership.
over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the The deed was therefore valid as it simply affirmed the heir’s rights in Alfonso’s estate.
administrators of his estate. Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion 2. Authority of Conrado to Sign: Conrado’s lack of authority from his co-heirs to sign on their behalf
of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands. On April did not void the deed but made it unenforceable against his co -heirs without their ratification.
19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands However, such agreements among heirs—even if done orally—are valid between the parties, as
that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for no creditors were affected.
taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed Doctrines:
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs. 1. Partition as Confirmation, Not Conveyance: Partition among heirs is not a conveyance of property
but an act of designation of specific shares, not requiring formal conveyance. Even oral
agreements are valid if they do not harm creditors.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering 2. Agency in Contracts: Contracts made without authority or representation are unenforceable
the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on unless ratified by the party on whose behalf they were made, but they are not void. Conrado’s
October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of unauthorized act did not void the deed, only limited enforceability against his co -heirs.
Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate Class Notes:
when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter. • A partition does not amount to a transfer of title but serves as a mere recognition of pre -existing
ownership among heirs.
ISSUE Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid. • Oral partitions are valid among heirs if no creditors’ rights are affected.
• Acts done by an unauthorized agent may render a contract unenforceable but not void, allowing
RULING Yes. It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a for ratification to validate the contract.
conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property
from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property
that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is
merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a
special power of attorney is not necessary. In fact, as between the parties, even an oral
partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written
memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs
where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir. A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable,
unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party. Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain
authority from his co -heirs to sign the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition in their behalf did not
result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it
rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrado’s co -heirs for having been
entered into without their authority.

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6. Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals (GR No. 108581)
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:31 PM

Facts:
Private respondents, the legitimate children of Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes, were involved in
a dispute over Alejandro’s estate. After Aniceta’s death in 1969, her estate remained unsettled, and
Alejandro passed away sometime later. In 1977, the petitioner, who claimed to have cared for Alejandro
but was not his legal wife, sought probate of his last will. The will was admitted to probate in 1981, but
private respondents did not appeal the probate order. In 1983, they successfully moved to have the will
declared intrinsically void, as it was determined Alejandro's alleged wife, the petitioner, was not legally
married to him, and the will unlawfully deprived the legitimate heirs of their inheritance.
The petitioner’s appeal was dismissed for procedural lapses, and the ruling declaring the will intrinsically
void became final. Despite this, the petitioner sought to oppose the execution of the order, which
included distributing the estate according to intestate laws. The trial court later attempted to reopen
the case, deeming the order interlocutory, but the Court of Appeals nullified this move, reinforcing the
finality of the prior ruling.

Issue:
Can a last will and testament that has been admitted to probate but later declared intrinsically void in a
final and executory order still be enforced?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, stating that the January 30, 1986, order
declaring the will intrinsically void had attained finality and could no longer be revisited. The Court
emphasized that probate proceedings address the extrinsic validity of a will (i.e., due execution,
testamentary capacity, and compliance with formalities). Even if a will is extrinsically valid, it must also
be intrinsically valid. In this case, the will was deemed intrinsically void because it violated succession
laws, depriving the lawful heirs of their legitime.
Doctrine:
• A final and executory order cannot be altered or reopened, regardless of perceived errors, and a
lower court cannot reverse the decision of a superior court.
• Probate decisions regarding a will's extrinsic validity are binding and final if unchallenged within
the proper time frame.
• The intrinsic validity of a will must conform to the laws of succession; if provisions violate lawful
inheritance rights, the will’s contents cannot be enforced.
• Public policy dictates that litigation must end at some point to avoid indefinite legal disputes,
emphasizing finality in judicial decisions.
Disposition:
The petition was denied, and the appealed decision was affirmed, enforcing the distribution of
Alejandro and Aniceta’s estates under the rules of intestate succession.

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7. Nuguid v. Nuguid (GR No. L-23445)
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:36 PM

Facts:
Rosario Nuguid, a resident of Quezon City, died on December 30, 1962, unmarried and without
descendants. She was survived by her parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and her
siblings, including Remedios Nuguid.

Remedios Nuguid presented a holographic will, allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on

November 17, 1951, which named Remedios as the sole heir. Remedios petitioned for the will's
probate.

