Supreme Court of the Philippines
63 Phil. 464
G. R. No. 45220, September 18, 1936
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, PLAINTIFF
AND APPELLEE, VS. TOMAS TAPEL, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.
DIAZ, J.:
Tomas Tapel was charged with and convicted of the
crime of theft and sentenced by the Court of First
Instance of Manila to one month and one day of
arresto mayor, to indemnify Hamilton Brown, owner
of the stolen articles, in the sum of P14, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs of the suit. Being a
habitual delinquent, he was furthermore sentenced
to an additional penalty of ten years and one day of
prision mayor.
Not agreeing to his sentence, Tomas Tapel appealed
therefrom, alleging that the lower court committed
the three errors relied upon in his brief as follows:
"I. In taking into consideration, for the
purposes of a conviction under article 62,
subsection 5, of the Revised Penal Code,
and to declare him a habitual delinquent, the
evidence presented in the municipal court
wherein this case was originally brought,
said court not being a court of record in
accordance with law.
"II. In not taking into account the
information filed in this case and the
defendant's- spontaneous plea of 'guilty'
made therein in open court, and
"III. In imposing upon him an excessive
penalty contrary to and outside the law."
When the appellant was arraigned in the lower court,
he spontaneously confessed having committed the
crime with which he was charged therein, thereby
admitting not only his guilt but also all the material
facts alleged against him. One of said facts is that he
had been previously convicted twice of the crime of
simple theft and four times of the crime of qualified
theft, but the information is silent as to the dates of
said convictions except one, which was December 5,
1929. It is evident, therefore, that in the
commission of the crime herein imputed to the
appellant, the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary confession, which mutually compensate
each other, must be taken into account thus
producing the effect of imposing the penalty
corresponding to said appellant's crime in its
medium period (art. 64, rule 4, of the Revised Penal
Code).
By reason of the amount involved therein, the crime
imputed to the appellant is punished in article 309,
subsection 5, of said Code, with arresto mayor in its
full extent, and the medium period of said penalty is
from two months and one day to four months.
The allegation in the information that the appellant
is a habitual delinquent reads as follows:
"That the said accused is a habitual
delinquent under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, he haying been
previously convicted twice or the crime of
theft and four times of the crime of qualified
theft, by virtue of final judgments rendered
by competent courts, having been last
convicted on December 5, 1929."
We have already stated more than once that an
allegation of this nature is insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that if the accused in one case pleads
guilty, he actually admits that he is a habitual
delinquent. In the cases of People vs. Santiago (55
Phil., 266), and People vs. Venus (p. 435, ante), not
to mention others, we extensively stated the reasons
why this is so and it is not amiss that we reiterate the
recommendation made by us in the latter of said two
cases. Prosecuting attorneys should take case that
in preparing their informations in cases wherein an
averment of habitual delinquency must be made
against the accused, the dates of the commission of
his previous crimes, the dates of his convictions and
those of his release for service of sentence are
clearly expressed so as to avoid the inconveniences
stated in said case of People vs. Venus.
The principal penalty that should have been imposed
upon the appellant is four months of arresto mayor,
which is included within the medium period of that
prescribed by law.
Wherefore, the appealed judgment is modified,
sentencing the appellant to four months of arresto
mayor, instead of one month and one day thereof,
without the additional penalty imposed upon him
by the lower court, it not having been proved that
he is a habitual delinquent, and it is affirmed in all
other respects, with the costs to the appellant. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial,
Recto, and Laurel, JJ., concur.
Batas.org
