Anandi Mukta Sadguruu Shree Mukta … vs V.R.

Rudani & Ors

..On 21 April, 1989

Bench: [Link] Shetty, Goverdhan Lal Oza

Petitioner: Anandi Mukta Sadguru Mukta Jeevandassawami Suvarna Jaya

Vs
Respondent: V.R. Rudani & Ors

Citation: 11989 AIR 1607, 1989 SCC 691, 1989 SCR 697

Ayaz Ahmaed
2021-342-024
Administration Law, 704
Submitted to... Mrs. Sneha Arora Ma’am
Abstract:
This case analysis is the essence in understanding the administrative jurisdiction and other key
aspect of administration law.
Anandi Mukta Sadguru Shree vs Rudani & Ors plays an important role in the understanding right
and duties of trustee in management of the trust and servants, what constitute a governmental
body or grounds on which mandamus (writ) can be granted and the exception to it, meaning of
public authority or the term authority means in the article 12 vs article 226, power of high court
to issue writs to any person or authority and is mandamus can be issued to non-statutory or non-
governmental, company, non-officials etc.
Introduction:
This is an Appeal to the supreme court in which appellant no.1 is a public trust and the other
appellants are its trustee. The trust was running a science college at Ahmedabad. The college was
temporary affiliated to the Gujrat University and later in 1973 had permanent affiliation. A
dispute between the university area teacher association and the university was referred to the
chancellor of the university who gave his award in 1970 the award was accepted by the state
government as well as by the university. The later issued direction to all affiliated colleges to pay
their teachers in term of the award. The appellants instead of implementing the award served a
notice of termination upon 11 teachers on the ground that they were surplus and approached the
University for Permission to remove them. The vice-chancellor did not accept their request.
Thereupon the trust decided to close down the college.
The retrenched persons demand (teachers) arrears of the salary and allowances, provident fund
and gratuity dues and closure compensation. But the management did not pay these dues, the
employees then moved to the high court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the trust to pay
the retrenched employees their legitimate dues. The high court accepted the writ petitions.
Before moving to the appellant’s court the appellant accepted the just right of the employees to
get salary for 2 and half months and the provident fund dues, and contended that the trust was
entitled to get reimbursement from the government in lieu of these payment as regard the arrears
of salary payable under the chancellor’s award, the appellants further contented that it was the
liability of the government and not of the management of the college. As regard the closure that
prescribing compensation in the ordinance 120E was Ultra Vires and at any rate not binding on
the trust since it was enacted prior to the affiliation of the college. It was further contended that
the trust was a private body and was not subject to the writ jurisdiction under Article 226.
Facts: the college had its permanent affiliation to the Gujrat University on June 15, 1973.
On June 12, 1970 the chancellor gave his award in the following terms; that the revised pay scale
as applicable to the teachers who joined after April 1, 1966 should be similarly be applicable to
those who joined after April 1, 1966 and they be continued even after April 1, 1971. And these
pay scale includes dearness allowance. However with effect from April 1, 1971 in respect of
both the categories of teachers i.e. pre 1966 and post 1966 dearness allowance was to be merged
with the salary. And for the period from April 1, 1966 to March 31 1970 accruing due under the
award were to be paid without interest in ten equal instalments beginning from April 1, 1971.
The college was closed with the effect from June 15, 1975 with the termination of all services of
all the academic staff, without the approval of the university.
The respondents (trust and its trustees) are directed to pay the petitioners (Employees) their
salary dues and allowances, the provident fund and gratuity dues in accordance with the Rules
framed by the University and closure compensation that would be payable under Ordinance 120
E.
Arguments:
Petitioners: - The retrenched persons were not agitating for their continuance in the service, they
demanded only the arrears of the salary, provident funds, gratuity and closure compensation
which were legitimately due to them.
Respondents: - the trust resisted the writ petitions on every conceivable ground. The objection
raised by the trust which follows as: (i) the trust is not a statutory body and is not subject to the
writ jurisdiction of the high court, (ii) the resolution of the university direction payment to
teachers in the revised pay scale is not binding on the trust, (iii) the university has no power to
burden the trust with additional financial liability by retrospectively revising the pay scales, (iv)
the claim for gratuity by retrenched teachers is untenable. It is payable only to the teachers
retiring, resigning, or dying and not to those removed on account of closure of the college, and
(v) ordinance 120E prescribing closure compensation is ultra vires of the power of the syndicate.
It is at any rate not binding on the trust, since it was enacted prior to affiliation of the college.