Felix and Paz Nuguid opposed the probate, arguing that the will preterited them as compulsory
heirs, which made it void and resulted in intestacy.

The lower court declared the will null and dismissed the petition. Remedios Nuguid appealed this
decision.

Arguments of the Parties:

• Petitioner (Remedios Nuguid): Argued that the will should be probated and that the case
concerned ineffective disinheritance, not preterition.
• Oppositors (Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid): Claimed the will preterited them as
compulsory heirs. They contended that the complete omission of the parents from the will made
the institution of Remedios as sole heir void, leading to intestate succession.
Issues:
a. Whether the will of Rosario Nuguid should be probated.
b. Whether the institution of Remedios as the sole heir is null due to the preterition of
Rosario’s parents, the compulsory heirs.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the will is null. The institution of
Remedios as the sole heir was declared void due to the complete omission (preterition) of
Rosario's parents, who are compulsory heirs. This preterition resulted in the total nullification of
the will, causing intestate succession.

Doctrine:
1. Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Validity: The court emphasized that probate proceedings should focus on
the extrinsic validity of the will, such as due execution and testamentary capacity. However, given
the practical considerations, the Court resolved the issue of the will's intrinsic validity, which
rendered the institution of heir void due to preterition.

2. Preterition under Article 854: Preterition or the complete omission of compulsory heirs in the
direct ascending line nullifies the institution of heir and leads to intestate succession. If a will
contains only the institution of an heir and no other dispositions (e.g., legacies or devises), then
the entire will becomes null.

Class Notes:
• Preterition vs. Disinheritance: Preterition refers to the omission of compulsory heirs without any
mention or disinheritance. Disinheritance must be express and for legal causes, and its
consequences differ. Preterition results in the annulment of the entire institution of heir, while
ineffective disinheritance merely reduces the inheritance to provide for the legitime.

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 ineffective disinheritance merely reduces the inheritance to provide for the legitime.
• Intestate Succession: When the institution of heir is void due to preterition, the entire estate is
subject to intestate succession, ensuring the compulsory heirs receive their legitimes.

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8. Perez v. Garchitorena GR L-31703
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:46 PM

Facts:
1. The plaintiff, Carmen G. de Perez, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara (deceased), had a
deposit of ₱21,428.58 in her name with La Urbana in Manila. This sum represented the liquidated
credit of the deceased Ana Maria Alcantara against another deceased individual, Andres
Garchitorena.
2. The defendant, Mariano Garchitorena, held a judgment for ₱7,872.23 against Joaquin Perez
Alcantara (the plaintiff's husband).
3. To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff, under the writ of execution, attached the amount deposited
with La Urbana.
4. The plaintiff argued that the funds belonged to the fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara,
not to her or her husband, and secured a preliminary injunction against the execution.
5. The defendants countered that Carmen G. de Perez was the universal heiress, and thus the
injunction should be dissolved.
Issues:
1. Whether a trust (fideicommissary substitution) was created by the will of Ana Maria Alcantara.
2. Whether the amount on deposit with La Urbana belongs to the children of Carmen G. de Perez
as fideicommissary heirs.
3. Whether the injunction preventing the attachment should be permanent.

Arguments:
• Plaintiff (Appellee): Claimed that the will created a fideicommissary substitution. The funds were
intended for the decedent's grandchildren (children of the plaintiff), who were the
fideicommissary heirs, and thus, the money could not be used to satisfy the husband's debt.
• Defendants (Appellants): Argued that the plaintiff was the universal heiress and the sole owner of
the inheritance, which included the funds. They believed this made the funds subject to
attachment to satisfy the husband’s debt.\

Ruling of the Court:

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling in favor of the plaintiff. The court held
that:
1. The will of Ana Maria Alcantara created a fideicommissary substitution.
2. The funds deposited with La Urbana belonged to the fideicommissary heirs (the children of
Carmen G. de Perez).
3. The injunction was made permanent, as the funds were not Carmen G. de Perez’s absolute
property but were held in trust for her children, per the testatrix's intent.

