COUNTER-

TERRORISM
COMMITTEE
Spring MUN 2024
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Table of Contents
1. Letters from the executive board

2. Introduction to the committee

3. Introduction to the region of conflict

4. Introduction to the conflict

5. History of the conflict

6. Extremist groups

7. Humanitarian crisis

8. Economic situation

9. Actions taken by the countries of the region

10. Foreign intervention

11. Points to discuss in committee

12. Position paper guide

13. Paperwork guide

14. Citations
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Letter from the Director

Dear Delegates,
It is with immense pride and honour that I welcome you to the Counter Terrorism Committee
at SpringMUN 2024! I will serve as your director and Secretary General for the two days of the
conference.

My name is Shllok Rawat, and I am currently studying in the 11th Grade at Hill Spring
International school. My primary academic interests are economics and maths, and apart
from MUNning, I thoroughly enjoy reading, watching movies and Mixed Martial Arts. I also love
global politics and enjoy engaging in any conversations about current affairs.
I have attended over 15 conferences and each one of them has proved to be engaging and
challenging in its own right. MUNs have made me a better orator, as well as improved my
knowledge on global affairs and also contributed tremendously to increasing my self
confidence. I have always enjoyed committees regarding extremism, as I believe it is a
pertinent issue that requires multidimensional thinking to address.

As the director of the CTC at Spring Mun, I expect delegates to come up with radical yet
innovative communiques, well-researched fiery speeches, a high level of intense debate,
and viable solutions to the crisis. I expect to see the use of diplomacy and conflict when
necessary to further the delegate’s own gains and do what is ultimately best for their own
delegation.

My advice to all delegates would be to never back down from trying your best, express
yourselves by continuously giving amazing speeches, and come for the conference well-
researched with the issue. While the topics being discussed are sensitive and serious, I
assure you that these two days will be action-packed and entertaining.

On a lighter note, one way to get into my good books is by praising Kohli or talking to me
about world issues. I am looking forward to some engaging and intense debate coupled with
a discussion of unconventional solutions. I wish you all the very best and hope that this
conference proves to be engaging and memorable for all of you. Feel free to reach out to
me at ctcspringmun2024@[Link] for any doubts or queries you may have.
Director of the CTC
Shllok Rawat
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Letter from the Assistant Director

Honourable delegates,
My name is Arrman Sanganeria, and it is my pleasure to serve as the assistant director for
SpringMun’s 2024 Counter Terrorism Committee. I’m currently in the 11th grade of the IBDP at
Hill Spring International School, pursuing the sciences and mathematics, which thoroughly
engross me. Specifically, I’m fascinated by the study of astrophysics and astronautical
engineering. Beyond academics, I take pride in my familiarity with music in all its forms, from
classical pieces, to contemporary projects from artists of a variety of genres.

With my first MUN conference in 2020, I have attended over 10 conferences in the last three
years, all of which have played a significant role in shaping me into the person I am today.
The vigorous hours that a MUN requires challenged my ability to focus, and allowed me to
eventually overcome that limitation. Additionally, MUNs increased my awareness of the world
around me and its challenges and helped me to look at each crisis and incident from
several perspectives. Furthermore, it transformed me into a calm and confident individual.
MUN, unlike any other activity, forces you to embrace and advocate for a set of views you
may not even agree with, allowing you to grasp issues from a variety of perspectives.

The Counter Terrorism Committee this year will have 4 non-state actors, namely extremist
groups in the Sahel Region, pitted against the sovereign countries that are plagued by their
existence. We hope to see fruitful, yet fiery debate occur within committee.

Delegates are expected to be well versed in the nature of the conflict, and apply their
knowledge in implementing ingenious solutions through their directives, and (where
applicable) communiques.

I look forward to witnessing a high-level of debate between delegates, and do not hesitate
to contact the Executive board with doubts or clarifications.
Assistant Director of the CTC,
Arrman Sanganeria.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Letter from the Assistant Director

Hi delegates!
I am Veer Sharma and it’s my pleasure to be on the executive board for CTC in Springmun
2024. Aside from MUN, I love music and making beats, watching movies and am a massive
football fan (Being a Manchester City or weaving eminem references into your speeches is a
good way to earn extra brownie points). I am excited to get to know you delegates and see
you in action in committee.

The agenda for CTC this year is a pressing issue- the Sahel crisis. With armed conflict crawling
through the Sahel region, Delegates will be made to think on their feet to avert this crisis and
also tackle the updates hurled at you. This gives room for fiery debate and creative solutions,
which the EB is keen on seeing.

My advice to all delegates, especially first timers, is to actively engage in committee as much
as possible. Getting yourself involved in crises- be it through engrossing speeches or unique
communiques- is one of the best ways to gain recognition in committee. The EB will also be
looking out for well thought out speeches, clearly addressing the issue at hand and providing
constructive solutions, rather than being the loudest voice in the room.