Issues:
Whether the state is liable to recompense the appellants in respect of the amount payable
to the respondents?
Whether the trust was a statutory body and not subjected to the writ jurisdiction of High
court?
Does the university has no power to bind the trust with the additional financial liability?
Is claim of gratuity (compensation) by retrenched persons (teachers) untenable?
Does Ordinance 120 E prescribing closure compensation is Ultra vires?

Judgement: The judgement of the court was delivered by K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J.

Appellant question whether the state is liable to recompense the appellants in respect of the
amount payable to the respondents was not considered by the High court and indeed could not
have been examined since the State was not a party to the proceedings. However the persuasive
power of this court finds out that the appellants are trying to side track the issue and needlessly
delaying the legitimate payment due to the respondents. Stated that the state is under no
obligation to pay the appellants as against the sum due to the respondents as state is not the party
to the agreement and it is indeed wholly outside the scope of these appeals, the court is only
concerned with the liability of the management of the college towards the employees, under the
relation of master and servant. The management is primarily responsible to pay salary and other
benefits to the employees and could not say that unless and until the state compensates, it will
not make full payment to the staff.
The maintainability of the writ petition for mandamus as against the management of the college
under the Article 226 is argued, that the management of the college being a trust registered under
the Public Trust is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High court or the trust is a private
institution against which no writ of mandamus can be issued. To resolve the issue the court relied
upon two decision of this court: (a) Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College, Shamli and
others v. Lakshmi Narain and Ors [1976] and (b) Deepak Kumar Biswas v Director of Public
Instructions [1987], in the former case the respondent institution was a degree college managed
by a registered cooperative society. A suit was filed against the college by the dismissed
principal for reinstatement. It was contended that the executive committee of the college which
was registered under the cooperative societies act and affiliated to the Agra University and
subsequently to Meerut University was a statutory body. The important contention lies in the fact
that in such a case, reinstatement could be ordered if the dismissal is in violation of statutory
obligation but the court refused to accept the contention. It was observed that the management of
the college was not a statutory body since not created by or under a statute. It was emphasized
that an institution which adopts, certain statutory provisions will not become a statutory body
and the dismissed employee cannot enforce a contract of personal service against a non-statutory
body.
In the latter case the Vaish degree college decision was followed, there again a dismissed lecturer
of a private college was seeking reinstatement in service. The court refused to grant the relief
although it was found that the dismissal was wrongful. This court instead granted substantial
monetary benefits to the lecturer. This appears to be the preponderant judicial opinion because of
the common law principal that a service contract cannot be specifically enforced.
But these two cases is different from the present case, there is no plea for specific performance of
contractual service. The respondents are not seeking a declaration that they be continued in
service. They are not calling mandamus to put them back into the college. They are claiming
only the terminal benefits and arrears of salary payable to them. The court stated that if the right
are purely of a private character no mandamus can issue. If the management of the college is
purely a private body with no public duty mandamus will not lie. The court contended these two
as the exception to the writs of mandamus but if they are absent and the party has no other
equally convenient remedy, mandamus cannot be denied. It was appreciated that the appellants
trust was managing the affiliated college to which public money is paid as government aid, thus
public money paid as governmental aid plays a major role in the control, maintenance and
working of educational institutions. The aided institutions like Government institutions discharge
public function by way of imparting education to students. They are subject to the rules and
regulations of the affiliating University. Their activities are closely supervised by the University
authorities. Employment in such institutions, therefore, is not devoid of any public character. The
court stated that when a university take a decision regarding their pay scales, it will be binding
on the management. The service conditions of the academic staff are therefore not purely of a
private character. It has super added protection by university decisions creating a legal right and
duty relationship between the staff and the management. When there is existence of this
relationship, mandamus cannot be refused to the aggrieved party. Hence the Appeals was
dismissed. And directed the appellant to pay all the dues amount to the respondents as per High
court’s judgement with the 12 percent interest. The balance remaining shall be paid within two
months from the date of judgement. And the appellant shall also pay the cost of the respondents
teachers which is quantify at Rs.26, 000.