Reasoning:
• The court analyzed the three relevant clauses of the will (clauses IX, X, and XI) and determined
that they collectively indicated a fideicommissary substitution rather than a simple substitution.
• Clause IX appointed Carmen G. de Perez as the universal heiress, allowing her to enjoy the estate.
• Clause X stipulated that upon Carmen’s death, the estate would pass to her children and should
not leave their hands, which aligns with the requirements of a fideicommissary substitution.
• Clause XI directed that if Carmen died while her children were minors, an administrator would
manage the estate.
• The court cited Manresa's commentary on fideicommissary substitution, noting that:
The primary heir (Carmen G. de Perez) was called to enjoy the estate,

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 ○ The primary heir (Carmen G. de Perez) was called to enjoy the estate,
○ An obligation was imposed on her to preserve and pass it to her children, and
○ Her children, as second heirs, were entitled to the estate from the testatrix’s death.
Doctrine:
1. Fideicommissary Substitution requires:
○ A first heir primarily called to enjoy the estate,
○ An obligation for the first heir to preserve and transmit the estate to a third person,
○ A second heir who inherits directly from the testator.
2. Under a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir (fiduciary) has only the right to enjoy the
inheritance, not the right to dispose of it. The inheritance directly belongs to the second heir
(fideicommissary), not to the fiduciary’s creditors.
Class Notes:
• Fideicommissary Substitution vs. Simple Substitution: In fideicommissary substitution, the estate
does not fully belong to the first heir but is meant to be preserved for the second heir. In a simple
substitution, the inheritance would entirely pass to the next in line only if the first heir cannot
inherit.
• Implication of the Ruling: The court emphasized the intent of the testatrix to prevent the estate
from leaving the hands of her designated heirs, which protected the inheritance from the
fiduciary’s creditors.

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9. Ramirez v. Ramirez GR L-27952
Monday, November 4, 2024 11:51 PM

Facts:
• Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with a will that was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
• His widow, Marcelle de Ramirez, was his only compulsory heir. Other beneficiaries included his
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
• The estate included various properties, including shares and land, valued at around PHP
512,976.97.
• The will provided several substitutions and usufructs over the estate, including portions of it to be
held by Marcelle and Wanda in usufruct.
Issues:
1. Whether the usufruct in favor of Marcelle and Wanda, as well as the substitutions, were valid.
2. Whether the provisions of the will that gave Wanda, an alien, usufruct rights over real property
in the Philippines violated the 1935 Philippine Constitution.
Arguments:
• Appellants (Roberto and Jorge Ramirez) argued:
○ The vulgar substitutions in favor of Wanda were invalid because the first heirs (Marcelle and
Wanda) outlived the testator.
○ The fideicommissary substitutions violated Article 863 of the Civil Code because the first and
second heirs were not related within one degree.
○ The usufruct given to Wanda violated the Philippine Constitution's prohibition against aliens
acquiring land in the Philippines.
• Appellee (Maria Luisa Palacios, administratrix) contended:
○ The usufruct given to Wanda was valid since it did not transfer ownership, but merely
granted a real right.
○ The vulgar and fideicommissary substitutions were legitimate according to the Civil Code.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court modified the partition proposed by the lower court, ruling as follows:
1. Marcelle’s Legitime: She is entitled to one-half of the estate in full ownership as her legitime,
without additional usufruct over any other part of the estate.
2. Usufruct to Wanda:
○ The usufruct granted to Wanda was valid, as a usufruct is a real right but does not transfer
ownership of land, thus not violating the constitutional prohibition.
○ The fideicommissary substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez
was invalid since it exceeded the permissible one degree from the original heir, Wanda.
3. Substitution: The simple substitution in favor of the legatees Jorge and Roberto was upheld as it
met the criteria under the Civil Code.
Doctrine:
• Legitime: Under Article 900 of the Civil Code, if only the widow survives, she is entitled to one-half
of the hereditary estate in full ownership, free from any encumbrance.
• Fideicommissary Substitution: Article 863 mandates that fideicommissary substitutions should
not exceed one degree from the heir originally instituted, and both the first and second heirs must
be alive at the testator's death.
• Usufruct by Aliens: The constitutional prohibition on land acquisition by aliens does not extend to
usufructuary rights, as usufruct does not vest title in the usufructuary.
Key Points (Class Notes):
• Usufruct and Constitutionality: The usufruct over real property for an alien does not violate the
Constitution as long as it does not transfer ownership, per Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935

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 Constitution as long as it does not transfer ownership, per Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution.
• Substitution Validity: Valid vulgar substitutions can occur even if the primary heir outlives the
testator, provided there’s a possibility of refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance. However,
fideicommissary substitutions must adhere strictly to the "one-degree" rule.
• Will Interpretation: The court must balance the testator’s intent with legal limitations, ensuring
that the widow's legitime is protected while respecting valid substitutions within statutory
bounds.
Final Disposition:
The Supreme Court ordered the estate to be distributed with one-half to Marcelle as her legitime, and
the remaining half to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez in naked ownership, with a usufruct to Wanda. The
court's ruling supersedes the lower court’s project of partition.