I look forward to seeing the committee unfold this year and seeing how you tackle this crisis.
Please feel free to reach out to any of us on the CTC email ID or even approach us in person in
committee in case you have any doubts. Good luck delegates!
Assistant Director of the CTC
Veer Sharma
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Introduction to the Committee

The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was established by Security Council resolution 1373
(2001), which was adopted unanimously on 28 September 2001 in the wake of the 11 September
terrorist attacks in the United States.
The Committee, comprising all 15 Security Council members, is tasked with monitoring the
implementation of resolution 1373 (2001), which requested countries to implement a number of
measures intended to enhance their legal and institutional ability to counter terrorist activities at
home, in their regions, and around the world, including taking steps to:
[Link] the financing of terrorism
[Link] without delay any funds related to persons involved in acts of terrorism
[Link] all forms of financial support for terrorist groups
[Link] the provision of safe haven, sustenance or support for terrorists
[Link] information with other governments on any groups practicing or planning
terrorist acts
[Link] with other governments in the investigation, detection, arrest, extradition,
and prosecution of those involved in such acts;
[Link] active and passive assistance for terrorism in domestic law and bring violators to
justice.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Introduction to the Committee

The CTC is an Ad Hoc body and therefore does not have the power to pass resolutions. The
committee will majority consist of crises, and therefore the EB would look favourably upon
ending committee with Directives. This year the CTC will be majorly stimulated by crisis, wherein
delegates will get real-time updates on the basis of their crisis notes and
communiques. In this committee, 4 Non-State actors will act toward preventing nation-states
from diminishing their influence in the regions that have been taken control of, as well as
expanding their own self-interests.

When a crisis is introduced by the executive board, delegates can raise moderated caucuses to
discuss the specific update or delegates can raise a Special Speakers List (SSL) which is a
method to specifically discuss an update. In an SSL, delegates can choose to yield the
remainder of 90/60 seconds to questions, comments, another delegate or back to the
Executive board. Majority of the committee will flow through the modus operandi of SSL’s
alongside moderated caucuses. Delegates will also be allowed to raise unmoderated caucuses
in between certain updates to draft paperwork and communique. The final resultant paperwork
for the state actors in committee would be a directive aiming to solve all the crises that unfold
in committee. Whilst Non-state actors will not have voting rights in the committee, they can be
involved in drafting directives and ensuring that paperwork in committee represents their best
interests. They will also have great capability with respect to their communiques.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee
Introduction to the region of conflict
The Sahel is a region in western and north-central Africa, stretching east from Senegal to
Sudan. It forms the transition zone between the north's arid Sahara desert and the south's humid
savanna zone. The Sahel runs east from the Atlantic Ocean through northern Senegal, southern
Mauritania, the great bend of the Niger River in Mali, Burkina Faso, southern Niger, northeastern
Nigeria, south-central Chad, and into Sudan.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee will primarily focus on the Liptako Gourma region, which
borders Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, the epicentre of human suffering and extremist jihadist
militant activity.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Introduction to the conflict

The Sahel Crisis, a complex and multifaceted issue, has become a major concern for both the
Sahel region of Africa and the international community at large. Stretching across countries such
as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mauritania, the crisis is emblematic of the intricate web of
challenges that arise from the confluence of social, political, economic, and environmental
factors. Historically, the Sahel, characterized by its semi-arid environment, has been prone to
periodic droughts which have, over time, led to food scarcity and fierce competition for resources.
However, the recent intensification of the crisis can be attributed in part to the political
aftershocks of the Libyan Civil War in 2011. The resultant proliferation of arms and fighters
throughout the region exacerbated already simmering tensions. The situation was further
complicated in 2012 when Mali's president was ousted, creating a vacuum of power and
governance that extremist groups were quick to exploit.

These jihadist groups, including prominent entities like Boko Haram, ISWAP(Islamic State West
Africa Province), ISSP Islamic State Sahel Province), and JNIM (Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-
Muslimin), have entrenched themselves in the region. Their modus operandi includes engaging in
kidnappings, a variety of trafficking activities - from humans to drugs and arms - and launching
indiscriminate attacks against civilians, state apparatus, and international forces. This reign of
terror has ushered in an era of widespread human rights violations. Reports highlight issues such
as gender-based violence, violence against children, and extrajudicial killings, all of which paint a
grim picture of the region's security and humanitarian landscape.

Adding another layer of complexity to this already dire scenario is the undeniable impact of
climate change. As the Sahel grapples with the challenges of desertification, land degradation,
and unpredictable weather patterns, the struggle for dwindling resources further fuels the conflict.
This environmental strain intensifies the competition among local communities, driving them
further into the arms of extremist groups that promise sustenance or protection.