The court further said that the remedy by prerogative writs has to be simpler and less procedural.
However the prerogative writ of mandamus is confined only to public authorities to compel
performance of public duty. The public authority means everybody which is created by statute
and whose power and duties are defined by statue. So Government departments, local authorities,
police authorities, and statutory undertakings and corporations, are all 'public authorities'. But
there is no such limitation for our High Courts to issue the writ 'in the nature of mandamus'.
Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative
writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to
"any person or authority". It can be issued "for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights
and for any other purpose".
The term "authority" used in Article 226, in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the
term in Article 12. Article 12 is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights
under Art. 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the
fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words "Any person or authority, used
in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities
of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the
body concerned is not very much relevant. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on
the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or
authority to the affected party. No matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive
obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.

In the case of Praga Tools Corporation v shri C.A Imanual & Ors, [1969], court stated that a
mandamus can issue against a person or body to carry out the duties placed on them by the statutes
even though they are not the public officials or statutory body.
However it is not necessary that person or the authority have to be a public officials. Mandamus
can be issue, for instance to an official, or any person whom society compels to carry out the term
of the statute and also to companies or corporations carry out the duty or fulfilling public
responsibilities.
Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available to reach injustice wherever it is
found. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Article 226.
Critical Analysis:
The case arose when V.R. Rudani and other employees of an educational institution, managed by
a trust, claimed they were wrongfully denied their terminal benefits after the institution was closed.
They approached the High Court under Article 226 for relief. The High Court ruled in their favor,
issuing a writ of mandamus directing the trust to disburse the benefits. The trust challenged this
decision in the Supreme Court, arguing that writs under Article 226 could not be issued against a
private entity like a trust.
The Supreme Court ruling, the court of appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the High court
decision with the key observation of the judgement that are (i) Broad interpretation of the term
authority: the court ruled that the Article 226 is not confined to the governmental and quasi-
governmental bodies. Term authorities under article 12 has confined meaning in compare with
Article 226. A writ can also be issued against a private body if it performs public duties or function.
(ii) Public duties performed by the private entity: colleges, institutions, companies or corporations
or any other body official or non-official performing public duty or guiding by the governmental
bodies under positive obligation cannot evade from the accountability under the Article 226. (iii)
Terminal benefits as a legal right: the court under scored that terminal benefits like gratuity and
provident fund are legal entitlements, not discretionary payment. Denying them to employees was
unjust and warranted judicial intervention.

Comments:
Where this judgement was in the rightly favored to the plaintiff (respondent) but might increase
the risk of judicial overreach, by subjecting private bodies to writs jurisdiction under Article 226.
The risks excessively by judicial interference in the internal affairs of private organizations, which
might not always align with the principles of minimal state intervention. Such intervention could
deter private entities from engaging in public services or undertaking social responsibilities,
fearing litigation and the loss of their operational independence. A matter will rise in defining
public duty, as what determining and qualifies as a public duty, and should all private schools or
hospitals which cater to public needs, be subjected to writ jurisdiction. Without clear guidelines
this could lead to a flood of litigation against private bodies.
Other issue might rise that the relation between the employer and employee is based on contractual
duties and allowing writs jurisdiction in such disputes might over pass the contractual framework.
Conclusion:

The Anandi Mukta judgment is a landmark in Indian constitutional jurisprudence, widening the
scope of judicial review under Article 226. It underscores the principle that entities performing
public duties cannot evade accountability, regardless of their private status. While it has been
praised for upholding justice and protecting employee rights, it also raises questions about the
extent of judicial oversight over private entities. The judgment continues to serve as a cornerstone
in cases concerning the interplay between public duties and private entities, shaping the evolution
of administrative and constitutional law in India.