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10. Rabadilla v. CẢ GR 113725
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 1:52 PM

Johnny RABADILLA v. CA and Maria Marlena Conscuella Y Belleza SUMMARY: Aleja left a Will with a codicil attached
Villacarlos to it, wherein she left the subject lot to Dr. Jorge,
Solemnities of Wills: Codicils | Testamentary Succession: Kinds of with the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar to
Institution of Heirs| June 29, 2000 | Purisima Respondent Maria annually, else the lot will be
seized by Maria and given to Aleja’s near
Nature of Case: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of descendants. When Dr. Jorge died, Petitioner
the Court of Appeals. Johnny, his son, succeeded him. Maria filed a
Digest maker: Dacillo complaint against Dr. Jorge’s heirs for non-
compliance with the obligation to deliver to Maria.
Aleja Belleza left a will and testament, appended to which is a RTC ruled for Johnny. CA reversed for Maria. SC
codicil. In the codicil, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, Petitioner Johnny’s affirmed that Maria has the right to seize the lot
father, was instituted as a devisee of a parcel of land in Bacolod. because Johnny, as Dr. Jorge’s modal heir, inherited
The codicil was duly probated and admitted. the obligation under the Codicil.
It was indicated in the codicil that Dr. Jorge, his heirs, and any
buyer, lessee, mortgagee of the subject lot shall deliver 100 piculs DOCTRINE:
of sugar to Respondent Maria until Maria dies. #1 on Codicils: A codicil is supplement or addition
In the event of non-compliance, Maria shall immediately seize the to a will, made after the execution of a will and
lot and turn it over to Aleja’s near descendants, who shall continue annexed to be taken as a part thereof, by which
the obligation. disposition made in the original will is explained,
Dr. Jorge died in 1983, and is surivived by his wife, daughters, and added to, or altered.” <A825, NCC> A codicil is
herein petitioner Johnny, his son. ALWAYS related to some prior will. It explains,
In 1989, Respondent Maria brought a complaint against Dr. Jorge’s alters, or adds to the original will. <Tolentino>
heirs for non-compliance to the condition of delivery of sugar to
her since 1985. #2 on Kinds of Institution of Heirs:
During pre-trial, the parties admitted the existence of a Institution sub modo or modal institution: a mode
Memorandum of Agreement settlement between Respondent imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but
Maria and Alan Azurin, lessee of the subject lot. But there was no it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to his
compliance to the MoA. succession. Here, the testator states:
RTC DISMISSED the complaint in favor of Petitioner Johnny. The object of the institution
Action is premature because Respondent Maria has no cause of The purpose or application of the property left by
action against Petitioner Johnny. It’s Dr. Jorge who is the owner the testator
and devisee, and Respondent Maria cannot come after Petitioner The charge imposed by the testator upon the heir
Johnny simply because he is Dr. Jorge’s son. Conditional testamentary disposition: condition
CA REVERSED in favor of Respondent Mari. must happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to
Respondent Maria has a right to receive the sugar from Petitioner be entitled to succeed the testator.
Johnny, as he is the modal heir of Dr. Jorge. The condition suspends but does not obligate; and
the mode obligates but does not suspend.
WON there is cause of action? – YES
Petitioner Johnny, as well as his mother and sisters, are
compulsory heirs of Dr. Jorge, therefore they succeeded him by
operation of law. The succession includes the right/ownership of
the subject lot as well as the obligation to Respondent Maria which
attaches to the lot by virtue of the codicil.