The ramifications of this crisis have not remained confined to the Sahel. Neighboring countries like
Mauritania and Chad are already wrestling with the spillover effects, both in terms of security
threats and mounting humanitarian needs. Furthermore, there's a palpable fear that the tentacles
of this crisis might soon reach other West African nations, broadening the scope of regional
instability.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Introduction to the conflict

To tackle this behemoth of a problem, international collaborations, like the G5 Sahel force, have
emerged. Despite the combined efforts of entities such as the UN, the African Union, and ECOWAS,
the vast and porous borders of the Sahel, coupled with limited resources and the
multidimensional nature of the crisis, present significant hurdles. The Sahel Crisis, therefore, isn't
merely a localised conflict. Its ramifications resonate far and wide, stressing the urgent need for
comprehensive strategies that address not just the symptoms but the root causes of the conflict.

The Counter-Terrorism Committee will be tasked with tackling these pressing humanitarian crises,
as well as aiming to combat the extremist groups that have laid waste to the Sahel region.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

History of conflict

The Sahel region, which stretches from Senegal to Eritrea and is located between the Sahara to
the north and the African tropics to the south, has long faced severe, complicated security and
humanitarian issues. Since their independence in the 1960s, several Sahelian nations have
witnessed violent extremism as a result of a convergence of weak and illegitimate government,
economic collapse, and the growing consequences of climate [Link] the previous
decade, violence, war, and criminality have increased, crossing national borders and posing
enormous difficulties to governments both inside and beyond the area. The subregions of
Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin are the epicentres of conflict and humanitarian crisis.

Liptako-Gourma is located in the middle Sahel region, near the borders of Burkina Faso, Mali,
and [Link] current condition of insecurity is linked to the breakdown of the Libyan state in
2011, which resulted in the spread of weapons and armed combatants in the [Link] 2012, an
inflow of radicals into northern Mali rekindled the dormant Tuareg uprising, which had previously
erupted in 1963, 1990, and [Link] Tuareg people, who make up only 10% of the Malian
population, sought an autonomous state and allied themselves with multiple Islamist groups,
including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West
Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine, in order to drive government forces out of the north.

The army removed then-President Amadou Toumani Touré in a March 2012 coup, citing the
government's failure to crush the [Link] a result of the breakdown of governmental
institutions in the north, the MNLA was able to seize the regional capitals of Gao, Kidal, and
Timbuktu; by April, the organisation had established the independent state of Azawad in
northern [Link] their effort to impose Islamic rule and create an Islamic caliphate over
the northern area, the MNLA rapidly separated from al-Qaeda and other associated Islamist
factions in June.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

History of conflict

Following a period of relative peace, the issue worsened in January 2013, when AQIM, MUJAO,
and Ansar Dine advanced south to take Konna in central [Link] returned to a civilian-led
administration in August under Ibrahim Boubacar Keta, who eventually struck a peace accord
with a coalition of Tuareg independence parties, including the MNLA, in 2015. The alliance did not
include Islamist organisations, which rapidly used the pact to strengthen their power, pushing
farther into central Mali and neighbouring Burkina Faso and Niger. Liptako-Gourma has now
become a hotspot of Sahelian violent extremism.

In 2015 and 2016, notable assaults on the Radisson Blu Hotel in Mali, the Splendid Hotel in Burkina
Faso, and the L'Etoule du Sud Hotel in Ivory Coast revealed the depth of the Islamist danger to
the Sahel and West Africa. The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) initially appeared in
Burkina Faso in September 2016, conducting its first significant attack on a border station near
the Burkinabe city of [Link]'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) was formed in
2017 when numerous al-Qaeda branches [Link] rise of ISGS and JNIM, as well as their
frequently contentious, but occasionally cooperative relationship, have increased violence in the
[Link] and ISGS have both advanced further south in Liptako-Gourma, jeopardising West
African stability.

In the same era as the reemergence of Boko Haram in northern Nigeria, violent extremism
existed across the Lake Chad Basin, which connects Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Boko
Haram, which was founded in 2002 in northeastern Nigeria by Muhammed Yusuf, was pushed
underground in 2009 when Nigerian security forces murdered over 700 militants, including
Yusuf, during a raid in [Link] who remained were scattered over Afghanistan, Algeria,
Chad, northern Mali, Niger, and Somalia. Boko Haram demonstrated its more wide and violent
tactics in June and August 2011 by committing suicide assaults against police and the UN
offices in Abuja, Nigeria.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