WON this is a modal institution? – YES

Petitioner Johnny claims that this is not a modal institution, but a
mere substitution where Aleja’s near descendants are only meant
to substitute in the obligation to deliver sugar to Respondent
Maria. It is not a modal institution where the non-compliance of
the obligation merits the reversion of the lot back to the estate of
Aleja.
Substitution: the designation by the testator of a person/s to take

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Substitution: the designation by the testator of a person/s to take
the place of the heir/s first instituted.
Simple substitution: 2nd heir takes the inheritance in default of the
1st heir by reason of incapacity, pre-decease, or renunciation.
Court held that there is no simple substitution because there is no
condition of pre-decease, incapacity, or renunciation necessary
before Aleja’s near descendants can substitute Dr. Jorge or his
heir.
Fideicommissary substitution: the 1st heir is strictly mandated to
preserve the property and transmit it to the 2nd heir.
Court held that there is no fideicommissary substitution because
there is no obligation to preserve; and because the 2nd heirs
(Aleja’s near descendants) are not related at all to the 1st heir (Dr.
Jorge), when the requirement is that the 2nd heir must not be
beyond 1 degree from the 1st heir.
[See Doctrine #2]
Here, Aleja intended that the lot be inherited by Dr. Jorge. She
then imposed an obligation on him and his heirs. BUT she did not
make Dr. Jorge’s inheritance be dependent on the performance of
the obligation.
The manner of institution is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the heir without affecting the efficacy of
the institution.

WON Respondent Maria only holds a right of usufruct, and not a

right to seize the property? – NO
When an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, the testator’s
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will. Such
construction as will sustain and uphold the will in all its parts must
be adopted.
It was clear in the codicil that Maria has the right to seize the
property.

WON the MoA between Maria and Alan works as substantial

compliance on the part of Johnny? – NO
Johnny claims that because of the MoA, Maria’s recourse is now to
enforce the obligation under the MoA and not the seizure of the
lot.
The Court held that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable, and
free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take affect
after his death.
Wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed, and
the Will cannot be subject of a MoA/compromise agreement
which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will.

RULING: Petition DISMISSED. CA AFFIRMED.

Vitug, J. Separate Opinion:

Mode obligates the instituted heir to comply with the mandate
made by the testator but does not prevent the heir from at once
claiming the inheritance provided he gives a security to ensure
compliance with the will of the testator and the return of the thing
received together with its fruits and interests, “should (the heir)
disregard this obligation.”
The obligation imposed upon the heir or legatee is deemed not to
be a condition for his entry forthwith into the inheritance unless a
contrary intention of the testator is evident.
Condition dictates the efficacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory

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Condition dictates the efficacy, either in a suspensive or resolutory
manner, of a testamentary disposition.
In case of doubt, the institution is considered modal, rather than
conditional.

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11. Morente v. Dela Santa GR L-3891
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 1:45 PM

Facts:
1. Consuelo Morente, in her will, left all her real estate to her husband, Gumersindo de la Santa, with
certain stipulations. The will included conditions that her husband should not marry anyone else, should
not leave her siblings, and should continue living in a property where a bakery was located.
2. A clause in the will specified that if the husband had children with anyone, two-thirds of the property
would pass to the testatrix’s brother, Vicente, or his heirs, and only one-third would remain with the
husband.
3. Gumersindo de la Santa remarried four months after Consuelo’s death. Elena Morente, the sister of
the deceased, petitioned for the annulment of the legacy, arguing that the husband’s marriage caused
him to forfeit his rights to the property under the conditions of the will.
4. The Court of First Instance denied Elena’s petition, stating that the husband's rights to the property
were not forfeited simply because he remarried.

---

Issues:
1. Did the will of Consuelo Morente impose a condition on the legacy given to her husband, Gumersindo
de la Santa, such that remarriage would result in forfeiture of the property?
2. Can a condition of forfeiture be implied from the provisions of the will?

---

Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance. It held that:
1. There was no express condition in the will stating that the husband would lose his rights to the
property upon remarriage.
2. The will must be interpreted as a whole, and no implied condition of forfeiture could be inferred from
the language used in the will.
3. The only explicit condition mentioned was that if the husband had children with someone else, two-
thirds of the property would pass to Vicente. Since no such event occurred, the legacy remains with the
husband.

---

Doctrine:
1. Testamentary Conditions: A testamentary disposition is conditional only if the condition is clearly and
expressly stated in the will. Implied conditions are not favored and must not be presumed from
ambiguous language.
2. Construction of Wills: Wills must be interpreted by considering all the clauses together, and any
intention to impose a condition must be unambiguously evident from the wording of the will.

---

Class Notes:
1. Testamentary Provisions: Article 790 and Article 793 of the Civil Code allow conditions to be attached
to wills, but such conditions must be expressly stated. The court refrains from inferring unstated
conditions unless they are clearly implied.
2. Importance of Express Language: This case emphasizes the necessity for clear and unequivocal
language when imposing conditions on legacies. Any ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the

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language when imposing conditions on legacies. Any ambiguity will be resolved in favor of the
beneficiary.
3. Legacy vs. Condition: The court makes a distinction between an absolute legacy and one subject to a
condition. In this case, the husband's remarriage did not trigger a forfeiture clause because no such
condition was explicitly provided.

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12. Hilarion, Jr. b. Trusteeship of the Estate of Doña
Margarita
Facts
Rodriguez GR 168660
Tuesday, November
Doña Margarita 5, 2024 passed
Rodriguez 4:50 away
PM on July 19, 1960, leaving a last will and testament, which was
admitted to probate. Her will included clauses creating a trust for her estate’s income, to be distributed
among named beneficiaries. Additionally, Clause 10 of the will prohibited the sale or mortgage of certain
properties indefinitely. Nearly forty years later, the heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr., beneficiaries under
Clause 24, filed a motion to dissolve the trust, arguing it exceeded the permissible duration under the
Civil Code and was contrary to the ruling in Rodriguez v. CA.

Ruling of the RTC (Court a quo)

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila denied the motion, reasoning that while perpetual alienation
was void after 20 years, the trust itself remained valid. The RTC referenced Article 1013(4) of the Civil
Code, which it interpreted to allow the establishment of a permanent trust for income use.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

The case was brought to the Supreme Court as a petition for certiorari due to the legal nature of the
issues.

Issues Presented to the Supreme Court

Can the trusteeship over the properties of Doña Margarita Rodriguez be dissolved based on Articles 867
and 870 of the Civil Code?
Did the RTC err in stating that these Civil Code provisions were inapplicable to the motion?
Was the RTC correct in applying Article 1013(4) to support the perpetuity of the trust?
Arguments
Petitioners (Orendain heirs): Argued that the trust’s perpetual duration violated Articles 867 and 870 of
the Civil Code, which voids dispositions prohibiting alienation after 20 years.
Respondents (Trustees): Claimed that while perpetual prohibition on alienation was void, the trust itself
remained enforceable to fulfill the decedent’s instructions.
Ruling of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court granted the petition, ruling that:

The trust must be dissolved as the 20-year period prohibiting alienation had lapsed, and maintaining a
perpetual trust was contrary to law.
The RTC misapplied Article 1013(4), which pertains to properties inherited by the state and is
inapplicable to testator-created trusts with no institutional heir.
The Court ordered the RTC to determine the remaining properties under Clause 10 and the intestate
heirs eligible to inherit.

Doctrine
The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a testamentary trust prohibiting property alienation cannot exceed
20 years (Articles 867 and 870, Civil Code). If no heir is appointed for the trust properties, intestate
succession applies. Additionally, Article 1013(4) applies exclusively to state inheritance scenarios and
cannot validate perpetual trusts contrary to the decedent's designation.

Class Notes
Key Principle: Testamentary trusts must comply with Civil Code limitations on the duration of alienation
prohibitions.
Intestate Succession: If no heir is named for certain properties, those properties pass under intestate
succession.
Case Reference: Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals clarified permissible trust limitations under Philippine
law.

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 13. Treyes v. Larlar GR 232579
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 4:54 PM