History of conflict

The assassination of Chadian President Idriss Déby on April 20, 2021, left a leadership vacuum in
regional counterterrorism [Link] and its military served as a pillar in regional security
coalitions spanning both Liptako-Gourma and the Lake Chad Basin under Déby. Benin, Cameroon,
Chad, Niger, and Nigeria formed the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in 2014 to combat Boko
Haram, organised crime, and banditry in the Lake Chad Basin. In February 2017, France and the
Sahel Group of Five (G5) countries—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger—announced
the formation of the G5 Sahel Force, a 5,000-strong counterterrorism force aimed at combating
militant groups with an expanded mandate to cross borders in the Sahel region.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist Groups
One of the main reasons behind the destruction and crisis in the Sahel region is the non-state-
acting extremist groups. Non-state actors are groups who are not directly affiliated with any
government or state and act according to their own volition. The Counter-Terrorism Committee’s
core concern is the extremist groups in the Sahel region, and the committee will be entrusted to
find ways to curb the radicalization of these extremist groups, to prevent the atrocities in the
region.

Islamic State Sahel Province(ISSP)

The ISSP, formally known as ISGS is a jihadist militant group formed after its leader, Adnan Abu
Walid al-Sahrawi, pledged allegiance to the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in 2015. ISSP was
originally an independently operating subgroup of the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP),
another extremist group. However, in March 2022, the ISGS declared its province autonomous and
separated itself from ISWAP, forming ISSP. This militant group adheres to the ideologies of Salafi
Jihadism, which is a Sunni extremist ideology seeking to establish a global extremist caliphate.

Atrocities Committed:
ISSP is responsible for numerous attacks on military and civilian targets in the region, and their
tactics have been characterized by extreme violence. They have been involved in:
1. Massacres of local populations.
2. Attacks on military bases and patrols.
3. Kidnappings, especially of foreigners for ransom or political leverage.
4. Use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) targeting military convoys and civilian areas.
5. Attacks on infrastructure and places of worship.

Region of operation:
The ISSP operates mainly in the border region between Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, which is a
vast and sparsely populated area characterized by desert and semi-arid terrain. The group
benefits from the region's porous borders and takes advantage of local grievances, ethnic
tensions, and economic hardships to recruit fighters and gain local support.

Goal:
The overarching objective of ISSP, like its parent organization ISIS, is the establishment of a strict
interpretation of an Islamic Caliphate in its area of operations. This includes:
1. Imposing a rigid interpretation of Sharia law.
2. Expanding territorial control.
3. Eradicating Western influence and any local governance structures that do not conform to its
ideology.
4. Ultimately, ISSP aims to consolidate its presence in the Sahel and link up with other jihadist
groups in the region, thereby expanding the footprint and influence of jihadist ideologies
across the continent.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist groups
Jama’at Nusrat Al Islam Wal Muslimin(JNIM)
JNIM, which stands for Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and
Muslims), is a prominent extremist group operating in the Sahel region of West Africa. It is a
Salafi-Jihadist organization that aligns itself with al-Qa'ida's global jihadist ideology and
exploits local divisions and grievances to grow its support in the region.

Origins:
JNIM was formed in March 2017 as a merger of several extremist groups, most notably:
1. Al-Mourabitoun: Originally a result of a merger between two jihadist groups in the Sahel.
2. Ansar Dine: An Islamist group that primarily operated in northern Mali.
3. The Macina Liberation Front: An Islamist extremist group active in central Mali.
4. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s Sahara branch (AQIM-Sahara): The regional affiliate of
the global terrorist group Al-Qaeda.

The unification of these groups under the banner of JNIM indicated an effort to consolidate
resources, manpower, and influence in the region. The group pledged allegiance to Ayman al-
Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda, signalling its connection and commitment to the global
jihadist movement.

Atrocities committed:
JNIM has been responsible for a series of violent attacks and kidnappings, targeting both local
populations and international forces. These attacks often manifest in the form of:
1. Suicide bombings: Particularly targeting military bases and peacekeeping missions.
2. Ambushes: Targeting local and foreign security forces.
3. Kidnappings: Often targeting foreigners, both for ideological reasons and ransom.
4. Attacks on civilians: Including assassinations and violence against perceived opponents or
collaborators with foreign forces.

The violence perpetrated by JNIM has resulted in the displacement of thousands of people and
has significantly destabilised the Sahel region.

Region of operation:
While JNIM operates throughout the Sahel region, its primary areas of operation include:
Northern and Central Mali: Particularly in the regions of Timbuktu, Gao, and Mopti.
Border areas: Such as the region bordering Mali and Burkina Faso, and Mali and Niger. These
border areas are particularly vulnerable due to less stringent security.

G
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist groups
Goals:
JNIM's objectives are a blend of local and global jihadist aims:
Establishment of Sharia Law: They aim to implement a strict interpretation of Islamic law in the territories
they control.
Expelling Western Influence: JNIM opposes the presence of Western military forces, particularly the French
troops deployed in the Sahel. They view them as invaders and colonisers.
Unification of Jihadist Movements: As evidenced by their formation, JNIM seeks to bring together different
jihadist factions for a unified front.
Furthering the Global Jihadist Agenda: By pledging allegiance to al-Qaeda, JNIM has aligned itself with the
broader goal of establishing a global Islamic caliphate.