FACTS:
Rosie Larlar Treyes died intestate and without a child. Rosie’s siblings sent a letter to Dr. Nixon
Treyes, the husband of Rosie, inviting him for a conference for the settlement of estate of
Rosie. Treyes ignored the letter and executed two affidavits of self-adjudication which he
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Marikina, Rizal, and San Carlos, Negros Occidental,
transferring unto himself 14 properties, as sole heir of his decedent-spouse. After sending a
second letter, it was found out by the siblings that the properties of Rosie were already
transferred to Treyes.
The siblings Larlar filed an action for annulment of the Affidavits, cancellation of TCTs,
reconveyance of ownership
and possession, partition, and damages, before the RTC of Negros Occidental.
A first service of summons was served on Treyes, which he filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. A re-service of summons was served
to Treyes which then he filed another Motion to Dismiss arguing that the private respondents’
Complaint should be dismissed on the following grounds: (1) improper venue; (2) prescription;
and (3) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Treyes filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground, among others, of lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter and, corollarily, lack of real parties in interest, arguing that the petitioners have
not established their right to succession and thus lacking the personality to file the complaint;
prescription on the ground that the action for recovery of properties of the heirs has
prescribed, and improper venue for the complaint was filed before the RTC of San Carlos,
Negros Occidental.
The RTC denied the Omnibus Motion, prompting Treyes to file before the Court of Appeals (CA)
a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. The CA, however, denied the same.
ISSUE and HOLDING:
1) Whether the action should be dismissed for improper venue
No, the action cannot be dismissed for improper venue. Invoking rule 73 to allege improper
venue is entirely inconsistent with Treyes’ assertion that the complaint filed is not a special
proceeding but an ordinary civil action. Rule 9, Section 1 of the rules provides that all defenses
and objections not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or in an answer shall be deemed as a
waiver with exception to the grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
prescription, res judicata, litis pendentia. Likewise under Rule 15, Section 8, it provides that a
motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment shall include all objections available, else such
objection not raised shall be deemed waived (exception: the 4 grounds of motion to dismiss).
In this case, in the first motion to dismiss, Treyes only raised lack of jurisdiction over the
petitioner. The defense for improper venue was very much available at the time of filing. Thus,
raising the defense of improper venue although would not have been prejudicial to the
petitioner, there is no valid justification for the failure to invoke such defense.
2) Whether the action has prescribed
No, the defense of prescription of the complaint has no merit. Treyes invoked prescription on
the basis of Rule 74 is inconsistent with his main theory that the complaint is an ordinary civil
action and not a special proceeding. The provisions of Rule 74, Section 4 barring distributees or
heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such
extrajudicial partition is applicable only:
1. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and

New Section 2 Page 20

1. to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and
2. when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the
persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are
represented by themselves or through guardians.
The court held that both requirements are absent in this case; thus, the prescriptive period on
constructive trust under the Civil Code, particularly under implied constructive trust, applies,
and not the prescription on Special Proceedings.
The Civil Code identifies 2 kinds of Trusts:
1. Implied – by operation of law
2. Express – by intention of the parties
Under Implied Trust, there are two more categories:
1. Resulting Trust
– disposition of property which raises an inference that he does not intent the person
holding the property to have any beneficial interest
2. Constructive Trust
– subject to equitable duty to convey to another, on ground that he would be unjustly
enriched if he were permitted to retain it
– The duty to acquire property arises because of fraud, duress, undue influence,
mistake, wrongful disposition, breach of fiduciary duty.
In an action for reconveyance based on implied constructive trust, the law provides a
prescription of 10 years from issuance of the torrens title over the property, which is based in
article 1144 of the civil code. This issuance of title operates as a contructive notice to the whole
world, which the discovery of fraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of such issuance.
3) Whether there is a need for prior determination of heirship in a special proceeding prior to
filing an action for recovery of ownership and possession of property
No. Treyes contends that the petitioners have not established their right as legal heirs and is a
prerequisite to an ordinary suit; hence, their action for reconveyance should be dismissed.
The court held that the establishment of right of the heirs is conferred by law and there is no
need for judicial confirmation to establish petitioners as heirs. It was already established by the
petitioners that they are heirs ipso facto jure, thus there is no need for any judicial
confirmation. The complaint alleges that their rights over the properties is by virtue of their
being siblings of the decedent.
In Article 777 of the Civil Code, it substantially provides that rights of succession is transmitted
upon the moment of death of the decedent. This much to say that the title or rights is
immediately passed to the heirs upon death. Thus, the heirs have legally been deemed to have
acquired ownership over the estate of the decedent, without need of any declaration.
In partition, even before a property is judicially partitioned, heirs are already deemed owners
and without need for prior separate judicial declaration of their heirship.
In a summary settlement of estates, heirs may undertake the extrajudicial settlement of estate
of decedent amongst themselves through execution of a public instrument without prior
declaration in separate judicial proceeding that they are heirs of the decedent.

Article 1001 likewise provides that brothers and sisters or their children who survive with the
widow or widower are entitled to one-half of the inheritance, the other half to the surviving
spouse.
Here, the petitioners have already established their filiation with the decedent and therefore
there is no need for a declaration of heirship through special proceedings. The need to instittue
a sperate special proceeding for determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake
of practicaility as when parties in a civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. Further, in this case, the

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court and already presented evidence regarding the issue of heirship. Further, in this case, the
plaintiffs do not really seek to establish their right as an heir but seek the enforcement of their
rights brought about them being heirs by operation of law, as provided under Article 777, in
relation to Article 1001 of the Civil Code.
Hence, the petition is denied.

From <https://www.lexanimo.com/2022/08/23/treyes-vs-larlar-g-r-no-232579/>

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14. Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court GR L-69679
Tuesday, November 5, 2024 4:57 PM

Facts
This case involves a dispute over the estate of the deceased Dra. Esperanza Cabatbat, where her sisters
and the children of her deceased brothers are contesting the claim of Violeta Cabatbat Lim, who asserts
she is Esperanza’s only child and heir. Violeta Lim, her husband Liam Biak Chiao, and the Calasiao Bijon
Factory, contested a decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming that she is not the biological
child of Esperanza Cabatbat.
Ruling of the Court a Quo (Trial Court)
The trial court held that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not the biological child of the spouses Esperanza and
Proceso Cabatbat, thereby concluding that she is not a legal heir of Esperanza. It ordered her to return
estate properties and awarded shares in the estate to Esperanza’s surviving spouse and siblings, with
proportional shares assigned to them.
Appellate Court Ruling
The Intermediate Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) affirmed the trial court’s decision, upholding
that Violeta is not Esperanza’s child and thus not entitled to inherit from her estate. The petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied.
Issues Presented to the Supreme Court
1. Whether the Intermediate Appellate Court erred in concluding that Violeta Cabatbat is not the
child of Esperanza Cabatbat.
2. Whether Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court was disregarded in failing to authenticate
Violeta's birth record.
3. Whether Article 263 of the New Civil Code applies.
4. Whether certain documentary exhibits submitted by Violeta were improperly disregarded.
Arguments of the Parties
• Petitioners (Violeta Cabatbat Lim et al.) argued:
○ Violeta is the legitimate child of Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat, as evidenced by her birth
record and other documents indicating her parental relationship to the deceased.
○ Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should validate her birth record as authentic.
○ Article 263 of the New Civil Code supports her legitimacy.
• Private Respondents (Sisters and Nieces/Nephews of Esperanza) argued:
○ Violeta was merely a ward ("ampon") taken in by the Cabatbat spouses, not their biological
or legally adopted child.
○ Evidence contradicted Violeta’s birth claim, including hospital records and testimony
suggesting she was born to another woman.
Supreme Court Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, with slight modification, excluding the
widows of Esperanza's deceased brothers from inheritance. The Supreme Court held that:
• The factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on Violeta’s non-filiation to
Esperanza are binding, especially since substantial evidence supported these findings.
• Section 22, Rule 132 on authenticating private writings does not apply here due to significant
doubts about the birth record's authenticity.
• Article 263 of the Civil Code does not apply, as the case was not about impugning legitimacy but
determining heirship based on genuine filiation.
Doctrine
Factual findings by lower courts, especially regarding heirship and family relations, are binding on the
Supreme Court if adequately supported by evidence and not contradicted by statutory protections or
rules on legitimacy and heirship.

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rules on legitimacy and heirship.
Class Notes
1. Binding Nature of Factual Findings: The Supreme Court generally respects factual findings by
lower courts, especially regarding familial relationships unless there is clear error or lack of
evidentiary support.
2. Section 22, Rule 132: The rule on private writings' authenticity through presumption applies only
if the document is unblemished by suspicious circumstances.
3. Heirship and Filiation: Heirship cannot be claimed merely by presence in an estate if there’s
insufficient evidence of blood relation, legal adoption, or acknowledgment.
4. Applicability of Article 263 of the New Civil Code: This provision applies only in disputes about the
legitimacy of a child, not where the issue is whether a person is a child at all.

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