Islamic State West African Province(ISWAP)

ISWAP, the Islamic State's West Africa Province, is an offshoot of Boko Haram, the extremist group that has
been active in northeastern Nigeria since 2002. Boko Haram itself was established to challenge Western-
style education and promote a strict interpretation of Sharia law.

In 2015, a significant faction of Boko Haram, led by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, split from the main group,
primarily due to differences over strategy and leadership. The splinter group then pledged allegiance to
ISIS (the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) and subsequently became known as ISWAP.

Atrocities committed:
Like its predecessor, Boko Haram, ISWAP is responsible for numerous kidnappings, mass murders,
bombings, and attacks on both military and civilian targets. Some of the most notorious incidents include:
1. Attacks on military bases, leading to significant casualties.
2. Kidnapping of schoolgirls and women, with the Chibok schoolgirls' abduction by Boko Haram in 2014
being the most internationally recognized.
3. Massacres in villages and towns across the Lake Chad Basin region, leading to thousands of deaths
and displacement of local populations.

Region of operation:
While ISWAP primarily operates in northeastern Nigeria, its activities have spread across borders into
countries that are part of the Lake Chad Basin region. This includes areas in:
1. Nigeria: Especially the states of Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa.
2. Chad: Areas near Lake Chad and the western regions.
3. Niger: Regions bordering northeastern Nigeria and northern areas of Lake Chad.
4. Cameroon: Parts of its Far North Region.
Lake Chad itself is a significant geographic and strategic point for ISWAP operations.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist groups
Boko Haram
Boko Haram, whose name loosely translates from the Hausa language to "Western
education is forbidden," is a jihadist militant organization that operates mainly in
northeastern Nigeria and, to a lesser extent, in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon.

Origins:
Boko Haram was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, by Mohammed
Yusuf. Initially, it presented itself as a religious movement, opposing Western-style education
and seeking the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law) across Nigeria.

The group's ideology was rooted in a blend of local Salafist teachings with an emphasis on
strict Sharia implementation. Boko Haram's hostility to the Nigerian state grew more
pronounced, and in 2009, a clash with the Nigerian military led to the death of Yusuf and
many of its members. The death of Yusuf radicalized the group even further, and under the
leadership of Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram transformed into a violent insurgency.

Atrocities committed:
Boko Haram's reign of terror includes a wide range of human rights violations:
1. Mass Kidnappings: Perhaps most famously, in 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276
schoolgirls from Chibok, prompting the global #BringBackOurGirls campaign.
2. Suicide Bombings: Boko Haram has used suicide bombers, including children, to target
markets, mosques, churches, and other civilian areas.
3. Massacres: The group has raided villages, often slaughtering residents, burning homes,
and looting property.
4. Forced Recruitment: Boko Haram has forcibly recruited men and boys into their ranks,
and women and girls have been subjected to sexual slavery.
5. Displacement: Boko Haram's activities have contributed to significant internal
displacement within Nigeria and its neighbouring countries.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist groups
Region of operation:
Though Boko Haram originated and is primarily active in northeastern Nigeria, particularly in
Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, its influence and attacks have spilt over into
neighbouring countries:
1. Nigeria: Northeastern parts mainly, but they've conducted attacks in major cities,
including the capital, Abuja.
2. Chad: Particularly in the areas near the Lake Chad basin.
3. Niger: Especially in the southeastern regions close to the Nigeria-Niger border.
4. Cameroon: Northern areas bordering Nigeria.

Goals:
Boko Haram's overarching goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria based on
their interpretation of Sharia law. Over time, their ambitions have been associated with a
broader global jihadist agenda, with links (though sometimes tenuous) to groups like ISIS.

Their objectives include:

1. Opposition to Secular Education: As their name suggests, they oppose Western-style,
secular education.
2. Establishment of Sharia Law: They seek to replace the current Nigerian government and
legal system with one based on their interpretation of Sharia.
3. Anti-Western and Anti-Christian Agendas: While Boko Haram targets both Muslims and
Christians, they have shown significant animosity towards Nigeria's Christian population
and Western entities.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Extremist groups
Conflicts between the extremist groups
While these groups share jihadist ideologies, these groups sometimes find themselves in
conflict due to territorial disputes, competition for resources, and ideological differences:
1. Boko Haram vs ISWAP:
a. Boko Haram, under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, has been in conflict with
ISWAP since the latter's formation. ISWAP was essentially a splinter group from Boko
Haram, breaking away in 2016.
b. ISWAP, after pledging allegiance to ISIS, criticized Shekau's leadership, particularly his
indiscriminate killing of Muslims. This ideological rift has resulted in violent clashes
between the two factions, especially in northeastern Nigeria.
c. While both groups compete for territory and resources in the Lake Chad Basin, ISWAP
has made concerted efforts to win local populations over by avoiding (in some
instances) the mass civilian casualties that became characteristic of Boko Haram.
2. JNIM vs ISSP:
a. JNIM, an umbrella group of several jihadist factions in the Sahel, is linked with Al-
Qaeda. On the other hand, ISSP has declared allegiance to ISIS.
b. The Al-Qaeda (JNIM) vs. ISIS (ISSP) divide has historical roots in the broader global
jihadist movement, and this ideological split is reflected in their regional affiliates'
conflicting interests in the Sahel.
c. There have been reports of violent confrontations between JNIM and ISSP in the
border regions of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These confrontations stem from
disputes over territory, resources, and the recruitment of local fighters.

While these groups are united in their extremist interpretations of Islam and their shared goal
to establish Islamic governance in their respective territories, territorial ambitions, ideological
rifts, and competition for resources drive them into occasional conflicts with each other. The
fluid nature of alliances and enmities in the region requires consistent monitoring to
understand the shifting dynamics among these jihadist entities.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Humanitarian crisis
In certain areas, extremist groups have resorted to the brutal tactic of indiscriminate killing,
forcing residents into devastating choices: either flee their homes, ally with the militants, or
risk death. Often, these militants disproportionately target men. Adult males confront the
stark reality of execution, while younger boys face abduction and subsequent indoctrination.
Desperate mothers strive to protect their children from this gruesome fate, but with
informants embedded within the community, the risk of betrayal is ever-present.

This bleak scenario has become increasingly familiar across the Sahel region. Despite
numerous international efforts initiated since 2012 to curb this menace, the tide of extremist
aggression has surged from its origins in Mali, extending its shadow to Burkina Faso and
Niger. Even now, other countries, including Benin and Cote d'Ivoire, stand threatened. Human
Rights Watch highlights a disturbing irony: government-led counterterrorism operations,
riddled with abuse and enjoying unchecked power, inadvertently serve as catalysts,
bolstering recruitment for radical Islamist factions. Reinforcing this sentiment, organisations
such as the UN Refugee Agency and Médecins Sans Frontières have reported a significant
exodus from urban areas, as civilians attempt to escape the clutches of groups like the
Islamic State. These extremist factions, intolerant of dissent, inflict unspeakable atrocities
such as sexual violence, forced conscription, and the merciless silencing of educational
institutions that resist their dogma.

A deep dive into records maintained by entities like Human Rights Watch and the United
Nations paints a grim portrait of the escalating violence. Between 2019 and 2021 alone, a
staggering 600 illegal killings have been attributed to counterterrorism operations carried
out by the security forces of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. Yet, attempts to bring the culprits
to justice remain woefully inadequate. Parallelly, extremist groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda
and the Islamic State are under the scanner for countless heinous acts, including the
horrifying mass slaughters of villagers across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Humanitarian crisis
It's not just the extremist factions that have blood on their hands. Security forces from Burkina
Faso and Mali have gained notoriety for their draconian tactics, which have frequently
spiralled into flagrant violations of human rights. A particularly harrowing instance of this was
the unearthing of 180 men, many of whom were bound and blindfolded, near the town of
Djibo in Burkina Faso. Niger's Tillabéri region, too, stands out as a locus of contention, with
allegations of unlawful killings intensifying after major attacks on security posts. This region is
now synonymous with extrajudicial executions, forced disappearances, and the discovery of
numerous mass graves.

The catastrophic ripple effects of this situation are palpable, with the displacement figures
painting a sombre picture. By 2023, a staggering 4.2 million individuals have been uprooted
within their homeland, with another half a million seeking solace in neighbouring countries.
States like Mauritania and Chad are already feeling the strain, and there's mounting concern
that this crisis might spill into countries like Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. To further
underscore the dire nature of the situation, as of 2022, over 10 million children in the Sahel
find themselves in desperate need of humanitarian assistance.

Facing this intricate web of challenges, the committee's task is dual-pronged: address the
rampant human rights violations perpetuated by extremist groups and simultaneously root
out the deeply embedded governmental corruption in Sahelian nations. Addressing these
intertwined issues is paramount to resolving the humanitarian crisis and ensuring justice for
the region's inhabitants.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Economic situation
While the Sahel region grapples with numerous challenges, the economic repercussions of
extremist activities have become increasingly profound. Terrorist groups' actions have
created ripple effects, further deepening economic vulnerabilities and affecting everyday
lives in the region.

Direct Economic Costs of Terrorism:

a. Reduced Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Historically, the Sahel has struggled to
attract significant FDI. However, due to the rise in extremist activities, there's been a
further decline. According to the Global Terrorism Index, countries with higher
terrorism levels can experience a reduction in their net FDI by over 2%.
b. Decline in Trade: The instability caused by terrorism has disrupted trade routes both
within and outside the region. For instance, trade volumes between Niger and Nigeria
have suffered due to increased border controls and security concerns.
c. Tourism Downturn: Once attracting tourists with UNESCO heritage sites and unique
cultures, Sahelian countries like Mali have seen tourism revenues plummet. The attack
on foreign tourists in Timbuktu in 2012, among others, has made international
travellers wary.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Economic Situation
Indirect Economic Impacts:
a. Rising Costs of Security: Governments in the Sahel have had to redirect a considerable
chunk of their budgets towards security and defence, taking funds away from crucial
sectors like education, health, and infrastructure. For example, Burkina Faso increased its
defence and security budget by over 24% in 2019 in response to extremist threats.
b. Displacement and Its Repercussions: The violence has led to the internal displacement of
populations, straining resources in certain areas while leaving others abandoned. As of late
2020, Burkina Faso alone had over 1 million internally displaced persons due to extremist
violence, impacting agriculture and local economies.
c. Stunted Infrastructure Development: Infrastructure projects are often delayed or halted due
to extremist activities. This not only inflates project costs but also deprives regions of
potential economic benefits these projects could bring.
d. Impact on Insurance and Business Costs: The threat of terrorist attacks has increased
insurance premiums for businesses operating in the region. In addition, the constant threat
forces businesses to spend more on private security, thus raising operational costs.

Economic Opportunities Lost to Terrorism:

a. Brain Drain: The uncertainty and lack of opportunities have driven many educated
individuals to seek opportunities elsewhere, depriving the Sahel of its human capital.
b. Natural Resources Untapped: The Sahel has significant untapped mineral resources, such
as gold in Mali and uranium in Niger. The security situation has hindered full-scale
exploration and exploitation, limiting potential revenue streams for these nations.
c. Agricultural Losses: Terrorist activities, combined with forced migrations, have left vast
agricultural lands uncultivated. In a region where over 80% of the population relies on
subsistence farming, this has severe food security and economic implications.

The economic toll of terrorism in the Sahel extends beyond immediate damages. It has reshaped
trade, investment, and development trajectories for these countries. Understanding the intricate
relationship between terrorism and economic downturn is crucial for any meaningful intervention
or policy aimed at restoring stability and prosperity in the region.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Actions taken by the countries of the region

The countries of the Sahel have been grappling with escalating terrorism and its subsequent
implications, a challenge that has necessitated concerted action on both national and
regional scales. As part of their endeavours to alleviate the threats posed by extremist
groups, they have embarked on numerous counter-terrorism measures. These measures
encompass a combination of military initiatives, intelligence-sharing practices, and
collaborative approaches to address the underlying socio-economic factors that often
contribute to radicalization.

One of the most notable regional collaborative initiatives is the formation of the G5 Sahel
Joint Force. Comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, this alliance
underscores the commitment of Sahelian countries to jointly combat terrorism and reinforce
regional stability. The G5 Sahel Joint Force operates with a mandate to neutralize terrorist
groups and ensure that these regions are no longer safe havens for such entities. By pooling
resources and expertise, these nations aim to create a unified front, making their counter-
terrorism operations more effective and responsive.

Beyond the direct military action, these countries, through the G5 Sahel framework, are also
working on strengthening their institutional capacities. By enhancing border security and
bolstering the judicial system, they aim to curtail the movement of extremists and ensure
that captured terrorists face the rule of law. Moreover, recognizing the cross-border nature of
the terrorism threat in the Sahel, they are investing in better intelligence-sharing
mechanisms. This ensures that pertinent information about potential threats or extremist
activities is rapidly communicated among member countries, leading to swift and
coordinated responses.

I
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Actions taken by the countries of the region

In addition to the G5 Sahel Joint Force, various Sahelian countries have also engaged with
other regional bodies and international partners for capacity-building and strategic
guidance. Their collaboration extends to partners in the West and organizations like the
United Nations, seeking expertise, training, and financial support for their counter-terrorism
efforts.

However, it's essential to note that the challenge of terrorism in the Sahel isn't merely military.
The root causes of radicalization, often tied to socio-economic disenfranchisement, poverty,
and lack of education, also demand attention. Consequently, Sahelian nations are taking
strides to address these underlying issues, understanding that a holistic approach to
counter-terrorism must incorporate development initiatives, community engagement, and
efforts to strengthen social cohesion.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Foreign Intervention
Foreign intervention in the Sahel primarily pivots around the need to counteract the surge of
extremist groups that have taken root in the region. Multiple countries and international
bodies have recognized the global implications of unchecked extremism and have thus
stepped in to assist the Sahelian nations in their counter-terrorism efforts.

French Engagement
France, having historical ties to several countries in the Sahel due to its colonial past, has
been particularly involved. Through Operation Barkhane, launched in 2014, France has
deployed over 5,000 troops across the region. Their operations span across Chad, Mali,
Burkina Faso, Mauritania, and Niger. The French troops primarily focus on training local forces,
providing intelligence support, and conducting joint operations to neutralise high-value
extremist targets.

United States' Contribution

The U.S. established the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) as a multi-
faceted, multi-year strategy aimed at building the counter-terrorism capacities of nations in
the Sahelian belt. They offer training, equipment, and intelligence support. Drone bases have
also been set up for surveillance and intelligence-gathering, such as the one in Niger, which
assists in monitoring extremist activities.

European Union (EU) Involvement

The EU has adopted a comprehensive approach to the Sahel, providing funds and training
through its missions like EUCAP Sahel Mali and EUCAP Sahel Niger. These missions aim at
training local police and security forces and enhancing their ability to maintain security.
Additionally, the EU has been keen on promoting governance, development, and resilience
initiatives to address root causes of extremism.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Foreign intervention
UN Peacekeeping Mission
MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) is the
primary UN peacekeeping force in the Sahel, stationed mainly in Mali. While its role isn't directly
counter-terrorism, its presence helps stabilize regions, support political processes, and ensure
that humanitarian aid reaches those in need, indirectly creating an environment less hospitable
to extremist ideologies.

Coalition Partnerships
Recognizing the interconnected nature of extremist threats, multiple countries have formed
coalitions to share intelligence, conduct joint operations, and synchronise their counter-terrorism
strategies. One example is the Takuba Task Force, where European special forces teams work
alongside the Malian military and G5 Sahel troops to combat extremist factions.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Points to discuss in committee

What actions should the international community take to
eradicate terrorism from the region, and demilitarise the existing
militant groups?
How should the CTC tackle the issue of corruption in the
government of the Sahel countries?
What measures should be taken to halt the funding of these
extremist groups?
What should the international community do to stabilise the
Sahel’s economy?
Should the international community interfere with the issues of the
Sahel region or should they adopt a policy of non-
interventionism?
How should the CTC ensure that no militant group emerges in the
Sahel region in the future?
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Position paper guide

Your position paper should ideally span 1-2 sides, divided by three
paragraphs. The first paragraph should overview a generic understanding
of the agenda and conflict. The second paragraph should detail your
allocation’s specific stance and pertinent information. Your final paragraph
should delve into your individual course of action which you will attempt to
cement during committee. Include possible solutions to the conflict you wi
attempt to implement using your directives.
Citations are imperative, and need to be formatted as per MLA8. Plagiarism
or AI detection above 5% is grounds to be disqualified from any and all
awards.
The font style to be utilised is Times new roman 12. Submit the paper at
ctcspringmun2024@[Link]
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Paperwork guide

The two main forms of paperwork that will be used widely in the CTC are communiques and
directives. Since the CTC is an ad-hoc committee there will be no resolutions, and the
committee will end with final directives to solve the whole crisis at hand.

Communiques:
Communiques are pieces of paperwork, which are used to take any action in the crisis part of
the CTC. A communique is basically an action a delegate would like to take, to either solve the
crisis at hand or further the delegations personal gain. There are two main types of
communiques, covert and overt communiques. Covert communiques are communiques that
will not be read out to the rest of the committee, whereas overt communiques will be read out
to the whole committee. Ensure that your communiques are innovative and detailed, as the
more detailed they are the more likely the EB is to pass them and introduce them in committee.

Directives:
Directives are more substantial forms of paperwork which require the committee’s vote to pass.
A directive will contain solutions to all the crises that have happened in committee, and will be
formatted similarly to resolutions. Since the CTC is an ad-hoc committee, a directive will be
able to take substantial action and will not follow any specific mandate. It should have concrete,
plausible and detailed actions for the directive to be passed by committee and for it to be
effective.
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

Concluding remarks

The Executive Board is present purely to help you, so if you have any doubts, or
apprehensions or require help, please feel free to reach out to us on the CTC
committee email: ctcspringmun2024@[Link] and we will do our best to help you!
The EB hopes that delegates will arrive at comprehensive solutions to solve the Sahel
Crisis. We strongly encourage you to use this study guide as a base for your research
and use the further reading links as well as your own research to develop a thorough
idea of the stance of your allocation. Even though this is not a historic committee, CTC
will have a freeze date of January 12th, 2024, so real-world developments don’t
adversely affect the committee. The EB looks forward to meeting all of you in January
and hearing some engaging debate!
 Counter-Terrorism Committee

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